THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR
The war between Japan and Russia was inevitable, because, as already pointed out in this volume,[185] the two countries represented different and naturally hostile interests. Ever since Russia, shut out from an open port on the European or Western Asiatic seaboard, began to spread eastward through Asia to seek an outlet into the Pacific Ocean, it had been inevitable that the two powers would some day come into collision. And it can be confidently affirmed that the Russians did nothing, while Japan had done much, to avert the conflict. Russia not infrequently committed overt acts to provoke Japan, and had generally treated the latter in an overbearing and insolent manner.
In 1875, Japan was forced to give up Sakhalin for the bleak and barren Kurile Islands. It was just twenty years later (1895) that Russia committed her most unjust act of interference and provocation. Japan, after her successful conflict with China, by the treaty of Shimonoseki, had obtained the cession of the Liaotung Peninsula, of which Port Arthur was then the most important port. “Hardly was the ink dry on it [treaty] before the three great European powers—Russia, France, and Germany—stepped in, and, in order to justify their interference, declared that any holding of Manchurian territory by Japan would constitute a menace to the peace of Asia.”[186] Japan, exhausted by her first foreign war under the new régime, was in no position to offer any opposition to three of the greatest World Powers, when they tendered her kindly(?) advice. The only two powers who might have assisted her against this combination were neither sufficiently interested nor far-sighted enough to interfere; and they (Great Britain and the United States) kept silent. Therefore, Japan had nothing to do but to submit and accept a monetary consideration for giving up her claim to the Liaotung Peninsula.
This in itself was not a casus belli, but it was enough to arouse to almost fever-heat the excitement of an intensely patriotic and naturally militant nation. The Government was able to hold in check the indignant people; but nothing could prevent the development of a not unnatural desire for revenge. From that time it was definitely and positively known that a war with Russia was inevitable in the not-distant future; and calmly and carefully the Japanese went to work to prepare themselves for that conflict. It is not necessary to go into the details of that preparation, the thoroughness of which has been surprising the civilized world.
But even then war might have been averted, for the spirit of revenge would have faded away in the multitude of other interests and sentiments that have been pressing upon Japan’s attention within the past decade. Indeed, during the Boxer troubles of 1900 and 1901 in China, when the troops of Japan were marching, in company with those of Russia, Germany, France, Great Britain, the United States, et al., to the relief of the beleaguered foreigners in Peking, it almost seemed like a harbinger of continued peace in the Far East. But this harmony was only apparent, not real,—only temporary, not permanent.
In fact, it was that very campaign which enabled Russia to complete her practical possession of Manchuria. She had, in the meantime, obtained from China a lease of that very territory which she had forced Japan to give up. She had also obtained permission from China to extend the Siberian Railway through Manchuria to Port Arthur and Dalny, and thus obtain an outlet to the Pacific Ocean. Measures of material expansion might not have alarmed Japan, if it had not been that Russia sought to obtain permanent possession of Manchuria through a military occupation ostensibly for the purpose of protecting her commercial interests. She marched her troops in large numbers into Manchuria in order to protect the railway from the depredations of Chinese bandits; she fortified Port Arthur and built up Dalny, the great “fiat city,” and in every way showed no intention of letting Manchuria slip out of her control. All such acts did not tend to allay the spirit of revenge in the hearts of the Japanese, but of course made them more and more indignant.
Nor was this all. Russia began to show most evident signs of encroaching upon Korea. “Japan watched all these things with profound anxiety. If there were any reality in the dangers which Russia, Germany, and France had declared to be incidental to Japanese occupation of part of Manchuria, the same dangers must be doubly incidental to Russian occupation of the whole of Manchuria; the independence of Korea would become illusory ...; an obstacle would be created to the permanent peace of the East.”[187]
If Russia succeeded in maintaining her position in Manchuria, her next step would take her into Korea, for whose safety and independence there would be no guarantee; and still another step would bring her over against Japan. Thus would be endangered, not only the influence of Japan on the continent, but even her very existence. She would sink at least into the position of a third-rate power, and would be completely isolated from all opportunities for expansion.
But, even in spite of insults and provocations, Japan set herself to resist the Russian encroachments by peaceable means and measures, in which she at last had the support of Great Britain and the United States. It was to be presumed that Russia would keep her promise to give up her military occupation of Manchuria and restore to China the administration of the “Three Provinces” on the dates specified in a convention with China signed April 8, 1902. According to this, Russia agreed to withdraw her troops gradually from Manchuria and entirely resign her control thereof within one year.
But when the time came for the final evacuation, Russia showed no sign of intending to carry out her agreement. After futile protests from Japan, Great Britain, and the United States, Japan suggested to Russia to open up negotiations concerning their respective interests in the Far East; and to this Russia assented. It is scarcely profitable to follow the devious windings of these negotiations, which were delayed by Russia on one pretext or another. It is sufficient to state that Japan invited Russia to nothing more than “to subscribe to the policy enunciated by the United States and Great Britain,—the policy of the ‘open door’ and of the integrity of the Chinese and [the] Korean Empires.”
During the course of the prolonged negotiations, Russia was moving troops to the scene of action and making other military preparations. These did not necessarily mean that she anticipated war, but that she at least expected to overawe little Japan and thus obtain her desires.
“The only alternatives for Japan were war or total and permanent effacement in Asia. She chose war, and in fighting, she is fighting the battle of Anglo-Saxondom as well as of herself,—the battle of free and equal opportunities for all without undue encroachment upon the sovereign rights or territorial integrity of China or Korea, against a military dictatorship, against a programme of ruthless territorial aggrandizement, and against a policy of selfish restrictions.”[188]
DISTINGUISHED NAVAL COMMANDERS
ADMIRAL URIU
ADMIRAL KAMIMURA COMMANDER HIROSE
But it was not till after six months of negotiations that the Japanese Government, on February 5, 1904, “having exhausted without effect every means of conciliation,” and “finding that their just representations and moderate and unselfish proposals in the interest of a firm and lasting peace in the extreme East are not receiving the consideration which is their due,” officially announced to the Russian Government that they would not only “terminate the present futile negotiations,” but also “sever their diplomatic relations with the Imperial Russian Government,” and “reserve to themselves the right to take such independent action as they may deem best.”[189] This was tantamount to a declaration of war.
On February 6, Admiral Togo left Sasebo under official instructions, and about midnight of February 8 struck the first blow of the war. Six of his torpedo-boats attacked the Russian squadron in the harbor of Port Arthur, inflicted serious damage upon the enemy, and retired without much loss. On the following day a detachment of the fleet under Admiral Uriu defeated two Russian cruisers in the harbor of Chemulpo, Korea. Thus within a few hours the Japanese gained control of the sea, and landed troops, who soon entered Seoul.
The formal declaration of war was made by Russia on February 9, and by Japan on February 10, for publication in the newspapers of the following day, which was the anniversary of the founding of the Japanese Empire in 660 B. C. and of the promulgation of the Constitution in 1889.
On February 23, a treaty of alliance between Japan and Korea was formally signed at Seoul.[190] On the next night began a series of attempts on the part of the Japanese squadron to block the mouth of the harbor of Port Arthur. After several essays, in one of which Commander Hirose met his heroic end, the Japanese so far succeeded that the Russian war vessels were shut up in the harbor for a long period. This enabled Japan to land troops with perfect immunity at several points on the coast of Manchuria.
In the meantime, the First Army, under General Kuroki, was marching across Korea without encountering much opposition, and, by brilliant strategy, succeeded in crossing the Yalu River in the face of a well-fortified Russian army. The Second Army, under General Oku, landed at Kinchow, and after bloody contests, especially at Nanshan, was able to get possession of Dalny, and sever connections between the Russians in Port Arthur and their main force under General Kuropatkin. The Third Army, under General Nodzu, having landed at Takushan, soon got into touch with the First Army; and together they continued their march northward in the face of constant opposition.
When Port Arthur was isolated from the rest of the Russian forces, still another army was sent out, under General Nogi, to carry on the investment of that place, so that the former armies might be free to give undivided attention to General Kuropatkin’s force. The attempt of the latter to relieve Port Arthur was checked by the Japanese in bloody battles at Telissu and Kaiping, after which they advanced northward toward Liaoyang.
In the meantime, in March, the Imperial Diet had met and voted unanimously the Government’s proposals to raise from various sources a special war fund of yen 576,000,000. Indeed, in every possible way, the Japanese people, as a unit, supported the Government in the carrying on of war, even to undergoing many hardships. All domestic loans thus far issued have been over-subscribed three or four times.
Moreover, on the last day of March, the fiftieth anniversary of Commodore Perry’s treaty with Japan, a memorable meeting to celebrate the event was held in the Y. M. C. A. Hall, Tōkyō. It was attended by a large number of both Japanese and foreigners, and, after listening to eloquent speeches, unanimously adopted a resolution to raise a Perry Memorial Relief Fund for the destitute families of Japanese soldiers and sailors. The subscription of over 60,000 yen on the spot has since been increased to about 100,000 yen.
The events off Port Arthur were colored still more tragically on April 13, when the Russian flagship “Petropavlovsk” of Admiral Makaroff was sunk, and almost all on board, including the admiral and the famous painter Verestchagin, perished. In May, the Japanese suffered their first heavy losses in the sinking of the “Hatsuse” and the “Yoshino.”
In April the Russian Vladivostok squadron had taken the offensive and sunk a Japanese transport with a few troops on board. After that it made occasional sorties toward the Korean Straits in the hope of creating a diversion from Port Arthur, and in one instance sunk the “Hitachi Maru” with a large number of Japanese troops on board. Moreover, in July this squadron succeeded in getting through the Tsugaru Straits to the eastern coast of Japan, where it committed depredations, even just off the entrance of Tōkyō Bay. But later it was met in the Korean Straits by Admiral Kamimura’s squadron and defeated with the loss of the “Rurik.”
By the early part of August the army investing Port Arthur had made such progress, in spite of severe opposition, that it became extremely dangerous for the Russian fleet to remain there longer. Therefore, on August 10, they made a sortie with the intention of escaping to Vladivostok. But Admiral Togo was not to be caught napping, and engaged in battle with the squadron. A few vessels, badly damaged, regained Port Arthur; others, some of which were severely injured, escaped to neutral ports, where they had to be dismantled; the “Novik” eluded its pursuers for a short time, but was finally overtaken and sunk in Korsakoff Harbor, Sakhalin.
On August 23 began the great battle of Liaoyang, which continued for over a week, and deserves to go down on the pages of history as one of the severest, bloodiest, and probably most decisive battles ever fought. It was only by the most tremendous exertions that General Kuropatkin was enabled to save his army from having its retreat cut off by the flanking movement of Kuroki, while Oku and Nodzu were pounding away from other directions.
The attempt of Kuropatkin to retrieve his fortunes by advancing with heavy reënforcements to retake Liaoyang met with another disastrous defeat in the battle of the Shaho River, October 10-15. After that, the two armies practically went into Winter quarters and engaged in nothing more than skirmishes until January, 1905, when Mitschenko’s cavalry made an unsuccessful raid upon Newchang and Yinkow, and Kuropatkin’s army, apparently urged on by the political exigencies caused by discontent at home, attempted a flanking movement on Liaoyang, but was repulsed in the battle of Heikeutai.
In view of the lull in hostilities along at the front, popular interest was once more directed toward Port Arthur. The Japanese navy continued faithfully its task of watching the harbor; and, although it could not maintain an absolutely complete blockade, it was nevertheless able to prevent exit and entrance, except in the case of Chinese junks and small steamers, which occasionally succeeded in running the blockade under cover of night or stormy weather. The navy also coöperated with the army by means of frequent bombardments of the harbor, in which the remnants of the Russian fleet had sought refuge, and even of the city of Port Arthur.
The Japanese army persistently pushed the attack from the land side; and the Russians stubbornly resisted every step of the advance. The former employed both direct and flanking attacks, and utilized every device known in engineering to overcome the “impregnable” fortress, so well fortified both by nature and by art. Slowly but steadily the besiegers pressed on and obtained possession of various forts. On October 30 they made a general assault, in which they succeeded in capturing several important positions. Just one month later, the “203-metre Hill” fell into the hands of the Japanese and gave them the command of the inner harbor. In a few days they had succeeded in completely disabling the remnants of the Russian squadron, so that the greater portion of their own fleet was released from its long and arduous blockade, and enabled to undergo a thorough overhauling in the docks. A portion of it, under Vice-Admiral Uriu, was despatched to watch the course of the Baltic fleet, and every preparation was made to accord to these visitors as warm a reception as possible.
Admirals Togo and Kamimura, with their suites, returned, for a short period, to Tōkyō, where they were greeted on December 30 with an enthusiastic welcome. And, when the eventful year 1904 passed away, it was generally thought that Port Arthur might be able to hold out a month longer.
It may, therefore, be easily imagined with what complete surprise came the news that on January 1 General Stoessel had opened negotiations with General Nogi concerning surrender. “Hope deferred maketh the heart sick”: but the relief from the long suspense showed itself in a kind of prolonged banzai and a series of celebrations which lasted through the month. The stubborn defence and the bravery of the defenders had awakened in every Japanese heart a feeling of admiration; so that the chivalrous treatment of the garrison found a ready response on all sides.
DISTINGUISHED LAND COMMANDERS
GENERAL BARON KODAMA GENERAL COUNT NOGI
ADMIRAL PRINCE ITŌ
During most of the month of February, the two armies confronting each other along the banks of the Shaho River remained in apparent inactivity, except for occasional skirmishes, but in real preparation for another battle. Just when this began it is a little difficult to state precisely, because some of the earlier operations were only feints to disguise the real purpose. On February 24, the Japanese gained a point by the capture of Ching-ho-cheng after two days of hard fighting. And from this time the struggle went on practically without cessation for two or three weeks. Within a few days the Japanese had turned both flanks of the Russian army, which was compelled to beat a precipitate retreat in great confusion and barely escaped complete annihilation. The Japanese pushed on in hot pursuit, and occupied Fushun, Mukden, Tiehling, Kaiyuan, and Changtu. This was the result of the great battle of Mukden, which was much more decisive than even Liaoyang, and ended the military activity in Manchuria for several months.
In the meantime the Baltic fleet had been leisurely making its way eastward, and, apparently regardless of international law, had been enjoying the hospitality of neutral waters, especially those of Madagascar and Annam. But, although Japan, supported by Great Britain and the United States, vigorously protested against the flagrant violations of international law in the abuse of French hospitality, yet she did not allow herself to swerve from her original plan concerning the Baltic fleet, or to be lured away from her own strategic position to a battlefield of Russia’s choosing. The Japanese fleet, under the indomitable Togo, was watching and waiting in the waters between Japan and Korea; and, as all things come to those who wait, to the Japanese came finally the Russian fleet, steering boldly through the Tsushima channel for Vladivostok. May 27 and 28 (the latter the birthday of the Empress of Japan) are the red-letter dates of the great naval battle, which resulted in the practical annihilation of the Baltic fleet, with tremendous loss to the Russians and only slight damage to the Japanese. The Battle of the Sea of Japan, as it is officially designated, was the decisive conflict of the war; and it deserves also to rank among the decisive battles of the world’s history. If Togo had been defeated, the communications of the immense Japanese army in Manchuria would have been severed, and Japan itself would have been at the mercy of the depredations of the Russian fleet. But the destruction of the latter was so complete, that it is not strange that Russia was willing at last to listen to the tactful intervention of President Roosevelt. Peace commissioners were appointed by both combatants to meet in some suitable place in the United States about August 1. The Japanese representatives were Baron Komura, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Mr. Takahira, Minister to the United States; and the Russian representatives were Count Sergius Witte, President of the Imperial Committee of Ministers, and Baron Rosen, Minister to the United States.
COUNT KOMURA
MINISTER TAKAHIRA
THE JAPANESE PEACE ENVOYS
Accordingly, avoiding the heat of Washington, the peace envoys convened at Portsmouth, N. H., on August 9, after paying their respects to President Roosevelt. The Japanese presented the following twelve articles for the consideration of their opponents:
1. That Russia recognize Japan’s preponderating influence in Korea.
2. That Russia and Japan evacuate Manchuria.
3. That Japan restore Chinese sovereignty and civil government in Manchuria.
4. That both powers respect Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria and the principle of equal commercial opportunity there for all nations.
5. That the island of Sakhalin be ceded to Japan.
6. That Russia surrender to Japan all rights accruing under Chinese leases of the Liaotung peninsula, including Port Arthur, Dalny, and the Blonde and Elliott islands.
7. That Russia surrender to China by arrangement with Japan the branch of the Chinese Eastern railway from Harbin to Port Arthur and Newchwang, with retrocession of all privileges under the concession of 1898.
8. That the Russian concessions obtained in 1896 by which the short route connecting the Trans-Siberian and Ussuri railways in northern Manchuria be given to the Chinese Eastern railway, Chinese imperial police to be substituted for the Russian guards.
9. That Russia pay Japan the substantial costs of the war.
10. That Russia surrender to Japan all warships interned in far Asiatic waters.
11. That Russia limit strictly the naval establishment maintained in neutral waters of the far East.
12. That Russia grant fishing rights to Japan along the Russian littoral in Siberia.
After the agreement by Russia to certain of these articles, and skilful manœuvring by the Russian envoys until the demand by Japan for an indemnity was practically the one remaining cause for dispute between them, the world was startled on August 29 by the surrender of the Japanese of all demand for indemnification and the consequent declaration of peace. As amended the treaty grants to Japan all that Japan contended for before the declaration of war except the maintenance of the territorial integrity of China, with the addition of the valuable fishing rights along the Siberian coast and the right to establish a consular service throughout eastern Russia.
The two powers mutually obligate themselves not to fortify the Russo-Korean frontier nor to erect fortifications on the island of Sakhalin, the more valuable portion of which, situated below the fiftieth meridian, is ceded to Japan. Japan obtains the Chinese Eastern railway and the right to build a branch line to Kirin, while the South Manchuria railway is to be used for commercial purposes only, both powers maintaining guards along its right of way. Korea, Manchuria, and Siberia are opened to trade on the most favored nation basis, and Manchuria is given the “open door” for all the world to enter.
Japan finds herself in possession of the sea and land routes to Peking through the ownership of Port Arthur, and her influence in China has waxed as that of Russia has waned, the subjects of the czar standing now in the territorial position they occupied in 1890, with every diplomatic advantage then held at the Chinese capital practically annihilated.
By the surrender of all claim for compensation, except that for the care of Russian prisoners of war, and by the return of the warships interned in far Eastern waters, Japan has shown herself as magnanimous as brave, as thoughtful for the peace of the world as for the details which have brought her such success. Scrupulously respecting all the rules of war, Japan has also set the world a new standard of hygienic efficiency in the care of the wounded and especially in the prevention of disease among her soldiers in the field.
Space fails to tell of innumerable deeds of Spartan heroism at the front; of the calmness and dignity of the Japanese people in the time of war, which they do not allow to interfere with their usual daily duties; of working overtime to increase the productive wealth of the country in this crisis; of the extra labor performed, even at night, that a neighbor’s field or business may not suffer loss during his absence from home to fight his country’s battles; of the work of women, young and old, to provide necessary clothing and “comfort bags” for those at the front; of the suffering and self-sacrifice of many at home that loved ones may serve the country on the battlefield; of the kindly care of Russian prisoners, who are “treated more like guests”; of the work of the Red Cross Society, and its abundant labors both at home and at the front. The Japanese are truly heroic in every sense of the word.
Two features have already stood out prominently in this war,—the “splendid tenacity” of the Japanese soldiery, and the coördination of the movements of their armies and navy. The strategic phase of the war reflects the utmost credit upon Yamagata, Ōyama, Kodama, and the others who planned the campaigns.
It ought not to be necessary to consider seriously the so-called “Yellow Peril,” but it may be well to refer briefly to this bogy. For such an idea there is not an iota of a reason. It is true that the Japanese are ambitious to become the leaders and teachers of Korea, China, and Siam;[191] but it is for the purpose of leading and teaching them in civilization. Japan has turned her back, whether for good or for ill, upon Oriental civilization, and has turned her face, whether for good or ill, toward Occidental civilization. By this is not meant, either that she will throw away all things Oriental, or that she will accept all things Occidental. But it is simply meant, as before pointed out,[192] that she will be the true reconciler between East and West, and will develop that which is good and useful in both civilizations. It is her purpose, therefore, not to array the East against the West, but to bring them closer together in various bonds of unity. It would be absolutely impossible for her to take any backward step in the path which she has begun to tread, and in which she is striving earnestly and succeeding rapidly in catching up with Western nations. Japan represents in the Far East the ideals of Western civilization more than does Russia. The immense empire of China with its teeming population under Russian domination or only under Russian influence would constitute a real “Yellow Peril,” or “Muscovite Menace,” terrible to contemplate. But Japanese leadership or hegemony in Korean and Chinese affairs constitutes a guarantee of peace and prosperity, of the “open door,” of the spread of true civilization, in the Far East.
The real policy of Japan in this war has been clearly set forth in various ways, of which one case follows:
On May 16 there was held in Tōkyō a most significant mass meeting of representatives of all kinds and shades of philosophies, cults, and religions. The thousand persons present included foreign missionaries, American and British, and Japanese Shintōists, Buddhists, Roman Catholics, Greek Catholics, and Protestants of various denominations, besides probably many free-thinkers. There was a small number of women, both Japanese and foreign, in attendance.
There were several speakers, all of whom dwelt upon the necessity of union in the present crisis in the history of Japan. From the “Japan Mail” we extract the following paragraphs in summary of some of the addresses:—
“Mr. Ōuchi, the representative of Buddhism, declared that the Japanese do not constitute the Yellow Peril. The Mongols constitute it, and, above all, the Russians, who are Mongols. Napoleon had well said that a Russian has a white skin over a yellow heart. Japan has a yellow skin over a white heart. The whole practice of Russia, her boundless aggressions, her despotism and intolerance, mark her as the true Yellow Peril of the era.”
“Mr. Shibata, representing Shintō, said that the pity of Buddhism, the charity (love) of Christianity, and the pure heart of Shintō are all one and the same thing under different names.”
“Dr. Imbrie (representative of Christianity) adduced as proofs that religion and race have nothing to do with the present war: first, the fact that one of the belligerents, Japan, has a constitution guaranteeing freedom of conscience; secondly, the meeting now assembled, where all creeds and all races united in a common cause. He believed that the heart of the nation was with them in this matter, and that such an assembly might be convened in any part of Japan. He believed also that the victory in the war would be with Japan for the sake of the principles she represented.”
The meeting unanimously adopted the following resolution:—
“The war now existing between Japan and Russia has for its object, on the part of Japan, the security of the empire and the permanent peace of the East. It is carried on in the interests of justice, humanity, and the civilization of the world. With differences between races or religions it has nothing whatever to do. We, therefore, meeting together without distinction of race or religion, agree that we will endeavor to publish to the world, each in a manner accordant with the methods observed in the religious body to which he belongs, the real purpose of the present war, as now described. We also express a most earnest desire for the speedy accomplishment of an honorable peace.”
The significance of this meeting can scarcely be overestimated. It is a perfectly conclusive answer to the attempts made in various quarters “to foment an anti-Japanese crusade on the ground of racial and religious prejudices.” Japan stands before the world as a champion of “the equality and fraternity of all races.” The so-called “Yellow Peril” is a myth, a fantasy, a delusion; the reality is to be found in the “Golden Opportunity” to win the Orient for Christ through Japan’s leadership.
H. E. Count Katsura, in his official capacity as Prime Minister and speaking in the name of His Majesty the Emperor, has given assurances that the “Yellow Peril” is a myth, and that the religious liberty guaranteed in the Japanese constitution is to be enforced. He has stated most emphatically that “Japan stands for religious freedom.” The leading statesmen of Japan, whether in or out of office, assert most positively that Japan’s interests in the Far East are practically identical with those of Great Britain and the United States, and that she desires to work in harmony with those nations.[193]
The cause of Christian civilization in Japan has been indirectly benefited by this war. The people, with minds broadened by the responsibilities of their country, and with hearts touched by the practical sympathy of Christian nations, are listening with deeper interest to the presentation of Christian truths. The noble work of the Young Men’s Christian Association at Antung proved so successful that the military authorities soon requested its extension to other portions of Manchuria. The Japanese have felt that though their nation is nominally non-Christian, yet it is fighting the battle of Christian civilization against a nation nominally Christian. The war has been one of the most momentous in history, and decides whether the Far East is to be dominated by conservative, despotic Russia or directed by progressive, liberal Japan.