THE DEFENCE OF AUSTRALIA
With a total area of 2,948,000 square miles, a population of less than four and a half million, and a coast line of 11,300 miles, the continent of Australia is peculiarly open to attack, and the possibilities of invasion, or of attempts at invasion, have not only been much discussed there of late years, but they have given rise to schemes of land defence in which the building of strategical railways and the adapting of existing lines to strategical purposes form important factors.
Under present conditions Western Australia and the Northern Territory are isolated from the remaining States of the Commonwealth so far as regards rail communication, and are at the mercy of any invader who might be able to land a force there unchallenged by the British Fleet.
Since the autumn of 1912, however, there has been under construction a railway which, starting from Kalgoorlie, the eastern terminus of the Western Australian system, will proceed in a direct line for 1,063 miles to Port Augusta, on the South Australian system, thus establishing through rail connection between Perth (Western Australia) and the farthest limit of the Queensland railway system, a total distance, that is, of about 4,000 miles. When this, the first of Australia's proposed trans-continental lines, is completed, it will be possible to send troops from the Central or the Eastern States to Western Australia, not only by rail, but by a railway laid so far inland that they will be safe from attack from the sea. There would thus be a reasonable certainty of the troops arriving at their destination; whereas if they had to go by water there might be the risk of the vessels in which they were making the journey being captured by the enemy. While, therefore, the Kalgoorlie-Port Augusta line is expected to serve other than purely strategical purposes, it is, in effect, the latter which claim first consideration.
Referring to the Northern Territory, in an article contributed by him to The Empire Review for May, 1910, Mr. F. A. W. Gisborne, an authority on Australian questions, wrote:—
This vast region embraces 523,620 square miles of land, and lies close to Asia, the most populous of the continents. At present it contains, exclusive of the aborigines, barely one thousand white people and about twice as many Chinese. It lacks railway communication with the settled parts of Australia, and is completely isolated from them. Its magnificent harbour, accessible to the largest vessels afloat, and constituting the natural gateway to tropical Australia, lies, save for the British Fleet, absolutely defenceless. Behind it extend millions of acres of fertile plains never yet tilled, and never likely to be cultivated by white hands. Practically no industry flourishes in a region which could support myriads of agriculturists and operatives.
That some of the peoples of crowded Asia may, sooner or later, seek a settlement for their surplus millions on what, for them, would be so desirable a land as the Northern Territory, with its magnificent opportunities for those capable of working in a tropical climate, is a contingency that has been fully realised in Australia, and the questions have arisen (1) as to whether the presence of a thousand whites in a region half a million square miles in extent constitutes such "effective occupation" thereof as gives them a right to its exclusive possession; and (2) whether it would be possible either to prevent Asiatics from invading the Northern Territory, if they sought so to do, or to eject them therefrom if they did.
The latter question raises in an especially interesting form the problem as to the respective merits and possibilities of sea-power and rail-power.
Sea-power would, assuredly, have to be relied upon for safeguarding the Northern Territory against invasion, since it would be impossible for the Commonwealth Government to station troops at every prospective landing point along 1,200 miles of a tropical coast-line in sufficient force to keep off any invader who might appear there at some unexpected moment. For the checking, therefore, of such invasion, dependence would have to be placed on the power of the British Fleet (1) to stop the invader, (2) to cut off his connections if he should effect a landing, or (3) to carry war into the invader's own country.
Nor, if any large Asiatic settlement—as distinct from an "invasion" in the ordinary acceptation of that term—did take place in the Northern Territory under conditions that might not call for the intervention of the British Fleet, is it certain that the ejection of the settlers could be ensured with the help even of a trans-continental line of railway. Here the question is not that of the carrying power of a single line of railway. The examples offered by the War of Secession, the South African War and the Russo-Japanese War have well established the great advantages that even single lines, extending for great distances, can confer in the effecting of military transport. The considerations that would arise in Australia are, rather, (1) the fact that troops arriving at Pine Creek or Port Darwin from the south might have to make some very long and very trying marches across the 523,000 square miles comprising the Northern Territory before they reached the settlement of the Asiatics whom they were to eject, while they would be dependent for their supplies on a far-distant railway base; and (2) the doubt as to whether Australia could spare a sufficiently large body of troops to undertake such an expedition, having regard to the defence requirements of her south-eastern States, the integrity of which would count as of more vital importance than an Asiatic settlement in her Far North. So there are those who think that if such a settlement were eventually effected in the Northern Territory, under conditions not constituting a casus belli, Australia would simply have to accept the situation, and reconcile herself to it as best she could.
All these things may seem to reflect on the precise value, from the rail-power point of view, of that direct communication which, more especially for strategical reasons, Australia has hoped eventually to obtain between north and south as well as between west and east. It is, nevertheless, desirable to see what has already been done in this direction.
The construction of a north-to-south trans-continental line, passing through the very centre of the Australian mainland, and linking up the Northern Territory with the southern and eastern States, has been under discussion for a period of about forty years. Progress seemed to be assured by the Acceptance Act of 1910, under which the Government of the Commonwealth, in taking over the Northern Territory from South Australia, agreed to build a trans-continental line connecting Oodnadatta, the northern terminus of the South Australian railway system, and 688 miles from Adelaide, with Pine Creek, the southern terminus of the Northern Territory system, and 145 miles distant from Port Darwin. This connecting link would have a length of 1,063 miles,—the same, by a singular coincidence, as that of the Kalgoorlie-Port Augusta line.
Since this "bargain" between the South Australia and the Commonwealth Governments was made, there have been many advocates of an alternative, or, otherwise, a supplementary route which, instead of going direct from South Australia to the Northern Territory, (passing through the central Australian desert,) would link up—on their west—with the railway systems of Victoria, New South Wales and Queensland, connections with the new line being made by these States where necessary. This "eastern deviation route" would, it is argued, offer a greater strategical advantage, as compared with the other route, because if troops had to be despatched to the north, they could more readily be supplied from Melbourne and Sydney—which, between them, contain over one-fourth of the entire population of Australia—than from Adelaide; while to send troops from Queensland, New South Wales and Victoria to South Australia in order that they might start on their journey to the Northern Territory from Oodnadatta, would involve a material delay under, possibly, urgent conditions. Thus it is estimated that if the eastern route were adopted, troops and travellers from Brisbane to Port Darwin would only travel about 2,234 miles as against 3,691 miles via Sydney, Melbourne, Adelaide and the central Australian route from Oodnadatta.
How these rival claims and contentions will be eventually settled remains to be seen; but there has now been added to them a project for the building of other avowedly strategical lines, establishing a more direct connection between the Kalgoorlie-Port Augusta trans-continental line, when it is finished, and the capitals of Victoria, New South Wales and Queensland respectively, facilitating the mutual defence of the eastern, southern and western States in a time of crisis. This further scheme is, however, designed only to supplement the trans-continental lines already mentioned.
As regards the eastern States and the "central" State of South Australia, the question of an Asiatic invasion may be assumed not to arise. It has, however, long been regarded as possible that if Great Britain were at war with some non-Asiatic Power able to challenge her supremacy on the seas, the enemy might make an attack, not on the admittedly vulnerable Northern Territory—which he would not want either as a colony for Europeans or as a "jumping-off" place from which to conquer the remainder of Australia—but on some point along the coast-line of nearly 2,000 miles which, stretching from Rockhampton, in Queensland, to Adelaide, in South Australia, comprises (with a Hinterland of some 200 miles) the most populous, the most wealthy and (for non-Asiatics) the most desirable section of the whole Australian continent.
It is true that Germany—the Power which claims first attention from this point of view—has shown far greater desire to convert Africa into a German Empire than she has to effect the annexation of Australia. Yet that she has recognized the weakness of the Australian situation is suggested by the fact that, in dealing with the defensive power of the Commonwealth, Dr. Rohrbach, one of the exponents of German World-Policy, and author of "Deutschland unter den Weltvölkern," among other works, has declared that Australia could not resist if her four chief towns, all of them near the coast, were occupied by an invader.[87]
Which of these four towns, or which particular point along the said 2,000 miles of coast-line, an invader would select for his main attack—apart from feints elsewhere—must needs be uncertain; but this very fact only adds to the imperative importance of those responsible for the defence of Australia being able to move troops freely, and within the shortest possible period, either from one State to another or from any place to another within one and the same State, as the defence conditions might require.
When we thus pass on to consider the question as to the use of existing lines of railway in Australia for strategical purposes, we find that the most noteworthy expression of opinion on this branch of the subject is contained in the following extract from the "Memorandum" which Lord Kitchener wrote in 1910, as the result of an investigation made by him, at the request of the Commonwealth Government, into the "Defence of Australia":—
Railway construction has, while developing the country, resulted in lines that would appear to be more favourable to an enemy invading Australia than to the defence of the country. Different gauges in most of the States isolate each system, and the want of systematic interior connection makes the present lines running inland of little use for defence, although possibly of considerable value to an enemy who would have temporary command of the sea.
The "different gauges" undoubtedly constitute one of the most serious shortcomings of the existing railways in Australia in regard to those military movements with which we are here alone concerned.
Strategical considerations as applied to rail transport require, not only that troops shall be readily conveyed, when necessary, from one part of a country or one part of a continent to another, but that a mobilisation of the forces shall be followed by a mobilisation of railway rolling stock. Locomotives, carriages and trucks on lines which are not themselves likely to be wanted for military transport should be available for use on the lines that will be so wanted, in order that all the rolling stock of all the railways in all parts of the country or of the States concerned can, at a time of possibly the gravest emergency, be concentrated or employed on whatever lines, or in whatever direction, additional transport facilities may be needed.
The importance of this principle was first recognised by von Moltke; but when the railways of Australia were originally planned, each State took a more or less parochial view of its own requirements, its own geographical conditions, or its own resources, and adopted the gauge which accorded best therewith, regardless of any future need for a co-ordinated system of rail-transport serving the requirements of the Australian continent as a whole.
So we find that the 3 ft. 6 in. gauge has been adopted in Queensland, South Australia (with a further 600 miles of 5 ft. 3 in. gauge), Western Australia, and the Northern Territory; the 4 ft. 8½ in. gauge (the standard gauge in Great Britain and, also, of over 65 per cent. of the world's railway mileage,) in New South Wales; and the 5 ft. 3 in. gauge in Victoria. This means, in most cases, that when the frontier of a State is reached, passengers, mails, baggage and merchandise must change or be transferred from the trains on the one system to those of the other.
Assuming that the west-to-east trans-continental railway (which is being built with the 4 ft. 8½ in. gauge) were now available for use, a traveller by it from Perth, Western Australia, through South Australia, Victoria, New South Wales, and Queensland would require, on account of the differences in gauge, to change trains at least five times. This may be regarded as an extreme case; but the evils of the existing conditions are presented to us in a concrete form by an estimate which the Defence Department of the Commonwealth recently made as to the time it would take to move a force of 30,000 mounted troops from Melbourne to Brisbane. It was shown that, with the present break of gauge, this operation would occupy no less a time than sixty-three days; whereas if there were no break of gauge twenty-three days would suffice. Thus the differences of gauge would mean a loss of forty days in effecting transfers at the frontier. In this time much might happen if the enemy had obtained temporary control of the sea. Under these conditions, in fact, he would be able to move his own forces by sea for the still longer distance from Adelaide to Brisbane in five days. Brisbane might thus be captured by the enemy while the reinforcements it wanted were still changing trains at the State boundaries.
It may be of interest here to recall the fact that at one time there were still greater differences of gauge on the railways in the United States; that in 1885 the American railway companies resolved upon establishing uniformity as a means of overcoming the great inconveniences due to these conditions; and that in 1886, after adequate preparation, the conversion of practically the entire system of railways in the United States to the 4 ft. 8½ in. gauge was effected in two days. Strategically, therefore, the United States Federal Government could now, not only send troops by rail from any one part of their vast territory to another, but utilise almost the whole of the available rolling stock for military purposes.[88]
Unification of gauge forms, however, a serious proposition for Australia on account of the prodigious outlay which, owing to the short-sighted policy of the past, it would now involve.[89]
The estimated cost of converting all the 4 ft. 8½ in. gauge in New South Wales and all the 3 ft. 6 in. gauge in Queensland, South Australia, Western Australia and the Northern Territory to the 5 ft. 3 in. gauge of Victoria is no less than £51,659,000. To convert all the 3 ft. 6 in. and 5 ft. 3 in. railways to the 4 ft. 8½ in. gauge of the New South Wales lines would cost £37,164,000. To convert to the 4 ft. 8½ in. gauge all the trunk lines connecting the capitals—and this without shortening the present circuitous routes or modifying the heavy grades—would alone cost about £12,000,000.
In addition to this still undecided "battle of the gauges" there are in Australia other disadvantages, from a strategical standpoint, in the existing railway system, included therein being (1) an undue preponderance of single over double track, so that any exceptional amount of traffic causes a congestion which is likely only to be aggravated by new lines constructed, or extensions made, before the carrying capacity of the trunk lines has been increased; and (2) the building of lines which either lead nowhere or have been expressly stopped short of the boundaries of a State in order to retain, for the railways of that State, traffic from outlying districts which would pass, by a much shorter journey, to the port of a neighbouring State if, by means of through railway connexion, the residents in the districts concerned were free to avail themselves of their geographical advantage in respect to their nearness to such port.
In addition to the efforts she has already made, or is proposing to make, to effect such improvement both in her railway system and in her military transport facilities as may be practicable, Australia has sought to provide for that effective organisation without which, as experience elsewhere has fully shown, great and even disastrous confusion may arise at a critical moment owing to conflicts of authority and other troubles or difficulties in the working of such railways as may be utilised for military movements.
The action taken in this direction is based on a further recommendation made by Lord Kitchener, who, in the course of his Memorandum to the Commonwealth Government in 1910 said (paragraph 85):—
Preparation for mobilisation is primarily the work of the General Staff, who recommend the lines to be followed and advise where, and in what quantities, the munitions of war of the various units should be stored. Concentration can only be satisfactorily effected when the railway and military authorities are in the closest touch, and work in absolute harmony. To secure this co-operation, I advise that a War Railway Council be formed, as is the case in the United Kingdom, composed of the Chief Railway Commissioner from each State, under the presidency of the Quartermaster-General of the Citizen Forces, and with an officer of the Headquarters Staff as secretary.
A War Railway Council for the Commonwealth was duly constituted in 1911. The Council, which forms an adjunct of the Commonwealth Defence Department, consists of the Quartermaster-General, (president,) the senior officer of the Engineer and Railway Staff Corps also created for the railway system alike of the Commonwealth and of each State (such senior officer being the Chief or the Deputy Commissioner of Railways); the Consulting Military Engineer of the Commonwealth, and two representatives of the naval and military forces, with a military officer as secretary. The duties of the Council in time of peace are, generally, to furnish advice to the Minister of Defence on railway matters, and, particularly (a) to determine the method of supplying information to, and obtaining it from, the different railway departments; (b) to suggest regulations and instructions for carrying out movement of troops; (c) to suggest the method of organising railway staff officers in time of war to act as intermediaries between the various railway authorities and the troops; (d) to consider the question of extra sidings, loading platforms, etc.; and proposals for unification of gauges; and (e) to suggest the organisation and system of training of railway troops. In time of war the Council further advises the Minister of defence on questions of mobilisation. The organisation for military rail-transport in the several States follows on the lines of the system already adopted in the United Kingdom, as laid down in the Field Service Regulations.