Transport Conditions
The need for the elaborate organisation thus brought into existence was all the greater because of the difficulties by which those responsible for the conduct of military transport were faced.
In November, 1899, considerable portions of the lines both in Cape Colony and in Natal were in the possession of the Boers, so that, beyond a certain distance, the British would have to fight for every mile of railway before they could make use of it. After, also, regaining possession of the lines on British territory controlled by the Boers, they would require first to capture and then to operate those on the enemy's territory; and in each case they would have to be prepared to repair the damage the enemy would be certain to do to the lines in order to prevent their use by the advancing forces. Meanwhile the traffic must be kept open, as far as possible, for the conveyance of troops and stores to the theatre of war and for the carrying out of such strategic movements as the requirements of the military situation might render necessary, adequate protection of the lines being meanwhile assured. There were, in fact, occasions when the whole issue of the campaign seemed to turn upon the question as to whether or not the British could either secure possession of the railways or, alternatively, repair them as fast, more or less, as the enemy could demolish them.
Although, again, so elaborate a system of organisation had been arranged, there was much that required to be done to adapt it to the conditions of African warfare. Initial mistakes had to be remedied; old evils reappeared in new forms; regulations had to be made or modified according to experiences gained; and, while there was at no time any general failure of transport, there certainly were partial failures. Not only was there an inadequate supply of trucks, partly because of the considerable number in the Boer States at the time of the declaration of war and partly because of the number locked up in Kimberley and Mafeking, but trucks were kept loaded when they should have been promptly unloaded and released for service elsewhere; lines were seriously blocked at critical moments by these loaded trucks, while chaos in certain large troop movements was only avoided owing to the control of Cape Town facilities by the Director's staff and to the fact that the Deputy-Assistant-Directors of Railways were enabled to have special officers at all important points.