Footnotes

[1.]Mill tells us that his Essay On Liberty was planned and written down in 1854. It was in mounting the steps of the Capitol in January, 1855, that the thought first arose of converting it into a volume, and it was not published till 1859. The author, who in his Autobiography speaks with exquisite modesty of all his literary performances, allows himself one single exception when speaking of his Essay On Liberty. “None of my writings,” he says, “have been either so carefully composed or so sedulously corrected as this.” Its final revision was to have been the work of the winter of 1858 to 1859, which he and his wife had arranged to pass in the South of Europe, a hope which was frustrated by his wife's death. “The Liberty,” he writes, “is likely to survive longer than anything else that I have written (with the possible exception of the Logic), because the conjunction of her mind with mine has rendered it a kind of philosophic text-book of a single truth, which the changes progressively taking place in modern society tend to bring out into strong relief: the importance to man and society, of a large variety of character, and of giving full freedom to human nature to expand itself in innumerable and conflicting directions.”[2.]Herzen defined Nihilism as “the most perfect freedom from all settled concepts, from all inherited restraints and impediments which hamper the progress of the Occidental intellect with the historical drag tied to its foot.”[3.]Ueber die Akademische Freiheit der Deutschen Universitäten, Rede beim Antritt des Rectorats an der Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität in Berlin, am October 15, 1877, gehalten von Dr. H. Helmholtz.[4.]Ueber eine Akademie der Deutschen Sprache, p. 34. Another keen observer of English life, Dr. K. Hillebrand, in an article in the October number of the Nineteenth Century, remarks: “Nowhere is there greater individual liberty than in England, and nowhere do people renounce it more readily of their own accord.”[5.]Spencer Hardy, Manual of Buddhism, p. 391.[6.]Spencer Hardy, Manual of Buddhism, p. 39.[7.]“As one generation dies and gives way to another, the heir of the consequences of all its virtues and all its vices, the exact result of preëxistent causes, so each individual, in the long chain of life, inherits all, of good or evil, which all its predecessors have done or been, and takes up the struggle towards enlightenment precisely where they left it.” Rhys Davids, Buddhism, p. 104.[8.]Bunsen, Egypt, ii. pp. 77, 150.[9.]Mémoire sur l'Origine Egyptienne de l'Alphabet Phénicien, par E. de Rougé, Paris, 1874.[10.]See Brandis, Das Münzwesen.[11.]“Is it not almost a self-evident axiom, that the State should require and compel the education, up to a certain standard, of every human being who is born its citizen? Yet who is there that is not afraid to recognize and assert this truth?” On Liberty, p. 188.[12.]Times, January 25, 1879.[13.]Sacred Books of the East, edited by M. M., vols. i. to ix.; Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1879 and 1880.[14.]Computation or Logic, t. iii., viii., p. 36.[15.]Lectures on Mr. Darwin's “Philosophy of Language,” Fraser's Magazine, June, 1873, p. 26.[16.]Prantl, Geschichte der Logik, vol. i. p. 121.[17.]L. Noiré, Pädagogisches Skizzenbuch, p. 157; “Todtes Wissen.”[18.]Mill On Liberty, p. 193.[19.]Zeller, Ueber den wissenschaftlichen Unterricht bei den Griechen, 1878, p. 9.[20.]Her. ii. 53, οὗτοι δέ εἰσι οἱ ποιήσαντες θεογονίην Ἕλλησι, καὶ τοῖσι θεοῖσι τὰς ἐπωνυμίας δόντες καὶ τιμάς τε καὶ τέχνας διελόντες, καὶ εἴδεα αὐτῶν σημήναντες.[21.]

Πάντα θεοῖς ἀνέθηκαν Ὀμηρός θ᾽ Ἠσίοδός τε
ὅσσα παρ᾽ ἀνθρώποισι ὀνείδεα καὶ ψόγος ἐστίν.
ὡς πλεῖστ᾽ ἐφθέγξαντο θεῶν ἀθεμίστια ἔργα,
κλέπτειν μοιχεύειν τε καὶ ἀλλήλους ἀπατεύειν.
Sext. Emp. adv. Math. 1289; ix. 193.

δοκέουσι θεοὺς γεγενῆσθαι
τὴν σφετέρην τ᾽ αἴσθησιν ἔχειν φωνήν τε δέμας τε.—
Ἀλλ᾽ εἴτοι χεῖράς γ᾽ εἶχον βόες ἠὲ λέοντες
ἥ γράψαι χείρεσσι καὶ ἔργα τελεῖν ἄπερ ἄνδρες,
καί κε θεῶν ἰδέας ἔγραφον καὶ σώματ᾽ ἐποίουν
τοιαῦθ᾽ οἷόν περ καύτοὶ δέμας εἶχον ὁμοῖον,
ἵπποι μέν θ᾽ ἵπποισι, βόες δέ τε βουσὶν ὁμοῖα.
Clem. Alex. Strom. v. p. 601, c.

Ὥς φησιν Ξενοφάνης Αἰθιοπές τε μέλανας σιμούς τε, Θρᾷκες τε πυρῥοὺς καὶ γλαυκοὺς. Clem. Alex. Strom. vii. p. 711, B. Historia Philosophies, ed. Ritter et Preller, cap. iii.

The word ψυχή is clearly connected in Greek with ψύχω, which meant originally blowing, and was used either in the sense of cooling by blowing, or breathing by blowing. In the former acceptation it produced ψύχος, coldness; ψυχρός, cold; ψυχάω, I cool; in the latter ψυχή, breath, then life, then soul. So far the purely Greek growth of words derived from ψύχω is clear. But ψύχω itself is difficult. It seems to point to a root spu, meaning to blow out, to spit; Lat. spuo, and spuma, foam; Goth, speivan; Gr. πτύω, supposed to stand for σπιύω. Hesychius mentions ψύττει = πτύει, ψυττόν = πτύελον. (Pott, Etym. Forsch. No. 355.) Curtius connects this root with Gr. φυ, in φῦσα, blowing, bellows, φυσάω, to blow, φυσιάω, to snort, ποι-φύσσω, to blow, and with Lat. spirare (i.e. spoisare). See E. B. Tylor, “The Religion of Savages,” Fortnightly Review, 1866, p. 73.

Stahl, who rejected the division of life and mind adopted by Bacon, and returned to the Aristotelian doctrine, falls back on Plato's etymology of ψυχή as φυσέχη, from φύσιν ἔχειν or ὀχεῖν, Crat. 400 B. In a passage of his Theoria Medica Vera (Halæ, 1708), pointed out to me by Dr. Rolleston, Stahl says: “Invenio in lexico græco antiquiore post alios, et Budæum imprimis, iterum iterumque reviso, nomenclaturam nimis quam fugitive allegatam; φυσέχη, poetice, pro ψυχή. Incidit animo suspicari, an non verum primum nomen animæ antiquissimis Græcis fuerit hoc φυσέχη, quasi ἔχων τὸ φύειν, e cuius vocis pronunciatione deflectente, uti vere familiariter solet vocalium, inprimis sub accentibus, fugitiva enunciatione, sensim natum sit φυσ-χή φσυχή, denique ad faciliorem pronunciationem in locum φσυχή, ψυχή. Quam suspicionem fovere mihi videtur illud, quod vocabuli ψυχῆς, pro anima, nulla idonea analogia in lingua græca occurrat; nam quæ a ψύχω ducitur, cum verus huius et directus significatus notorie sit refrigero, indirectus autem magis, spiro, nihil certe hæc ad animam puto.” (P. 44.)

At the end of the hymn the poet says:—

χαῖρε, ἄναξ, πρόφρων δὲ βίον θυμήρε᾽ ὄπαζε;
ἐκ σέο δ᾽ ἀρξάμενος κλῄσω μερόπων γένος ἀνδρῶν
ἡμιθέων, ὦν ἔργα θεοὶ θνητοῖσιν ἔδειξαν.

This would seem to imply that the poet looked upon Helios as a half-god, almost as a hero, who had once lived on earth.

Reynard the Fox in South Africa, or Hottentot Fables and Tales, by W. H. I. Bleek, 1864, p. 69. Dr. Theophilus Hahn, Die Sprache der Nama, 1870, p. 59. As a curious coincidence, it may be mentioned that in Sanskrit, too, the Moon is called sasāanka, i. e. “having the marks of a hare,” the black marks in the moon being taken for the likeness of the hare. Another coincidence is that the Namaqua Hottentots will not touch hare's flesh (see Sir James E. Alexander's Expedition of Discovery into the Interior of Africa, vol. i. p. 269), because the hare deceived men, while the Jews abstain from it, because the hare is supposed to chew the cud (Lev. xi. 6).

A similar tradition on the meaning of death occurs among the Zulus, but as they do not know of the Moon as a deity, the message that men are not to die, or that they are to die, is sent there by Unkulunkulu, the ancestor of the human race, and thus the whole story loses its point. See Dr. Callaway, Unkulunkulu, p. 4; and Gray, Polynesian Mythology, pp. 16-58.

A writer in the Index objects to my representation of what Josephus said with regard to the observance of the seventh day in Greek and barbarian towns. He writes:—

Washington, Nov. 9, 1872.

“The article by Max Müller in the Index of this week contains, I think, one error, caused doubtless by his taking a false translation of a passage from Josephus instead of the original. ‘In fact,’ says Professor Müller, ‘Josephus (Contra Apion. ii. 39) was able to say that there was no town, Greek or not Greek, where the custom of observing the seventh day had not spread.’ Mr. Wm. B. Taylor, in a discussion of the Sabbath question with the Rev. Dr. Brown, of Philadelphia, in 1853 (Obligation of the Sabbath, p. 120), gives this rendering of the passage: ‘Nor is there anywhere any city of the Greeks, nor a single barbarian nation, whither the institution of the Hebdomade (which we mark by resting) has not travelled;’ then in a note Mr. Taylor gives the original Greek of part of the passage, and adds: ‘Josephus does not say that the Greek and barbarian rested, but that we [the Jews] observe it by rest.’

“The corrected translation only adds strength to Max Müller's position in regard to the very limited extent of Sabbath observance in ancient times; and Mr. Taylor brings very strong historical proof to maintain the assertion (p. 24) that ‘throughout all history we discover no trace of a Sabbath among the nations of antiquity.’ ”

It seems to me that if we read the whole of Josephus's work, On the Antiquity of the Jews, we cannot fail to perceive that what Josephus wished to show towards the end of the second book was that other nations had copied or were trying to copy the Jewish customs. He says: Ὑφ᾽ ἡμῶν τε διηνέχθησαν οἱ νόμοι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν ἀνθρώποις, ἀεὶ καὶ μᾶλλον αὐτῶν ζῆλον ἐμπεποιήκασι. He then says that the early Greek philosophers, though apparently original in their theoretic speculations, followed the Jewish laws with regard to practical and moral precepts. Then follows this sentence: Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ πλήθεσιν ἤδη πολὺς ζῆλος γέγονεν ἐκ μακροῦ τῆς ἡμετέρας εὐσεβείας, οὐ δ᾽ ἔστιν οὐ πόλις Ἑλλήνων οὐδετισουν οὐδὲ βάρβαρος, οὐδὲ ἕν ἔθνος, ἔνθα μὴ τὸ τῆς ἑβδομάδος, ἥν ἀργοῦμεν ἡμεῖς, ἔθος οὐ διαπεφοιτηκε, καὶ αἱ νηστεῖαι καὶ λύχνων ἀνακαύσεις καὶ πολλὰ τῶν εἰς βρῶσιν ἡμῖν οὐ νενομισμένων παρατετήρηται. Μιμεῖσθαι δὲ πειρῶνται καὶ τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἡμῶν ὁμόνοιαν, κ.τ.λ. Standing where it stands, the sentence about the ἑβδομάς can only mean that “there is no town of Greeks nor of barbarians, nor one single people, where the custom of the seventh day, on which we rest, has not spread, and where fastings, and lighting of lamps, and much of what is forbidden to us with regard to food are not observed. They try to imitate our mutual concord also, etc.” Hebdomas, which originally meant the week, is here clearly used in the sense of the seventh day, and though Josephus may exaggerate, what he says is certainty “that there was no town, Greek or not Greek, where the custom of observing the seventh day had not spread.”

Indriyabalabodhyaṅgasabda. These are technical terms, but their meaning is not quite clear. Spence Hardy, in his Manual, p. 498, enumerates the five indrayas, viz. (1) sardhâwa, purity (probably sraddhâ, faith), (2) wiraya, persevering exertion (vîrya), (3) sati or smirti, the ascertainment of truth (smriti), (4) samâdhi, tranquillity, (5) pragnâwa, wisdom (pragñâ).

The five balayas (bala), he adds, are the same as the five indrayas.

The seven bowdyânga (bodhyaṅga) are, according to him: (1) sihi or smirti, the ascertainment of the truth by mental application, (2) dharmmawicha, the investigation of causes. (3) wîraya, persevering exertion, (4) prîti, joy, (5) passadhi, or prasrabdhi, tranquillity, (6) samâdhi, tranquillity in a higher degree, including freedom from all that disturbs either body or mind, (7) upekshâ, equanimity.

It will be seen from this that some of these qualities or excellences occur both as indriyas and bodhyaṅgas, while balas are throughout identical with indriyas.

Burnouf, however, in his Lotus, gives a list of five balas (from the Vocabulaire Pentaglotte) which correspond with the five indriyas of Spence Hardy: viz. sraddhâ-bala, power of faith, vîrya-bala, power of vigor, smriti-bala, power of memory, samâdhi-bala, power of meditation, pragñâ-bala, power of knowledge. They precede the seven bodhyaṅgas both in the Lotus, the Vocabulaire Pentaglotte, and the Lalita-Vistara.

To these seven bodhyaṅgas Burnouf has assigned a special treatise (Appendix xii. p. 796). They occur both in Sanskrit and Pâli.