The False Prophets of the Philippines.
Here is an extract from General Merritt’s evidence taken from the Blue Book, fifty-sixth congress, third session, document No. 62, part I, p. 367:
Mr. Reid: Do you think any danger of conflict is now reasonably remote?
General Merritt: I think there is no danger of conflict as long as these people think the United States is going to take possession there. If they imagine or hear from any source that the Spaniards are to be reinstated there, I think they will be very violent.
Mr. Davis: Suppose the United States, by virtue of a treaty with Spain, should take Luzon ... paying no attention to the insurgents—how would that be taken by Aguinaldo?
General Merritt: I think Aguinaldo and his immediate following would resist it; but whether he could resist to any extent I do not know, because his forces are divided. I believe that, as matters go, Aguinaldo will lose more or less of his power there.
The Chairman: If the United States should say, We will take this country and govern it our own way, do you think they would submit to it?
General Merritt: Yes, sir.
Mr. Davis: How many troops in your opinion will be necessary to administer the government of this island—to secure the administration of our government there?
General Merritt: From 20,000 to 25,000 would be requisite at first.
I admire the conviction of this distinguished officer that the benefits of American rule would be highly appreciated by the Tagals, of whom, by-the-bye, he knew next to nothing, having only been a few weeks in Manila amongst sycophantic Mestizo-Americanistas.
That interesting people were, however, of a different opinion. On p. 4582 of the ‘Congressional Record,’ I find that Señor Mabini, in a manifesto published at San Isidro, April 15th, 1899, states that “race hatred is much more cruel and pitiless among the Anglo-Saxons” (he is comparing them with the Spaniards). Again he says, “Annexation, in whatever form it may be adopted, will unite us for ever to a nation whose manners and customs are different from our own, a nation which hates the coloured race with a mortal hatred, and from which we could never separate ourselves except by war.” The outbreaks against the negroes that have recently happened [August, 1900] in New Orleans, Liberty City, Georgia, and in New York, seem to justify Señor Mabini’s remarks.
Don Macario Adriatico, in an answer to a message of General Miller, writing from Jaro, January 3rd, 1900, says: “It could easily be conceived that the Philippines would not suffer a new reign, least of all of a nation on whose conscience the curse of the Redskins rests as a heavy load.”
In other documents they refer to the probable action of the Trusts, and anticipate that, what with the Sugar Trust, the Tobacco Trust, and the Hemp Trust, they would soon find themselves reduced to the condition of porters and workmen, or even of domestic servants.
They seem to have an intelligent anticipation of what will probably befall them when conquered, and hence their desperate resistance to a large American army.
But let us now turn up the evidence of another expert on the Philippines, Mr. John Foreman, who also ventured to prophesy what the Tagals would do (Blue Book, before mentioned, p. 443).
Mr. Foreman (answering Mr. Day): “The Tagals are of a very plastic nature, willing in their nature (sic), I should say, to accommodate themselves and take up any new established dominion which might be decided upon, and I think they would fall into any new system adopted.
“The inhabitants of the Central Islands or Visayas are more uncouth, decidedly less hospitable, and somewhat more averse to associations and relations with outsiders than the Tagals, but I think they would easily come under sway. They want a little more pressure and would have to be guided, more closely watched, and perhaps a little more of the iron hand used than in Luzon.”
Thus was the administration in Washington misled, and it is probable that the American military chiefs reported that they could easily overcome all opposition, so they were allowed to try.
Yet in June, 1900, we read, “The recall of General Otis is taken to mean that the administration considers the war to be at an end, and that there is no longer any necessity for military rule.”
General McArthur is appointed to the command, however, and the first thing he does is to cable to Washington for more troops, whilst Admiral Remey asks for an extra battalion of marines. These are to be sent, also at least three regiments of infantry. Sixty-five thousand men and forty ships of war are now admitted to be the proper garrison to hold down the Philippines.
However necessary reinforcements may be, so deep is the racial antipathy between the United States’ soldiers, white or black, and the natives, that every additional man sent out is a source of disaffection, and even exasperation. Not only will the volunteers become demoralised and diseased in mind and body by their sojourn in America’s new possession, but the very fact of their presence renders the pacification of the country more difficult. The more troops are kept there, the more discontented the natives will be.
To bring this chapter up to date, the position seems to be as follows: There is a recrudescence of activity amongst the insurgents; fighting is going on over a great part of the Archipelago, the American troops are harassed and overworked, sickness is rife, including the bubonic plague; yet, notwithstanding all this, the Taft Commission has taken over the administration of the islands from September 1st.
The date fixed is not a convenient one for the Commission, as it is in the middle of the rainy season, but it has probably been selected to suit the presidential campaign in America.
Aguinaldo has issued a proclamation warning the Filipinos against the Taft Commission, which, he says, has no authority from Congress; does not represent the sentiments of the American people, and is simply the personal instrument of Mr. McKinley sent out to make promises which it has no power to keep, and which the United States Government will not be bound to observe. He denounces the Americanistas, and threatens condign punishment to all who accept offices under the Commission. It would appear that a settlement on present lines is still some way off.
Judge Taft seems to have inherited the cheerful optimism of General Otis. On September 1st he reported that the insurrection is virtually ended, and on 20th forwarded another favourable report. On 21st, General McArthur cabled accounts of engagements in several provinces of Luzon. The American troops at Pekin are being hurried to Manila, as the reinforcement of General McArthur is absolutely imperative.
[1] Report published in Outlook, September 1st and 21st, 1899.
[2] The Abbé de Brantôme, whose appreciative remarks upon the courtesans who accompanied the Army of the Duke of Alva are quoted by Motley in ‘The Rise of the Dutch Republic,’ would have been delighted to take up his favourite subject and chronicle the following of the American Army.
[3] My remarks apply to the accounts published in the Times.
[4] May 11th, 1899, The New York Herald’s correspondent at Manila reports that the insurgents have succeeded in landing ten machine guns on the island of Panay.
[5] The kindness and mercy are not obvious.
Chapter XIII.
Native Admiration for America.
Their fears of a corrupt government—The islands might be an earthly paradise—Wanted, the man—Rajah Brooke—Sir Andrew Clarke—Hugh Clifford—John Nicholson—Charles Gordon—Evelyn Baring—Mistakes of the Peace Commission—Government should be a protectorate—Fighting men should be made governors—What might have been—The Malay race—Senator Hoar’s speech—Four years’ slaughter of the Tagals.
Not a few of the natives in arms were, and still are, sincere admirers of the true greatness of the United States. The noble deeds and words of America’s great men attain the summit of human grandeur in their fervid imaginations.
The statesmen and the historians of the great Republic receive their tribute of praise from Filipino lips.
The names of Washington, Lincoln, Prescott, Motley, are known and honoured by them. Were the natives treated according to the immortal principles of right and justice laid down or praised by such as these, they would welcome the tutelage, and, in fact, all Asia might envy them.
But they will never consent to become the prey of the politician, the boss, the monopolist, and the carpet-bagger, and from these they must be assured of protection before they will submit.
What confidence can they have in a form of government under which the tariffs on their great staples will be made in the interests of their American competitors.
Under such a system, and with a pension list steadily growing by millions of dollars year by year, their comfortable competence would, in a few years, be reduced to the hideous poverty of over-taxed British India.
Having passed so many years amongst this people, I may be expected to give some opinion as to whether the Philippines can be governed by America.
The islands were badly governed by Spain, yet Spaniards and natives lived together in great harmony, and I do not know where I could find a colony in which the Europeans mixed as much socially with the natives. Not in Java, where a native of position must dismount to salute the humblest Dutchman. Not in British India, where the Englishwoman has now made the gulf between British and native into a bottomless pit.
It will be difficult for the Americans to avoid this social ostracism of the natives, and in this respect they are not likely to do as well as the Spaniards, being less tolerant.
As regards the administration of the government, no doubt great improvements can be made; but I abstain from prophecy, remembering Merritt’s and Foreman’s want of success in that line. There is certainly a wonderful opportunity to show the world how to govern a tropical protectorate or dependency.
So rich a country with so intelligent and industrious a population only requires good guidance to make it an earthly paradise. But the guidance should be given by the gentle hand of an elder sister, and not by the boot of a frontier ruffian.
Much as our officials praise the administration of the Indian Empire, I think it quite possible with a few years of disinterested tutelage to weld the Philippines into a nation, more united, freer, happier, richer and better educated, than the finest state in that vast possession. What is wanted is The Man, no stubborn and tactless general “spoiling for a fight,” harsh, peremptory, overbearing, but a civilian of the highest rank, or a naval officer, one of America’s very best, full of sympathy, tact and patience, yet firm as Stonewall Jackson. He must have a gracious presence, and “magnetism” in the highest degree, for he must rule by personal influence, by inspiring confidence and affection.
Not otherwise did Rajah Brooke obtain his election to the sovereignty of Sarawak; Sir Andrew Clarke pacify the Malay Peninsula; nor is it otherwise that Hugh Clifford is leading the Malays of North Borneo to peaceful pursuits.
The man, when found, must be invested with absolute power, and be backed up by all the forces of the Republic.
The British Government gave America an example of what to avoid when it sacrificed Governor Eyre, of Jamaica, to a shrieking gang of pseudo-philanthropists, when, in a great emergency, whilst the honour of white women and the lives of men were at the mercy of a mob of negroes, he omitted some legal technicality before hanging one of the cowardly instigators.
However, I do not think America will go back on her sons like that.
Great Britain has produced some men who could have taken up the burden of the Philippines. It happens that the three I shall cite were all soldiers, but their extraordinary magnetic qualities by no means proceeded from their profession.
The God-like man who died at Delhi, the beloved of John Lawrence, would have made an ideal ruler: the people would have worshipped him.
The hero who died at Khartoum could have ruled the Philippines, or any Asiatic or African country, and the people would have loved him.
To quote one who is still with us, Lord Cromer has coped with difficulties of a different kind, yet, perhaps, as great as those of the Philippines, and in a few years has changed the face of the land of Pharaoh, and lightened the lot of millions. This has been done by the assistance of a few engineers, administrators, judges and soldiers. He and all of them have displayed the most unfailing tact and patience, indomitable courage and fortitude, and each has put honour and duty before all. Men like John Nicholson, Charles Gordon and Evelyn Baring, are rare, but their peers doubtless exist amongst Americans of the good old colonial stock, and it is the President’s business to find them, and send them out to protect and govern America’s great dependency.
America has, I suppose, taken these islands from Spain to save them from the ruthless[1] Teuton, and to show the world that she can do for the Philippines what we have done for Egypt. Unfortunately, she began wrong by treating with Spain, and buying the islands, as if the natives were cattle on a ranch.
Then the Peace Committee went wrong over the estates of the Religious Orders, as before explained.
In my opinion, the form of government should be a protectorate, varying in character with the civilisation of the different islands, the executive functions being in the hands of the natives whenever possible, but under inspection to prevent abuses. On this basis peace could, I think, be made, and then America should remember that the most worthy of the natives are precisely those who have been in arms for their freedom. Their chiefs (with one or two exceptions), are the men who should be appointed to govern provinces, and the fighting-men enrolled in the native army.
No offices of government should be given to the so-called Americanistas, who are mostly people who need not be taken into account, and whose support is worth nothing. They will go on with their pettifogging and their pawnbroking, and that is enough reward for them. They are Americanistas because they cannot help themselves, and not from any attachment to American ways. Formerly the Spaniards protected them; now the American bayonets stand between them and the Tagal bolos.
Without this, well they know that what happened to the mulattos in Hayti would surely happen to them sooner or later—perhaps sooner.
It is, indeed, sad to see what is, and to think what might have been accomplished by a little patience, a little forbearance, a tinge of sympathy, for a gallant people struggling for freedom and light. But no patience was vouchsafed to them, no forbearance was shown them, nor can I discover in what has been done the faintest sign of sympathy for them.
Yet the Malay race can claim to have enlisted the sympathies of some not undistinguished men. Rajah Brooke, Spenser St. John, Hugh Clifford, Professor Blumentritt, Louis Becke, Joseph Conrad—the names that first occur to me—have all confessed to an affection for them. The old Spanish conquerors speak of their dignified courtesy and gentle manners.
There are, however, in America, generous souls who can judge the Tagals fairly and even indulgently. I do not allude to those who raise a clamour to discredit the administration for political purposes, but to the noble, eloquent, and truly patriotic speech, inspired in the best traditions of the United States, delivered by Mr. Hoar in the Senate on April 17th. I hope that touching appeal to the national conscience will bear fruit, and that, by the exercise of true statesmanship, an end may be put to this dreadful war, and a pacification effected satisfactory to Filipinos and Americans.
For four long years, slaughter and destruction have ravaged one of the fairest lands on earth, converting what might be a paradise into a pandemonium.
What evils have these poor Tagals not suffered in that time? Arbitrary imprisonment, torture, confiscation of property, banishment to unhealthy places, military executions, bombardments, the storming and burning of towns, indiscriminate slaughter, and the bubonic plague, added to the calamities they are always exposed to—volcanic eruptions, floods, earthquakes, typhoons, locusts, epidemics.
Famine seems to be the only calamity they have been free from, but even that may not be far distant.
[1] I think, in view of the German atrocities in Africa, including many cases of flogging women, that this epithet is well earned.
Chapter XIV.
Resources of the Philippines.
At the Spanish conquest—Rice—the lowest use the land can be put to—How the Americans are misled—Substitutes for rice—Wheat formerly grown—Tobacco—Compañia General de Tabacos—Abacá—Practically a monopoly of the Philippines—Sugar—Coffee—Cacao—Indigo—Cocoa-nut oil—Rafts of nuts—Copra—True localities for cocoa palm groves—Summary—More sanguine forecasts—Common-sense view.