Fourth Day—February 10.
The first witness at the fourth day’s hearing was to have been Mme. Dreyfus, whom at first the court had refused to hear on the question of Zola’s good faith, but whom, after further reflection, it had decided to hear. Nevertheless Mme. Dreyfus did not appear, M. Labori consenting to excuse her in view of a letter which he had received from her, and which read as follows:
Dear Master:
I answered to the call of my name at Tuesday’s hearing, in spite of my great agitation. I made the effort because I hoped to express to the court and the jury my deep gratitude to, and my admiration for, M. Zola, who, obeying the voice of his conscience, has sacrificed himself for justice and truth with a sublime disdain of the insults and threats which he has drawn upon himself. I hoped also to declare my absolute faith in my husband’s innocence,—an innocence which, I am convinced, will be established before long,—and also my sincere gratitude to you, dear master, who display so much courage and talent to secure the triumph of the truth. The anguish of these three days, added to all that I have suffered for three years, has put me in a condition in which I could not endure a fresh trial. Permit me, then, to absent myself from the court and accept, I beg of you, the expression of my most distinguished sentiments.
L. Dreyfus.
February 10, 1898.
Testimony of M. Trarieux.
M. Trarieux was recalled to the witness-stand.
M. Labori.—“Will M. Trarieux tell us what he knows about the way in which Colonel Picquart’s mission was executed?”
The Judge.—“In other words, you ask M. Trarieux if he is familiar with the mission entrusted to Colonel Picquart.”
M. Labori.—“I do not ask the object of the mission. I simply wish to know if the circumstances surrounding it are familiar to the witness, in which case I should like to have him tell us what they were.”
The Judge.—“General de Boisdeffre told us yesterday that it was a secret mission.”
M. Labori.—“I do not ask the witness the object of the mission. It is secret, like everything else in this case, but those in a position to know the details of the mission know that their declarations would compromise no higher interest. It is a secret, because it is a secret; there is no other reason.”
The Judge.—“It may involve secrets concerning the national defence. That is why I will put no question on the point.”
M. Labori.—“It is so said, I know, but I should like to find out whether M. Trarieux is familiar with the circumstances under which Colonel Picquart was asked to undertake his mission, and whether there was anything extraordinary about these circumstances.”
The Judge.—“Witness, you understand the question. I will ask you to say what you think it is your duty to say.”
M. Trarieux.—“I saw nothing in General Gonse’s letters in the nature of a secret concerning the national defence. All that I can say is that I got an impression from the letters that Colonel Picquart was in most affectionate and cordial relations with his superiors, and seemed to command their entire confidence. The reading of this correspondence gave me the idea—though this is but an interpretation—that Colonel Picquart was sent away from Paris for a certain reason. At first he was sent to the east; then to the south. Frequently new orders came to him, taking him ever a little farther from Paris, and finally he had to cross the Mediterranean and go to Algeria and Tunis. These letters gave me the impression that, after having sent him away from Paris on the eve of the Castelin interpellation, they were determined that he should not come back.”
M. Labori.—“Could M. Trarieux tell us whether, while he was minister of justice, he received a visit from a lawyer especially interested in the matters in question here?”
M. Trarieux.—“I suppose you refer to the visit of M. Demange?”
M. Labori.—“Yes.”
The Judge.—“Is this in relation to the Dreyfus case?”
M. Labori.—“It is in relation to a document involved in the Dreyfus trial.”
The Judge.—“I ask you to say nothing about it.”
M. Labori.—“Yesterday General Mercier thought it his duty to refer to the Dreyfus case in words which, like all those that come from a certain direction here, are incomplete. They were received with very violent manifestations, but I have not been able to obtain anything additional, because it is an understood thing here that in this matter anyone can say anything that will injure us, but no one has a right to say anything that can help us.”
The Judge.—“Pardon me, M. Labori, I believe that I preside here with all the independence desirable. If I prevent M. Trarieux from speaking of the Dreyfus case, it is because there has been a decree of the court. You remind me of what General Mercier said yesterday. Permit me to add that, if the general said it, it was because I did not have time to stop him. He spoke too quickly; otherwise I would have prevented him. You ask questions that violate the decree which we have rendered.”
M. Labori.—“I shall ask all the questions that I think useful to my offence, whatever your opinion of them may be. You will pass upon them, Monsieur le Président,—and the court with you, for you are not the sole master,—as you see fit.”
M. Clemenceau.—“I think that the court misunderstands. None of us intend to violate its decrees. What we wish to point out is that, in spite of you, Monsieur le Président,—you yourself have said it,—General Mercier made a certain declaration yesterday. We desired to bring out today either a contradiction or a confirmation of the words uttered by General Mercier, and, by virtue of a decree of the court, you say to us: ‘That is not possible.’ The jurors will observe that for a court of justice this is a singular situation. The charge may be made, but it may not be contradicted.”
M. Trarieux.—“The charge, whether against M. Scheurer-Kestner or against M. Mathieu Dreyfus, that they are responsible for the existing agitation and disorder is quite erroneous and ill-founded. In fact, there are two ways of obtaining the revision of a judicial error, and Article 443 of the code of criminal examination defines them. The first is this: once a condemnation has been pronounced, if it be discovered that the facts on which this condemnation rest were committed by some other person than the person condemned, this other person may be prosecuted, and, if a condemnation is secured, this condemnation being contradictory of the previous condemnation of an innocent man, a revision of the judicial error becomes imperative. Thus these two condemnations necessarily bring about, ipso facto, a revision of the trial. The second method is provided by a law passed by the present legislature on June 6, 1895, under the government to which I had the honor to belong. It provides that, if, after a condemnation, a new fact be discovered which was unknown at the time of the condemnation, and which is of a nature to establish the innocence of the party condemned, the matter may be laid before the minister of justice to induce him to procure a revision of the case. The minister of justice is asked to lay the matter before the court of appeals, which is judge in such a matter. Now, it is indisputable that M. Mathieu Dreyfus took the first method, for, by preferring a formal complaint against Major Esterhazy, he hoped to secure a condemnation of him, the immediate consequence of which would have been a revision of his brother’s case. The question is whether he would not have done better to take the second method. It seems to be the opinion that he should have applied to the minister of justice and asked him to lay the matter before the court. I think that this is a mistaken opinion. Suppose, instead of making the complaint against Major Esterhazy, M. Mathieu Dreyfus had applied to the minister of justice for a revision, what new fact could he have pointed out to induce the minister of justice to lay the matter before the court of appeals? There was only one,—the similarity of Major Esterhazy’s handwriting to that of the bordereau attributed by the verdict of 1894 to Captain Dreyfus. If this had been pointed out to the minister of justice, it would have been necessary to draw the immediate conclusion that the author of this handwriting, M. Esterhazy, was the guilty party. It would have been impossible to lay the demand for revision before the court of appeals prior to a decision upon this question after a confrontation with M. Esterhazy. No revision of the judicial error of which Dreyfus was the victim could have been ordered, until it had been established in the presence of the party directly interested, M. Esterhazy, that this error was committed by him, or that it was the result of his crime, and that he was the author of the bordereau unjustly attributed to Dreyfus. Therefore the minister of justice would have had to prosecute M. Esterhazy. But this he could not have done himself, for the simple reason that M. Esterhazy, being a soldier, is responsible only to the military courts, and consequently the minister of justice would have had to hand the matter over to the minister of war, who would have been charged with the prosecution. If, then, M. Mathieu Dreyfus had chosen the method of appealing to the minister of justice, not only would nothing have been gained, but time would have been lost, for the same result would have been reached by a circuitous route.”
A group of witnesses was then called, consisting of M. Forzinetti, M. Lebrun-Renault, and others who had heard M. Lebrun-Renault declare that Dreyfus had never made a confession to him. But, the court declining to hear any of them, on the ground that their testimony concerned the Dreyfus case, they were all obliged to retire.
Testimony of Doctor Socquet.
Dr. Socquet was then recalled to the stand.
M. Clemenceau.—“I forgot to ask Dr. Socquet whether he found Mme. de Boulancy at No. 22, Boulevard des Batignolles.”
Dr. Socquet.—“No.”
M. Clemenceau.—“Will he tell the court how he succeeded in finding her, since that was the only address that he knew?”
Dr. Socquet.—“Through the letter handed to me by Monsieur le Président. He gave me a doctor’s certificate establishing her sickness, which was accompanied by a letter that gave the address.”
M. Clemenceau.—“I remind the court of an incident that occurred at the last hearing. I informed the court that Mme. de Boulancy did not live in the Boulevard des Batignolles, and the court answered: ‘She does live there, for the doctor’s certificate designates that address.’ Therefore I am at a loss to understand. Does Monsieur le Président recall the incident?”
The Judge.—“Perfectly. I am looking for the address in the letter.”
Dr. Socquet.—“It is on the third page.”
M. Zola.—“From whom is this letter?”
The judge then read the letter from Mme. de Boulancy which he had read at a previous hearing, but including this time the following sentence, which before he had omitted: “I am with my family, at No. 54, Avenue de Neuilly.”
M. Clemenceau.—“The court will remember that this information had not been previously furnished me. Therefore I have no further occasion to ask the doctor how he found Mme. de Boulancy, but I should like to ask him another question.”
M. Zola.—“Reference to the stenographic report will show that Mme. de Boulancy’s present address was not given at the hearing.”
The Judge.—“That is a matter of no importance.”
M. Clemenceau.—“I make a reservation, and pass on. In the course of Dr. Socquet’s visit to Mme. de Boulancy was there any conversation between them about matters other than his sickness?”
Dr. Socquet [after some hesitation].—“Yes, we talked of something else.”
M. Clemenceau.—“Something that did not concern her health?”
Dr. Socquet.—“Yes.”
M. Clemenceau.—“Did Dr. Socquet ask Mme. de Boulancy the following question: ‘Is it true that you have other letters from Major Esterhazy than those that have been published?’”
Dr. Socquet.—“No.”
M. Clemenceau.—“Did the witness say to Mme. de Boulancy: ‘Is it true that you have three telegrams from Major Esterhazy?’”
Dr. Socquet.—“No.”
M. Clemenceau.—“Did Mme. de Boulancy declare spontaneously: ‘I have letters from Major Esterhazy which are much more serious than those that have been published?’ And did she also declare, of her own initiative: ‘It has been incorrectly stated that I had three telegrams from Major Esterhazy; I have only two’?”
Dr. Socquet.—“No.”
M. Clemenceau.—“Was the name Esterhazy uttered at all in the course of the conversation?”
Dr. Socquet [after reflection].—“Yes.”
M. Clemenceau.—“Under what circumstances was this name uttered, and by whom?”
Dr. Socquet.—“By Mme. de Boulancy.”
M. Clemenceau.—“As Mme. de Boulancy would not have uttered this word singly, will the witness tell us what other words she added?”
The Judge.—“I call M. Clemenceau’s attention to the fact that he is entering into the domain of a private conversation.”
M. Clemenceau.—“The defence attaches the greatest importance to the testimony of Mme. de Boulancy and to the production of the letters which are still in her possession, as well as of the two telegrams which she also possesses. Under these circumstances we shall do all that we possibly can, and shall talk as long as the court does not prevent us, to secure the appearance of Mme. de Boulancy that she may enlighten this court and this jury regarding Major Esterhazy’s letters. I ask the witness what other words Mme. de Boulancy added to the word Esterhazy.”
Dr. Socquet.—“I am entirely ready to answer, but it is a matter outside of the mission that the court entrusted to me. Still, if it be not inappropriate, I will say that, when I examined Mme. de Boulancy, she talked to me of sundry matters,—among others of the way in which she had reached her present condition, and the annoyance that she felt. I let her talk, for I wanted to form an opinion as to the state of her health. She spoke of Major Esterhazy’s letters, and told me that she had complained at the office of the public prosecutor, who was looking into her charge, that a person had abused her letters. She said that she had entrusted these letters to a person who had found them interesting, and who had used them in a way of which she did not learn until later. She told me especially that this person had entrusted them to ‘Le Figaro,’ and that, an hour after he brought them back, M. Hadamard, sub-chief of police, came to seize them. She added that all these letters were from Major Esterhazy. That is all that she said to me on that subject.”
M. Clemenceau.—“By ‘all these letters’ did she mean those published by ‘Le Figaro,’ or the other letters that she had in her possession, or had deposited with one of her lawyers?”
Dr. Socquet.—“She said: ‘All his letters.’ Six letters, plus a seventh, which contains the word ‘Uhlans.’”
M. Clemenceau.—“Did she say that they were genuine?”
Dr. Socquet.—“That is what she said. I did not question her. I allowed her to talk, seeing no objection to it.”
Testimony of M. du Paty de Clam.
M. Socquet then stepped down, and M. du Paty de Clam took his place.
“Monsieur le Président,” said he, “I am called here to testify concerning the Esterhazy case. I am ready to answer all questions, except those that involve professional secrecy. But it is with deep sadness that I call attention to the fact that matters of my private life have been raised here. It does not embarrass me personally, for I have always behaved as a gallant man should. I have the esteem of my superiors, and that is enough for me. But I can not admit that it is allowable to reflect upon the honor of a young girl who has always been respected. I ask the court, in the name of French honor, to eliminate such questions from the discussion, and I will answer all others.”
The Judge.—“But here there has been no question” ...
M. Labori.—“I have referred here to but one woman, Mlle. Blanche de Comminges. It seems to be the opinion of the newspapers that I insinuated, or meant to say, that there had been between Mlle. de Comminges and Colonel du Paty de Clam private relations susceptible of an annoying interpretation. Nothing of the kind has been in my thoughts. Mlle. Blanche de Comminges is a young girl of fifty-five years; she is a friend of Colonel Picquart; her name has been used in telegrams which Colonel Picquart considers forgeries, and in regard to which he has complained. It is only of this that I have spoken. Now I come to different questions. In the first place, was M. du Paty de Clam ever acquainted with the father of Mlle. de Comminges?”
M. du Paty de Clam.—“Yes.”
M. Labori.—“Did he have a correspondence with one or more members of his family?”
M. du Paty de Clam.—“It is on this point, Monsieur le Président, that I ask permission to keep silent. I can reveal nothing. This concerns the honor of a family, the memory of a dead person, and I will not do it. It is private ground. It is my domain, and no one has a right to infringe upon it. It has no relation with the Esterhazy case, and I will say nothing about it.”
The Judge.—“You understand the answer?”
M. Labori.—“Yes, Monsieur le Président, I understand the answer, and I understand also that, though you consider it good, I do not.”
The Judge.—“Exactly.”
M. Labori.—“I do not, and I will tell you why, if you will permit me.”
The Judge.—“Go ahead.”
M. Labori.—“I never before saw an assize court like this. All means are sought here to prevent the light from being thrown on any point.”
The Judge.—“These are your witnesses.”
M. Labori.—“Pardon me, these are not our witnesses; they are witnesses. M. du Paty de Clam is called because we wanted a complete investigation, and, whenever we put a question, in the absence of a good reason why it should not be answered, we are offered two bad ones. When there has been a consideration of the matter behind closed doors, they say: ‘We will not answer, because this occurred behind closed doors.’ I say this to the jurors: Are you not as worthy to keep a secret as French military officers? If closed doors are necessary, let the doors be closed. We do not distrust you. Then they appeal to professional secrecy. When that will not do, they invoke secrets of State. And when they can invoke neither professional secrecy or secrets of State or closed doors, they invoke private secrets. Consequently I have no further questions to put to M. du Paty de Clam.”
Testimony of Colonel Henry.
The next witness was Colonel Henry.
M. Labori.—“Will Colonel Henry tell us how far the facts related in Major Ravary’s report are correct, and what documents Colonel Picquart took from the files? Will Colonel Henry tell us whether that report described correctly the scene that took place in his presence in Colonel Picquart’s private office between M. Leblois and Colonel Picquart, and what that scene really was?”
Colonel Henry.—“I was absent when the file was taken by Colonel Picquart. I was on leave of absence, in August or September, 1896. Colonel Picquart asked M. Gribelin for the file, and he gave it to him.”
The Judge.—“M. Gribelin made the same answer.”
Colonel Henry.—“M. Gribelin, the keeper of the archives, to whom I had given the key of my closet,” ...
M. Labori.—“Thus it results from the testimony of the witness” ...
The Judge.—“M. Gribelin was under Colonel Picquart’s orders.”
M. Labori.—“But what was Colonel Henry’s position?”
Colonel Henry.—“Major.”
M. Labori.—“Under whose orders?”
Colonel Henry.—“Under the orders of Colonel Picquart.”
M. Labori.—“The chief of the service was M. Picquart. Consequently, if I rightly understand, Colonel Picquart, who was at the head of the service, asked M. Gribelin, who was under his orders, like Major Henry himself, to give him, by opening the closet with the key,—that is, under the most natural conditions,—a file that was a part of Colonel Picquart’s service. Is that it?”
Colonel Henry.—“Exactly. If I had been present, I would have pointed out to Colonel Picquart that my instructions, given me by Colonel Sandherr, were to give this file to nobody, except in the presence of the sub-chief of staff, the chief of staff, and myself.”
The Judge.—“It was Colonel Sandherr who gave those orders. He is dead, I believe.”
Colonel Henry.—“He was sick and unconscious.”
M. Labori.—“Under these circumstances Colonel Sandherr had been replaced by Colonel Picquart. Does Colonel Henry invoke against Colonel Picquart, then his chief, instructions given him by a previous chief? Will Colonel Henry tell us who succeeded Colonel Picquart in the war offices?”
Colonel Henry.—“Colonel Picquart’s successor is General Gonse, sub-chief of staff, for it was to General Gonse that Colonel Picquart handed over his service when in November, 1897, he started on a mission.”
M. Labori.—“Who is now in the service under General Gonse’s orders?”
Colonel Henry.—“I am.”
M. Labori.—“Thank you.”
M. Clemenceau.—“Did not Colonel Henry confer concerning a certain matter directly with M. Leblois? I ask no details.”
Colonel Henry.—“You refer to the Bouleau affair? One day there was,—that is to say, I talked to Colonel Picquart in presence of M. Leblois. Colonel Picquart said: ‘When we are embarrassed concerning any question of spying, you can refer to M. Leblois, who is a lawyer, and will be able’” ...
M. Clemenceau.—“When you wanted to send an envelope containing no matter what to another office, and did not want this envelope to be opened, had you not a method of assuring yourself that it would not be opened? Was it not your habit to place your signature on envelopes that you did not wish to be opened?”
Colonel Henry.—“No.”
M. Clemenceau.—“Was it not the habit of the witness to do that?”
Colonel Henry.—“No.”
The Judge.—“But one of the witnesses yesterday said that it was?”
M. Labori.—“Pardon me. Permit me to interrupt to ask that the question be put as we frame it. I protest; there has been already too much said. I ask that the question be thus put: Did Colonel Henry once do this?”
Colonel Henry then admitted that he placed his signature on the secret file. The witness was then confronted with M. Leblois, whom Colonel Henry said that he had never seen, except in Colonel Picquart’s presence.
M. Leblois.—“I had a long discussion with Colonel Henry concerning a matter that had been under examination in the office of the public prosecutor at Nancy.”
The Judge.—“In the absence of Colonel Picquart?”
Colonel Henry.—“We talked once in the presence of Colonel Picquart. The latter said to me: ‘When we shall have need of additional information concerning some matter of spying, here is M. Leblois, who will be able to lend us his aid.’ Well, I have never conferred with M. Leblois.”
M. Leblois.—“This conference lasted several hours in your own private office. You admitted it before the council of war.”
Testimony of M. de la Batut.
The next witness was M. de la Batut, who testified as follows:
“At the time of which I speak Lieutenant du Paty de Clam was giving a course of instruction to the conditional volunteers of a year. When the conditional volunteers came to the regiment, they were given, as a subject of historical composition, ‘The Wars of the First Empire.’ I wrote such a composition as I was able to from my recollections of the matter, and I finished by saying that it was to be hoped that henceforth intelligence, and not cannons, would govern the world. The next day the lieutenant-colonel sent for me, and said: ‘You are from the south; you shall have a fortnight in prison.’ I answered: ‘My colonel, I am not exactly from the south, I am from Dordogne.’ ‘Yes, yes, you are from the south. You shall have a fortnight in prison for your composition.’ And I was taken to prison. The colonel, who was absent, returned the next morning, and, probably finding my punishment excessive, hastened to relieve me of it.”
M. Clemenceau.—“After he had thus relieved you, was the punishment replaced by another of a more general character?”
M. de la Batut.—“Yes; the colonel said to me: ‘I relieve you of your punishment, because it was a little too severe, and you have not yet the military spirit. But you and all your comrades will get no leave of absence for a month.’”
Then the following witnesses were successively called and dismissed, because their testimony was to relate to the Dreyfus case: Major Besson d’Ormescheville, M. Maurel, M. Vallecalle, M. Eichmann, M. Gallet, and M. Roche. Then came Major Ravary.
Testimony of Major Ravary.
M. Labori.—“I find the following in Major Ravary’s report: ‘One evening, when Lieutenant-Colonel Henry, on returning to Paris, suddenly entered M. Picquart’s office, he found M. Leblois, the lawyer, who paid the colonel long and frequent visits, sitting near the desk and searching with him the secret file. A photograph bearing the words, “That scoundrel D...” had been taken from the file and spread upon the desk.’”
M. Ravary.—“There is an error. It is a secret file, not the secret file.”
M. Labori.—“I ask first not what this file contained, since it is secret, but to what it related?”
M. Ravary.—“I do not exactly understand. A witness said that there was a document spread between M. Leblois and Colonel Picquart. I know nothing more.”
M. Labori.—“Unless it is understood that there is always to be some method of evasion, I insist on a reply from M. Ravary. Here we are squarely in the Esterhazy matter. We have Major Ravary’s report. He was the official reporter. It is not possible that he accepted testimony that has been contradicted here by the evidence of M. Gribelin and M. Henry. It is not possible that M. Ravary accepted evidence without pressing the witnesses. It is not possible that a matter so serious as a secret file should have been referred to in a report read to the council of war without resulting in an examination of its contents. I do not ask what its contents were, but to what it related. If the witness cannot answer, I shall infer that judicial examinations before a council of war are carried on as we have never seen them carried on in trials in which we take part.”
M. Ravary—“I protest that all our examinations are carried on with the greatest honesty and conscientiousness. As to the document of which M. Labori speaks, it did not interest me, and for this reason. I had an accused man before me, Major Esterhazy. I was to seek proof either of his innocence or of his guilt, and this document had nothing to do with Major Esterhazy.”
M. Labori.—“This document was a part of the Esterhazy file. I ask the court to ask M. Ravary, who conducted the examination, what this document was.”
M. Ravary.—“As to that, I am completely ignorant.”
M. Labori.—“That is enough; I am satisfied.”
M. Clemenceau.—“The witness said in his report that there was a file of documents open on Colonel Picquart’s desk. I should like to know if he maintains that declaration.”
M. Ravary—“It was so stated in the testimony of either Colonel Henry or M. Gribelin.”
M. Clemenceau.—“I remind the court that M. Gribelin said that there was a file of documents in an envelope. Colonel Henry said the same thing, and so I ask the court to recall M. Gribelin.”
M. Ravary.—“I said either M. Gribelin or Colonel Henry.”
M. Gribelin, being recalled testified as follows: “What I said was that the documents were contained in a yellow envelope; they were not scattered; I even specified, in my written deposition, that they were not searching the documents.”
M. Ravary.—“My report is a sincere expression of the file of documents. Let the file be called for.”
M. Clemenceau.—“M. Gribelin says that the file was in an envelope.”
M. Ravary.—“The envelope was cut lengthwise.”
M. Clemenceau.—“The documents were in an envelope, and the side of the envelope was cut; so it was impossible to know what was in the envelope.”
M. Ravary.—“But there was not one visit simply; there were several. M. Leblois has been seen several times at the office of Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart.”
The Judge.—“We know it.”
M. Clemenceau.—“Let us not depart from the question. M. Gribelin says that on the day that he entered there was a file of documents on the desk relating to carrier pigeons,—documents in an envelope.”
The Judge.—“Exactly.”
M. Clemenceau.—“The report says that there was an open file of documents from which had been taken a document containing these words, ‘That scoundrel D....’”
M. Ravary.—“But I wrote that in my report on the strength, not of M. Gribelin’s testimony, but of the testimony of another. Send for the Esterhazy file, and you will see.”
M. Labori.—“But we ask nothing better.”
M. Ravary.—“That does not concern me. My conduct was that of an honest man; that is all.”
Testimony of General de Pellieux.
The next witness to take the stand was General de Pellieux. “I feel,” he began, “that it is necessary that the whole truth should be known, and I shall tell it.”
M. Clemenceau.—“We shall remember this promise.”
General de Pellieux.—“On the 14th of last November, M. Mathieu Dreyfus lodged with the minister of war a complaint against Major Esterhazy. He formally accused him of being the author of the bordereau that had led to the condemnation of his brother, basing his accusation upon an absolute similarity of handwriting. On the 16th I received from the military governor of Paris an order to make a military investigation. I was instructed to give M. Mathieu Dreyfus an opportunity of proving his charge. I sent for him. He brought me no proof of any sort,—nothing but allegations. In reality, my investigation was virtually over, but, in view of the public feeling that the charge had created, I felt that I could not stop. I received from M. Scheurer-Kestner the names of M. Leblois and Colonel Picquart. M. Leblois came. He had a file of documents, composed of letters, fac-similes of Major Esterhazy’s writing, a telegram in characters similar to those used in print, which had been addressed to M. Scheurer-Kestner, and of which I do not recall the terms, and fourteen letters from General Gonse. He showed me these fourteen letters, and I read them. I read likewise the drafts of the letters addressed by Colonel Picquart to M. Leblois. The latter told me that he had been long in relationship with Colonel Picquart, and had often been to see him at the war department, and he gave me a history of his relations with Colonel Picquart. These relations, then, are admitted. M. Leblois has been at the office of the minister of war, and he has in his hands letters from Colonel Picquart. For some days there has been talk of the communication of a secret file. It is admitted that Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart placed General Gonse’s letters in the hands of M. Leblois. It is admitted that he said to M. Leblois, who repeated it to M. Scheurer-Kestner, that a file in a war office contained a document formally accusing Major Esterhazy of treason. Here I will point out that, in my opinion, there is nothing more secret, nothing more sacred, in the world than an examination begun against an officer for the crime of treason. There is nothing in the world so sacred as a man’s honor, as long as he remains unconvicted of the crime with which he is charged. Well, Colonel Picquart told M. Leblois that in the office of the minister of war there was a file containing a document that formally accused Major Esterhazy of treason. I defy anyone to contradict me. There you have communication of a secret file, proved and patent.
“Now I can explain General Gonse’s letters. They do not relate to the Dreyfus case, but solely to the Esterhazy case. General Gonse recommends his subordinate to act with the greatest prudence. He tells him that he does not wish to stop him in his inquiries,—naturally, for they never stop an inquiry, once it is begun,—but at the same time he cautions him against taking irreparable steps, such a step as the immediate arrest of Colonel Esterhazy would have been. I reported to the military governor of Paris that there was no proof against Major Esterhazy, but that Colonel Picquart had made a serious blunder from a military standpoint. As a result of this first report, it appeared that there had been some confusion, and that it was the intention of the minister that my investigation should be a judicial one. The governor did not so understand it, nor did I.
“I immediately began a new investigation, with a clerk, and acting as a magistrate. I summoned the accused, and confronted him with the charges against him. But first I had a search made of Colonel Picquart’s premises. Because of this search I have been bitterly attacked. Let me say that it was my absolute right, given me by the code of military justice as a judicial officer of police. Moreover, it was my duty. This search had been demanded of me, and I could not refuse without being suspected of an indisposition to get at the truth. So I instituted a regular search through M. Aymard, a police commissioner connected with the government of Paris. The results of the search were brought to me under seal, and I broke the seal in presence of Colonel Picquart. Of the documents taken I kept but a single letter, to which I will refer directly. All of the other letters I returned to Colonel Picquart, after a cursory glance at them. There were numerous letters from his mother, which I have perfectly respected, and numerous letters from Mlle. Blanche de Comminges, one of which was the only document that I retained as being possibly of interest. Then I summoned the various witnesses whom I had seen in my first investigation, and examined them on two points. First, concerning the bordereau. M. Mathieu Dreyfus had accused Major Esterhazy of being the author of the bordereau. About this bordereau much has been said. Few people have seen it; I believe that it would be easy to count them. But many have seen fac-similes, and I, who have seen it, must say that these fac-similes singularly resemble forgeries, and that to pretend to base an expert opinion of handwriting on fac-similes that have appeared in the newspapers is, it seems to me, to go a long way. Nothing less resembles the newspaper fac-simile than the original bordereau; consequently all the expert testimony made so lightly is of no value.
“I listened to Major Esterhazy’s defence concerning the bordereau. As it is well known, I will not repeat it. He tried to demonstrate that it would have been impossible for him to produce the documents of which the bordereau speaks. The council of war has judged that matter, and I will not insist. But in the course of Colonel Picquart’s examination an incident occurred. He spoke to me of the document of which M. Leblois and M. Scheurer-Kestner had spoken to me, a card-telegram which, according to Colonel Picquart, was of the same origin as the bordereau. This document was torn,—had been torn and pasted together. It contained writing which seemed to prove, according to Colonel Picquart, that Major Esterhazy was in suspicious relations with an agent of a foreign power. The first thing to be done was to establish the genuineness of this document, Lieutenant-Colonel Picquart being the only one who had any knowledge of it. It was very certain that this card-telegram had not been sent to the person for whom it was intended, and consequently had not reached him. That in itself was sufficient to invalidate the authenticity of the document; it had not been deposited in the post-office, and bore no post-office stamp. In examining other witnesses, I spoke of this document, and learned that attempts had been made to give it the appearance of authenticity that it lacked. It was desired to have it so photographed as to cause all traces of tear to disappear, that it might be said: ‘It was torn afterwards; when it came, it was intact.’ An effort was made also to have a post-office stamp placed upon it, in order that it could be said that it had been seized in the mails. To me this document had no appearance of genuineness. I am astonished that Colonel Picquart, chief of the bureau of information of a great power,—we have not yet fallen to the level of the republic of Andorra or of St. Marin,—an officer who ought to be intelligent, should be naive enough to believe that a military attaché of a great foreign power would have corresponded with one of its agents by a card-telegram. A card-telegram left with a janitor, and liable to be opened by a janitor, or any other servant,—is it thus that they would have corresponded with Esterhazy? I confess that I did not believe it. I said to Colonel Picquart: ‘You have sought other proofs against Esterhazy; what means have you employed of finding them?’ And I come now to a very serious matter. He confessed that for months, without the order or the authorization of his superiors, General Gonse and General de Boisdeffre, he had been seizing in the mails all of Esterhazy’s correspondence. For eight months he opened that officer’s letters, and was obliged to admit that he had found nothing. He admitted that without orders he had had that officer’s premises searched, overturning his furniture, disarranging his wife’s effects, and ransacking the apartments; and proof exists—at first he admitted it—that a piece of furniture was forced open, and, being unable to lock it again, they had a key made for that purpose, so that today, instead of two keys for this piece of furniture, there are three. It seemed to me that this was proof of inadmissible manœuvres, and I confess that, when a council of war acquitted Esterhazy, I was not astonished. Of my participation in that acquittal I am proud. I succeeded in showing that there were not two traitors among the officers, but only one, and that he had been justly condemned. General de Boisdeffre and General Mercier were allowed to say a word of Dreyfus; I ask to be similarly authorized.”
The judge refused to allow the request.
M. Clemenceau.—“Just now I heard the witness say that there is nothing more serious than to communicate documents accusing officers of treason, especially when these documents were secretly filed in the office of the minister of war. I ask him, then, for his opinion concerning the following facts: a secret document was taken from the office of the minister of war, carried about Paris by a veiled lady, and handed by this veiled lady to Major Esterhazy, who brought it back to the office of the minister of war, and, strange to say, the minister of war gave him a receipt for it. I would like to know the opinion of General de Pellieux on the withdrawal of this first document.”
General de Pellieux.—“I have no opinion to express.”
M. Clemenceau.—“Ah! very well.”
General de Pellieux.—“What opinion do you expect me to express?”
The Judge.—“Were you familiar, in the Esterhazy case, with the communication of secret documents by Colonel Picquart to M. Leblois?”
M. Clemenceau.—“That is not what we are talking about. It is agreed that, when General de Pellieux learns that a document accusing Major Esterhazy is communicated to a third party, he is indignant. It is established, on the other hand, that, when a document accusing another officer is carried about Paris, he has no opinion. General de Pellieux has said that he caused a search to be made of M. Picquart’s premises. May I point out to him that M. Picquart was a witness, and ask him also why he did not cause a search to be made of the premises of M. Esterhazy, who was the party accused?”
General de Pellieux.—“It was absolutely useless to search the premises of Major Esterhazy, as that had been done during eight months by Colonel Picquart.”
M. Clemenceau.—“Eighteen months had elapsed between what General de Pellieux calls the searches of Major Esterhazy’s premises by M. Picquart and the Esterhazy investigation. I repeat: How did it happen to occur to General de Pellieux to search the premises of a witness, and not the premises of the accused?”
General de Pellieux.—“I did not cause a search to be made of Major Esterhazy’s premises, because I was a judicia officer of police and did not deem it necessary.”
General de Pellieux then stepped down, and the defence offered the testimony of MM. Dupuy, Guérin, and Poincaré concerning the secret document, which testimony the court declined to hear for the usual reasons, and the hearing of which M. Labori insisted on by the usual motions. Then the stand was taken by M. Thévenet, former minister of justice.
Testimony of M. Thévenet.
Being asked what he thought of the good faith of M. Zola in writing the article, “I Accuse,” he said:
“I am absolutely convinced that M. Zola acted in good faith, and these are my reasons. In the Esterhazy case there was an astonishing gap, which I consider very important. The examination had shown that Major Esterhazy had received from a veiled lady on several occasions the copy of a secret document which existed in the office of the minister of war, and which demonstrated, it was said, the guilt of Dreyfus. Well, I say very frankly to the jury that what struck me in this military examination was that this matter of extreme importance was not thoroughly looked into. If the veiled lady really existed, why did they not search for her with much activity and patience, and why was not this important matter gone into thoroughly? I am astonished—and in parliament I am not alone in this astonishment—that the military authorities dropped this matter without a fundamental examination. If a secret document of this character had been taken from the office of the minister of war, a secret document on which everybody’s eyes were fixed, and which was securely locked in a closet, it was for the interest of the national defence that serious measures should be taken to avoid other leaks of this sort, for other secret documents might be similarly embezzled by this woman, or by some one in her confidence. Moreover, it would have been easy to make such an investigation. This woman had arranged meetings in somewhat strange spots; she had been taken there in cabs on two occasions, if my memory serves me; and Paris cabmen never exhibit a failure of memory when the courts call on them for testimony. Hence the cabman, and perhaps the woman, could easily have been found. At any rate, a serious investigation should have been made to find out how the document was taken.
“If the veiled lady is a legendary character,—which is possible, for I believe that in this case there are many legends,—the question was no less serious. For then the problem arises: how could a secret document, from the office of the minister of war, showing the guilt of Captain Dreyfus, have been communicated to Major Esterhazy, when it had not been communicated to Captain Dreyfus, whom this document accused? I can understand that M. Zola’s conscience has been troubled. And it is not only his that has been troubled. I can understand how M. Zola could arrive at the belief that the second council of war, inexactly informed by an inadequate examination, had perhaps misjudged.”
M. Thévenet was then asked by M. Labori what he thought of M. Zola’s good faith in writing that sentence in his letter to President Faure in which he accused the second council of war of having covered the illegality of the first council of war, in obedience to orders, by committing in its turn the crime of knowingly acquitting a guilty person. The witness answered:
“It is said that neither Dreyfus or his council were made aware of a secret document, which nevertheless had been communicated to the members of the council of war that condemned Dreyfus. Well, gentlemen, I am astonished that this question, which has been under discussion so long, has not been settled already. It is, in my opinion, not simply the only question involved in this trial, but the capital question of this entire discussion. It should have been met at the beginning, and it seemed to me—I ask your pardon for this allusion—that it was possible to answer it very frankly by a yes or a no. I have read the reports of the trial, and I have been surprised that this question, which has been asked, if I am not mistaken, has been met by silence. It has been put to honorable generals who were able to answer, but who considered themselves bound by professional secrecy. I say, gentlemen, that here we touch a question which is not simply a point of law, but a much higher principle,—that of the liberty of defence, the imprescriptible right which every accused man has of knowing on what evidence he is accused. Is it true, yes or no, that the first council of war considered documents that were not made known to M. Demange or to Captain Dreyfus? That can be answered by a yes or a no. They make no answer. What does that mean? If they had answered yes, the court of appeals would have passed upon it. Would that have established the innocence of Dreyfus? Not at all. He would have come again before the council of war, before military authority itself, and military authority, after examining the documents and submitting them to Dreyfus and his counsel, would have decided whether Dreyfus was guilty. But in that case Dreyfus would have had a chance to defend himself against documents that he had been permitted to read. Perhaps there would have been a second conviction. I do not know. But the trial would have been complete, the law would have been respected, and the liberty of defence—human dignity, I should say—would have been safeguarded. I declare, for my part, that, if the minister of war had come here to give his word of honor that no communication had been made to the council of war which judged Dreyfus, I should have bowed before his word. But let him give it. This it is that disturbs public opinion, and prolongs, and perhaps will perpetuate, this trial, which is an evil for everybody and an evil for the country.”
M. Zola.—“Surely.”
M. Thévenet.—“I say that this no should be spoken with a loud voice. But they are silent. What are we to believe? What are we to think? In what country are we living? Where are we? Is there a magistrate among those who listen to me, is there any of my confrères, any person whatsoever, anyone among you, gentlemen of the jury, who can understand that we should be left in uncertainty on this important point whether Dreyfus, yes or no, was acquainted with the documents that proved his guilt, and, if not, why they were not shown to him, why they were not shown to his counsel, that confrère whom we all respect, bound to professional secrecy as well as the generals, and who is certainly as patriotic as anybody. That is what I have to say. And I finish with one word: I say that, for the reasons that I have indicated, perhaps at too great length, the good faith of M. Zola is on a level with his talent, and I consider that glorious.”
M. Thévenet was succeeded on the witness-stand by M. Salle, an aged member of the Paris bar, who was said to have received from a member of the council of war a confession that a secret document was communicated to it.
Testimony of M. Salle.
M. Labori.—“Does M. Salle know any fact of interest to the defence of M. Zola?”
The Judge.—“That is not a question. In relation to what?”
M. Labori.—“In relation to the affair of M. Zola.”
The Judge.—“That is not a question, either. I will not put such a question as that. Does it relate to the Dreyfus case or to the Esterhazy case?”
M. Labori.—“Permit me, Monsieur le Président, in spite of all my respect for you, to say that I do not understand this distinction. For this there are two reasons. The first is that, as I said yesterday, the only case in litigation here is the case of M. Zola. The second is—and it is upon this especially that I insist—that General Mercier, General de Pellieux, General Gonse, and others like them, come here, speaking of the decrees of justice with which they are familiar, sheltering themselves behind their privilege to avoid speaking, and nevertheless, one after another, with the same vagueness and the same uncertainty, throwing their word into the balance, convinced that, thanks to the love which this country has for itself, their word, as soldiers, will be sufficient, and need not be supported by any reason. We do not stop them. They have the right to say, one after another: ‘Dreyfus is guilty.’ They speak out thus, in spite of the decrees of the court, and no one blames them, for it is impossible to speak of the Esterhazy case without speaking of the Dreyfus case. For this reason, as for others, being given that there is a thing judged, as in the Esterhazy case, I see but one explanation of the gag that is placed in our mouths—namely, that they do not dare to speak of the Dreyfus case, which it is impossible to separate from the Esterhazy case. I ask that the liberty to speak be given to all the witnesses on all points that do not concern the national defence, and I ask especially that, when I put a question as discreet, as reserved, as moderate, as that which I put to M. Salle, face to face with a witness in possession of a secret which I know they do not want him to tell,—I ask that the question be put, or else I protest against the obscurity that is being thickened a little more every day because of fear of the light.”
The Judge.—“You can protest as much as you like. I have told you that I would put no question to the witness on this point. I repeat it, and so it will be to the end of the trial. [To the witness.] Have you anything to say in relation to the Esterhazy case?”
M. Salle.—“Concerning the Esterhazy case I have nothing to say.”
The Judge.—“Of the Dreyfus case let us say nothing.”
M. Labori.—“But, Monsieur le Président, I do not wish to speak of the Dreyfus case.”
The Judge.—“Pardon me, you wish to speak of it indirectly.”
M. Clemenceau.—“Will Monsieur le Président allow me to put the following question? Was the witness told by one of the members of the council of war of 1894 that a secret document was communicated to the judges in the council-chamber,—a document which had been communicated neither to the accused or to his counsel?”
The Judge.—“I have told you that that question would not be put.”
M. Clemenceau.—“Then I ask a legal declaration to that effect from the court.”
The Judge.—“The court grants you a legal declaration of anything you like.”
M. Clemenceau.—“Oh! Monsieur le Président, it seems to me that you are going a little fast. My question to the witness involves the principal point in this case. The court will not put it. Under these circumstances I must offer a motion asking acknowledgment that in the presence of the accusation against M. Zola” ...
The Judge.—“The accusation concerning the Esterhazy case.”
M. Labori.—“I did not say that. I asked the court to put to M. Salle the following question: Does M. Salle know of a serious fact concerning the accusation against M. Zola that may be useful to him from the standpoint of morality and good faith?”
The Judge [to the witness].—“Do you know of anything in the Esterhazy case which” ...
M. Labori.—“I ask that the question be put in the terms in which I framed it.”
The Judge.—“You have no right to ask indirect questions in order to reach an end which you should not reach.”
M. Labori.—“Monsieur le Président, I use no indirect methods.”
The Judge.—“I ask your pardon.”
M. Labori.—“I accept no observations which imply that I desire to reach an end by indirect means.”
The Judge.—“You know the summons; you know the court’s decree. Let us not go outside of that.”
M. Labori.—“I do not go outside of it. And let me tell you, Monsieur le Président, since you blame me personally here, that I am convinced that, if you came here desirous of the light, but not knowing the light, knowing nothing of this affair, you would not know what I expect of this man; and therefore, when you refuse to put the question that I have just asked you to put, I say that you foresee the reply that would be made; I say that you make this a tendency trial, and I do not accept it.”
The Judge.—“I repeat that I will put only such questions as concern the Esterhazy case, and none that concern the Dreyfus case.”
M. Labori.—“I make no reference to the Dreyfus case. Here we come to the culminating point of this trial. Monsieur le Président, I ask your permission to offer a motion, in order to secure a decision from the court regarding the putting of the question which I ask the court to put.”
M. Clemenceau.—“I think it important to give due weight to this fact,—that, a witness being on the stand, the defence rises and says: ‘We maintain that this witness knows from the lips of a member of the council of war that a secret document was communicated,’ and that, confronted with this affirmation, upon which we insist, the court declares that the question shall not be put. We make the jury judge. Let the witness contradict us with a word. Monsieur le Président will not have time to stop him.”
The Judge.—“Monsieur, do not answer.”
M. Clemenceau then offered his motion in legal form, and the court at once rendered a decree sustaining the president, and refusing to put the question, whereupon the court adjourned for the day.