SEPARATION
The year 1567 marks the beginning of civil war in the Low Countries. Up till then, the nobility and the States General had worked more or less together, acting as intermediaries between the Government and the people. The sovereign rights of the king had never been questioned. Henceforth, the Low Countries were to be divided into two parties, having their headquarters in the South and in the North. Both aimed at preserving their national liberties and equally resented foreign oppression, but, while the people of the Northern provinces decided to sever all connection with Spain, the people of the South were loath to part from their national dynasty and were easily conciliated as soon as the Government adopted a moderate attitude; while the people of the North adopted Calvinism as their only public religion, the people of the South remained attached to the Roman Church.
NORTH AND SOUTH
The story of the sixteenth-century revolution in the Low Countries is so well known that it is scarcely necessary to recall again here the details of events. From the point of view of the formation of Belgian nationality, the revolution has an extraordinary importance, since it engendered the separation of the Low Countries into two distinct nationalities, which were later to be known as Belgian and Dutch. Most English readers who remember their Motley, or any of the less valuable writings he inspired, are under the impression that if the Belgians did not adopt the same attitude as the Dutch all through the struggle against Spain, it was either because they were blinded by their religious prejudices or because their patriotism did not rise to the same exalted height. Such an opinion is perfectly plausible, but it does not sufficiently take into account the intransigent and selfish attitude adopted by the Northern provinces, the political mistakes committed by their leader, and the difference between the strategical position and the economic interests of the revolutionaries in the North and in the South of the country. It may therefore be useful to examine the efforts made towards unity during the struggle and the causes of their failure.
The steps taken by the Calvinist nobles which resulted in the failure of de Marnix to seize Antwerp (March 13th) and the taking of Valenciennes by Government troops (March 24th) were followed by a strong reaction. The placards were again enforced, and a rumour began to spread that the Duke of Alba was being sent by Philip to the Netherlands at the head of a strong army. At this news over a hundred thousand Protestants emigrated to England or to the North.
Many people in Southern Belgium were, however, unable to believe in the possibility of ruthless repression, and even some of those who had taken an active part in recent events remained in the country. They did not know the intentions of the Duke of Alba and the instructions he had received from his master. "I will try to arrange the affairs of religion in the Low Countries," wrote Philip at the time, "if possible without having recourse to force, because this means would imply the total destruction of the country, but I am determined to use it nevertheless, if I cannot otherwise arrange everything as I wish." When, after a fortnight of festivities, the duke suddenly ordered the arrest of the Counts of Egmont and Horn (September 9th), the people were taken entirely by surprise. In spite of the protests of Marguerite and the counsels of moderation of the pope and the Emperor Maximilian, repression was systematically organized by the Council of Troubles, soon called the "Council of Blood." Egmont and Horn were executed on June 5th, and all those who had participated in the agitation of the Compromise and the Iconoclast movement were arrested. During the three years which followed, from six to eight thousand people perished. All resistance was impossible. Only a few bands of Beggars kept to the woods ("Boschgeuzen") and a few privateers operated in the North Sea ("Zeegeuzen"). Alba repulsed with equal success the attacks of Louis of Nassau and of the Prince of Orange. "The people are very pleased," he declared; "there is no people in the world more easy to govern when one knows how to manage them." The new taxes he raised in 1569 to pay for the cost of the war rendered his régime still more odious. These taxes of 1 per cent. on all property, 5 per cent. on the sale of real estate and 10 per cent. on the sale of all goods, were of course unconstitutional, and for a long time Brussels and Louvain refused to pay them. When at last they came into force, in 1571, all trade stopped and the people opposed passive resistance amid great privations and sufferings. The situation was at last relieved by the bold coup de main of the Sea Beggars on the port of La Brielle, in Zeeland. Up till then, they had sought refuge in the English ports, but in 1572 Queen Elizabeth closed her ports to them, and the seizure of a naval base in the Low Countries became imperative. The taking of La Brielle, coming as it did in the worst time of Spanish oppression, provoked unbounded enthusiasm. Successively Flushing, Rotterdam, Schiedam, and soon all Zeeland and Holland, with the exception of a few towns, revolted against the duke. The Huguenots were no less active in the South, where La Noue seized Valenciennes and Louis of Nassau Mons (May 25th). Orange himself advanced victoriously through Gelder towards Brabant. These successes roused great hopes in the Southern provinces, but were unhappily marred by the massacre of the monks at Gorcum and other excesses. They were abruptly stopped by the news of the massacre of St. Bartholomew, Orange's French allies being obliged to leave his army.
PROTESTANT SUCCESSES
Holland and Zeeland became henceforth the centre of resistance. These provinces had not taken an important share in the life of the Low Countries during the Middle Ages. Their prosperity was of comparatively recent date and mainly due to their merchant fleet, which brought to Antwerp wood and corn from the Baltic and wine from Bordeaux. Their sailors had ventured as far as Madeira and the Azores, and, on being stopped by Charles V from reaching America by the Southern route, had endeavoured to find a route to India by the North. From the beginning of the sixteenth century, Amsterdam had become the great corn market, Middleburg the centre of the French wine trade, and the shipyards of Vere, Goes and Arnemuyden were among the most active in Northern Europe. The influx of capital resulting from trade and shipping was used to reclaim marshes, to build fresh dikes and to increase considerably the cultivated area. Nowhere else, according to Guicciardini, was prosperity so general or did the traveller meet such "clean and agreeable houses and such smiling and well cared for country." Economically speaking, the Northern provinces were only beginning to feel the benefit of the advantages of their position, already so manifest in Antwerp. They were, so to speak, in a stage of formation, and far more ready to cut loose the links of tradition with an obscure past and to throw themselves into some great adventure in which they might try their strength.
They occupied, besides, a safer situation than the South, controlling the outlets of three great streams and the adjoining seas, among low-lying lands which, as a last resort, could be flooded in order to stop the advance of an enemy or cut off his retreat. This situation adapted itself remarkably well to a defensive strategy by land and an aggressive strategy by sea. The small number of inhabitants and the small forces available rendered any offensive by land against the Spanish armies extremely dangerous, so that the Southern provinces, exposed on all sides to invasion, were left to shift for themselves. It so happened that the Prince of Orange, the principal leader of the opposition, had, as governor of Holland and Zeeland, acquired a great popularity in the country, which was considerably increased by his conversion to Calvinism. He had been made "Stadhouder" of his provinces and had found great resources in the confiscation of ecclesiastical property.
The next campaign (1572-73) affords an excellent example of the strength of Orange's position. He was finally able to compel the duke to raise the siege of Alkmaar, in spite of his overwhelming superiority in numbers and of the striking successes which had marked his progress from Malines to Zutphen, to Naarden and to Harlem. The Spanish retreat, in October 1573, coincided with a naval defeat off Enkhuizen. Alba, discouraged, left the Low Countries in December and was replaced by a Spanish aristocrat, Louis de Zuniga y Requesens.
REQUESENS
Philip was at last resigned to make some concessions, but remained adamant with regard to religion. Thanks to the victory won by the Spaniards at Mook, where Louis of Nassau lost his life, Requesens was able to grant some of the claims of the States General without losing prestige. He proclaimed a general amnesty, suppressed the taxes of 10 per cent. and 5 per cent., and induced the Council of Troubles not to pronounce any more death sentences. He would not, however, dismiss the Spanish troops, and the North having refused to negotiate, the Spaniards laid siege to Leyden. In 1575 Maximilian offered his mediation, and a congress was held at Breda between the representatives of Philip and of the Prince of Orange. The religious question, however, proved a stumbling-block, Philip maintaining Catholicism as the only State religion and the prince asking for a guarantee with regard to the preservation of liberty of conscience.
After the death of Requesens, on March 15, 1576, the administration was taken over by the Council of State, including the moderate Catholics, Mansfeld, Berlaymont and Viglius. They hastened to suppress the Council of Troubles, but were unable to disband the Spanish army, in spite of the insistence of the provincial States, owing to the lack of funds for their arrears of pay. At the beginning of July some Spanish units took Alost, which became the centre of pillaging expeditions. These excesses and the increasing danger of the situation brought about a reconciliation between Orange and the Belgian nobles, and once more the dream of a common country came within reach of realization. The States of Brabant proscribed the Spanish soldiers and called the citizens to arms. The members of the Council of State were arrested and the States General assembled. In spite of the irregularity of such procedure, all the provinces sent their representatives with the sole exception of Luxemburg. Philip was still proclaimed "sovereign lord and natural prince," but the command of the national troops was given to the Belgian nobles, and Orange was asked to help in reducing the rebellious soldiery and in besieging the citadels of Ghent and Antwerp. While the delegates of the Stadhouder and of the States conferred in Ghent, news reached them of the terrible excesses committed, on November 4th, by the Spanish soldiers in Antwerp, during the course of which seven thousand people lost their lives. These riots are remembered as the "Spanish Fury."
PACIFICATION OF GHENT
Deplorable though they were, they would not have been too heavy a price to pay if national unity could have been maintained. Never did it seem nearer at hand. With fresh memories of Alba's régime and the wholesale executions of the Council of Blood, under the direct influence of the terrible news from Antwerp, the Belgian Catholics were never more ready to wipe off old grievances, to forget the sacrileges of the Iconoclasts, the massacre of Gorcum and the persecution of those of their faith in the North. The Pacification of Ghent was signed on November 8th. The seventeen provinces allied themselves into a confederation, promised to render each other mutual help, to expel the Spanish armies, to suppress the placards and the ordinances of the Duke of Alba and to proclaim a general amnesty. Liberty of conscience, however, was only proclaimed in fifteen provinces. Calvinism remained the only religion permitted in Holland and Zeeland. It is true that the pre-eminent situation of Catholicism was recognized and that the Protestants were not allowed any public manifestations outside Holland and Zeeland, but if we take into account the fact that, all over the country, the Catholics were far more numerous than their rivals, this last clause of the Pacification of Ghent shows that the Calvinists were bent on exacting all the advantages of the situation they had so heroically conquered and that the moderates of the Southern provinces still found themselves placed between the hammer of Spanish domination and the anvil of Calvinist sectarianism.
The Prince of Orange cannot be held entirely responsible for missing this unique opportunity of concluding with his compatriots a fair and liberal compact. His correspondence shows that he had hard work to reconcile his partisans even to such one-sided religious conclusions as those expressed in the Pacification of Ghent, and that in many instances he had to resign himself to being led in order to be allowed to lead.
DON JUAN
This mistake was bound to bear fruit, when the new Governor, Don Juan of Austria, a natural son of Charles V who had covered himself with glory at the battle of Lepanto, reached the country, in November 1576. Philip, aware that the Netherlands would escape him if he did not make some sacrifices, had given Don Juan still freer instructions than those given to Requesens. The religious question only was excluded from concessions. Besides, the king hoped that the Belgians would be flattered by the choice of a prince of the blood and would be captivated by the romantic reputation of this striking representative of Renaissance nobility. Negotiations between Don Juan and the States General were rendered difficult by the opposition of the partisans of Orange and by the want of good faith on the part of the new Governor, who, while promising to recall the Spanish troops, was discovered secretly negotiating with them. The first Union of Brussels was, however, concluded on January 9, 1577. The States promised to obey the king and to maintain the Catholic religion as the only State religion all through the country. On the other hand, Don Juan, by the Edict of Marche, known as "Edit Perpétuel," undertook to convoke the States General, to recall the Spanish troops and not to persecute the partisans of the Reform. Orange and his partisans in Holland and Zeeland naturally refused to ratify such an arrangement, which violated the articles of the Pacification of Ghent.
Don Juan entered Brussels in May, after dismissing the Spanish troops, but, in spite of all his efforts, was unable to ingratiate himself in the eyes of the population. Most of the people had resented the signature of the Union of Brussels, and when the negotiations with the Northerners broke off and Don Juan asked for troops to fight them, he met with a curt refusal. Alarmed by this veiled hostility and exasperated by his protracted negotiations with Orange, Don Juan shut himself up in the fortress of Namur and recalled the Spanish troops. Nothing better could have happened from the point of view of the patriots, and the differences which had begun to undermine the work of the Pacification of Ghent, during the last months, were promptly forgotten. William of Orange made a triumphal entry into Brussels on September 23rd. He was greeted as the liberator of his country, amid scenes of unbounded enthusiasm. He was proclaimed "Ruwaert" of Brabant and his authority did not meet with any further open opposition.
Faithful to his principles, Orange endeavoured to establish liberty of conscience in the Low Countries. His ideas, however, were only shared by a few friends whose rather elastic religious principles allowed them to sacrifice sectarianism to the higher interests of the State. They did not suit the Catholic aristocracy, who, though strongly opposed to Spain, remained attached to legitimist principles. They did not suit Calvinist democrats, who, though in a minority, intended to overwhelm all opposition. The intellectuals among them propounded the idea of the "Monarchomaques" that "the prince existed for the people, not the people for the prince," while the uneducated classes already proclaimed the principle of modern democracy and universal suffrage and questioned the right of the States to represent the people. Since August 1577 Brussels had been practically in the hands of the Commune, represented by a Council of Eighteen. Similar Councils had seized power in some provincial towns, and at Ghent, where the Calvinists dominated the Commune, the articles of the Pacification were entirely disregarded, the churches being plundered and the priests persecuted. Holland and Zeeland maintained an expectant and somewhat moody attitude. They resented their leader's concessions to the Catholics and were not over-enthusiastic towards unification. They felt themselves stronger than the rest of the country and had largely benefited from the closing of the Scheldt and the momentary stoppage of Antwerp's trade. They were loath to sacrifice such advantages for the sake of joining hands with "Papists and monarchists."
POLICY OF ORANGE
As the democratic tendencies and Calvinist excesses were more and more apparent, following the return of Orange to Brussels, the Catholic aristocracy of the Southern provinces became alarmed. The nobles were afraid of the attitude adopted by the people concerning their privileges and of the personal prestige of Orange. They endeavoured to check his power by inviting foreign princes to take the leadership of the country. The Duke of Aerschot induced Archduke Matthias, brother of the Emperor, to come to the Low Countries, but Orange easily countered this manœuvre by arresting the duke and opening negotiations with Matthias, who signed the second Union of Brussels, on December 10, 1577, and guaranteed liberty of conscience. The young archduke was henceforth a mere figurehead and Orange remained the real ruler of the country.
To add to the confusion, Don Juan opened an offensive, a few days later, and easily defeated the national troops which opposed his progress in Luxemburg, Namur and Hainault, forcing the Government to take refuge in Antwerp. It became more and more apparent that the provinces could not rid themselves of the Spaniards without appealing to foreign help. The Emperor Rudolph being unwilling to support Matthias, the latter had become practically useless. In spite of repeated entreaties, Queen Elizabeth would not consent to give military help. She encouraged the revolution, since it proved a drain on Philip's resources and an efficient protection from Spanish enterprise against England, but she would not openly break with Spain. Only France remained. As early as July 1578, Count de Lalaing endeavoured to repeat with the Duke of Anjou, Henry III's brother, the manœuvre of Aerschot. He sought, at the same time, to deliver the country from Spain with foreign help and to check the increasing power of Orange and all he stood for in his eyes. Anjou had no respect for the liberties and aspirations of the provinces, neither did his rather tepid religious convictions, as a Catholic prince, stand in his way. He hoped to obtain the title of sovereign of the Netherlands and thus to increase his chances of succeeding in his suit for the hand of Queen Elizabeth.
Once more Orange took for himself the plans propounded by his enemies. He negotiated with Anjou, who received the title of "Defender of the Liberties of the Low Countries" in exchange for some military help. Don Juan was obliged to retreat on Namur, where he died, completely disheartened, on October 1, 1578, leaving his lieutenant, Alexander Farnese, Duke of Parma, to continue the struggle.
THE MALCONTENTS
The situation, during the last months of 1578, had become extremely intricate. The Spanish troops, commanded by Farnese, held the Southern provinces as far as the Sambre and the Meuse. Holland and Zeeland maintained their powerful position in the North, but, between Spanish and Dutch headquarters, the country was thrown into a state of complete anarchy, and the power of the Stadhouder, who, from Antwerp, tried vainly to maintain unity, was more and more disregarded. The Act of Religious Peace, which he had issued in June and which placed the two confessions on a footing of equality, though endeavouring to conciliate everybody, only increased the discontent. Its clauses were entirely ignored by the Calvinist Republic of Ghent, which pursued its own ruthless policy under the leadership of Ryhove and terrorized the Catholics. On the other hand, the Catholic nobles, who commanded some units of the national army, formed themselves into a new party, the "Malcontents," and occupied Menin on October 1st. Civil war became more and more inevitable. Ryhove called the Prince Palatine, John Casimir, a protégé of Queen Elizabeth, to his help, while Anjou, alarmed by the apparition of this unexpected rival, helped the Malcontents to reduce the Calvinist Communes in Arras, Lille and Valenciennes.
William of Orange, who had displayed such extraordinary political aptitudes during the first years of the revolution, seemed, since his entry into Brussels, to have disregarded some essential conditions of success. Though imbued by the principle of national unity, he never threw himself wholeheartedly into the struggle and never gave the country the leadership it so badly needed. He first seemed to ignore the difficulties ahead, owing to the rivalry of religious factions, and, when these were made clear to him, he did not take any strong measure to enforce on the people the principle of liberty of conscience which he so loudly proclaimed. The recurrence of excesses and cruelties committed by the fanatic leaders of the Communes contributed to create a widespread impression, among the Catholics, that he was merely paying lip-service to them, while determined to tolerate any disobedience among his own followers. His retirement to Antwerp, in close contact with Holland and Zeeland, but far removed from the Southern provinces, was also unfavourable to the maintenance of the Union under his leadership. Finally, the interference in national affairs of such disreputable adventurers as John Casimir and Anjou diminished, to a certain degree, the reluctance with which the Catholics envisaged the possibility of treating with Spain.
UNION OF ARRAS
On January 6, 1579, Artois, Hainault and Walloon Flanders formed the "Confederation of Arras," which sanctioned the first Union of Brussels—that is to say, the maintenance of Catholicism all over the country; and from that time negotiations began between the Catholic bourgeoisie and nobility and Farnese. Had Orange proved more active or Farnese less diplomatic, the Union might still have been maintained even at the eleventh hour. For nothing but religious passion, and perhaps, to a certain extent, the fear of mob rule, prompted the Southern provinces to accept the Spanish offers. The States of Hainault had declared that they would not undertake anything contrary to the common cause, but wanted only to preserve their existence, to "maintain the Pacification of Ghent against an insolent and barbarian tyranny worse than the Spanish" and "to prevent the extinction of their holy faith and religion, of the nobility and of all order and state." They did not abandon any of their old claims against Spain, but they refused to acknowledge the social and religious transformation which had taken place in the country since the signature of the Pacification. The defenders of the new confederation expressed the hope that in all towns the oppressed Catholics would join hands with them. The Union of Arras ought to be considered therefore, not as a Walloon, but as a purely Catholic League. It confirms the first Union of Brussels, including all its anti-Spanish stipulations concerning the restoration of the old privileges, the voting of taxes by the States, the defence of the country by native troops, the maintenance of the Catholic religion in all the provinces being the only common ground on which Spaniards and Belgians could meet. It was, nevertheless, a breach of the Pacification of Ghent, and was destined to link Belgium with Spain for many years to come. It was also a definite and irretrievable step towards separation.
It has been suggested that the difference of race and languages might have influenced the fateful decision of the Walloon provinces. Such an interpretation does not take into account the language situation in the Low Countries at the time. One seeks vainly for any grievance which the Southern provinces might have entertained on that ground. French was used in all the acts of the central Government and in the deliberations of the States General. Even the Prince of Orange had kept the Burgundian tradition and considered French as his mother-tongue. He was surrounded and supported by a great number of French Huguenots and Walloon Calvinists. Owing to their smaller population the Southern provinces were rather over-represented in the States General, where the vote went by province and not by numbers. Besides, we must not overlook the fact that the confederates represented themselves not as dissenters, but as the true supporters of the Act of Union, which had been violated by the Calvinists. They did not show any separatist tendencies like Holland and Zeeland, but opposed their policy of Union to the policy of the Prince of Orange. One of their most urgent demands was that the Prince of the Netherlands should henceforth be of royal and legitimate blood, in order to restore a national policy, similar to that followed during the early years of the reigns of Philip the Handsome and Charles V. All through the troubled period of the last twenty years, Walloons and Flemings never ceased to emphasize their will to live together. Their mottoes are, "Viribus unitis"; "Belgium fœderatum"; "Concordia res parvæ crescunt"; and almost every speech and public manifestation insists on the necessity of protecting a common "patrie" against a common enemy through a common defence. As a matter of fact, the principle of unity was so popular at the time in the Southern provinces that the confederates would have made themselves thoroughly unpopular if they had dared to preach separation, and, on both sides, it was only by pretending to defend the Union that the extremists, moved by class hatred and religious passion, succeeded in destroying it.
The centre of Catholic reaction might have been formed in any other part of the Southern provinces under similar circumstances. The region of Armentières and Valenciennes had been the cradle of the Iconoclast rebellion, but repression in that quarter was far more effective than in any other. A great proportion of the Walloon workers who did not perish under Alba's rule emigrated to England. The Southern cities were thus considerably depleted of their Calvinist element, and the peasants and the bourgeois outnumbered them far more than in any other part of the country. Even under ordinary circumstances the workers of the towns exercised very little influence on the States of Hainault and Artois. In Hainault (Valenciennes and Tournai forming special circumscriptions), Mons remained alone to represent their interests. In Artois, Arras, St. Omer and Béthune were the only important centres whose representatives could oppose those of the far more important agricultural districts. The question of race and language had no more influence on the attitude of the Walloon provinces than on that of Holland, Zeeland and Utrecht. Both were determined by economic, social and religious conditions as well as by their strategic situation.
UNION OF UTRECHT
The Confederation of Arras was proclaimed on January 6, 1579. On the 23rd the Union of Utrecht was constituted, under the same claim of defending the Pacification of Ghent. It grouped around Holland and Zeeland the provinces of Utrecht, Gelder, Friesland, Over-Yssel and Groningen, together with the most important towns of Flanders and Brabant: Ghent, Ypres, Bruges, Antwerp, Brussels, etc. They undertook to act jointly in reference to peace, war, alliances and all external matters, while retaining their local autonomy. The exercise of religion remained free, with the exception of Holland and Zeeland, from which Catholicism was excluded. The Union of Utrecht was the origin of the Republic of the Seven United Provinces. It was entirely dominated by the particularist policy of Holland and Zeeland, which, as events developed more and more in favour of Farnese in the South, took less and less interest in their Southern confederates. The small forces at their disposal rendered any offensive towards Flanders and Brabant, which would have provided the beleaguered cities with food and arms, very difficult, and the reopening of the Scheldt, which must have taken place in the event of the integral preservation of the Union of Utrecht, would have reacted unfavourably on the trade of the Northern ports.
ALEXANDER FARNESE
Owing to the defensive attitude of the North, events moved rather slowly during the following years. After the fall of Maestricht, which was marked by further massacres of the people by the Spanish soldiery, Farnese, who had staked all on a policy of conciliation, gradually dismissed the Spanish troops and organized native units with the help of the Malcontents. Now that all bonds were severed between the Union of Utrecht and the crown of Spain, Philip II endeavoured to revenge himself on his opponent by putting a price on his head (1580). The apology written by the Prince of Orange in answer to Philip's accusations, in the shape of a letter addressed to the States General, is one of the most dignified pleas of such a kind in history. Orange had no difficulty in showing the sincerity of his motives and his devotion to the common weal. The reader of this eloquent document will, however, realize that its author lacked the energy and self-reliance necessary to deal with the desperate situation in which the country was placed. In his eagerness to save the Belgian towns and to safeguard unity, in spite of the unwillingness of Holland and Zeeland to depart from their expectant attitude, he concluded with the Duke of Anjou, on September 29th, the treaty of Plessis-lez-Tours, by which, in exchange for military help, the duke was to receive the title of hereditary sovereign of the United Provinces, undertook to respect the rights of the States General and maintain the representatives of the House of Orange-Nassau as hereditary Stadhouders of Holland, Zeeland and Utrecht. This last clause was introduced far more to pacify the Northerners, who strongly objected to these negotiations, than to further Orange's personal ambition. It shows once more the privileged situation occupied by the three provinces and their strong particularist tendencies. The treaty of Plessis-lez-Tours, which was supposed to save the Union, was destined to give it its death-blow and to strengthen the alliance between the Southern provinces and Farnese. By that time, the central Government in Antwerp had become purely nominal. The Northern provinces had ceased to send their representatives and the delegates from the South could not claim to represent the people, who were more and more unfavourable to their attitude. The States General was only used to register and sanction Orange's decisions. In spite of some opposition, it finally proclaimed, on July 26, 1581, the deposition of the king.
Hostilities were at once resumed, Farnese besieging Cambrai and Tournai, which had not yet joined the Confederation. The first town was saved by the intervention of the French troops of Anjou, but the second capitulated on November 3rd. From that time, Farnese endeavoured to treat his enemies with the greatest clemency. He suppressed severely all acts of terrorism or pillage and offered honourable conditions to any city willing to surrender, the Protestants being free to leave the town after settling their affairs and the local liberties remaining intact. By these moderate conditions and by the loyalty with which he kept to them, he gradually earned the respect, if not the sympathy, of a great number of his former opponents, and his attitude contrasted favourably with the vagaries of Anjou, whose rule was, after all, the only alternative offered to the Southern provinces at the time. After a journey to England, where he received a rebuff from Queen Elizabeth, Anjou was greeted with great honours at Antwerp (February 19, 1582). During the year which followed, he grew more and more impatient of the obstacles placed in his way and the restrictions imposed on his authority. He finally decided to make a bid for power, and, on the night of January 16-17, 1583, his soldiers endeavoured to seize the gates of Antwerp and occupy the public buildings. They were, however, defeated by the armed citizens, and the duke, entirely discredited, was obliged to leave the country. This episode is remembered as the "French Fury."
The last hopes of reconstituting the unity of the Netherlands were ruined by the murder, on July 10, 1584, at Delft, of the Prince of Orange, the only statesman who had pursued this aim with some consistency, in spite of all his mistakes. This action was as criminal as it was senseless. The prince had failed in his great enterprise of uniting the Netherlands against Spain, and no efforts on his part could have restored the situation. Thanks to the Spanish reinforcements the Confederation had allowed him to receive, Farnese was systematically blockading and besieging every important Flemish town. Already Dunkirk, Ypres and Bruges had opened their gates to him and obtained very favourable conditions. Ghent itself, the stronghold of Calvinism in Flanders, whose population had distinguished itself by so many cruelties and excesses and which was considered as the arch-enemy of the Malcontents, benefited from the same policy when obliged to surrender, on September 17th. All the old customs were restored, the town was obliged to pay 200,000 golden écus, its hostages were pardoned, and, though the Protestants were not allowed to celebrate their worship in public, they obtained a delay of two years before leaving the city.
FALL OF ANTWERP
At the beginning of 1585 almost every town had been reduced as far as Malines. Brussels, which had vainly expected some help from the North, opened its gates to Farnese on March 10th, and the taking of Antwerp, on August 16th, closed the series of operations which definitely separated Belgium from Holland and again placed the Southern provinces under the subjection of Spain. Antwerp had been defended obstinately by its burgomaster, the Calvinist pamphleteer, Marnix de St. Aldegonde, who confidently hoped that his Northern allies would create a diversion and at least prevent the Spanish from cutting off the great port from the sea. In the case of Antwerp, Holland and Zeeland might have interfered without so much danger, but Orange was no longer there to plead for unity and the great port of the Southern provinces was abandoned to its fate.