The 3rd Battalion

3rd Batt.

In the first week in October the Battalion remained at Doignies, where during a practice attack a barrage from a smoke rifle grenade was tried, and on the 8th moved to Premy Chapel. An attack was being made by the Sixty-second Division, and the Battalion, which was not called upon, moved on later to Masnières. Cambrai could be seen in the distance burning fiercely throughout the night.

On the 9th the orders were not received until the Battalion was in its assembly position.

The following officers took part in these operations:

Lieut.-Colonel the Viscount Lascelles, D.S.O.Commanding Officer.
Capt. E. G. A. Fitzgerald, D.S.O.Adjutant.
Lieut. R. C. G. de ReuterIntelligence Officer.
Capt. E. R. M. Fryer, M.C.No. 1 Company.
Lieut. K. A. Campbell, D.S.O. "  "
2nd Lieut. G. R. Gunther, M.C. "  "
Capt. A. H. S. Adair, M.C.No. 2 Company.
Lieut. S. G. Fairbairn, M.C. "  "
Lieut. C. B. Hollins "  "
Lieut. F. Anson, M.C.No. 3 Company.
2nd Lieut. H. J. Gibbon, M.C. "  "
Capt. E. J. Bunbury, M.C.No. 4 Company.
2nd Lieut. A. E. F. F. Strangways-Rogers "  "
2nd Lieut. H. I'B. Smith "  "
2nd Lieut. R. P. Papillon "  "
Capt. J. H. Graff, U.S.A.M.O.R.C.Medical Officer.
Capt. the Rev. S. Phillimore, M.C.Chaplain.

Oct. 9.

In the early part of the attack one of our guns appears to have been badly laid, with the result that it continued to shoot short, causing several casualties among the leading companies of the Battalion. This was particularly irritating, since only a short time before these companies had been mistaken for the enemy, and had been fired at by one of our own aeroplanes. The first objective was taken by 6.30, and no Germans were encountered, the only casualties being caused by our barrage.

The Battalion started off with No. 1 Company under Captain Fryer on the right, No. 2 under Captain Adair on the left, No. 3 under Lieutenant Anson in support, and No. 4 under Captain Bunbury in reserve. As there seemed every possibility of the Germans retiring rapidly, the scheme of attack was ambitious, with a large extent of ground to be covered. The first objective was a trench running from Niergnies to Seranvillers; the second objective the road running from Cambrai to La Targette; and after that there were four "bounds," ending up with the Cambrai—Beauvois road. There was no sign of the enemy, not even any hostile shelling at first, and no difficulty was experienced in securing the objectives. In the second bound, Wambaix Copse, which might possibly have been held by the enemy, was also taken without opposition. At 10.30 the capture of Estourmel was effected, and still the enemy had shown no sign of fighting. Lord Lascelles decided that the dinners should be eaten now, and as the 1st Guards Brigade had not come up there was plenty of time for the men to dine before resuming the advance. It was not until the Battalion reached the Cambrai—Beauvois road and Igniel-dit-les-Frisettes that the enemy's resistance stiffened, and it suffered casualties. Captain Adair with No. 2 Company occupied Igniel, but reported that casualties were occurring from machine-gun fire on his right, and from the enemy's heavy guns at long range. This village was in a clump of trees on the crest of a hill on the farther side of the Cambrai—Beauvois road, and was approached by a sunken road, on each side of which the ground rose in a gentle slope, and formed an ideal position for machine-guns. Captain Adair advanced up the sunken road, and as soon as his company appeared on the hill it was subjected to a harassing machine-gun fire. He at first ordered his men to dig themselves in, but later he decided to move up into Igniel-dit-les-Frisettes. When No. 2 Company moved into the trees and buildings, it was so heavily shelled that Lord Lascelles, who had come up to see how the situation was developing, told him his men would be safer out in the open. There seems little doubt that the German ammunition was already deteriorating, for when their shells burst the pieces did not scatter so well as before. But for this the casualties would certainly have been very heavy, and in all probability it would have been found necessary to retire from the hill altogether. At 4.30 P.M. Lord Lascelles received instructions to support a cavalry patrol of the Oxfordshire Hussars, which had been sent out through the 1st Battalion Coldstream on the left. He was surprised at this message, for he knew that no cavalry patrol could possibly go out in the face of this machine-gun fire, and when the officer commanding the patrol appeared at the Battalion Headquarters to say that it had been unable to go forward at all, he was able to disregard the order, and send in a report asking for confirmation of his action. In the evening orders were received to establish an outpost line with two companies over the Cambrai—Beauvois road, with two companies in support near Estourmel. That night a warning order was received for a farther advance the next morning, and the Battalion Headquarters moved up to Grand Chanfemel.

Oct. 10.

The next morning the 1st Battalion Scots Guards passed through the outpost line, and continued the advance by bounds, while the Battalion moved forward in support. No. 3 Company on the right, under Lieutenant Anson, and No. 4, under Captain Bunbury, formed the support, with the other two companies in reserve. In the afternoon the Scots Guards were held up west of St. Hilaire, and were ordered to establish an outpost line for the night. Nos. 3 and 4 Companies were placed under the orders of the Officer Commanding the 1st Battalion Scots Guards, while two companies of the 1st Battalion Coldstream were sent up to take their place.

On the 11th the 1st Guards Brigade passed through the outpost line, and continued the advance, while the Battalion went into very comfortable billets in St. Hilaire, where the German baths were used. On the 13th the 2nd Guards Brigade passed through with the 3rd Battalion Grenadiers on the right, the 1st Battalion Coldstream on the left, and the 1st Battalion Scots Guards in reserve. These Battalions were ordered to be at immediate notice to move in case the 3rd Guards Brigade, which was crossing the Selle River, should require assistance, but the warning orders were later cancelled; and that night the Battalion relieved the 2nd Battalion Scots Guards in the front line along the Selle River. Second Lieutenant Gunther with a patrol of eight men crossed the river, and surprised a German whom he gagged and brought back. He reported that the enemy seemed in a sleepy and disorganised state, and Lord Lascelles accordingly asked for permission to push a company across the river that night, but was told instead to establish a bridgehead on the following night north of St. Python.

The erection of a bridgehead so near to so many houses was a matter of some difficulty, since it was obvious that the crossing could not be held if the enemy occupied houses within 300 yards of it. Lord Lascelles therefore ordered Lieutenant H. I'B. Smith to occupy the nearest house to the bridgehead and Lieutenant F. Donnison to search the four or five houses near it and make sure they were empty. Second Lieutenant Smith had no difficulty in occupying the house, but found that the walls on the enemy's side were so full of large holes that the house was untenable. Lieutenant Donnison moved forward to reconnoitre but ran into the Germans in some force in the streets beyond, and was forced by machine-gun fire and bombs to fall back on Lieutenant Smith's party, leaving behind two men who were too badly wounded to move.

The alternatives open to Lord Lascelles were first, to hold the bridge with trenches dug practically on it, but this was dismissed as being strategically unsound; secondly, to dig trenches beyond the bridge, which was difficult, because the men would have to be on the top of the river bank, and overlooked by the houses 300 yards away; thirdly, to occupy one house and strongly fortify it. This seemed at first to be the best solution of the difficulty, but when Second Lieutenant Smith and Second Lieutenant Donnison, who had behaved with great gallantry and coolness, reported that it was impossible to hold the nearest house, and that all the neighbouring houses would have to be cleared of the enemy, Lord Lascelles came to the conclusion that this would involve him in endless operations in the town. He therefore decided to have the bridgehead dug in on the banks of the river.

Captain Bunbury, who commanded No. 4 Company, from which the two platoons had been sent to secure the houses on the farther side of the river, was placed in a difficult position. He brought up the remainder of his company, and held a quarter of the village of St. Python, the houses on the other side of the stream being held entirely by the Germans. It was impossible to get to him in daylight, and by night all the streets were swept with machine-gun fire. He handled his men under circumstances of exceptional difficulty with some skill during the days he was there. Throughout these operations some five hundred civilians lived in the cellars and performed many acts of kindness to the men of the Battalion who visited them. It was impossible for them to move out of their retreat without being shot at. One little girl, eleven years old, quite unconscious of the danger she ran, walked out in the streets in broad daylight, and was brutally shot by a German; at great risk one of the men of the Battalion went out and carried her back, but she died.

Operations

October 20th, 1918

Emery Walker Ltd.

This was the beginning of the period when the Germans seemed to spare all the buildings, and to concentrate their fire chiefly on the exits from villages.

On the 16th the enemy was reported to be massing men on the St. Python—Haussy road, and our artillery shelled the area indicated for two hours, but no counter-attack developed. The following day the Battalion was relieved, and went into billets at St. Vaast. On the 20th the 1st and 3rd Guards Brigades attacked, and captured the high ground east of Solesmes and St. Python, but the 2nd Guards Brigade was not wanted. On the 22nd the whole of the Guards Division was taken out of the line for a week's rest.