Turkey, the Great Powers, and the Bagdad Railway: A study in imperialism

by Edward Mead Earle

British Resistance is Stiffened by the Entente

One year after the failure of the Bagdad Railway negotiations of 1903, the age-old colonial rivalry of France and Great Britain was brought to a temporary close by the Entente Cordiale. It is not possible, with the information now at our disposal, to estimate with any degree of accuracy the influence which the Bagdad Railway exerted upon British imperialists in the final determination to reach an agreement with France. One may agree with an eminent French authority, however, that “neither in England nor in France is the principle of the understanding to be sought. Rather was it the fear of Germany which determined England—not only her King and Government, but the whole of her people—to draw nearer France.”[38] British fear and dislike of Germany were founded upon the phenomenal growth of German industry and overseas commerce, the rapid expansion of the German mercantile marine, the construction of the German navy, and the insistence of German diplomatists that Germany be not ignored in colonial matters. The Bagdad Railway did nothing to quiet those fears. It served, rather, to render precarious Britain’s position in the East.

In March, 1903, when the definitive Bagdad Railway concession was granted, British imperial affairs were in a far from satisfactory state. The termination of the Boer War had ended the fear that the British Empire might lose its hold on South Africa, but the sharp criticism of British conduct toward the Boers—criticism which came not only from abroad, but from malcontents at home—had dealt a severe blow to British prestige. The relentless advance of Russia in China, Persia, and Afghanistan gave cause for anxiety as to the safety of Britain’s possessions in the Middle and Far East. And although France had withdrawn gracefully from the Fashoda affair, it was by no means certain that Egypt had seen the last of French interference. Added to all of these difficulties was the proposed German-owned railway from Constantinople to the Persian Gulf, flanking the Suez Canal and reaching out to the back door of India.

Under such circumstances it was small wonder that Great Britain took stock of her foreign policies. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 already had ended the British policy of aloofness, and there appeared to be no sound reason against the negotiation of other treaties which similarly would strengthen the British position in the East. The Bagdad Railway negotiations collapsed, but the agreement with France—which seemed far more difficult of achievement—was consummated without further delay. Three years later, in 1907, Great Britain came to an agreement with another of her rivals in the East—Russia. The Tsar, chastened by military defeat abroad and by revolution at home, recognized a British sphere of interest in Persia, relinquished all claims in Afghanistan, and acknowledged the suzerainty of China over Tibet.[39] The understanding with France had assured the safety of the Suez Canal from an attack from the Sudan; the agreement with Russia removed the menace of an attack upon India from the north and northwest. Germany became Great Britain’s only formidable rival in the Near East.

Thus the Germans found themselves facing a powerful diplomatic obstacle to the construction of the Bagdad Railway. Here was another instance, in their minds, of the “encirclement” of Germany by a hostile coalition—an “encirclement” not only on the Continent, but in a German sphere of imperial interest as well. A conspicuous German Oriental scholar said that the attitude of the other European powers toward the Bagdad Railway was the best proof of their enmity toward Germany. “Every single kilometre had to be fought for against the unyielding opposition of Great Britain, Russia, and France, who desired to frustrate any increase in the power of Turkey. Great Britain led and organized this opposition because she feared that India and Egypt were threatened by the Bagdad Railway.” If one wishes to understand the diplomatic history of the War, “he needs only to study the struggle for the Bagdad Railway—he will find a laboratory full of rich materials.”[40] Here was the tragedy of the Bagdad Railway—it was one of a number of imperial enterprises which together constituted a principal cause of the greatest war of modern times!

There were some ardent British imperialists who were out of sympathy with the popular opposition to the Bagdad Railway and with the policy of the Entente in obstructing the building of the line. Few Englishmen were more thoroughly acquainted with the Near East than Sir William Willcocks.[41] Basing his opinions upon an intimate, scientific study of conditions in Mesopotamia, he advocated full British coöperation with the Deutsche Bank in the construction of the Bagdad Railway, which he considered was the best means of transportation for Irak. He criticized the British Government for its short-sighted policy in the protection of the Lynch Brothers and their antiquated river service; “rivers,” he said, “are for irrigation, railways for communications.” Furthermore, “You cannot leave the waters of the rivers in their channels and irrigate the country with them. For navigation you may substitute railway transport; for the purpose of irrigation nothing can take the place of water.”[42] He believed that adequate irrigation of the Mesopotamian Valley would result in such a wave of prosperity for the country that it would induce immigration, particularly from Egypt and British India. It was not inconceivable, under such conditions, that Britain would fall heir to ancient Mesopotamia when the Ottoman Empire should disintegrate.[43] Sir William Willcocks was neither pacifist nor visionary; he, himself, was an empire-builder.

Another British imperialist who believed that Great Britain was pursuing entirely the wrong course in obstructing German economic penetration in Turkey was Sir Harry Johnston, novelist, explorer, lecturer, former member of the consular service. He believed in “The White Man’s Burden,” in the inevitable overrunning of the habitable globe by the Caucasian race. But he believed that the task of spreading white civilization to the four corners of the earth was such an herculean task, that “what we white peoples ought to strive for, with speech and pen, is unity of purpose; an alliance throughout all the world in this final struggle for mastery over Nature. We ought to adjust our ambitions and eliminate causes of conflict.” His program for the settlement of the Near Eastern question was: “the promotion of peace and goodwill among white nations, to start with; and when the ambitions and the allotment of spheres of influence have been nicely adjusted, then to see that the educational task of the Caucasian is carried out in a right, a Christian, a practical, and sympathetic fashion towards the other races and sub-species of humanity.” Sir Harry believed that Great Britain was the last country in the world which ought to oppose the legitimate colonial aspirations of any other nation. There was every reason for the recognition of the economic and moral bases of German expansion, and any dog-in-the-manger attitude on the part of British statesmen, he was sure, would defeat the highest interests of the Empire.[44]

Applying his principles to the problem of Teutonic aggrandizement in the Ottoman Empire, Sir Harry Johnston advocated that the western European nations should acknowledge the Austrian Drang nach Osten as a legitimate and essential part of the German plans for a Central European Federation and for the economic development of Turkey. “The Turkish Sultanate would possibly not come to an end, but would henceforth, within certain limits, be directed and dominated by German councils. Germany in fact would become the power with the principal ‘say’ as to the good government and economic development of Asia Minor. Syria might be constituted as a separate state under French protection, and Judea might be offered to the Jews under an international guarantee. Sinai and Egypt would pass under avowed British protection, and Arabia (except the southern portion, which already lies within the British sphere of influence) be regarded as a federation of independent Arab States. For the rest, Turkey-in-Asia—less Armenia, which might be handed over to Russia—would, in fact, become to Germany what Egypt is to England—a kingdom to be educated, regenerated, and perhaps transfused and transformed by the renewed percolation of the Aryan Caucasian. Here would be a splendid outlet for the energies of both Germany and Austria, sufficient to keep them contented, prosperous, busy, and happy, for at least a century ahead.” Sir Harry believed that obstructionist tactics on the part of Great Britain would promote Prussianism within Germany, whereas, on the other hand, a frank recognition of Germany’s claims in the Near East would provide Central Europe with a safety valve which would “relieve pressure on France, Belgium, and Russia, paving the way for an understanding on Continental questions. Let us—if we wish to be cynical—welcome German expansion with Kruger’s metaphor of the tortoise putting out his head. Germany and Austria are dangerous to the peace of the world only so long as they are penned up in their present limits.”[45]

One obvious disadvantage of the solution suggested by Sir Harry Johnston was its total indifference to the wishes of the Ottoman Turks. Apparently it was out of place to consider the welfare of Turkey in a discussion of the Bagdad Railway question! Certainly there were very few European statesmen who cared the least about the opinions of Turks in the disposition of Turkish property. Among the few was Viscount Morley, one of the old Gladstonian Liberals. Answering Lord Curzon, in the House of Lords, March 22, 1911, Lord Morley, a member of the Asquith cabinet, asserted the right of the Turks to determine their own destinies: “A great deal of nonsense,” he said, “is talked about the possible danger to British interests which may be involved some day or other when this railway is completed, and there have been whimsical apprehensions expressed. One is that it will constitute a standing menace to Egypt ... because it would establish [by junction with the Syrian and Hedjaz railways] uninterrupted communication between the Bosporus and Western Arabia. That would hardly be an argument for Turkey to abandon railway construction on her own soil, whereas it overlooks the fact that the Sinai Peninsula intervenes. You cannot get over this plain cardinal fact, that this railway is made on Turkish territory by virtue of an instrument granted by the Turkish Government.... I see articles in newspapers every day in which it is assumed that we have the right there to do what we please. That is not so. It is not our soil, it is Turkish soil, and the Germans alone are there because the Turkish Government has given them the right to be there.”[46]