The Guards Division
In October the Germans found the retirement more and more difficult. During September they had lost a quarter of a million prisoners and an immense number of guns, and their original intention of making a determined stand on one of their deeply fortified lines had long since been abandoned. The Allied Armies were pressing them back all along the line, and the continual retirement was beginning to affect the spirit of the Army. After the Siegfried line had been broken through, Sir Douglas Haig commenced operations on a seventeen-mile front from Cambrai to Sequehart with the Third and Fourth Armies, and the Sixth Corps, in which the Guards Division was, advanced to the south of Cambrai.
On October 6 Major-General Matheson received a warning order to be prepared to move to Havrincourt, but this move was postponed later for twenty-four hours. The Guards Division was in support of the Second and Third Divisions, and in the event of little opposition being encountered was to pass through and continue the advance on La Henières and Igniel-dit-les-Frisettes, but as the Germans offered a stubborn resistance the Guards Division did not go into the line until the next day.
All sorts of wild rumours were about, and as there seemed every danger of the enemy making use of them to gain time, Major-General Matheson issued the following order:
(1) Rumours are current that the German Government intends to propose a suspension of hostilities, with a view to the discussion of Peace terms. It is possible that attempts at fraternisation may in consequence be made by German troops in the line.
(2) The German Army is hard pressed and the German High Command needs time to carry out its present withdrawal without heavy loss in men and material. German Peace talk is therefore circulated in order to relax our pressure, gain time for the withdrawal, and prepare for a long defensive campaign next year.
(3) All our troops will be warned against paying any attention to rumours of this kind. They are intended not to shorten the war but to save the German Army from the consequences of defeat this year and to preserve its strength for the defence of German soil next year. Any attempts made by the enemy to fraternise in the field will also be disregarded absolutely.
It is our intention to beat the enemy as fast as we can, not to allow him to recover his strength.
On the morning of October 9 De Crespigny's Brigade on the right, and Sergison-Brooke's Brigade on the left, passed through the Third and Second Divisions, and attacked under a barrage.
It was expected that the Caudry—Cambrai railway, running diagonally across the line of advance, with its steep embankments and deep cuttings, would form a serious obstacle, and special steps were taken to bring enfilade artillery and machine-gun fire to bear on it, till the infantry was within assaulting distance. It was soon found, however, that the enemy had withdrawn during the night, and it was not till late in the afternoon that the German advanced troops were again located, holding a line of trenches west of Boistrancourt and east of Igniel-dit-les-Frisettes. A night operation to capture Boistrancourt revealed the farther withdrawal of the enemy.
On the 10th De Crespigny's and Sergison-Brooke's Brigades followed up the enemy, and after some skirmishing with his rear-guards, took up an outpost line west of Quevy and St. Hilaire, with detached posts east of those villages.
On the morning of the 11th the 3rd Guards Brigade, which was now under the command of Brigadier-General Heywood, passed through the outposts, and was soon engaged with the German rear-guards, which were now fighting stubbornly.
The next few days were spent in clearing the enemy from the west bank of the River Selle, after which there was a pause to allow time for the reconstruction of the railways in rear. The most difficult problem of this period was the evacuation of the civil population from the villages on the banks of the Selle, which were occupied by both our own and the enemy's troops. The evacuation was carried out by night with scarcely a casualty.
On the 20th the Guards Division took part in a general attack, launched with the object of driving the enemy from his new positions, east of the River Selle. The attack, which started at 1 A.M., was carried out by De Crespigny's Brigade on the right, and Heywood's Brigade on the left. The Sixty-second Division was to clear Solesmes of the enemy on the right of the Guards Division, and the Nineteenth Division was to capture Haussy on the left. A great deal of the success of this attack depended on whether the River Selle was held in any strength, but the Germans never attempted to dispute the passage, and both Brigades passed over with little loss. The first objective was secured without difficulty, but when the advance to the second objective commenced, a good deal of opposition was encountered, especially on the left, where the Nineteenth Division had been held up after capturing Haussy. The resistance was so stubborn that at one time artillery preparation was contemplated; but when the Sixty-second Division advanced towards Romeries, the Guards Division was able to secure the second objective, and even push out patrols as far as the River Harpies.
During the afternoon the Germans put down on the new positions an artillery concentration, which many officers present considered to have been the heaviest they had experienced since the battle of the Somme; our troops were, however, so well dug in that hardly any casualties were inflicted. On the night of the 22nd the Division was relieved by the Second Division, which continued the attack the following day.
The remainder of the month was spent in rest, which was, however, much interfered with by the constant change of quarters, necessitated by the withdrawal of the enemy.