The Grenadier Guards in the Great War of 1914-1918, Vol. 3 of 3

by Frederick Ponsonby

The Guards Division

The Guards Division.

The advance in November, culminating in the capture of Maubeuge, was so rapid, the extent of ground covered in so short a time so great, and the number of prisoners and guns taken so large, that there was little doubt that an Armistice on any conditions was the only thing that could save the German army from absolute disaster.

The Guards Division moved up on the 2nd from Escarmain towards Villers Pol. The objectives or bounds were no longer measured in yards but in miles, and the ambitious programme produced by the Divisional Staff would have been considered beyond the bounds of possibility, even six months before.

It was known that the Germans must now stand and fight, if they were to gain time for the withdrawal of their armies elsewhere, and a final attack was ordered for November 4 in order to break through their resistance, and complete the victory of the Allied Armies. Preparations for the attack were somewhat disorganised by a partial withdrawal of the enemy during the afternoon of the 3rd.

General Sergison-Brooke and General de Crespigny felt their way forward, and Villers Pol was occupied during the night, but it was impossible to notify the artillery of the exact position of the leading companies by the time the attacks started on the 4th, and in order to allow a margin of safety the barrage had to start some way east of the village, with the result that some of our troops never caught it. Up to mid-day the Germans fought very stubbornly, but they were everywhere driven back, and by the evening Preux-au-Sart was in our hands, an advance of nearly four miles. So fierce had been the fighting that the losses on both sides were exceptionally heavy, the Germans in particular leaving a large number of dead upon the ground.

During the two following days Heywood's Brigade drove back the enemy's rear-guards another five miles, and patrols of the 1st Battalion Welsh Guards entered Bavai, an important town, and the junction of no less than eleven roads. Bavai was not on the front allotted to the Guards Division, but during the whole of this advance the line on the left of the Division was very much thrown back, which caused great inconvenience, since it enabled the enemy to enfilade the troops from the north, for the Germans were now prodigal in the expenditure of shells, which they knew they could never carry away with them. The troops billeted in villages in rear suffered considerably, and as the left flank of the Division was thrown back the back areas were all within easy range from the north. In particular the village of Amfroipret was heavily punished, and General Heywood was severely wounded by a shell, which exploded in his headquarters just west of that village. Once more the 3rd Guards Brigade was without a commander. Brigadier-General Campbell, V.C., was sent for to take command, and in the meantime the Brigade was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Stirling, Scots Guards.

On the 7th Sergison-Brooke's Brigade, passing through the 3rd Guards Brigade, continued to drive the enemy back, but the following day the advance was checked owing to enfilade fire from the north. That afternoon a German orderly carrying an important message was captured. The message was at once sent by special despatch rider to Divisional Headquarters, and on being translated proved to be an urgent order to the rear-guard commander, telling him to hold on to his present position at all costs, and cover the withdrawal of the main body to a line east of Maubeuge. The resistance of the rear-guard, the message added, must be such as to gain time for the consolidation of this new line and thus save the rest of the army. General Matheson at once ordered General Sergison-Brooke to push forward his reserve Battalion (the 3rd Battalion Grenadiers) directly it was dark, with instructions to force its way through the enemy's rear-guard and straight on down the road to Maubeuge.

The 3rd Battalion Grenadiers moved forward at 10 P.M., and reached the citadel of Maubeuge at 2 A.M., but it was just too late to cut off the enemy's rear-guard. De Crespigny's Brigade was ordered to consolidate a line on the high ground east of the city; this was many miles east of any point reached by the remainder of the British Army. With the capture of Maubeuge the advance of the Guards Division ended, and at 11 A.M. on the 11th the Armistice was signed.

The final rapid advance had been made under circumstances of exceptional difficulty, since the systematic destruction of the railways by the Germans had necessitated the supply of ammunition and rations being brought up by road. The country was closely intersected by streams, and as all road bridges were destroyed, it was necessary to erect temporary bridges with deviations through the fields leading to them, while the original bridges were being repaired. Constant rain and the continuous stream of transport soon turned these deviations into a quagmire, through which the horses, often up to their bellies in mud, had to pull their heavy load: only the persistent determination of the transport officers and men to get through at all hazards, and the fine condition of the horses made the task of supplying the troops possible.

Even then these efforts would have been of no avail, but for the work of the Royal Engineers in repairing the innumerable bridges to carry lorry traffic: day and night, without rest and with scarcely time for food, they worked, and never failed to do what was asked of them.

But the finest part of the advance, without which victory could not have been enforced in 1918, was the dash and courage of the infantry in face of the insidious knowledge that peace was within sight. Every officer and man who went into those attacks in November knew that it might be the last engagement of the war, and that if he avoided unnecessary risk he would probably get through safely; if he took it, he might be throwing away his life on the last day of the war. That knowledge had not the smallest effect upon the conduct of the troops, and the attack on November 4 was carried out with a dash and reckless courage that had never been surpassed in the war.

The result cannot be over-estimated: instead of a half-hearted Armistice with the Germans still under the impression they were, as far as the army was concerned, virtually the victors, the last attacks had shown them that it was merely a matter of estimating how far their defeat had been completed, and had made them understand that their safest course lay in bringing about an Armistice as speedily as possible, to save the reputation of their army.