BIBLIOGRAPHICAL AND EXPLANATORY NOTES
[1] The Annual Register, 1888, pp. 44, 310.
[2] Good general statements of the transportation problem of Turkey during the two decades 1880–1900 are Verney and Dambmann, op. cit., Part III; J. Courau, La locomotive en Turquie d’Asie (Brussels, 1895), pp. 18–47; Corps de droit ottoman, Volume IV, pp. 117 et seq.
[3] Corps de droit ottoman, Volume IV, pp. 202–223, 237–242, etc.
[4] Bulletin de la Chambre de Commerce française de Constantinople, August 31, 1888, p. 10; September 30, 1888, p. 31. Cf., also a prospectus issued by a banker, Mr. W. J. Alt, “Heads of a Convention for the extension of the Haidar Pasha-Ismid Railway” (London, 1886), a copy of which was loaned to the author by Mr. Ernest Rechnitzer.
[5] The story of these negotiations is well told in a new book by Dr. Karl Helfferich, Georg von Siemens—ein Lebensbild (Leipzig, 1923), the proofs of which I have had the privilege of reading. For an official copy of the convention and by-laws of the Anatolian Railway Company (Firman Impérial de concession et statuts de la Société du Chemin de Fer Ottomane d’Anatolie, Constantinople, 1889), I am indebted to Dr. Arthur von Gwinner, of the Deutsche Bank. Cf., also, Administration de la dette publique ottomane—Rapport sur les opérations de l’année 1888 (Constantinople, 1889); Report of the Anatolian Railway Company, 1889, pp. 1–2; Corps de droit ottoman, Volume IV, pp. 120–142.
[6] Helfferich, op. cit., Part V; A. P. Brüning, Die Entwicklung des ausländischen, speciell des überseeischen deutschen Bankwesens (Berlin, 1907), pp. 14 et seq.; Report of the Anatolian Railway Company, 1889, p. 3; Report of the Deutsche Bank, 1892, p. 4, 1890, p. 4.
[7] Report of the Anatolian Railway Company, 1891, p. 20, 1892, pp. 16, 23.
[8] Actes de la concession du chemin de fer Eski Shehr-Konia (Constantinople, 1893); Report of the Anatolian Railway Company, 1896, pp. 4, 9.
[9] Corps de droit ottoman, Volume IV, pp. 191–197. The junction of the two systems at Afiun Karahissar did not immediately materialize. The distance from that town to Constantinople is longer by sixty-six kilometres than the distance to Smyrna; the latter port, therefore, is the better natural outlet for the products of Anatolia. This diversion of traffic to Smyrna the Anatolia Railway sought to avoid, it is said, by granting discriminatory rates in favor of through freight to Constantinople over its own lines. A rate war ensued between the Anatolian and Smyrna-Cassaba systems, and neither was willing to permit an actual joining of the tracks at Afiun Karahissar, with the result that for years the rails of the two roads lay a comparatively few yards apart. This absurd situation, so obviously detrimental to the interests of the two roads, was remedied by an agreement of 1899. Infra, pp. 59–60. Cf., also R. LeCoq, Un chemin de fer en Asie Mineure (Paris, 1907), pp. 23–24; Report of the Anatolian Railway Company, 1899, p. 3.
[10] A summary of the report of the Commission is to be found in Diplomatic and Consular Reports, No. 3140 (London, 1903), pp. 26 et seq. A statement of its membership and purposes is given in the Report of the Anatolian Railway Company, 1899, p. 9.
[11] Report of the Anatolian Railway Company, 1897, p. 3.
[12] Alldeutsche Blätter, December 17, 1899. It should be borne in mind, however, that until the Bagdad Railway concession was granted French financiers held the lead in the number of kilometres of railway in operation or contracted for. The situation in 1898 was as follows:
| British | |
| Kiloms. | |
| Smyrna-Aidin | 373 |
| Mersina-Adana | 67 |
| —- | |
| Total | 440 |
| French | |
| Kiloms. | |
| Smyrna-Cassaba | 512 |
| Jaffa-Jerusalem | 87 |
| Beirut-Damascus | 247 |
| Damascus-Aleppo | 429 |
| —- | |
| Total | 1,266 |
| German | |
| Kiloms. | |
| Haidar Pasha-Ismid | 91 |
| Ismid-Ankara | 485 |
| Eski Shehr-Konia | 444 |
| —- | |
| Total | 1,020 |
All of the British and German lines were in operation in 1898, whereas the French Syrian Railways were only partially completed.
[13] Statistisches Handbuch für das deutsche Reich, Volume 2, pp. 506, 510; Diplomatic and Consular Reports, No. 2950 (1902), pp. 5, 23; Turkey in Europe, No. 16 of the Foreign Office Handbooks, pp. 86–87.
[14] J. Riesser, Die deutschen Grossbanken und ihre Konzentration im Zusammenhang mit der Entwicklung der Gesamtwirtschaft in Deutschland (third edition, Jena, 1909); translated into English and published as Senate Document No. 593, Sixty-first Congress, Second Session, 1911. References here given are to the translation. In this connection cf. “The Oversea and Foreign Business of the German Credit Banks,” pp. 420 et seq.
[15] Syria and Palestine, p. 126; The Times, October 28, 1898, August 2 and 16, 1899.
[16] Karl Helfferich, Die deutsche Türkenpolitik (Berlin, 1921), pp. 10 et seq.; J. A. R. Marriot, The Eastern Question (Oxford, 1917), pp. 347 et seq.
[17] L. Ostrorog, The Turkish Problem (London, 1919), pp. 52–53; E. Dutemple, En Turquie d’Asie (Paris, 1883), pp. 131 et seq.
[18] For a biographical account of General von der Goltz (1843–1916) cf. F. W. Wile, Men Around the Kaiser (Philadelphia, 1913), Chapter XXVI. Bismarck consented to the appointment of von der Goltz’s military mission—which was not in accord with his general Eastern policy—as a sort of insurance against the possibility that chauvinism, Pan-Slavism, and anti-German elements in Russia should gain the ascendancy at the court of the Tsar. In such an event it might be possible to utilize Turkish bayonets and Turkish artillery, especially if they had been trained by Prussian officers. Memoirs of Prince Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst (English translation, New York, 1906), Volume II, p. 268.
[19] Recueil d’actes internationaux de l’Empire Ottoman, Volume IV (1903), Document No. 960.
[20] Mary E. Townsend, Origins of Modern German Colonialism (New York, 1921), Chapters V-VII; Prince Bismarck, Reflections and Reminiscences (New York, 1899), Volume II, pp. 233 et seq.
[21] For this letter, hitherto unpublished, I am indebted to Dr. Karl Helfferich, son-in-law of the late George von Siemens.
[22] The italics are mine.
[23] Die grosse Politik der europäischen Kabinette, 1871–1914 (Berlin, 1922 et seq.), Volume VI, pp. 360–361. (A compilation of documents from the files of the Foreign Office, edited by a non-partisan commission appointed by the Government of the German Republic.) Of Bismarck’s policy in the Near East the Ex-Kaiser writes, “Bismarck spoke quite disdainfully of Turkey, of the men in high position there, and of conditions in that land.– I thought I might inspire him in part with essentially more favorable opinions, but my efforts were of little avail.... Prince Bismarck was never favorably inclined toward Turkey and never agreed with me in my Turkish policy.” W. von Hohenzollern, My Memoirs, 1878–1918 (New York, 1922), p. 27.
[24] Diplomatic and Consular Reports, No. 2950 (1902), p. 20.
[25] For information regarding the appointment of Baron Marschall to Constantinople the author is indebted to Dr. Arthur von Gwinner, who believes that the Baron was being sentenced to political exile when he was detailed to the Sublime Porte, but that his opponents overlooked the possibilities of the embassy at the Ottoman capital. Wile, op. cit., Chapter XVIII, gives a short biographical account of Baron Marschall.
[26] Cf. E. Lamy, “La France du Levant: Voyage de l’Empereur Guillaume II,” in Revue des deux mondes, Volume 150 (1898), pp. 880–911, Volume 151 (1899), pp. 315–348; E. Lewin, The German Road to the East (New York, 1917), pp. 105 et seq.; C. S. Hurgronje, The Holy War, Made in Germany (New York, 1915), pp. 70–71; The All Highest Goes to Jerusalem, being an English translation of a series of articles published in Le Rire (Paris) during 1898 (New York, 1917). In Germany the royal pilgrimage was intended to be taken seriously. Herr Heine, of the Munich Simplicissimus, was convicted of lèse majesté and imprisoned for six months for having published humorous cartoons of the Kaiser and his party on their travels. The Annual Register, 1898, pp. 255–258.
[27] The author found some difference of opinion in Germany regarding the connection between the Kaiser’s visit and the pending Anatolian and Bagdad concessions. Dr. von Gwinner denies that there was any such purpose behind the Emperor’s trip to the East—or, at least, if there was, that it was unsolicited by the promoters and not looked upon with favor by them. Dr. Helfferich, on the other hand, is convinced that His Majesty was directly concerned with the desirability of obtaining additional railway concessions for German financiers. The Kaiser himself agrees with Dr. Helfferich. Cf., My Memoirs, 1878–1918, p. 86.
[28] Cf. foreign correspondence in The Times (London), October 25, 1898, and days immediately thereafter.
[29] For an analysis of this situation see The Manchester Guardian, July 31, 1899, which took the stand that “for no sort of mercantile gain would a nation be justified in making friendly advances to the blood-stained tyrant of Armenia.”
[30] In this connection see Leonard Woolf, Economic Imperialism (London and New York, 1920), Chapter I; Ramsay Muir, The Expansion of Europe (New York, 1917), Chapter I; J. E. Spurr (editor), Political and Commercial Geology (New York, 1920), Chapter XXXII, entitled “Who Owns the Earth?”; Aspi-Fleurimont, “La Question du coton,” in Questions diplomatiques et coloniales, Volume 15 (1903), pp. 429–432; J. A. B. Scherer, Cotton as a World Power (New York, 1922). In addition, for the wider aspects of imperialism, consult H. N. Brailsford, The War of Steel and Gold (New edition, London, 1915), Chapter II; F. C. Howe, Why War? (New York, 1916), passim; Walter Lippman, The Stakes of Diplomacy (New York, 1915); J. A. Hobson, Imperialism: A Study (London, 1902).
[31] W. H. Dawson, The Evolution of Modern Germany (New York, 1908), Chapter XII. P. Rohrbach, Deutschland unter den Weltvölkern, p. 17.
[32] Riesser, op. cit., pp. 110, 121.
[33] It should be remarked here that the author is not unaware of the fallacy of speaking of “German trade” and “German industry.” He is cognizant of the fact that trade takes place not between countries, but between individuals. If he anthropomorphizes the German Empire for the purposes of this description, it is not because of either ignorance or malice, but for convenience.
[34] For further consideration of German economic progress during the late nineteenth century see: Dawson, op. cit., Chapters III, IV, XII, XVI; E. D. Howard, The Cause and Extent of the Recent Industrial Progress of Germany (New York, 1907); T. B. Veblen, Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution (New York, 1915); W. H. Dawson, Industrial Germany (London, 1913); Karl Helfferich, Germany’s Economic Progress and National Wealth (New York, 1913); G. Blondel, L’Essor industriel et commercial du peuple allemand (Paris, 1900).
[35] Paul Dehn, Weltwirtschaftliche Neubildungen (Berlin, 1904), passim.
[36] Bernhard von Bülow, Imperial Germany (English translation, New York, 1914), pp. 17, 18–20.
[37] The extent of German economic control of central and eastern Europe before the War is indicated by Mr. J. M. Keynes, in his book The Economic Consequences of the Peace (New York, 1920), pp. 17–18: “Germany not only furnished these countries with trade, but in the case of some of them supplied a great part of the capital needed for their own development. Of Germany’s pre-war foreign investments, amounting in all to about six and a half billion dollars, not far short of two and a half billions was invested in Russia, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Turkey. And by the system of ‘peaceful penetration’ she gave these countries not only capital, but what they needed hardly less, organization. The whole of Europe east of the Rhine thus fell into the German industrial orbit, and its economic life was adjusted accordingly.” A frank German admission of a policy of a self-sufficient Central Europe is the work of Friedrich Naumann, Mittel-Europa, translated into English by C. M. Meredith and published under the title Central Europe (New York, 1917). See, especially, Chapters IV-VII. Cf., also, Ernst zu Reventlow, Deutschlands auswärtige Politik (3rd revised edition, Berlin, 1916), pp. 336 et seq.; K. H. Müller, Die Bedeutung der Bagdadbahn (Hamburg, 1916), p. 29.
[38] Paul Rohrbach, Die Bagdadbahn (Berlin, 1903), p. 16.
[39] H. A. Gibbons, The Reconstruction of Poland and the Near East (New York, 1917), pp. 57–58. The author is not in agreement with either Dr. Rohrbach or Dr. Gibbons. He certainly would hesitate to call any imperialist policy “inevitable.”
[40] Die deutsche Türkenpolitik, p. 8.