VIII.

Fontainebleau,
August 17, 1868.

My dear Stoffel,

I send you with this letter a memorandum which was dictated to me, and which requests you to explain some things mentioned therein. I preferred to send it in the shape of a memorandum rather than to copy it and add it to my letter, as the E. [the Emperor] told me to do....

[M. Pietri notes the Emperor’s satisfaction with Colonel Stoffel’s last two letters, and with his last reports to the War Minister, which His Majesty said were “très bien faits.” The writer proceeds:]

I must tell you, on my own account, that I should think your admiration of the Prussian army and of the country itself was exaggerated if I did not know that you intentionally exaggerated your views of both a little, with an object which I understand—viz., to give France a good idea of the strength and vitality of those who may one day become our enemies, as to-day they are our adversaries. I believe everybody is in accord upon this point.... It has made us feel the necessity of making great efforts in order not to be outdistanced. These efforts have been made, and are being made every day.... We are ready for every event, big as it might be. That we have committed faults, no one, I think, will deny; that we have lacked foresight is not to be doubted; but from all that we have learnt a good lesson, and it is not to be believed that in future we shall leave even the smallest things to chance. If our diplomacy has not always been skilful, we must do it the justice of saying that for some time past it has not done badly by remaining tranquil and by giving way, while not losing sight of things, but observing them attentively. We have been out of luck up to now, and we must hope that fortune will not delay to turn, and that it will bring us some good coups, of which we shall have to take clever advantage.

* * * * *

In the first week of December, 1868, the Court was at Compiègne. M. Pietri writes to Colonel Stoffel to say that at Compiègne everything was proceeding on traditional lines: hunting, shooting, rides and walks to Pierrefonds, and in the evening “monster dinners and dances.” One improvement had been made: the barrel-organ, which the Emperor sometimes “ground,” was replaced by a live pianist, M. Waldteuffel.

Writing from Paris on May 27, 1869, M. Pietri reproaches Stoffel for having left Paris without hearing Rossini’s Mass. “I like it less than the Stabat, but that did not prevent me from going to hear it three times.”

On December 10, in the same year, M. Pietri wrote to tell the Colonel that Paris was going through a crisis, and that men’s minds were unsettled. Matters had not improved at the date of the next letter (February 4, 1870). Victor Noir had been shot by Prince Pierre Bonaparte, and on the next day Rochefort published in the “Marseillaise” an appeal to the people. Thus what was destined to be the “Terrible Year” began most unfortunately.

I am told (writes M. Pietri) that the English Government will insist upon Prussia disarming. It is thought that nothing would come from such a step, and that it would be un coup d’épée dans l’eau.... What do you think of it? Do you think that it would be sufficient to say to the Federal Chancellor, “You must disarm,” to cause him to disarm? I should be curious to know what answer he would make to anybody who made such a proposition to him, and what he would really think and express privately. I am certain that he would make many promises without intending to keep one of them. No doubt you think as I do, and if you can find time (try to find it) tell me if I deceive myself.

In April, 1870, Colonel Stoffel was in Paris, and M. Pietri wrote on the 9th: “The Emperor wishes to see you to-morrow morning at ten. Be punctual, and come and breakfast with us.”

After that date there is a gap in the correspondence. In a long letter, dated March 5, 1871, M. Pietri says: “What sorrows since we parted! More than once I thought I should go mad, and that my heart would be unable to withstand so many troubles. To look on powerlessly at the cutting of the throat of one’s own country; to see all that one holds dearest ruined, destroyed; and, after the disasters caused by the foreigners, to foresee others

H.H. PRINCE ROLAND BONAPARTE.

President of the Geographical Society of France. Father of H.R.H. Princess George of Greece.

Photographed by Boissonas et Taponier, Paris,
and lent for this work by the Prince.

[To face p. 336.]

caused by the madness of our citizens—are not these things sufficient to fill with despair the heart of every Frenchman who sincerely loves his country?...”

A week later M. Pietri writes to tell Stoffel that all the news coming from France is very sad. He despairs of the future. Then comes a most remarkable passage, which I take upon myself to emphasize, for it shows, as I have always argued—years before this book was written—that Colonel Stoffel, if his warnings had been taken, might, and probably would, have saved France. M. Pietri himself admits it, and there is no more trustworthy surviving authority than the Empress Eugénie’s devoted Secretary and valued friend. M. Pietri writes to Stoffel: “I have always done you justice, and to-day more than ever I recognize that you were right, and that if you had been listened to we should not have been where we are; but all were blind—Ministers, statesmen, the Deputies who were in the majority and those who formed the Opposition. Everybody worked against the country. The Emperor alone, perhaps, saw correctly, but, blocked every moment by the remarks of some and by the ill-will of others, he was carried away [by the current] and unable to carry out many of the plans which he had formed. I admit that he must bear the responsibility, for in this world there must always be a scapegoat; but [public] opinion will calm down, and by degrees will better appreciate the responsibility of each [individual]. The Emperor’s responsibility will then be lessened.” These are noble words, ringing with patriotism and a desire to render justice to The Man who gave the Warning. And I rejoice that the Editor of the “Revue de Paris” has so generously afforded me an opportunity of making the English peoples acquainted with the fact that France had in Colonel Stoffel the most devoted and most prescient of servants, who made it as clear as daylight, not once, but again and again, that Bismarck meant to have war and meant to goad France into beginning it. At Grenoble most of us have gazed admiringly at the statue of Bayard, the preux Chevalier, who was “sans peur et sans reproche.” When will Paris “do the right thing” by Stoffel? When?

CHAPTER XXIII
PRINCE NAPOLEON
The Empress in 1910-11.

[⁂ These Political Views of H.I.H. Prince Napoleon now appear for the First Time in concrete Form. Questioned in London, in June, 1911, as to his “Programme,” the Prince replied: “The Name of Bonaparte is a Programme.”]

It has been recently said that I adhere to the Republic, the actual Government. That is an exaggeration. In the actual Government there are statesmen, men of order, and, without mentioning names, I may add that there are talented chiefs. I am, above all, a man of my epoch, a lover of progress. The time has gone for coups d’état and for proscriptions in France. I could, to-morrow, work with some past Ministers, or with some who are retiring. I should have considered it an honour to have voted for the social laws enacted by the Government. I think only that the laws ought to be prepared more juridically. A Council of State should give a legal shape to the informal opinions of legislators not thoroughly versed in the laws. That could be done without injury to Parliamentary initiative.

All régimes have some good in them. Take, for instance, the family of Louis Philippe. Well, Louis Philippe did some excellent things. He prepared the way for the Empire admirably. If I am not with the Extreme Left, I am still less with the Right. I have none of the ideas, none of the illusions, cherished by the Parliamentary party of the Right. I am in the Centre, with legality. I put my country above dynastic questions; I would not disturb order. I crave for the Revolution, the mother of all of us—the Revolution, from which modern France has sprung. It has been said that yesterday I asked that the “Marseillaise” should be played. At my marriage, which was celebrated privately, no national air was played; but in the evening a local band of musicians serenaded us. I was asked if I should like to hear the “Marseillaise,” with the “Brabançonne”[171] and the Italian Hymn, and I heard it with a feeling of respect. Did it not precede the Eagles across Europe? The “Marseillaise” is the only French [national] hymn the Moncalieri bandsmen know. I was pleased with it. The words of the “Marseillaise” have now only an historic sense, and it was with that air that my great-uncle led his armies across the world.

I note with the deepest interest all that happens in France—everything that is done and everything that is said. I admit with pleasure that some excellent things are often done there. The longer we—nous autres Français—live abroad, the more we love our France. For me the word “Republic” always preserves its Latin sense, res publica (the “public thing”), but there were, and there still are, in France men who have regarded, and continue to regard, it in that sense, and I do not hesitate to say that I approve from the bottom of my heart their actions. Excellent things have been done for the army, for the military service; but more attention ought to have been paid to the cadres, in order to have assured the re-engagement of the bons sousofficers; more especially should anti-militarism not have been encouraged.

France has especially need of order. I am often accused of not concerning myself sufficiently with politics; but there they make a mistake. I think I should concern myself with politics still less. That Ministers of the Interior and of Foreign Affairs should be political Ministers is perfectly natural; but Commerce, Public Works, and Agriculture ought to be only administrations.[172] That a pension should be given to every Frenchman upon attaining a certain age is an idea which I entirely approve; but how many millions of francs would that cost, and where would they come from? No Government which increases the taxes would be popular.

The Empire! Do you really believe that France could still exist under all the laws of the First, and even of the Second, Empire? The times have progressed. We have railways, telephones, newspapers. The conditions of the peoples have changed. A good Government, you see, is one which, above all other things, sees to the needs of the epoch in which we live.

To be unable to visit our museums in France is one of the most painful phases of my exile. So much has been done for the museums: they have been so greatly enriched. My deep love of art suffers from my inability to inspect their treasures. What emotion I should feel at seeing again Fontainebleau and the Malmaison, where there are so many souvenirs of my family! And Versailles!

It seems to me that my exile, in proportion as it is prolonged, exalts the national sentiment in me. I love France as a good Frenchman, with a particular and disinterested affection. I am with all those who contribute to its greatness and prosperity, wherever they come from, and to whatever party they belong. They know me very imperfectly, and many errors have been spread about me. I am of my time; I am a man of progress. I do not live in the past, with old-fashioned sentiments. I desire above everything the well-being of my country. Narrow political formulas embarrass me only very slightly.

In all camps I see those who work to realize the greatness of France, and I am their unknown friend. I have never abandoned my own projects. Whether it is this one or that one who secures the happiness and greatness of France matters little to me—that, for me, is a secondary question. I am with all who collaborate for that purpose. France first! I am, beside, un sage. I do not believe in adventures. In a modern country the army alone is powerless to bring about a change of régime, if it has not behind it the assent and the willingness of the country.

One must know how to await opportunities, and never attempt to precipitate events.


M. Jules Delafosse, the eminent Deputy for Calvados, and a zealous member of H.I.H. Prince Napoleon’s party, has defined “Bonapartism” as being, “not a doctrine,” but “an absolutism”:

It is the régime which Napoleon I. inaugurated, and which Napoleon III. adopted, that is represented to-day by their dynastic heir [the Pretender]. At present no one occupies himself with Bonapartism, and the Prince does nothing to direct attention to himself. For the indifferent and the satisfied the Bonapartist programme is only a purely speculative indication, which is of no more value in their eyes than a prospectus; it will have no value until the Republic expires, and the Republic will not die until it has lost the right to live. That may come sooner than one imagines. The accidental causes which may any day sweep away the régime include the increasing dissatisfaction caused by the horrible unpopularity of Parliament, which is the visible figure and the hidden soul of the Republic. The spectacles which it daily gives us reproduce the prophetic features which mark the “agony,” generally disgusting, of dying régimes. That, perhaps, is not a reason why the Empire should necessarily succeed it; but it is a reason for thinking of it. One may think of it in all ranks of society, and even in all camps, because the Empire is not a party, but a refuge. It is not impossible that the heir of the Napoleons may attain to power by the political paths that anarchy fatally opens to the predestined man. It is by the Consulate or the Presidency that the elect of his race were conducted to the throne. There is no worse servitude than that of oligarchies, those especially which have the appetites and passions of negroes. It is to this miserable condition of affairs—in which the germs of revolution are already, thank God! apparent—that Republican Parliamentarism has led us; and that is why from all hearts there rises the same cry of desire and of hope—“Exoriare aliquis!”

The years 1896 and 1898 were marked by exceptional exultation in the Bonapartist camp. In 1896 there were serious differences amongst the rival Orleanist factions. Some of the younger and more ardent Royalists, recalling the début in political life of Napoleon III., were desirous of putting forward the Duc d’Orléans as a Parliamentary candidate. The managing committee of the party, however, decided that “a son of France should not parody a Bonaparte.” The Duc d’Audiffret Pasquier communicated this decision to the Duc d’Orléans, who curtly replied that the committee should have consulted him upon the subject before expressing an opinion. Pasquier repelled this snub by resigning his membership of the committee, which, guided by Buffet, De Broglie, and d’Haussonville, was accused by the stalwarts of lack of energy in the propaganda. A cleavage seemed imminent among the Royalist sections, for many Catholics abandoned the party, and the Pope repudiated it.

Taking advantage of the misfortunes of others, the Bonapartists became more of a militant party. On August 15, 1898 (the old Napoleonic fête-day), they mustered in force at a banquet, made speeches ridiculing the Republic, and cheered to the echo a letter from the Pretender containing a promise to “appear at the proper moment,” which he declared to be “at hand.” In the intervening thirteen years the Royalists have done most of the “shouting,” or, rather, it has been done by the “Camelots du Roy,” led by the two sons of the late Paul de Cassagnac, M. Léon Daudet, and even M. Henri Rochefort!