Introduction
On the strength of his Aristotelian “Paraphrases” Themistius may be called a scholar, though hardly a philosopher as he himself claimed. Technically he was a Sophist: that is to say he gave public lectures (ἐπιδείξεις), wrote exercises after the Sophistic pattern and went on embassies, which were entrusted to him solely on account of his persuasive charm. But he insisted that he was no Sophist, because he took no fees[365] and styled himself a practical philosopher.[366] He was indifferent to the Neo-Platonic philosophy,[367] and, since Constantius made him a Senator, he cannot have betrayed any zeal for the Pagan religion. From Julian's Pagan restoration he seems to have held aloof, and, though Julian had been his pupil, probably at Nicomedia, he did not appoint him to any office. Under the Christian Emperor Theodosius he held a prefecture. There is no evidence for a positive coolness, such as Zeller[368] assumes, between Themistius and Julian, and we know too little of their relations to assert with some critics that the respectful tone of this letter is ironical.[369] It was probably written after Julian had [pg 201] become Emperor, though there is nothing in it that would not suit an earlier date; it is sometimes assigned to 355 when Julian was still Caesar. The quotations from Aristotle are appropriately addressed to Themistius as an Aristotelian commentator.
[253] ΙΟΥΛΙΑΝΟΥ ΑΥΤΟΚΡΑΤΟΡΟΣ
(Julian, Emperor)
ΘΕΜΙΣΤΙΩΙ ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΩΙ
(To Themistius the Philosopher)
Ἐγώ σοι βεβαιῶσαι μέν, ὥσπερ οὖν γράφεις, τὰς ἐλπίδας καὶ σφόδρα εὔχομαι, δέδοικα δὲ μὴ διαμάρτω, μείζονος οὔσης τῆς ὑποσχέσεως, ἣν ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ πρός τε τοὺς ἄλλους ἅπαντας καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον πρὸς σεαυτὸν ποιῇ· καί μοι πάλαι μὲν οἰομένῳ πρός τε τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον καὶ τὸν Μάρκον, καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος γέγονεν ἀρετῇ διαφέρων, [B] εἶναι τὴν ἅμιλλαν φρίκη τις προσῄει καὶ δέος θαυμαστόν, μὴ τοῦ μὲν ἀπολείπεσθαι παντελῶς τῆς ἀνδρείας δόξω, τοῦ δὲ τῆς τελείας ἀρετῆς οὐδὲ ἐπ᾽ ὀλίγον ἐφίκωμαι. εἰς ταῦτα ἀφορῶν ἀνεπειθόμην τὴν σχολὴν ἐπαινεῖν, καὶ τῶν Ἀττικῶν διαιτημάτων[370] αὐτός τε ἡδέως ἐμεμνήμην καὶ τοῖς φίλοις ὑμῖν προσᾴδειν ἠξίουν, ὥσπερ οἱ τὰ βαρέα φορτία φέροντες ἐν ταῖς ᾠδαῖς ἐπικουφίζουσιν αὑτοῖς τὴν ταλαιπωρίαν. [C] σὺ δέ μοι νῦν μεῖζον ἐποίησας διὰ τῆς ἔναγχος ἐπιστολῆς τὸ δέος καὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα τῷ παντὶ χαλεπώτερον ἔδειξας, ἐν ταύτῃ παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ τετάχθαι με τῇ μερίδι λέγων, ἐν ᾗ πρότερον Ἡρακλῆς καὶ Διόνυσος ἐγενέσθην φιλοσοφοῦντες ὁμοῦ καὶ βασιλεύοντες καὶ πᾶσαν [pg 204] σχεδὸν [254] τῆς ἐπιπολαζούσης κακίας ἀνακαθαιρόμενοι γῆν τε καὶ θάλατταν. κελεύεις δὲ πᾶσαν ἀποσεισάμενον σχολῆς ἔννοιαν καὶ ῥᾳστώνης σκοπεῖν, ὅπως τῆς ὑποθέσεως ἀξίως ἀγωνιούμεθα· εἶτα ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῖς τῶν νομοθετῶν μέμνησαι, Σόλωνος, Πιττακοῦ, Λυκούργου, καὶ τούτων ἁπάντων μείζονα χρῆναι παρ᾽ ἡμῶν λέγεις τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐν δίκῃ νῦν περιμένειν. τούτοις ἐγὼ τοῖς λόγοις ἐντυχὼν ἐξεπλάγην μικροῦ· [B] σοὶ μὲν γὰρ ὑπελάμβανον οὐδαμῶς θεμιτὸν κολακεύειν ἢ ψεύδεσθαι, ἐμαυτῷ δὲ συνειδὼς φύσεως μὲν ἕνεκα διαφέρον οὐδὲν οὔτε ἐξ ἀρχῆς οὔτε νῦν ὑπάρξαν, φιλοσοφίας δὲ ἐρασθέντι μόνον· τὰς γὰρ ἐν μέσῳ σιγῶ τύχας, αἵ μοι τὸν ἔρωτα τοῦτον ἀτελῆ τέως ἐφύλαξαν· οὐκ εἴχον οὖν ὅ, τι χρὴ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων λόγων συμβαλεῖν, ἕως ἐπὶ νοῦν ἤγαγεν ὁ θεός, [C] μή ποτε ἄρα προτρέπειν ἐθέλεις διὰ τῶν ἐπαίνων καὶ τῶν ἀγώνων δεῖξαι τὸ μέγεθος, οἷς ἀνάγκη πᾶσα τὸν ἐν πολιτείᾳ ζῶντα παραβεβλῆσθαι τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον.
(I earnestly desire to fulfil your hopes of me even as you express them in your letter, but I am afraid I shall fall short of them, since the expectations you have raised both in the minds of others, and still more in your own, are beyond my powers. There was a time when I believed that I ought to try to rival men who have been most distinguished for excellence, Alexander, for instance, or Marcus;[371] but I shivered at the thought and was seized with terror lest I should fail entirely to come up to the courage of the former, and should not make even the least approach to the latter's perfect virtue. With this in mind I convinced myself that I preferred a life of leisure, and I both gladly recalled the Attic manner of living, and thought myself to be in sweet accord with you who are my friends, just as those who carry heavy burdens lighten their labour by singing.[372] But by your recent letter you have increased my fears, and you point to an enterprise in every way more difficult. You say that God has placed me in the same position as Heracles and Dionysus of old who, being at once philosophers and kings, purged almost the whole earth and sea of the evils that infested them. You bid me shake off all thought of leisure and inactivity that I may prove to be a good soldier worthy of so high a destiny. And besides those examples you go on to remind me of law-givers such as Solon, Pittacus, and Lycurgus, and you say that men have the right to expect from me now greater things than from any of these. When I read these words I was almost dumbfounded; for on the one hand I was sure that it was unlawful for you as a philosopher to flatter or deceive; on the other hand I am fully conscious that by nature there is nothing remarkable about me—there never was from the first nor has there come to be now,—but as regards philosophy I have only fallen in love with it (I say nothing of the fates that have intervened[373] to make that love so far ineffectual). I could not tell therefore how I ought to interpret such expressions, until God brought it into my mind that perhaps by your very praises you wished to exhort me, and to point out how great are those trials to which a statesman must inevitably be exposed every day of his life.)
Τοῦτο δὲ ἀποτρέποντός ἐστι πλέον ἢ πρὸς τὸν βίον παρορμῶντος. ὥσπερ γὰρ εἴ τις τὸν πορθμὸν τὸν παρ᾽ ὑμῖν πλέων καὶ οὐδὲ τοῦτον ῥᾳδίως οὐδὲ εὐκόλως ὑφιστάμενος ἀκούοι παρά του μαντικὴν ἐπαγγελλομένου τέχνην, [D] ὡς χρεὼν αὐτὸν τὸν Αἰγαῖον ἀναμετρῆσαι καὶ τὸν Ἰόνιον καὶ τῆς ἔξω θαλάσσης ἅψασθαι, καὶ “Νῦν μὲν” ὁρᾷς ὁ προφήτης λέγοι “τείχη καὶ λιμένας, ἐκεῖ δὲ γενόμενος [pg 206] οὐδὲ σκοπιὰν οὐδὲ πέτραν ὄψει, ἀλλ᾽ ἀγαπήσεις καὶ ναῦν πόρρωθεν κατιδὼν προσειπεῖν τοὺς ἐμπλέοντας, καὶ τῆς γῆς ὀψέ ποτε ἁψάμενος, τῷ θεῷ πολλάκις προσεύξῃ, πρὸς αὐτῷ γοῦν τῷ τέλει τοῦ βίου τυχεῖν [255] ὅρμου καὶ τήν τε ναῦν σώαν παραδοῦναι καὶ τοὺς ἐμπλέοντας ἀπαθεῖς τοῖς οἰκείοις κακῶν παραστῆσαι καὶ τὸ σῶμα τῇ μητρὶ γῇ δοῦναι, τοῦτο δὲ ἐσόμενον ἴσως ἄδηλον ἔσται σοι μέχρι τῆς τελευταίας ἐκείνης ἡμέρας·” ἆρ᾽ οἴει τούτων ἀκούσαντα τῶν λόγων ἐκεῖνον πόλιν γ᾽ ἂν[374] οἰκεῖν ἑλέσθαι πλησίον θαλάσσης, οὐχὶ δὲ χαίρειν εἰπόντα πλούτῳ καὶ τοῖς ἐξ ἐμπορίας ἀγαθοῖς περιγιγνομένοις, γνωρέμων πολλῶν, ξενικῆς φιλίας, [B] ἱστορίας ἐθνῶν καὶ πόλεων ὑπεριδόντα σοφὸν ἀποφαίνειν τὸν τοῦ Νεοκλέους, ὃς κελεύει λαθεῖν βιώσαντα; καὶ σὺ δὲ ἕοικας τοῦτο καταμαθὼν προκαταλαμβάνειν ἡμᾶς ταῖς εἰς τὸν Ἐπίκουρον λοιδορίαις καὶ προεξαιρεῖν τὴν τοιαύτην γνώμην. φὴς γάρ που σχολὴν ἐπαινεῖν ἀπράγμονα καὶ διαλέξεις ἐν περιπάτοις προσήκειν ἐκείνῳ· [C] ἐγὲ δὲ ὅτι μὲν οὐ καλῶς Ἐπικούρῳ ταῦτα ἐδόκει, πάλαι καὶ σφόδρα πείθομαι· εἰ δὲ πάνθ᾽ ὁντινοῦν ἐπὶ πολιτείαν προτρέπειν ἄξιον, καὶ τὸν ἧττον πεφυκότα καὶ τὸν οὔπω τελέως δυνάμενον, ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἴσως διαπορῆσαι χρή. λέγουσι γάρ τοι καὶ τὸν Σωκράτη πολλοὺς μὲν οὐ σφόδρα εὐφυῶς[375] ἔχοντας ἀπαγαγεῖν τοῦ βήματος, [pg 208] καὶ Γλαύκωνα ἐκεῖνον, Ξενοφῶν λέγει· τὸν δὲ[376] τοῦ Κλεινίου παῖδα πειραθῆναι μὲν ἐπισχεῖν, [D] οὐ δυνηθῆναι δὲ περιγενέσθαι τοῦ νεανίσκου τῆς ὁρμῆς. ἡμεῖς δὲ καὶ ἄκοντας καὶ ξυνιέντας αὑτῶν προσαναγκάσομεν, θαρρεῖν ὑπὲρ τηλικούτων ἔργων κελεύοντες, ὧν οὐκ ἀρετὴ μόνον ἐστὶν οὐδὲ προαίρεσις ὀρθὴ κυρία, πολὺ δὲ πλέον ἡ τύχη κρατοῦσα πανταχοῦ καὶ βιαζομένη ῥέπειν ᾗπερ ἂν ἐθέλῃ τὰ πράγματα; Χρύσιππος δὲ δοκεῦ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα σοφὸς εἶναι καὶ νομισθῆναι δικαίως, ἀγνοήσας δὲ τὴν τύχην καὶ τὸ αὐτόματον καί τινας ἄλλας αἰτίας [256] τοιαύτας ἔξωθεν τοῖς πρακτικοῖς παρεμπιπτούσας οὐ σφόδρα ὁμολογούμενα λέγειν οἷς ὁ χρόνος ἡμᾶς διὰ μυρίων ἐναργῶς διδάσκει παραδειγμάτων. ποῦ γὰρ εὐτυχῆ καὶ μακάριον Κάτωνα φήσομεν; ποῦ δὲ Δίωνα τὸν Σικελιώτην εὐδαίμονα; οἷς τοῦ μὲν ἀποθανεῖν ἔμελεν ἴσως οὐδέν, τοῦ δὲ μὴ λείπειν ἀτελεῖς τὰς πράξεις, ἐφ᾽ ἃς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὥρμησαν, [B] καὶ σφόδρα ἔμελε, καὶ πάντα ἂν εἵλοντο παθεῖν ὑπὲρ τούτου. σφαλέντες δὲ ἐν ἐκείνοις εἰ μὲν εὐσχημόνως ἔφερον, ὥσπερ οὖν λέγεται, τὴν τύχην παραμυθίαν ἔσχον ἐκ τῆς ἀρετῆς οὐ μικράν, εὐδαίμονες δὲ οὐκ ἂν λέγοιντο τῶν καλλίστων πράξεων διημαρτηκότες, πλὴν ἴσως διὰ τὴν Στωικὴν ἔνστασιν· πρὸς ἣν ῥητέον, ὡς οὐ ταὐτόν ἐστιν ἐπαινεῖσθα καὶ μακαρίζεσθαι, καὶ εἰ φύσει τὸ ζῷον εὐδαιμονίας ὀρέγεται, [C] κρεῖττον εἶναι τὸ κατ᾽ [pg 210] ἐκείνην μακαριστὸν τέλος τοῦ κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν ἐπαινετοῦ. ἥκιστα δὲ φιλεῖ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἡ βεβαιότης τῇ τύχῃ πιστεύειν. καὶ τοὺς ἐν πολιτείᾳ ζῶντας οὐκ ἔνεστιν ἔνευ ταύτης ἀναπνεῖν τὸ δὴ λεγόμενον ...[377] ἀληθῶς θεωροῦντες εἴτε καὶ πεποιήκασι καὶ στρατηγὸν λόγῳ[378], καθάπερ οἱ τὰς ἰδέας εἴτε καὶ ψευδῶς ξυντιθέντες, ἐν τοῖς ἀσωμάτοις καὶ νοητοῖς ἱδρῦσθαί που τῶν τυχαίων ὑπεράνω πάντων, ἢ τὸν Διογένους ἐκεῖνον
(But your method is more likely to discourage than to make one eager for such an existence. Suppose that a man were navigating your strait,[379] and were finding even that none too easy or safe, and then suppose some professional soothsayer should tell him that he would have to traverse the Aegaean and then the Ionian Sea, and finally embark on the outer sea. “Here,” that prophet would say, “you see towns and harbours, but when you arrive there you will see not so much as a watch-tower or a rock, but you will be thankful to descry even a ship in the distance and to hail her crew. You will often pray to God that you may, however late, touch land and reach a harbour, though that were to be the last day of your life. You will pray to be allowed to bring home your ship safe and sound and restore your crew unscathed to their friends, and then to commit your body to mother earth. And this indeed may happen, but you will not be sure of it until that final day.” Do you think that such a man after being told all this would choose even to live in a sea-port town? Would he not bid adieu to money-making and all the advantages of commerce, and caring little for troops of friends and acquaintances abroad, and all that he might learn about nations and cities, would he not approve the wisdom of the son of Neocles[380] who bids us “Live in obscurity”? Indeed, you apparently perceived this, and by your abuse of Epicurus you tried to forestall me and to eradicate beforehand any such purpose. For you go on to say that it was to be expected that so idle a man as he should commend leisure and conversations during walks. Now for my part I have long been firmly convinced that Epicurus was mistaken in that view of his, but whether it be proper to urge into public life any and every man, both him who lacks natural abilities and him who is not yet completely equipped, is a point that deserves the most careful consideration. We are told that Socrates dissuaded from the statesman's profession[381] many who had no great natural talent, and Glaucon too, Xenophon[382] tells us; and that he tried to restrain the son of Cleinias[383] also, but could not curb the youth's impetuous ambition. Then shall we try to force into that career men who are reluctant and conscious of their deficiencies, and urge them to be self-confident about such great tasks? For in such matters not virtue alone or a wise policy is paramount, but to a far greater degree Fortune holds sway throughout and compels events to incline as she wills. Chrysippus[384] indeed, though in other respects he seems a wise man and to have been rightly so esteemed, yet in ignoring fortune and chance and all other such external causes that fall in to block the path of men of affairs, he uttered paradoxes wholly at variance with facts about which the past teaches us clearly by countless examples. For instance, shall we call Cato a fortunate and happy man? Or shall we say that Dio of Sicily had a happy lot? It is true that for death they probably cared nothing, but they did care greatly about not leaving unfinished the undertakings which they had originally set on foot, and to secure that end there is nothing that they would not have endured. In that they were disappointed, and I admit that they bore their lot with great dignity, as we learn, and derived no small consolation from their virtue; but happy one could not call them, seeing that they had failed in all those noble enterprises, unless perhaps according to the Stoic conception of happiness. And with regard to that same Stoic conception we must admit that to be applauded and to be counted happy are two very different things, and that if every living thing naturally desires happiness,[385] it is better to make it our aim to be congratulated on the score of happiness rather than to be applauded on the score of virtue. But happiness that depends on the chances of Fortune is very rarely secure. And yet men who are engaged in public life cannot, as the saying is, so much as breathe unless she is on their side ... and they have created a merely verbal idea of a leader who is established somewhere above all the chances of Fortune in the sphere of things incorporeal and intelligible, just as men define the ideas, whether envisaging them truly or falsely imagining them. Or again they give us the ideal man, according to Diogenes)
Ἄπολιν, [D] ἄοικον, πατρίδος ἐστερημένον,
(“The man without a city, without a home, bereft of a fatherland,”[386])
οὐκ ἔχοντα μὲν εἰς ὅ,τι παρ᾽ αὐτῆς εὖ πάθῃ καὶ τοὐναντίον ἐν τίνι σφαλῇ· τοῦτον δὲ ὃν ἡ συνήθεια καλεῖν εἴωθε καὶ Ὅμηρος πρῶτος,
(that is to say, a man who can gain nothing from Fortune, and on the other hand has nothing to lose. But one whom we are in the habit of calling, as Homer did first,)
Ὧι λαοί τ᾽ ἐπιτετράφαται καὶ τόσσα μέμηλεν,
(“The man to whom the people have been entrusted and so many cares belong,”[387])
πῶς ἄν τις ἔξω τύχης ἀπαγαγὼν τὴν θέσιν φύλάσσοι; πάλιν [257] δ᾽ ὁ αὑτὸν ὑποτιθεὶς ταύτῃ πόσης αὑτῷ δεῖν οἰήσεται παρασκευῆς[388] καὶ φρονήσεως πηλίκης ὥστε τὰς ἐφ᾽ ἑκάτερα ῥοπάς, καθάπερ πνεύματος κυβερνήτην, εὐσχημόνως φέρειν;
(how I ask shall we lead him beyond the reach of Fortune and keep his position secure? Then again, if he subject himself to Fortune, how great the provision he will think he must make, how great the prudence he must display so as to sustain with equanimity her variations in either direction, as a pilot must sustain the variations of the wind!)
Οὐκ ἔστι θαυμαστὸν ἀντιτάξασθαι προσπολεμούσῃ μόνον αὐτῇ, πολὺ δὲ θαυμασιώτερον[389] τῶν ὑπαρξάντων παρ᾽ αὐτῆς ἀγαθῶν ἄξιον φανῆναι. τούτοις ὁ μέγιστος ἑάλω βασιλεὺς ὁ τὴν Ἀσίαν [pg 212] καταστρεψάμενος [B] Δαρείου καὶ Ξέρξου χαλεπώτερος καὶ μᾶλλον ἀλαζὼν φανείς, ἐπειδὴ τῆς ἐκείνων ἀρχῆς κατέστη κύριος, τούτοις ἁλόντες τοῖς βέλεσιν ἄρδην ἀπώλοντο Πέρσαι, Μακεδόνες, ὁ τῶν Ἀθηναίων δῆμος, Συρακούσιοι, τὰ Λακεδαιμωνίων τέλη, Ῥωμαίων στρατηγοὶ καὶ ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῖς αὐτοκράτορες μυρίοι. πολὺ μῆκος ἂν γένοιτο πάντας ἀπαριθμουμένῳ τοὺς διὰ πλοῦτον καὶ νίκας καὶ τρυφὴν ἀπολομένους· ὅσοι δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν δυσπραγιῶν ἐπικλυσθέντες δοῦλοι [C] μὲν ἀντ᾽ ἐλευθέρων, ταπεινοὶ δὲ ἀντὶ γενναίων καὶ σφόδρα εὐτελεῖς ἀντὶ τῶν πρόσθεν σεμνῶν ἅπασιν ὤφθησαν, τί με χρὴ νῦν ὥσπερ ἐκ δέλτου μεταγράφοντα καταλέγειν; εἰ γὰρ ὤφελεν ὁ τῶν ἀνθρώπων βίος ἀπορεῖν παραδειγμάτων τοιούτων. ἀλλ᾽ οὔτε ἐστὶν οὔτ᾽ ἂν γένοιτό ποτε τῶν τοιούτων ἐνδεὴς παραδειγμάτων, ἕως ἂν τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων διαμένῃ γένος.
(Yet it is nothing wonderful to withstand Fortune when she is merely hostile, but much more wonderful is it to show oneself worthy of the favours she bestows. By her favours the greatest of kings, the conqueror[390] of Asia was ensnared, and showed himself more cruel and more insolent than Darius and Xerxes, after he had become the master of their empire. The shafts of her favours subdued and utterly destroyed the Persians, the Macedonians, the Athenian nation, Spartan magistrates, Roman generals, and countless absolute monarchs besides. It would be an endless business to enumerate all who have fallen victims to their wealth and victories and luxury. And as for those who, submerged by the tide of their misfortunes, from free men have become slaves, who have been humbled from their high estate after all their splendour and become poor and mean in the eyes of all men, what need now to go through the list of them as though I were copying it from a written record? Would that human life afforded no such instances! But it does not nor ever will lack such, so long as the race of man endures.)
[D] Ὅτι δὲ οὐκ ἐγὼ μόνος τὴν τύχην ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἐν τοῖς πρακτέοις κρατεῖν νενόμικα, λέγοιμ᾽ ἂν ἤδη σοι τὰ τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἐκ τῶν θαυμασίων Νόμων, εἰδότι μὲν καὶ διδάξαντί με, ἀπόδειξιν δὲ ὥσπερ τοῦ μὴ ῥᾳθυμεῖν ποιούμενος παραγέγραφά σοι τὴν ῥῆσιν ὧδέ πως ἔχουσαν. “Θεὸς μὲν πάντα καὶ μετὰ θεοῦ τύχη καὶ καιρὸς τὰ ἀνθρώπινα διακυβερνῶσι ξύμπαντα. ἡμερώτερον μὴν τούτοις συγχωρῆσαι [258] τρίτον δεῖν ἕπεσθαι τέχνην.” εἶτα ὁποῖον εἶναι χρὴ τὸν τεχνίτην καὶ δημιουργὸν τῶν καλῶν πράξεων καὶ βασιλέα θεῖον[391] ὑπογράφων· “Γινώσκων ὁ Κρόνος ἄρα, καθάπερ ἡμεῖς, φησί, διεληλύθαμεν, ὡς ἀνθρωπεία φύσις [pg 214] οὐδαμῇ οὐδεμία ἱκανὴ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα διοικοῦσα αὐτοκράτωρ πάντα μὴ οὐχ ὕβρεώς τε καὶ ἀδικίας μεστοῦσθαι, [B] ταῦτ᾽ οὖν διανοούμενος ἐφίστη τότε βασιλέας καὶ ἄρχοντας ταῖς πόλεσιν ἡμῶν οὐκ ἀνθρώπους, ἀλλὰ γένους θειοτέρου καὶ ἀμείνονος, δαίμονας, οἷον νῦν ἡμεῖς δρῶμεν τοῖς ποιμνίοις καὶ ὅσων ἡμεροί εἰσιν ἀγέλαι· οὐ βοῦς βοῶν οὐδὲ αἶγας αἰγῶν ἄρχοντας ποιοῦμεν αὐτοῖς τινας, ἀλλ᾽ ἡμεῖς αὐτῶν δεσπόζομεν, ἄμεινον ἐκείνων γένος. ταὐτὸν δὴ καὶ ὁ θεὸς φιλάνθρωπος ὢν γένος ἄμεινον ἡμῶν ἐφίστη τὸ τῶν δαιμόνων, ὃ διὰ πολλῆς μὲν αὐτοῖς ῥᾳστώνης, [C] διὰ πολλῆς δ᾽ ἡμῖν, ἐπιμελόμενον ἡμῶν, εἰρήνην τε καὶ αἰδῶ καὶ δὴ ἀφθονίαν δίκης παρεχόμενον, ἀστασίαστα καὶ εὐδαίμονα τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀπειργάζετο γένη. λέγει δὴ καὶ νῦν οὗτος ὁ λόγος ἀληθείᾳ χρώμενος, ὅσων πόλεων μὴ θεός, ἀλλά τις ἄρχει θνητός, οὐκ ἔστι κακῶν αὐτοῖς οὐδὲ πόνων ἀνάψυξις· ἀλλὰ μιμεῖσθαι δεῖν ἡμᾶς οἴεται πάσῃ μηχανῇ τὸν ἐπὶ τοῦ Κρόνου λεγόμενον βίον, [D] καὶ ὅσον ἐν ἡμῖν ἀθανασίας ἔνεστι, τούτῳ πειθομένους δημοσίᾳ καὶ ἰδίᾳ τάς τε οἰκήσεις καὶ τὰς πόλεις διοικεῖν, τὴν τοῦ νοῦ διανομὴν ὀνομάζοντας νόμον. εἰ δὲ ἄνθρωπος εἷς ἢ ὀλιγαρχία τις ἢ δημοκρατία ψυχὴν ἔχουσα ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν ὀρεγομένην καὶ πληροῦσθαι [259] τούτων δεομένην ἄρξει δὴ πόλεώς τινος ἢ ἰδιώτου καταπατήσας τοὺς νόμους, οὐκ ἔστι σωτηρίας μηχανή.”
(And to show that I am not the only one who thinks that Fortune has the upper hand in practical affairs, I will quote to you a passage from that admirable work the Laws of Plato. You know it well and indeed taught it to me, but I have set down the speech which runs something like this, and offer it as a proof that I am not really indolent. “God governs all things and with God Fortune and Opportunity govern all human affairs: but there is a milder view that Art must needs go with them and must be their associate.”[392] He then indicates what must be the character of a man who is the craftsman and artificer of noble deeds and a divinely inspired king. Then he says: “Kronos therefore, as I have already related, knew that human nature when endowed with supreme authority is never in any case capable of managing human affairs without being filled with insolence and injustice; therefore, having regard to this he at that time set over our cities as kings and governors not men but beings of a more divine and higher race, I mean demons; thus doing as we do now for our flocks and domestic herds. We never appoint certain oxen to rule over other oxen or goats to rule over goats, but we are their masters, a race superior to theirs. In like manner then God, since he loves mankind, has set over us a race of beings superior to ourselves, the race of demons; and they with great ease both to themselves and us undertake the care of us and dispense peace, reverence, aye, and above all justice without stint, and thus they make the tribes of men harmonious and happy. And that account is a true one which declares that in our day all cities that are governed not by a god but by a mortal man have no relief from evils and hardships. And the lesson is that we ought by every means in our power to imitate that life which is said to have existed in the days of Kronos: and in so far as the principle of immortality is in us we ought to be guided by it in our management of public and private affairs, of our houses and cities, calling the distribution of mind ‘law.’[393] But whether the government be in the hands of one man or of an oligarchy or democracy, if it have a soul that hankers after pleasure and the lower appetites and demands to indulge these, and if such a one rule over a city or individual having first trampled on the laws, there is no means of salvation.”[394])
Ταύτην ἐγώ σοι τὴν ῥῆσιν ἐξεπίτηδες ὅλην παρέγραφα, μή με κλέπτειν ὑπολάβῃς καὶ κακουργεῖν μύθους ἀρχαίους προφέροντα, τυχὸν μὲν ἐμφερῶς, οὐ μὴν ἀληθῶς πάντη ξυγκειμένους. ἀλλ᾽ ὅ γε ἀληθὴς ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν λόγος τί φησιν; ἀκούεις ὅτι, κἂν ἄνθρωπός τις ᾖ τῇ φύσει, θεῖον εἶναι χρὴ τῇ προαιρέσει καὶ δαίμονα, πᾶν ἅπλως ἐκβαλόντα τὸ θνητὸν καὶ θηριῶδες τῆς ψυχῆς, [B] πλὴν ὅσα ἀνάγκη διὰ τὴν τοῦ σώματος παραμένειν σωτηρίαν; ταῦτα εἴ τις ἐννοῶν δέδοικεν ἐπὶ τηλικοῦτον ελκόμενος βίον, ἆρά σοι φαίνεται τὴν Ἐπικούρειον θαυμάζειν ἀπραγμοσύνην καὶ τοὺς κήπους καὶ τὸ προάστειον τῶν Ἀθηνῶν[395] καὶ τὰς μυρρίνας καὶ τὸ Σωκράτους δωμάτιον; ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπου γε ἐγὼ ταῦτα προτιμήσας τῶν πόνων ὤφθην. ἥδιστα ἄν σοι τοὺς ἐμαυτοῦ πόνους διεξῆλθον καὶ τὰ ἐπικρεμασθέντα παρὰ τῶν φίλων καὶ ξυγγενῶν, ὅτε τῆς παρ᾽ ὑμῖν [C] ἠρχόμην παιδείας, δείματα, εἰ μὴ σφόδρα αὐτὸς ἠπίστασο. τὰ δὲ ἐν Ἰωνίᾳ πρὸς τὸν καὶ γένει προσήκοντα καὶ φιλίᾳ μᾶλλον οἰκεῖον ὄντα μοι πραχθέντα πρότερον ὑπὲρ ἀνδρὸς ξένου μικρά παντελῶς γνωρίμου μοι γενομένου, τοῦ σοφιστοῦ φημί, λέληθεν οὐδέν σε. ἀποδημίας δὲ οὐχ ὑπέστην τῶν φίλων ἕνεκα; καίτοι Καρτερίῳ μὲν οἶσθ᾽ ὅπως [D] συνηράμην πρὸς τὸν ἑταῖρον ἡμῖν ἀφικόμενος Ἀράξιον ἄκλητος, ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ δεησόμενος. ὑπὲρ δὲ τῶν τῆς θαυμασίας Ἀρετῆς κτημάτων καὶ ὧν ἐπεπόνθει παρὰ τῶν γειτόνων [pg 218] οὐκ εἰς τὴν Φρυγίαν τὸ δεύτερον ἀφικόμην ἐν οὐδὲ ὅλοις μησὶ δύο, ἀσθενοῦς ἤδη μοι παντελὼς ὄντος τοῦ σώματος διὰ τὴν ἐπιγενομένην ὑπὸ τῆς πρότερον κακοπαθείας ἀρρωστίαν; ἀλλὰ δὴ τὸ τελευταῖον πρὸ τῆς εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα γενομένης ἡμῖν ἀφίξεως, ὅτε περὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων, ὡς ἂν εἴποιεν οἱ πολλοί, κινδυνεύων ἐγὼ τῷ στρατοπέδῳ παρέμενον, [260] ὁποίας ἔγραφον ἐπιστολὰς πρὸς σὲ νῦν ὑπομνήσθητι, μήποτε ὀδυρμῶν πλήρεις, μήτι μικρὸν ἢ ταπεινὸν ἢ λίαν ἀγεννὲς ἐχούσας. ἀπιὼν δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα πάλιν, ὅτε με φεύγειν ἐνόμιζον πάντες, οὐχ ὡς ἐν ἑορτῇ τῇ μεγίστῃ τὴν τύχην ἐπαινῶν ἡδίστην ἔφην εἶναι τὴν ἀμοιβὴν ἐμοὶ [B] καὶ τὸ δὴ λεγόμενον
(I have purposely set down the whole of this speech for you lest you should think that I am cheating and defrauding by bringing forward ancient myths which may have some resemblance to the truth, but on the whole are not composed with regard to truth. But what is the true meaning of this narrative? You hear what it says, that even though a prince be by nature human, he must in his conduct be divine and a demi-god and must completely banish from his soul all that is mortal and brutish, except what must remain to safeguard the needs of the body. Now if, reflecting on this, one is afraid to be constrained to adopt a life from which so much is expected, do you therefore conclude that one admires the inaction recommended by Epicurus, the gardens and suburbs of Athens and its myrtles, or the humble home of Socrates? But never has anyone seen me prefer these to a life of toil. That toil of mine I would willingly recount to you, and the hazards that threatened me from my friends and kinsfolk at the time when I began to study under you, if you did not yourself know them well enough. You are well aware of what I did, in the first place, in Ionia in opposition to one who was related to me by ties of blood, but even more closely by ties of friendship, and that in behalf of a foreigner with whom I was very slightly acquainted, I mean the sophist. Did I not endure to leave the country for the sake of my friends? Indeed, you know how I took the part of Carterius when I went unsolicited to our friend Araxius to plead for him. And in behalf of the property of that admirable woman Arete and the wrongs she had suffered from her neighbours, did I not journey to Phrygia for the second time within two months, though I was physically very weak from the illness that had been brought on by former fatigues?[396] Finally, before I went to Greece, while I was still with the army and running what most people would call the greatest possible risks, recall now what sort of letters I wrote to you, never filled with complaints or containing anything little or mean or servile. And when I returned to Greece, when everyone regarded me as an exile, did I not welcome my fate as though it were some high festival, and did I not say that the exchange to me was most delightful, and that, as the saying is, I had thereby gained)
χρύσεα χαλκείων, ἑκατόμβοι᾽ ἐννεαβοίων
(“gold for bronze, the price of a hundred oxen for the price of nine”?[397])
ἔφην ἀντηλλάχθαι; οὕτως ἀντὶ τῆς ἐμαυτοῦ ἑστίας τὴν Ἑλλάδα λαχὼν ἐγανύμην, οὐχ ἀγρόν, οὐ κῆπον, οὐ δωμάτιον ἐκεῖ κεκτημένος.
So great was my joy at obtaining the chance to live in Greece instead of in my own home, though I possessed there no land or garden or the humblest house.
Ἁλλὰ ἴσως ἔοικα ἐγὼ τὰς μὲν δυσπραγίας οὐκ ἀγεννῶς φέρειν, πρὸς δὲ τὰς παρὰ τῆς τύχης δωρεὰς ἀγεννής τις εἶναι καὶ μικρός, ὅ γε ἀγαπῶν τὰς Ἀθήνας μᾶλλον τοῦ νῦν περὶ ἡμᾶς ὄγκου, τὴν σχολὴν δήπουθεν ἐκείνην ἐπαινῶν, διὰ δὲ τὸ [C] πλῆθος τῶν πράξεων τοῦτον αἰτιώμενος τὸν βίον; ἀλλὰ μή ποτε χρὴ περὶ ἡμῶν ἄμεινον κρίνειν, οὐκ εἰς ἀπραξίαν καὶ πρᾶξιν βλέποντας, μᾶλλον δὲ εἰς τὸ Γνῶθι σαυτὸν καὶ τὸ
(But perhaps you think that though I can bear adversity in the proper spirit, yet I show a poor and mean spirit towards the good gifts of Fortune, seeing that I prefer Athens to the pomp that now surrounds me; because, you will doubtless say, I approve the leisure of those days and disparage my present life because of the vast amount of work that the latter involves. But perhaps you ought to judge of me more accurately, and not consider the question whether I am idle or industrious, but rather the precept, “Know thyself,” and the saying,)
Ἔρδοι δ᾽ ἕκαστος ἥντιν᾽ εἰδείη τέχνην.
(“Let every man practise the craft which he knows.”[398])
Μεῖζον ἔμοιγε φαίνεται τὸ βασιλεύειν ἢ κατ᾽ ἄνθρωπον καὶ φύσεως δεῖσθαι δαιμονιωτέρας βασιλεύς, [D] ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ Πλάτων ἔλεγε· καὶ νῦν Ἀριστοτέλους εἰς ταῦτὸ συντείνοντα παραγράψω λόγον, οὐ γλαῦκα Ἀθηναίοις ἄγων, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι μὴ παντάπασιν ἀμελῶ τῶν ἐκείνου λόγων ἐπιδεικνύμενος. φησὶ δὲ ὁ ἀνὴρ ἐν τοῖς πολιτικοῖς συγγράμμασιν· “Εἱ δὲ δή τις ἄριστον θείη τὸ βασιλεύεσθαι ταῖς πόλεσι, τῶς ἕξει τὰ περὶ τῶν τέκνων; πότερον καὶ τὸ γένος δεῖ βασιλεύειν; ἀλλὰ γιγνομένων ὁποῖοί τινες ἔτυχον, βλαβερόν. ἀλλὰ οὐ παραδώσει [261] κύριος ὢν τοῖς τέκνοις; ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἔτι ῥᾴδιον τοῦτο πιστεῦσαι· χαλεπὸν γὰρ καὶ μείζονος ἀρετῆς ἢ κατ᾽ ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν.” ἑξῆς δὲ περὶ τοῦ κατὰ νόμον λεγομένου βασιλέως διεξελθών, ὡς[399] ἐστὶν ὑπηρέτης καὶ φύλαξ τῶν νόμων, καὶ τοῦτον οὐδὲ βασιλέα καλῶν, οὐδὲ τὸν τοιοῦτον εἶδος πολιτείας[400] οἰόμενος, προστίθησι· “[B] Περὶ δὲ τῆς παμβασιλείας καλουμένης, αὕτη δ᾽ ἐστὶ καθ᾽ ἣν ἄρχει πάντων κατὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ βούλησιν ὁ βασιλεύς, δοκεῖ τισιν οὐδὲ κατὰ φύσιν εἶναι τὸ κύριον ἕνα πάντων εἶναι τῶν πολιτῶν· τοῖς γὰρ ὁμοίοις φύσει τὸ αὐτὸ δίκαιον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι.” εἶτα μετ᾽ ὀλίγον φησίν· “Ὁ μὲν οὖν τὸν νοῦν κελεύων ἄρχειν δοκεῖ κελεύειν ἄρχειν τὸν θεὸν καὶ τοὺς νόμους· ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπον κελεύων [pg 222] προστίθησι καὶ θηρία· [C] ἥ τε γὰρ ἐπιθυμία τοιοῦτον καὶ ὁ θυμὸς ὃς[401] διαστρέφει καὶ τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄνδρασ· διόπερ ἄνευ ὀρέξεως ὁ νοῦς νόμος ἐστίν.” ὁρᾷς, ὁ φιλόσοφος ἔοικεν ἐνταῦθα σαφῶς ἀπιστοῦντι καὶ κατεγνωκότι τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως. φησὶ γὰρ οὕτω ῥήματι τοῦτο λέγων· οὐδεμίαν ἀξιόχρεων εἶναι φύσιν ἀνθρωπίνην πρὸς τοσαύτην τύχης ὑπεροχήν· [D] οὔτε γὰρ τῶν παίδων τὸ κοινῇ τοῖς πολίταις συμφέρον προτιμᾶν ἄνθρωπόν γε ὄντα ῥᾴδιον ὑπολαμβάνει, καὶ πολλῶν ὁμοίων ἄρχειν οὐ δίκαιον εἶναί φησι, καὶ τέλος ἐπιθεὶς τὸν κολοφῶνα τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν λόγοις νόμον μὲν εἶναί φησι τὸν νοῦν χωρὶς ὀρέξεως, ᾧ μόνῳ τὰς πολιτείας ἐπιτρέπειν χρῆναι, ἀνδρῶν δὲ οὐδενί. ὁ γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς νοῦς, κἂν ὦσιν ἀγαθοί, συμπέπλεκται θυμῷ καὶ ἐπιθυμίᾳ, θηρίοις χαλεπωτάτοις. ταῦτα ἐμοὶ [262] δοκεῖ τοῖς τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἄκρως ὁμολογεῖν, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι κρείττονα χρὴ τῶν ἀρχομένων εἶναι τὸν ἄρχοντα, οὐκ ἐπιτηδεύσει μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ φύσει διαφέροντα· ὅπερ εὑρεῖν ἐν ἀνθρώποις οὐ ῥᾴδιον·[402] ... καὶ τρίτον ὅτι πάσῃ μηχανῇ κατὰ δύναμιν νόμοις προσεκτέον οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ παραχρῆμα κειμένοις οὐδὲ ὡς ἔοικε νῦν τεθεῖσιν ὑπ᾽ ἀνδρῶν οὐ πάντη κατὰ νοῦν βεβιωκότων, ἀλλ᾽ ὅστις μᾶλλον τὸν νοῦν καθαρθεὶς καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν οὐκ εἰς τὰ παρόντα [B] ἀφορῶν ἀδικήματα οὐδὲ εἰς [pg 224] τὰς παρεστώσας τύχας τίθησι τοὺς νόμους, ἀλλὰ τὴν τῆς πολιτείας φύσιν καταμαθὼν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον οἷόν[403] ἐστι τῇ φύσει καὶ ποταπόν ἐστι τἀδίκημα τεθεαμένος τῇ φύσει, εἶθ᾽ ὅσα δυνατὸν ἐστιν ἐκεῖθεν ἐνταῦθα μεταφέρων καὶ τιθεὶς νόμους τοῖς πολίταις κοινούς, οὔτε εἰς φιλίαν οὔτε εἰς ἔχθραν ἀφορῶν [C] οὔτε εἰς γείτονα καὶ ξυγγενῆ· κρεῖσσον δέ, εἰ μηδὲ τοῖς καθ᾽ ἑαυτὸν ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ὕστερον ἢ ξένοις γράψας ἀποπέμποι νόμους, ἔχων γε οὐδὲν οὐδὲ ἐλπίζων πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἕξειν ἰδιωτικὸν συνάλλαγμα. ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸν Σόλωνα τὸν σοφὸν ἀκούω μετὰ τῶν φίλων συμβουλευσάμενον ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν χρεῶν ἀναιρέσεως τοῖς μὲν εὐπορίας ἀφορμήν, αὑτῷ δὲ αἰσχύνης αἰτίαν παρασχεῖν, καὶ ταῦτα τῷ πολιτεύματι τὸν δῆμον ἐλευθερώσαντα. οὕτως [D] οὐ ῥᾴδιόν ἐστι τὰς τοιαύτας ἐκφυγεῖν κῆρας, κἂν τὸν αὑτοῦ νοῦν παράσχῃ τις ἀπαθῆ πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν.
(To me, at any rate, it seems that the task of reigning is beyond human powers, and that a king needs a more divine character, as indeed Plato too used to say. And now I will write out a passage from Aristotle to the same effect, not “bringing owls to the Athenians,”[404] but in order to show you that I do not entirely neglect his writings. In his political treatises he says: “Now even if one maintain the principle that it is best for cities to be governed by a king, how will it be about his children? Ought his children to succeed him? And yet if they prove to be no better than anybody else, that would be a bad thing for the city. But you may say, though he has the power he will not leave the succession to his children? It is difficult indeed to believe that he will not; for that would be too hard for him, and demands a virtue greater than belongs to human nature.”[405] And later on, when he is describing a so-called king who rules according to law, and says that he is both the servant and guardian of the laws, he does not call him a king at all, nor does he consider such a king as a distinct form of government; and he goes on to say: “Now as for what is called absolute monarchy, that is to say, when a king governs all other men according to his own will, some people think that it is not in accordance with the nature of things for one man to have absolute authority over all the citizens; since those who are by nature equal must necessarily have the same rights.”[406] Again, a little later he says: “It seems, therefore, that he who bids Reason rule is really preferring the rule of God and the laws, but he who bids man rule, adds an element of the beast. For desire is a wild beast, and passion which warps even the best men. It follows, therefore, that law is Reason exempt from desire.” You see the philosopher seems here clearly to distrust and condemn human nature. For he says so in so many words when he asserts that human nature is in no case worthy of such an excess of fortune. For he thinks that it is too hard for one who is merely human to prefer the general weal of the citizens to his own children; he says that it is not just that one man should rule over many who are his equals; and, finally, he puts the finishing stroke[407] to what he has just said when he asserts that “law is Reason exempt from desire,” and that political affairs ought to be entrusted to Reason alone, and not to any individual man whatever. For the reason that is in men, however good they may be, is entangled with passion and desire, those most ferocious monsters. These opinions, it seems to me, harmonise perfectly with Plato's; first, that he who governs ought to be superior to his subjects and surpass them not only in his acquired habits but also in natural endowment; a thing which is not easy to find among men;... thirdly, that he ought by every means in his power to observe the laws, not those that were framed to meet some sudden emergency, or established, as now appears, by men whose lives were not wholly guided by reason; but he must observe them only in case the lawgiver, having purified his mind and soul, in enacting those laws keeps in view not merely the crimes of the moment or immediate contingencies; but rather recognises the nature of government and the essential nature of justice, and has carefully observed also the essential nature of guilt, and then applies to his task all the knowledge thus derived, and frames laws which have a general application to all the citizens without regard to friend or foe, neighbour or kinsman. And it is better that such a lawgiver should frame and promulgate his laws not for his contemporaries only but for posterity also, or for strangers with whom he neither has nor expects to have any private dealings. For instance, I hear that the wise Solon, having consulted his friends about the cancelling of debts, furnished them with an opportunity to make money, but brought on himself a disgraceful accusation.[408] So hard is it to avoid such fatalities, even when a man brings a passionless mind to the task of governing.)
Ἃ δεδιὼς ἐγὼ πολλάκις εἰκότως ἐπαινῶ τὸν ἔμπροσθεν βίον, καὶ σοὶ πειθόμενος μάλιστα ταῦτα ἐγὼ διανοοῦμαι, οὐχ ὅτι μοι τὸν ζῆλον πρὸς ἐκείνους μόνον ἔφης προκεῖσθαι τοὺς ἄνδρας, Σόλωνα καὶ Λυκοῦργον καὶ Πιττακόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅτι μεταβῆναί με φὴς ἐκ τῆς ὑποστέγου φιλοσοφίας πρὸς τὴν ὑπαίθριον. [263] ὥσπερ οὖν, εἰ τῷ χαλεπῶς καὶ μόλις ὑγιείας ἕνεκα τῆς αὑτοῦ γυμναζομένῳ μετρίως οἴκαδε προύλεγες, ὅτι “Νῦν ἥκεις εἰς Ὀλυμπίαν καὶ μεταβέβηκας ἐκ τῆς ἐν τῷ δωματίῳ παλαίστρας ἐπὶ τὸ στάδιον τοῦ Διός, οὗ θεατὰς ἕξεις τούς τε ἁπανταχόθεν Ἕλληνας [pg 226] καὶ πρώτους γε τοὺς σαυτοῦ πολίτας, ὑπὲρ ὧν ἀγωνίζεσθαι χρή, τινὰς δὲ καὶ τῶν βαρβάρων, οὓς ἐκπλῆξαι χρεών, φοβερωτέραν αὐτοῖς τὴν πατρίδα όο γε εἰς σὲ νῦν ἧκον ἐπιδείξαντα,” κατέβαλες ἂν εὐθέως καὶ τρέμειν ἐποίησας πρὸ τῆς ἀγωνίας· [B] οὕτω κἀμὲ νῦν νόμιζε διατεθῆναι τοῖς τοιούτοις λόγοις. καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων εἴτε ὀρθῶς ἔγνωκα νῦν εἴτε ἐν μέρει σφάλλομαι τοῦ προσήκοντος εἴτε καὶ τοῦ παντὸς διαμαρτάνω, διδάξεις αὐτίκα μάλα.
(And since this sort of thing is what I dread, it is natural that I should often dwell on the advantages of my previous mode of life, and I am but obeying you when I reflect that you said not only that I must emulate those famous men Solon, Lycurgus and Pittacus, but also that I must now quit the shades of philosophy for the open air. This is as though you had announced to a man who for his health's sake and by exerting himself to the utmost was able to take moderate exercise at home: “Now you have come to Olympia and have exchanged the gymnasium in your house for the stadium of Zeus, where you will have for spectators Greeks who have come from all parts, and foremost among them your own fellow-citizens, on whose behalf you must enter the lists; and certain barbarians will be there also whom it is your duty to impress, showing them your fatherland in as formidable a light as lies in your power.” You would have disconcerted him at once and made him nervous before the games began. You may now suppose that I have been affected in the same manner by just such words from you. And you will very soon inform me whether my present view is correct, or whether I am in part deceived as to my proper course or whether indeed I am wholly mistaken.)
[C] Ὑπὲρ δὲ ὧν ἀπορῆσαί μοι πρὸς τὴν ἐπιστολὴν τὴν σὴν παρέστη, ὦ φίλη κεφαλὴ καὶ πάσης ἔμοιγε τιμῆς ἀξία, βούλομαι δηλῶσαι· σαφέστερον γάρ πως ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἐπιθυμῶ μαθεῖν. ἔφησθα ὅτι τὸν ἐν τῇ πράξει παρὰ τὸν φιλόσοφον ἐπαινεῖς βίον, καὶ τὸν Ἀριστοτέλη τὸν σοφὸν ἐκάλεις μάρτυρα, τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἐν τῷ πράττειν εὖ τιθέμενον, καὶ τὴν διαφορὰν σκοποῦντα τοῦ τε πολιτικοῦ βίου καὶ τῆς ἐν τῇ θεωρίᾳ ζωῆς, διαπορεῖν ἄττα περὶ αὐτῶν, καὶ τὴν μὲν θεωρίαν ἐν ἄλλοις προτιμᾶν, ἐπαινεῖν δὲ ἐνταῦθα τοὺς τῶν καλῶν πράξεων ἀρχιτέκτονας. [D] τούτους δὲ αὐτὸς μὲν εἶναι φὴς τοὺς βασιλέας, Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ εἴρηκεν οὐδαμοῦ κατὰ τὴν ὑπὸ σοῦ προστεθεῖσαν λέξιν, πλέον δὲ θάτερον ἐξ ὧν παραγέγραφας ἄν τις νοήσειε. τὸ γὰρ “Μάλιστα δὲ πράττειν λέγομεν κυρίως καὶ τῶν ἐξωτερικῶν πράξεων τοὺς ταῖς διανοίαις ἀρχιτέκτονας” εἰς τοὺς νομοθέτας καὶ [pg 228] τοὺς πολιτικοὺς φιλοσόφους καὶ πάντας ἁπλῶς τοὺς νῷ τε καὶ λόγῳ πράττοντας, οὐχὶ δὲ εἰς τοὺς αὐτουργοὺς [264] καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν πράξεων ἐργάτας εἰρῆσθαι νομιστέον· οἷς οὐκ ἀπόχρη μόνον ἐνθυμηθῆναι καὶ κατανοῆσαι καὶ τὸ πρακτέον τοῖς ἄλλοις φράσαι, προσήκει δὲ αὐτοῖς ἕκαστα μεταχειρίζεσθαι καὶ πράττειν ὧν οἱ νόμοι διαγορεύουσι καὶ πολλάκις οἱ καιροὶ προσαναγκάζουσι, πλὴν εἰ μὴ τὸν ἀρχιτέκτονα καλοῦμεν, καθάπερ Ὅμηρος τὸν Ἡρακλέα καλεῖν εἴωθεν ἐν τῇ ποιήσει “μεγάλων ἐπιίστορα ἔργων,” αὐτουργότατον ἁπάντων γενόμενον.
(But I should like to make clear to you the points in your letter by which I am puzzled, my dearest friend to whom I especially am bound to pay every honour: for I am eager to be more precisely informed about them. You said that you approve a life of action rather than the philosophic life, and you called to witness the wise Aristotle who defines happiness as virtuous activity, and discussing the difference between the statesman's life and the life of contemplation, showed a certain hesitation about those lives, and though in others of his writings he preferred the contemplative life, in this place you say he approves the architects of noble actions. But it is you who assert that these are kings, whereas Aristotle does not speak in the sense of the words that you have introduced: and from what you have quoted one would rather infer the contrary. For when he says: “We most correctly use the word ‘act’ of those who are the architects of public affairs by virtue of their intelligence,”[409] we must suppose that what he says applies to lawgivers and political philosophers and all whose activity consists in the use of intelligence and reason, but that it does not apply to those who do the work themselves and those who transact the business of politics. But in their case it is not enough that they should consider and devise and instruct others as to what must be done, but it is their duty to undertake and execute whatever the laws ordain and circumstances as well often force them; unless indeed we call that man an architect who is “well versed in mighty deeds,”[410] a phrase which Homer in his poems usually applies to Heracles, who was indeed of all men that ever lived most given to do the work himself.)
[B] Εἰ δὲ τοῦτ᾽ ἀληθὲς ὑπολαμβάνομεν ἢ καὶ μόνον ἐν τῇ πράττειν τὰ κοινά φαμεν εὐδαίμονας τοὺς κυρίους[411] ὄντας καὶ βασιλεύοντας πολλῶν, τί ποτε περὶ Σωκράτους ἐροῦμεν; Πυθαγόραν δὲ καὶ Δημόκριτον καὶ τὸν Κλαζομένιον Ἀναξαγόραν ἴσως διὰ τὴν θεωρίαν κατ᾽ ἄλλο φήσεις εὐδαίμονας· Σωκράτης δὲ τὴν θεωρίαν παραιτησάμενος καὶ τὸν πρακτικὸν ἀγαπήσας βίον οὐδὲ τῆς γαμετῆς ἦν τῆς αὑτοῦ κύριος οὐδὲ τοῦ παιδός· [C] ἦπού γε δυοῖν ἢ τριῶν πολιτῶν ἐκείνῳ κρατεῖν ὑπῆρχεν; ἆρ᾽ οὖν οὐκ ἦν ἐκεῖνος πρακτικός, ἐπεὶ μηδενὸς ἦν κύριος; ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν Ἀλεξάνδρου φημὶ μείζονα τὸν Σωφρονίσκου κατεργάσασθαι, τὴν Πλάτωνος αὐτῷ σοφίαν ἀνατιθείς, τὴν Ξενοφῶντος στρατηγίαν, τὴν Ἀντισθένους ἀνδρείαν, τὴν Ἐρετρικὴν φιλοσοφίαν, τὴν Μεγαρικήν, τὸν Κέβητα, [pg 230] τὸν Σιμμίαν, [D] τὸν Φαίδωνα, μυρίους ἄλλους· καὶ οὔπω φημὶ τὰς γενομένας ἡμῖν ἐνθένδ᾽ ἀποικίας, τὸ Λύκειον, τὴν Στοάν, τὰς Ἀκαδημείας. τίς οὖν ἐσώθη διὰ τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρου νίκην; τίς πόλις ἄμεινον ᾠκήθη; τίς αὑτοῦ γέγονε βελτίων ἰδιώτης ἀνήρ; πλουσιωτέρους μὲν γὰρ πολλοὺς ἂν εὕροις, σοφώτερον δὲ οὐδένα οὐδὲ σωφρονέστερον αὐτὸν αὑτοῦ, εἰ μὴ καὶ μᾶλλον ἀλαζόνα καὶ ὑπερόπτην. ὅσοι δὲ σώζονται νῦν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας, διὰ τὸν Σωκράτη σώζονται. καὶ τοῦτο οὐκ ἐγὼ μόνος, [265] Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ πρότερος[412] ἔοικεν ἐννοήσας εἰπεῖν, ὅτι μὴ μεῖον αὐτῷ προσήκει φρονεῖν ἐπὶ τῆς θεολογικῇ συγγραφῇ τοῦ καθελόντος τὴν Περσῶν δύναμιν. καί μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτο ἐκεῖνος ὀρθῶς ξυννοῆσαι· νικᾶν μὲν γὰρ ἀνδρείας ἐστὶ μάλιστα καὶ τῆς τύχης, κείσθω δέ, εἰ βούλει, καὶ τῆς ἐντρεχοῦς ταύτης φρονήσεως, ἀληθεῖς δὲ ὑπὲρ τοῦ θεοῦ δόξας ἀναλαβεῖν οὐκ ἀρετῆς μόνον τῆς τελείας ἔργον ἐστίν, [B] ἀλλ᾽ ἐπιστήσειεν ἄν τις εἰκότως, πότερον χρὴ τὸν τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα ἢ θεὸν καλεῖν. εἰ γὰρ ὀρθῶς ἔχει τὸ λεγόμενον, ὅτι πέφυκεν ἕκαστον ὑπὸ τῶν οἰκείων γνωρίζεσθαι, τὴν θείαν οὐσίαν ὁ γνωρίσας θεῖός τις ἂν εἰκότως νομίζοιτο.
(But if we conceive this to be true, or that only those are happy who administer public affairs and who are in authority and rule over many, what then are we to say about Socrates? As for Pythagoras and Democritus and Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, you will perhaps say that they were happy in another sense of the word, because of their philosophic speculations. But as for Socrates who, having rejected the speculative life and embraced a life of action, had no authority over his own wife or his son, can we say of him that he governed even two or three of his fellow-citizens? Then will you assert that since he had no authority over any one he accomplished nothing? On the contrary I maintain that the son of Sophroniscus[413] performed greater tasks than Alexander, for to him I ascribe the wisdom of Plato, the generalship of Xenophon, the fortitude of Antisthenes, the Eretrian[414] and Megarian[415] philosophies, Cebes, Simmias,[416] Phaedo and a host of others; not to mention the offshoots derived from the same source, the Lyceum, the Stoa and the Academies. Who, I ask, ever found salvation through the conquests of Alexander? What city was ever more wisely governed because of them, what individual improved? Many indeed you might find whom those conquests enriched, but not one whom they made wiser or more temperate than he was by nature, if indeed they have not made him more insolent and arrogant. Whereas all who now find their salvation in philosophy owe it to Socrates. And I am not the only person to perceive this fact and to express it, for Aristotle it seems did so before me, when he said that he had just as much right to be proud of his treatise on the gods as the conqueror[417] of the Persian empire. And I think he was perfectly correct in that conclusion. For military success is due to courage and good fortune more than anything else or, let us say, if you wish, to intelligence as well, though of the common everyday sort. But to conceive true opinions about God is an achievement that not only requires perfect virtue, but one might well hesitate whether it be proper to call one who attains to this a man or a god. For if the saying is true that it is the nature of everything to become known to those who have an affinity with it, then he who comes to know the essential nature of God would naturally be considered divine.)
Ἀλλ᾽ ἐπειδὴ πάλιν ἐοίκαμεν εἰς τὸν θεωρηματικὸν ὁρμήσαντες βίον τούτῳ παραβάλλειν τὸν πρακτικόν, ἐξ ἐρχῆς παραιτησαμένου καὶ σοῦ τὴν σύγκρισιν, [C] αὐτῶν ἐκείνων, ὧν ἐπεμνήσθης, Ἀρείου, Νικολάου, Θρασύλλου καὶ Μουσωνίου μνημονεύσω. τούτων γὰρ οὐχ ὅπως τις ἦν κύριος τῆς αὑτοῦ πόλεως, ἀλλ᾽ ὁ μὲν Ἄρειος, ὡς φασί, καὶ διδομένην αὐτῷ τὴν Αἴγυπτον ἐπιτροπεῦσαι παρῃτήσατο, Θράσυλλος δὲ Τιβερίῳ πικρῷ καὶ φύσει χαλεπῷ τυράννῳ ξυγγενόμενος, εἰ μὴ διὰ τῶν καταλειφθέντων ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ λόγων ἀπελογήσατο, δείξας ὅστις ἦν, [D] ὦφλεν ἂν εἰς τέλος αἰσχύνην ἀναπάλλακτον, οὕτως αὐτὸν οὐδὲν ὤνησεν ἡ πολιτεία, Νικόλαος δὲ πράξεων μὲν οὐ μεγάλων αὐτουργὸς γέγονε γνώριμος δέ ἐστι μὰλλον διὰ τοὺς ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν λόγους, καὶ Μουσώνιος ἐξ ὧν ἔπαθεν ἀνδρείως καὶ νὴ Δί᾽ ἤνεγκεν ἐγκρατῶς τὴν τῶν τυράννων ὠμότητα γέγονε γνώριμος, ἴσως οὐκ ἔλαττον εὐδαιμονῶν ἐκείνων τῶν τὰς μεγάλας ἐπιτροπευσάντων βασιλείας. Ἄρειος δὲ ὁ τὴν ἐπιτροπὴν [266] τῆς Αἰγύπτου παραιτησάμενος ἑκὼν αὑτὸν ἀπεστέρει τοῦ κρατίστου τέλους εἰ τοῦτ᾽ ᾤετο κυριώτατον. σὺ δὲ αὐτὸς ἡμῖν ἄπρακτος εἶ, μήτε στρατηγῶν μήτε δημηγορῶν μήτε ἔθνους ἢ πόλεως ἄρχων; ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἂν φαίη νοῦν ἔχων ἁνήρ. ἔξεστι γάρ σοι φιλοσόφους πολλοὺς ἀποφήναντι, εἰ δὲ μή, τρεῖς ἢ τέτταρας μείζονα τὸν βίον εὐεργετῆσαι τῶν ἀνθρώπων πολλῶν ὁμοῦ βασιλέων. [B] οὐ μικρᾶς γὰρ μερίδος ὁ φιλόσοφος [pg 234] προέστηκεν, οὐδέ, καθάπερ ἔφης, συμβουλῆς ἐστι μόνης τῆς ὑπὲρ τῶν κοινῶν ἐκεῖνος κύριος, οὐδὲ ἡ πρᾶξις εἰς λόγον αὖθις αὐτῷ περιίσταται, ἔργῳ δὲ βεβαιῶν τοὺς λόγους καὶ φαινόμενος τοιοῦτος, ὁποίους βούλεται τοὺς ἄλλους εἶναι, πιθανώτερος ἂν εἴη καὶ πρὸς τὸ πράττειν ἀνυσιμώτερος τῶν ἐξ ἐπιτάγματος [C] ἐπὶ τὰς καλὰς πράξεις παρορμώντων.
(But since I seem to have harked back to the life of contemplation and to be comparing it with the life of action, though in the beginning of your letter you declined to make the comparison, I will remind you of those very philosophers whom you mentioned, Areius,[418] Nicolaus,[419] Thrasyllus,[420] and Musonius.[421] So far from any one of these governing his own city, Areius we are told refused the governorship of Egypt when it was offered to him, and Thrasyllus by becoming intimate with the harsh and naturally cruel tyrant Tiberius would have incurred indelible disgrace for all time, had he not cleared himself in the writings that he left behind him and so shown his true character; so little did his public career benefit him. Nicolaus did not personally do any great deeds, and he is known rather by his writings about such deeds; while Musonius became famous because he bore his sufferings with courage, and, by Zeus, sustained with firmness the cruelty of tyrants; and perhaps he was not less happy than those who administered great kingdoms. As for Areius, when he declined the governorship of Egypt he deliberately deprived himself of the highest end, if he really thought that this was the most important thing. And you yourself,—may I ask, do you lead an inactive life because you are not a general or a public speaker and govern no nation or city? Nay, no one with any sense would say so. For it is in your power by producing many philosophers, or even only three or four, to confer more benefit on the lives of men than many kings put together. To no trivial province the philosopher appointed, and, as you said yourself, he does not only direct counsels or public affairs, nor is his activity confined to mere words; but if he confirm his words by deeds and show himself to be such as he wishes others to be, he may be more convincing and more effective in making men act than those who urge them to noble actions by issuing commands.)
Ἀλλ᾽ ἐπανιτέον εἰς ἀρχὴν καὶ συμπεραντέον τὴν ἐπιστολὴν μείζονα ἴσως οὖσαν τοῦ δέοντος. ἔστι δὲ ἐν αὐτῇ τὸ κεφάλαιον, ὅτι μήτε τὸν πόνον φεύγων μήτε τὴν ἡδονὴν θηρεύων μήτε ἀπραγμοσύνης καὶ ῥᾳστώνης ἐρῶν τὸν ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ δυσχεραίνω βίον· ἀλλ᾽, ὅπερ ἔφην ἐξ ἀρχῆς, οὔτε παιδείαν ἐμαυτῷ [D] συνειδὼς τοσαύτην οὔτε φύσεως ὑπεροχήν, καὶ προσέτι δεδιώς, μὴ φιλοσφίαν, ἧς ἐρῶν οὐκ ἐφικόμην, εἰς τοὺς νῦν ἀνθρώπους οὐδὲ ἄλλως εὐδοκιμοῦσαν διαβάλλω, πάλαι τε ἔγραφον ἐκεῖνα καὶ νῦν τὰς παρ᾽ ὑμῶν ἐπιτιμήσεις ἀπελυσάμην εἰς δύναμιν.
(But I must go back to what I said at the beginning, and conclude this letter, which is perhaps longer already than it should be. And the main point in it is that it is not because I would avoid hard work or pursue pleasure, nor because I am in love with idleness and ease that I am averse to spending my life in administration. But, as I said when I began, it is because I am conscious that I have neither sufficient training nor natural talents above the ordinary; moreover, I am afraid of bringing reproach on philosophy, which, much as I love it, I have never attained to, and which on other accounts has no very good reputation among men of our day. For these reasons I wrote all this down some time ago, and now I have freed myself from your charges as far as I can.)
Διδοίη δὲ ὁ θεὸς τὴν ἀρίστην τύχην καὶ φρόνησιν ἀξίαν τῆς τύχης, ὡς ἐγὼ νῦν ἔκ τε τοῦ κρείττονος τό γε πλέον καὶ παρ᾽ ὑμῶν τῶν φιλοσοφούντων [267] ἁπάσῃ μηχανῇ[422] βοηθητέος εἶναί μοι δοκῶ, προτεταγμένος ὑμῶν καὶ προκινδυνεύων. εἰ δέ τι μείζον ἀγαθὸν τῆς ἡμετέρας παρασκευῆς καὶ ἧς ὑπὲρ ἐμαυτοῦ γνώμης ἔχω τοῖς ἀνθρώποις δι᾽ ἡμῶν ὁ θεὸς παράσχοι, χαλεπαίνειν οὐ χρὴ πρὸς τοὺς ἐμοὺς λόγους. ἐγὼ γὰρ οὐδὲν ἐμαυτῷ [pg 236] συνειδὼς ἀγαθὸν πλὴν τοῦτο μόνον, ὅτι μηδὲ οἴομαι τὰ μέγιστα ἔχειν ἔχων τε[423] οὐδέν, ὡς ὁρᾷς αὐτός, εἰκότως βοῶ καὶ μαρτύρομαι μὴ μεγάλα παρ᾽ ἡμῶν ἀπαιτεῖν, [B] ἀλλὰ τῷ θεῷ τὸ πᾶν ἐπιτρέπειν· οὕτω γὰρ ἐγὼ τῶν τε ἐλλειμμάτων εἴην ἂν ἀνεύθυνος καί, γενομένων ἁπάντων δεξιῶν, εὐγνώμων ἂν καὶ μέτριος εἴην, οὐκ ἀλλοτρίοις ἐμαυτὸν ἔργοις ἐπιγράφων, τῷ θεῷ δέ, ὥσπερ οὖν δίκαιον, προσανατεθεικὼς ἅπαντα αὐτός τε εἴσομαι καὶ ὑμᾶς προτρέπω τὴν χάριν εἰδέναι.
(May God grant me the happiest fortune possible, and wisdom to match my fortune! For now I think I need assistance from God above all, and also from you philosophers by all means in your power, since I have proved myself your leader and champion in danger. But should it be that blessings greater than of my furnishing and than the opinion that I now have of myself should be granted to men by God through my instrumentality, you must not resent my words. For being conscious or no good thing in me, save this only, that I do not even think that I possess the highest talent, and indeed have naturally none, I cry aloud and testify[424] that you must not expect great things of me, but must entrust everything to God. For thus I shall be free from responsibility for my shortcomings, and if everything turns out favourably I shall be discreet and moderate, not putting my name to the deeds of other men,[425] but by giving God the glory for all, as is right, it is to Him that I shall myself feel gratitude and I urge all of you to feel the same.)