MOBILE BAY. AUGUST 5, 1864.

Farragut had returned to New York, after arduous service in the Mississippi, which cannot be told here, and had received the hearty congratulations and hospitalities of not only public bodies, but of all grateful citizens. He had been made Rear Admiral, a new rank in the United States, and had been thanked by Congress for his achievements.

But, after about four months of rest and relaxation he was called to duty again, and early in January, 1864, he once more hoisted his flag upon the Hartford and sailed for the Gulf. His flag-ship had received much needed repairs, and, on examination, it was found that she had been struck two hundred and forty times by shot and shell.

After a short stay at New Orleans, to settle naval matters there, he visited Ship Island and Pensacola, the established depots for supplies.

He was now preparing for the long desired attack on Mobile Bay and its defences, which he had long contemplated, and was only prevented from carrying out before by the necessity of carrying out joint operations on the Mississippi River.

It was impossible to prevent vessels from occasionally entering Mobile, no matter how vigilant the blockaders were. Forts Morgan, Powell and Gaines protected the principal channels, and the light blockade-runners would creep along the shore, under cover of the night, under charge of experienced pilots, and soon be under the protecting guns of the forts. Now and then some adventurous craft would suffer for her temerity, by being captured, or driven on shore and riddled with shot and shell; but, still, too many got in. Most of these vessels had clearances for Matamoros, a Mexican town on the Rio Grande.

A steamer was captured off Mobile which was evidently a blockade-runner. The Captain was sent on board the flag-ship, to be interrogated by the Admiral. Farragut recognized him as an old acquaintance, and one of the most experienced merchant captains in the Gulf trade. The Admiral asked him what in the world he was doing close in with Mobile, when he was three hundred miles out of his course for Matamoros. The Captain entered into a long story about having been swept in shore by a northeast gale. When he had finished, Farragut smiled and said, “How could you be blown to the northward and eastward by a northeast gale? I am very sorry for you, but we shall have to hold you for your thundering bad navigation.” Among the articles captured in this vessel were one thousand copies of a caricature of General Butler, who has certainly had notoriety conferred upon him in that way as often as any one who ever lived.

Personal reconnoissances and skirmishes with the different forts about Mobile occupied the Admiral for some time, and he recognized the importance of having light draft ironclads to fight those which the enemy were preparing.

He wrote, “I feel no apprehension about Buchanan’s raising the blockade at Mobile, but with such a force as he has in the Bay, it would be unwise to take in our wooden vessels, without the means of fighting the enemy on an equal footing. By reference to the chart you will see how small a space there is for the ships to manœuvre.”

On the 2d of March he wrote, “I saw the Mobile ram Tennessee yesterday. She is very long, and I thought moved very slowly.”

He was most anxious to make the attack upon Mobile, as every week’s delay rendered the work more dangerous. But he was delayed by the necessity of awaiting ships.

In the meantime stirring work was going on inland, and the armies grappling in the fight of giants. Farragut’s letters show that he was keenly alive to all that was going on, although the mental strain upon him in keeping up the blockade and in preparing for the undertaking he had in view, was very great.

In a letter written in May he says, “We have the Southern papers of the 17th, and yet they contain no news. All is dark with respect to Grant and Lee. Grant has done one thing. He has gone to work making war and doing his best, and kept newsmongers out of his army. The only comfort I have is, that the Confederates are more unhappy, if possible, than we are.”

“We started with few good officers of experience, but shall end with some of the best in the world. Our fellows are beginning to understand that war means fighting.”

To Admiral Bailey, at Key West, he writes, “I am watching Buchanan, in the ram Tennessee. She is a formidable looking thing, and there are four others, and three wooden gun-boats. They say he is waiting for the two others to come out and attack me, and then raid upon New Orleans. Let him come. I have a fine squadron to meet him, all ready and willing. I can see his boats very industriously laying down torpedoes, so I judge that he is quite as much afraid of our going in as we are of his coming out.”

On June 21st he writes, “I am tired of watching Buchanan and Page, and wish from the bottom of my heart that Buck would come out and try his hand upon us. This question has to be settled, iron versus wood, and there never was a better chance to settle the question as to the sea-going qualities of ironclad ships. We are to-day ready to try anything that comes along, be it wood or iron, in reasonable quantities. Anything is preferable to lying on our oars. But I shall have patience until the army has finished its campaign in Virginia and Georgia. I hope it will be the close of the war.”

On the 6th of July, he writes, “My birth-day; sixty-three years old. I was a little down in the mouth, because I thought we had not done as well as we ought to, in destroying a blockade-runner that tried to force her way by us. But Dyer, in the Glasgow, ran her on shore under the guns of Fort Morgan, and I had been trying to get the gun-boats to destroy her, but they did bad work, and the Rebels were at it, night before last, trying to get her off. I determined to send a party to board and set her on fire. Watson volunteered for the work, and I sent him, with Tyson, Ensign Dana, Whiting, Glidden, and Pendleton, and Master’s Mate Herrick. Jouett and McCann covered the party. Well, as you may suppose, it was an anxious night for me; for I am almost as fond of Watson as yourself, and interested in the others. I thought it was to be a hand-to-hand fight, if any. I sat up till midnight, and then thought they had found the enemy in too great force, and had given it up; so I laid down to rest. About half an hour later the Rebel was reported to be on fire, and I was happy, because I had heard no firing, and I knew the surprise was perfect. And so it turned out. The Rebels scampered off as our fellows climbed on board. The boats returned about 2 o’clock A. M., all safe, no one hurt. I was anxious until their return. But no one knows what my feelings are; I am always calm and quiet.”

“I have never seen a crew come up like our’s. They are ahead of the old set in small arms, and fully equal to them at the great guns. They arrived here a new lot of boys and young men, and have now fattened up, and knock the nine-inch guns about like 24-pounders, to the astonishment of everybody.”

One more extract—for these show the man:—

On July 20th, he wrote, “The victory of the Kearsarge over the Alabama raised me up. I would sooner have fought that fight than any ever fought on the ocean. Only think! it was fought like a tournament, in full view of thousands of French and English, with a perfect confidence, on the part of all but the Union people, that we would be whipped. People came from Paris to witness the fight. Why, my poor little good-for-nothing Hatteras would have whipped her (the Alabama) in fifteen minutes, but for an unlucky shot in the boiler. She struck the Alabama two shots for one, while she floated. But the triumph of the Kearsarge was grand. Winslow had my old First Lieutenant of the Hartford, Thornton, in the Kearsarge. He is as brave as a lion, and as cool as a parson. I go for Winslow’s promotion!”

On the 31st of July all the monitors sent to Farragut had arrived, except the Tecumseh, and she was at Pensacola, to be ready in a day or two.

The preparations for the attack upon the Mobile defences were now about completed, and Farragut had apprised each of his Commanders of his plans for passing into the Bay.

Generals Canby and Granger had visited the Hartford, and in this interview it was agreed that all the troops that could be spared should be sent to co-operate with the fleet in the attack upon Forts Morgan and Gaines.

Subsequently Canby found he had not force sufficient to invest both forts; so, at Farragut’s suggestion, he sent a body of troops to land on Dauphin Island, near Fort Gaines. The Admiral appreciated the assistance of the army in this case, and the responsibility of his position. He was not the man to begin the attack without having taken every precaution to insure success. He said he was ready to take the offensive the moment the troops were ready to act with him; that there was no doing anything with these forts so long as their back doors were open. More than that, his communications had to be kept open for supplies, which required a force of troops to cut off all the enemy’s land communications with Mobile.

The 4th of August had been fixed as the day for the landing of the troops and the entrance into the Bay, but the Tecumseh was not ready. General Granger promptly landed his troops on Dauphin Island at that date. As it turned out, all was for the best, for the Confederates were busily engaged, during the 4th, in throwing troops and supplies into Fort Gaines, all of which were captured a few days afterward.

The attack was then postponed until the 5th, and Farragut wrote a letter to his wife that night, which is a model of its kind, and shows he fully appreciated the desperate work before him.

For it we must refer the reader to his Life, by his son, from which this account is principally taken.

The battle of Mobile Bay was, very properly, the crowning achievement of Farragut’s naval career, for it was the most brilliant action in which he ever took part.

The defences of the Bay, at the time of his attack, consisted mainly of three forts, Morgan, Gaines and Powell. Fort Morgan was one of the old brick forts, with a wall four feet eight inches thick. It is on the west end of a peninsula which encloses the Bay, called Mobile Point, and forms, with Gaines, the principal defence of the main ship channel to the Gulf. It was armed with eighty-six guns, of various calibre, some very heavy, and in exterior batteries were twenty-nine additional guns. The water battery had two rifled 32s, four 10-inch Columbiads, and one 8-inch Brookes rifle. The garrison, officers and men, numbered six hundred and forty.

Fort Gaines is three miles northwest from Fort Morgan, at the eastern extremity of Dauphin Island. This is also a brick fort, and mounted thirty guns, with a garrison of forty-six officers and eight hundred and eighteen men.

On the flats south and east of Fort Gaines innumerable piles were driven, to obstruct the passage of vessels, and from these, two lines of torpedoes extended towards Fort Morgan, terminating at a point a few hundred yards from that fort, marked by a red buoy. This portion of the passage was left open for the use of blockade-runners, and vessels using it had to pass within easy range of the guns of the fort.

Six miles northeast of Fort Gaines is another narrow channel, only fit for light draught vessels, called Grant’s pass. There was a redoubt there, mounted with four very heavy guns.

Auxiliary to this land defence the iron-clad steamer Tennessee lay about five hundred yards north of Fort Morgan. She was two hundred and nine feet long and forty feet wide, with an iron prow projecting two feet below the water line. Her sloping sides were covered with armor varying in thickness from five to six inches. She carried six rifled guns in casemate, two of which were pivot, and the others broadside guns, throwing solid projectiles of one hundred and ten and ninety-five pounds respectively. The ports, of which there were ten, were so arranged that the pivot guns could be fought in broadside, sharp on the bow, and in a direct line with her keel. Her great defect was in the steering-gear, which was badly arranged and much exposed. Near her were anchored three wooden gun-boats, the Morgan, Gaines and Selma. The first carried one 63 cwt. eight-inch gun, and five 57 cwt. 32-pounders; the Gaines, one eight-inch Brooke rifle and five 57 cwt. 32-pounders; the Selma, three eight-inch Paixhans and one old-fashioned heavy thirty-two, converted into a rifle and banded at the breech, throwing a solid shot of about sixty pounds.

Farragut had long before issued general orders in regard to the attack, and made no secret of his intention to attack. They were as follows:—

“Strip your vessels and prepare for the conflict. Send down all your superfluous spars and spare rigging. Put up the splinter-nets on the starboard side, and barricade the wheel and steers-men with sails and hammocks. Lay chains or sand bags on the deck, over the machinery, to resist a plunging fire. Hang the sheet chains over the side, or make any other arrangement for security that your ingenuity may suggest. Land your starboard boats, or lower and tow them on the port side, and lower the port boats down to the water’s edge. Place a leadsman and the pilot in the port quarter-boat, or the one most convenient to the Commander.

“The vessels will run past the forts in couples, lashed side by side, as hereinafter designated. The flag-ship will lead and steer from Sand Island N. by E., by compass, until abreast of Fort Morgan, then N.W., half N., until past the middle ground, then N. by W., and the others, as designated in the drawing, will follow in due order, until ordered to anchor; but the bow and quarter line must be preserved, to give the chase guns a fair range, and each vessel must be kept astern of the broadside of the next ahead; each vessel will keep a very little on the starboard quarter of his next ahead, and when abreast of the fort will keep directly astern, and as we pass the fort, will take the same distance on the port quarter of the next ahead, to enable the stern guns to fire clear of the next vessel astern.

“It will be the object of the Admiral to get as close to the fort as possible before opening fire; the ships, however, will open fire the moment the enemy opens upon us, with their chase and other guns, as fast as they can be brought to bear. Use short fuses for the shell and shrapnel, and as soon as within 300 or 400 yards, give them grape. It is understood that heretofore we have fired too high, but with grape-shot, it is necessary to elevate a little above the object, as grape will dribble from the muzzle of the gun.

“If one or more of the vessels be disabled, their partners must carry them through, if possible; but if they cannot, then the next astern must render the required assistance; but as the Admiral contemplates moving with the flood tide, it will only require sufficient power to keep the crippled vessels in the channel.

“Vessels that can, must place guns upon the poop and top-gallant forecastle, and in the tops on the starboard side. Should the enemy fire grape, they will remove the men from the top-gallant forecastle and the poop to the guns below, until out of grape range.

“The howitzers must keep up a constant fire from the time they can reach with shrapnel until out of its range.” * * * * “There are certain black buoys placed by the enemy across the channel, from the piles on the west side of the channel towards Fort Morgan. It being understood that there are torpedoes and other obstructions between the buoys, the vessels will take care to pass eastward of the easternmost buoy, which is clear of all obstructions. The Admiral will endeavor to remove the others before the day of attack, as he thinks they support that which will otherwise sink, and at least to destroy them for guides to the demons who hope to explode them. So soon as the vessel is opposite the end of the piles, it will be best to stop the propeller of the ship, and let her run in with her headway and the tide, and those having side-wheel gun-boats will continue on with the aid of their paddles, which are not likely to foul with their drag-ropes.

D. G. Farragut,
Rear-Admiral, Commander Western Gulf Squadron.

P. S.—Carry low steam.

D. G. F.”

As has been already mentioned, Farragut had fully determined to run into the bay, on the 4th of August, but had been prevented from doing so by the non-arrival of the monitor Tecumseh. But on the afternoon of the 4th she arrived, and took up her anchorage behind Sand Island, with the others of her class—the Winnebago, Manhattan, and Chickasaw.

On the morning of the 5th, long before daylight, all hands were called “up hammocks,” and while the Admiral, his Fleet-Captain and Fleet-Surgeon were having breakfast, daylight was reported, with weather threatening rain. It was Friday, a day of bad omen for sailors; but the clouds worked round, and the day came fair, which was, on the other hand, a good omen. The wind was west-southwest, too, just where the fleet wanted it, for it would blow the smoke upon Fort Morgan.

At four o’clock the wooden ships formed in double column, lashed securely in pairs, in the following order, the first mentioned of each pair being the starboard vessel, or that next the fort. (The Admiral had concluded to let another ship lead, and he was second.) Here is the order:—

The Brooklyn was appointed to lead, because she had four chase guns and apparatus for picking up torpedoes.

At half-past five, while at the table, still sipping his tea, the Admiral quietly said, “Well, Drayton, we might as well get under way.”

Immediately the answering signals were shown from every vessel, and the wooden vessels promptly took up their respective stations, while the monitors came out from under Sand Island and formed on the right of the wooden ships, as follows: Tecumseh, Commander T. A. M. Craven; Manhattan, Commander J. W. A. Nicholson; (these were single-turreted, Eastern built, or sea monitors). The Winnebago, Commander T. A. Stevens; and the Chickasaw, Lieutenant-Commander Perkins, followed. The two last were double-turreted, Western built monitors, from the Mississippi river.

The leading monitor was abreast of the leading wooden ship.

The Confederate vessels took up position in single line, in echelon, across the channel, with their port batteries bearing to rake the advancing fleet. The ram Tennessee was a little westward of the red buoy spoken of already, and close to the inner line of torpedoes.

Farragut had ordered six light steamers and gun-boats to take up a position outside, and open a flank fire on Fort Morgan, but they could not get near enough to be of much service.

And now the attacking fleet steamed steadily in. At 6.47 the first gun was fired by the monitor Tecumseh, and Fort Morgan at once replied. As the wooden vessels came within shorter range Farragut made signal for “closer order,” which was promptly obeyed, each vessel closing up to within a few yards of the one ahead, and a little on the starboard quarter, thus enabling such ships as had chase guns to bring them to bear.

The battle had opened, but at that time the enemy had the advantage, and the fleet now received a raking fire from the fort, battery, and Confederate vessels. This they had to endure for fully half an hour, before they could bring their batteries to bear with any effect. At the end of that time the Brooklyn and Hartford were enabled to open their broadsides, which soon drove the gunners of the fort from the barbette guns and water batteries.

The scene on the poop of the flag-ship was now particularly interesting, as all were watching eagerly the movements of the leading monitor, Tecumseh. The Admiral stood in the port main rigging, a few ratlines up, where he could see all about him and at the same time communicate easily with the Metacomet, lashed alongside. Freeman, his trusty pilot, was above him, in the top. Captain Drayton was on the poop, with the officers of the Admiral’s staff, while Knowles, the Signal Quartermaster, attended to the signals. This petty officer, with the three seamen at the wheel, McFarland, Wood and Jassin, had been in every engagement of the ship, and steadily and coolly they now attended to their most important duties. All these were nearly stationary. The men at the wheel merely gave a spoke or two of helm, from time to time, in response to a short order.

On the deck below, the gun crews were working with a will, and all was animation and bustle.

As the smoke increased and obscured his view, the Admiral ascended the rigging, ratline by ratline, until he was up among the futtock shrouds, under the top. Captain Drayton, seeing him in this position, and fearing that some slight shock might precipitate him into the sea, ordered Knowles to take up a line, and make his position secure. Knowles says, “I went up with a piece of lead-line, and made it fast to one of the forward shrouds, and then took it round the Admiral to the after shroud, making it fast there. The Admiral said, ‘Never mind, I am all right,’ but I went ahead and obeyed orders, for I feared he would fall overboard if anything should carry away or he should be struck.” Here Farragut remained until the fleet entered the bay.

Loyall Farragut gives a striking extract from the journal of one of the Hartford’s officers, as follows: “The order was, to go slowly, slowly; and receive the fire of Fort Morgan. * * * * The fort opened, having allowed us to get into such short range that we apprehended some snare; in fact, I heard the order passed for our guns to be elevated for fourteen hundred yards some time before one was fired. The calmness of the scene was sublime. No impatience, no irritation, no anxiety, except for the fort to open; and after it did open full five minutes elapsed before we answered.

“In the meantime the guns were trained as if at a target, and all the sounds I could hear were, ‘Steady! boys, steady! Left tackle a little; so! so!’ Then the roar of a broadside, and an eager cheer, as the enemy were driven from their water battery. Don’t imagine they were frightened; no man could stand under that iron shower; and the brave fellows returned to their guns as soon as it lulled, only to be driven away again.

“At twenty minutes past seven we had come within range of the enemy’s gun-boats, which opened their fire upon the Hartford, and as the Admiral told me afterward, made her their special target. First they struck our foremast, and then lodged a shot of 120 pounds in our mainmast. By degrees they got better elevation, and I have saved a splinter from the hammock netting to show how they felt their way lower. Splinters, after that, came by cords, and in size, sometimes, were like logs of wood. No longer came the cheering cry, ‘nobody hurt yet.’ The Hartford, by some unavoidable chance, fought the enemy’s fleet and fort together for twenty minutes by herself, timbers crashing, and wounded pouring down—cries never to be forgotten.”

By half-past seven the Tecumseh was well up with the fort, and drawing slowly by the Tennessee, having her on the port beam, when she suddenly reeled to port and went down, with almost every soul on board, destroyed by a torpedo. Commander Craven, in his eagerness to engage the ram, had passed to the west of the fatal buoy. If he had gone but the breadth of his beam to the eastward of it, he would have been safe, so far as the torpedoes were concerned.

This very appalling disaster was not immediately realized by the fleet. Some supposed the Tennessee had been sunk, or some signal advantage gained over the enemy, and cheers from the Hartford were taken up and echoed along the line. But the Admiral, from his lofty perch, saw the true state of things, and his anxiety was not decreased when the leading ship, the Brooklyn, just ahead of him, suddenly stopped. Hailing the top, above him, he asked Freeman, the pilot, “What is the matter with the Brooklyn? She must have plenty of water there.” “Plenty, and to spare, Admiral,” the pilot replied. Alden had seen the Tecumseh suddenly engulfed, and the heavy line of torpedoes across the channel made him pause.

The Brooklyn then began to back; the vessels in the rear pressing on those in the van soon created confusion, and disaster seemed imminent. “The batteries of our ships were almost silent,” says an eye-witness, “while the whole of Mobile Point was a living flame.

Farragut Entering Mobile Bay.

“What’s the trouble?” was shouted, through a trumpet, from the flag-ship to the Brooklyn. “Torpedoes!” was shouted back, in reply. “Damn the torpedoes!” said Farragut “Four bells! Captain Drayton, go ahead! Jouett, full speed!” And the Hartford passed the Brooklyn, assumed the head of the line, and led the fleet to victory. It was the one only way out of the difficulty, and any hesitation would have closed even this escape from a frightful disaster. Nor did the Admiral forget the few poor fellows who were struggling in the water when the Tecumseh went down, but ordered Jouett, of the Metacomet, to lower a boat and pick them up. This was done, the boat being commanded by a mere boy, an Acting Master’s mate, by the name of Henry Clay Nields, a native of Chester County, Pennsylvania, who lately died, a Lieutenant-Commander. This gallant fellow and his small boat’s crew pulled coolly into a perfect flurry of shot and shell, and while doing so (remembering the standing orders about boats showing flags), he coolly got his out and hoisted it, and then took his seat again, and steered for the struggling survivors of the Tecumseh. This was as conspicuous an act of gallantry as was performed on that eventful day.

A Confederate officer, who was stationed in the water battery at Fort Morgan, says the manœuvring of the vessels at this critical juncture was a magnificent sight. At first they appeared to be in inextricable confusion, and at the mercy of their guns, and when the Hartford dashed forward, they realized that a grand tactical movement had been accomplished.

The Hartford had passed nearly a mile ahead before the line could be straightened, but the vessels were soon able to pour in a storm of shell, shrapnel and grape, that completely silenced the batteries; not, however, before they had all suffered more or less. The Oneida, having the most exposed position, at the rear of the column, was severely handled. The wisdom of lashing the vessels two-and-two was now manifest; for this ship, though in a helpless condition, was easily towed along by her consort, the Galena, with the flood-tide. The Admiral’s theory, “that the safest way to prevent injury from an enemy is to strike hard yourself,” was exemplified in his warning to his captains, to run close to Fort Morgan, and use shell, shrapnel and grape freely. It is said that the Richmond and Brooklyn were saved from destruction at the time the line was being straightened, by the rapid broadsides of shrapnel which those ships poured into the water battery. The aim of the artillerists on shore was disconcerted by the dense smoke which enveloped the ships, and they were driven from their guns by the rapid firing. An officer who was in the engagement remarks, that it was “painfully apparent, judging from the number of shot that passed over the rail of my ship, that a few yards to the west would have increased the damage and casualties.”

As soon as the Hartford had crossed the torpedo-ground and was steaming rapidly up the channel, Buchanan, on the Tennessee, saw the blue flag of Farragut. He made a dash to ram the latter’s flag-ship, but failed to do so, the ships merely exchanging shots. By this time the Brooklyn and Richmond had passed safely over the obstructions, and were following in the wake of the Hartford. The Tennessee now turned her attention to the Brooklyn, making for her starboard bow; but when within about one hundred yards of that ship, she starboarded her helm and passed within two hundred feet of her, pouring in a broadside which went through and through her, doing great damage. Passing on, she attempted the same manœuvre with the Richmond, the next in line, apparently first attempting to ram, and then sheering off. Captain Jenkins saw her approaching, and placed marines on the forecastle, with orders to fire into the great ram’s ports whenever the iron shutters opened, at the same time giving orders to use solid shot in his heavy guns, and to aim at the Tennessee’s water-line. The two vessels passed each other at their best speed.

Whether from the rapidity of the movement or the precaution taken by Captain Jenkins to disconcert the aim of the gunners, the Tennessee’s shot passed over the Richmond.

She also missed the Lackawanna, but the fire from her heavy guns created sad havoc when they struck, while the shot from the Union fleet failed to make any impression on her mailed sides.

Captain Strong, in the Monongahela, now attempted to ram her, but she avoided the blow, and the two vessels collided at an acute angle, the ram swinging alongside of the Monongahela’s consort, the Kennebec, whose sharp cutwater sheared her barge in two. A shell from the Tennessee exploded on the Kennebec’s berth-deck, and came near setting her dangerously on fire; but, by the cool conduct of the officers, confidence was quickly restored.

The ram then attacked the crippled Oneida, running under her stern and delivering two broadsides in rapid succession, destroying her boats and dismounting a twelve-pound howitzer upon her poop. Captain Mullany was severely wounded at this time, after having escaped injury off the forts, where he had borne so heavy a fire.

The Tennessee then returned to her anchorage under the guns of Fort Morgan.

As soon as he was clear of the fire of the forts, Farragut had turned his attention to the enemy’s gun-boats. Their heavy raking fire had been a source of great annoyance. One shot from the Selma, alone, had killed ten men and wounded five. After the fleet had passed the obstructions these vessels had continued the contest, keeping up with the leading ships and exchanging shots, thus separating themselves widely from the Tennessee.

Soon the Gaines was in a sinking condition, and her commander ran her aground, under the guns of Fort Morgan, where she was afterwards set on fire.

A few minutes after she had quitted the fight, the Selma and Morgan, seeing the hopelessness of the encounter, also retreated, the former up the bay, and the latter down towards Navy Cove, some distance to the eastward.

It was then that the Admiral made the signal, “Gunboats chase enemy’s gunboats.” In a moment the Metacomet had cut the lashings which confined her to the flagship, and was off.

The Metacomet was the fastest of all the smaller vessels, and so it came that she engaged the Morgan. Just then firing was interrupted by a thick rain-squall. During the squall the Morgan, as was learned afterwards, grounded upon a long spit which runs out for about a mile from Navy Cove.

In the meantime the Metacomet, Port Royal, Kennebec, and Itasca had started after the Selma, and the Metacomet captured her, three or four miles up the bay. The Morgan backed off the shoal, and proceeded to Fort Morgan; and that same night, under a starlit sky, her captain, Harrison, made a hazardous but successful retreat up to Mobile, being pursued and fired at by several of the Union gun-boats.

Farragut’s fleet now came to anchor about three miles up the bay, with anchors hove short. They had scarcely done so when they saw the ram Tennessee steering directly for the flag-ship. Buchanan had anticipated Admiral Farragut, for the latter had intended to attack the ram the moment it was dark enough for the smoke to prevent Page, the commander of the fort, from distinguishing friend from foe. He had already made a plan to go in with the three monitors, himself in the Manhattan, and board her, if it was found feasible. He now accepted the situation, and signalled the fleet to “attack the ram, not only with their guns, but bows on, at full speed.”

The Monongahela was under way at the time, and Strong immediately dashed off for the ram at full speed; but the Tennessee paid no attention to her, merely putting her helm aport, which caused the Monongahela to strike her obliquely. The ram also fired two shots at the Monongahela, which pierced her through and through, while Strong’s shot glanced harmlessly from her sloping sides.

The Chickasaw at this time hit the ram with a solid bolt, which merely penetrated her armor, without doing serious damage.

The next vessel to bear down on the Tennessee was the Lackawanna, and she suffered more than the ram. She had a fair stroke at her, and stove her bow in for some feet above and below the water-line, while the shock to the Tennessee was slight, and she quickly righted, and moved steadily for the Hartford. The latter now took the aggressive, and, following in the wake of the Lackawanna, struck the ram a fearful blow, and then poured in a broadside, but all without effect.

The ram had one great advantage. She was surrounded by enemies, and could fire continually, while the Union vessels had to use the utmost care not to fire into or collide with one another. This did happen to the flag-ship, just as she was preparing to attack a second time, for the Lackawanna ran into her, and cut her down nearly to the water’s edge.

In the meantime the monitors, Manhattan, Winnebago and Chickasaw, had been pounding the ram with their heavy shot, and her steering apparatus and smoke-stack were shot away, and her port-shutters jammed, while one 15-inch shot had found a weak spot, and penetrated her armor. Admiral Buchanan was wounded, and the Tennessee showed a white flag and surrendered.

The success was complete, but had cost the Union fleet three hundred and thirty-five men.

Of one hundred and thirty souls in the Tecumseh, seventeen were saved, and one hundred and thirteen drowned. The other casualties, fifty-two killed and one hundred and seventy wounded, were distributed as follows: Hartford, twenty-five killed, twenty-eight wounded; Brooklyn, eleven killed, forty-three wounded; Lackawanna, four killed, thirty-five wounded; Oneida, eight killed, thirty wounded; Monongahela, six wounded; Metacomet, one killed, two wounded; Ossipee, one killed, seven wounded; Richmond, two slightly wounded; Galena, one wounded; Octorara, one killed, ten wounded; Kennebec, one killed, six wounded.

Knowles, the Signal Quartermaster already mentioned, says that the Admiral came on deck just as the poor fellows who had been killed were being laid out on the port side of the quarter-deck. He says, “It was the only time I ever saw the old gentleman cry, but the tears came in his eyes, like a little child.”

The losses among the enemy’s vessels were confined to the Tennessee and Selma—ten killed and sixteen wounded. The loss in the forts is not known.

Next morning Farragut published the following:—

(GENERAL ORDER No. 12.)

United States Flag-ship Hartford,
Mobile Bay, August 6, 1864.

“The Admiral returns thanks to the officers and crews of the vessels of the fleet for their gallant conduct during the fight of yesterday.

“It has never been his good fortune to see men do their duty with more courage and cheerfulness; for, although they knew that the enemy was prepared with all devilish means for our destruction, and though they witnessed the almost instantaneous annihilation of our gallant companions in the Tecumseh by a torpedo, and the slaughter of their friends, messmates and gun-mates on our decks, still there were no evidences of hesitation in following their Commander-in-chief through the line of torpedoes and obstructions, of which we knew nothing, except from the exaggerations of the enemy, who had given out, ‘that we should all be blown up as certainly as we attempted to enter.’

“For this noble and implicit confidence in their leader, he heartily thanks them.

“D. G. Farragut,
“Rear-Admiral Commanding W. G. B. Squadron.”

The gallantry of Acting Ensign Nields, in going to the rescue of the survivors of the Tecumseh has been alluded to. In connection with that lamentable event it is related that when the monitor was going down, Commander Craven and the pilot, whose name was Collins, met at the foot of the ladder leading to the top of the turret; Craven, knowing that it was through no fault of the pilot, but by his own order, that the course had been changed to the other side of the buoy, stepped back, saying, “After you, Pilot.” “There was nothing after me,” said Mr. Collins, in relating the event, “for when I reached the top round of the ladder the vessel seemed to drop from under me.” Among those who went down with Craven was Chief Engineer Faron, who rose from a sick bed, in the hospital at Pensacola, to go on board the Tecumseh.

Admiral Farragut highly complimented Fleet-Surgeon Palmer, for certain extra service. It happened that the Admiral’s steam barge came into the bay, under the port side of the Seminole. Fleet-Surgeon Palmer, having attended to the wounded on board the flag-ship, and leaving them in the hands of his assistants, wished to visit the wounded of the other vessels, and the Admiral gave him the steam barge. He had just shoved off when the Tennessee was seen steaming for the Hartford. The Admiral beckoned to Palmer, just before he made the general signal, and desired him to “go to all the monitors, and tell them to attack that Tennessee.” Afterwards he wrote to Dr. Palmer, and expressing some opinions in regard to war duty, says, * * * “I am happy to say that, from my own experience, war is the time when I have always found the medical officers ready and willing to do their duty without regard to personal risk.” * * *

When a shot perforated the starboard boiler of the Oneida, scalding thirteen men, one gun’s crew wavered for a moment as the steam rushed out, but, at the order of Commander Mullany, “Back to your quarters, men!” they instantly returned to their gun. Mullany soon after lost his arm, and was wounded in several other places.

The incident of Farragut’s being lashed aloft has created much controversy. The fact of his being lashed in the futtock shrouds was shown in a picture by Page, which was afterwards presented to the Emperor of Russia. The fact was, that the Admiral did not remain long anywhere. While the fleet was entering the bay, he was in the port main rigging, where he was secured by Knowles, the Quartermaster, as has been mentioned. But when the ram made her attack he had come down on deck, and, as the Hartford was about to ram the Tennessee, he got into the port mizzen rigging, where, as his Flag-Lieutenant, J. Crittenden Watson, says, “I secured him by a lashing passed with my own hands, having first begged him not to stand in such an exposed place.”

Surgeon General Palmer writes: “The Richmond waved to me as I passed in the Loyall (the steam-barge), and told me that Admiral Farragut had partly signalled for me to return, which I did immediately. When I got near enough to the Hartford, the Admiral himself hailed, and directed me to go on board the captured ram and look after Admiral Buchanan, who was wounded. It was difficult, even from a boat, to get on board the Tennessee, and I had to make a long leap, assisted by a strong man’s hand. I literally scrambled through the iron port, and threaded my way among the piles of confusion, to a ladder, by which I mounted to where Admiral Buchanan was lying, in a place like the top of a truncated pyramid. Somebody announced me, and he answered (tone polite, but savage) ‘I know Dr. Palmer;’ but he gave me his hand. I told him I was sorry to see him so badly hurt, but that I should be glad to know his wishes. He answered, ‘I only wish to be treated kindly, as a prisoner of war.’ My reply was, ‘Admiral Buchanan, you know perfectly well you will be treated kindly.’ Then he said, ‘I am a Southern man, and an enemy, and a rebel.’ I felt a little offended at his tone, but rejoined carefully that he was at that moment a wounded person and disabled, and that I would engage to have his wishes fulfilled. As to the present disposal of his person, that Admiral Farragut would take him on board the Hartford, or send him to any other ship he might prefer. He said he didn’t pretend to be Admiral Farragut’s friend, and had no right to ask favors of him, but that he would be satisfied with any decision that might be come to. Dr. Conrad, lately an assistant Surgeon in our Navy, told me he was Fleet-Surgeon, and desired to accompany Buchanan wherever he might go. (It had been proposed by Dr. Conrad to amputate the injured leg of the Confederate Admiral, but Palmer dissented from his opinion, and declined to have the operation performed, and for his skillful management of the case received grateful acknowledgments, in after life, from Buchanan.) “I promised that he should, and returned to the Hartford, and reported to Admiral Farragut, circumstantially. This generous man seemed hurt at Buchanan’s irritated feeling, and said he (Buchanan) had formerly professed friendship for him. I saw there must be some embarrassment in bringing them together, and therefore proposed that I should have a steamer to take all the wounded to Pensacola, and another one to send all ordinary invalids to New Orleans.”

To carry out this suggestion Farragut addressed a note to Brigadier-General R. L. Page, commanding Fort Morgan (formerly of the United States Navy), informing him that Admiral Buchanan and others of the Tennessee had been wounded, and desiring to know whether he would permit one of our vessels, under a flag of truce, to convey them, with or without our wounded, to Pensacola, on the understanding that the vessel should take out none but the wounded, and bring nothing back that she did not take out. This was acceded to, and all the wounded sent.

In his official report to the Navy Department, Admiral Farragut, after awarding praise to many of the officers, mentioning them by name, says, “The last of my staff to whom I would call the attention of the Department is not the least in importance. I mean Pilot Martin Freeman. He has been my great reliance in all difficulties, in his line of duty. During the action he was in the main-top, piloting the ships into the bay. He was cool and brave throughout, never losing his self-possession. This man was captured, early in the war, in a fine fishing-smack, which he owned, and though he protested he had no interest in the war, and only asked for the privilege of fishing for the fleet, yet his services were too valuable to the captors, as a pilot, not to be secured. He was appointed a first-class pilot, and has served us with zeal and fidelity, and has lost his vessel, which went to pieces on Ship Island. I commend him to the Department.”

The importance of Farragut’s success was fully appreciated, both North and South, while an English Service paper named him as “the first naval officer of the day, as far as actual reputation, won by skill, courage and hard fighting, goes.”

General Granger’s troops, after Forts Gaines and Powell had surrendered, had been transferred to the rear of Fort Morgan, and that work was invested on August 9th.

Page was summoned to surrender, but firmly refused, and seemed disposed to hold out stubbornly. It then became a question of time. Troops were poured in, heavy siege guns placed in position, and the investing lines drawn closer and closer. Even the captured Tennessee’s formidable battery was turned against the fort. A battery of four nine-inch Dahlgren guns, manned by seamen from the fleet, and under the command of Lieutenant Tyson, of the Navy, also took part in the siege. General Granger, in his report of the operations, compliments them highly, not only for their faithful work “in getting their guns into the difficult position selected for their batteries,” but for “their distinguished skill and accuracy during the bombardment.”

After a furious cannonade, on August 22d, which was gallantly responded to by Morgan, that fort surrendered unconditionally on the 23d.

The total number of prisoners captured in the defences of Mobile was one thousand four hundred and sixty-four, with one hundred and four guns.

Mobile forts being once secured, Farragut next turned his attention to the dangerous work of taking up torpedoes, twenty-one of which were picked up in the main ship channel, from which many beside had been swept away, and many had sunk.

On September 1st despatches arrived from the North, marked ‘Important.’ These proved to be from the Navy Department, warning him not to attempt an attack upon the Mobile defences unless he was sure that he had a sufficient force, as powerful reinforcements would be sent to him as soon as possible. We can imagine his satisfaction in looking round him, and feeling that the work was done.

In his congratulatory letter to Admiral Farragut, Secretary Welles said: “In the success which has attended your operations, you have illustrated the efficiency and irresistible power of a naval force led by a bold and vigorous mind, and the insufficiency of any batteries to prevent the passage of a fleet thus led and commanded.

“You have, first on the Mississippi, and recently in the bay of Mobile, demonstrated what had been previously doubted, the ability of naval vessels, properly manned and commanded, to set at defiance the best constructed and most heavily armed fortifications. In these successive victories you have encountered great risks, but the results have vindicated the wisdom of your policy and the daring valor of your officers and seamen.”

The further operations about the City of Mobile need not be gone into.

Farragut’s health had somewhat failed, with the strain of the previous two years’ work and a long stay in the Gulf climate, and he was ordered home in November, 1864. Upon his arrival in New York great preparations were made for his reception, and formal congratulations were presented to him from the City of New York; the Chamber of Commerce, and other bodies.

On December 22d a bill creating the rank of Vice-Admiral was introduced into Congress, and passed both houses. On the 23d the President signed it, and named Farragut for the office, which nomination was immediately confirmed by the Senate.

On July 25th, 1866, Congress passed a law creating the grade of Admiral, which had never before existed in our Navy, and, as a matter of course, the office was immediately conferred upon Farragut.

LE SOLFERINO (à Eperon), 1865.
(First-class French Ironclad, with Ram.)

Thus was gratified his most legitimate ambition. When there was a talk of making him a candidate for the Presidency he said, “I am greatly obliged to my friends, but am thankful that I have no ambition for anything but what I am, an Admiral.”