CHAPTER XX
“Never Greece, never Rome, never any people of the ancient world, exposed the motives of its independence with a more noble simplicity, nor based them upon more evident truths.”
Gudin de la Brenellerie, Histoire de Beaumarchais.
The Declaration of Independence and Its Effect in Europe—Beaumarchais’s Activity in Getting Supplies to America—Difficulties Arise About Sailing—Treachery of du Coudray—Lafayette’s Contract with Deane—His Escape to America—Beaumarchais’s Losses—Baron von Steuben Sails for America in Beaumarchais’s Vessel, Taking the Latter’s Nephew, des Epinières, and His Agent, Theveneau de Francy—The Surrender of Burgoyne—Beaumarchais Finds Himself Set Aside While Others Take His Place—Faces Bankruptcy—Vergennes Comes to His Assistance.
“THE Act,” says Doniol (I, p. 561), “which proclaimed to the civilized world the institution of the American Republic and which was destined to open a new phase of civilization, was announced in Europe only as an incident, secondary to the resistance of the rebels.
“The English Government would not admit that the solemn act produced any visible emotion in London. In the beginning Garnier, the French Ambassador, was no more struck than the cabinet of London by the page of political philosophy put into being by the declaration of Congress, and which was to respond so loudly in the country of Voltaire and the Encyclopædia.” In France, “when it became known,” continues Doniol, “it produced the most vivid sensation which was possible to create a century ago by the means of publicity then existing.”
But though the action of the colonies was greeted with wild enthusiasm by the populace, the government remained cold and undemonstrative. Silas Deane had written to Congress, January 17, 1777, “The hearts of the French people are universally for us and the opinion for an immediate war with Great Britain is very strong, but the court has its reasons for postponing a little longer.”
The chief cause of the apparent inaction of the government arose from the ruined condition of its finances. Beaumarchais, as was seen in the last chapter, already had been commissioned to draw up a plan of finance which should aid in the present crisis. This he had done, basing his scheme of reform upon the wise and prudent measures adopted by the great Sully. He endeavored to prove that these reforms would, if put into execution, cause such an increase of revenue as would enable France safely to declare war, without increasing the rate of taxation or incurring the risk of bankruptcy. His scheme, however, had been set aside. On the 30th of March, 1777, he addressed a lengthy memoir to the prime minister, M. le Comte de Maurepas, of which the following is an extract: “... I have doubtless explained badly my ideas of help for the Americans, since it seems that you have not adopted them. The fear of giving you too much to read makes me concise to the point of being perhaps obscure.... Read the letter of M. Deane.... Judge if a good Frenchman, a zealous subject of the King, a good servitor of M. de Maurepas, who respects him and wishes to see his administration honored among all the people of the world, judge if he can support your constant refusal to lend him a hand, the earnest solicitations of America at bay, and the insolent triumph of armed England.... M. le Comte, spare your servitors the sorrows of one day hearing you reproached with having been in a position to save America at small cost and you have not done it, to tear her from the yoke of England and to unite her to us by commerce, and that you have neglected it.
“Hear me, I pray you; you distrust too much your own powers and my resources; and above all I fear that you do not sufficiently esteem the empire, which your age and your wisdom gives you over a young prince whose heart is formed, but whose politics are still in the cradle. You forget that that fresh young soul has been turned and brought back from very far. He is tractable, helpless, weak in his whole being. You forget that while dauphin, Louis XVI had an invincible repugnance to the old parliaments, yet that their recall honored the first six months of his reign; you forget also that he swore never to be vaccinated, yet that eight days afterwards he had the vaccine in his arm. No one is ignorant of this, and no one will excuse you for not employing the beautiful power of your place in causing to be adopted the great things which you have in your mind.
“If you find my liberties too daring, go back to their respectful motives, and you will pardon them to my attachment.
“It was not play on my part, M. le Comte, when attaching myself to you, I said with feeling: ‘I shall never have a day of true happiness, if your administration passes away without having accomplished the three greatest acts which could illustrate it: the humiliation of England by the union of America and France; the re-establishment of the finances, following the plan of Sully, which I have placed several times at your feet, and the rendering of civil existence to protestants.... These three things are to-day in your hands; I wish only the honor of having often recalled them to you. What work, M. le Comte, what success more beautiful, could crown your career? After such actions, there is no death. The dearest existence of man, his reputation, survives all and becomes eternal. Hear me then, I beg you, in favor of the Americans. Remember that the deputies await my answer to dispatch a courier who will carry encouragement or desolation into Congress.... Do not render my pains unfruitful, through not concurring in them, and may the recompense of my works be the honor of having made them acceptable to you!
“I am, with the most respectful devotion, M. le Comte,
“Your very, etc.,
“de Beaumarchais.”
To all this Maurepas made no reply, and the unhappy agent, still harassed and thwarted in his plans, wrote to Vergennes:
“April 13, 1777.
“... If I do my duty, as M. de Maurepas had before the goodness to say to me, in presenting without ceasing and under all its faces, the picture of so important an affair, permit me to represent to you, M. le Comte, what you know better than I, that loss of time, silence and indecision are even worse than refusal. Refusal is a deed, one can act afterwards, but from nothing, nothing ever comes—it remains nothing....”
GENERAL JOHN SCHUYLER
In the same letter he warmly pleaded his own cause. “In so far as I work alone,” he said, “my secret is secure. If the indiscretion of the officers of the Amphitrite and their foolish chief make known the destination of the vessel, what can I do more than you? I defy any man in this country, beginning with the ministers themselves, to cite either what name, what charge, from what port and for what destination I have sent the vessels dispatched since.... In a word, M. le Comte, now that all is in operation, when the first pains and labors of so vast an establishment have obtained a certain success, when my profound disdain for the idle gossip of society has turned aside the babblers and now that I can assure the happy consequence of the enterprise, do you refuse to concur any longer? and does my active perseverance inspire the same in no one?... In the name of Heaven, of honor, of the interests of France, retard no longer your decision, M. le Comte! Confer again with M. de Maurepas. No object is more important, and none so pressing.
“In the instant of closing this letter, I receive one from Nantes, by which I am informed of the refusal to provide sailors, and so my richest ship is stopped at the moment it is ready to sail.... I implore you, M. le Comte, promptly to arrange with M. de Sartine what is necessary for the departure of my vessel.... I hope to go myself for your orders upon very many objects Thursday evening, if you do not send them before. I recommend the Americans to your remembrance and their advocate to your good will.... The hour of the post has passed while I was writing. I send this therefore by a man on horseback.”
In striking contrast to the outspoken and independent tone assumed by Beaumarchais when addressing the ministers, is the friendly yet authoritative manner which he employs when it is question of a subordinate. To de Francy, his confidential agent, he had written February 28, 1777, in relation to the dispatching of the Amphitrite, after it had been brought back by du Coudray: “We shall have to say, like Bartholo (one of the characters in the Barbier de Séville) ‘le diable est entré dans mon affaire,’ and remedy as best we may the evil that is past, by preventing its happening again. Give the enclosed letter to M. du Coudray. I send it to you open, in order that you may reply in my behalf to his objections, should he make any. Show to Captain Fautrelle, the enclosed order which we give him, in quality of proprietor of the vessel which he commands, and take his word of honor to conform to it entirely. I received yesterday a letter from my nephew along with yours. As unreasonable as the rest of them, my nephew seems to be unwilling to go back to his place on the Amphitrite. You can understand the little attention which I pay to such childishness. Simply recommend him again to the special care of M. de Conway and to the Chevalier de Bore. Command the captain to receive on board M. le Marquis de la Rouërie, who comes to us with special recommendations. Give to the Captain the general rule and the secret of the route. If the force of circumstances obliges him to put into Santo Domingo, arrange with him and M. de Conway not to stop there, but to write to the governor of the island in order to notify him that the fear of some unlucky encounter, alone prompted the drawing up of the fictitious order in regard to the destination of the Amphitrite, and take from him a new fictitious order for France, in order to shelter yourself by that order in case you encounter an English vessel between Santo Domingo and the true destination of the ship. You know very well that all the precautions of the Ministry are taken in accord with us; it is upon this that we can count.
“As soon as the Amphitrite has set sail, go on to Nantes, where, by the way, you will probably find le Mercure started, because it is ready now to set sail. Good-bye, my dear Francy. Come quickly back to Paris. You have trotted about enough for this time; other work awaits you here: but I will be there to divide it with you. Bring me back this letter.”
The fear of a possible reconciliation of the colonies with Great Britain, which constantly haunted the agent of the French Government, had of late been greatly augmented. The 8th of March, 1777, he had written to Vergennes:
“Sunday morning.
“M. le Comte; Another letter you will say. Will they never stop! Eh! how can I stop, M. le Comte, when new objects unceasingly excite my attention and my vigilance? A private secretary of Lord Germaine arrived yesterday, secretly sent to Messrs. Deane and Franklin. He brings propositions of peace. The most superb recompenses are promised him if he succeeds.”...
Monday morning, he wrote ... “America is doing the impossible to hold her own. But be sure that she cannot go much farther without you, or without a reconciliation with Great Britain.... While I am treating with you, I warn you that England is secretly attempting to treat with M. Franklin.... Deane is regarded as a formidable obstacle to any project of adjustment: They will attempt to dislodge him at whatever price. My news is so positive as to the intention of the ministers that my conjectures become facts. They have the project to compel Deane to leave France, and to make of him the expiatory victim.” A short time before Beaumarchais had written to the same minister: “The doctor Franklin at this moment, wishes to send away M. Deane from France. My special object is to prevent his leaving. The manly firmness of this Republican alone, can arrest the insinuations of every kind employed against the doctor.”
As a matter of fact, Franklin was well aware of the dismay which the noise of his secret communications with agents of Great Britain had caused the ministers, nor did he desire to allay their suspicions. He knew well the value for France of an alliance with the colonies, at least supposing the fact of their independence. He knew, also, how far it was to the interest of England to prevent such an alliance. So long as France remained outwardly inactive, Franklin did nothing to allay the fears of the one government nor to weaken the hopes of the other, although there can be no doubt that in his heart he was bent only upon concluding a treaty with France. In March, 1777, he wrote: “I did not come to make peace, but to procure the aid of European powers to permit us to defend our liberty and our independence, which it is certainly to their interest to guarantee, because our great and growing commerce will be open, and cease to be the monopoly of England.... I think we shall be capable with a little help, of defending our possessions long enough, so that England will be ruined if she persists in destroying us.... I flatter myself to live to see my country established in peace and prosperity, while Great Britain will no longer be so formidable a figure among the powers of Europe.” There also seems no doubt but that he had at last secretly concurred with Deane in aiding the escape of Lafayette from the restrictions imposed upon him by the French government, although subsequently, the whole blame was allowed to rest upon Deane alone.
The situation in regard to Lafayette was as follows: Some time during the year 1775, the young Marquis who was then scarcely eighteen, and who was serving under the Comte de Broglie at the garrison of Metz, was present at a dinner given in the fortress where the English Duke of Gloucester was guest. The latter was bitterly opposed to the policy of George III in regard to America, and at table spoke freely of the uprising among the colonists; it was then, so Lafayette tells us in his memoirs, that he formed the resolution of offering his services to the insurgents. Through the intervention of De Broglie, the Baron von Kalb, a Prussian general serving in France, introduced to Silas Deane on November 5, 1776, the young marquis with two of his cousins who had formed the same determination to offer their services to America. Silas Deane received them with enthusiasm, and promised all high positions in the American Army (see Doniol Vol. II, p. 63). Eleven other officers were added and the entire group were to sail from Havre on La Seine, one of the fleet of Hortalès et Cie. when the order already spoken of, came from the government to prevent further operations of the house. Moreover, a special prohibition was issued regarding the young officers, because it was of great importance for the French Government to seem to oppose the enlistment of such prominent members of the high nobility as Lafayette and his colleagues. Nothing daunted, Lafayette, whose fortune made him independent, bought a vessel of his own, La Victoire, and having decided “to go in spite of everything and without regard to consequences” secretly negotiated with Deane, and set sail, April 20, 1777, with some twenty other commissioned officers.
The agreement which had been drawn up between them was signed by Lafayette, the Baron von Kalb, and Silas Deane; it bore the date of December 7, 1776, although it was not really issued until February, 1777. This discrepancy was owing to the fact that since the arrival of Franklin in December, Deane’s commission had changed in nature, so that he no longer was empowered to enlist officers for the American service. The date of December 7, 1776 had been chosen because on that day the two noblemen had been presented to the American Commissioner and an informal engagement entered into. This was immediately before the arrival of Franklin in France.
The true patriotism which inspired Deane led him to adopt this subterfuge, feeling as he did that the services of so brilliant an officer as Lafayette, and one belonging to such an illustrious house, would be of sufficient value to his country to warrant the irregularity of the act. The Baron von Kalb had originally, it would seem, stipulated with Deane for a considerable salary, part of which was to be paid in advance. (See Our French Allies, Stone, p. 39.) Deane rightly understood the effect which would be produced in the different courts of Europe by the daring deed of the young nobleman and foresaw the consequent fury of the English which could not help but hasten the final decision of the ministry. Therefore he willingly concurred in the designs of Lafayette, aiding them to the utmost of his power (Doniol, Vol. II, Chap. VII). Congress afterwards disavowed all the commissions granted by Deane, so that most of the officers were obliged to return to France. Lafayette and the Baron von Kalb, having fortunes of their own, were willing to serve without pay; they were therefore given appointments. The romantic escape of the young nobleman caused all the commotion that was expected of it. The Capital went wild with exultation, openly vindicating his act, while the anger of the English knew no bounds.
England, indeed, had good grounds for discontent with the conduct of her rival. “Public opinion in London,” says Doniol, “was more and more for war. France everywhere was accused of aiding the colonies.... It was said that open war was preferable to the insidious peace which we pretended to maintain while according every advantage to the revolted colonies.”—(Doniol II, p. 455.) Other causes of grievance, especially in regard to the protection granted to American vessels in all French ports, were constantly coming up. “England,” says Doniol, “incriminated especially the authorities of Martinique. According to Lord Weymouth, the Americans armed openly in the island, favored by the most notable persons. So much pressure was brought to bear upon the French Government by the English Ambassador, that, not yet ready for war, it was forced to grant the satisfaction which was demanded. As in previous instances, the blow fell heaviest upon Beaumarchais. July 1, 1777, he wrote:
“I have just received news that afflicts me.... M. de Bouille, the new governor of Martinique, has notified the merchants that it is agreed between the courts of France and England, that the English Navy seize the French vessels coming from their islands, taking all the commodities of America which they find.... This is so impossible, that though I have read it, I still cannot believe it!
“Afternoon.... I am indeed, in despair to receive the confirmation of that trying announcement. It seems certain that France has ceded to the English the right to seize all French vessels coming from the islands, which are charged with American commodities. What distress, M. le Comte, could have brought about such an arrangement?... I learn by letters from Cape Francis of the 18th of May, that the cargo of the Amétie, happily arrived in that port, has started for America, divided on several American and Bermudan vessels, bought at my cost at Santo Domingo for....
“P. S. You are not to blame, M. le Comte, for the consequences of that sorrowful convention with the English. Your hands were tied to sign it. But I am in despair. I made my payment of the 30th yesterday, selling all the paper money which I had, at a disadvantage. A quarter of an hour is so important, that a million arriving the next day could not repair the lack of but thirty thousand louis d’or. I was compelled to pay yesterday £184,328 2s., and £21,864 8s. 4d. remain unpaid from the 15th on which I have only received £200,000 instead of £221,864 8s. 4d. From now until the 15th, I must pay £268,304 8s. 3d. I am lacking therefore £490,168 16s. 7d. with the loss of my paper money, and the three last payments which I must replace so as to be abreast of my affairs. I therefore beg you to send me an order for 5,000,000 fr., after that I can go forward, but as my destination is not a matter of indifference, I shall have the honor of conferring with you about it.”
The documents deposited in the bureau of foreign affairs, show that M. de Vergennes “taking into consideration the desperate situation into which Beaumarchais found himself thrown, owing to the obstinate refusal of Congress to send him returns, had advanced successively, the 13th May, 1777, 400,000 livres, the 16th of June, 200,000 livres, and the 3rd of July 474,496 livres.” (Loménie II, p. 145.) By this means alone, Beaumarchais was able to continue his active services in the cause of America.
Although the court of Louis XVI were making pretense of not favoring the Americans, they already had decided on war and were endeavoring to bring the court of Spain to a similar decision.
“The 26th of June,” says Doniol, “a memoir was addressed to the Spanish cabinet explaining the seasonableness of associating themselves positively with the colonies, and in consequence, of making war upon England.”
“By the means so far employed,” wrote Vergennes, “the reconciliation of the colonies with Great Britain cannot be prevented; those means have been all that have been prudent, but they will not suffice any longer; it is necessary that the assistance become sufficiently effective to assure a total separation and so compel the Americans to gratitude.”
Madrid was finally forced to follow the course laid out for it at Versailles; but before openly declaring their alliance, both courts awaited some decisive act of the Americans. The capture of Burgoyne determined the King, although several months more elapsed before the treaty was actually signed.
But if the court was thus apparently inactive, Beaumarchais continued as assiduous as ever in aiding the Americans, and this notwithstanding the coldness of the commissioners, the total absence of returns and the unbroken silence of the Continental Congress. The Hon. John Bigelow, in his admirable paper Beaumarchais, the Merchant, speaking of Beaumarchais at this period, said: “He received no tobacco, nor money, nor thanks, nor even a letter from Congress.... His funds were exhausted, and all his expectations of returns were disappointed.... At last, reduced to extremities, he resolved to send a confidential agent to the United States, to obtain, if possible some explanation of results so chilling to his enthusiasm, and for which he was so poorly prepared. For this mission he selected a young man named Theveneau de Francy, a person of considerable talent, generous and enthusiastic, but poorly trained for the delicate duty assigned him. De Francy embarked for the United States at Marseilles on the 26th of September, 1777, on board of one of Beaumarchais’s ships, carrying twenty-four guns, called Le Flammand.”
“De Francy,” says Loménie, “went out with the double mission of obtaining justice from Congress for the past, and to prevent cargoes from being delivered gratis in the future.”
But before entering into a consideration of his mission, let us pause to note among the passengers of the Flammand a now justly celebrated personage, who was destined to render such effective aid in training the American troops; this was Baron von Steuben. In his life of that famous Prussian officer, Frederick Kapp has given a detailed account of the incidents which led up to his entering the American service. The French minister of war, the Comte de St. Germain, had long been a pronounced admirer of the military tactics employed by the king of Prussia. He had endeavored to have those tactics introduced into the French army but without success. Being on intimate terms with the Baron, the latter made a halt in Paris with the intention of visiting his friend at Versailles on the occasion of a voyage to England in the spring of 1777. Having notified the count of his desire to wait upon him, the Baron was surprised to be requested not to come to Versailles, but to meet him at the arsenal in Paris. “You have arrived very apropos,” the count said; opening a map and pointing to America, he continued, “Here is your field of action, here is the Republic you must serve. You are the very man she needs at this moment. If you succeed, your fortune is made and you will acquire more glory than you can hope for in Europe for many years to come.” He then pictured the bravery, the resources of the Americans, and intimated the possibility of an open alliance. After this he sketched the other side of the situation; spoke of the disadvantages under which the Americans labored: bad training, lack of order and discipline among the troops, and ended by saying “You see now why you must not be seen at Versailles.” The Baron, however, seemed but little touched by the eloquent appeal of his friend. He told the count that he was no longer young, that he had no ambition; though he was without fortune, yet his position was all that he desired.
After a second interview, his interest seemed somewhat aroused. The Count gave him a letter to Beaumarchais, who introduced him to Deane; and Deane took him to Passy to see Franklin. Both commissioners seemed anxious that Steuben should enter the service. “But,” says his biographer, “when Steuben mentioned a disbursement for the expenses of his journey, they expressed some doubts of their power to grant it. Mr. Deane made no difficulties; Franklin, however, made several. He spoke a great deal of presenting him with a couple of thousand acres of land,... but Steuben did not care for them.... As to any advances, Franklin positively declared that it was out of the question; he told him this with an air and manner to which Steuben, as he remarked in a letter written at that time, ‘was then little accustomed,’ whereupon he immediately took leave, without any further explanation.
“He went thence to M. de Beaumarchais, telling him that he intended to set out immediately for Germany, and that he did not wish to hear any more of America. As soon as Beaumarchais was informed of the cause of Steuben’s resolution, he said to him, that if he wanted nothing but money, a thousand louis d’or and more were at his disposal. Steuben thanked him for his generous offer, but said his determination was fixed. The Count of St. Germain endeavored to dissuade him, but to no effect.
“Arrived at Rastadt, he found a very persuasive letter from M. de Beaumarchais, who wrote that the Comte de St. Germain expected his prompt return to Versailles; that a vessel was ready at Marseilles for his embarkation, and that Beaumarchais’s funds were entirely at the Baron’s disposal.
“Prince William of Baden, with whom Steuben conferred, urged him to accept; accordingly he returned to Paris, August 17, 1777.”
On the 26th of September he set sail. Beaumarchais wrote to Congress:
“The art of making war successfully being the fruit of courage combined with prudence, knowledge and experience, a companion in arms of the great Frederic, who stood by his side for twenty-two years, seems one of the men best fitted to second M. Washington.”
Baron von Steuben was well received in America. As he asked for no pay, and wished to enter the army as a simple volunteer, no objection was made to his enlistment. He soon was raised to a position suitable to his rank and talents. A little more than a year after his arrival, Beaumarchais, overjoyed at the success which had attended the Baron, wrote to his agent, Theveneau de Francy: “Recall me often to the memory of M. the Baron von Steuben.
“I congratulate myself from that which I learn of him, to have given so great an officer to my friends, the free men of America, and to have forced him in a way to follow that noble career. I am in no way disquieted about the money that I lent him for his voyage. Never have I made an investment which gave me greater pleasure, because I have been able to put a man of honor in his true place. I learn that he is Inspector General of all the American troops. Bravo! Tell him that his glory is the interest of my money, and that I do not doubt but at that title, he will pay me with usury.”
On the same vessel went also the nephew of Beaumarchais, the son of his elder sister married to the watchmaker, De Lépine, who on entering the American service took the name of des Epinières. It was the same of whom Beaumarchais had spoken impatiently on the occasion of his refusing to continue his voyage upon the Amphitrite, when du Coudray had brought that vessel back to port. That he had his way, is proved by the fact that his name is mentioned amongst the six aids who accompanied the Baron von Steuben to America. An idea of the young man’s character may be gained from the following brief extract of a letter written by him the evening of an engagement: “Your nephew,” he wrote, “my very dear Uncle, may perhaps lose his life, but he will never do a deed unworthy of one who has the honor of belonging to you. This is as certain as the tenderness which he always will have for the best of uncles.” According to Loménie, he never returned to France, but died on the field of battle, after having attained the rank of Major.
At the time when the Baron von Steuben set sail for America, Beaumarchais was no longer the confidential agent of the government. As has been seen, Franklin had from the first, refused to treat with him, while Lee’s influence at home and abroad was at all times used to bring about his ruin. More than this “everything,” says Doniol, “seemed to cost too much; they (Franklin and Lee) had allowed themselves to be persuaded that Beaumarchais ought to serve them for nothing. The Barbier de Séville, as he was called familiarly, passed with too many people for gaining great profit, for there not to be many interested in ruining him. It was also of the utmost importance to England to interfere with his operations, and the English Ambassador fed the flames.... Dubourg had his part to play ... but whatever the reasons, it remains true that Franklin never missed an opportunity openly to contest the operations of Roderigue Hortalès et Cie., and to attempt to bring them to naught.” (Doniol II, 611.) Other intermediaries, therefore, began to be employed.
Although less recognition was given to Beaumarchais by the government, the ministers continued to make use of his advice. “At the moment,” says Doniol, “when he was treated with the greatest coldness, his counsels were appropriated.... They used his political estimates almost in the terms in which he expressed himself, sometimes textually. At the end of October he was admitted to discuss with Vergennes and Maurepas the definite stand to take in offering propositions of alliance with the American colonies. Three months later when the King was about to sign the treaty, it was evident that the Secretary of State had demanded of Beaumarchais a résumé of their discussion. This résumé entitled, Mémoire particulière pour l’Etat,” was drawn up by Beaumarchais under circumstances peculiarly distressing. It was at the moment when he first realized with absolute certainty that his coöperation in the aid soon to be freely and openly accorded the Americans was no longer desired. Nevertheless, he continued to express himself with the same manly vigor as previously. After setting forth the actual situation of France and Spain with regard to England, he said: “What remains for us to do?
“Three courses are open to us. The first is worth nothing, the second is the most sure, the third, the most noble; but a wise combination of the third and second could instantly raise the King of France to be the first power of the civilized world.
“The first course, which is worth nothing, absolutely nothing, is to continue to do what we are doing, or rather what we are not doing; to remain longer passive by the side of the turbulent activity of our neighbors, and obstinately to refuse to take sides while still awaiting events.” After setting forth at length the actual condition of affairs in England, the perils which menaced France, the desire which actuated all parties in Great Britain to make peace with America while wreaking their vengeance upon France, he continues warningly, “But the first step towards peace being once taken, be sure that it will be too late for France to declare in favor of America.” Then follows a narration of preparations then making in England to take France unawares. “After having become the laughing stock of all Europe,” cries the daring advocate of the alliance, “a fatal war and the bankruptcy of America will be the worthy reward of our inaction.
“The worst course therefore, of all the courses, is now, to take no course and to attempt none in conjunction with America, waiting until England shall have closed up every way; something which will certainly happen very shortly.
“The second course which I regard as the most sure, would be to accept publicly the treaty of alliance proposed to us for more than a year by America,... As soon,” he says, “as the English learn that there is no longer any hope to treat with a country which has treated with us, they will instantly make war upon us, declaring us to be aggressors.”... One objection after another that might present itself to the minds of the ministers is then taken up and weighed, especially in relation to the ignorance which existed among them with regard to the “extent of the powers entrusted to the legation at Passy, the uncertainty of the consent of Congress, the possible mobility of an assembly of which the majority was the only law, and which made them fearful that France might have to regret too late, a step which naturally would exasperate the English.
“These fears, Beaumarchais knew how to turn aside by reasons and considerations (Doniol II, p. 742) which would not have been out of place in the mouth of a minister.”
The third course open to France, “the noblest of all,” was to declare to the English in a manifesto which should be announced at the same time to the other potentates of Europe, that the King of France, after having, through delicacy and regard to England, long remained a passive spectator of the war existing between England and America, to the great disadvantage and injury of French Commerce; “that conditions being so and so,” which he proceeded to clearly define, “His Majesty obliged by circumstances to decide upon some definite course ... and not wishing to declare war against England, nor to insult her ... His Majesty contents himself with declaring that he will hold the Americans for independent, and desires to regard them as such from henceforward, relatively to their commerce with France, and the commerce of France with them.”...
“After drawing up his manifesto, Beaumarchais entered into the exposition of the measures to take, and discussed the shades of opinion of each minister exactly as though he had been part of the council.... It is not one of the least singularities of the times to see the author of the Barbier de Séville deliberating as it were with the ministers, saying ‘I would do’ and putting himself naïvely in the place of the King of France.” (Loménie, II, p. 160.)
It was early in December that news of the surrender of Burgoyne reached Europe. “The joy of the news of Saratoga brought Beaumarchais to Passy, in spite of the bitter griefs which he had against the Commissioners.” (Doniol II, 646.) The same day he wrote to Vergennes:
“December 5, 1777.
“Monsieur le Comte:
“... Yesterday I was at Passy with the courier who arrived from Congress, and I passed the morning in comforting my heart with the excellent news of which we had that moment received the announcements.
“I came back to Paris, bringing M. Grand in a light carriage with a postillion and two horses. The carelessness of my postillion ... caused us to be overturned.... Mr. Grand had his shoulder broken; the violence of the fall made me bleed profusely at the nose and mouth;—a piece of broken glass entered my right arm—the negro who followed was badly hurt. See me then prostrated, but more ill in mind than body ... it is not the postillion who kills me, but M. de Maurepas. Nevertheless the charming news from America is a balance to my soul.... I am the voice which cries from the depths of my bed, ‘De profundis clamavi ad te Domine; Domine exaudi orationem meam.’ Although you received the Gazette of Boston yesterday, I will send you the extract which I myself made to insert in le Courrier d’Europe. It is just that I give them in England by my phrases all the poniard thrusts which their Ambassador gives me here with his. I salute you, respect and cherish you, and will sign, if I can with my wounded arm, the assurance of the unalterable devotion with which I am, etc.
“Beaumarchais.”
Two days later, he wrote:
“M. le Comte:
“Your honorable and sweet interest consoles me for everything. In thanking you for the counsels which you have been so good as to give me I can assure you that I did not allow myself to be too vivacious in the letter of which I sent you a copy; I cannot explain myself in writing, but you will be much more surprised than I, because you are less acquainted with the persons of whom it is a question, when I give you an account of all that has happened. I always have put a great difference between the honest deputy Deane, and the insidious Lee, and the silent Dr. Franklin.
“The movement which the news of America has given to all idle heads is inconceivable; the English of the cafés do not know where to hide themselves;—but all that is nothing like so curious as what will take place in London from the shock of the different reports. I await the details with a pleasure equal to all the trouble which they have tried to make me. I thank you for the interest which you take in my health. I am getting up to-day for the first time, and to-morrow I hope to go out.... Receive with your ordinary goodness the assurances of the very respectful devotion with which I am, etc.
“Beaumarchais.”
Wounded in body and sick at heart, the zealous patriot and vigilant friend of America continued to give notice to the government of the news which, through his agents and friends in London, he received before anyone else.
Thursday, the 11th of December, he wrote:
“To M. le Comte de Vergennes, to be communicated, if he pleases, to M. le Comte de Maurepas.
“M. le Comte:
“Although I find it difficult to use my right arm, still I must force it to aid me in announcing to you that I received last night very particular news from London. Everything is in such a state of fermentation since the news of Burgoyne that the crisis has arrived, when the deceived King, the audacious ministry, and the most corrupt parliament must cede to the cries of a furious nation....
“What is the true moral sense of this crisis? It is, that whichever one of the two nations, France or England, recognizes first the independence of America, she alone will reap all the fruits, while that independence will certainly be ruinous to the one which allows her rival to get the advance. This word sums up everything; this moment accomplishes everything. As to the details, in spite of my grievances and my sufferings, if my poor body can endure the broutage, and if you have the time and the desire to receive me to-day, or better, to-morrow, my postillion has orders to await yours.
“I renew, with the same devotion, M. le Comte, the assurances of the very profound respect of the poor turned and overturned
“Beaumarchais.”
A few days later he had still more startling news to announce; a mysterious stranger had arrived in Paris, had visited M. Deane, had dined with him, remaining more than two hours. At the end of that time, a lackey of Mr. Deane came into the street, looked anxiously about; seeing a cab (which was none other than the one in the employ of Beaumarchais) he asked if it was engaged; being told that it awaited two ladies, the lackey entered the house and soon the mysterious stranger came into the street and went away on foot, followed, of course, by the cab.
Two more days passed, and at the end of that time, Beaumarchais was able to give more definite information. The mysterious stranger proved to be a secretary of the Lord Germaine. “Beaumarchais,” says Doniol, “informed as usual before all others, dispatched at once a notice to the ministers. He had followed the English Emissary from the moment of his arrival, informed himself of what he already had accomplished, found out his lodgings and notified the ministers, who sent at once an agent to confer with Deane.” (Doniol II, 64.) Vergennes hastened to inform the Court of Spain of the secret actions of England, with a design to rouse it to action. The moment was indeed a critical one, for the English government was leaving nothing undone to come to terms with the Americans.
January 1, 1777, Beaumarchais wrote to Vergennes:
“I hasten to inform you that an emissary from Lord North arrived in Paris yesterday. He has been watched ever since he left London. He has orders to gain the deputation at Passy at any price whatever. This is the moment or never, to cry tu dors Brutus. But I know that you are not asleep. From your side you see very well that I do not keep bad guard either.... Be sure that the English ministers are working seriously to make peace with America, and that it is of as much value to the nation that they make it, as it is for Lord Chatham and others.... And so peace with America is absolutely resolved; this is what has been very expressly communicated to me. As for myself, I am informed by the same avenue that the minister of France has given the Americans here help of money by means of Messrs. Grand, that the English ministers know it on good authority and that I am shifted off, which annoys no one in England. I easily believe it. Then I have lost the fruits of the most noble and unbelievable labors, by the very means that lead others to glory; I have several times guessed as much by the strange things which have struck me in the conduct of the Americans towards me.... Miserable human prudence, thou canst save no one when intrigue is bent upon ruining us.
“M. le Comte, you are the man upon whose equity I have the most counted; you have not even refused at times esteem and well-wishing to my active zeal. Before I perish as merchant, I demand to be fully justified as agent and trader. I demand to lay before you my accounts, in order that it be proved well that no one else could have done so much with so little means across so many difficulties. It is certain that this summer M. le Comte de Maurepas permitted me to send guns to America, and he promised me that when they were gone I should be reimbursed, because he feared at that time the indiscretion of those about M. le Comte de St. Germain. I bought them, sent them and gave my notes which fall due soon, and yet M. de Maurepas seems to have forgotten his promise. This article and the charging of my vessel at Rochefort, arrives at more than 800,000 francs.
“By the unbelievable retention of my vessel in port, everyone considers me lost and demands his money; nevertheless, though ready to perish through this delay and money not reimbursed, I do not lose my head. You can judge of that by the cold and reasoned work which I put into your hands Saturday. But I avow that I am at the end of my courage and my strength by the assurance that Messrs. Grand have secured the confidence which I believed I so well merited.[1] This breaks my heart. I have fulfilled the most thorny of tasks; I must be allowed to prove that I have fulfilled it well; it is in giving my accounts that this truth will appear....
“Be happy, M. le Comte, this year and all years. No one merits to be so, more than you, and no one desires it more truly than
“Beaumarchais.”
Although no longer made use of as intermediary, the former agent of the government was not wholly abandoned by Vergennes.
A few days previously Beaumarchais had written:
“M. le Comte: I felt yesterday the sweet influences of your goodness. If I did not obtain what I asked for, at least I could judge by the gentle tone of the prohibitions that they were less directed against me than forced by events and promises already made. To lose much money is a great evil, when one has very little; but to carry in one’s heart the mortal sorrow of displeasing when one has done one’s best, and even the best that could be done, under the circumstances, is a state which kills me. Receive, M. le Comte the warmest testimony of my gratitude.”
On the 22nd of January, 1778, the discarded agent handed in the résumé required of him by the ministers. In writing to Vergennes he said: “This sorrowful Memorial (Mémoire Particulière, pour les ministres du Roi, et une manifeste pour l’Etat) which at another time, and on another subject, I could have finished in two hours, has taken me eight days to write, my head being so confused by the frightful medley of objects which it contains, and in regard to which I claim your justice while invoking your mercy.
“I even thought for four days that it had become useless through delay, and abandoned everything to work upon my consular balance-sheet. By a tour de force, I put myself on my feet for twelve or fifteen days;—But grand Dieu, is this to live? The more I assume a tranquil air, the more my secret torment increases. I have examined myself well, I have not done the least wrong, and in going over my papers to assure myself of my state, I have been frightened at all it has been necessary to overcome in the last two years, to arrive where I am. If I am to be aided, you cannot do it too quickly or too secretly for the letters of change are like death, they wait for no one.... If I am not to be, Amen—I have done what I ought, and more than what I could. I learn by sure news that my two vessels of Marseilles are certainly at Charlestown. This, in spite of France and England. Sixty-six cannons, twenty-two mortars, bombs and bullets in proportion; eighty thousand weight of sulphur and my poor guns which have not yet been paid for. All this is in America, by my indefatigable labor, and I have had to deceive all the world, with unbelievable pains, in order to make this shipment secretly. Ah, M. le Comte, it is my balance sheet which will show what an active man you have allowed to be lost and dishonored if you permit this fearful misfortune to accomplish itself. I have no courage to talk of England, because in truth I am dying of sorrow.”
GENERAL BARON VON STEUBEN
That the Comte de Vergennes did not lend an altogether deaf ear to this cry of despair, may be judged from the following letter, dated February 15, 1778,
“M. le Comte:
“You have seemed to take a too obliging interest in my fearful situation, for me to allow you to remain ignorant a moment of the excessive joy which I have felt since yesterday. Yesterday, my teeth clenched with fury to be without news, I waited the moment to close my case, refusing to make any payment the 15th, which falling due to-day Sunday, was exigible yesterday, the 14th. Read, M. le Comte, read I implore you what I received at 2 o’clock, and what I replied this morning, see, my joy is excessive. I am no longer exposed to the dishonor of a bankruptcy, which, notwithstanding all my efforts, I could never have justified, without an involuntary and fatal indiscretion. M. le Comte de Maurepas received me Monday, like a corsaire who had failed in respect to our flag. I did not say a word, I would have had too much to say. I withdrew, death in my heart. Not that I thought the interests of America abandoned. I know very well that they are not....
“The profound silence which I have imposed upon myself for the past two months, since the departure of the brother of M. Deane, secretly embarked at Bordeaux and bearing ... but this shall be matter for another letter. It is just that M. de Maurepas learns through me of this affair, for if the fear of the most frightful misfortune has rendered me pressing solicitor, I am not a man without virtue; it will be the strongest proof which I can offer of the resignation with which I know how to support the coldness and disdain of those who have protected me. Ah! but I am again saved. It is to you that I render a million thanks for all the efforts which you have made in my favor. Never will I forget the generous efforts which you have made to save me from ruin....”
The moment of the open alliance between France and America was now hastening forward. With it, ends the first phase of the war of the United States against England, “phase heroic by its enterprise, its constancy, its privations, by the serenity of its chief and by the results obtained, if one considers the nature and quality of the soldiers.” (Doniol III, 260.)
It was to this period that the activities of Beaumarchais in the cause of America essentially belong. The operations, however, now so well under way, he continued to carry on through his agent de Francy, though from henceforward they are wholly private in character.