A Handbook of Modern Japan

by Ernest W. Clement

BIBLIOGRAPHY.

Especially helpful are Iyenaga’s “Constitutional Development of Japan,” Wigmore’s articles in the “Nation,” and several papers in the Transactions Asiatic Society of Japan. See also the author’s “Local Self-Government in Japan” in the “Political Science Quarterly” for June, 1892, and “A Japanese State Legislature” in the “Nation” for February 27, 1890. On the subject of Formosa, besides Davidson’s book already mentioned, see chap. xiv. of Ransome’s “Japan in Transition,” pp. 167, 169, of Diosy’s “New Far East,” and Takekoshi’s “Japanese Rule in Formosa.”

CHAPTER XI
JAPAN AS A WORLD POWER

Outline of Topics: Standards of world-power; conscription; draft and exemption; army; arms and ammunition; officers of the army; navy; types of Japanese war-vessels; coal supply; “Blue-jacket Spirit”; Japan as a sea power; growth of cosmopolitan spirit; Anglo-Japanese Alliance,—natural, guarantee of peace, confession of England’s weakness, admission of Japan’s strength; Japan’s responsibility; meaning for Christianity; the United States a silent partner.—Bibliography.

IT is a sad commentary on the present standards of civilization that a consideration of Japan as a world power requires special attention to military and naval affairs. It is rather a strange coincidence that it was not until little Japan in 1894 showed that she could easily overcome immense China that the “Great Powers” were willing to revise their treaties with her on terms of equality and admit her to the comity of nations. And it is another strange coincidence that it was the Boxer troubles which gave Japan another opportunity to display the efficiency of her military and naval organizations, and win such laurels side by side with troops of the other “Powers,” that Great Britain, the mightiest of them all, abandoned her time-honored policy of “splendid isolation” and sought Japan’s assistance by means of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. It is not, however, to be imagined that Great Britain overlooked or ignored Japan’s other elements of power; but it is quite evident that the latter’s military and naval efficiency made a great impression on the former. Therefore it is our duty, having considered Japan’s geographical, industrial, commercial, social, historical, and political features, to take up now her polemic ability.

DISTINGUISHED LAND COMMANDERS
GENERAL BARON KUROKI
GENERAL BARON OKU
GENERAL BARON NODZU

The Japanese army and navy are created and sustained, as to personnel, by a conscription system, quite like that of Germany. Theoretically, “all males between the full ages of 17 and 40 years, who are Japanese subjects, shall be liable to conscription.”[106] This period is, moreover, divided up as follows: (1) Active service with the colors, for 3 years in the army and 4 years in the navy, by those who have “attained the full age of 20 years”; so that those who are between 17 and 20 are apparently exempt except “in time of war or other emergency”; (2) First Reserve term, of 4 years in the army and 3 years in the navy, “by such as have completed their service with the colors”; (3) Second Reserve term of 5 years, “by those who have completed their service in the First Reserves”; and (4) Service in the Territorial Army for the remaining years by those who have completed the preceding term. But the last three services are merely nominal, as the First and Second Reserves and the Territorial Army are ordinarily called out only for drill once a year and are mobilized, in order, “in time of war or of emergency.” And, by a special arrangement, the actual service in barracks may be only 2 years.

A very thorough method of drafting carries into effect these provisions, and would make more than 200,000 young men annually liable to service. But, as this is a much larger number than the government could possibly care for, or would need in times of peace, there is a “sweeping system of exemptions” that brings the number of conscripts down within practical limits. This system takes into account physical conditions, educational courses, individual and family necessities, official duties, business requirements, etc. Even then the number of those available who pass the examination is too large, so that it is reduced by lot. Those who are finally enrolled are divided up among the various lines of service according to physique, former occupation and attainments. “Conscripts for active naval service shall be selected from youths belonging to the sea-coast or insular districts.” The term of active service is computed from December 1 of each year; so that the days just preceding or following that day are busy ones for those who are either giving new conscripts a fine send-off or welcoming home those whose terms have expired.

Japan is divided, for military purposes, into eighteen districts, each of which is occupied by a division. The headquarters of these districts are located at Tōkyō, Sendai, Nagoya, Ōsaka, Hiroshima, Kumamoto, Asahigawa, etc., etc. There is also the Imperial Guard, with headquarters, of course, at Tōkyō: they are to be distinguished from other soldiers by having a red instead of a yellow band around the cap, and are “a picked corps,” who present a very fine appearance. The war-footing of the Japanese army exceeds 500,000 men, and its peace-footing is almost 200,000: these figures take account only of combatants. The discipline, courage, and endurance of the Japanese army have been clearly exhibited side by side with the troops of Occidental nations in China, and have suffered naught by comparison. The army has been called “the most formidable mobile land force in the Far East, indeed in the whole of Asia,” and “the best army in the world, for its size.” And the remarkable manner in which the various parts of the service coöperate and smoothly carry out the general plans has won the admiration of capable critics.[107]

The guns for the artillery service used to be purchased abroad, but are now chiefly manufactured in Ōsaka. There is an excellent arsenal in the Koishikawa District of Tōkyō; it is on part of the site of the magnificent yashiki (mansion) of the Prince of Mito, whose beautiful garden still remains a delight to all visitors. This arsenal is where the once famous Murata rifle was formerly manufactured; but that has been superseded by the “30th Year” (of Meiji) rifle; and both of these are Japanese inventions. The arsenal is also turning out ammunition at the ordinary rate of a million rounds a day.

According to the Constitution, the Emperor “has the supreme command of the army and the navy”; and under him come the Minister of War, the actual Commander-in-Chief, the Chief of Staff, the generals and other officers and officials in order. The Emperor is not expected to take command in person; but often one of the Imperial Princes will act as Commander-in-Chief in the field. There are now only two living Field-Marshals, Marquis Yamagata and Marquis Ōyama. There are various schools for educating and training the officers of the army and the navy.

As Japan is entirely an insular nation, the importance of her navy cannot be over-estimated. Even before the war with China, the Japanese navy had been rapidly growing; and it showed its marked efficiency in the battles of the Yalu and Wei-hai-wei (1894, 1895). The post-bellum plans for expansion have, moreover, emphasized the value to Japan of sea-power; and the programme of naval expansion, in spite of increased burdens of taxation, has met comparatively little opposition. For purposes of administration, the coast of Japan is divided into five naval districts, each with one fort which is a first-class naval station. These stations are Yokosuka, Kure, Saseho, Maizuru, and (to be established) Muroran. The navy at present includes battleships, cruisers, ships for coast defence, gunboats, torpedo boats, torpedo catchers, and despatch ships. Of the first four kinds there are two or three classes in each; and of battleships there are nine first-class ones of more than 15,000 tons each. The organization of the navy is similar to that of the army: below the Emperor, who is nominally in supreme command, come the Minister of the Navy, the actual Commander-in-Chief, the Chief of Staff, the admirals, etc.

MILITARY LEADERS OF NEW JAPAN
FIELD-MARSHAL ŌYAMA
AND
FIELD-MARSHAL YAMAGATA

Attention should be called to two or three points emphasized by Mr. Arthur Diosy.[108] The first is that “Nelson’s own plan, as valid to-day as it was in his time,” has been carried out in the types of vessels built for the Japanese fleet. “The main idea prevailing in their selection is the defence of the national interests by offensive operations against the enemy’s fleets,” but “at no very great distance from the base of operations at home.” The warships of Japan, therefore, are not required to devote so much space to the storage of coal and other supplies for long voyages, and can utilize more space for guns and reserve ammunition, or can be built smaller and “handier.” It is in this way that “they are among the swiftest of all the fighting ships afloat.”

The second point, which is related to the first, is that Japan “stands in the foremost rank as a naval power,” not merely on account of the number and fighting strength of her ships, the efficiency of their officers and crews, and the perfection of the naval organization, but also on account of the well-equipped dockyards and arsenals in convenient locations, and the abundant supply of excellent coal in easy reach.

The third point concerns what Diosy calls the “Blue-jacket Spirit,” a “scarcely definable something” that is hard to describe in words, but that shines forth in every word and deed of the officer, the sailor, the marine,—the esprit de corps of the personnel of the Japanese navy. This spirit he finds only in the British, Japanese, and United States navies.

And we cannot refrain from quoting the same writer’s paragraph of summary as follows:—

“Japan possesses all the elements of Sea-Power: swift, powerful ships, adapted to the work they are intended for, numerous good harbors, excellent coal in abundance, capital facilities for the repair of her vessels, and the necessary plant, constantly augmented and improved, for building new ones. Her naval organization is wise and efficient, her administrative services are thorough and honest; her naval officers are gallant, dashing, and scientifically trained, and the armament they control is of the latest and best pattern. Strong in ships, strong in guns, Japan is stronger still in the factor without which ships and guns are useless—‘the Man behind the Gun.’”[109]

Ten years ago it was improper to speak of Japan as a world power; it was then fitting to treat of her, as Norman did in one chapter of his “Real Japan,” under the caption of “Japan as an Eastern Power.” But, as already pointed out, it was her overwhelming defeat of China that at least expedited her formal and nominal recognition in the comity of nations. The new treaties which formulated this recognition went into effect in 1899, from which date it may be eminently proper to begin a seventh period,[110] that of “Cosmopolitanism,” in the history of New Japan. And by Japan’s successes in the second war with China arising out of the Boxer troubles, she confirmed her claim to recognition as a world power; and this recognition was completed through the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902. Not many years ago the ideal was still such a narrow theme as “The Japan of the Japanese”; then the vision widened out so as to include “The Japan of Asia”; but now the horizon is unlimited and extends to “The Japan of the World.” Indeed, the Japanese have outgrown “Native Japan,” and even “Asiatic Japan,” into “Cosmopolitan Japan.” They are interested, not only in national, but also international, problems.

It has already been pointed out that the complete recognition of Japan as a world power was manifested in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. This is the greatest political event of 1902,[111] so far as concerns directly the future of the Orient and indirectly the affairs of the Occident. This convention between Great Britain and Japan caused profound surprise and widespread rejoicing, and in Japan particularly it was the occasion for numerous feasts, even in various provincial localities, where more or less profuse self-gratulation was the order of the day. But it is now possible to take a calmer view of the situation and to make a more judicial estimate of the importance of the alliance.

In the first place, it is well to remember that this formal alliance is only the natural outcome of a community of interests in the Far East, and is the natural result of practical coöperation for some time past. As Count Ōkuma put it, they (Great Britain and Japan) have been allies in effect for some years; they are now allies in name. Indeed, for several years past this alliance has existed in spirit, and it has now merely become a public acknowledgment of sympathy and similar aims in policy in the Far East. This alliance, then, is not artificial or compulsory, but natural, spontaneous, and voluntary.

The second point to notice is that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance includes the greatest power each of the Occident and of the Orient. This alliance is also the combination of two of the greatest naval powers, as well as two great military powers of the world. It would seem likely, therefore, as a prominent Japanese expressed it, “that there is no power or combination of powers that could make head against this union in the Far East; the attempt would be like spitting at a tiger.” The Anglo-Japanese Alliance is, therefore, a guarantee, of the very first quality, of peace in the Orient, and of just dealings with China and Korea.

Another important point in connection with this alliance is the fact that herein Great Britain has abandoned, has broken to pieces, her traditional policy of “splendid isolation.” For many decades she has not been in the habit of contracting alliances with other powers in carrying out plans to advance her own interests. The fact, therefore, that in this case she has seen fit to depart from her usual policy is a positive indication that the situation in the Far East was one of imminent peril and demanded unusual precaution. It is a proof that Russian aggressions were no mere phantoms, but were terribly real and threatening.

And the fact that, when Great Britain broke her policy of grand isolation, it was to enter into alliance with an Oriental rather than an Occidental power, is also one of great significance. It proves more effectively than folios of verbal argument, and speaks out more loudly than a thousand tongues could tell, the present satisfactory status of Japan. The insignificant, “half-civilized” country of a few years ago is now “on the same lotus-blossom” with Great Britain. That little island-empire of the Orient is now but fifty years out of her own practically complete isolation from the rest of the world; she is only thirty years out of feudalism; she has been only a little more than a decade in constitutionalism and parliamentary government, and she has been only a few years in the comity of nations by virtue of treaties on terms of equality; nevertheless, she has become the political partner of that immense island-empire which stretches in all directions, and encircles the globe with the drum-beat of her garrisons. The huge empire on whose possessions the sun never sets has taken as its ally the small empire of the rising sun!

This recognition of the status of New Japan has been, of course, a matter of great pride and rejoicing to that nation and therefore a source of encouragement to continue steadfast in the paths of progress along which she has been moving so rapidly.[112] It has likewise been recognized that this alliance imposes great responsibilities upon Japan, if she would maintain her new position.[113] These responsibilities are along not only military, naval, political, and commercial lines, but also along social, moral, and religious lines. The new alliance means that licentiousness, dishonesty, and other vices should not be tolerated, and that ignorance, superstition, and idolatry should not be allowed to thrive among a people in alliance with such a progressively Christian nation as Great Britain. In other words, this alliance should hasten the spread of the Gospel in Japan.

But this alliance means much to Christianity, not merely in Japan, but over all the Orient. For the prime objects of the alliance are the independence of Korea and the integrity of the Chinese Empire; and the prime effect of the alliance is peace in the Orient. This means that Russian aggressions in China and Korea will be, already have been, considerably checked, and that Anglo-Saxon and Japanese influences will be paramount in those countries. And all this means that Christian missionary work will be practically unhindered, unless it be by local and spasmodic prejudice; and that the word will have freer course and be glorified. The alliance of the first nation of Christendom with a largely Christianized nation like Japan cannot fail to Christianize the Far East.

STATESMEN OF NEW JAPAN
COUNT ŌKUMA, MARQUIS INOUYE, COUNT ITAGAKI, MARQUIS MATSUKATA

Finally, one significant phase of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance is the fact that, to all intents and purposes, it includes the United States of America, which may be called a “silent partner.” It is well known that the convention was shown at Washington before it was promulgated, and that it was heartily approved by our government. Practically, therefore, it is, in a very broad sense, an Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Certainly our interests in the Far East have been and are identical with those of Great Britain and Japan; and all our “moral influence,” at least, should be exerted toward the purposes of that convention. Indeed, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance should mean the union of Great Britain and the United States with Japan to maintain in the Orient the “open door,” not merely of trade and commerce, but of all social, intellectual, moral, and religious reforms; the open door, not of material civilization only, but also of the gospel of Jesus Christ.[114]