NEUTRAL INDEPENDENCE
From 1839 till 1914, Belgium lived under the régime of independent neutrality.
Her territory had been gradually reduced during modern times. She stood stripped of all her marches. In the course of the seventeenth century she had lost Walloon Flanders and Artois to France and Northern Brabant to Holland, while the conquest by the latter Power of Zeeland Flanders and some districts in Eastern Limburg had been confirmed and enlarged by the 1839 settlements. In 1816 Prussia had seized the districts of Eupen, Malmédy, St. Vith and Bitsburg, and the XXIV Articles had given half of Luxemburg to the German Confederation.
The same treaty granted Belgium independence. Within these narrow limits, she remained at least mistress of her destinies. She had her own king, her own Government, her own Constitution. As far as internal affairs were concerned, she enjoyed full sovereignty. She was diminished, but not deeply altered. She maintained, in the nineteenth century, all the main characteristics which had distinguished her history and civilization during the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. Two races, two languages, were still associated on her soil. Walloons and Flemings took an equal share in the framing of her future. The sea remained free for commercial purposes, and the great European roads, which had so largely contributed in the past to placing her in the forefront of European nations, still found in the country their natural and necessary meeting-place. This main fact must be made evident if one attempts to explain the causes of the Belgian renaissance during the nineteenth century. It is not enough to say that the Belgium of Leopold I and Leopold II followed the tradition of the Belgium of Charles V and Philip the Good. It must be added that modern Belgium, in spite of gradual encroachments, had remained whole. Such encroachments having taken place on all sides, the nucleus was untouched. Belgium preserved her great towns and her main streams. No essential organ of the national body had been impaired.
As far as internal affairs were concerned, Belgium then emerged free and sound from the turmoil of three centuries of European warfare. For external affairs, she was still subjected to the restriction of guaranteed neutrality. It is scarcely necessary to dwell on the distinction between self-imposed neutrality, such as that existing in Switzerland, and the régime of guaranteed neutrality imposed by the Powers on Belgium. The first is no restriction of the sovereign rights of the State upon its foreign policy, the second takes away from it practically all initiative in foreign matters. If the Powers bound themselves, in the 1839 treaty, not to violate the integrity of Belgian territory and to defend the country in case of attack, Belgium, on her side, undertook to observe strictly the rules of neutrality and to take necessary measures towards the defence of her frontiers. It might be argued, and it has been argued frequently in Belgium, that such neutrality could not prevent a nation from possessing colonies and concluding a defensive alliance for the sole purpose of safeguarding herself. But, as a matter of fact, rival Powers could not give such a liberal interpretation to the text of the treaties. First from the French side, later from the German side, Belgium was constantly held under suspicion. Any manifestation of public opinion concerning foreign affairs was deeply resented, her military policy was narrowly watched, she could not take a step towards self-defence or economic expansion without provoking some discontent among the Powers. Thanks to the firmness of her statesmen and, more than once, to the friendly support of Great Britain, she was able to resist urgent demands. But it goes without saying that the Belgian Government, anxious to preserve their dignity, avoided all possible cause of friction, so that Belgium scarcely ever made use of her legitimate right to determine, within some limits, her foreign policy. Neutrality, to all intents and purposes, meant paralysis. For many, it meant worse than that—carelessness and apathy.
FALSE SECURITY
After the eight years of uncertainty which followed the first signature of the XXIV Articles—eight years during which all parties joined under the permanent Dutch menace—two currents of thought divided Belgian opinion. The first attempted to minimize the military responsibility of the country, and, trusting blindly to the promise of the Powers, to reduce to a strict minimum Belgium's military charges in men and money. The second saw clearly that, without an adequate army and the necessary defences, Belgium would be unable to fulfil her obligations in case her integrity should be violated, and would suffer in consequence; it realized that any weakness in the country's defences increased the temptation of some Powers to break their pledge. It is easy to understand that the first school was generally more popular than the other, and rallied not only the sincere idealists who thought such a contingency as the tearing up of solemn treaties absolutely impossible, but many unscrupulous politicians only too anxious to use the popular catchword "Not a penny, not a soldier," or "Niemand gedwongen soldaat," for electoral purposes. The Belgians had always been stubbornly opposed to conscription; it will be remembered that they resisted all attempts at enforcing it in the past and that it was the main cause of the War of Peasants (1798) against the "Sans Culottes." To a people which, by tradition, was strongly adverse to militarism and centralization, it was only too easy to misrepresent measures of self-defence, urgently required by the European situation, as the first step towards autocracy and oppression. The partisans of military safeguards found themselves, therefore, in a minority, and their only support was the personal influence of the Belgian kings, who, from the first days of the new régime till the eve of the war, never ceased to emphasize the evident danger of disregarding the country's international responsibilities. It is true that, with the lapse of time, the danger became more and more threatening, but, on the other hand, the "anti-militarists" found a fresh argument in the fact that, during so many years, the country had been able to weather the storm.
MILITARY PROBLEMS
The first trouble arose in connection with the Socialist revolution which broke out in France in 1848. In the previous year, Marx and Engels had established their headquarters in Brussels, where they drafted the "Manifesto of the Communist Party." The Belgians, however, were not prepared to adopt it, and the revolutionaries decided to invade the country from the South. Bands organized in France and secretly encouraged by some French leaders attempted to cross the frontier near Mouscron, at Risquons Tout, but their advance was easily checked by the Belgian forces.
The only consequence of these disturbances was the vote by the Chamber of a new grant towards the reinforcement of the army: "No doubt," said the Minister Rogier on that occasion, "it will cost something to equip a greater number of men. But has one ever estimated the cost of an invasion, even if it only lasted a week?" In 1850, Leopold II wrote to one of his ministers: "Without means of defence you will be the plaything of everyone."
A greater danger loomed ahead. Louis Napoleon had, by the coup d'état of December 1, 1851, imposed his dictatorship on France. Many prominent exiles and refugees came to Belgium, and the Brussels papers openly expressed their opinion of the new dictator. So that Belgium, which three years before had been branded as ultramontane, was now denounced as a nest of communists and rebels. Pressure was even brought to bear on the Government to introduce Press censorship. It was duly ignored, and the relations between the two countries became strained. One year later, Napoleon became Emperor of the French, and all clear-sighted Belgians realized that he was only awaiting an opportunity to extend his power and authority towards the North. This was shown plainly by the French policy with regard to Luxemburg.
FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR
The emperor having approached the King of Holland in view of obtaining from him the cession of the Grand Duchy, a conference was called in London (May 1867) at which the independence, neutrality and inviolability of the duchy were placed under the collective guarantee of the Powers. Thwarted in this direction by European diplomacy, Napoleon III attempted to obtain a footing in Luxemburg by controlling the railways. In January 1868 the Compagnie de l'Est, under guarantee of the French Government, took over from the Compagnie Guillaume Luxembourg its railway lines both in Luxemburg and Belgian territory. Further negotiations began with the Belgian companies Grand Luxemburg and Chemins de fer Liégeois-Limbourgeois, which would have placed all the main railways of Luxemburg and South-eastern Belgium in French hands. Warned in time, the Premier, Frère-Orban, instructed the Belgian representative in Paris to declare that Belgium would never consent to such an arrangement. Napoleon's threats remained without result, the Belgian policy being strongly upheld by Lord Clarendon, and, in July 1869, a protocol was signed annulling the contracts of the Compagnie de l'Est as far as the Belgian railways were concerned. At the same time, Napoleon III, anxious to find at any cost "compensations" for the increased prestige which Prussia obtained from her Danish and Austrian victories, had sounded that Power regarding a project of partition of the Netherlands. His proposal, first kept secret and subsequently revealed by Bismarck on the morrow of the declaration of war in 1870, was to annex Belgium to France, while Prussia would be left a free hand in Holland. The publication of this revelation by The Times did more than anything else to alienate British public opinion, if not from France at least from the French emperor, during the Franco-Prussian War.
Baron Chazal, who had joined the Belgian ministry in 1857, succeeded in convincing the Cabinet of the necessity of reinforcing Belgian defences. In view of the superiority of the French army—for the threat came evidently from that quarter at the time—it was decided to give up the idea of defending the country by a cordon of inefficient fortresses, and to build round Antwerp a powerful "entrenched camp," where the Belgian army could retreat and maintain itself until reinforcements came from abroad. It goes without saying that the only country which would be in a position to send such reinforcements to Antwerp, in case of an invasion, was Great Britain, and Antwerp was purposely chosen as the only position where considerable forces could conveniently be disembarked from the sea. In view of the present interpretation placed on the 1839 treaties by Holland, which gives to the latter country the right to close the Scheldt in time of war, this scheme seems, to say the least, hastily conceived. But the Dutch exclusive sovereignty over the Scheldt did not appear nearly so definite at the time as it appears now. No mention being made of the matter in the 1839 settlement, many Belgian authorities considered that the stream was placed under a régime of co-sovereignty, and it seemed then incredible that the Dutch should stop the passage of relief ships.
In the face of strong popular opposition, the Chamber voted a credit of 50,000,000 francs for the Antwerp fortifications, and General Brialmont, one of the foremost military engineers in Europe, was entrusted with the work. After its completion, Antwerp was considered one of the strongest fortified towns in the world.
As soon as a conflict became imminent between France and Prussia, Great Britain, in accordance with her traditional policy as far as Belgium was concerned, demanded from the two Powers a declaration confirming Belgian neutrality. The situation in 1870 corresponds exactly to that in 1914, and the language used by Mr. Asquith during the first days of August of the latter year seems to echo the words uttered forty years before by his great chief. "It would be impossible for us not to interfere," firmly declared Mr. Gladstone, "should we witness the destruction of Belgium's liberty and independence." In both cases, British policy was inspired by the guarantee mentioned in the treaties, a guarantee which not only implied safety for Belgium, but also absolute opposition to any Power attempting to seize the Belgian coast. The motives were the same, the steps taken were the same, the outcome only was different. Both the French emperor and Bismarck confirmed, in 1870, the inviolability of Belgian territory, the latter stating that such a declaration was not required, the treaties being sufficiently explicit on the subject.
EUROPEAN POLICY IN 1870
Why did Germany respect in 1870 a treaty which she ignored in 1914? Even without taking into account the change in German mentality since her victory, military conditions were totally different. The strong chain of fortifications on the French Eastern frontier had not yet been erected, and the strength of the Belgian army appeared by no means negligible. Before the enormous increase of modern armies which took place during the twenty years of "armed peace," 80,000 men might have made all the difference one way or the other. It was approximately the strength of the French army which surrendered at Sedan. After this great defeat, German Headquarters declared their intention to pursue the fugitives into Belgian territory if the French forces attempted to escape being encircled by crossing the frontier. Such steps, however, were not rendered necessary. While showing their intense sympathy for the vanquished, the Belgians fulfilled most scrupulously all their obligations, and the European diplomats who had conceived the idea of neutralizing "the cockpit of Europe" could congratulate themselves. Their arrangements had worked perfectly, and for once Belgium had not been drawn into the conflict.
In the light of recent events, it is almost to be regretted that the test had been so successful. More than anything else, the 1870 experience allayed suspicion in and out of Belgium. The Powers refrained from pressing on the country the necessity for further armaments, and the hands of the anti-militarists in Belgium, instead of being weakened (as they ought to have been if events had been placed in their proper light), were considerably strengthened.
leopold ii.
(Reigned 1865-1909).
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Ph. B.
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ANTWERP, LIÉGE, NAMUR
During the long period of armed peace which followed, while the Powers formed, on one side the "Triplice" (1883), on the other the "Duplice" (1891) and the Entente Cordiale (1904), while armies and fleets were increased tenfold and German aggressive policy asserted itself more and more acutely, Belgium's defences were only slowly reinforced, in spite of the desperate efforts of disinterested patriots and of the stern warnings of the kings. The name of Leopold II must be associated here with that of Albert I. Both were prompted in their action by the same motives that inspired Leopold I's policy. They placed security on a level with, and even above, prosperity. Standing aloof from party intrigues, they were in a position to appeal to all patriots without distinction, and to make use of the services of a little band of clear-sighted citizens who saw the centre of danger transferred from France to Germany, and watched the young Empire's military and economic development with growing anxiety. Foremost among them stood Emile Banning, author of a prophetic report on the Meuse defences (1881-86). Nothing illustrated more clearly the crippling influence of neutrality on Belgian international thought than the way this man of genius was ignored by his fellow-citizens. In any other country, he would have exercised a considerable influence on public opinion. In Belgium, he was only heard by a few statesmen and, happily, by Leopold II, who no doubt had his report in mind when, in 1887, he warned one of his ministers of the necessity of Belgium not only safeguarding her independence, but "preventing the passage" of foreign troops through her territory. Germany had now become the main source of danger, but in order to avoid all criticism it was decided to build two bridgeheads, one at Namur and the other at Liége. The first commanded the upper valley of the Meuse, the second the middle course of the stream; one was facing France, the other Germany. The plan of defence was consequently developed, the forts enabling the army to make a short stand before retiring into the entrenched camp of Antwerp. It is largely to Banning's clearsightedness and to Leopold II's firm attitude that Western Europe owes the respite given by the resistance of Liége in August 1914. Had not General Brialmont's original plans of the forts been unduly curtailed, this resistance would have proved still more effective.
MILITARY REFORM
Credits for the defences of Liége and Namur, like those of Antwerp a few years before, were voted grudgingly by a Chamber lulled into a false state of security by the experience of 1870. But, if public opinion was little inclined to devote money to improve the country's defences, it became obdurate when experts advised a reform of the Belgian military system. Not only were the effectives ridiculously small, compared with the size of the German and French armies, but recruiting was managed through a system of drawing lots, to which was added the evil of "substitution"—that is to say, the sons of the bourgeois class who drew a "bad number" were entitled to buy a substitute, who took their place in the ranks. A campaign for personal and general service was launched, but in spite of the king's support it met with little success. A certain number of volunteers were added to the normal effectives in 1902, and in 1908, after the sensational journey of William II to Tangiers, new credits were voted for the development of the Antwerp defences. To those who objected that fortifications would be useless if Belgium did not possess a sufficient army to man them, the king answered: "Let us have the stones first. The men will come later." When the seventy-fifth anniversary of Belgian Independence gave him at last the opportunity of breaking the silence imposed upon him by the Congo campaign, he uttered a supreme warning to the nation: "Let us not be overconfident in our present prosperity; let us stand closer and closer together around our flag. Nations, like human beings, have to pass through a critical age which brings about old age or premature death. Its date, for young nations, falls during the last quarter of the first century of their existence." Once more, on February 18, 1909, he imparted to a friend—for his lack of popularity had made public declarations useless at that time—his anxieties regarding the future: "It is indispensable that we should possess a good army, that we should be able to defend ourselves, and thus, in conformity with our international obligations, prevent the crossing of our territory by a foreign army, and make such crossing as costly as possible, in order to remove the temptation from those who would be inclined to attempt it.... On my return from my recent journey to Germany, I warned all concerned that Germany is building more ships and increasing her military expenses. We must efficiently complete our fortifications and our equipment. You know that neither one nor the other can be improvised...."
Leopold II attached such importance to the adoption of personal service, proposed in 1909, that he deliberately postponed an operation which might have saved his life, in order to be able to sign the decree which placed the Bill on the Statute Book. He died three days later.[1]
This supreme satisfaction was not unmixed. Important concessions had had to be made. The voluntary system was maintained to a certain extent, only one son per family being called up for a short time (fifteen months). The passing of the Bill was a victory in principle, but it only increased very slightly the strength of the Belgian army.
The Pan-German campaign was in full swing by then. Maps were published, beyond the Rhine, showing large portions of Belgium painted in imperial red, like the rest of the Reich. Pamphlets and books appeared claiming Antwerp as a German port and connecting East Africa with the German Cameroons through the Belgian Congo. Still the majority of the Belgians would not believe that such views were shared by the German Emperor and his Government. It was only after the Agadir coup (1911) and Algeciras (1912) that M. de Broqueville, Minister of War, strongly supported by King Albert, was able to carry through a Bill introducing general and compulsory service, which would have placed the army on a proper footing if its provisions had been rendered immediately effective. Unhappily, the Bill only provided for a gradual increase, the army reaching its full strength of 340,000 men in 1917. This last reservation proved nearly fatal to the country, for, when mobilization was ordered, in July 1914, the total forces available only amounted to 117,000 men, of which the combatant portion was reduced to 93,000 bayonets—an increase of only 10,000 over the effectives of 1870.
There are few subjects so depressing as the slow development of Belgian defences under the threat of invasion. Each time the situation became serious, as in 1848, 1852, 1908 and 1911, public opinion allowed some progress to be made. But it came always too late. The people were ready to face their responsibilities, but they could not be made to realize them. Blindly relying on the 1839 treaties, absorbed in their economic and intellectual development, they showed little interest in international affairs. Those who did, found themselves in the dilemma either of taking refuge in a fools' paradise or of powerlessly facing an ever-growing menace. Neutrality may have saved Belgium in 1870, full independence might have saved her in 1914.