The 2nd Battalion
Roll of Officers
July.
The 2nd Battalion, which had been training during the first few days in July at Saulty, proceeded by train on the 5th to Ransart, where tea was provided for the men by the Thirty-second Division. Guides from the Royal Scots led the Battalion to the position which it was to take up as reserve battalion of the brigade 500 yards east of Ransart. The Guards Division was occupying a sector of the line with its right joining the Second Division between Ayette and Moyenneville, and its left joining the Canadian Corps on the outskirts of Boisieux St. Marc. While in reserve, companies carried out training round the outskirts of Ransart, and scouting and patrolling by day were practised. In order to accustom the men to night-work they wore darkened glasses, which produced much the same effect as night. On the 11th the Battalion moved up into support, and relieved the 1st Battalion Irish Guards near the outskirts of Hendecourt. A place was found for a cricket-ground in a sheltered valley, and two matches were played with composition balls and bats made by the pioneers. From the 17th to the 23rd the Battalion went up into the front line, which had been formerly held by isolated posts, but which was now a continuous trench. The weather was fine and the casualties were not heavy, although there was usually a certain amount of shelling in the early morning. From the 24th to the 28th the Battalion returned to the reserve trenches at Ransart, when Lieutenant T. A. Combe, Lieutenant M. H. Ponsonby, Second Lieutenant A. P. J. M. P. de Lisle, and Second Lieutenant D. L. King joined the Battalion. During the days in reserve an increasing stream of American officers were attached to the 1st Guards Brigade for instruction, and the following amusing messages show the excellent relations that existed between the officers of the two armies:
From:—Guards Division Q.
To:—Transport Officer, 1st Guards Brigade.
Draw 6 bottles of Whisky from Divisional Soldiers Club and deliver to Brigade H.Q. for American Officers attached.
From G.O.C. 1st Guards Brigade.
To:—Guards Division Q.
On behalf of all officers of the American Army attached to the Brigade under my command, I wish to express my deepest thanks for the courteous present of whisky foreshadowed in your message. I am requested to add that these officers accept this gift as a proof of the solidarity of the union existing between the American and British nations, which will endure until the whisky runs out.
C. R. C. de Crespigny,
Brigadier-General.
Aug.
While the Battalion was in support at Hendecourt, Captain A. H. Penn, M.C., resigned the adjutancy, much to the regret of all ranks, and was succeeded by Captain R. G. Briscoe, M.C. On August 4 the Battalion went up into the front line in front of Boiry St. Martin, and on August 5 six platoons of Americans who were to be initiated in the mysteries of trench warfare were attached for four days. The enemy was, however, not very active, and there was but little shelling. From the 10th to the 16th the Battalion remained in reserve at Ransart, where Lieutenant G. F. Lawrence took on the duties of Intelligence Officer from Second Lieutenant S. C. K. George, who was invalided home with dysentery. On the 18th the Battalion relieved the 320th American Regiment in the front line, where again the enemy was fairly quiet. Two advanced posts were established some 500 yards from the line, and the nights were spent in active patrolling to prevent the enemy occupying the dead ground in front of Moyenneville, which was to become the forming-up area for the attack on the 21st.
After three days spent in the reserve, the Battalion moved up into very inadequate trench accommodation in Boiry St. Martin. These trenches were now the reserve line, and out of range of enemy artillery owing to the advance on the 21st.
Aug. 25.
On the afternoon of the 25th the Battalion marched off to relieve a battalion in the 3rd Guards Brigade. A three hours' uncomfortable halt was made in a field at Hamelincourt, and as the ground had been well covered with gas, the companies had to move about to escape the drifting fumes. Respirators had to be worn, which rendered the eating of the evening meal no easy matter.
The relief in the front line of St. Leger was carried out without a hitch, although complicated by the fact that the Battalion was taking over a wide and sketchy front from the remnants of the 1st Battalion Grenadier Guards and the 1st Battalion Scots Guards. During the night Second Lieutenant H. A. Finch and eight men went out as a patrol to get in touch with the enemy and never returned. Second Lieutenant Finch was found killed 1000 yards in front of the line, when the Battalion advanced, which showed how thoroughly he had carried out his instructions.
August 26 was a very quiet day, with occasional shelling around Mory Trench. Judging by the extent to which he fired his machine-guns after dark, the enemy seemed very apprehensive. The following officers took part in the operations on August 26-28:
| Lieut.-Colonel G. E. C. Rasch, D.S.O. | Commanding Officer. |
| Lieut. R. G. Briscoe, M.C. | Adjutant. |
| Lieut. G. F. Lawrence | Intelligence Officer. |
| Lieut. M. H. Ponsonby | No. 1 Company. |
| Lieut. N. McK. Jesper | " " |
| Lieut. C. C. T. Giles | " " |
| Capt. O. Martin Smith | No. 2 Company. |
| Lieut. C. Gwyer | " " |
| 2nd Lieut. A. P. J. M. P. de Lisle | " " |
| Capt. J. C. Cornforth, M.C. | No. 3 Company. |
| Lieut. H. White | " " |
| Lieut. R. M. Oliver | " " |
| 2nd Lieut. F. J. Langley | " " |
| Lieut. H. B. G. Morgan | No. 4 Company. |
| 2nd Lieut. J. A. Paton | " " |
| 1st Lieut. E. L. Major (U.S.A. Army) | Medical Officer. |
Aug. 26.
At midnight on the 26th a conference held at Battalion Headquarters was attended by all Company Commanders, at which Lieut.-Colonel Rasch explained the general situation and the objectives of the advance for the following day as far as they were known.
Definite orders were not received until 1.30 A.M. on the morning of the 27th. The instructions the Battalion received were to push forward at zero hour (7 A.M.), with the 2nd Battalion Coldstream Guards on its left, and the Sixty-second Division on its right, and to secure the enemy's trenches in and south of Ecoust and Longatte. Before dawn the Battalion was to be reorganised and disposed in battle formation. No. 3 Company under Captain J. C. Cornforth, M.C., extended along the whole Battalion frontage of 1500 yards, along the road in No Man's Land, running from Mory Copse to St. Leger. No. 2 Company under Captain O. M. Smith in left support lay concealed until zero in Hally Copse. No. 4 Company under Lieutenant Morgan was in right support in Mory Copse, and No. 1 Company under Lieutenant M. Ponsonby in reserve, with Battalion Headquarters in Mory Trench.
There were three points in these orders which caused a little uneasiness. In the first place, a very short space of time before dawn was allowed to re-dispose the Battalion, although fortunately strong patrols had been sent out earlier in the night to secure the Mory Copse—St. Leger road. In the second place, dawn being at 4.30 A.M. and zero at 7 A.M., No. 3 Company would be in an exposed position during daylight at some points within fifty yards of the enemy. It was a clear night, and even in the darkness this company got into difficulties, for while they were forming up, they were observed by the enemy, who spent the rest of the night sweeping the ground and putting up innumerable lights, probably thinking it was a patrol. Fortunately there were a number of large felled tree-trunks along the road, which enabled this Company to escape detection from ground observation, and from the low-flying aeroplanes, which continually patrolled No Man's Land at dawn. In the third place, although Bank's Trench was known to be held all along the whole front, the barrage table showed that on the left of the Battalion the barrage would open a considerable distance behind the trench, probably owing to the proximity of our front troops to the enemy position.
The reorganisation and forming up of the Battalion were successfully carried out before dawn. Unfortunately, while No. 1 Company was moving across the open to take up its position in reserve, a shell fell in the centre of No. 1 Platoon, mortally wounding Lieutenant M. Ponsonby, and causing casualties to the whole platoon, with the exception of three other ranks. Lieutenant Jesper took command of the remaining three platoons, and brought them to their allotted positions.
Aug. 27.
At zero hour (7 A.M.) the field-gun barrage came down on a line about 300 yards in front of No. 3 Company, creeping forward at the rate of 100 yards every two minutes. As soon as our troops moved off from their forming-up positions to close up to the barrage, the enemy covered his front with a deadly and accurate screen of bullets, fired from numerous carefully-sighted machine-guns, which were so well protected that our field-gun barrage had little or no effect upon them. In consequence we suffered heavy casualties from the very outset. On the left the troops of the leading company were mown down as soon as they got on to their feet, and were unable to advance. The right of the 2nd Battalion Coldstream Guards had also suffered severely, and was unable to push forward.
As No. 2 Company, under Captain O. Martin Smith, debouched from Hally Copse, it was caught by the machine-gun fire, and nearly cut to pieces before it could extend from artillery formation. Captain O. Martin Smith made a determined effort to reinforce the left of No. 3 Company, and push forward the advance, but long before his Company reached the front troops it had suffered over 50 per cent casualties. Captain O. Martin Smith and Lieutenant de Lisle were wounded, and Lieutenant Gwyer, who was pluckily pushing forward in spite of the storm of bullets, was killed. Captain O. Martin Smith ordered his Company to lie down in the open, while the N.C.O.'s collected the men who were nearest to them, and eventually got in close support of No. 3 Company. As, however, the enemy was entrenched on the top of the rise, 200 yards in front, the slightest movement attracted a torrent of lead. This made it impossible to get communication in any direction or to collect the wounded, who had to remain in the open on the fire-swept ground until dark. Lieutenant R. M. Oliver, who had been in charge of the left platoon of No. 3 Company, had been killed earlier, so the left half of the Battalion was now without an officer.
In the centre, during the first 200 yards, the machine-gun fire, although equally intense, was slightly less accurate; but on nearing the St. Leger—Homme Mort road Captain Cornforth found it swept by a practically impassable hail of machine-gun bullets, fired from three directions—the Homme Mort on the south, Bank's Trench on the east, and outskirts of St. Leger on the north. This last enemy position was off the Battalion frontage, and the troops opposite it had been held up. The only method of relieving this pressure on the left was to push on at all costs in our centre and right.
Lieut.-Colonel Rasch sent up No. 1 Company to reinforce the thinned ranks of No. 3, and to help in the capture of Homme Mort and the rushing of Bank's Trench. While going up this Company came under heavy fire, and Lieutenant Jesper and Lieutenant Giles were both wounded. Captain Cornforth therefore took over command of this Company in addition to his own.
With these reinforcements Lieutenant White and Second Lieutenant Langley led their platoons forward against the machine-gun nest at Homme Mort, but in advancing up the slope they were met with an increasing volume of accurate fire, and both the officers were mortally wounded before the position was reached. These platoons, however, with an inspired dash and determination took the position after a hard fight. Twenty prisoners were captured, in spite of the fact that, in the short rush up to the position, these platoons had been practically decimated.
At the same time Captain Cornforth decided to rush Bank's Trench, although the road was still swept by enfilade fire from the left, and by frontal fire from the trench itself. A party of men was sent over the road to cover the advance, but few succeeded in crossing it. Captain Cornforth thereupon collected a small number of men, led them across the road, and by short rushes succeeded with three other men in gaining Bank's Trench. Here fortunately they found a large supply of German hand-grenades, which they quickly detonated, and by this means succeeded in clearing the trench for 500 yards northwards, knocking out six German machine-guns and taking 40 men prisoners. Several other men soon succeeded in joining them, and this party, which eventually numbered one officer and 25 men, found that they were completely isolated. No other troops could be located on their flanks, and the ground was being swept by machine-gun fire from Bank's Copse in the front, from the high ground on the right, and from the outskirts of St. Leger on the left. It was impossible to advance farther, and the rest of the day was spent in resisting the efforts of the Germans to turn them out, and in endeavouring to gain communication on the flanks.
Lieutenant Morgan with No. 4 Company was more successful. At zero he advanced along Mory Switch and the southern end of Bank's Trench, eventually establishing a position in Vraucourt Trench. The lie of the land and the cover afforded by the trenches enabled this Company to keep up with the barrage, and to avoid coming under the intense fire that the remainder of the Battalion had experienced. During the advance this Company captured a German Battalion Commander and 180 men—a remarkably fine performance. Lieutenant Morgan led his Company forward with such dash that they succeeded in penetrating the enemy's position to a depth of 2000 yards. However, it was soon clear that they were completely isolated, as they were being fired at from all directions. When it was dark Lieutenant Morgan decided that it would be unwise to remain in such an advanced position, since neither the Sixty-second Division on his right nor our own troops on his left showed any signs of coming into line with him, and he consequently withdrew his Company until he was in touch with troops on his flanks.
Aug. 28.
During the night the enemy retired from our front, and in the morning the remnants of the Battalion were reorganised, and continued the advance over the original frontage for about 1700 yards to a marked-out trench called Bank's Reserve. Here some machine-guns were encountered, but a good and continuous line was established with connection on both flanks.
This line was handed over to the 1st Battalion Gordon Highlanders on the night of the 28th-29th, and the Battalion marched back to the trenches east of Hamelincourt. The only officers left with the Battalion were Lieut.-Colonel Rasch, Captain Cornforth, Captain Briscoe, and Lieutenant Morgan. The total casualties were 12 officers and 278 other ranks. Amongst the officers the casualties were as follows:
| Lieut. G. F. Lawrence | Killed. |
| Lieut. R. M. Oliver | " |
| Lieut. C. Gwyer | " |
| Lieut. H. White | " |
| 2nd Lieut. F. J. Langley | " |
| 2nd Lieut. H. A. Finch | " |
| Lieut. M. H. Ponsonby | Died of wounds. |
| Capt. O. Martin Smith | Wounded. |
| Lieut. N. McK. Jesper | " |
| Lieut. C. C. T. Giles | " |
| 2nd Lieut. J. A. Paton | " |
| 2nd Lieut. A. P. J. M. P. de Lisle | " |
In a message, which Major-General Feilding afterwards sent to Brigadier-General de Crespigny, he said: "All Battalions of the 1st Guards Brigade discharged their duty splendidly. The attack delivered by the 2nd Battalion Grenadier Guards and 2nd Battalion Coldstream Guards on August 27 not only inflicted heavy losses on the enemy and brought in large numbers of prisoners, but also compelled him next day to relax his hold on the high ground south of Croisilles."