PROFIT-SHARING, PRODUCERS' AND CONSUMERS' COÖPERATION
§ I. PROFIT-SHARING
Nature and definition of profit-sharing
1. Profit-sharing is rewarding labor with a share of the profits in addition to contract wages. The essential mark of profit-sharing is that the additional payment depends on the net profits of the whole business at the end of the year. It is not to be confused with a free gift, or with special privileges granted by the employer, such as lunch-rooms, bathrooms or houses at a low rent. Profit-sharing is a contract made in advance, not a free gift. Nor is it the same as a bonus or premium for a larger output, made contingent on the physical product, on the increased number of pieces turned out by the workmen, individually or in groups. Premium for output is given for something directly under the influence of the worker. The amount of profits is affected by the amount of output, but also by a number of other things that are quite outside the control of the workmen.
The possibilities of profit-sharing
2. The purpose of the employer in adopting profit-sharing is to stimulate the industry of the workers, thus reducing waste and cost of labor and supervision. The employer adopting the plan does not intend to lose by it; he believes that if he can get his workmen to take an interest in the business his costs will be reduced. He offers to divide with them the resulting savings. There is, in every factory, greater or less waste of materials, destruction of tools, and loss of time, that no rules or penalties can prevent. If the worker can be made to take a strong enough personal interest he will use care when the eye of the foreman is not upon him. The product also can be slightly increased in many ways by the workmen's exertions or suggestions. In some cases the quality of the work cannot be insured by the closest inspection as well as it can be by a small degree of personal interest. Either responsibility for the fault cannot be fixed, or the defect is one not measurable by any easily applied standard. Strikes are averted, good feeling is promoted, and contentment is furthered if the interest of the worker can be made to approach, and actually to be in harmony with, that of the employer. The economic result of the plan, if it can be made to work, must be to reduce the costs of these establishments below what they are. The crucial question is whether this alone insures that the costs will be less than those of competitors, thus giving a source out of which an increased amount, really a wage, can be paid to the laborer. This additional wage is made conditional on the employer's success in gaining a net profit on the year's business.
Its successes and failures
3. The profit-sharing plan is now successfully working in over one hundred firms in America and Europe. The plan was first tried in Paris by Leclaire, a house-painter. In house-painting there is often a great waste of materials and time by men working singly or in small groups in different parts of the city. By this new method Leclaire enlisted the aid of the workmen, reduced the costs, and increased the profits. It is a remarkable fact that the plan has been continued successfully by the same firm to the present time. The most important examples of profit-sharing in the United States are the Pillsbury Mills in Minneapolis, Procter and Gamble's soap-factories at Ivorydale, O., and the Nelson Mfg. Co. at Leclaire, Ill. In some cases both manufacturer and workman value the system highly. N. P. Gilman, the author of "Profit Sharing," puts the ratio of successes very high. Others declare that the failures are mostly lost sight of and are very many. The proportion of business done in this way is not large. One hundred firms is a very small fraction of one per cent. of the total number of firms in Germany, France, England, and America. A still more important fact is that this method of remuneration did not spread in the ten years preceding 1900.
Objections to and difficulties in profit-sharing in practice
4. The failure of profit-sharing to grow is due to objections on the side both of the employer and of the workman. On the side of the workman there is the bookkeeping difficulty. He is suspicious, and he lacks knowledge of the business. If at the end of the year the books show no profits, the workman loses confidence, considers the plan to be mere deception, and rejects it. Moreover, the plan puts a limitation upon the workman's freedom to compete for better wages by changing his place of work. It is almost indispensable to make length of service a condition to the sharing of profits. Workmen coming and going, working only a few months, cannot be allowed to share; the percentage given to the others increases with length of employment. Whenever men are thus practically subject to a fine (equal to the amount of shared profits) if they accept a better position, there is danger of a covert lowering of wages. The plan tends to break up the trade-unions, which is one of the reasons that the employers like it, and is the reason that organized labor opposes it. The employer on his part objects to the interference with his management, the troublesome inspection of the books, and the constant grumbling and complaint of the workmen. It makes known the amount of his profits; if they are large, the advertising of his success invites competition; if they are small, publicity injures his credit and depresses the value of his property. In view of all these difficulties it is not surprising that while the plan often starts promisingly, it usually loses its efficiency after a short trial. Business methods are severely subject to the principle of the survival of the fittest. Through competition and the survival of the firms that adopt improvements, better methods must eventually supplant poorer ones. If a method fails to spread when it has been tried for fifty years and all are free to adopt it, there must be some defects inherent in it. That must be our conclusion as to profit-sharing.
Defective character of profit-sharing
5. It is usually better to make wages depend on the worker's efficiency rather than on the profits of the whole business. The strongest motive to efficiency is present when reward is connected immediately and directly with effort, not with some result only slightly under the worker's control. In profit-sharing the added share is only partially due to increased effort of the worker. Labor is but one of the groups of costs. Profits are the net result of many influences. Chief among these is the wisdom of the enterpriser in planning and conducting the business. The "profits" may be nothing, though the worker may be exerting himself to the utmost. The plan is, therefore, reactionary, not in accord with the general progress of the wage system, which is tending constantly to centralize responsibility, to put the risk into the hands of competent managers, and to secure to the worker a definite amount in advance, as high as conditions make possible. The system of premiums, or bonus payments, for output, gives in most cases better results and is rapidly spreading. It is sounder in conception and works better in practice. This premium depends on the increase by the laborer of the output of his particular machine or process as compared with a standard based on the experience of some definite period.
§ II. PRODUCERS' COÖPERATION
Purpose of producers' coöperation
1. Producers' coöperation is the union of workers in a self-employing group to do away with any other enterpriser than themselves, and to secure for themselves the profits. Its object is not to do away with any return on the capital investment. Capital may be borrowed either from outsiders or from the individual coöperators, and is paid a stipulated interest apart from the profits. The source of the gain is to be found in the saving of what the worker looks upon as the needless drain of profits into the pockets of the employer. The hope is that the enterpriser's function (if it is admitted that he has any useful function) will be performed by the workers collectively or through their representatives. They undertake to furnish brain as well as muscle, management as well as hand-work. The hope is even to increase the profits through increasing the stimulus to the workers and by saving in friction, disputes, and strikes.
Its limited success
2. Practically the plan has been made to work in a comparatively few simple industries. The most notable examples of successful coöperation in America have been the cooper-shops in Minneapolis. There were a simple problem of costs, few and uniform materials, patterns, and qualities of product, few machines and much hand-labor, simple well-known processes, a sure local market. Mr. Lloyd, in a recent book, describes many successful societies in England, but they are all of a simple sort of industry, as agriculture and dairy-farming. Within the whole field of industry, this method of organization makes little if any progress. Most experiments have failed and the successful ones often become ordinary stock companies with the most able men in control. Therefore, whether losing or making money, they nearly all cease to exist as coöperative enterprises. This result has disappointed the prophecies of many wise men of seventy-five years ago. In the time of John Stuart Mill, great expectations were entertained of the future of productive coöperation, which was thought to be a solution of the whole social problem.
Its main difficulty
3. The main difficulty in productive coöperation is to secure managing ability of a high order. There is no touchstone for business talent, no way of selecting it with any certainty in advance of trial. This selection is made hard in coöperative shops by the jealousies and rivalries, and by the politics among the workmen. A man thus selected by his fellows finds it almost impossible to enforce discipline. In coöperation there is occasionally developed good business ability that might have remained dormant under the wage system; some workmen showing unusual capacity cease to be handicraftsmen. But the unwillingness on the part of the workers to pay high salaries results in the loss of able managers. Having demonstrated their ability, the leaders go to competing industries where their function is not in such bad repute, and where higher salaries can be earned; or they go into business independently, being able easily to get control of the necessary capital.
Coöperators under-value the enterpriser's function
4. Most coöperative schemes have suffered from a lack of good theory, an inability of the workers to see the importance of the enterpriser's service. Most men make a very imperfect analysis of the productive process. They see that a large part of the product does not go to the workmen; they see the gross amount going to the enterpriser, and they ignore the fact that this contains the cost of materials, interest on capital, and incidental expenses. They ignore further that the enterpriser's function is a productive and essential one. The theory of exploitation, or robbery, as explaining the employer's profits, is very commonly held in a more or less vague way by workmen. With a body of intelligent and thoroughly honest workmen, keenly alive to the truth, the dangers, and the risks of the enterprise, coöperation would be possible in many industries where now it is not. The producers' coöperative schemes usually stumble into an unsuspected pitfall. When a heedless and over-confident army ventures into an enemy's country without a knowledge of its geography, without a map, and without leaders that have been tested on the field of battle, the result can easily be foreseen.
§ III. CONSUMERS' COÖPERATION
Nature and kinds of consumers' coöperation
1. Consumers' coöperation is the union of a number of buyers to save for themselves the profits of the merchants or agents. There are many classes of consumers' coöperation, but the chief ones are: (1) to sell goods (retail stores); (2) to provide insurance (coöperative insurance companies); (3) to provide credit or capital (coöperative banks). These are also productive enterprises, for the merchant's work adds value to the goods, the insurance company and its agent do a real service, the profits of the small bank are, ordinarily, earned fairly under existing conditions. The terms producers' and consumers' coöperation merely set in contrast the part of the productive process that is undertaken. Producers' coöperation is concerned with the earlier steps, usually stopping when the product is disposed of to wholesale or retail merchants. Consumers' coöperation (often called distributive coöperation) is concerned with the later steps, the placing of a consumption good (rarely also productive agents) into the hands of the final user. It imparts the same value to goods that the retail merchant does. The one thing this class of coöperators is sure of when they begin is a number of consumers to make use of the service or products they purpose to supply; hence the name.
Costliness of competitive mercantile business
2. The waste of competitive mercantile business is the source from which it is expected that the savings of the coöperative enterprise will come. It is a great expense to the retail dealer to secure a body of customers. Rent of store-room, clerk hire, interest on invested capital are fixed charges, which can be met only on condition of a regular and frequent turnover of the stock. To attract customers the dealer must have a well-located store, must advertise, keep open long hours, and pay idle clerks. Frequently he must give credit, raising the price enough to cover the expense of bookkeeping, collection, bad accounts, and loss of interest. The public's likings, whims, lack of judgment, and lack of business analysis make these charges necessary. There are many communities where it would be impossible to carry on a cash business even at considerably lower prices. Customers are exacting and require the costly delivery of small packages; two horses and a driver must travel two miles to deliver a spool of thread or a half-dozen oranges. Frequent changes of fashion and the shifting of customers from one store to another keep the merchant always insecure in his trade. A number of buyers mutually agreeing to pay cash, to buy at certain times, to place all their orders with one store, to go to a cheaper location, down an alley or into a basement, can save much of this cost on one condition: that the management approaches in its efficiency that of ordinary competitive business. In spite of all these advantages, if there is inefficient management the final cost will be no less than that of ordinary business.
The more successful coöperative stores
3. Despite the possibilities of saving, most coöperative stores fail through a lack of good management. Note first the greater successes. Since 1842, from which time it dates, the coöperative-store movement has progressed steadily in England, where the scores of retail societies are federated and own large wholesale stores. The long experience has developed good methods and a conservatism almost inconceivable to an American mind. They are practically great stock companies in which one can buy a share at a small cost and become a purchaser at usual prices, receiving a dividend later according to the amount of his purchases. Coöperative stores in American universities are generally successful, apparently because they don't coöperate. Some get into politics and go the way of the wicked. The survivors gravitate into the hands of a committee of the faculty, which tries to employ an efficient manager, and administers the business as a public trust without private profit. The wastefulness of multiplying orders for text-books to be used by a class whose number is definitely known in advance, and the comparatively uniform character of the supplies, make economy peculiarly easy in this case. A large part of the services of the coöperative store, however, are indirect; it reduces and regulates the charges in the stores near by.
The failures and their causes
Nearly all the Granger stores, started thirty years ago in great numbers, and most of the coöperative stores among American workmen, have failed. The failure is easily explained by the ignorance of danger, by lack of harmony, by credit sales, and by inefficient management. The wastes of competitive business are partly a tax imposed upon men (taken collectively) by their lack of business method; the community is not intelligent enough, honest enough, or self-sacrificing enough to do business in the most economical way. Partly they are the price paid for variety and change, and for the cherished American right "to kick"—something difficult for the members of a coöperative store to do without hurting themselves.
Profit-sharing and coöperation in relation to the enterpriser
Continued need of the enterpriser
4. The experience with these plans verifies the analysis of the enterpriser's function: pure profits are the earnings of a productive service. Comparing these three plans, they are seen to be alike in seeking to make workers share some of the profits, to change the destination to which profits would go. The first would create profits by the effort of the workers, and give them a part of the saving. The second would have collective workers perform the enterpriser's work in the factory and get his reward. The third would have collective buyers do the work of the merchant and save his profits and other costs. The last is the easiest to do. Profit-sharing is next in difficulty, and producers' coöperation is the hardest of all to put into practice. In some cases, under some conditions, the enterpriser's services may be more economically performed than at present, for the waste is great. But taking men as they are and things as they are, in most places the enterpriser's service is necessary and must be paid for. His contribution to the success of the industry depends on his nature and ability, and it can be distinguished theoretically and practically from the contribution made by the workmen. Nothing but changes in human nature, in education, and in morality can diminish the necessity for his service.