BOUNDARY QUESTIONS.
The most pressing and ever urgent question which the Republic has to face is the protection of its frontier against aggression; Liberia has two powerful neighbors, both of which are land-hungry and are continually pressing upon her borders; she has already lost large slices of her territory and is still menaced with further loss.
FIRST BRITISH AGGRESSION.
Shortly after his election to the presidency of the Republic, President J. J. Roberts visited Europe. He was well received both in England and France. On one occasion, in 1848, when he was dining in London with the Prussian Ambassador, the conversation dealt with the difficulties which the Liberian settlers had with the native chiefs along the Gallinhas River; these hostilities were kept alive by slave traders who had their trading stations near the river’s mouth; these difficulties had generally been incited and directed by a chief named Mano. Among the guests who were present at the dinner were Lord Ashley and Mr. Gurney; it was suggested that an end might be put to these difficulties and the anti-slavery cause advanced, if Liberia would purchase this territory; considerable interest was aroused by the suggestion, and through Lord Ashley’s effort the necessary money was raised for consummating the purchase. On his return to Liberia, President Roberts entered into negotiations which extended from 1849 to 1856, by which the land was gradually acquired; the area secured stretched from the Mano River to the Sewa and Sherbro Island on the west. Through the annexation of this territory, Liberia’s domain extended from Cape Lahon to the eastward of Cape Palmas, west to the border of Sierra Leone, a distance of 600 miles. This acquisition of territory was attended with considerable difficulty; the influence of traders, of slavers, and even of England herself was thrown in the way of the negotiations—so Commodore Foote tells us. Nor did the acquisition of the territory put an end to the difficulties in that region. In the year 1860 John Myers Harris, an English trader, had established himself in the country between the Mano and Sulima Rivers and refused to acknowledge Liberia’s authority; as he was conducting a flagrant trade in contravention of Liberian laws of commerce, President Benson sent a coast guard to seize two schooners, the Phoebe and Emily, which had been consigned to him; the seizure was made between Cape Mount and Mano Point, clearly Liberian territory. It is curious that this seizure was made by a Liberian government vessel, the Quail, which had been a gift to the Republic from Great Britain. We have, then, a vessel, contributed through British sympathy, operating within an area secured through British philanthropy, against law-breaking indulged in by British subjects. The captured schooners were taken to Liberia and were held for legal adjudication; under the orders of the Sierra Leone Government, the British gunboat, Torch, appeared at Monrovia, and seized the two schooners by force on December 17; at the same time the commander of this gunboat demanded from the Liberian Government a penalty of fifteen pounds per day for nineteen days’ detention. Shortly after these events, President Benson, on his way to England for public business, visited the government of Sierra Leone and tried to adjust the difficulties which had arisen; he was, however, referred to London. At about this time part of the disputed territory was annexed by Sierra Leone to her own area. While in London, Benson took up the matter with the British Government. Lord Russell acknowledged the territorial rights of Liberia to extend from the coast east of Turner Point (Mattru) to the San Pedro River on the east, thus admitting the point for which Liberia contended. This decision was by no means satisfactory to the troublers in Africa. Harris agitated the matter in dispute. Backed by Governor Hall of Sierra Leone, he and neighboring traders protested against the concession Russell had made. A commission was therefore appointed and met at Monrovia April 25, 1863, continuing in session until May 4, when it adjourned without decision. The British Commissioners examined the title deeds held by Liberia and were inclined to recognize some of these and to refuse others; they objected to Liberia’s possessing any territory beyond the Mano River, and proposed that river as the boundary. The Liberian Commissioners demurred, urging the validity of the deeds they showed and proposing that the Sherbro should be their northwest boundary; they asserted a good title to the territories known as Cassee, Gumbo, and Muttru. The British Commissioners based their claims upon letters from the chiefs of the territories involved and on statements which they asserted had been made by them. The Commission broke up without a settlement, as the Liberians held strictly to the concession which Lord Russell had previously made. London, however, yielding to the colonial pressure, regretted that no solution had been reached, and claimed that it was “justified in view of the facts” in only recognizing Liberia’s sovereignty over Sugaree. The closing episode in this exchange of views was the sending of a letter by Dr. Blyden, who was then Secretary of State for the Republic, which ran as follows: “The President is equally grieved that the oral statements of barbarous and heathen chiefs on a subject affecting the prosperity of a rising Christian state should be regarded by Her Majesty’s Government as entitled to more weight than the statements of Christian men supported by written documents and by the known local conduct of the chiefs towards the Liberian Government since the cession of their territories until very recently.”
As might be expected, the troubles did not cease. Traders continued to smuggle; local chiefs continued to harass; shipping continued to bid defiance to Liberian laws; vessels continued to be seized; threats continued to be made. Harris began to act almost as if he were an independent chief within this territory; there were various tribes about him, and some of them were inclined to resist his exactions; disputes with him aroused the Vai to undertake reprisals; Harris organized the Gallinhas peoples in an attack upon the Vai; the Liberian Government sent forces in 1869 to aid the Vai, who were loyal to them. The Gallinhas natives were defeated, fled, and in their rage turning on Harris, destroyed one of his factories; this of course gave him a basis for new claims for damages. On this military expedition some property had been destroyed or confiscated. Thus new difficulties grew up; there were occasional seizures, retaliatory threats, demands for damages, shows of force. Naturally, the hostile chiefs living in the Mano District, encouraged by the unsettled conditions, raided and destroyed Liberian settlements; things presently were critical, and in 1871 another expedition was despatched by the Liberian Government into Mano and Sulima; property was destroyed, including powder and goods belonging to British owners; the usual demands for damages were made, and these demands known as the “Mano River Claims” were pending until 1882.
Between the constant pushing of the “Harris Claims” and the “Mano River Claims,” things finally came to a head in December, 1878. A new commission was then appointed which met in 1879, first at Sierra Leone, then at Sulima; Commodore Shufeldt, of the American navy, was chosen as an arbitrator between the two contestants. The “Harris Claims” by this time amounted to some 6000 pounds. The conduct of Great Britain on this occasion was supercilious. The Liberian Commissioners, after reaching Sierra Leone, were kept waiting for three weeks before the British Commissioners made their appearance; the commissioners examined the title deeds of the Liberian Government and took oral testimony of witnesses favorable to and hostile to the Liberian claims. The Liberians claimed the territories known as Sugaree, Mano, Rock River, and Sulima; the British Commissioners took the ground that no such countries were in existence. The meeting was rather stormy; Shufeldt reduced the “Harris Claims” to £3000, but the British Commissioners were not inclined either in this matter or in others to abide by the decision of the umpire; finally the Commission broke up without accomplishing any good results. The British claimed that Sierra Leone should undertake the protectorate of the whole country as far as the Mano River, as they said Liberia was unable to maintain order west of that point. “Undoubtedly they were unable to fight British traders, since every time they used force, marine or military, the said traders were able to command the armed interference of the Sierra Leone Government.” The matter was again referred to London; nothing final was there done.
Matters reached a crisis when, on March 20, 1882, Sir Arthur Havelock, governor of Sierra Leone, with four gunboats appeared before Monrovia and demanded that the Republic should pay an indemnity of £8,500 to settle all outstanding claims, and that it should accept the Maffa River as a boundary. The Liberian Government yielded to these insistent claims. They promised to pay the indemnity, admitted the Maffa River as a temporary boundary, and agreed to receive from Great Britain a money payment in return for what she had expended for the purchase of the disputed territory. Before the Liberian Government yielded, she set up a statement of her own position which was just and dignified. As soon as the action of the government was known at Monrovia, Havelock having returned to Sierra Leone, violent hostility arose; the Senate rejected the treaty; the Liberians asked that the whole matter be submitted to arbitration. On September 7, Sir Arthur Havelock again appeared with gunboats, demanding immediate ratification of the treaty. Liberia again raised her defense: “If the contested territory was British, why did the British Government claim from Liberia an indemnity for acts of violence amongst the natives which had taken place thereon? If, however, Liberia acknowledged her responsibility, as she had done, and agreed to pay an indemnity, why should she be in addition deprived of territories for the law and order of which she was held responsible, and which were hers by acts of purchase admitted by the British Government?” The Senate again refused to ratify the treaty. Sir Arthur Havelock sailed away; but in March, 1883, the Sierra Leone Government seized the territories in question between Sherbro and the Mano River, territories which from first to last had cost Liberia £20,000. The whole matter was finally settled by a treaty signed at London, Nov. 11, 1885, whereby the river Mano was admitted to be the western boundary; a badly defined interior line was agreed upon; a repayment of £4750 of purchase money was made to Liberia.
THE KANRE-LAHUN AFFAIR.
The next act of serious aggression on the part of Great Britain grew out of the bad definition of the interior boundary by the treaty of 1885. The Mano River had been recognized as the boundary between Sierra Leone and Liberia. The question now arose as to whether the two parties enjoyed equal rights of freedom on the river. The Liberian Government attempted to secure to Liberian traders and to foreigners resident in Liberia the rights to free navigation on the river without subjection to the payment of customs dues and other charges to the Sierra Leone Government. The matter became of sufficient consequence to call for a commission in the year 1901. Three Liberians, among them Arthur Barclay, then Secretary of the Treasury (later President of the Republic), were appointed; the meeting was held in London and led to the following memorandum of agreement between His Majesty’s Government and the Liberian Republic.
1. His Majesty’s Government are prepared to accede to the requests of the Liberian Government that a British officer should be deputed to demarcate the Anglo-Liberian Boundary.
2. They are also ready to lend the services of a British officer for employment by the Liberian Government in the demarcation of the Franco-Liberian Boundary whenever the Liberian Government shall have made an arrangement with the French Government for such demarcation.
3. The Liberian Government undertakes to repay to His Majesty’s Government the whole of any cost incurred by them in connection with the survey and demarcation of the Anglo-Liberian Frontier.
4. His Majesty’s Government are willing that, in lieu of the Governor of Sierra Leone acting as British Consul to Liberia, arrangements shall be made whereby some other British officer shall be Consul in the Republic.
5. His Majesty’s Government undertakes the survey of the Kru Coast, provided the Liberian Government will throw open to foreign trade the native ports on the coast.
6. With regard to the navigation on the Mano River, His Majesty’s Government are prepared to permit the Government of the Liberian Republic and its citizens to trade on that river, provided that it is not to be considered actual right, and if, in return, the Government of Sierra Leone is allowed to connect by bridges and ferries the two banks of the river with any roads or trade-routes in the neighborhood.
7. The Government of the Liberian Republic have expressed a desire for closer union with Great Britain: His Majesty’s Government are actuated by the most friendly feelings toward the Republic; and with the view of meeting their wishes in this respect, so far as it is consistent with the declaration made by His Majesty’s government in connection with other powers, will at all times be ready to advise them in matters affecting the welfare of Liberia, and to confer with the Government of the Republic as to the best means of securing its independence and the integrity of its territory.
When this agreement was submitted to the Senate of Liberia for ratification, they made the following amendments:
Section 1. Amended to read, that the Liberian Government shall depute an officer or officers to be associated with the British officer in demarcating the Anglo-Liberian Boundary.
Section 2. Amended to read, that the Liberian Government shall depute an officer or officers to be associated with the British and French officers in demarcating the Franco-Liberian Frontier.
Section 5. The Senate, not perceiving the advisability of throwing the coast open for the present, is under the necessity of withholding its vote in favor of this section.
Section 7. Amended to read, “One bridge at the place where the Liberian Customs House is now erected, and one ferry at the place where the second Liberian Customs House may hereafter be erected; that said bridge and ferry will be accessible to the citizens of the Liberian Government without any restrictions or extra toll, or charges, more than is required to be paid by the subjects of His Majesty’s Government.”
The British Government left the settlement of the details of that portion of the agreement which had reference to the navigation of the Mano River to be settled between the Liberian Government and the Government of Sierra Leone. The colonial government imposed such restrictions that no understanding was ever arrived at. However, a joint commission for the demarcation of the Anglo-Liberian frontier was appointed and in 1903 proceeded with its work. In due time the boundary was satisfactorily settled by this commission. This boundary, however, very soon gave rise to a serious difficulty and to a flagrant aggression. By the delimitation, the town and district of Kanre-Lahun fell to Liberia; Colonel Williams, the Liberian Commissioner, hoisted the Liberian flag at that town which, at the time, was occupied by a detachment of the Sierra Leone Frontier Force; curiously enough, the British force was not withdrawn.
In 1904 the British Government complained to the Liberian Government that the Kissi were making raids into British territory in consequence of a war between Fabundah, a chief of the Kanre-Lahun District, and Kah Furah, a Kissi chief, and asked permission for the entrance of British troops into Liberian territory for the purpose of repressing the disorder which, it was said, threatened British interests. The request was granted; British troops advanced to the Mafisso where they established a post. In November the British Vice-Consul sent word to the President of Liberia saying that the chief Kah Furah had been driven out of the Kissi country, and that the people, at the invitation of the military authorities, had elected a new chief, and had pledged themselves not to receive Kah Furah among them again. The Liberian Government assumed that the matter was at an end and that the British force had been withdrawn. In 1906 Mr. Lomax, the Liberian Commissioner for the French frontier, was instructed to proceed to this point; he reached Kanre-Lahun in December, and found Waladi, a town in Liberian territory, garrisoned by a Sierra Leone force. While Mr. Lomax was at Kanre-Lahun, complaints were made against him by the Chief Fabundah and others. These complaints were examined in the presence of Governor Probyn, Sir Harry Johnston, Mr. Lamont, and leading military officers, and Mr. Lomax justified himself completely, except in a single case where damages of five pounds were suggested and paid. Later on, British officers sent in complaints that the escort with Mr. Lomax were plundering the country. It was impossible in such districts and under such circumstances to prevent some petty thieving. Mr. Lomax, however, accepted the complaints and paid the damages claimed. With a view to permanently settling the country under Liberian rule, Mr. Lomax ordered a local election to be held. Three chiefs were chosen—Fabundah for the lower section, Gardi for the Bombali section, and Bawma for the Gormah section. Fabundah, who before had been exercising jurisdiction over the Bombali, was dissatisfied. The Sierra Leone authorities promised to support him against the Liberian Government; they placed a frontier force at his disposal for the purpose of ruining the chiefs who were favorable to Liberian control or who had received commissions from the President; efforts to arouse opposition and dissatisfaction were made; Lomax was hounded from the district; the chief, Gardi, was driven from the country, his town was plundered, and his brother made a prisoner in Kanre-Lahun.
In 1908 attempts had been made in Europe to settle difficulties pending with Great Britain and France. Mr. F. E. R. Johnson, the Liberian Secretary of State, who had been sent to arrange these matters, found conditions threatening. In London the British Government stated that it had no designs against Liberia, but that they believed the French were planning encroachment, and that, if Liberia lost territory to France, Great Britain would find it necessary to take a new piece of territory contingent to Sierra Leone in her own defense. Matters appeared so serious that President Barclay was advised to come to Europe himself; he arrived in London on the 29th of August, accompanied by T. McCants Stewart, and there met Mr. Johnson. He told the British Government of his fears regarding further aggression upon Liberian territory and expressed the desire that Great Britain and America should jointly guarantee the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic. The reply was that Great Britain would on no account enter into any such guarantee; if the Liberian Government obtained a settled frontier with France, and inaugurated certain reforms, there would be little danger of any one’s troubling it; if the reforms desired by England were not undertaken, nothing would save it from the end which threatened. At the same time London refused to treat of the Kanre-Lahun and Mano River difficulties until after the troubles with France had been arranged. In France, as will be shortly seen, the Liberian envoys met with no success; a treaty was indeed arranged by means of which the Republic was robbed of a large amount of valuable territory. The envoys were again in London in September to take up the matters of the Kanre-Lahun and Mano River negotiations. The British officials now demanded that Fabundah should come entirely under the jurisdiction of the British Government, and that the frontier line on the northwest should be so altered as to place his territory within the British colony; the area thus demanded contained something like 250 square miles of territory. At no time had the area actually in charge of Fabundah amounted to any such quantity; the Liberians demurred at the largeness of the territorial claim—the British officials themselves stated that they were surprised at its extent, but insisted upon receiving the entire amount. No decision was actually reached, the matter being postponed until the delimitation of the new Franco-Liberian boundary should be achieved.
Great Britain’s claim to this region was based upon the flimsiest pretext. It is true that she had had relations with Fabundah before the boundary had been delimited; it is true that, previous to that date, she had had a force in Kanre-Lahun; however, when the boundary was actually fixed, Kanre-Lahun was clearly within Liberian territory, and no objection whatever was made to the Republic’s taking possession and to the withdrawal of the Sierra Leone force. When, later on, Great Britain sent soldiers into the area, it was done on the pretext that intertribal difficulties in the region threatened British interests; permission was given as a favor to Great Britain and with the expectation that, as soon as the difficulty had been adjusted, the British force would be withdrawn. Such was not the case; once in Kanre-Lahun, it remained there; Major Lomax was hounded from the country; the Liberian customs officer, Mr. Hughes, was ordered to abandon his post of duty and to surrender the customs house to the British commander. This act of occupation was bad enough; but soon Great Britain demanded that the army of occupation should be paid by the Liberian Government before it would evacuate the district; no such understanding had been arranged, and the claim was unjustified and ridiculous; the frontier force of Sierra Leone was not increased, nor put to any extra expense in the matter. In asking for a new boundary line which should cut out Fabundah’s territory, flagrant injustice was committed; it is true that the boundary which had been arranged cut the land controlled by the chief; about one-twenty-fifth of his territory was on the British side, the remaining twenty-four-twenty-fifths being in Liberia; if a new line were to be drawn, it should have given the one-twenty-fifth to Liberia and reduced the Sierra Leone territory. The matter dragged along for months. December 8, 1909, President Barclay accepted a proposition to exchange or sell the district in dispute; the legislature refused to accept the proposition. In May, 1911, however, an agreement was finally arranged; the British authorities took over the Kanre-Lahun District, an area of extraordinary wealth and dense population; in return for this valuable and most needed area, Liberia received a piece of country lying between the Morro and Mano Rivers, which had formerly been a part of the Colony of Sierra Leone; this territory is almost without population, densely forested, and practically worthless. Even so, it is little likely that the Republic will be left in peaceful possession of it. On some pretext, in the future, Great Britain will no doubt regain it.
THE FRENCH BOUNDARY QUESTION.
When Maryland was added to the Liberian Republic, it possessed lands acquired by deeds of purchase and treaties as far east as the San Pedro River, sixty miles east of the Cavalla; this country was occupied by Kru tribes, and its eastern boundary practically marked their limit; it was hence not only a geographical, but an ethnographical boundary. For years no one questioned Liberia’s right to the whole area, and on maps and in repeated descriptions of the country its rights were recognized. In 1885, however, the French Government claimed that the French possessions extended continuously from the Ivory Coast westward beyond the Cavalla River and Cape Palmas as far as Garawé; at the same time it suggested certain shadowy claims to Cape Mount, Grand Bassa, and Grand Butu;—in other words, points at intervals along the whole coast of the Liberian Republic; these claims were based on agreements stated to have been drawn up between native chiefs and the commanders of war vessels. In 1891 the French Government officially communicated to Great Britain her intention of taking possession of and administering the district mentioned as far as Garawé; she modified her claim, however, in such a way as to extend her rights only to the Cavalla River. In 1891 a French commissioner was authorized to treat with Liberia in this matter. He claimed that the French had deeds to Grand Cesters, dating to 1788, and to Garawé, dating to 1842; he referred to other shadowy rights and mentioned treaties which, he asserted, chiefs in the neighborhood of the Cavalla and San Pedro Rivers had made with French authorities; asked to produce these documents, he admitted that he did not have them with him. The French Government asked that Liberia should recognize the right of France from the Cavalla River to the San Pedro, saying that, if this recognition were granted, they might not revive their old claims. Liberia urged that the treaty formed with her by the French Government in 1852 clearly recognized her rights to the region in question; a French war map, dated 1882, was shown, on which Liberia’s area was clearly shown to extend to the San Pedro River; at the same time Liberia asked that the whole matter should be referred to arbitration. Arbitration was refused; a treaty drawn up by France was offered for approval in August, 1892; the Liberian legislature refused absolutely to ratify it, and the Liberian Government appealed to the United States for assistance and advice. The country was greatly aroused over the manifest injustice of its powerful neighbor. Especially in Maryland, feeling ran high. A printed appeal was issued to the world. In it occurs the following passage:
“We appeal to all the civilized nations of the world.—Consider, we pray you, the situation. Having been carried away into slavery, and, by the blessing of God, returned from exile to our fatherland, are we now to be robbed of our rightful inheritance? Is there not to be a foot of land in Africa, that the African, whether civilized or savage, can call his own? It has been asserted that the race is not capable of self-government, and the eyes of many are watching the progress of Liberia with a view to determining that question. We only ask, in all fairness, to be allowed just what any other people would require—free scope for operation. Do not wrest our territory from us and hamper us in our operations, and then stigmatize the race with incapacity, because we do not work miracles. Give us a fair chance, and then if we utterly fail, we shall yield the point. We pray you, the civilized and Christian nations of the world, to use your influence in our behalf. We have no power to prevent this aggression on the part of the French Government: but we know that we have right on our side, and are willing to have our claims to the territory in question examined. We do not consent to France’s taking that portion of our territory lying between the Cavalla and San Pedro Rivers; nor do we recognize its claims to points on our Grain Coast which, as shown above, our government has been in possession of for so long. We protest, too, against that government’s marking off narrow limits of interior land for us. We claim the right to extend as far interiorward as our necessities require. We are not foreigners: we are Africans, and this is Africa. Such being the case, we have certain natural rights—God-given rights—to this territory which no foreigners can have. We should have room enough, not only for our present population, but also to afford a home for our brethren in exile who may wish to return to their fatherland and help us to build up a negro nationality. We implore you, the civilized and Christian nations of the world, to use your influence to have these, our reasonable requirements secured to us.” But neither the official appeal to the United States nor the unofficial appeal to the Christian nations of the world availed. France seized the territory and threatened to refuse to recognize rights beyond Grand Cesters on the seaboard, and Boporo in the interior. After fruitless remonstrance, the Republic was forced to yield and a treaty was accepted on December 8, 1892. By it the Cavalla River was recognized as the boundary between France and Liberia, from its mouth “as far as a point situated at a point” about twenty miles south of its confluence with the River “Fodedougouba” at the intersection of the parallel 6° 30′ north and the Paris meridian 9° 12′ west; thence along 6° 30′ as far as 10° west, with the proviso that the basin of the Grand Cesters River should belong to Liberia and the basin of the Fodedougouba to France; then north along 10° to 8° north; and then northwest to the latitude of Tembi Kunda (supposed 8° 35′), after which due west along the latitude of Tembi Kunda, until it intersects the British boundary near that place. But the entire Niger Basin should be French; Bamaquilla and Mahommadou should be Liberian; Mousardou and Naalah, French.
LATER FRENCH DIFFICULTIES.
Notwithstanding this delimitation, difficulties with the French continued. In 1895 French posts along the northern border began to crowd in upon the Republic. The town of Lola, in Liberia, was attacked by Senegalese soldiers; these were repulsed and two French officers were killed. Aggressions continued until, finally, in 1903, Liberia begged that a final delimitation might be arranged, as the old had proved completely unsatisfactory. In 1904 F. E. R. Johnson and J. J. Dossen were sent to France to arrange matters. On their way, they called at the British Foreign Office and asked their aid and interest in bringing about an understanding. Arrived in Paris, it was quickly found that the French were planning to possess themselves of all the territory situated in the basin of the Cavalla and the Upper St. Paul’s Rivers; the British Foreign Office expressed sympathy, but did nothing more. In 1905 several efforts were made toward bringing about an agreement. Dr. Blyden was sent to France, but accomplished nothing; in November Sir Harry Johnston was asked to treat with the French Government which, however, refused to recognize him as an official negotiator. In 1907 Secretary Johnson was commissioned to treat with the French Government, but found its attitude most hostile and unfriendly. President Barclay himself was summoned to Europe; taking T. McCants Stewart with him, they joined Johnson, and interviewed the French officials. A treaty was submitted to them by which Liberia would be deprived of a large portion of her territory situated in the richest and most prosperous districts of the Republic. It was in vain that the Liberian commissioners remonstrated; the French were inflexible. The English Government had refused to deal with the commissioners in regard to the British boundary difficulty until they had come to some arrangement with France. In this unhappy condition of affairs, the commissioners decided to consult the American Ambassador in Paris; they asked that the United States should assist Liberia and prevent her being robbed of so large a portion of her territory, and should use her influence in bringing the French Government to submit the whole matter in dispute to arbitration. Ambassador White replied that he doubted whether the United States would aid Liberia in this crisis; he advised President Barclay to accept the treaty, urging that, if he failed to do so, the French would make further encroachments, and the Republic would meet with greater losses. As the case seemed hopeless, the commissioners accepted the treaty. It involved the delimitation of a fixed boundary by an international commission. Liberia engaged two Dutch officials as her commissioners. They were on hand ready to fix the boundary in February, 1898, but were kept waiting until May by the dilatoriness of the French commissioners; in order to have a permanent boundary fixed, the Republic made great concessions and lost valuable regions. It was willing, however, to sacrifice much for peace.
Of course the sacrifice was without result. At the present time the whole question of the Franco-Liberian boundary is again open, and from the points urged by the French Government it is evident that it aims at new acquisition of territory and new restriction of the power of the little Republic.
We stand at the threshold of a new era; new political theories are being advanced; new interpretations are being given to the principles of international law; larger fulfilments of national obligations are being required of individual nations; new duties are being thrust upon us. They cannot be shirked, we must keep pace with world requirements. Regeneration and reform must be our watchword. The people must see that they become so. The process must operate from within outwards, or else influences from without will compass our ruin.—E. Barclay.