The Rise of Rail-Power in War and Conquest, 1833-1914

by Edwin A. Pratt

The Herero Rising

The attainment of this higher purpose seemed likely to be furthered as the result of the steps taken to suppress the risings of the Hereros and the Hottentots between the years 1903 and 1907. Not only did the reinforcements sent out from Germany assume such proportions that at one time the Germans are said to have had no fewer than 19,000 men under arms in the Protectorate, but the troops took with them a plentiful supply of pom-poms, mountain guns, field guns and Maxims of various kinds, the Revue Militaire des Armées Étrangères being led to remark thereon that "the German columns had an unusually large proportion of artillery, roughly two batteries to three companies of mounted infantry; and it is difficult to believe that so many guns were necessary, especially as the Hereros had no artillery at all.[58] Probably," the Revue continued, "the artillery could have been dispensed with altogether; and had this been done, the columns would have been rendered more mobile."

The military measures taken appeared to be in excess of requirements even when allowance was made for the fact that the campaign was fought in difficult country and that the Germans themselves lost about 5,000 men; but the real significance of the policy adopted lay in the keeping of a considerable proportion of the German expeditionary force in the colony after the rising had, with German thoroughness, been effectively crushed.

This procedure attracted attention and adverse comment even in Germany, where doubts were already being entertained as to whether good value was being received for the £30,000,000 which the suppression of the troubles had cost. It was, however, made clear that the still considerable body of German troops left in the colony was being kept on hand there in case of the opportunity arising for its employment in another direction—that, namely, of achieving Germany's aspirations in regard to the conquest of British South Africa, and the final elimination of British influence from Africa in general.

Evidence both as to the nature of these continued aspirations and as to the further purpose it was hoped the troops on the spot might effect was forthcoming in various directions.

In a book of 416 pages, published in 1905, under the title of "Das neue Südafrika," Dr. Paul Samassa emphasised the part which the German people had taken in the settlement of South Africa; pointed to the close relationship and affinity of feeling between Germans and Boers; encouraged the idea of their mutually looking forward to the opening up of South Africa as "a land of settlement for the German race," and said, further:—

German South-West Africa is, to-day, a strong tramp card in our hands, from the point of view of Weltpolitik. In England much has been said of late as to what a good thing it would be for that country if our fleet were annihilated before it became dangerous.... On our side we might cool these hot-heads, and strengthen the peace party in England, if we reminded them that, whatever the loss to ourselves of a war with that country, England would run a greater risk—that of losing South Africa. We have in German South-West Africa to-day about 12,000 troops, of whom one-half will remain there for a considerable time. In the event of a war between Germany and England the South African coast would naturally be blockaded by England; and there would then be nothing left for our troops to do but to go on to Cape Colony—for their food supplies.

In so doing they could, he argued, count upon the support of the Boers, of whom there were 14,000 opposed to the English at the end of the South African war. As against this possible concentration of German troops and Boers there was the fact that the English garrison in South Africa did not exceed 20,000. So, he added, the people in England could consider "what an incalculable adventure a war with Germany might be, notwithstanding the superiority of the English fleet."

Speaking in the Reichstag in February, 1906, Herr Ledebour called attention to the fact that Major von François, who at one time was in command of German South-West Africa, had declared, in his book, "Nama und Damara," issued three months previously, that fewer than one thousand troops would suffice to maintain order in the colony; and Herr Ledebour added:—"For two years imaginative Pan-German politicians have been disseminating the idea that a large force must be maintained in South-West Africa for the purpose of exercising in the sphere of Weltpolitik pressure upon England, with the eventual object of invading Cape Colony."

There is the testimony, also, of "An Anglo-German," who, in the course of an article on "German Clerks in British Offices," published in The London Magazine for November, 1910, tells the following story:—

During a recent stay in Germany I was introduced by a man I know to be one of the chief functionaries of the Commerce Defence League[59] to a friend of his who had just returned from German South-West Africa. On a subsequent meeting I entered into conversation with this gentleman, and made inquiries about German progress in that part of the world. He answered my questions without reserve. Little headway was being made, and little was looked for. Men and money were being freely expended, without present return. The only good harbour (Walfisch Bay) is a British possession, as likewise are all the islands of any value which are dotted along the coast.

"Why then," was my inevitable query, "do the Germans persist in their occupation of the country?"

He smiled craftily.

"We Germans look far ahead, my friend," he replied. "We foresee a British débácle in South Africa, and we are on the spot. Thanks to the pioneers of our excellent League, our plans are all matured. The League finances the scheme and the Imperial Government supplies the military forces. By cession—or otherwise—Walfisch Bay will before long be German territory; but in the meantime British Free Trade opposes no obstacle to us, and we can pursue our purpose unmolested."

"But what is that purpose?" I asked, with the object of leading him on.

"Surely you are not so blind as to need enlightenment!" was his reply. "Germany has long regarded South Africa as a future possession of her own. When the inevitable happens, and Great Britain finds her hands full elsewhere, we are ready to strike the moment the signal is given, and Cape Colony, Bechuanaland, Rhodesia—all frontier States—will fall like ripe apples into our grasp."

In order, however, that Germany might be prepared thus to take action at a moment's notice, two things were essential, in addition to having troops on the spot, namely, (1) that the colony should possess railways within striking distance alike of the Cape, of Bechuanaland and of Rhodesia; and (2) that the military preparations as a whole should be so complete as to be ready for any emergency.