MILITARY EXAMPLES
“Men habituated to luxury cannot contend with an army accustomed to fatigue and inured to want.”—Caesar.
“That wing with which you propose to engage the enemy should be composed of your best troops.”—Epaminondas.
The Sacred Band of the Thebans was composed of men selected for valor and character. Epaminondas called them Comrades and by honorable rewards and distinctions induced them to bear without murmur the hardest fatigues and to confront with intrepidity the greatest dangers.
At Leuctra (371 B.C.) and again at Mantinea (362 B.C.) the right wing of the Lacedaemonian Army, composed exclusively of Spartans and for six hundred years invincible, was overthrown and destroyed by the Sacred Band led by Epaminondas.
This formidable body of Theban warriors was massacred by Alexander the Great at the Battle of Chaeronea (338 B.C.)
The Macedonian Phalanx was devised by Philip, King of Macedon. It was made up of heavy infantry accoutred with cuirass, helmet, greaves, and shield. The principal weapon was a pike twenty-four feet long.
The Phalanx had a front of two hundred and fifty-six files and a depth of sixteen ranks. A file of sixteen men was termed Lochos; two files were called Dilochie; four files made a Tetrarchie; eight files a Taxiarchie and thirty-two of the last constituted a simple Phalanx of 4096 men. A grand Phalanx had a front of one thousand and twenty-four files and a depth of sixteen ranks. It was made up of four simple Phalanxes and contained 16,384 men.
With this formation of his infantry, Alexander the Great, when eighteen years of age, destroyed the Allied Athenian—Theban—Boeotian army at Chaeronea, the hosts of Persia at the river Grancius (334 B.C.) at Issus (333 B.C.) and Arbela (331 B.C.) and conquered Porus, King of India at the Hydaspes (326 B.C.).
The Spanish Heavy Cavalry and Nubian Infantry of Hannibal was a reproduction of that Macedonian organization whereby Alexander the Great had conquered the world.
With this formation Hannibal maintained himself for fifteen years in the richest provinces of Italy and destroyed seven Roman armies, at the Trebia (218 B.C.) at Lake Trasymenus (217 B.C.) at Cannae (216 B.C.) and at Herdonea (212 B.C.) at Herdonea (210 B.C.) at Locri (208 B.C.) and at Apulia (208 B.C.).
At Zama (202 B.C.) Hannibal’s effacement as a military factor was directly due to his lack of that organization which had been the instrument of his previous successes; a circumstance thus commented on by the victorious Roman commander, Scipio Africanus;
“Hitherto I have been opposed by an army without a general; now they send against me a General without an army.”
The Tenth Legion of Caesar was the quintessence of that perfection in elementary tactics devised by the Romans to accord with the use of artillery.
The fundamentals of minor tactics as elucidated by Epaminondas and exploited by Alexander the Great and Hannibal are unchanged in the Legion, but by subdivision of the simple Phalanx into ten Cohorts, a necessary and maximum gain in mobility was effected.
The Roman Legion consisted of 6100 infantry and 726 cavalry, divided into the Militarain Cohort of 1105 heavy foot, 132 Cuirassiers and nine ordinary Cohorts, each containing 555 heavy foot and 66 Cuirassiers. The Legion was drawn up in three lines; the first of which was termed Principes, the second Hastati, and the third Triarii. The infantry were protected by helmet, cuirass, greaves and shield; their arms were a long sword, a short sword, five javelins and two large spears.
With this formation Caesar over-run Spain, Gaul, Germany, Britain, Africa, Greece, and Italy. The Scots alone withstood him and the ruins of a triple line of Roman entrenchments extending from the North to the Irish Seas to this day mark the southern boundary of the Scottish Highlands and the northern limit of Roman dominion.
At Pharseleus, Pompey made the inexplicable blunder of placing his best troops in his right wing, which was covered by the river Enipeus and inferior troops on his left wing which was in the air. By its first charge, the Tenth Legion destroyed the latter, outflanked the entire Pompeian army, drove it backward into the river and single handed won for Caesar undisputed dominion of the Earth.
The Scots Volunteers of Gustavus Adolphus consisted of two brigades aggregating about 12,000 foot, made up of Scottish gentlemen who for various reasons were attracted to the Continental Wars.
At Leipsic, (Sept. 7, 1631) 20,000 Saxons, constituting one-half of the allied Protestant army, were routed at the first charge, put to flight and never seen again. Tilly’s victorious right wing then turned upon the flank of the King’s army. Three regiments of the Scots Volunteers on foot held in check in open field 12,000 of the best infantry and cavalry in Europe, until Gustavus had destroyed the Austrian main body and hastened to their aid with the Swedish heavy cavalry.
The Castle of Oppenheim was garrisoned by 800 Spanish infantry. Gustavus drew up 2,000 Swedes to escalade the place. Thirty Scots Volunteers, looking on observed that the Spaniards, intently watching the King had neglected to guard the opposite side of the fortress. Beckoning to their aid about a hundred of their comrades, they scaled the wall, captured the garrison and opened the gates to the king. Gustavus entered on foot, hat in hand. “My brave Scots,” said he, “you carry in your scabbards, the key to every castle in Europe.”
The Van-Guard of Frederic the Great is the perfect adaptation of the minor tactics of Epaminondas to gunpowder. This choice body was made up of the best troops in the army divided into infantry, cuirassiers, dragoons and light artillery.
The Van-Guard, a miniature army in itself, always marched between the main body and the enemy; it always led in the attack, followed by that wing containing the best soldiers, in two lines; and supported by the heavy cavalry on that flank.
At Rosbach (Nov. 5, 1757) the Prussian Van-Guard, composed of 4,800 infantry, 2,500 cavalry and 30 guns, annihilated 70,000 French regular troops, by evolutions so rapidly executed that the Prussian main army was unable to overtake either pursuers or pursued and had no part in the battle, other than as highly interested spectators.
The Continentals of the Revolutionary army under Washington were made up of troops enlisted for the war and trained by Baron von Steuben, a Major-General in the Prussian service, who had served throughout the Seven Years War under Frederic the Great.
The Continentals, without firing a shot, carried by assault, Stony Point (July 16, 1779), Paulus Hook (July 20, 1779) and the British intrenchments at Yorktown (Oct. 19, 1781). Of these troops, the Baron von Steuben writes:
“I am satisfied with having shown to those who understand the Art of Warfare, an American army worthy of their approbation; officers who know their profession and who would do honor to any army in Europe; an infantry such as England has never brought into the field, soldiers temperate, well-drilled and obedient and the equal of any in the world.”
The Consular Guard was the reproduction of the Van Guard of Frederic the Great, but its sphere of action was strangely restricted by Bonaparte, who, instead of placing his best troops in the front of his army, as is the practice of all other of the Great Captains; subordinated their functions to that of a reserve and to personal attendance upon himself.
This Corps d’elite was but once notably in action; at Marengo (June 14, 1800) it undoubtedly saved the day for France, by maintaining the battle until the arrival of Gen. Desaix and his division.
The Imperial Guard of Napoleon was the development of the Consular Guard of Bonaparte. Under the Empire the Guard became an independent army, consisting of light and heavy infantry, horse and field artillery, cuirassiers, dragoons, hussars and chasseurs, and composed of the best troops in the French service.
The functions of this fine body, like that of its prototype, was limited to the duties of a reserve and to attendance upon the person of the Emperor; and perhaps next to announcement of victory, Napoleon’s favorite bulletin always read, “The Imperial Guard was not engaged.”
Many were the unavailing remonstrances made by his advisors against this policy, which judged by the practice of the great masters of warfare, is putting the cart before the horse; and seemingly is that speck of cloud in Napoleon’s political sky, which properly may be deemed a precursor of St. Helena.
At Austerlitz (Dec. 2, 1805), the cuirassiers of the French Imperial Guard routed a like body of Russian cavalry. At Eylau (Nov. 7, 1807) the Guard, as at Marengo again saved the day, after the corps d’armee of Soult and Angereau had been destroyed, by maintaining the battle until the arrival of Ney and Davoust. In the retreat from Russia (1812) the Guard then numbering 64,000 men was nearly destroyed. What was left of it won at Ligny (June 16, 1815), Napoleon’s last victory and at Waterloo (June 18, 1815), one of its two surviving divisions covered the flight of the French army, while the other escorted Napoleon in safety to Paris.
The Royal Prussian Guard, under Von Moltke, was organized and utilized in accord with the teachings of Frederic the Great.
Its most notable achievement occurred in the campaign of 1870. The right flank of the French having been turned by the battle of Woerth (Aug. 4, 1870) and Marshal MacMahon’s army being driven to the westward, it became the paramount object of Von Moltke to seize the country in rear of Metz and thus prevent the retreat of Marshall Bazine across the Moselle River.
The Royal Prussian Guard out-marching both friends and enemies first reached the Nancy road (Aug. 18, 1870) and until the German corps reached the battlefield this body of picked troops successfully withstood the assault of nearly the entire French army. In the first half-hour the Guard lost 8,000 men.
As the result of all this, Marshal Bazine with 150,000 men was forced back into and taken in the intrenched camp at Metz; and the Emperor Napoleon III, Marshal MacMahon and a second French army of 140,000 men was captured at Sedan (Sept. 1, 1870), in an attempt to rescue Marshal Bazine.
“I must tell you beforehand this will be a bloody touch. Tilly has a great army of old lads with iron faces that dare look an enemy in the eye; they are confident of victory, have never been beaten and do not know what it means to fly. Tilly tells his men he will beat me and the old man is as likely to do it as to say it.”—Gustavus Adolphus.
“Tilly’s men were rugged, surly fellows; their faces mangled by wounds and scars had an air of hardy courage. I observed of them that their clothes were always dirty, their armor rusty from winter storms and bruised by musket-balls, their weapons sharp and bright. They were used to camp in the open fields and to sleep in the frosts and rain. The horses like the men were strong and hardy and knew by rote their exercises. Both men and animals so well understood the trade of arms that a general command was sufficient; every man was fit to command the whole, and all evolutions were performed in order and with readiness, at a note of the trumpet or a motion of their banners.
“The 7th of Sept. (1631) before sunrise, the Swedish army marched from Dieben to a large field about a mile from Leipsic, where we found old Tilly’s army in full battalia in admirable order, which made a show both glorious and terrible.
“Tilly, like a fair gamester, had taken up but one side of the plain, and left the other side clear and all the avenues open to the King’s approach, nor did he stir to the charge until the Swedish army was fully drawn up and was advancing toward him. He had with him 44,000 old soldiers and a better army I believe never was so soundly beaten.…
“Then was made a most dreadful slaughter, and yet there was no flying. Tilly’s men might be killed or knocked down, but no man turned his back, nor would give an inch of ground, save as they were marched, wheeled, or retreated by their officers.… About six o’clock the field was cleared of the enemy except at one place on the King’s front, where some of them rallied; and though they knew that all was lost, they would take no quarter, but fought it out to the last man, being found dead the next day in rank and file as they were drawn up.”
Perfection in Organization is attained when troops instantly and intelligently act according to order and execute with exactness and precision any and every prescribed evolution.
TOPOGRAPHY
“Let us not consider where we shall give battle, but where we may gain the victory.”—Phocion.
“There can be no discretion in a movement which forsakes the advantage in ground.”—Gustavus Adolphus.
“That battlefield is best which is adapted to the full use of the chief constituents of your army and unfavorable to the mass of the enemy.”—Napoleon.