BIBLIOGRAPHICAL AND EXPLANATORY NOTES
[1] Mufty-Zade Zia Bey, “How the Turks Feel,” in Asia, Volume XXII (1922), p. 857.
[2] “Declaration of the Rights of the Toiling and Exploited People,” Article III. Available in English translation in International Conciliation, No. 136 (New York, 1919).
[3] Supra, Chapter VII.
[4] The text of the Russo-Turkish Treaty of March 16, 1921, is given as an appendix to an article by A. Nazaroff, “Russia’s Treaty with Turkey,” in Current History, Volume XVII (1922), pp. 276–279.
[5] Bowman, op. cit., p. 398.
[6] Cf. supra, pp. 202–203. Professor Toynbee now speaks of this feature of the Entente in terms of contempt: “Its direct motive was covetousness, and it rested locally on nothing more substantial than the precarious honor among thieves who find their business threatened by a vigorous and talented competitor. Some of the thieves, at any rate, never got out of the habit of picking their temporary partners’ pockets.“ Op. cit., p. 46.
[7] Ibid., pp. 45–46.
[8] It seems to be established that Mr. Lloyd George compelled a readjustment of the terms of the Sykes-Picot Treaty by threatening M. Clémenceau with a complete exposure and repudiation of all of the secret treaties. Cf. Baker, op. cit., Volume I, pp. 70–72.
[9] See Minutes of the Council of Four, March 20, 1919, reported in full by Baker, op. cit., Volume III, Document No. 1.
[10] Regarding the claims of the Turkish Petroleum Company, cf. supra, p. 261.
[11] Parliamentary Papers, No. Cmd. 675 (1920). Cf., also, the “Franco-British Convention of December 23, 1920, on Certain Points Connected with the Mandates for Syria, the Lebanon, Palestine, and Mesopotamia,” Parliamentary Papers, No. Cmd. 1195 (1921). For a general discussion of the oil situation, see: H. Bérenger, La politique du pétrole (Paris, 1920); F. Delaisi, Le pétrole—La politique de la production (Paris, 1921); A. Apostol and A. Michelson, La lutte pour le pétrole (Paris, 1922).
[12] Cf. supra, Chapter X, Note 18.
[13] Supra, pp. 301–302.
[14] Interesting sidelights on these points will be found in the correspondence between the French and British Governments regarding the Angora Treaty of October 20, 1921, Parliamentary Papers, No. Cmd. 1571, Turkey No. 1 (1922). Cf., also, Toynbee, op. cit., Chapter III, “Greece and Turkey in the Vicious Circle”; Jean Lescure, “Faut-il détruire la Turquie?” in Revue politique et parlementaire, Volume 103 (1920), pp. 42–48; “Where Diplomacy Failed,” The Daily Telegraph (London), September 19, 1922.
[15] M. de Montille to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, November 17, 1921, in the official correspondence cited in Note 14.
[16] Cf. a statement by M. Briand regarding the purposes and the scope of the agreement, Journal officiel, Débats parlementaires, Chambre des députés, March 16, 1921, pp. 1272–1273. The text of the agreement is available in Current History, Volume XIV (1921), pp. 203–204, and in the Contemporary Review, Volume 119 (1921), pp. 677–679.
[17] Regarding the Heraclea coal mines cf. supra, p. 14. During the War the mines were operated by Hugo Stinnes.
[18] For the text of the Turco-Italian treaty see L’Europe Nouvelle (Paris), May 28, 1921, or The Nation, Volume 113 (New York, 1921), p. 214. The New York Times, April 13, 1921, contains a good summary of the treaty and the circumstances of its negotiation.
[19] The text of the Angora Treaty is given in Parliamentary Papers, No. Cmd. 1556, Turkey No. 2 (1921). It has been reprinted in Current History, January, 1922. For a statement by M. Briand regarding the purposes and scope of the treaty, cf. Journal officiel, Débats parlementaires, Sénat, October 28, 1921, pp. 818–819.
[20] Aleppo remained within the French mandate for Syria, so that for a time—until the Turks construct a substitute line—through trains will have to pass through French territory for a short distance. Guarantees against interruption of either military or commercial traffic were exacted by the Turks, however. In addition, Turkey was guaranteed full use of the port of Alexandretta on a basis of absolute equality with Syria.
[21] Most of the supplementary economic concessions are provided for in a covering letter of Yussuf Kemal Bey and in an exchange of notes which coincided with the signature of the treaty. These were kept absolutely secret until December, when their contents were made known to the British Government.
[22] Supra, p. 83.
[23] The italics are mine. Discrimination against British trade from Mosul to Alexandretta, for example, might be used to force Great Britain to abandon many of her claims in northern Mesopotamia.
[24] The Times (London), August 2, 1922; Manchester Guardian Commercial, August 31, 1922; Chicago Tribune, Paris edition, August 21, 1922.
[25] For the text of the correspondence, cf. Parliamentary Papers, No. Cmd. 1571, Turkey No. 1 (1922).
[26] Cf. supra, pp. 301–302.
[27] A not unrepresentative Greek view is the following: “Nationalist Turkey became, in a military sense, French territory. Political missions, military missions, propaganda missions, financial missions, found their way from Paris to Angora. The entire credit of the French Republic was placed behind Kemal. The warships of France and the liners of the Messageries Maritimes became Turkish transports, and the French arsenals were placed at the disposal of the Turks. Once the ally of Kemal, France supported him to the fullest extent of its ability and its resources.” A. T. Polyzoides, “The Greek Collapse in Asia Minor,” in Current History, Volume XVII (1923), p. 35.
[28] Material regarding the Lausanne Conference is scattered and fragmentary. The text of the proposed treaty is to be found in L’Europe Nouvelle (Paris), February 24 and March 10, 1923; a summary is given in The Times (London), February 1, 1923. The newspaper accounts which I have used are those of The New York Times, The Times (London), The Manchester Guardian, The World (New York), and the Christian Science Monitor (Boston). For reports and editorial comment in weekly periodicals I have consulted The Near East, L’Europe Nouvelle, Journal des Débats, The New Statesman (London), The Nation (New York). The following magazine articles have proved useful: “The Lausanne Conference,” in Current History, Volume XVII (1923), pp. 531–537, 743–748, 929–930; Saint-Brice, “De la Ruhr à Lausanne,” in Correspondance d’Orient (Paris), February, 1923; “The Oriental Labyrinth at Lausanne,” in the Literary Digest, April 21, 1923, pp. 19–20; H. Froidevaux, “Les négociations de Lausanne et leur suspension,” in L’Asie Française, 33 year, No. 208 (Paris, 1923), pp. 8–10; J. C. Powell, “Italy at Lausanne,” in The New Statesman, Volume XX (1922), pp. 291–292; A. J. Toynbee, “The New Status of Turkey,” in the Contemporary Review, Volume 123 (1923), pp. 281–289; P. Bruneau, “La question de Mossoul,” in L’Europe Nouvelle, February 3, 1923, pp. 138–140. For some of my information regarding the Lausanne Conference I am indebted to Djavid Bey.
[29] Cf. supra, Chapters IX and X, ad lib.
[30] Compare with the provisions of the Treaty of Sèvres, supra, pp. 301–302.
[31] The New York Times, February 5, 1923.
[32] Cf. supra, pp. 324–325.
[33] The Chester concessions will be treated more fully in the succeeding pages.
[34] Supra, pp. 245–249, 325–326. It was the Turkish contention that the Black Sea concessions were invalid for the following reasons: they were negotiated by a government for the acts of which the National Assembly assumed no responsibility; they never had been ratified by the Turkish Parliament; the French bankers had not fulfilled all the conditions upon which the concessions were predicated.
[35] The New York Times, April 12, 1923.
[36] Regarding the Bank für orientalischen Eisenbahnen, cf. supra, p. 32. Accounts of the purchase by British interests are to be found in The New York Times, April 28, May 15 and 16, 1923, and The Times (London), May 18, 1923.
[37] The Chester concessions conflict, to a degree, with the rights of the British-owned Turkish Petroleum Company (cf. supra, Chapter X) in the vilayet of Mosul. The area in conflict is so small, compared to the total of the two concessions, however, that it is extremely doubtful if there will be any serious difficulty in reaching a satisfactory adjustment.
[38] “Report of the King-Crane Mission to the Near East,” published as a supplement to the Editor and Publisher, Volume 55 (New York, 1922), pp. I-XXVIII. Cf., also, “Report of the American Military Mission to Armenia,” Senate Document No. 266, Sixty-sixth Congress, First Session (Washington, 1920).
[39] E. J. Bing, “Chester and Turkey, Inc.,” in The New Republic, Volume XXXIV (New York, 1923), pp. 290–292.
[40] Cf. E. M. Earle, “The Outlook for American Imperialism,” in the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Volume CVIII (Philadelphia, 1923).
[41] For the text of this correspondence, cf. Parliamentary Papers, No. Cmd. 675 (1921).
[42] The New York Times, October 29, 1922.
[43] Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1921, passim; “The Trade of Turkey During 1920,” Commerce Reports, Special Supplement (Washington, 1921).
[44] Compare with the terms of the Bagdad Railway concession, supra, pp. 70–71, 77–84.
[45] The text of the Chester concessions—in an English translation which leaves much to be desired—is to be found in Current History, Volume XVIII (1923), pp. 485–489. For an official copy of the concessions, with a map, I am indebted to Mr. M. Zekeria, Secretary of the Turkish Information Service in New York.
[46] The Chester concessions contain the usual provisions for the utilization of the railways by the gendarmerie and the military, both in time of peace and in time of war.
[47] The World (New York), April 10, 1923.
[48] The remarks are those of Mr. Ernest Filsinger, of the firm of Lawrence & Company, exporters. Mr. Filsinger has been good enough to supply me with a copy of his speech.
[49] The New York Times, April 12, 1923.
[50] Ibid., April 23, 1923.
[51] The United States Navy as an Industrial Asset (Washington, Office of Naval Intelligence, 1923). Cf., also, C. Merz, “Bristol, Quarterdeck Diplomat,” in Our World, December, 1922.
[52] Allen Westcott, “The Struggle for the Mediterranean,” in Our World, February, 1923, pp. 11–17.
[53] Cf., supra, pp. 63–65.
[54] Cf. W. E. Weyl, American World Policies (New York, 1917), Chapter V; A. Demangeon, America and the Race for World Dominion (Garden City, 1921), a translation of Le Déclin de l’Europe (Paris, 1920).
[55] Supra, pp. 40–42.