Korea's Fight for Freedom

by Fred A. McKenzie

RESOLUTIONS

That a Provisional Government shall be organized.

That a demand be made of the Government of Japan to withdraw the
administrative and military organs from Korea.

That a delegation shall be appointed to the Paris Peace
Conference. That the Koreans in the employ of the Japanese
Government shall withdraw.

That the people shall refuse to pay taxes to the Japanese
Government.

That the people shall not bring petitions or litigations before
the Japanese Government.

* * * * *

It was expected in Korea that there would be an immediate agitation in America to secure redress. The American churches were for some weeks strangely silent. There is no reason why the full reasons should not be made public.

The missionary organizations mainly represented in Korea are also strongly represented in Japan. Their officials at their headquarters are almost forced to adopt what can be politely described as a statesmanlike attitude over matters of controversy between different countries. When Mr. Armstrong, of the Presbyterian Board of Missions of Canada, arrived in America, burning with indignation over what he had seen, he found among the American leaders a spirit of great caution. They did not want to offend Japan, nor to injure Christianity there. And there was a feeling—a quite honest feeling,—that they might accomplish more by appealing to the better side of Japan than by frankly proclaiming the truth. The whole matter was referred, by the Presbyterian and Methodist Boards, to the Commission on Relations with the Orient of the Federal Council of the Churches, a body representing the Churches as a whole.

The Secretary of that Commission is the Rev. Sydney Gulick, the most active defender of Japanese interests of any European or American to-day. Mr. Gulick lived a long time in Japan; he sees things, inevitably, from a Japanese point of view. He at once acted as though he were resolved to keep the matter from the public gaze. This was the course recommended by the Japanese Consul-General Yada at New York. Private pressure was brought on the Japanese authorities, and the preparation of a report was begun in very leisurely fashion.

Every influence that Mr. Gulick possessed was exercised to prevent premature publicity. The report of the Federal Council was not issued until between four and five months after the atrocities began. A Presbyterian organization, The New Era Movement, issued a stinging report on its own account, a few days before. The report of the Federated Council was preceded by a cablegram from Mr. Hara, the Japanese Premier, declaring that the report of abuses committed by agents of the Japanese Government in Korea had been engaging his most serious attention. "I am fully prepared to look squarely at actual facts."

The report itself, apart from a brief, strongly pro-Japanese introduction, consisted of a series of statements by missionaries and others in Korea, and was as outspoken and frank as any one could desire. The only regret was that it had not been issued immediately. Here was a situation that called for the pressure of world public opinion. In keeping this back as long as possible Mr. Gulick, I am convinced, did the cause of Korean Christianity a grave injury, and helped to prevent earlier redress being obtained.

"No neutrality for brutality" was the motto adopted by many of the missionaries of Korea. It is a good one for the Churches as a whole. There are times when the open expression of a little honest indignation is better than all the "ecclesiastical statesmanship" that can be employed.

In Japan itself, every effort was made by the authorities to keep back details of what was happening. Mr. Hara, the Progressive Premier, was in none too strong a position. The military party, and the forces of reaction typified by Prince Yamagata, had too much power for him to do as much as he himself perhaps would. He consented to the adoption of still more drastic methods in April, and while redress was promised in certain particular instances, as in the Suigen outrage, there was no desire displayed to meet the situation fully. Taxed in Parliament, he tried to wriggle out of admissions that anything was wrong.

The attitude of the people of Japan at first was frankly disappointing to those who hoped that the anti-militarist party there would really act. One American-Japanese paper, the Japan Advertiser, sent a special correspondent to Korea and his reports were of the utmost value. The Japan Chronicle, the English owned paper at Kobe, was equally outspoken. The Japanese press as a whole had very little to say; it had been officially "requested" not to say anything about Korea.

The Japanese Constitutional Party sent Mr. Konosuke Morya to investigate the situation on the spot. He issued a report declaring that the disturbances were due to the discriminatory treatment of Koreans, complicated and impracticable administrative measures, extreme censorship of public speeches, forcible adoption of the assimilation system, and the spread of the spirit of self-determination. Of the assimilation system he said, "It is a great mistake of colonial policy to attempt to enforce upon the Koreans, with a 2,000-year history, the same spiritual and mental training as the Japanese people."

By this time the Japanese Churches were beginning to stir. The Federation of Churches in Japan sent Dr. Ishizaka, Secretary of the Mission Board of the Japan Methodist Church, to enquire. Dr. Ishizaka's findings were published in the Gokyo. I am indebted for a summary of them to an article by Mr. R.S. Spencer, in the Christian Advocate of New York:

"Dr. Ishizaka first showed, on the authority of officials, missionaries and others, that the missionaries could in no just way be looked upon as the cause of the disturbances. Many Koreans and most of the missionaries had looked hopefully to Japanese control as offering a cure for many ills of the old regime, but in the ten years of occupation feeling had undergone a complete revulsion and practically all were against the Japanese governing system. The reasons he then sketches as follows: (1) The much-vaunted educational system established by the Governor-General makes it practically impossible for a Korean to go higher than the middle schools (roughly equivalent to an American high school) or a technical school. Even when educated Koreans were universally discriminated against. In the same office, at the same work, Koreans receive less pay than Japanese. (The quotations are from the translation of the Japan Advertiser.) 'A Korean student in Aoyama Gakuin, who stayed at Bishop Honda's home, became the head officer of the Taikyu district office. That was before the annexation…. That officer is not in Taikyu now. He is serving in some petty office in the country. The Noko Bank, in Keijo (Seoul) is the only place where the Japanese and Koreans are treated equally, but there, also, the equality is only an outward form.' (2) The depredations of the Oriental Improvement Co., the protégé of the government, resulted in the eviction of hundreds of Korean farmers, who fled to Manchuria and Siberia, many dying miserably. The wonderful roads are mentioned, it being shown that they are built and cared for by forced labour of the Koreans. That most galling and obnoxious of all bureaucratic methods, carried to the nth power in Japan—the making out of endless reports and forms—has created dissatisfaction. Dr. Ishizaka relates how an underling official required a Korean of education to rewrite a notice of change of residence six times because he omitted a dot in one of those atrocious Chinese characters, which are a hobble on the development of Japan. This last opinion is mine, not the doctor's. (3) The gendarmerie, or military police system, is mentioned, 13,000 strong, of whom about 8,000 are renegade Koreans. Admittedly a rough lot, these men are endowed with absolute power of search, personal or domiciliary, detention, arrest (and judging from the reports, I would say torture) without warrant. Bribery is, of course, rampant among them. (4) Associated closely with the police system, indeed controlling it and the civil administration and everything else, is the military government. The Governor-General must be a military officer. Dr. Ishizaka says: 'Militarism means tyranny; it never acts in open daylight, but seeks to cover up its intentions. The teachers in primary schools and even in girls' schools, that is, the men teachers, wear swords.' (5) Lastly, Dr. Ishizaka speaks of the method, which we can easily recognize as to source, of trying to 'assimilate' the Koreans by prohibiting the language, discarding Korean history from the schools, repressing customs, etc.

"In conclusion Dr. Ishizaka points out that not alone must these errors be righted, but that the only hope lies in the assumption on the part of Japanese, public and private, of an attitude of Christian brotherhood towards the Koreans. He announces a campaign to raise money among Japanese Christians for the benefit of Koreans and their churches."

The Japanese Government at last came to see that something must be done. Count Hasegawa, the Governor-General and Mr. Yamagata, Director-General of Administration, were recalled and Admiral Baron Saito and Mr. Midzuno were appointed to succeed them. Numerous other changes in personnel were also made. An Imperial Rescript was issued late in August announcing that the Government of Korea was to be reformed, and Mr. Hara in a statement issued at the same time announced that the gendarmerie were to be replaced by a force of police, under the control of the local governors, except in districts where conditions make their immediate elimination advisable, and that "It is the ultimate purpose of the Japanese Government in due course to treat Korea as in all respects on the same footing as Japan." Admiral Saito, in interviews, promised the inauguration of a liberal régime on the Peninsula.

The change unfortunately does not touch the fundamental needs of the situation. No doubt there will be an attempt to lessen some abuses. This there could not fail to be, if Japan is to hold its place longer among the civilized Powers. But Mr. Hara's explanation of the new program showed that the policy of assimilation is to be maintained, and with it, the policy of exploitation can hardly fail to be joined.

These two things spell renewed failure.