PREPARATION FOR THE NAVAL WAR
"Germany's future lies on the sea." A proud saying, which contains a great truth. If the German people wish to attain a distinguished future and fulfil their mission of civilization, they must adopt a world policy and act as a World Power. This task can only be performed if they are supported by an adequate sea power. Our fleet must be so strong at least that a war with us involves such dangers, even to the strongest opponent, that the losses, which might be expected, would endanger his position as a World Power.
Now, as proved in another place, we can only stake our forces safely on a world policy if our political and military superiority on the continent of Europe be immovably established. This goal is not yet reached, and must be our first objective. Nevertheless, we must now take steps to develop by sea also a power which is sufficient for our pretensions. It is, on the one hand, indispensably necessary for the full security of our Continental position that we guard our coasts and repel oversea attacks. On the other hand, it is an absolute economic necessity for us to protect the freedom of the seas—by arms if needs be—since our people depend for livelihood on the export industry, and this, again, requires a large import trade. The political greatness of Germany rests not least on her flourishing economic life and her oversea trade. The maintenance of the freedom of the seas must therefore be always before our eyes as the object of all our naval constructions. Our efforts must not be merely directed towards the necessary repulse of hostile attacks; we must be conscious of the higher ideal, that we wish to follow an effective world policy, and that our naval power is destined ultimately to support this world policy.
Unfortunately, we did not adopt this view at the start, when we first ventured on the open sea. Much valuable time was wasted in striving for limited and insufficient objects. The Emperor William II. was destined to be the first to grasp this question in its bearing on the world's history, and to treat it accordingly. All our earlier naval activity must be set down as fruitless.
We have been busied for years in building a fleet. Most varied considerations guided our policy. A clear, definite programme was first drawn up by the great Naval Act of 1900, the supplementary laws of 1906, and the regulations as to the life of the ships in 1908. It is, of course, improbable that the last word has been said on the subject. The needs of the future will decide, since there can be no certain standard for the naval forces which a State may require: that depends on the claims which are put forward, and on the armaments of the other nations. At first the only object was to show our flag on the sea and on the coasts on which we traded. The first duty of the fleet was to safeguard this commerce. Opposition to the great outlay thus necessitated was soon shown by a party which considered a fleet not merely superfluous for Germany, but actually dangerous, and objected to the plans of the Government, which they stigmatized as boundless. Another party was content with a simple scheme of coast-protection only, and thought this object attained if some important points on the coast were defended by artillery and cheap flotillas of gunboats were stationed at various places.
This view was not long maintained. All discerning persons were convinced of the necessity to face and drive back an aggressive rival on the high seas. It was recognized that ironclads were needed for this, since the aggressor would have them at his disposal. But this policy, it was thought, could be satisfied by half-measures. The so-called Ausfallkorvetten were sanctioned, but emphasis was laid on the fact that we were far from wishing to compete with the existing large navies, and that we should naturally be content with a fleet of the second rank. This standpoint was soon recognized to be untenable, and there was a fresh current of feeling, whose adherents supported the view that the costly ironclads could be made superfluous by building in their place a large number of torpedo-boats. These, in spite of their small fighting capacity, would be able to attack the strongest ironclads by well-aimed torpedoes. It was soon realized that this theory rested on a fallacy—that a country like the German Empire, which depends on an extensive foreign trade in order to find work and food for its growing population, and, besides, is hated everywhere because of its political and economic prosperity, could not forego a strong armament at sea and on its coasts. At last a standpoint had been reached which corresponded with actual needs.
The different abortive attempts to solve the navy question in the most inexpensive manner have cost us much money and, above all, as already stated, much time; so that, at the present day, when we stand in the midst of a great crisis in the world's history, we must summon all our strength to make up for lost opportunities, and to build a thoroughly effective ocean-going fleet of warships in addition to an adequate guard for our coasts. We have at last come to see that the protection of our commerce and the defence of our shores cannot possibly be the only object of such a fleet, but that it, like the land army, is an instrument for carrying out the political ends of the State and supporting its justifiable ambitions. There can be no question of such limited objects as protection of commerce and passive coast defence. A few cruisers are enough to protect commerce in times of peace; but in war the only way to safeguard it is to defeat and, where possible, destroy the hostile fleet. A direct protection of all trade lines is obviously impossible. Commerce can only be protected indirectly by the defeat of the enemy. A passive defence of the coast can never count on permanent success. The American War of Secession, amongst others, showed that sufficiently.
The object of our fleet, therefore, is to defeat our possible rivals at sea, and force them to make terms, in order to guarantee unimpeded commerce to our merchantmen and to protect our colonies.
It is therefore an erroneous idea that our fleet exists merely for defence, and must be built with that view. It is intended to meet our political needs, and must therefore be capable of being employed according to the exigencies of the political position; on the offensive, when the political situation demands it, and an attack promises success; on the defensive, when we believe that more advantages can be obtained in this way. At the present day, indeed, the political grouping of the Great Powers makes a strategical offensive by sea an impossibility. We must, however, reckon with the future, and then circumstances may arise which would render possible an offensive war on a large scale.
The strength which we wish to give to our fleet must therefore be calculated with regard to its probable duties in war. It is obvious that we must not merely consider the possible opponents who at the moment are weaker than we are, but rather, and principally, those who are stronger, unless we were in the position to avoid a conflict with them under all circumstances. Our fleet must in any case be so powerful that our strongest antagonist shrinks from attacking us without convincing reasons. If he determines to attack us, we must have at least a chance of victoriously repelling this attack—in other words, of inflicting such heavy loss on the enemy that he will decline in his own interests to carry on the war to the bitter end, and that he will see his own position threatened if he exposes himself to these losses.
This conception of our duty on the sea points directly to the fact that the English fleet must set the standard by which to estimate the necessary size of our naval preparations. A war with England is probably that which we shall first have to fight out by sea; the possibility of victoriously repelling an English attack must be the guiding principle for our naval preparations; and if the English continuously increase their fleet, we must inevitably follow them on the same road, even beyond the limits of our present Naval Estimates.
We must not, however, forget that it will not be possible for us for many years to attack on the open sea the far superior English fleet. We may only hope, by the combination of the fleet with the coast fortifications, the airfleet, and the commercial war, to defend ourselves successfully against this our strongest opponent, as was shown in the chapter on the next naval war. The enemy must be wearied out and exhausted by the enforcement of the blockade, and by fighting against all the expedients which we shall employ for the defence of our coast; our fleet, under the protection of these expedients, will continually inflict partial losses on him, and thus gradually we shall be able to challenge him to a pitched battle on the high seas. These are the lines that our preparation for war must follow. A strong coast fortress as a base for our fleet, from which it can easily and at any moment take the offensive, and on which the waves of the hostile superiority can break harmlessly, is the recognized and necessary preliminary condition for this class of war. Without such a trustworthy coast fortress, built with a view to offensive operations, our fleet could be closely blockaded by the enemy, and prevented from any offensive movements. Mines alone cannot close the navigation so effectively that the enemy cannot break through, nor can they keep it open in such a way that we should be able to adopt the offensive under all circumstances. For this purpose permanent works are necessary which command the navigation and allow mines to be placed.
I cannot decide the question whether our coast defence, which in the North Sea is concentrated in Heligoland and Borkum, corresponds to these requirements. If it is not so, then our first most serious duty must be to fill up the existing gaps, in order to create an assured base for our naval operations. This is a national duty which we dare not evade, although it demands great sacrifices from us. Even the further development of our fleet, important as that is, would sink into the background as compared with the urgency of this duty, because its only action against the English fleet which holds out any prospect of success presupposes the existence of some such fortress.
But the question must be looked at from another aspect.
The Morocco negotiations in the summer of 1911 displayed the unmistakable hostility of England to us. They showed that England is determined to hinder by force any real expansion of Germany's power. Only the fear of the possible intervention of England deterred us from claiming a sphere of interests of our own in Morocco, and, nevertheless, the attempt to assert our unquestionable rights in North Africa provoked menacing utterances from various English statesmen.
If we consider this behaviour in connection with England's military preparations, there can be no doubt that England seriously contemplates attacking Germany should the occasion arise. The concentration of the English naval forces in the North Sea, the feverish haste to increase the English fleet, the construction of new naval stations, undisguisedly intended for action against Germany, of which we have already spoken; the English espionage, lately vigorously practised, on the German coasts, combined with continued attempts to enlist allies against us and to isolate us in Europe—all this can only be reasonably interpreted as a course of preparation for an aggressive war. At any rate, it is quite impossible to regard the English preparations as defensive and protective measures only; for the English Government knows perfectly well that Germany cannot think of attacking England: such an attempt would be objectless from the first. Since the destruction of the German naval power lies in the distinct interests of England and her schemes for world empire, we must reckon at least with the possibility of an English attack. We must make it clear to ourselves that we are not able to postpone this attack as we wish. It has been already mentioned that the recent attitude of Italy may precipitate a European crisis; we must make up our minds, then, that England will attack us on some pretext or other soon, before the existing balance of power, which is very favourable for England, is shifted possibly to her disadvantage. Especially, if the Unionist party comes into power again, must we reckon upon a strong English Imperial policy which may easily bring about war.
Under these circumstances we cannot complete our armament by sea and our coast defences in peaceful leisure, in accordance with theoretical principles. On the contrary, we must strain our financial resources in order to carry on, and if possible to accelerate, the expansion of our fleet, together with the fortification of our coast. It would be justifiable, under the conditions, to meet our financial requirements by loans, if no other means can be found; for here questions of the greatest moment are at stake—questions, it may fairly be said, of existence.
Let us imagine the endless misery which a protracted stoppage or definite destruction of our oversea trade would bring upon the whole nation, and, in particular, on the masses of the industrial classes who live on our export trade. This consideration by itself shows the absolute necessity of strengthening our naval forces in combination with our coast defences so thoroughly that we can look forward to the decisive campaign with equanimity. Even the circumstance that we cannot, perhaps, find crews at once for the ships which we are building need not check the activity of our dockyards; for these ships will be valuable to replace the loss in vessels which must occur in any case.
The rapid completion of the Kaiser-Wilhelm Canal is of great importance, in order that our largest men-of-war may appear unexpectedly in the Baltic or in the North Sea. But it does not meet all military requirements. It is a question whether it is not expedient to obtain secure communication by a canal between the mouth of the Ems, the Bay of Jahde, and the mouth of the Elbe, in order to afford our fleet more possibilities of concentration. All three waters form a sally-port in the North Sea, and it would be certainly a great advantage if our battleships could unexpectedly unite in these three places. I cannot give any opinion as to the feasibility of this scheme. If it is feasible, we ought to shirk no sacrifices to realize it. Such a canal might prove of decisive value, since our main prospect of success depends on our ability to break up the forces of the enemy by continuous unexpected attacks, and on our thus finding an opportunity to inflict heavy losses upon him.
As regards the development of the fleet itself, we must push on the completion of our battle-fleet, which consists of ships of the line and the usual complement of large cruisers. It does not possess in its present condition an effective value in proportion to its numbers. There can be no doubt on this point. Five of the ships of the line, of the Kaiser class, are quite obsolete, and the vessels of the Wittelsbach class carry as heaviest guns only 24-centimetre cannons, which must be considered quite inadequate for a sea-battle of to-day. We are in a worse plight with regard to our large cruisers. The five ships of the Hansa class have no fighting value; the three large cruisers of the Prince class (Adalbert, Friedrich Karl, Heinrich) fulfil their purpose neither in speed, effective range, armament, nor armour-plating. Even the armoured cruisers Fürst Bismarck, Roon, York, Gneisenau, and Scharnhorst do not correspond in any respect to modern requirements. If we wish, therefore, to be really ready for a war, we must shorten the time allowed for building, and replace as rapidly as possible these totally useless vessels—nine large cruisers and five battleships—by new and thoroughly effective ships.
Anyone who regards the lowering thunder-clouds on the political horizon will admit this necessity. The English may storm and protest ever so strongly: care for our country must stand higher than all political and all financial considerations. We must create new types of battleships, which may be superior to the English in speed and fighting qualities. That is no light task, for the most modern English ships of the line have reached a high stage of perfection, and the newest English cruisers are little inferior in fighting value to the battleships proper. But superiority in individual units, together with the greatest possible readiness for war, are the only means by which a few ships can be made to do, at any rate, what is most essential. Since the Krupp guns possess a certain advantage—which is not, in fact, very great—over the English heavy naval guns, it is possible to gain a start in this department, and to equip our ships with superior attacking power. A more powerful artillery is a large factor in success, which becomes more marked the more it is possible to distribute the battery on the ship in such a way that all the guns may be simultaneously trained to either side or straight ahead.
Besides the battle-fleet proper, the torpedo-boats play a prominent part in strategic offence and defence alike. The torpedo-fleet, therefore—especially having regard to the crushing superiority of England—requires vigorous encouragement, and all the more so because, so far, at least, as training goes, we possess a true factor of superiority in them. In torpedo-boats we are, thanks to the high standard of training in the personnel and the excellence of construction, ahead of all other navies. We must endeavour to keep this position, especially as regards the torpedoes, in which, according to the newspaper accounts, other nations are competing with us, by trying to excel us in range of the projectile at high velocity. We must also devote our full attention to submarines, and endeavour to make these vessels more effective in attack. If we succeed in developing this branch of our navy, so that it meets the military requirements in every direction, and combines an increased radius of effectiveness with increased speed and seaworthiness, we shall achieve great results with these vessels in the defence of our coasts and in unexpected attacks on the enemy's squadrons. A superior efficiency in this field would be extraordinarily advantageous to us.
Last, not least, we must devote ourselves more energetically to the development of aviation for naval purposes. If it were possible to make airships and flying-machines thoroughly available for war, so that they could be employed in unfavourable weather and for aggressive purposes, they might render essential services to the fleet. The air-fleet would then, as already explained in Chapter VIII., be able to report successfully, to spy out favourable opportunities for attacks by the battle-fleet or the torpedo-fleet, and to give early notice of the approach of the enemy in superior force. It would also be able to prevent the enemy's airships from reconnoitring, and would thus facilitate the execution of surprise attacks. Again, it could repulse or frustrate attacks on naval depots and great shipping centres. If our airships could only be so largely developed that they, on their side, could undertake an attack and carry fear and destruction to the English coasts, they would lend still more effective aid to our fleet when fighting against the superior force of the enemy. It can hardly be doubted that technical improvements will before long make it possible to perform such services. A pronounced superiority of our air-fleet over the English would contribute largely to equalize the difference in strength of the two navies more and more during the course of the war. It should be the more possible to gain a superiority in this field because our supposed enemies have not any start on us, and we can compete for the palm of victory on equal terms.
Besides the campaign against the enemy's war-fleet, preparations must be carefully made in peace-time for the war on commerce, which would be especially effective in a struggle against England, as that country needs imports more than any other. Consequently great results would follow if we succeeded in disturbing the enemy's commerce and harassing his navigation. The difficulties of such an undertaking have been discussed in a previous chapter. It is all the more imperative to organize our preparations in such a way that the swift ships intended for the commercial war should be able to reach their scene of activity unexpectedly before the enemy has been able to block our harbours. The auxiliary cruisers must be so equipped in peace-time that when on the open sea they may assume the character of warships at a moment's notice, when ordered by wireless telegraphy to do so.
A rapid mobilization is especially important in the navy, since we must be ready for a sudden attack at any time, possibly in time of peace. History tells us what to expect from the English on this head.
In the middle of peace they bombarded Copenhagen from September 2 to September 5, 1807, and carried off the Danish fleet. Four hundred houses were burnt, 2,000 damaged, 3,000 peaceful and innocent inhabitants were killed. If some explanation, though no justification, of the conduct of England is seen in the lawlessness of all conditions then existing, and in the equally ruthless acts of Napoleon, still the occurrence shows distinctly of what measures England is capable if her command of the seas is endangered. And this practice has not been forgotten. On July 11 and 12, 1882, exactly thirty years ago, Alexandria was similarly bombarded in peace-time, and Egypt occupied by the English under the hypocritical pretext that Arabi Pasha had ordered a massacre of the foreigners. The language of such historical facts is clear. It is well not to forget them.
The Russo-Japanese War also is a warning how modern wars begin; so also Italy, with her political and military attack on Turkey. Turkish ships, suspecting nothing of war, were attacked and captured by the Italians.
Now, it must not be denied that such a method of opening a campaign as was adopted by Japan and Italy may be justified under certain conditions. The interests of the State may turn the scale. The brutal violence shown to a weak opponent, such as is displayed in the above-described English procedure, has nothing in common with a course of action politically justifiable.
A surprise attack, in order to be justified, must be made in the first place only on the armed forces of the hostile State, not on peaceful inhabitants. A further necessary preliminary condition is that the tension of the political situation brings the possibility or probability of a war clearly before the eyes of both parties, so that an expectation of, and preparations for, war can be assumed. Otherwise the attack becomes a treacherous crime. If the required preliminary conditions are granted, then a political coup is as justifiable as a surprise attack in warfare, since it tries to derive advantage from an unwarrantable carelessness of the opponent. A definite principle of right can never be formulated in this question, since everything depends on the views taken of the position, and these may be very divergent among the parties concerned. History alone can pass a final verdict on the conduct of States. But in no case can a formal rule of right in such cases—especially when a question of life or death is depending on it, as was literally the fact in the Manchurian War as regards Japan—limit the undoubted right of the State. If Japan had not obtained from the very first the absolute command of the seas, the war with Russia would have been hopeless. She was justified, therefore, in employing the most extreme measures. No such interests were at stake for England either in 1807 or 1882, and Italy's proceedings in 1911 are certainly doubtful from the standpoint of political morality.
These examples, however, show what we may expect from England, and we must be the more prepared to find her using this right to attack without warning, since we also may be under the necessity of using this right. Our mobilization preparations must therefore be ready for all such eventualities, especially in the period after the dismissal of the reservists.
Public policy forbids any discussion of the steps that must be taken to secure that our fleet is ready for war during this time. Under all circumstances, however, our coast defences must be continuously ready for fighting, and permanently garrisoned in times of political tension. The mines must also be prepared for action without delay. The whole matériel requisite for the purpose must be on the spot ready for instant use. So, too, all measures for the protection of commerce at the mouths of our rivers and in the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal must be put in force directly the situation becomes strained. This is a mere simple precept of self-protection. We must also attach as much importance to the observation and intelligence service on our coasts in peace-time as is done in England.
When we realize in their entirety the mass of preparations which are required for the maintenance of our place among the Great Powers by the navy, we see that extraordinarily exacting demands will be made on the resources of our people. These weigh the heavier for the moment, since the crisis of the hour forces us to quite exceptional exertions, and the expenditure on the fleet must go hand-in-hand, with very energetic preparations on land. If we do not possess the strength or the self-devotion to meet this twofold demand, the increase of the fleet must be delayed, and we must restrict ourselves to bringing our coast defences to such a pitch of completeness as will meet all our requirements. Any acceleration in our ship-building would have to be provisionally dropped.
In opposition to this view, it is urged from one quarter that we should limit our fortification of the coast to what is absolutely necessary, devote all our means to developing the fleet, and lay the greatest stress on the number of the ships and their readiness for war, even in case of the reserve fleet. This view starts from the presupposition that, in face of so strong and well-equipped a fleet as the Naval Act contemplates for Germany, England would never resolve to declare war on us. It is also safe to assume that a fleet built expressly on uniform tactical principles represents a more powerful fighting force than we have to-day in an equal number of heterogeneous battleships.
I cannot myself, however, endorse this view. On the one hand, it is to be feared that the fighting strength of the hostile fleets increases quicker than that of ours; on the other hand, I believe that the general situation makes war with England inevitable, even if our naval force in the shortest time reaches its statutory strength in modern men-of-war. My view, therefore, is that we must first of all lay the solid foundation without which any successful action against the superior forces of the enemy is unthinkable. Should the coast fortifications fail to do what is expected from them, success is quite impossible.
It is, however, all the more our duty to spare no sacrifices to carry out both objects—the enlargement of the fleet, as well as whatever may still be necessary to the perfecting of our coast defences. Though this latter point calls for the first attention, the great necessity for the navy admits of no doubt. If we do not to-day stake everything on strengthening our fleet, to insure at least the possibility of a successful war, and if we once more allow our probable opponent to gain a start which it will be scarcely possible to make up in the future, we must renounce for many years to come any place among the World Powers.
Under these circumstances, no one who cherishes German sentiments and German hopes will advocate a policy of renunciation. On the contrary, we must try not only to prosecute simultaneously the fortification of the coast and the development of the fleet, but we must so accelerate the pace of our ship-building that the requirements of the Naval Act will be met by 1914—a result quite possible according to expert opinion.
The difficult plight in which we are to-day, as regards our readiness for war, is due to two causes in the past. It has been produced in the first place because, from love of the pleasures of peace, we have in the long years since the founding of the German Empire neglected to define and strengthen our place among the Powers of Europe, and to win a free hand in world politics, while around us the other Powers were growing more and more threatening. It was, in my opinion, the most serious mistake in German policy that a final settling of accounts with France was not effected at a time when the state of international affairs was favourable and success might confidently have been expected. There has, indeed, been no lack of opportunities. We have only our policy of peace and renunciation to thank for the fact that we are placed in this difficult position, and are confronted by the momentous choice between resigning all claim to world power or disputing this claim against numerically superior enemies. This policy somewhat resembles the supineness for which England has herself to blame, when she refused her assistance to the Southern States in the American War of Secession, and thus allowed a Power to arise in the form of the United States of North America, which already, although barely fifty years have elapsed, threatens England's own position as a World Power. But the consequences of our peace policy hit us harder than England has suffered under her former American policy. The place of Great Britain as a Great Power is far more secured by her insular position and her command of the seas than ours, which is threatened on all sides by more powerful enemies. It is true that one cannot anticipate success in any war with certainty, and there was always the possibility during the past forty years that we might not succeed in conquering France as effectually as we would have wished. This uncertainty is inseparable from every war. Neither in 1866 nor in 1870 could Bismarck foresee the degree of success which would fall to him, but he dared to fight. The greatness of the statesman is shown when at the most favourable moment he has the courage to undertake what is the necessary and, according to human calculation, the best course. Just Fate decides the issue.
The second cause of our present position is to be seen in the fact that we started to build our fleet too late. The chief mistake which we have made is that, after the year 1889, when we roused ourselves to vote the Brandenburg type of ship, we sank back until 1897 into a period of decadence, while complete lack of system prevailed in all matters concerning the fleet. We have also begun far too late to develop systematically our coast defences, so that the most essential duties which spring out of the political situation are unfulfilled, since we have not foreseen this situation nor prepared for it.
This experience must be a lesson to us in the future. We must never let the petty cares and needs of the moment blind us to the broad views which must determine our world policy. We must always adopt in good time those measures which are seen to be necessary for the future, even though they make heavy financial calls on our resources.
This is the point of view that we must keep in mind with regard to our naval armament. Even at the eleventh hour we may make up a little for lost time. It will be a heinous mistake if we do not perform this duty devotedly.