STRENGTH AND POSITION OF THE ARMIES

(On September 5–6, except where otherwise indicated, in order from West to East)

ALLIEDGERMAN

6th ARMY (General MAUNOURY),(H.Q., Claye). Under the directionof General Gallieni till September10.

I ARMY (General vonKLUCK), (H.Q., Coulommiers).

7th Corps (General Vautier).
Brought from Lorraine to theAmiens region, thence to east ofParis. Consisting of 14th DivisionActive (General Villaret) and 63rdDivision of Reserve (General Lombard)—the latter in lieu of the 13thDivision, left in the Vosges.
Came into action on September6, and then formed the left.

IV Cavalry Division.

5th Group of Reserve Divisions(General Lamaze).
Also from Lorraine and Amiens,after hard fighting and heavylosses. Consisting of 55th DivisionReserve (General Leguay),56th Division Reserve (Generalde Dartein), and a brigade ofMoroccan Infantry (General Ditte).
This group came into action onthe afternoon of September 5, andafterwards formed the centre.

IV Corps of Reserve (Generalvon Schwerin).
Consisting of the VII andXXII Reserve Divisions.At the commencement ofthe battle, stood, as rearguardon the west of theOurcq, about Marcilly,Barcy, and Penchard, inface of the French 6thArmy. It had nothing behindto call upon, save

45th Division (General Drude).
From Algeria.

A Cavalry Brigade (General Gillet),much fatigued in the retreat fromBelgium.
The above units were whollynorth of the Marne, save for a thinconnection with the British Army.
They were reinforced during thebattle by the following:

A Brigade of Landwehr,
which was brought to thenorth of the battlefield fromthe Oise on September 8.

4th Corps (General Boëlle).
7th and 8th Divisions, broughtfrom the 3rd Army (embarked atSte. Menehould, September 2).Some regiments had lost heavilyon the Meuse. The 8th Division(de Lartigues) was sent acrossthe Marne on September 6 tolink Maunoury’s and the BritishArmies; the 7th Division (Generalde Trentinian), on September 8,to Maunoury’s left, where it wasafterwards joined by the 8thDivision.

The following units wereat first all south of theMarne, facing the BritishExpeditionary Force andthe French 5th Army:

6th Group of Reserve Divisions(General Ebener).
Much reduced by fighting nearCambrai, and exhausted in theretreat. Consisting of 61st ReserveDivision (General Deprez) and62nd Reserve Division (GeneralGaneval). Engaged September7 and 9.

1st Cavalry Corps (General Sordet.Succeeded at 9 a.m. on September8 by General Bridoux).

II Corps (General von Linsingen).
Of Stettin. III and IVDivisions, one north andone south of the GrandMorin, between Crécy-en-Brieand Coulommiers,facing the British. Withdrawnto the Ourcq on September 6.

1st, 3rd, and 5th Divisions: muchfatigued in the retreat. Orderedfrom south of the Seine toNanteuil-le-Haudouin, September 7.

2½ Battalions of Zouaves weresent on September 9 to the aid ofthe left wing. A brigade of Spahis,detrained on September 10, tookpart in the pursuit to the Aisne.Three groups of garrison batterieswere sent, on September 6, tosupport Lamaze, who had nocorps artillery. 4 divisions ofTerritorials (83, 85, 89, and 92) ofthe Paris garrison did rear duty, butwere not engaged in the battle.Admiral Ronar’ch’s Brigadeof Marines, afterwards famous atDixmude, was not engaged, beinginsufficiently trained.

IV Corps (General von Armin).
Of Magdeburg. VII andVIII Divisions; south of theGrand Morin from Coulommiersto Chevru, facing theBritish. Withdrawn to theOurcq on September 7.

BRITISH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE(General Sir John FRENCH),(H.Q., Melun).

3rd Corps (General Pulteney).
Consisting of the 4th Division(Major-General Snow, 10th, 11th,12th Brigades, and 5th CavalryBrigade), and the 19th Brigade.The 4th Division joined before thebattle of Le Cateau. This formedthe British left, south ofCrécy-en-Brie.

III Corps (General vonLochow).
Of Berlin. V and VI Divisions,across the highroadfrom Montmirail to Provins,midway between these towns.

2nd Corps (General Sir H.Smith-Dorrien).
Comprising the 3rd Division(Hamilton—7th, 8th, and 9th Brigades,and 2nd Cavalry Brigade);and 5th Division (Ferguson—13th,14th, and 15th Brigades, and 3rdCavalry Brigade). This corpshad borne the heaviest fighting inthe 150 miles’ retreat from Mons,its casualties numbering 350 officersand 9200 men. These losses hadbeen partly made good.

IX Corps (General von Quast).
Of Altona. Two divisions,one north of Esternay,and one at the right of this,near Morsains.

1st Corps (General Sir D. Haig).
1st Division (Lomax—1st, 2nd,3rd Brigades, and 1st CavalryBrigade); 2nd Division (Murray—4th,5th, 6th Brigades, and 4thCavalry Brigade). This made theBritish right, east of Rozoy.
All these troops consisted ofhome regiments of the old regulararmy.

(The III Reserve andIX Reserve Corps of VonKluck’s Army had beenleft behind—partly beforeAntwerp, partly beforeMaubeuge.)

5th ARMY (General FranchetD’ESPÉREY), (H.Q., Romilly-sur-Seine).

2nd Cavalry Corps (General Conneau).Brought from the Lorraine front.

Comprising the 4th, 8th, and 10thDivisions (Generals Abonneau,Baratier, and Gendron). Arrivingfrom the 2nd Army at the beginningof September, it kept contact withthe British Army on the left, north-westof Provins.

Cavalry Corps.
Consisting of the IIand IX Cavalry Divisions(General von der Marwitz)facing the left and centre ofthe British Army, and the VDivision and Guard CavalryDivision (General von Richthofen)placed between andbefore the German IV andIII Corps, south of theGrand Morin, at La Ferté-Gaucher,facing the junctionof the French 5th andBritish Armies. The GuardC.D. was particularlystrong, having 3 Jägerbattalions and 6 machine-guncompanies attached.

18th Corps (General de Maud’huy).
35th, 36th, and 38th Divisions(Generals Marjoulat, Jouannic, andMuteau). Before and behind Provins.There was thus fully 10miles between it and Sir DouglasHaig’s Corps.

3rd Corps (General Hache).
5th, 6th, and 37th Divisions(Generals Mangin, Petain, andComby), south-west of Esternay.

1st Corps (General Deligny,succeeding General Franchet d’Espérey).
1st and 2nd Divisions (GeneralsGallet and Duplessis). Across theGrand Morin at Esternay.

The above three corps faced the leftof the German I Army.

10th Corps (General Defforges).
19th and 20th Divisions (GeneralsBonnier and Rogerie) east ofEsternay. Sent to aid of 9th Armyfrom September 9 to 11.

II ARMY (General vonBÜLOW), (H.Q., Montmirail).

The above four corps extended overthe plateaux from the British rightto the Paris–Nancy highroad,midway between Esternay andSézanne, their right being advanced.

VII Corps Active (General vonEinem), (XIII and XIVDivisions).
This had come on tardily,and was in the rear,between Château-Thierryand Montmirail, when thebattle opened. Being behindKluck’s left, it hassometimes been counted aspart of the I Army andthe IX as part of Bülow’s.The VII Reserve Corpswas detained before Maubeuge,and only reachedthe Aisne on September 13.

4th Group of Reserve Divisions(General Valabrègue).
Consisting of the 51st, 53rd, and69th Divisions of Reserve (GeneralsBouttegourd, Perruchon, andLegros). In support and reserve:much fatigued after the battle ofGuise and the retreat.

Light Brigade of 2nd Division Infantry.In reserve.

9th ARMY (General FOCH), (H.Q.,Pleurs).

X Corps Reserve (Generalvon Hülsen).
Consisting of the XIXReserve Division and theII Guard Division. South-eastof Montmirail. Itwas engaged on the 5th incollecting its wounded andburying its dead.

42nd Division (General Grossetti).
From the 6th Corps of the Armyof Verdun. North of Sézanneacross the Epernay road, in touchwith d’Espérey’s right.

X Corps Active (General vonEben).
Of Hanover. FacingFoch’s left, about Villeneuve-lès-CharlevilleandSt. Prix, at the west endof the Marshes of St. Gond.

9th Corps (General Dubois).
From Nancy; afterwards partof the 4th Army. Consisting ofthe 1st Moroccan Division (GeneralHumbert), replacing all but onebattalion of the 18th Division (seebelow) and the 17th Division(General Moussy). On both sidesof Fère Champènoise, with advanceguards north of the St. GondMarshes.

Guard Corps (General vonPlattenberg).
North and north-east ofSt. Gond Marshes, fromEtoges to Morains, facingFoch’s right-centre.Placed here, without doubt,for the honour of breakingthe French centre.

11th Corps (General Eydoux).
From the 4th Army. The 18thDivision (General Lefebvre), fromLorraine, came into line on theevening of September 7 betweenConnantre and Normée. The21st Division (General Radiguet)and the 22nd Division (GeneralPembet) were, at the beginning ofthe battle, about Lenharrée andthe important cross-roads of Sommesous,facing the junction ofVon Bülow’s and the Saxon Armies,with reserves north of the RiverAube.

IV Cavalry Corps (Generalvon Falkenhayn).
After the battle of Guise,Bülow’s Army had comesouth through Laon, crossingthe Marne betweenDormans and Epernay.

52nd and 60th Reserve Divisions(Generals Battesti and Joppé).
From the 4th Army. The formerwas affected to the 9th and thelatter to the 11th Corps.

III ARMY (General vonHAÜSEN).

XII Corps Active (I Saxon),(General von Elsa).
North of Normée andLenharrée. It came abreastof the Guard only on themorning of the 7th.

9th Cavalry Division (General del’Espée).
In the rear at the Camp deMailly, keeping connection withthe 4th Army across a gap ofabout 12 miles.

4th ARMY (General de LANGLEDE CARY), (H.Q., Brienne).

XII Corps Reserve (Generalvon Kirchbach).
The XXIV and XXIII Divisions; across the Châlonshighroad north ofSommesous. The former,which had been besiegingGivet, could only join onSeptember 7. It was turnedsouth-west against Foch,the XXIII south-eastagainst de Langle.

21st Corps (General Legrand).
13th and 43rd Divisions (GeneralsBaquet and Lanquetot). From theVosges. Detrained on the eveningof September 8, and engaged September9 on the left, east of theCamp de Mailly.

XIX Corps (General vonLaffert).
On September 6, wassouth of Châlons, west andnorth-west of Vitry, facingde Langle’s left.

17th Corps (General J. B. Dumas).
33rd and 34th Divisions (GeneralsGuillaumat and Alby). FromCourdemanges to Sompuis.

IV ARMY (DUKE Albrechtof WÜRTEMBERG),(H.Q., Triaucourt).

12th Corps (General Roques).
23rd and 24th Divisions (GeneralsMasnon and Descoings), reducedby previous casualties to about 6effective battalions. At Vitryand Courdemange. The 23rd Divisionwas lent to the 17th Corps till afterthe passage of the Marne.

VIII Corps Active (GeneralTulffe v. Tscheppe u. Weidenbach).
Of Coblenz. North-eastof Vitry.

VIII Corps Reserve (Generalvon Egloffstein).
About Ponthion.

Colonial Corps (General Lefebvre).
2nd and 3rd Colonial Divisions(Generals Leblois and Leblond).Experienced troops, largely re-enlistedfrom the general army.They had suffered heavily in theBelgian Ardennes, losing manyofficers. At Blesmes and Dompremy.

XVIII Corps Active (Generalvon Tchenk).
Having lost heavily, wasreplaced during the battleby the

2nd Corps (General Gerard).
3rd and 4th Divisions, less abrigade (Generals Cordonnierand Rabier). At Maurupt and Sermaize.

XVIII Corps Reserve.
Both had come down thewest side of the Argonneand the Ste. Menehouldhighroad. About Somme–Yevreand Possesse.

A Cavalry Division.

A division of each of the lasttwo corps was shifted fromde Langle’s right to his left onSeptember 8. De Langle’s Armyextended along the railway fromSompius, by Blesmes Junction, toSermaize.

V ARMY (The ImperialCROWN PRINCE).

3rd ARMY (General SARRAIL),(H.Q., Ligny-en-Barrois).

VI Corps (General von Pricttwitz).
Of Breslau. Had comesouth by Les Islettes, andwas now south of theArgonne, striking towardRevigny.

15th Corps (General Espinasse).
29th and 30th Divisions (GeneralsCarbillet and Colle). From the2nd Army; detrained, September7. A brigade was diverted, September8, to the aid of the 4thArmy. Near Revigny. Part ofthe corps was afterwards senteast to defend the passages of theMeuse.

VI Corps Reserve.
A brigade only on thefront, at Passavant andCharmontois. The restwest of the Meuse, nearMontfaucon, facing Verdun.

Landwehr Division of thesame, before Verdun.

5th Corps (General Micheler).
9th and 10th Divisions (GeneralsMartin and Gossart). North ofRevigny, about Laimont andVillotte. General Gossart replacedGeneral Roques, killed on September6.

XIII Corps (General vonDürach).
Of Stuttgart. Comingby Ste. Menehould, it hadreached Triaucourt.

7th Cavalry Division (Generald’Urbal).
About Isle-en-Barrois. Sent onSeptember 11 to the Heights ofthe Meuse.

XVI Corps (General vonMudra).
Of Metz. Coming downthe east side of the Argonne,it had reached Froidos-sur-Aire,aiming at Bar-le-Duc.

6th Corps (General Verraux).
12th and 40th Divisions (GeneralSouchier, succeeded by GeneralHerr, and General Leconte) and107th Brigade of the 54th D.R.(General Estève). South of theArgonne, about Beauzée-sur-Aire.

V Corps Reserve (GeneralCount Solms).
Was still on the eastbank of the Meuse aboutConsenvoye, north of Verdun.

A Division of the IV Cavalry Corps.

* * *

3rd Group of Reserve Divisions(General Paul Durand).
65th (General Bigot); 67th(General Marabail); 75th (GeneralVimard). Behind and extendingthe 6th Corps on the Aire.

V Active Corps.
Sent from Metz on September6 to the MeuseHeights the force whichattacked Fort Troyon andneighbouring points.

72nd Division of Reserve (GeneralHeymann).
Sent from the garrison of Verdunby the Governor, General Coutanceau,to Souhesme-la-Grande, insupport.

When the battle was engagedthere remained only a fewbattalions in and before Verdunand on the Heights of the Meuse.

Sarrail’s Army was deployed south-westwardfrom near Souilly toRevigny.

The composition of the 1st and 2nd Armies of Generals Dubail and de Castelnau, and of the German armies facing them, is given in the chapter dealing with the defence of the eastern frontier (pp. [198–200]).

With so much accuracy as is yet possible, the relative strength of the opposed forces at the maximum was as follows:

SUMMARY OF STRENGTH

ALLIESGERMANS
Divisions. Divisions.
Infantry.Cavalry. Infantry.Cavalry.
French 6th Army  9½ 3½German  I Army115
British Army  5½ ” II ”82
French 5th Army 13½3” III ”6
” 9th ” 81” IV ”81
” 4th ”10 ” V ”111
” 3rd ” 10½1From Metz1
 57  9  45 (?48) 9
(of which 41 Active)(of which 31 Active)
(The B.E.F. included 5 Cavalry Brigades)
French 2nd and 1st
armies (approx.)
22 DivsGerman VI and VII Armies
(approx.)
24 Divs.
(of which 11 Active)(till Sept. 7, of which 12 Active)

This comparison of totals is of only limited value, for two main reasons: (1) As has been explained, the German reserve divisions were markedly stronger than the French, and the German corps generally were more homogeneous. (2) The table shows only the maximum development of each army. Light artillery was probably in about the same proportion as the infantry, with a marked advantage of quality on the side of the Allies; it had not been possible to bring the full German superiority in heavy guns to bear on the new front. It will be safe to say that between the regions of Paris and Verdun the Allies had obtained a distinct superiority in active formations, and one more marked at the height of the battle in the area of decision. Antwerp and Maubeuge held before them bodies of German troops that might have turned the balance in the south; the occupation of towns and the guarding of communications retained others; whether from nervousness or over-confidence, Berlin had called two corps (11th and Guard R.C.) from France for the Russian frontier—a “fateful” step for which Ludendorff disclaims responsibility. On the other hand, two new French armies had been created, chiefly at the cost of the eastern border; many units had been re-formed; the upper commands had been strengthened; and the whole line had been brought near to its bases. “The farther the Germans advanced, the French and British adroitly evading a decisive action, the more the initial advantage passed from the former to the latter,” says a German writer already cited.[55] “The Germans left their bases farther and farther behind, and exhausted themselves by fatiguing marches. They consumed munitions and food with a fearful rapidity, and the least trouble in the supply services might become fatal to masses so large. Meanwhile, the French were daily receiving fresh troops, daily approaching their stores of munitions and food.”

This great overturn of material strength was the first advantage the French Command had worked for and obtained. It is to be noted that on neither side was any mass held as a general reserve. Joffre had hoped to keep back the 21st Corps, but even this proved impossible. “The strategic situation,” he telegraphed to M. Millerand on September 5, “is excellent, and we cannot count on better conditions for our offensive. The struggle about to begin may have decisive results, but may also have for the country, in case of check, the gravest consequences. I have decided to engage our troops to the utmost and without reserve to obtain a victory.”