Manila Bay.
The width of the entrance to the vast Bay of Manila is nine and a half marine miles from shore to shore. It is divided into two unequal channels by the Island of Corregidor and Pulo Caballo, and a rock called El Frayle, about a mile and a half from the southern shore, farther reduces that channel.
The Boca Chica, or northern entrance between Corregidor Island and Punta Lasisi, is two marine miles wide, and in the middle of the channel the depth of water is about thirty fathoms.
The Boca Grande, or southern entrance between Pulo Caballo and El Frayle, is three and a half marine miles wide, with a depth of water in the fairway of about twenty fathoms.
In both channels the tide rushes in and out with great force.
With channels of such a width there was no difficulty in taking a squadron in at night, and little chance of suffering damage from the hastily improvised batteries of the Spaniards.
And it will be evident to all having the slightest knowledge of submarine mining that the conditions are most unfavourable to defence by such means. As a matter of fact, the Spaniards possessed only nine obsolete submarine mines fitted to explode by contact. These were sent over to Corregidor, but were not sunk, as it was obvious that they were useless.
On the other hand, it was a perfect position for the employment of torpedo boats or gunboats, there being excellent anchorage for such craft on both sides of the Channel and in Corregidor Cove. But at the time of the declaration of war, the Spaniards had no torpedo boats in the Philippines. The Elswick-built cruisers Isla de Cuba and Isla de Luzon were fitted with torpedoes, and might have been watching the channels for a chance to use them. Admiral Montojo knows best why he did not detach them on this service.
There was then nothing to prevent the entrance of the American Squadron; the mines, torpedo boats and narrow channels only existed in the imagination of some American newspaper correspondents.
But Admiral Dewey’s exploit does not need any such enhancing, it speaks for itself.
To any one having a knowledge of the Spanish navy, and especially of the squadron of the Philippines, the result of an action against an American Squadron of similar force could not be doubtful. As a matter of fact the Spanish ships, except the two small cruisers built at Elswick in 1887, were quite obsolete. The Castilla and Reina Cristina were wooden vessels, standing very high out of the water, and making admirable targets, whilst their guns were small, some of them had been landed at Corregidor, though never placed in battery. The boilers of one vessel were in the arsenal.
But even allowing for the fact that the tonnage of the American Squadron was half as much again as that of the Spaniards, and that they had more than twice as many, and heavier guns, no one would have supposed it possible that the Spanish Squadron could have been completely destroyed without inflicting any damage upon the enemy.
It was indeed a brilliant victory, reflecting great credit upon Admiral Dewey and the officers and crews of the American ships, not only for what they did that day, but for their careful preparation that enabled them to score so decided a success.
The Spanish sailors put up a good fight and showed pluck, but they had no skill as gunners, and so failed in the hour of their country’s need. Admiral Montojo bravely commanded his fleet, but as soon as the action was over he seems to have considered that his duty had terminated, for he returned to his Villa in San Miguel, leaving the remnants of his squadron and the Cavite arsenal to its fate.
We must infer that Admiral Dewey’s victory and its consequences were not foreseen by the American Government, for they had made no preparations to send troops to Manila, and from the time they learned of the destruction of the Spanish Squadron, till they had assembled a force strong enough to take and hold the city, three weary months elapsed. This was a very hap-hazard way of making war, and the delay cost many thousands of lives as will be seen later on.