Commonplace Book

I. = Introduction.

M. = Matter.

P. = Primary and Secondary qualities.

E. = Existence.

T. = Time.

S. = Soul—Spirit.

G. = God.

Mo. = Moral Philosophy.

N. = Natural Philosophy.

Qu. If there be not two kinds of visible extension—one perceiv'd by a confus'd view, the other by a distinct successive direction of the optique axis to each point?

No general ideas[46]. The contrary a cause of mistake or confusion in mathematiques, &c. This to be intimated in ye Introduction[47].

The Principle may be apply'd to the difficulties of conservation, co-operation, &c.

Trifling for the [natural] philosophers to enquire the cause of magnetical attractions, &c. They onely search after co-existing ideas[48].

M. P.

Quæcunque in Scriptura militant adversus Copernicum, militant pro me.

M. P.

All things in the Scripture wch side with the vulgar against the learned, side with me also. I side in all things with the mob.

I know there is a mighty sect of men will oppose me, but yet I may expect to be supported by those whose minds are not so far overgrown wth madness. These are far the greatest part of mankind—especially Moralists, Divines, Politicians; in a word, all but Mathematicians and Natural Philosophers. I mean only the hypothetical gentlemen. Experimental philosophers have nothing whereat to be offended in me.

Newton begs his Principles; I demonstrate mine[49].

I must be very particular in explaining wt is meant by things existing—in houses, chambers, fields, caves, &c.—wn not perceiv'd as well as wn perceived; and shew how the vulgar notion agrees with mine, when we narrowly inspect into the meaning and definition of the word existence, wh is no simple idea, distinct from perceiving and being perceived[50].

The Schoolmen have noble subjects, but handle them ill. The mathematicians have trifling subjects, but reason admirably about them. Certainly their method and arguing are excellent.

God knows how far our knowledge of intellectual beings may be enlarg'd from the Principles.

The reverse of the Principle I take to have been the chief source of all that scepticism and folly, all those contradictions and inextricable puzzling absurdities, that have in all ages been a reproach to human reason, as well as of that idolatry, whether of images or of gold, that blinds the greatest part of the world, and that shamefull immorality that turns us into beasts.

היה Vixit & fuit.

οὐσία, the name for substance, used by Aristotle, the Fathers, &c.

If at the same time we shall make the Mathematiques much more easie and much more accurate, wt can be objected to us[51]?

We need not force our imagination to conceive such very small lines for infinitesimals. They may every whit as well be imagin'd big as little, since that the integer must be infinite.

Evident that wch has an infinite number of parts must be infinite.

We cannot imagine a line or space infinitely great—therefore absurd to talk or make propositions about it.

We cannot imagine a line, space, &c., quovis lato majus. Since yt what we imagine must be datum aliquod; a thing can't be greater than itself.

If you call infinite that wch is greater than any assignable by another, then I say, in that sense there may be an infinite square, sphere, or any other figure, wch is absurd.

Qu. if extension be resoluble into points it does not consist of?

No reasoning about things whereof we have no ideas[52]; therefore no reasoning about infinitesimals.

No word to be used without an idea.

If uneasiness be necessary to set the Will at work, Qu. how shall we will in heaven?

Bayle's, Malbranch's, &c. arguments do not seem to prove against Space, but onely against Bodies.

M. P.

I agree in nothing wth the Cartesians as to ye existence of Bodies & Qualities[53].

Aristotle as good a man as Euclid, but he was allowed to have been mistaken.

Lines not proper for demonstration.

We see the house itself, the church itself; it being an idea and nothing more. The house itself, the church itself, is an idea, i.e. an object—immediate object—of thought[54].

Instead of injuring, our doctrine much benefits geometry.

Existence is percipi, or percipere, [or velle, i.e. agere[55]]. The horse is in the stable, the books are in the study as before.

In physiques I have a vast view of things soluble hereby, but have not leisure.

Hyps and such like unaccountable things confirm my doctrine.

Angle not well defined. See Pardies' Geometry, by Harris, &c. This one ground of trifling.

One idea not the cause of another—one power not the cause of another. The cause of all natural things is onely God. Hence trifling to enquire after second causes. This doctrine gives a most suitable idea of the Divinity[56].

Absurd to study astronomy and other the like doctrines as speculative sciences.

The absurd account of memory by the brain, &c. makes for me.

How was light created before man? Even so were Bodies created before man[57].

Impossible anything besides that wch thinks and is thought on should exist[58].

That wch is visible cannot be made up of invisible things.

M.S. is that wherein there are not contain'd distinguishable sensible parts. Now how can that wch hath not sensible parts be divided into sensible parts? If you say it may be divided into insensible parts, I say these are nothings.

Extension abstract from sensible qualities is no sensation, I grant; but then there is no such idea, as any one may try[59]. There is onely a considering the number of points without the sort of them, & this makes more for me, since it must be in a considering thing.

Mem. Before I have shewn the distinction between visible & tangible extension, I must not mention them as distinct. I must not mention M. T. & M. V., but in general M. S., &c.[60]

Qu. whether a M. V. be of any colour? a M. T. of any tangible quality?

If visible extension be the object of geometry, 'tis that which is survey'd by the optique axis.

I may say the pain is in my finger, &c., according to my doctrine[61].

Mem. Nicely to discuss wt is meant when we say a line consists of a certain number of inches or points, &c.; a circle of a certain number of square inches, points, &c. Certainly we may think of a circle, or have its idea in our mind, without thinking of points or square inches, &c.; whereas it should seem the idea of a circle is not made up of the ideas of points, square inches, &c.

Qu. Is any more than this meant by the foregoing expressions, viz. that squares or points may be perceived in or made out of a circle, &c., or that squares, points, &c. are actually in it, i.e. are perceivable in it?

A line in abstract, or Distance, is the number of points between two points. There is also distance between a slave & an emperor, between a peasant & philosopher, between a drachm & a pound, a farthing & a crown, &c.; in all which Distance signifies the number of intermediate ideas.

Halley's doctrine about the proportion between infinitely great quantities vanishes. When men speak of infinite quantities, either they mean finite quantities, or else talk of [that whereof they have[62]] no idea; both which are absurd.

If the disputations of the Schoolmen are blam'd for intricacy, triflingness, & confusion, yet it must be acknowledg'd [pg 012] that in the main they treated of great & important subjects. If we admire the method & acuteness of the Math[ematicians]—the length, the subtilty, the exactness of their demonstrations—we must nevertheless be forced to grant that they are for the most part about trifling subjects, and perhaps mean nothing at all.

Motion on 2d thoughts seems to be a simple idea.

Motion distinct from ye thing moved is not conceivable.

Mem. To take notice of Newton for defining it [motion]; also of Locke's wisdom in leaving it undefin'd[63].

Ut ordo partium temporis est immutabilis, sin etiam ordo partium spatii. Moveantur hæ de locis suis, et movebuntur (ut ita dicam) de seipsis. Truly number is immensurable. That we will allow with Newton.

Ask a Cartesian whether he is wont to imagine his globules without colour. Pellucidness is a colour. The colour of ordinary light of the sun is white. Newton in the right in assigning colours to the rays of light.

A man born blind would not imagine Space as we do. We give it always some dilute, or duskish, or dark colour—in short, we imagine it as visible, or intromitted by the eye, wch he would not do.

Proinde vim inferunt sacris literis qui voces hasce (v. tempus, spatium, motus) de quantitatibus mensuratis ibi interpretantur. Newton, p. 10.

I differ from Newton, in that I think the recession ab axe motus is not the effect, or index, or measure of motion, but of the vis impressa. It sheweth not wt is truly moved, but wt has the force impressed on it, or rather that wch hath an impressed force.

D and P are not proportional in all circles. d d is to 1/4d p as d to p/4; but d and p/4 are not in the same proportion in all circles. Hence 'tis nonsense to seek the terms of one general proportion whereby to rectify all peripheries, or of another whereby to square all circles.

N. B. If the circle be squar'd arithmetically, 'tis squar'd geometrically, arithmetic or numbers being nothing but lines & proportions of lines when apply'd to geometry.

Mem. To remark Cheyne[64] & his doctrine of infinites.

Extension, motion, time, do each of them include the idea of succession, & so far forth they seem to be of mathematical consideration. Number consisting in succession & distinct perception, wch also consists in succession; for things at once perceiv'd are jumbled and mixt together in the mind. Time and motion cannot be conceiv'd without succession; and extension, qua mathemat., cannot be conceiv'd but as consisting of parts wch may be distinctly & successively perceiv'd. Extension perceived at once & in confuso does not belong to math.

The simple idea call'd Power seems obscure, or rather none at all, but onely the relation 'twixt Cause and Effect. When I ask whether A can move B, if A be an intelligent thing, I mean no more than whether the volition of A that B move be attended with the motion of B? If A be senseless, whether the impulse of A against B be followed by ye motion of B[65]?

Barrow's arguing against indivisibles, lect. i. p. 16, is a petitio principii, for the Demonstration of Archimedes supposeth the circumference to consist of more than 24 points. Moreover it may perhaps be necessary to suppose the divisibility ad infinitum, in order to demonstrate that the radius is equal to the side of the hexagon.

Shew me an argument against indivisibles that does not go on some false supposition.

A great number of insensibles—or thus, two invisibles, say you, put together become visible; therefore that M. V. contains or is made up of invisibles. I answer, the M. V. does not comprise, is not composed of, invisibles. All the matter amounts to this, viz. whereas I had no idea awhile agoe, I have an idea now. It remains for you to prove that I came by the present idea because there were two invisibles added together. I say the invisibles are nothings, cannot exist, include a contradiction[66].

I am young, I am an upstart, I am a pretender, I am vain. Very well. I shall endeavour patiently to bear up under the most lessening, vilifying appellations the pride & rage of man can devise. But one thing I know I am not guilty of. I do not pin my faith on the sleeve of any great man. I act not out of prejudice or prepossession. I do not adhere to any opinion because it is an old one, a reviv'd one, a fashionable one, or one that I have spent much time in the study and cultivation of.

Sense rather than reason or demonstration ought to be employed about lines and figures, these being things sensible; for as for those you call insensible, we have proved them to be nonsense, nothing[67].

If in some things I differ from a philosopher I profess to admire, 'tis for that very thing on account whereof I admire him, namely, the love of truth. This &c.

Whenever my reader finds me talk very positively, I desire he'd not take it ill. I see no reason why certainty should be confined to the mathematicians.

I say there are no incommensurables, no surds. I say the side of any square may be assign'd in numbers. Say you assign unto me the side of the square 10. I ask wt 10—10 feet, inches, &c., or 10 points? If the later, I deny there is any such square, 'tis impossible 10 points should compose a square. If the former, resolve yr 10 square inches, feet, &c. into points, & the number of points must necessarily be a square number whose side is easily assignable.

A mean proportional cannot be found betwixt any two given lines. It can onely be found betwixt those the numbers of whose points multiply'd together produce a square number. Thus betwixt a line of 2 inches & a line of 5 inches a mean geometrical cannot be found, except the number of points contained in 2 inches multiply'd by ye number of points contained in 5 inches make a square number.

If the wit and industry of the Nihilarians were employ'd [pg 015] about the usefull & practical mathematiques, what advantage had it brought to mankind!

M. E.

You ask me whether the books are in the study now, when no one is there to see them? I answer, Yes. You ask me, Are we not in the wrong for imagining things to exist when they are not actually perceiv'd by the senses? I answer, No. The existence of our ideas consists in being perceiv'd, imagin'd, thought on. Whenever they are imagin'd or thought on they do exist. Whenever they are mentioned or discours'd of they are imagin'd & thought on. Therefore you can at no time ask me whether they exist or no, but by reason of yt very question they must necessarily exist.

But, say you, then a chimæra does exist? I answer, it doth in one sense, i.e. it is imagin'd. But it must be well noted that existence is vulgarly restrain'd to actuall perception, and that I use the word existence in a larger sense than ordinary.[68]

N. B.—According to my doctrine all things are entia rationis, i.e. solum habent esse in intellectum.

[[69]According to my doctrine all are not entia rationis. The distinction between ens rationis and ens reale is kept up by it as well as any other doctrine.]

You ask me whether there can be an infinite idea? I answer, in one sense there may. Thus the visual sphere, tho' ever so small, is infinite, i.e. has no end. But if by infinite you mean an extension consisting of innumerable points, then I ask yr pardon. Points, tho' never so many, may be numbered. The multitude of points, or feet, inches, &c., hinders not their numbrableness (i.e. hinders not their being numerable) in the least. Many or most are numerable, as well as few or least. Also, if by infinite idea you mean an idea too great to be comprehended or perceiv'd all at once, you must excuse me. I think such an infinite is no less than a contradiction[70].

The sillyness of the current doctrine makes much for me. They commonly suppose a material world—figures, motions, bulks of various sizes, &c.—according to their own confession to no purpose. All our sensations may be, and sometimes actually are, without them; nor can men so much as conceive it possible they should concur in any wise to the production of them.

Ask a man, I mean a philosopher, why he supposes this vast structure, this compages of bodies? he shall be at a stand; he'll not have one word to say. Wch sufficiently shews the folly of the hypothesis.

Or rather why he supposes all ys Matter? For bodies and their qualities I do allow to exist independently of our mind.

Qu. How is the soul distinguish'd from its ideas? Certainly if there were no sensible ideas there could be no soul, no perception, remembrance, love, fear, &c.; no faculty could be exerted[71].

The soul is the Will, properly speaking, and as it is distinct from ideas.

The grand puzzling question, whether I sleep or wake, easily solv'd.

Qu. Whether minima or meer minima may not be compar'd by their sooner or later evanescence, as well as by more or less points, so that one sensible may be greater than another, though it exceeds it not by one point?

Circles on several radius's are not similar figures, they having neither all nor any an infinite number of sides. Hence in vain to enquire after 2 terms of one and ye same proportion that should constantly express the reason of the d to the p in all circles.

Mem. To remark Wallis's harangue, that the aforesaid proportion can neither be expressed by rational numbers nor surds.

We can no more have an idea of length without breadth or visibility, than of a general figure.

One idea may be like another idea, tho' they contain no common simple idea[72]. Thus the simple idea red is in some sense like the simple idea blue; 'tis liker it than sweet or shrill. But then those ideas wch are so said to be alike, agree both in their connexion with another simple idea, viz. extension, & in their being receiv'd by one & the same sense. But, after all, nothing can be like an idea but an idea.

No sharing betwixt God & Nature or second causes in my doctrine.

Materialists must allow the earth to be actually mov'd by the attractive power of every stone that falls from the air, with many other the like absurditys.

Enquire concerning the pendulum clock, &c.; whether those inventions of Huygens, &c. be attained to by my doctrine.

The ... & ... & ... &c. of time are to be cast away and neglected, as so many noughts or nothings.

Mem. To make experiments concerning minimums and their colours, whether they have any or no, & whether they can be of that green wch seems to be compounded of yellow and blue.

Qu. Whether it were not better not to call the operations of the mind ideas—confining this term to things sensible[73]?

Mem. diligently to set forth how that many of the ancient philosophers run into so great absurditys as even to deny the existence of motion, and of those other things they perceiv'd actually by their senses. This sprung from their not knowing wt Existence was, and wherein it consisted. This the source of all their folly. 'Tis on the discovering of the nature and meaning and import of Existence that I chiefly insist. This puts a wide difference betwixt the [pg 018] sceptics &c. & me. This I think wholly new. I am sure this is new to me[74].

We have learn'd from Mr. Locke that there may be, and that there are, several glib, coherent, methodical discourses, which nevertheless amount to just nothing. This by him intended with relation to the Scholemen. We may apply it to the Mathematicians.

Qu. How can all words be said to stand for ideas? The word blue stands for a colour without any extension, or abstract from extension. But we have not an idea of colour without extension. We cannot imagine colour without extension.

Locke seems wrongly to assign a double use of words: one for communicating & the other for recording our thoughts. 'Tis absurd to use words for recording our thoughts to ourselves, or in our private meditations[75].

No one abstract simple idea like another. Two simple ideas may be connected with one & the same 3d simple idea, or be intromitted by one & the same sense. But consider'd in themselves they can have nothing common, and consequently no likeness.

Qu. How can there be any abstract ideas of colours? It seems not so easily as of tastes or sounds. But then all ideas whatsoever are particular. I can by no means conceive an abstract general idea. 'Tis one thing to abstract one concrete idea from another of a different kind, & another thing to abstract an idea from all particulars of the same kind[76].

Mem. Much to recommend and approve of experimental philosophy.

What means Cause as distinguish'd from Occasion? Nothing but a being wch wills, when the effect follows the volition. Those things that happen from without we are not the cause of. Therefore there is some other Cause of them, i.e. there is a Being that wills these perceptions in us[77].

[[78]It should be said, nothing but a Will—a Being which wills being unintelligible.]

One square cannot be double of another. Hence the Pythagoric theorem is false.

Some writers of catoptrics absurd enough to place the apparent place of the object in the Barrovian case behind the eye.

Blew and yellow chequers still diminishing terminate in green. This may help to prove the composition of green.

There is in green 2 foundations of 2 relations of likeness to blew & yellow. Therefore green is compounded.

A mixt cause will produce a mixt effect. Therefore colours are all compounded that we see.

Mem. To consider Newton's two sorts of green.

N. B. My abstract & general doctrines ought not to be condemn'd by the Royall Society. 'Tis wt their meeting did ultimately intend. V. Sprat's History S. R.[79]

Mem. To premise a definition of idea[80].

I. Mo.

The 2 great principles of Morality—the being of a God & the freedom of man. Those to be handled in the beginning of the Second Book[81].

Subvertitur geometria ut non practica sed speculativa.

Archimedes's proposition about squaring the circle has nothing to do with circumferences containing less than 96 points; & if the circumference contain 96 points it may be apply'd, but nothing will follow against indivisibles. V. Barrow.

Those curve lines that you can rectify geometrically. Compare them with their equal right lines & by a microscope you shall discover an inequality. Hence my squaring of the circle as good and exact as the best.

Qu. whether the substance of body or anything else be [pg 020] any more than the collection of concrete ideas included in that thing? Thus the substance of any particular body is extension, solidity, figure[82]. Of general abstract body we can have no idea.

Mem. Most carefully to inculcate and set forth that the endeavouring to express abstract philosophic thoughts by words unavoidably runs a man into difficulties. This to be done in the Introduction[83].

Mem. To endeavour most accurately to understand what is meant by this axiom: Quæ sibi mutuo congruunt æqualia sunt.

Qu. what the geometers mean by equality of lines, & whether, according to their definition of equality, a curve line can possibly be equal to a right line?

If wth me you call those lines equal wch contain an equal number of points, then there will be no difficulty. That curve is equal to a right line wch contains the same points as the right one doth.

I take not away substances. I ought not to be accused of discarding substance out of the reasonable world[84]. I onely reject the philosophic sense (wch in effect is no sense) of the word substance. Ask a man not tainted with their jargon wt he means by corporeal substance, or the substance of body. He shall answer, bulk, solidity, and such like sensible qualitys. These I retain. The philosophic nec quid, nec quantum, nec quale, whereof I have no idea, I discard; if a man may be said to discard that which never had any being, was never so much as imagin'd or conceiv'd.

In short, be not angry. You lose nothing, whether real or chimerical. Wtever you can in any wise conceive or imagine, be it never so wild, so extravagant, & absurd, much good may it do you. You may enjoy it for me. I'll never deprive you of it.

N. B. I am more for reality than any other philosophers[85]. They make a thousand doubts, & know not certainly but we may be deceiv'd. I assert the direct contrary.

A line in the sense of mathematicians is not meer distance. This evident in that there are curve lines.

Curves perfectly incomprehensible, inexplicable, absurd, except we allow points.

If men look for a thing where it's not to be found, be they never so sagacious, it is lost labour. If a simple clumsy man knows where the game lies, he though a fool shall catch it sooner than the most fleet & dexterous that seek it elsewhere. Men choose to hunt for truth and knowledge anywhere rather than in their own understanding, where 'tis to be found.

All knowledge onely about ideas. Locke, B. 4. c. 1.

It seems improper, & liable to difficulties, to make the word person stand for an idea, or to make ourselves ideas, or thinking things ideas.

Abstract ideas cause of much trifling and mistake.

Mathematicians seem not to speak clearly and coherently of equality. They nowhere define wt they mean by that word when apply'd to lines.

Locke says the modes of simple ideas, besides extension and number, are counted by degrees. I deny there are any modes or degrees of simple ideas. What he terms such are complex ideas, as I have proved.

Wt do the mathematicians mean by considering curves as polygons? Either they are polygons or they are not. If they are, why do they give them the name of curves? Why do not they constantly call them polygons, & treat them as such? If they are not polygons, I think it absurd to use polygons in their stead. Wt is this but to pervert language? to adapt an idea to a name that belongs not to it but to a different idea?

The mathematicians should look to their axiom, Quæ [pg 022] congruunt sunt æqualia. I know not what they mean by bidding me put one triangle on another. The under triangle is no triangle—nothing at all, it not being perceiv'd. I ask, must sight be judge of this congruentia or not? If it must, then all lines seen under the same angle are equal, wch they will not acknowledge. Must the touch be judge? But we cannot touch or feel lines and surfaces, such as triangles, &c., according to the mathematicians themselves. Much less can we touch a line or triangle that's cover'd by another line or triangle.

Do you mean by saying one triangle is equall to another, that they both take up equal spaces? But then the question recurs, what mean you by equal spaces? If you mean spatia congruentia, answer the above difficulty truly.

I can mean (for my part) nothing else by equal triangles than triangles containing equal numbers of points.

I can mean nothing by equal lines but lines wch 'tis indifferent whether of them I take, lines in wch I observe by my senses no difference, & wch therefore have the same name.

Must the imagination be judge in the aforementioned cases? but then imagination cannot go beyond the touch and sight. Say you, pure intellect must be judge. I reply that lines and triangles are not operations of the mind.

If I speak positively and with the air of a mathematician in things of which I am certain, 'tis to avoid disputes, to make men careful to think before they answer, to discuss my arguments before they go to refute them. I would by no means injure truth and certainty by an affected modesty & submission to better judgments. Wt I lay before you are undoubted theorems; not plausible conjectures of my own, nor learned opinions of other men. I pretend not to prove them by figures, analogy, or authority. Let them stand or fall by their own evidence.

When you speak of the corpuscularian essences of bodys, to reflect on sect. 11. & 12. b. 4. c. 3. Locke. Motion supposes not solidity. A meer colour'd extension may give us the idea of motion.

Any subject can have of each sort of primary qualities but one particular at once. Lib. 4. c. 3. s. 15. Locke.

Well, say you, according to this new doctrine, all is but meer idea—there is nothing wch is not an ens rationis. I answer, things are as real, and exist in rerum natura, as much as ever. The difference between entia realia & entia rationis may be made as properly now as ever. Do but think before you speak. Endeavour rightly to comprehend my meaning, and you'll agree with me in this.

Fruitless the distinction 'twixt real and nominal essences.

We are not acquainted with the meaning of our words. Real, extension, existence, power, matter, lines, infinite, point, and many more are frequently in our mouths, when little, clear, and determin'd answers them in our understandings. This must be well inculcated.

Vain is the distinction 'twixt intellectual and material world[86]. V. Locke, lib. 4. c. 3. s. 27, where he says that is far more beautiful than this.

Foolish in men to despise the senses. If it were not for

Mo.

them the mind could have no knowledge, no thought at all. All ... of introversion, meditation, contemplation, and spiritual acts, as if these could be exerted before we had ideas from without by the senses, are manifestly absurd. This may be of great use in that it makes the happyness of the life to come more conceivable and agreeable to our present nature. The schoolemen & refiners in philosophy gave the greatest part of mankind no more tempting idea of heaven or the joys of the blest.

The vast, wide-spread, universal cause of our mistakes is, that we do not consider our own notions. I mean consider them in themselves—fix, settle, and determine them,—we regarding them with relation to each other only. In short, we are much out in study[ing] the relations of things before we study them absolutely and in themselves. Thus we study to find out the relations of figures to one another, the relations also of number, without endeavouring rightly to understand the nature of extension and number in themselves. This we think [pg 024] is of no concern, of no difficulty; but if I mistake not 'tis of the last importance,

Mo.

I allow not of the distinction there is made 'twixt profit and pleasure.

Mo.

I'd never blame a man for acting upon interest. He's a fool that acts on any other principles. The not considering these things has been of ill consequence in morality.

My positive assertions are no less modest than those that are introduced with “It seems to me,” “I suppose,” &c.; since I declare, once for all, that all I write or think is entirely about things as they appear to me. It concerns no man else any further than his thoughts agree with mine. This in the Preface.

Two things are apt to confound men in their reasonings one with another. 1st. Words signifying the operations of the mind are taken from sensible ideas. 2ndly. Words as used by the vulgar are taken in some latitude, their signification is confused. Hence if a man use words in a determined, settled signification, he is at a hazard either of not being understood, or of speaking improperly. All this remedyed by studying the understanding.

Unity no simple idea. I have no idea meerly answering the word one. All number consists in relations[87].

Entia realia et entia rationis, a foolish distinction of the Schoolemen.

M. P.

We have an intuitive knowledge of the existence of other things besides ourselves & order, præcedaneous[88]. To the knowledge of our own existence—in that we must have ideas or else we cannot think.

We move our legs ourselves. 'Tis we that will their movement. Herein I differ from Malbranch[89].

Mo.

Mem. Nicely to discuss Lib. 4. c. 4. Locke[90].

Mem. Again and again to mention & illustrate the doctrine of the reality of things, rerum natura, &c.

Wt I say is demonstration—perfect demonstration. Wherever men have fix'd & determin'd ideas annexed to [pg 025] their words they can hardly be mistaken. Stick but to my definition of likeness, and 'tis a demonstration yt colours are not simple ideas, all reds being like, &c. So also in other things. This to be heartily insisted on.

The abstract idea of Being or Existence is never thought of by the vulgar. They never use those words standing for abstract ideas.

I must not say the words thing, substance, &c. have been the cause of mistakes, but the not reflecting on their meaning. I will be still for retaining the words. I only desire that men would think before they speak, and settle the meaning of their words.

Mo.

I approve not of that which Locke says, viz. truth consists in the joining and separating of signs.

Locke cannot explain general truth or knowledge without treating of words and propositions. This makes for me against abstract general ideas. Vide Locke, lib. 4. ch. 6.

Men have been very industrious in travelling forward. They have gone a great way. But none have gone backward beyond the Principles. On that side there lies much terra incognita to be travel'd over and discovered by me. A vast field for invention.

Twelve inches not the same idea with a foot. Because a man may perfectly conceive a foot who never thought of an inch.

A foot is equal to or the same with twelve inches in this respect, viz. they contain both the same number of points.

[Forasmuch as] to be used.

Mem. To mention somewhat wch may encourage the study of politiques, and testify of me yt I am well dispos'd toward them.

If men did not use words for ideas they would never have thought of abstract ideas. Certainly genera and species are not abstract general ideas. Abstract ideas include a contradiction in their nature. Vide Locke[91], lib. 4. c. 7. s. 9.

A various or mixt cause must necessarily produce a various or mixt effect. This demonstrable from the [pg 026] definition of a cause; which way of demonstrating must be frequently made use of in my Treatise, & to that end definitions often præmis'd. Hence 'tis evident that, according to Newton's doctrine, colours cannot be simple ideas.

I am the farthest from scepticism of any man. I know with an intuitive knowledge the existence of other things as well as my own soul. This is wt Locke nor scarce any other thinking philosopher will pretend to[92].

Doctrine of abstraction of very evil consequence in all the sciences. Mem. Barrow's remark. Entirely owing to language.

Locke greatly out in reckoning the recording our ideas by words amongst the uses and not the abuses of language.

Of great use & ye last importance to contemplate a man put into the world alone, with admirable abilitys, and see how after long experience he would know wthout words. Such a one would never think of genera and species or abstract general ideas.

Wonderful in Locke that he could, wn advanced in years, see at all thro' a mist; it had been so long a gathering, & was consequently thick. This more to be admir'd than yt he did not see farther.

Identity of ideas may be taken in a double sense, either as including or excluding identity of circumstances, such as time, place, &c.

Mo.

I am glad the people I converse with are not all richer, wiser, &c. than I. This is agreeable to reason; is no sin. 'Tis certain that if the happyness of my acquaintance encreases, & mine not proportionably, mine must decrease. The not understanding this & the doctrine about relative good, discuss'd with French, Madden[93], &c., to be noticed as 2 causes of mistake in judging of moral matters.

Mem. To observe (wn you talk of the division of ideas into simple and complex) that there may be another cause [pg 027] of the undefinableness of certain ideas besides that which Locke gives; viz. the want of names.

Mem. To begin the First Book[94] not with mention of sensation and reflection, but instead of sensation to use perception or thought in general.

I defy any man to imagine or conceive perception without an idea, or an idea without perception.

Locke's very supposition that matter & motion should exist before thought is absurd—includes a manifest contradiction.

Locke's harangue about coherent, methodical discourses amounting to nothing, apply'd to the mathematicians.

They talk of determining all the points of a curve by an equation. Wt mean they by this? Wt would they signify by the word points? Do they stick to the definition of Euclid?

We think we know not the Soul, because we have no imaginable or sensible idea annex'd to that sound. This the effect of prejudice.

Certainly we do not know it. This will be plain if we examine what we mean by the word knowledge. Neither doth this argue any defect in our knowledge, no more than our not knowing a contradiction.

The very existence of ideas constitutes the Soul[95].

Consciousness[96], perception, existence of ideas, seem to be all one.

Consult, ransack yr understanding. Wt find you there besides several perceptions or thoughts? Wt mean you by the word mind? You must mean something that you perceive, or yt you do not perceive. A thing not perceived is a contradiction. To mean (also) a thing you do not perceive is a contradiction. We are in all this matter strangely abused by words.

Mind is a congeries of perceptions[97]. Take away perceptions [pg 028] and you take away the mind. Put the perceptions and you put the mind.

Say you, the mind is not the perception, not that thing which perceives. I answer, you are abused by the words “that a thing.” These are vague and empty words with us.

The having ideas is not the same thing with perception. A man may have ideas when he only imagines. But then this imagination presupposeth perception.

That wch extreamly strengthens us in prejudice is yt we think we see an empty space, which I shall demonstrate to be false in the Third Book[98].

There may be demonstrations used even in Divinity. I mean in revealed Theology, as contradistinguish'd from natural; for tho' the principles may be founded in faith, yet this hinders not but that legitimate demonstrations might be built thereon; provided still that we define the words we use, and never go beyond our ideas. Hence 'twere no very hard matter for those who hold episcopacy or monarchy to be established jure Divino to demonstrate their doctrines if they are true. But to pretend to demonstrate or reason anything about the Trinity is absurd. Here an implicit faith becomes us.

Qu. if there be any real difference betwixt certain ideas of reflection & others of sensation, e.g. betwixt perception and white, black, sweet, &c.? Wherein, I pray you, does the perception of white differ from white men....

I shall demonstrate all my doctrines. The nature of demonstration to be set forth and insisted on in the Introduction[99]. In that I must needs differ from Locke, forasmuch as he makes all demonstration to be about abstract ideas, wch I say we have not nor can have.

The understanding seemeth not to differ from its perceptions or ideas. Qu. What must one think of the will and passions?

A good proof that Existence is nothing without or [pg 029] distinct from perception, may be drawn from considering a man put into the world without company[100].

There was a smell, i.e. there was a smell perceiv'd. Thus we see that common speech confirms my doctrine.

No broken intervals of death or annihilation. Those intervals are nothing; each person's time being measured to him by his own ideas.

We are frequently puzzl'd and at a loss in obtaining clear and determin'd meanings of words commonly in use, & that because we imagine words stand for abstract general ideas which are altogether inconceivable.

“A stone is a stone.” This a nonsensical proposition, and such as the solitary man would never think on. Nor do I believe he would ever think on this: “The whole is equal to its parts,” &c.

Let it not be said that I take away existence. I only declare the meaning of the word, so far as I can comprehend it.

If you take away abstraction, how do men differ from beasts? I answer, by shape, by language. Rather by degrees of more and less.

Wt means Locke by inferences in words, consequences of words, as something different from consequences of ideas? I conceive no such thing.

N. B. Much complaint about the imperfection of language[101].

But perhaps some man may say, an inert thoughtless Substance may exist, though not extended, moved, &c., but with other properties whereof we have no idea. But even this I shall demonstrate to be impossible, wn I come to treat more particularly of Existence.

Will not rightly distinguish'd from Desire by Locke—it seeming to superadd nothing to the idea of an action, but the uneasiness for its absence or non-existence.

Mem. To enquire diligently into that strange mistery, [pg 030] viz. How it is that I can cast about, think of this or that man, place, action, wn nothing appears to introduce them into my thoughts, wn they have no perceivable connexion with the ideas suggested by my senses at the present?

'Tis not to be imagin'd wt a marvellous emptiness & scarcity of ideas that man shall descry who will lay aside all use of words in his meditations.

Incongruous in Locke to fancy we want a sense proper to see substances with.

Locke owns that abstract ideas were made in order to naming.

The common errour of the opticians, that we judge of distance by angles[102], strengthens men in their prejudice that they see things without and distant from their mind.

I am persuaded, would men but examine wt they mean by the word existence, they wou'd agree with me.

c. 20. s. 8. b. 4. of Locke makes for me against the mathematicians.

The supposition that things are distinct from ideas takes away all real truth, & consequently brings in a universal scepticism; since all our knowledge and contemplation is confin'd barely to our own ideas[103].

Qu. whether the solitary man would not find it necessary to make use of words to record his ideas, if not in memory or meditation, yet at least in writing—without which he could scarce retain his knowledge.

We read in history there was a time when fears and jealousies, privileges of parliament, malignant party, and such like expressions of too unlimited and doubtful a meaning, were words of much sway. Also the words Church, Whig, Tory, &c., contribute very much to faction and dispute.

The distinguishing betwixt an idea and perception of the idea has been one great cause of imagining material substances[104].

That God and blessed spirits have Will is a manifest [pg 031] argument against Locke's proofs that the Will cannot be conceiv'd, put into action, without a previous uneasiness.

The act of the Will, or volition, is not uneasiness, for that uneasiness may be without volition.

Volition is distinct from the object or idea for the same reason.

Also from uneasiness and idea together.

The understanding not distinct from particular perceptions or ideas.

The Will not distinct from particular volitions.

It is not so very evident that an idea, or at least uneasiness, may be without all volition or act.

The understanding taken for a faculty is not really distinct from ye will.

This allow'd hereafter.

To ask whether a man can will either side is an absurd question, for the word can presupposes volition.

Anima mundi, substantial form, omniscient radical heat, plastic vertue, Hylaschic principle—all these vanish[105].

Newton proves that gravity is proportional to gravity. I think that's all[106].

Qu. whether it be the vis inertiæ that makes it difficult to move a stone, or the vis attractivæ, or both, or neither?

Mem. To express the doctrines as fully and copiously and clearly as may be. Also to be full and particular in answering objections[107].

To say ye Will is a power; [therefore] volition is an act. This is idem per idem.

Wt makes men despise extension, motion, &c., & separate them from the essence of the soul, is that they imagine them to be distinct from thought, and to exist in unthinking substance.

An extended may have passive modes of thinking good actions.

There might be idea, there might be uneasiness, there might be the greatest uneasiness wthout any volition, therefore the....

Matter once allow'd, I defy any man to prove that God is not Matter[108].

Man is free. There is no difficulty in this proposition, if we but settle the signification of the word free—if we had an idea annext to the word free, and would but contemplate that idea.

We are imposed on by the words will, determine, agent, free, can, &c.

Uneasiness precedes not every volition. This evident by experience.

Trace an infant in the womb. Mark the train & succession of its ideas. Observe how volition comes into the mind. This may perhaps acquaint you with its nature.

Complacency seems rather to determine, or precede, or coincide wth & constitute the essence of volition, than uneasiness.

You tell me, according to my doctrine a man is not free. I answer, tell me wt you mean by the word free, and I shall resolve you[109].

Qu. Wt do men mean when they talk of one body's touching another? I say you never saw one body touch, or (rather) I say, I never saw one body that I could say touch'd this or that other; for that if my optiques were improv'd, I should see intervalls and other bodies behind those whch now seem to touch.

Mem. Upon all occasions to use the utmost modesty—to confute the mathematicians wth the utmost civility & respect, not to style them Nihilarians, &c.

N. B. To rein in ye satyrical nature.

Blame me not if I use my words sometimes in some latitude. 'Tis wt cannot be helpt. 'Tis the fault of language [pg 033] that you cannot always apprehend the clear and determinate meaning of my words.

Say you, there might be a thinking Substance—something unknown—wch perceives, and supports, and ties together the ideas[110]. Say I, make it appear there is any need of it and you shall have it for me. I care not to take away anything I can see the least reason to think should exist.

I affirm 'tis manifestly absurd—no excuse in the world can be given why a man should use a word without an idea[111]. Certainly we shall find that wt ever word we make use of in matter of pure reasoning has, or ought to have, a compleat idea, annext to it, i.e. its meaning, or the sense we take it in, must be compleatly known.

'Tis demonstrable a man can never be brought to imagine anything should exist whereof he has no idea. Whoever says he does, banters himself with words.

We imagine a great difference & distance in respect of knowledge, power, &c., betwixt a man & a worm. The like difference betwixt man and God may be imagin'd; or infinitely greater[112] difference.

We find in our own minds a great number of different ideas. We may imagine in God a greater number, i.e. that ours in number, or the number of ours, is inconsiderable in respect thereof. The words difference and number, old and known, we apply to that wch is unknown. But I am embrangled[113] in words—'tis scarce possible it should be otherwise.

The chief thing I do or pretend to do is onely to remove the mist or veil of words[114]. This has occasion'd ignorance & confusion. This has ruined the schoolmen and mathematicians, lawyers and divines.

The grand cause of perplexity & darkness in treating of the Will, is that we imagine it to be an object of thought: (to speak with the vulgar), we think we may perceive, contemplate, and view it like any of our ideas; whereas in [pg 034] truth 'tis no idea, nor is there any idea of it. 'Tis toto cælo different from the understanding, i.e. from all our ideas. If you say the Will, or rather volition, is something, I answer, there is an homonymy[115] in the word thing, wn apply'd to ideas and volition and understanding and will. All ideas are passive[116].

Thing & idea are much what words of the same extent and meaning. Why, therefore, do I not use the word thing? Ans. Because thing is of greater latitude than idea. Thing comprehends also volitions or actions. Now these are no ideas[117].

There can be perception wthout volition. Qu. whether there can be volition without perception?

Existence not conceivable without perception or volition—not distinguish'd therefrom.

N. B. Several distinct ideas can be perceived by sight and touch at once. Not so by the other senses. 'Tis this diversity of sensations in other senses chiefly, but sometimes in touch and sight (as also diversity of volitions, whereof there cannot be more than one at once, or rather, it seems there cannot, for of that I doubt), gives us the idea of time—or is time itself.

Wt would the solitary man think of number?

There are innate ideas, i.e. ideas created with us[118].

Locke seems to be mistaken wn he says thought is not essential to the mind[119].

Certainly the mind always and constantly thinks: and we know this too. In sleep and trances the mind exists not—there is no time, no succession of ideas[120].

To say the mind exists without thinking is a contradiction, nonsense, nothing.

Folly to inquire wt determines the Will. Uneasiness, &c. are ideas, therefore unactive, therefore can do nothing, therefore cannot determine the Will[121].

Again, wt mean you by determine?

For want of rightly understanding time, motion, existence, &c., men are forc'd into such absurd contradictions as this, viz. light moves 16 diameters of earth in a second of time.

'Twas the opinion that ideas could exist unperceiv'd, or before perception, that made men think perception[122] was somewhat different from the idea perceived, i.e. yt it was an idea of reflection; whereas the thing perceiv'd was an idea of sensation. I say, 'twas this made 'em think the understanding took it in, receiv'd it from without; wch could never be did not they think it existed without[123].

Properly speaking, idea is the picture of the imagination's making. This is ye likeness of, and refer'd to the real idea, or (if you will) thing[124].

To ask, have we an idea of Will or volition, is nonsense. An idea can resemble nothing but an idea.

If you ask wt thing it is that wills, I answer, if you mean idea by the word thing, or anything like any idea, then I say, 'tis no thing at all that wills[125]. This how extravagant soever it may seem, yet is a certain truth. We are cheated by these general terms, thing, is, &c.

Again, if by is you mean is perceived, or does perceive, I say nothing wch is perceived or does perceive wills.

The referring ideas to things wch are not ideas, the using the term “idea of[126],” is one great cause of mistake, as in other matters, so also in this.

Some words there are wch do not stand for ideas, viz. particles, will, &c. Particles stand for volitions and their concomitant ideas.

There seem to be but two colours wch are simple ideas, viz. those exhibited by the most and least refrangible rays; [the others], being the intermediate ones, may be formed by composition.

I have no idea of a volition or act of the mind, neither has any other intelligence; for that were a contradiction.

N. B. Simple ideas, viz. colours, are not devoid of all sort of composition, tho' it must be granted they are not made up of distinguishable ideas. Yet there is another sort of composition. Men are wont to call those things compounded in which we do not actually discover the component ingredients. Bodies are said to be compounded of chymical principles, which, nevertheless, come not into view till after the dissolution of the bodies—wch were not, could not, be discerned in the bodies whilst remaining entire.

All our knowledge is about particular ideas, according to Locke. All our sensations are particular ideas, as is evident. Wt use then do we make of abstract general ideas, since we neither know nor perceive them?

'Tis allow'd that particles stand not for ideas, and yet they are not said to be empty useless sounds. The truth really is, they stand for operations of the mind, i.e. volitions.

Mo.

Locke says all our knowledge is about particulars. If so, pray wt is the following ratiocination but a jumble of words? “Omnis homo est animal; omne animal vivit: ergo omnis homo vivit.” It amounts (if you annex particular ideas to the words “animal” and “vivit”) to no more than this: “Omnis homo est homo; omnis homo est homo: ergo, omnis homo est homo.” A mere sport and trifling with sounds.

Mo.

We have no ideas of vertues & vices, no ideas of moral actions[127]. Wherefore it may be question'd whether we are capable of arriving at demonstration about them[128], the morality consisting in the volition chiefly.

Strange it is that men should be at a loss to find their idea of Existence; since that (if such there be distinct from perception) it is brought into the mind by all the ways of sensation and reflection[129], methinks it should be most familiar to us, and we best acquainted with it.

This I am sure, I have no idea of Existence[130], or annext to the word Existence. And if others have that's nothing to me; they can never make me sensible of it; simple ideas being incommunicable by language.

Say you, the unknown substratum of volitions & ideas is something whereof I have no idea. I ask, Is there any other being which has or can have an idea of it? If there be, then it must be itself an idea; which you will think absurd.

There is somewhat active in most perceptions, i.e. such as ensue upon our volitions, such as we can prevent and stop: e.g. I turn my eyes toward the sun: I open them. All this is active.

Things are twofold—active or inactive. The existence of active things is to act; of inactive to be perceiv'd.

S. E.

Distinct from or without perception there is no volition; therefore neither is there existence without perception.

God may comprehend all ideas, even the ideas wch are painfull & unpleasant, without being in any degree pained thereby[131]. Thus we ourselves can imagine the pain of a burn, &c. without any misery or uneasiness at all.

N. Mo.

Truth, three sorts thereof—natural, mathematical, & moral.

Mo.

Agreement of relation onely where numbers do obtain: of co-existence, in nature: of signification, by including, in morality.

Gyant who shakes the mountain that's on him must be acknowledged. Or rather thus: I am no more to be reckon'd stronger than Locke than a pigmy should be reckon'd stronger than a gyant, because he could throw off the molehill wch lay upon him, and the gyant could onely shake or shove the mountain that oppressed him. This in the Preface.

Promise to extend our knowledge & clear it of those shamefull contradictions which embarrass it. Something like this to begin the Introduction in a modest way[132].

Whoever shall pretend to censure any part, I desire he would read out the whole, else he may perhaps not understand me. In the Preface or Introduction[133].

Doctrine of identity best explain'd by taking the Will for volitions, the Understanding for ideas. The difficulty of consciousness of wt are never acted surely solv'd thereby.

I must acknowledge myself beholding to the philosophers who have gone before me. They have given good rules, though certainly they do not always observe them. Similitude of adventurers, who, tho' they attained not the desired port, they by their wrecks have made known the rocks and sands, whereby the passage of aftercomers is made more secure & easy. Preface or Introduction.

Mo.

The opinion that men had ideas of moral actions[134] has render'd the demonstrating ethiques very difficult to them.

An idea being itself unactive cannot be the resemblance or image of an active thing.

Excuse to be made in the Introduction for using the word idea, viz. because it has obtain'd. But a caution must be added.

Scripture and possibility are the onely proofs[135] with Malbranch. Add to these what he calls a great propension to think so: this perhaps may be questioned. Perhaps men, if they think before they speak, will not be found so thoroughly persuaded of the existence of Matter.

On second thoughts I am on t'other extream. I am certain of that wch Malbranch seems to doubt of, viz. the existence of bodies[136].

I. &c.

Mem. To bring the killing blow at the last, e.g. in the matter of abstraction to bring Locke's general triangle in the last[137].

They give good rules, tho' perhaps they themselves do not always observe them. They speak much of clear and distinct ideas, though at the same time they talk of general abstract ideas, &c. I'll [instance] in Locke's opinion of abstraction, he being as clear a writer as I have met with.

Such was the candour of this great man that I perswade myself, were he alive[138], he would not be offended that I differ from him: seeing that even in so doing I follow his advice, viz. to use my own judgement, see with my own eyes, & not with another's. Introduction.

The word thing, as comprising or standing for idea & volition, usefull; as standing for idea and archetype without the mind[139], mischievous and useless.

Mo.

To demonstrate morality it seems one need only make a dictionary of words, and see which included which. At least, this is the greatest part and bulk of the work.

Mo.

Locke's instances of demonstration in morality are, according to his own rule, trifling propositions.

P. S.

Qu. How comes it that some ideas are confessedly allow'd by all to be onely in the mind[140], and others as generally taken to be without the mind[141], if, according to you, all are equally and only in the mind? Ans. Because that in proportion to pleasure or pain ideas are attended with desire, exertion, and other actions which include volition. Now volition is by all granted to be in spirit.

If men would lay aside words in thinking, 'tis impossible they should ever mistake, save only in matters of fact. I mean it seems impossible they should be positive & secure that anything was true wch in truth is not so. Certainly I cannot err in matter of simple perception. So far as we can in reasoning go without the help of signs, there we have certain knowledge. Indeed, in long deductions made by signs there may be slips of memory.

Mo.

From my doctrine there follows a cure for pride. We are only to be praised for those things which are our own, or of our own doing; natural abilitys are not consequences of our volitions.

Mem. Candidly to take notice that Locke holds some dangerous opinions; such as the infinity and eternity of Space and the possibility of Matter's thinking[142].

Once more I desire my reader may be upon his guard against the fallacy of words. Let him beware that I do not impose on him by plausible empty talk, that common dangerous way of cheating men into absurditys. Let him not regard my words any otherwise than as occasions of bringing into his mind determin'd significations. So far as they fail of this they are gibberish, jargon, & deserve not the name of language. I desire & warn him not to expect to find truth in my book, or anywhere but in his own mind. Wtever I see myself 'tis impossible I can paint it out in words.

Mo.

N. B. To consider well wt is meant by that wch Locke saith concerning algebra—that it supplys intermediate ideas. Also to think of a method affording the same use in morals &c. that this doth in mathematiques.

Mo.

Homo is not proved to be vivens by means of any intermediate idea. I don't fully agree wth Locke in wt he says concerning sagacity in finding out intermediate ideas in matter capable of demonstration & the use thereof; as if that were the onely means of improving and enlarging demonstrative knowledge.

There is a difference betwixt power & volition. There may be volition without power. But there can be no power without volition. Power implyeth volition, & at the same time a connotation of the effects following the volition[143].

M. S.

We have assuredly an idea of substance. 'Twas absurd of Locke[144] to think we had a name without a meaning. This might prove acceptable to the Stillingfleetians.

M. S.

The substance of Body we know[145]. The substance of Spirit we do not know—it not being knowable, it being a purus actus.

Words have ruin'd and overrun all the sciences—law, physique, chymistry, astrology, &c.

Abstract ideas only to be had amongst the learned. The vulgar never think they have any such, nor truly do they find any want of them. Genera & species & abstract ideas are terms unknown to them.

Locke's out[146]—the case is different. We can have an idea of body without motion, but not of soul without thought.

Mo.

God ought to be worship'd. This easily demonstrated when once we ascertain the signification of the words God, worship, ought.

No perception, according to Locke, is active. Therefore no perception (i.e. no idea) can be the image of, or like unto, that which is altogether active & not at all passive, i.e. the Will.

I can will the calling to mind something that is past, tho' at the same time that wch I call to mind was not in my thoughts before that volition of mine, & consequently I could have had no uneasiness for the want of it.

The Will & the Understanding may very well be thought two distinct beings.

Sed quia voluntas raro agit nisi ducente desiderio. V. Locke, Epistles, p. 479, ad Limburgum.

You cannot say the m. t. [minimum tangibile] is like or one with the m. v. [minimum visibile], because they be both minima, just perceiv'd, and next door to nothing. You may as well say the m. t. is the same with or like unto a sound, so small that it is scarce perceiv'd.

Extension seems to be a mode of some tangible or sensible quality according as it is seen or felt.

The spirit—the active thing—that wch is soul, & God—is the Will alone. The ideas are effects—impotent things.

The concrete of the will & understanding I might call mind; not person, lest offence be given. Mem. Carefully to omit defining of person, or making much mention of it.

You ask, do these volitions make one Will? Wt you ask is meerly about a word—unity being no more[147].

N. B. To use utmost caution not to give the least handle of offence to the Church or Churchmen.

Even to speak somewhat favourably of the Schoolmen, and shew that they who blame them for jargon are not free of it themselves. Introd.

Locke's great oversight seems to be that he did not begin with his third book; at least that he had not some thought of it at first. Certainly the 2d & 4th books don't agree wth wt he says in ye 3d[148].

If Matter[149] is once allow'd to exist, clippings of weeds and parings of nails may think, for ought that Locke can tell; tho' he seems positive of the contrary.

Since I say men cannot mistake in short reasoning about things demonstrable, if they lay aside words, it will be expected this Treatise will contain nothing but wt is certain & evident demonstration, & in truth I hope you will find nothing in it but what is such. Certainly I take it all for such. Introd.

When I say I will reject all propositions wherein I know not fully and adequately and clearly, so far as knowable, the thing meant thereby, this is not to be extended to propositions in the Scripture. I speak of matters of Reason and Philosophy—not Revelation. In this I think an humble, implicit faith becomes us (when we cannot comprehend or understand the proposition), such as a popish peasant gives to propositions he hears at mass in Latin. This proud men may call blind, popish, implicit, irrational. For my part I think it is more irrational to pretend to dispute at, cavil, and ridicule holy mysteries, i.e. propositions about things that are altogether above our knowledge, out of our reach. When I shall come to plenary knowledge of the meaning of any fact, then I shall yield an explicit belief. Introd.

Complexation of ideas twofold. Ys refers to colours being complex ideas.

Considering length without breadth is considering any length, be the breadth wt it will.

I may say earth, plants, &c. were created before man—there being other intelligences to perceive them, before man was created[150].

There is a philosopher[151] who says we can get an idea of substance by no way of sensation or reflection, & seems to imagine that we want a sense proper for it. Truly if we had a new sense it could only give us a new idea. Now I suppose he will not say substance, according to him, is an idea. For my part, I own I have no idea can stand for substance in his and the Schoolmen's sense of that word. But take it in the common vulgar sense, & then we see and feel substance.

N. B. That not common usage, but the Schoolmen coined the word Existence, supposed to stand for an abstract general idea.

Writers of Optics mistaken in their principles both in judging of magnitudes and distances.

'Tis evident yt wn the solitary man should be taught to speak, the words would give him no other new ideas (save only the sounds, and complex ideas which, tho' unknown before, may be signified by language) beside wt he had before. If he had not, could not have, an abstract idea before, he cannot have it after he is taught to speak.

Mo.

“Homo est homo,” &c. comes at last to Petrus est Petrus, &c. Now, if these identical propositions are sought after in the mind, they will not be found. There are no identical mental propositions. 'Tis all about sounds and terms.

Mo.

Hence we see the doctrine of certainty by ideas, and proving by intermediate ideas, comes to nothing[152].

Mo.

We may have certainty & knowledge without ideas, i.e. without other ideas than the words, and their standing for one idea, i.e. their being to be used indifferently.

Mo.

It seems to me that we have no certainty about ideas, but only about words. 'Tis improper to say, I am certain I see, I feel, &c. There are no mental propositions [pg 044] form'd answering to these words, & in simple perception 'tis allowed by all there is no affirmation or negation, and consequently no certainty[153].

Mo.

The reason why we can demonstrate so well about signs is, that they are perfectly arbitrary & in our power—made at pleasure.

Mo.

The obscure ambiguous term relation, which is said to be the largest field of knowledge, confounds us, deceives us.

Mo.

Let any man shew me a demonstration, not verbal, that does not depend on some false principle; or at best on some principle of nature, which is ye effect of God's will, and we know not how soon it may be changed.

Qu. What becomes of the æternæ veritates? Ans. They vanish[154].

But, say you, I find it difficult to look beneath the words and uncover my ideas. Say I, Use will make it easy. In the sequel of my Book the cause of this difficulty shall be more clearly made out.

To view the deformity of error we need onely undress it.

“Cogito ergo sum.” Tautology. No mental proposition answering thereto.

N. Mo.

Knowledge, or certainty, or perception of agreement of ideas—as to identity and diversity, and real existence, vanisheth; of relation, becometh merely nominal; of co-existence, remaineth. Locke thought in this latter our knowledge was little or nothing. Whereas in this only real knowledge seemeth to be found[155].

We must wth the mob place certainty in the senses[156].

'Tis a man's duty, 'tis the fruit of friendship, to speak well of his friend. Wonder not therefore that I do wt I do.

A man of slow parts may overtake truth, &c. Introd. Even my shortsightedness might perhaps be aiding to me in this matter—'twill make me bring the object nearer to my thoughts. A purblind person, &c. Introd.

Locke to Limborch, &c. Talk of judicium intellectus preceding the volition: I think judicium includes volition. I can by no means distinguish these—judicium, intellectus, indifferentia, uneasiness to many things accompanying or preceding every volition, as e.g. the motion of my hand.

Qu. Wt mean you by my perceptions, my volitions? Both all the perceptions I perceive or conceive[157], &c. are mine; all the volitions I am conscious to are mine.

Homo est agens liberum. What mean they by homo and agens in this place?

Will any man say that brutes have ideas of Unity & Existence? I believe not. Yet if they are suggested by all the ways of sensation, 'tis strange they should want them[158].

It is a strange thing and deserves our attention, that the more time and pains men have consum'd in the study of philosophy, by so much the more they look upon themselves to be ignorant & weak creatures. They discover flaws and imperfections in their faculties wch other men never spy out. They find themselves under a necessity of admitting many inconsistent, irreconcilable opinions for true. There is nothing they touch with their hand, or behold with their eyes, but has its dark sides much larger and more numerous than wt is perceived, & at length turn scepticks, at least in most things. I imagine all this proceeds from, &c. Exord. Introd.[159]

These men with a supercilious pride disdain the common single information of sense. They grasp at knowledge by sheafs & bundles. ('Tis well if, catching at too much at once, they hold nothing but emptiness & air.) They in the depth of their understanding contemplate abstract ideas.

It seems not improbable that the most comprehensive & sublime intellects see more m.v.'s at once, i.e. that their visual systems are the largest.

Words (by them meaning all sorts of signs) are so necessary that, instead of being (wn duly us'd or in their own nature) prejudicial to the advancement of knowledge, [pg 046] or an hindrance to knowledge, without them there could in mathematiques themselves be no demonstration.

Mem. To be eternally banishing Metaphisics, &c., and recalling men to Common Sense[160].

We cannot conceive other minds besides our own but as so many selves. We suppose ourselves affected wth such & such thoughts & such and such sensations[161].

Qu. whether composition of ideas be not that faculty which chiefly serves to discriminate us from brutes? I question whether a brute does or can imagine a blue horse or chimera.

Naturalists do not distinguish betwixt cause and occasion. Useful to enquire after co-existing ideas or occasions.

Mo.

Morality may be demonstrated as mixt mathematics.

Perception is passive, but this not distinct from idea. Therefore there can be no idea of volition.

Algebraic species or letters are denominations of denominations. Therefore Arithmetic to be treated of before Algebra.

2 crowns are called ten shillings. Hence may appear the value of numbers.

Complex ideas are the creatures of the mind. Hence may appear the nature of numbers. This to be deeply discuss'd.

I am better informed & shall know more by telling me there are 10,000 men, than by shewing me them all drawn up. I shall better be able to judge of the bargain you'd have me make wn you tell me how much (i.e. the name of ye) money lies on the table, than by offering and shewing it without naming. I regard not the idea, the looks, but the names. Hence may appear the nature of numbers.

Children are unacquainted with numbers till they have made some progress in language. This could not be if they were ideas suggested by all the senses.

Numbers are nothing but names—never words.

Mem. Imaginary roots—to unravel that mystery.

Ideas of utility are annexed to numbers.

In arithmetical problems men seek not any idea of number. They only seek a denomination. This is all can be of use to them.

Take away the signs from Arithmetic and Algebra, and pray wt remains?

These are sciences purely verbal, and entirely useless but for practice in societies of men. No speculative knowledge, no comparing of ideas in them[162].

Qu. whether Geometry may not properly be reckon'd amongst the mixt mathematics—Arithmetic & Algebra being the only abstracted pure, i.e. entirely nominal—Geometry being an application of these to points[163]?

Mo.

Locke of Trifling Propositions. [b. 4. c. 8] Mem. Well to observe & con over that chapter.

Existence, Extension, &c. are abstract, i.e. no ideas. They are words, unknown and useless to the vulgar.

Mo.

Sensual pleasure is the summum bonum. This the great principle of morality. This once rightly understood, all the doctrines, even the severest of the Gospels, may clearly be demonstrated.

Mo.

Sensual pleasure, quâ pleasure, is good & desirable by a wise man[164]. But if it be contemptible, 'tis not quâ pleasure but quâ pain, or cause of pain, or (which is the same thing) of loss of greater pleasure.

Wn I consider, the more objects we see at once the more distant they are, and that eye which beholds a great many things can see none of them near.

By idea I mean any sensible or imaginable thing[165].

M. S.

To be sure or certain of wt we do not actually perceive[166] (I say perceive, not imagine), we must not be altogether [pg 048] passive; there must be a disposition to act; there must be assent, wch is active. Nay, what do I talk; there must be actual volition.

What do we demonstrate in Geometry but that lines are equal or unequal? i.e. may not be called by the same name[167].

I. M.

I approve of this axiom of the Schoolmen, “Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuit in sensu.”[168] I wish they had stuck to it. It had never taught them the doctrine of abstract ideas.

S. G.

“Nihil dat quod non habet,” or, the effect is contained in the cause, is an axiom I do not understand or believe to be true.

Whoever shall cast his eyes on the writings of old or new philosophers, and see the noise is made about formal and objective Being, Will, &c.

Absurd to argue the existence of God from his idea. We have no idea of God. 'Tis impossible[169].

M. E.

Cause of much errour & confusion that men knew not what was meant by Reality[170].

Des Cartes, in Med. 2, says the notion of this particular wax is less clear than that of wax in general; and in the same Med., a little before, he forbears to consider bodies in general, because (says he) these general conceptions are usually confused.

M. S.

Des Cartes, in Med. 3, calls himself a thinking substance, and a stone an extended substance; and adds that they both agree in this, that they are substances. And in the next paragraph he calls extension a mode of substance.

'Tis commonly said by the philosophers, that if the soul of man were self-existent it would have given itself all possible perfection. This I do not understand.

Mo.

Mem. To excite men to the pleasures of the eye & the ear, which surfeit not, nor bring those evils after them, as others.

We see no variety or difference betwixt volitions, only between their effects. 'Tis one Will, one Act—distinguished by the effects. This Will, this Act, is the Spirit, i.e. operative principle, soul, &c. No mention of fears and jealousies, nothing like a party.

Locke in his 4th Book[171], and Des Cartes in Med. 6, use the same argument for the existence of objects, viz. that sometimes we see, feel, &c. against our will.

While I exist or have any idea, I am eternally, constantly willing; my acquiescing in the present state is willing.

The existence of any thing imaginable is nothing different from imagination or perception[172]. Volition or Will, Wch is not imaginable, regard must not be had to its existence(?) ... First Book.

Mo.

There are four sorts of propositions:—“Gold is a metal;” “Gold is yellow;” “Gold is fixt;” “Gold is not a stone”—of which the first, second, and third are only nominal, and have no mental propositions answering them.

Mem. In vindication of the senses effectually to confute what Des Cartes saith in the last par. of the last Med., viz. that the senses oftener inform him falsely than truely—that sense of pain tells me not my foot is bruised or broken, but I, having frequently observed these two ideas, viz. of that peculiar pain and bruised foot go together, do erroneously take them to be inseparable by a necessity of Nature—as if Nature were anything but the ordinance of the free will of God[173].

M. S.

Des Cartes owns we know not a substance immediately by itself, but by this alone, that it is the subject of several acts. Ans. to 2d objection of Hobbs.

Hobbs in some degree falls in with Locke, saying thought is to the mind or himself as dancing to the dancer. Object.

Hobbs in his Object. 3 ridicules those expressions of [pg 050] the scholastiques—“the will wills,” &c. So does Locke. I am of another mind[174].

Des Cartes, in answer to Object. 3 of Hobbs, owns he is distinct from thought as a thing from its modus or manner.

E. S.

Opinion that existence was distinct from perception of horrible consequence. It is the foundation of Hobbs's doctrine, &c.

M. P. E.

Malbranch in his illustration[175] differs widely from me. He doubts of the existence of bodies. I doubt not in the least of this.

I differ from Cartesians in that I make extension, colour, &c. to exist really in bodies independent of our mind[176]. All ye carefully and lucidly to be set forth.

M. P.

Not to mention the combinations of powers, but to say the things—the effects themselves—do really exist, even wn not actually perceived; but still with relation to perception[177].

The great use of the Indian figures above the Roman shews arithmetic to be about signs, not ideas—or at least not ideas different from the characters themselves[178].

M. N.

Reasoning there may be about things or ideas, or about actions; but demonstration can be only verbal. I question, no matter &c.

Quoth Des Cartes, The idea of God is not made by me, for I can neither add to nor subtract from it. No more can he add to or take from any other idea, even of his own making.

The not distinguishing 'twixt Will and ideas is a grand mistake with Hobbs. He takes those things for nothing which are not ideas[179].

Say you, At this rate all's nothing but idea—mere phantasm. I answer, Everything as real as ever. I hope to call a thing idea makes it not the less real. Truly I should perhaps have stuck to the word thing, and not mentioned [pg 051] the word idea, were it not for a reason, and I think a good one too, which I shall give in the Second Book[180].

I. S.

Idea is the object of thought. Yt I think on, whatever it be, I call idea. Thought itself, or thinking, is no idea. 'Tis an act—i.e. volition, i.e. as contradistinguished to effects—the Will.

I. Mo.

Locke, in B. 4. c. 5, assigns not the right cause why mental propositions are so difficult. It is not because of complex but because of abstract ideas. Ye idea of a horse is as complex as that of fortitude. Yet in saying the “horse is white” I form a mental proposition with ease. But when I say “fortitude is a virtue” I shall find a mental proposition hard, or not at all to be come at.

Pure intellect I understand not[181].

Locke is in ye right in those things wherein he differs from ye Cartesians, and they cannot but allow of his opinions, if they stick to their own principles or causes of Existence & other abstract ideas.

G. S.

The properties of all things are in God, i.e. there is in the Deity Understanding as well as Will. He is no blind agent, and in truth a blind agent is a contradiction[182].

I am certain there is a God, tho' I do not perceive Him—have no intuition of Him. This not difficult if we rightly understand wt is meant by certainty.

It seems that the Soul, taken for the Will, is immortal, incorruptible.

Qu. whether perception must of necessity precede volition?

S. Mo.

Error is not in the Understanding, but in the Will. What I understand or perceive, that I understand. There can be no errour in this.

Mo. N.

Mem. To take notice of Locke's woman afraid of a wetting, in the Introd., to shew there may be reasoning about ideas or things.

Say Des Cartes & Malbranch, God hath given us strong inclinations to think our ideas proceed from bodies, or that [pg 052] bodies do exist. Pray wt mean they by this? Would they have it that the ideas of imagination are images of, and proceed from, the ideas of sense? This is true, but cannot be their meaning; for they speak of ideas of sense as themselves proceeding from, being like unto—I know not wt[183].

M. S.

Cartesius per ideam vult omne id quod habet esse objectivum in intellectu. V. Tract. de Methodo.

Qu. May there not be an Understanding without a Will?

Understanding is in some sort an action.

Silly of Hobbs, &c. to speak of the Will as if it were motion, with which it has no likeness.

Ideas of Sense are the real things or archetypes. Ideas of imagination, dreams, &c. are copies, images, of these.

My doctrines rightly understood, all that philosophy of Epicurus, Hobbs, Spinosa, &c., which has been a declared enemy of religion, comes to the ground.

Hobbs & Spinosa make God extended. Locke also seems to do the same[184].

I. E.

Ens, res, aliquid dicuntur termini transcendentales. Spinosa, p. 76, prop. 40, Eth. part 2, gives an odd account of their original. Also of the original of all universals—Homo, Canis, &c.

Spinosa (vid. Præf. Opera Posthum.) will have God to be “omnium rerum causa immanens,” and to countenance this produces that of St. Paul, “in Him we live,” &c. Now this of St. Paul may be explained by my doctrine as well as Spinosa's, or Locke's, or Hobbs's, or Raphson's[185], &c.

The Will is purus actus, or rather pure spirit not imaginable, [pg 053] not sensible, not intelligible, in no wise the object of the understanding, no wise perceivable.

Substance of a spirit is that it acts, causes, wills, operates, or if you please (to avoid the quibble yt may be made of the word “it”) to act, cause, will, operate. Its substance is not knowable, not being an idea.

Why may we not conceive it possible for God to create things out of nothing? Certainly we ourselves create in some wise whenever we imagine.

E. N.

“Ex nihilo nihil fit.” This (saith Spinoza, Opera Posth. p. 464) and the like are called veritates æternæ, because “nullam fidem habent extra mentem.” To make this axiom have a positive signification, one should express it thus: Every idea has a cause, i.e. is produced by a Will[186].

The philosophers talk much of a distinction 'twixt absolute & relative things, or 'twixt things considered in their own nature & the same things considered with respect to us. I know not wt they mean by “things considered in themselves.” This is nonsense, jargon.

It seems there can be no perception—no idea—without Will, seeing there are no ideas so indifferent but one had rather have them than annihilation, or annihilation than them. Or if there be such an equal balance, there must be an equal mixture of pleasure and pain to cause it; there being no ideas perfectly void of all pain & uneasiness, but wt are preferable to annihilation.

Recipe in animum tuum, per cogitationem vehementem, rerum ipsarum, non literarum aut sonorum imagines. Hobbs against Wallis.

'Tis a perfection we may imagine in superior spirits, that they can see a great deal at once with the utmost clearness and distinction; whereas we can only see a point[187].

Mem. Wn I treat of mathematiques to enquire into the controversy 'twixt Hobbes and Wallis.

Every sensation of mine, which happens in consequence of the general known laws of nature, & is from without, i.e. independent of my will, demonstrates the being of a God, i.e. of an unextended, incorporeal spirit, which is omnipresent, omnipotent, &c.

I say not with J.S. [John Sergeant] that we see solids. I reject his “solid philosophy”—solidity being only perceived by touch[188].

It seems to me that will and understanding—volitions and ideas—cannot be separated, that either cannot be possibly without the other.

E. S.

Some ideas or other I must have, so long as I exist or will. But no one idea or sort of ideas being essential[189].

The distinction between idea and ideatum I cannot otherwise conceive than by making one the effect or consequence of dream, reverie, imagination—the other of sense and the constant laws of nature.

Dico quod extensio non concipitur in se et per se, contra quam dicit Spinoza in Epist. 2a ad Oldenburgium.

My definition of the word God I think much clearer than those of Des Cartes & Spinoza, viz. “Ens summe perfectum & absolute infinitum,” or “Ens constans infinitis attributis, quorum unumquodque est infinitum[190].”

'Tis chiefly the connexion betwixt tangible and visible ideas that deceives, and not the visible ideas themselves.

But the grand mistake is that we know not what we mean by “we,” or “selves,” or “mind,” &c. 'Tis most sure & certain that our ideas are distinct from the mind, i.e. the Will, the Spirit[191].

I must not mention the understanding as a faculty or [pg 055] part of the mind. I must include understanding & will in the word Spirit—by which I mean all that is active. I must not say that the understanding diners not from the particular ideas, or the will from particular volitions.

The Spirit, the Mind, is neither a volition nor an idea.

N. S.

I say there are no causes (properly speaking) but spiritual, nothing active but Spirit. Say you, This is only verbal; 'tis only annexing a new sort of signification to the word cause, & why may not others as well retain the old one, and call one idea the cause of another which always follows it? I answer, If you do so I shall drive you into many absurditys: you cannot avoid running into opinions you'll be glad to disown, if you stick firmly to that signification of the word Cause.

Mo.

In valuing good we reckon too much on the present & our own.

Mo.

There be two sorts of pleasure. The one is ordained as a spur or incitement to somewhat else, & has a visible relation and subordination thereto; the other is not. Thus the pleasure of eating is of the former sort, of musick of the later sort. These may be used for recreation, those not but in order to their end.

Mo. N.

Three sorts of useful knowledge—that of Coexistence, to be treated of in our Principles of Natural Philosophy; that of Relation, in Mathematiques; that of Definition, or inclusion, or words (which perhaps differs not from that of relation), in Morality[192].

Will, understanding, desire, hatred, &c., so far forth as they are acts or active, differ not. All their difference consists in their objects, circumstances, &c.

We must carefully distinguish betwixt two sorts of causes—physical & spiritual.

The physical may more properly be called occasions. Yet (to comply) we may call them causes—but then we must mean causes yt do nothing.

According to Locke, we must be in an eternal uneasiness [pg 056] so long as we live, bating the time of sleep or trance, &c.; for he will have even the continuance of an action to be in his sense an action, & so requires a volition, & this an uneasiness.

I must not pretend to promise much of demonstration. I must cancell all passages that look like that sort of pride, that raising of expectation in my friend.

If this be the case, surely a man had better not philosophize at all: no more than a deformed person ought to cavil to behold himself by the reflex light of a mirrour.

Or thus, like deformed persons who, having beheld themselves by the reflex light of a mirrour, are displeased with their diseases.

What can an idea be like but another idea? We can compare it with nothing else—a sound like a sound, a colour like a colour.

Is it not nonsense to say a smell is like a thing which cannot be smelt, a colour is like a thing wh cannot be seen?

M. S.

Bodies exist without the mind, i.e. are not the mind, but distinct from it. This I allow, the mind being altogether different therefrom[193].

Certainly we should not see motion if there was no diversity of colours.

Motion is an abstract idea, i.e. there is no such idea that can be conceived by itself.

Contradictions cannot be both true. Men are obliged to answer objections drawn from consequences. Introd.

The Will and Volition are words not used by the vulgar. The learned are bantered by their meaning abstract ideas.

Speculative Math, as if a man was all day making hard knots on purpose to unty them again.

Tho' it might have been otherwise, yet it is convenient the same thing wch is M.V. should be also M.T., or very near it.

I must not give the soul or mind the scholastique name “pure act,” but rather pure spirit, or active being.

I must not say the Will or Understanding are all one, but that they are both abstract ideas, i.e. none at all—they not being even ratione different from the Spirit, quâ faculties, or active.

Dangerous to make idea & thing terms convertible[194]. That were the way to prove spirits are nothing.

Mo.

Qu. whether veritas stands not for an abstract idea?

'Tis plain the moderns must by their own principles own there are no bodies, i.e. no sort of bodies without the mind, i.e. unperceived.

S. G.

Qu. whether the Will can be the object of prescience or any knowledge?

If there were only one ball in the world, it could not be moved. There could be no variety of appearance.

According to the doctrine of infinite divisibility, there must be some smell of a rose, v. g. at an infinite distance from it.

Extension, tho' it exist only in the mind, yet is no property of the mind. The mind can exist without it, tho' it cannot without the mind. But in Book II. I shall at large shew the difference there is betwixt the Soul and Body or extended being.

'Tis an absurd question wch Locke puts, whether man be free to will?

Mem. To enquire into the reason of the rule for determining questions in Algebra.

It has already been observed by others that names are nowhere of more necessary use than in numbering.

M. P.

I will grant you that extension, colour, &c. may be said to be without the mind in a double respect, i.e. as independent of our will, and as distinct from the mind.

Mo. N.

Certainly it is not impossible but a man may arrive at the knowledge of all real truth as well without as with signs, had he a memory and imagination most strong and capacious. Therefore reasoning & science doth not altogether depend upon words or names[195].

I think not that things fall out of necessity. The connexion of no two ideas is necessary; 'tis all the result of freedom, i.e. 'tis all voluntary[196].

M. S.

If a man with his eyes shut imagines to himself the sun & firmament, you will not say he or his mind is the sun, or is extended, tho' neither sun or firmament be without mind.

'Tis strange to find philosophers doubting & disputing whether they have ideas of spiritual things or no. Surely 'tis easy to know. Vid. De Vries[197], De Ideis Innatis, p. 64.

De Vries will have it that we know the mind agrees with things not by idea but sense or conscientia. So will Malbranch. This a vain distinction.

August 28th, 1708. The Adventure of the [Shirt?].

It were to be wished that persons of the greatest birth, honour, & fortune, would take that care of themselves, by education, industry, literature, & a love of virtue, to surpass all other men in knowledge & all other qualifications necessary for great actions, as far as they do in quality & titles; that princes out of them might always chose men fit for all employments and high trusts. Clov. B. 7.

One eternity greater than another of the same kind.

In what sense eternity may be limited.

G. T.

Whether succession of ideas in the Divine intellect?

Time is the train of ideas succeeding each other.

Duration not distinguish'd from existence.

Succession explain'd by before, between, after, & numbering.

Why time in pain longer than time in pleasure?

Duration infinitely divisible, time not so.

The same τὸ νῦν not common to all intelligences.

Time thought infinitely divisible on account of its measure.

Extension not infinitely divisible in one sense.

Revolutions immediately measure train of ideas, mediately duration.

Time a sensation; therefore onely in ye mind.

Eternity is onely a train of innumerable ideas. Hence the immortality of ye soul easily conceiv'd, or rather the immortality of the person, that of ye soul not being necessary for ought we can see.

Swiftness of ideas compar'd with yt of motions shews the wisdom of God.

Wt if succession of ideas were swifter, wt if slower?

Fall of Adam, use of idolatry, use of Epicurism & Hobbism, dispute about divisibility of matter, &c. expounded by material substances.

Extension a sensation, therefore not without the mind.

In the immaterial hypothesis, the wall is white, fire hot, &c.

Primary ideas prov'd not to exist in matter; after the same manner yt secondary ones are prov'd not to exist therein.

Demonstrations of the infinite divisibility of extension suppose length without breadth, or invisible length, wch is absurd.

World wthout thought is nec quid, nec quantum, nec quale, &c.

'Tis wondrous to contemplate ye World empty'd of all intelligences.

Nothing properly but Persons, i.e. conscious things, do exist. All other things are not so much existences as manners of ye existence of persons[198].

Qu. about the soul, or rather person, whether it be not compleatly known?

Infinite divisibility of extension does suppose the external existence of extension; but the later is false, ergo ye former also.

Qu. Blind man made to see, would he know motion at 1st sight?

Motion, figure, and extension perceivable by sight are [pg 060] different from those ideas perceived by touch wch goe by the same name.

Diagonal incommensurable wth ye side. Quære how this can be in my doctrine?

Qu. how to reconcile Newton's 2 sorts of motion with my doctrine?

Terminations of surfaces & lines not imaginable per se.

Molyneux's blind man would not know the sphere or cube to be bodies or extended at first sight[199].

Extension so far from being incompatible wth, yt 'tis impossible it should exist without thought.

M. S.

Extension itself or anything extended cannot think—these being meer ideas or sensations, whose essence we thoroughly know.

No extension but surface perceivable by sight.

Wn we imagine 2 bowls v. g. moving in vacuo, 'tis only conceiving a person affected with these sensations.

Extension to exist in a thoughtless thing [or rather in a thing void of perception—thought seeming to imply action], is a contradiction.

Qu. if visible motion be proportional to tangible motion?

In some dreams succession of ideas swifter than at other times.

If a piece of matter have extension, that must be determined to a particular bigness & figure, but &c.

Nothing wthout corresponds to our primary ideas but powers. Hence a direct & brief demonstration of an active powerfull Being, distinct from us, on whom we depend.

The name of colours actually given to tangible qualities, by the relation of ye story of the German Count.

Qu. How came visible & tangible qualities by the same name in all languages?

Qu. Whether Being might not be the substance of the soul, or (otherwise thus) whether Being, added to ye faculties, compleat the real essence and adequate definition of the soul?

Qu. Whether, on the supposition of external bodies, it be possible for us to know that any body is absolutely [pg 061] at rest, since that supposing ideas much slower than at present, bodies now apparently moving wd then be apparently at rest?

Qu. What can be like a sensation but a sensation?

Qu. Did ever any man see any other things besides his own ideas, that he should compare them to these, and make these like unto them?

The age of a fly, for ought that we know, may be as long as yt of a man[200].

Visible distance heterogeneous from tangible distance demonstrated 3 several ways:—

1st. If a tangible inch be equal or in any other reason to a visible inch, thence it will follow yt unequals are equals, wch is absurd: for at what distance would the visible inch be placed to make it equal to the tangible inch?

2d. One made to see that had not yet seen his own limbs, or any thing he touched, upon sight of a foot length would know it to be a foot length, if tangible foot & visible foot were the same idea—sed falsum id, ergo et hoc.

3dly. From Molyneux's problem, wch otherwise is falsely solv'd by Locke and him[201].

Nothing but ideas perceivable[202].

A man cannot compare 2 things together without perceiving them each. Ergo, he cannot say anything wch is not an idea is like or unlike an idea.

Bodies &c. do exist even wn not perceived—they being powers in the active being[203].

Succession a simple idea, [succession is an abstract, i.e. an inconceivable idea,] Locke says[204].

Visible extension is [proportional to tangible extension, also is] encreated & diminish'd by parts. Hence taken for the same.

If extension be without the mind in bodies. Qu. whether tangible or visible, or both?

Mathematical propositions about extension & motion true in a double sense.

Extension thought peculiarly inert, because not accompany'd wth pleasure & pain: hence thought to exist in matter; as also for that it was conceiv'd common to 2 senses, [as also the constant perception of 'em].

Blind at 1st sight could not tell how near what he saw was to him, nor even whether it be wthout him or in his eye[205]. Qu. Would he not think the later?

Blind at 1st sight could not know yt wt he saw was extended, until he had seen and touched some one self-same thing—not knowing how minimum tangibile would look in vision.

Mem. That homogeneous particles be brought in to answer the objection of God's creating sun, plants, &c. before animals.

In every bodie two infinite series of extension—the one of tangible, the other of visible.

All things to a blind [man] at first seen in a point.

Ignorance of glasses made men think extension to be in bodies.

Homogeneous portions of matter—useful to contemplate them.

Extension if in matter changes its relation wth minimum visibile, wch seems to be fixt.

Qu. whether m.v. be fix'd?

Each particle of matter if extended must be infinitely extended, or have an infinite series of extension.

If the world be granted to consist of Matter, 'tis the mind gives it beauty and proportion.

Wt I have said onely proves there is no proportion at all times and in all men between a visible & tangible inch.

Tangible and visible extension heterogeneous, because they have no common measure; also because their simplest constituent parts or elements are specifically different, viz. punctum visibile & tangibile. N. B. The former seems to be no good reason.

M. N.

By immateriality is solv'd the cohesion of bodies, or rather the dispute ceases.

Our idea we call extension neither way capable of infinity, i.e. neither infinitely small or great.

Greatest possible extension seen under an angle wch will be less than 180 degrees, the legs of wch angle proceed from the ends of the extension.

Allowing there be extended, solid, &c. substances without the mind, 'tis impossible the mind should know or perceive them; the mind, even according to the materialists, perceiving onely the impressions made upon its brain, or rather the ideas attending these impressions[206].

Unity in abstracto not at all divisible, it being as it were a point, or with Barrow nothing at all; in concreto not divisible ad infinitum, there being no one idea demonstrable ad infinitum.

Any subject can have of each sort of primary qualities but one particular at once. Locke, b. 4. c. 3. s. 15.

Qu. whether we have clear ideas of large numbers themselves, or onely of their relations?

Of solidity see L. b. 2. c. 4. s. 1, 5, 6. If any one ask wt solidity is, let him put a flint between his hands and he will know. Extension of body is continuity of solid, &c.; extension of space is continuity of unsolid, &c.

Why may not I say visible extension is a continuity of visible points, tangible extension is a continuity of tangible points?

Mem. That I take notice that I do not fall in wth sceptics, Fardella[207], &c., in that I make bodies to exist certainly, wch they doubt of.

I am more certain of ye existence & reality of bodies than Mr. Locke; since he pretends onely to wt he calls sensitive knowledge[208], whereas I think I have demonstrative [pg 064] knowledge of their existence—by them meaning combinations of powers in an unknown substratum[209].

Our ideas we call figure & extension, not images of the figure and extension of matter; these (if such there be) being infinitely divisible, those not so.

'Tis impossible a material cube should exist, because the edges of a cube will appear broad to an acute sense.

Men die, or are in [a] state of annihilation, oft in a day.

Powers. Qu. whether more or one onely?

Lengths abstract from breadths are the work of the mind. Such do intersect in a point at all angles. After the same way colour is abstract from extension.

Every position alters the line.

Qu. whether ideas of extension are made up of other ideas, v.g. idea of a foot made up of general ideas of an inch?

The idea of an inch length not one determin'd idea. Hence enquire the reason why we are out in judging of extension by the sight; for which purpose 'tis meet also to consider the frequent & sudden changes of extension by position.

No stated ideas of length without a minimum.

Material substance banter'd by Locke, b. 2. c. 13. s. 19.

In my doctrine all absurdities from infinite space &c. cease[210].

Qu. whether if (speaking grossly) the things we see were all of them at all times too small to be felt, we should have confounded tangible & visible extension and figure?

Qu. whether if succession of ideas in the Eternal Mind, a day does not seem to God a 1000 years, rather than a 1000 years a day?

But one only colour & its degrees.

Enquiry about a grand mistake in writers of dioptricks in assigning the cause of microscopes magnifying objects.

Qu. whether a born-blind [man] made to see would at 1st give the name of distance to any idea intromitted by sight; since he would take distance yt that he had perceived by touch to be something existing without his mind, but he would certainly think that nothing seen was without his mind[211]?

Space without any bodies existing in rerum natura would not be extended, as not having parts—in that parts are assigned to it wth respect to body; from whence also the notion of distance is taken. Now without either parts or distance or mind, how can there be Space, or anything beside one uniform Nothing?

Two demonstrations that blind made to see would not take all things he saw to be without his mind, or not in a point—the one from microscopic eyes, the other from not perceiving distance, i.e. radius of the visual sphere.

The trees are in the park, i.e. whether I will or no, whether I imagine anything about them or no. Let me but go thither and open my eyes by day, & I shall not avoid seeing them.

By extension blind [man] would mean either the perception caused in his touch by something he calls extended, or else the power of raising that perception; wch power is without, in the thing termed extended. Now he could not know either of these to be in things visible till he had try'd.

Geometry seems to have for its object tangible extension, figures, & motion—and not visible[212].

A man will say a body will seem as big as before, tho' the visible idea it yields be less than wt it was; therefore the bigness or tangible extension of the body is different from the visible extension.

Extension or space no simple idea—length, breadth, & solidity being three several ideas.

Depth or solidity now perceived by sight[213].

Strange impotence of men. Man without God wretcheder than a stone or tree; he having onely the power to be miserable by his unperformed wills, these having no power at all[214].

Length perceivable by hearing—length & breadth by sight—length, breadth, & depth by touch.

Wt affects us must be a thinking thing, for wt thinks not cannot subsist.

Number not in bodies, it being the creature of the mind, depending entirely on its consideration, & being more or less as the mind pleases[215].

Mem. Quære whether extension be equally a sensation with colour? The mob use not the word extension. 'Tis an abstract term of the Schools.

Round figure a perception or sensation in the mind, but in the body is a power. L[ocke], b. 2. c. 8. s. 8.

Mem. Mark well the later part of the last cited section.

Solids, or any other tangible things, are no otherwise seen than colours felt by the German Count.

“Of” and “thing” causes of mistake.

The visible point of he who has microscopical eyes will not be greater or less than mine.

Qu. Whether the propositions & even axioms of geometry do not divers of them suppose the existence of lines &c. without the mind?

Whether motion be the measure of duration? Locke, b. 2. c. 14. s. 19.

Lines & points conceiv'd as terminations different ideas from those conceiv'd absolutely.

Every position alters a line.

Blind man at 1st would not take colours to be without his mind; but colours would seem to be in the same place with the coloured extension: therefore extension wd not seem to be without the mind.

All visible concentric circles whereof the eye is the centre are absolutely equal.

Infinite number—why absurd—not rightly solv'd by Locke[216].

Qu. how 'tis possible we should see flats or right lines?

Qu. why the moon appears greatest in the horizon[217]?

Qu. why we see things erect when painted inverted[218]?

Question put by Mr. Deering touching the thief and paradise.

Matter tho' allowed to exist may be no greater than a pin's head.

Motion is proportionable to space described in given time.

Velocity not proportionable to space describ'd in given time.

No active power but the Will: therefore Matter, if it exists, affects us not[219].

Magnitude when barely taken for the ratio partium extra partes, or rather for co-existence & succession, without considering the parts co-existing & succeeding, is infinitely, or rather indefinitely, or not at all perhaps, divisible, because it is itself infinite or indefinite. But definite, determined magnitudes, i.e. lines or surfaces consisting of points whereby (together wth distance & position) they are determin'd, are resoluble into those points.

Again. Magnitude taken for co-existence and succession is not all divisible, but is one simple idea.

Simple ideas include no parts nor relations—hardly separated and considered in themselves—nor yet rightly singled by any author. Instance in power, red, extension, &c.

Space not imaginable by any idea received from sight—not imaginable without body moving. Not even then necessarily existing (I speak of infinite space)—for wt the body has past may be conceiv'd annihilated.

Qu. What can we see beside colours? what can we feel beside hard, soft, cold, warm, pleasure, pain?

Qu. Why not taste & smell extension?

Qu. Why not tangible & visible extensions thought heterogeneous extensions, so well as gustable & olefactible perceptions thought heterogeneous perceptions? or at least why not as heterogeneous as blue & red?

Moon wn horizontal does not appear bigger as to visible extension than at other times; hence difficulties and disputes about things seen under equal angles &c. cease.

All potentiæ alike indifferent.

A. B. Wt does he mean by his potentia? Is it the will, desire, person, or all or neither, or sometimes one, sometimes t'other?

No agent can be conceiv'd indifferent as to pain or pleasure.

We do not, properly speaking, in a strict philosophical sense, make objects more or less pleasant; but the laws of nature do that.

Mo. S.

A finite intelligence might have foreseen 4 thousand years agoe the place and circumstances, even the most minute & trivial, of my present existence. This true on supposition that uneasiness determines the will.

Doctrines of liberty, prescience, &c. explained by billiard balls.

Wt judgement would he make of uppermost and lowermost who had always seen through an inverting glass?

All lines subtending the same optic angle congruent (as is evident by an easy experiment); therefore they are equal.

We have not pure simple ideas of blue, red, or any other colour (except perhaps black) because all bodies reflect heterogeneal light.

Qu. Whether this be true as to sounds (& other sensations), there being, perhaps, rays of air wch will onely exhibit one particular sound, as rays of light one particular colour.

Colours not definable, not because they are pure unmixt thoughts, but because we cannot easily distinguish & separate the thoughts they include, or because we want names for their component ideas.

By Soul is meant onely a complex idea, made up of existence, willing, & perception in a large sense. Therefore it is known and it may be defined.

We cannot possibly conceive any active power but the Will.

In moral matters men think ('tis true) that they are free; but this freedom is only the freedom of doing as they please; wch freedom is consecutive to the Will, respecting only the operative faculties[220].

Men impute their actions to themselves because they will'd them, and that not out of ignorance, but whereas they have the consequences of them, whether good or bad.

This does not prove men to be indifferent in respect of desiring.

If anything is meant by the potentia of A. B. it must be desire; but I appeal to any man if his desire be indifferent, or (to speak more to the purpose) whether he himself be indifferent in respect of wt he desires till after he has desired it; for as for desire itself, or the faculty of desiring, that is indifferent, as all other faculties are.

Actions leading to heaven are in my power if I will them: therefore I will will them.

Qu. concerning the procession of Wills in infinitum.

Herein mathematiques have the advantage over metaphysiques and morality. Their definitions, being of words not yet known to ye learner, are not disputed; but words in metaphysiques & morality, being mostly known to all, the definitions of them may chance to be contraverted.

The short jejune way in mathematiques will not do in metaphysiques & ethiques: for yt about mathematical propositions men have no prejudices, no anticipated opinions to be encounter'd; they not having yet thought on such matters. 'Tis not so in the other 2 mentioned sciences. A man must [there] not onely demonstrate the truth, he must also vindicate it against scruples and established opinions which contradict it. In short, the dry, strigose[221], rigid way will not suffice. He must be more ample & copious, else his demonstration, tho' never so exact, will not go down with most.

Extension seems to consist in variety of homogeneal thoughts co-existing without mixture.

Or rather visible extension seems to be the co-existence of colour in the mind.

S. Mo.

Enquiring and judging are actions which depend on the operative faculties, wch depend on the Will, wch is determin'd by some uneasiness; ergo &c. Suppose an agent wch is finite perfectly indifferent, and as to desiring not determin'd by any prospect or consideration of good, I say, this agent cannot do an action morally good. Hence 'tis evident the suppositions of A. B. are insignificant.

Extension, motion, time, number are no simple ideas, but include succession to them, which seems to be a simple idea.

Mem. To enquire into the angle of contact, & into fluxions, &c.

The sphere of vision is equal whether I look onely in my hand or on the open firmament, for 1st, in both cases the retina is full; 2d, the radius's of both spheres are equall or rather nothing at all to the sight; 3dly, equal numbers of points in one & t'other.

In the Barrovian case purblind would judge aright.

Why the horizontal moon greater?

Why objects seen erect?

To what purpose certain figure and texture connected wth other perceptions?

Men estimate magnitudes both by angles and distance. Blind at 1st could not know distance; or by pure sight, abstracting from experience of connexion of sight and tangible ideas, we can't perceive distance. Therefore by pure sight we cannot perceive or judge of extension.

Qu. Whether it be possible to enlarge our sight or make us see at once more, or more points, than we do, by diminishing the punctum visibile below 30 minutes?

I. S.

Speech metaphorical more than we imagine; insensible things, & their modes, circumstances, &c. being exprest for the most part by words borrow'd from things sensible. Hence manyfold mistakes.

The grand mistake is that we think we have ideas of the [pg 071] operations of our minds[222]. Certainly this metaphorical dress is an argument we have not.

Qu. How can our idea of God be complex & compounded, when his essence is simple & uncompounded? V. Locke, b. 2. c. 23. s. 35[223].

The impossibility of defining or discoursing clearly of such things proceeds from the fault & scantiness of language, as much perhaps as from obscurity & confusion of thought. Hence I may clearly and fully understand my own soul, extension, &c., and not be able to define them[224].

The substance wood a collection of simple ideas. See Locke, b. 2. c. 26. s. 1.

Mem. concerning strait lines seen to look at them through an orbicular lattice.

Qu. Whether possible that those visible ideas wch are now connected with greater tangible extensions could have been connected with lesser tangible extensions,—there seeming to be no necessary connexion between those thoughts?

Speculums seem to diminish or enlarge objects not by altering the optique angle, but by altering the apparent distance.

Hence Qu. if blind would think things diminish'd by convexes, or enlarg'd by concaves?

P.N.

Motion not one idea. It cannot be perceived at once.

M. P.

Mem. To allow existence to colours in the dark, persons not thinking, &c.—but not an actual existence. 'Tis prudent to correct men's mistakes without altering their language. This makes truth glide into their souls insensibly[225].

M. P.

Colours in ye dark do exist really, i.e. were there light; or as soon as light comes, we shall see them, provided we open our eyes; and that whether we will or no.

How the retina is fill'd by a looking-glass?

Convex speculums have the same effect wth concave glasses.

Qu. Whether concave speculums have the same effect wth convex glasses?

The reason why convex speculums diminish & concave magnify not yet fully assign'd by any writer I know.

Qu. Why not objects seen confus'd when that they seem inverted through a convex lens?

Qu. How to make a glass or speculum which shall magnify or diminish by altering the distance without altering the angle?

No identity (other than perfect likeness) in any individuals besides persons[226].

As well make tastes, smells, fear, shame, wit, virtue, vice, & all thoughts move wth local motion as immaterial spirit.

On account of my doctrine, the identity of finite substances must consist in something else than continued existence, or relation to determined time & place of beginning to exist—the existence of our thoughts (which being combined make all substances) being frequently interrupted, & they having divers beginnings & endings.

Qu. Whether identity of person consists not in the Will?

No necessary connexion between great or little optique angles and great or little extension.

Distance is not perceived: optique angles are not perceived. How then is extension perceiv'd by sight?

Apparent magnitude of a line is not simply as the optique angle, but directly as the optique angle, & reciprocally as the confusion, &c. (i.e. the other sensations, or want of sensation, that attend near vision). Hence great mistakes in assigning the magnifying power of glasses. Vid. Moly[neux], p. 182.

Glasses or speculums may perhaps magnify or lessen without altering the optique angle, but to no purpose.

Qu. Whether purblind would think objects so much diminished by a convex speculum as another?

Qu. Wherein consists identity of person? Not in actual consciousness; for then I'm not the same person I was this day twelvemonth but while I think of wt I then [pg 073] did. Not in potential; for then all persons may be the same, for ought we know.

Mem. Story of Mr. Deering's aunt.

Two sorts of potential consciousness—natural & præternatural. In the last § but one, I mean the latter.

If by magnitude be meant the proportion anything bears to a determined tangible extension, as inch, foot, &c., this, 'tis plain, cannot be properly & per se perceived by sight; & as for determin'd visible inches, feet, &c., there can be no such thing obtain'd by the meer act of seeing—abstracted from experience, &c.

The greatness per se perceivable by the sight is onely the proportion any visible appearance bears to the others seen at the same time; or (which is the same thing) the proportion of any particular part of the visual orb to the whole. But mark that we perceive not it is an orb, any more than a plain, but by reasoning.

This is all the greatness the pictures have per se.

Hereby meere seeing cannot at all judge of the extension of any object, it not availing to know the object makes such a part of a sphærical surface except we also know the greatness of the sphærical surface; for a point may subtend the same angle wth a mile, & so create as great an image in the retina, i.e. take up as much of the orb.

Men judge of magnitude by faintness and vigorousness, by distinctness and confusion, with some other circumstances, by great & little angles.

Hence 'tis plain the ideas of sight which are now connected with greatness might have been connected wth smallness, and vice versâ: there being no necessary reason why great angles, faintness, and distinctness without straining, should stand for great extension, any more than a great angle, vigorousness, and confusion[227].

My end is not to deliver metaphysiques altogether in a general scholastic way, but in some measure to accommodate them to the sciences, and shew how they may be useful in optiques, geometry, &c.[228]

Qu. Whether per se proportion of visible magnitudes be perceivable by sight? This is put on account of distinctness and confusedness, the act of perception seeming to be [pg 074] as great in viewing any point of the visual orb distinctly, as in viewing the whole confusedly.

Mem. To correct my language & make it as philosophically nice as possible—to avoid giving handle.

If men could without straining alter the convexity of their crystallines, they might magnify or diminish the apparent diameters of objects, the same optic angle remaining.

The bigness in one sense of the pictures in the fund is not determin'd; for the nearer a man views them, the images of them (as well as other objects) will take up the greater room in the fund of his eye.

Mem. Introduction to contain the design of the whole, the nature and manner of demonstrating, &c.

Two sorts of bigness accurately to be distinguished, they being perfectly and toto cælo different—the one the proportion that any one appearance has to the sum of appearances perceived at the same time wth it, wch is proportional to angles, or, if a surface, to segments of sphærical surfaces;—the other is tangible bigness.

Qu. wt would happen if the sphæræ of the retina were enlarged or diminish'd?

We think by the meer act of vision we perceive distance from us, yet we do not; also that we perceive solids, yet we do not; also the inequality of things seen under the same angle, yet we do not.

Why may I not add, We think we see extension by meer vision? Yet we do not.

Extension seems to be perceived by the eye, as thought by the ear.

As long as the same angle determines the minimum visibile to two persons, no different conformation of the eye can make a different appearance of magnitude in the same thing. But, it being possible to try the angle, we may certainly know whether the same thing appears differently big to two persons on account of their eyes.

If a man could see ... objects would appear larger to him than to another; hence there is another sort of purely visible magnitude beside the proportion any appearance bears to the visual sphere, viz. its proportion to the M. V.

Were there but one and the same language in the world, and did children speak it naturally as soon as born, and [pg 075] were it not in the power of men to conceal their thoughts or deceive others, but that there were an inseparable connexion between words & thoughts, so yt posito uno, ponitur alterum by the laws of nature; Qu. would not men think they heard thoughts as much as that they see extension[229]?

All our ideas are adæquate: our knowledge of the laws of nature is not perfect & adæquate[230].

M. P.

Men are in the right in judging their simple ideas to be in the things themselves. Certainly heat & colour is as much without the mind as figure, motion, time, &c.

We know many things wch we want words to express. Great things discoverable upon this principle. For want of considering wch divers men have run into sundry mistakes, endeavouring to set forth their knowledge by sounds; wch foundering them, they thought the defect was in their knowledge, while in truth it was in their language.

Qu. Whether the sensations of sight arising from a man's head be liker the sensations of touch proceeding from thence or from his legs?

Or, Is it onely the constant & long association of ideas entirely different that makes me judge them the same?

Wt I see is onely variety of colours & light. Wt I feel is hard or soft, hot or cold, rough or smooth, &c. Wt resemblance have these thoughts with those?

A picture painted wth great variety of colours affects the touch in one uniform manner. I cannot therefore conclude that because I see 2, I shall feel 2; because I see angles or inequalities, I shall feel angles or inequalities. How therefore can I—before experience teaches me—know that the visible leggs are (because 2) connected wth the tangible ones, or the visible head (because one) connected wth the tangible head[231]?

All things by us conceivable are—

1st, thoughts;

2ndly, powers to receive thoughts;

3rdly, powers to cause thoughts; neither of all wch can possibly exist in an inert, senseless thing.

An object wthout a glass may be seen under as great an angle as wth a glass. A glass therefore does not magnify the appearance by the angle.

Absurd that men should know the soul by idea—ideas being inert, thoughtless. Hence Malbranch confuted[232].

I saw gladness in his looks. I saw shame in his face. So I see figure or distance.

Qu. Why things seen confusedly thro' a convex glass are not magnify'd?

Tho' we should judge the horizontal moon to be more distant, why should we therefore judge her to be greater? What connexion betwixt the same angle, further distant, and greaterness?

My doctrine affects the essences of the Corpuscularians.

Perfect circles, &c. exist not without (for none can so exist, whether perfect or no), but in the mind.

Lines thought divisible ad infinitum, because they are suppos'd to exist without. Also because they are thought the same when view'd by the naked eye, & wn view'd thro' magnifying glasses.

They who knew not glasses had not so fair a pretence for the divisibility ad infinitum.

No idea of circle, &c. in abstract.

Metaphysiques as capable of certainty as ethiques, but not so capable to be demonstrated in a geometrical way; because men see clearer & have not so many prejudices in ethiques.

Visible ideas come into the mind very distinct. So do tangible ideas. Hence extension seen & felt. Sounds, tastes, &c. are more blended.

Qu. Why not extension intromitted by the taste in conjunction with the smell—seeing tastes & smells are very distinct ideas?

Blew and yellow particles mixt, while they exhibit an uniform green, their extension is not perceiv'd; but as soon as they exhibit distinct sensations of blew and yellow, then their extension is perceiv'd.

Distinct perception of visible ideas not so perfect as of tangible—tangible ideas being many at once equally vivid. Hence heterogeneous extension.

Object. Why a mist increases not the apparent magnitude of an object, in proportion to the faintness[233]?

Mem. To enquire touching the squaring of the circle, &c.

That wch seems smooth & round to the touch may to sight seem quite otherwise. Hence no necessary connexion betwixt visible ideas and tangible ones.

In geometry it is not prov'd that an inch is divisible ad infinitum.

Geometry not conversant about our compleat determined ideas of figures, for these are not divisible ad infinitum.

Particular circles may be squar'd, for the circumference being given a diameter may be found betwixt wch & the true there is not any perceivable difference. Therefore there is no difference—extension being a perception; & a perception not perceivd is contradiction, nonsense, nothing. In vain to alledge the difference may be seen by magnifying-glasses, for in yt case there is ('tis true) a difference perceiv'd, but not between the same ideas, but others much greater, entirely different therefrom[234].

Any visible circle possibly perceivable of any man may be squar'd, by the common way, most accurately; or even perceivable by any other being, see he never so acute, i.e. never so small an arch of a circle; this being wt makes the distinction between acute & dull sight, and not the m.v., as men are perhaps apt to think.

The same is true of any tangible circle. Therefore further enquiry of accuracy in squaring or other curves is perfectly needless, & time thrown away.

Mem. To press wt last precedes more homely, & so think on't again.

A meer line or distance is not made up of points, does [pg 078] not exist, cannot be imagin'd, or have an idea framed thereof,—no more than meer colour without extension[235].

Mem. A great difference between considering length wthout breadth, & having an idea of, or imagining, length without breadth[236].

Malbranch out touching the crystallines diminishing, L. 1. c. 6.

'Tis possible (& perhaps not very improbable, that is, is sometimes so) we may have the greatest pictures from the least objects. Therefore no necessary connexion betwixt visible & tangible ideas. These ideas, viz. great relation to sphæra visualis, or to the m. v. (wch is all that I would have meant by having a greater picture) & faintness, might possibly have stood for or signify'd small tangible extensions. Certainly the greater relation to s. v. and m. v. does frequently, in that men view little objects near the eye.

Malbranch out in asserting we cannot possibly know whether there are 2 men in the world that see a thing of the same bigness. V. L. 1. c. 6.

Diagonal of particular square commensurable wth its side, they both containing a certain number of m. v.

I do not think that surfaces consist of lines, i.e. meer distances. Hence perhaps may be solid that sophism wch would prove the oblique line equal to the perpendicular between 2 parallels.

Suppose an inch represent a mile. 1/1000 of an inch is nothing, but 1/1000 of ye mile represented is something: therefore 1/1000 an inch, tho' nothing, is not to be neglected, because it represents something, i.e. 1/1000 of a mile.

Particular determin'd lines are not divisible ad infinitum, but lines as us'd by geometers are so, they not being determin'd to any particular finite number of points. Yet a geometer (he knows not why) will very readily say he can demonstrate an inch line is divisible ad infinitum.

A body moving in the optique axis not perceiv'd to move by sight merely, and without experience. There is ('tis [pg 079] true) a successive change of ideas,—it seems less and less. But, besides this, there is no visible change of place.

Mem. To enquire most diligently concerning the incommensurability of diagonale & side—whether it does not go on the supposition of units being divisible ad infinitum, i.e. of the extended thing spoken of being divisible ad infinitum (unit being nothing; also v. Barrow, Lect. Geom.), & so the infinite indivisibility deduced therefrom is a petitio principii?

The diagonal is commensurable with the side.

M. P.

From Malbranch, Locke, & my first arguings it can't be prov'd that extension is not in matter. From Locke's arguings it can't be proved that colours are not in bodies.

Mem. That I was distrustful at 8 years old; and consequently by nature disposed for these new doctrines[237].

Qu. How can a line consisting of an unequal number of points be divisible [ad infinitum] in two equals?

Mem. To discuss copiously how & why we do not see the pictures.

M. P.

Allowing extensions to exist in matter, we cannot know even their proportions—contrary to Malbranch.

I wonder how men cannot see a truth so obvious, as that extension cannot exist without a thinking substance.

Species of all sensible things made by the mind. This prov'd either by turning men's eyes into magnifyers or diminishers.

Yr m. v. is, suppose, less than mine. Let a 3rd person have perfect ideas of both our m. vs. His idea of my m. v. contains his idea of yours, & somewhat more. Therefore 'tis made up of parts: therefore his idea of my m. v. is not perfect or just, which diverts the hypothesis.

Qu. Whether a m. v. or t. be extended?

Mem. The strange errours men run into about the pictures. We think them small because should a man be suppos'd to see them their pictures would take up but little room in the fund of his eye.

It seems all lines can't be bisected in 2 equall parts. Mem. To examine how the geometers prove the contrary.

'Tis impossible there should be a m. v. less than mine. If there be, mine may become equal to it (because they are homogeneous) by detraction of some part or parts. But it consists not of parts, ergo &c.

Suppose inverting perspectives bound to ye eyes of a child, & continu'd to the years of manhood—when he looks up, or turns up his head, he shall behold wt we call under. Qu. What would he think of up and down[238]?

I wonder not at my sagacity in discovering the obvious tho' amazing truth. I rather wonder at my stupid inadvertency in not finding it out before—'tis no witchcraft to see.

Our simple ideas are so many simple thoughts or perceptions; a perception cannot exist without a thing to perceive it, or any longer than it is perceiv'd; a thought cannot be in an unthinking thing; one uniform simple thought can be like to nothing but another uniform simple thought. Complex thoughts or ideas are onely an assemblage of simple ideas, and can be the image of nothing, or like unto nothing, but another assemblage of simple ideas, &c.

The Cartesian opinion of light & colours &c. is orthodox enough even in their eyes who think the Scripture expression may favour the common opinion. Why may not mine also? But there is nothing in Scripture that can possibly be wrested to make against me, but, perhaps, many things for me.

Bodies &c. do exist whether we think of 'em or no, they being taken in a twofold sense—

1. Collections of thoughts.

2. Collections of powers to cause those thoughts.

These later exist; tho' perhaps a parte rei it may be one simple perfect power.

Qu. whether the extension of a plain, look'd at straight and slantingly, survey'd minutely & distinctly, or in the bulk and confusedly at once, be the same? N. B. The plain is suppos'd to keep the same distance.

The ideas we have by a successive, curious inspection of ye minute parts of a plain do not seem to make up the extension of that plain view'd & consider'd all together.

Ignorance in some sort requisite in ye person that should disown the Principle.

Thoughts do most properly signify, or are mostly taken for the interior operations of the mind, wherein the mind is active. Those yt obey not the acts of volition, and in wch the mind is passive, are more properly call'd sensations or perceptions. But yt is all a case of words.

Extension being the collection or distinct co-existence of minimums, i.e. of perceptions intromitted by sight or touch, it cannot be conceiv'd without a perceiving substance.

Malbranch does not prove that the figures & extensions exist not when they are not perceiv'd. Consequently he does not prove, nor can it be prov'd on his principles, that the sorts are the work of the mind, and onely in the mind.

M. P.

The great argument to prove that extension cannot be in an unthinking substance is, that it cannot be conceiv'd distinct from or without all tangible or visible quality.

Tho' matter be extended wth an indefinite extension, yet the mind makes the sorts. They were not before the mind perceiving them, & even now they are not without the mind. Houses, trees, &c., tho' indefinitely extended matter do exist, are not without the mind.

The great danger of making extension exist without the mind is, that if it does it must be acknowledg'd infinite, immutable, eternal, &c.;—wch will be to make either God extended (wch I think dangerous), or an eternal, immutable, infinite, increate Being beside God.

Finiteness of our minds no excuse for the geometers.

The Principle easily proved by plenty of arguments ad absurdum.

The twofold signification of Bodies, viz.

1. Combinations of thoughts[239];

2. Combinations of powers to raise thoughts.

These, I say, in conjunction with homogeneous particles, may solve much better the objections from the creation than the supposition that Matter does exist. Upon wch supposition I think they cannot be solv'd.

Bodies taken for powers do exist wn not perceiv'd; but this existence is not actual[240]. Wn I say a power exists, no more is meant than that if in the light I open my eyes, and look that way, I shall see it, i.e. the body, &c.

Qu. whether blind before sight may not have an idea of light and colours & visible extension, after the same manner as we perceive them wth eyes shut, or in the dark—not imagining, but seeing after a sort?

Visible extension cannot be conceiv'd added to tangible extension. Visible and tangible points can't make one sum. Therefore these extensions are heterogeneous.

A probable method propos'd whereby one may judge whether in near vision there is a greater distance between the crystalline & fund than usual, or whether the crystalline be onely render'd more convex. If the former, then the v. s. is enlarg'd, & the m. v. corresponds to less than 30 minutes, or wtever it us'd to correspond to.

Stated measures, inches, feet, &c., are tangible not visible extensions.

Locke, More, Raphson, &c. seem to make God extended. 'Tis nevertheless of great use to religion to take extension out of our idea of God, & put a power in its place. It seems dangerous to suppose extension, wch is manifestly inert, in God.

But, say you, The thought or perception I call extension is not itself in an unthinking thing or Matter—but it is like something wch is in Matter. Well, say I, Do you apprehend or conceive wt you say extension is like unto, or do you not? If the later, how know you they are alike? How can you compare any things besides your own ideas? If the former, it must be an idea, i.e. perception, thought, [pg 083] or sensation—wch to be in an unperceiving thing is a contradiction[241].

I abstain from all flourish & powers of words & figures, using a great plainness & simplicity of simile, having oft found it difficult to understand those that use the lofty & Platonic, or subtil & scholastique strain[242].

Whatsoever has any of our ideas in it must perceive; it being that very having, that passive recognition of ideas, that denominates the mind perceiving—that being the very essence of perception, or that wherein perception consists.

The faintness wch alters the appearance of the horizontal moon, rather proceeds from the quantity or grossness of the intermediate atmosphere, than from any change of distance, wch is perhaps not considerable enough to be a total cause, but may be a partial of the phenomenon. N. B. The visual angle is less in cause the horizon.

We judge of the distance of bodies, as by other things, so also by the situation of their pictures in the eye, or (wch is the same thing) according as they appear higher or lower. Those wch seem higher are farther off.

Qu. why we see objects greater in ye dark? whether this can be solv'd by any but my Principles?

The reverse of ye Principle introduced scepticism.

N. B. On my Principles there is a reality: there are things: there is a rerum natura.

Mem. The surds, doubling the cube, &c.

We think that if just made to see we should judge of the distance & magnitude of things as we do now; but this is false. So also wt we think so positively of the situation of objects.

Hays's, Keill's[243], &c. method of proving the infinitesimals of the 3d order absurd, & perfectly contradictions.

Angles of contact, & verily all angles comprehended by a right line & a curve, cannot be measur'd, the arches intercepted not being similar.

The danger of expounding the H. Trinity by extension.

M. P.

Qu. Why should the magnitude seen at a near distance be deem'd the true one rather than that seen at a farther distance? Why should the sun be thought many 1000 miles rather than one foot in diameter—both being equally apparent diameters? Certainly men judg'd of the sun not in himself, but wth relation to themselves.

4 Principles whereby to answer objections, viz.

1. Bodies do really exist, tho' not perceiv'd by us.

2. There is a law or course of nature.

3. Language & knowledge are all about ideas; words stand for nothing else.

4. Nothing can be a proof against one side of a contradiction that bears equally hard upon the other[244].

What shall I say? Dare I pronounce the admired ἀκρίβεια mathematica, that darling of the age, a trifle?

Most certainly no finite extension divisible ad infinitum.

Difficulties about concentric circles.

Mem. To examine & accurately discuss the scholium of the 8th definition of Mr. Newton's[245] Principia.

Ridiculous in the mathematicians to despise Sense.

Qu. Is it not impossible there should be abstract general ideas?

All ideas come from without. They are all particular. The mind, 'tis true, can consider one thing wthout another; but then, considered asunder, they make not 2 ideas. Both together can make but one, as for instance colour & visible extension[246].

The end of a mathematical line is nothing. Locke's argument that the end of his pen is black or white concludes nothing here.

Mem. Take care how you pretend to define extension, for fear of the geometers.

Qu. Why difficult to imagine a minimum? Ans. Because we are not used to take notice of 'em singly; they not being able singly to pleasure or hurt us, thereby to deserve our regard.

Mem. To prove against Keill yt the infinite divisibility of matter makes the half have an equal number of equal parts with the whole.

Mem. To examine how far the not comprehending infinites may be admitted as a plea.

Qu. Why may not the mathematicians reject all the extensions below the M. as well as the dd, &c., wch are allowed to be something, & consequently may be magnify'd by glasses into inches, feet, &c., as well as the quantities next below the M.?

Big, little, and number are the works of the mind. How therefore can ye extension you suppose in Matter be big or little? How can it consist of any number of points?

Mem. Strictly to remark L[ocke], b. 2. c. 8. s. 8.

Schoolmen compar'd with the mathematicians.

Extension is blended wth tangible or visible ideas, & by the mind præscinded therefrom.

Mathematiques made easy—the scale does almost all. The scale can tell us the subtangent in ye parabola is double the abscisse.

Wt need of the utmost accuracy wn the mathematicians own in rerum natura they cannot find anything corresponding wth their nice ideas.

One should endeavour to find a progression by trying wth the scale.

Newton's fluxions needless. Anything below an M might serve for Leibnitz's Differential Calculus.

How can they hang together so well, since there are in them (I mean the mathematiques) so many contradictoriæ argutiæ. V. Barrow, Lect.

A man may read a book of Conics with ease, knowing how to try if they are right. He may take 'em on the credit of the author.

Where's the need of certainty in such trifles? The thing that makes it so much esteem'd in them is that we are thought not capable of getting it elsewhere. But we may in ethiques and metaphysiques.

The not leading men into mistakes no argument for the truth of the infinitesimals. They being nothings may perhaps do neither good nor harm, except wn they are taken for something, & then the contradiction begets a contradiction.

a + 500 nothings = a + 50 nothings—an innocent silly truth.

My doctrine excellently corresponds wth the creation. I suppose no matter, no stars, sun, &c. to have existed before[247].

It seems all circles are not similar figures, there not being the same proportion betwixt all circumferences & their diameters.

When a small line upon paper represents a mile, the mathematicians do not calculate the 1/10000 of the paper line, they calculate the 1/10000 of the mile. 'Tis to this they have regard, 'tis of this they think; if they think or have any idea at all. The inch perhaps might represent to their imaginations the mile, but ye 1/10000 of the inch cannot be made to represent anything, it not being imaginable.

But the 1/10000 of a mile being somewhat, they think the 1/10000 inch is somewhat: wn they think of yt they imagine they think on this.

3 faults occur in the arguments of the mathematicians for divisibility ad infinitum—

1. They suppose extension to exist without the mind, or not perceived.

2. They suppose that we have an idea of length without breadth[248], or that length without breadth does exist.

3. That unity is divisible ad infinitum.

To suppose a M. S. divisible is to say there are distinguishable ideas where there are no distinguishable ideas.

The M. S. is not near so inconceivable as the signum in magnitudine individuum.

Mem. To examine the math, about their point—what it is—something or nothing; and how it differs from the M. S.

All might be demonstrated by a new method of indivisibles, easier perhaps and juster than that of Cavalierius[249].

Unperceivable perception a contradiction.

P. G.

Proprietates reales rerum omnium in Deo, tam corporum quum spirituum continentur. Clerici, Log. cap. 8.

Let my adversaries answer any one of mine, I'll yield. If I don't answer every one of theirs, I'll yield.

The loss of the excuse[250] may hurt Transubstantiation, but not the Trinity.

We need not strain our imaginations to conceive such little things. Bigger may do as well for infinitesimals, since the integer must be an infinite.

Evident yt wch has an infinite number of parts must be infinite.

Qu. Whether extension be resoluble into points it does not consist of?

Nor can it be objected that we reason about numbers, wch are only words & not ideas[251]; for these infinitesimals are words of no use, if not supposed to stand for ideas.

Axiom. No reasoning about things whereof we have no idea. Therefore no reasoning about infinitesimals.

Much less infinitesimals of infinitesimals, &c.

Axiom. No word to be used without an idea.

M. P.

Our eyes and senses inform us not of the existence of matter or ideas existing without the mind[252]. They are not to be blam'd for the mistake.

I defy any man to assign a right line equal to a paraboloid, but wn look'd at thro' a microscope they may appear unequall.

Newton's harangue amounts to no more than that gravity is proportional to gravity.

One can't imagine an extended thing without colour. V. Barrow, L. G.

Men allow colours, sounds, &c.[253] not to exist without the mind, tho' they have no demonstration they do not. Why may they not allow my Principle with a demonstration?

M. P.

Qu. Whether I had not better allow colours to exist without the mind; taking the mind for the active thing wch I call “I,” “myself”—yt seems to be distinct from the understanding[254]?

The taking extension to be distinct from all other tangible & visible qualities, & to make an idea by itself, has made men take it to be without the mind.

I see no wit in any of them but Newton. The rest are meer triflers, mere Nihilarians.

The folly of the mathematicians in not judging of sensations by their senses. Reason was given us for nobler uses.

Keill's filling the world with a mite[255]. This follows from the divisibility of extension ad infinitum.

Extension, or length without breadth, seems to be nothing save the number of points that lie betwixt any 2 points[256]. It seems to consist in meer proportion—meer reference of the mind.

To what purpose is it to determine the forms of glasses geometrically?

Sir Isaac[257] owns his book could have been demonstrated on the supposition of indivisibles.

Innumerable vessels of matter. V. Cheyne.

I'll not admire the mathematicians. 'Tis wt any one of [pg 089] common sense might attain to by repeated acts. I prove it by experience. I am but one of human sense, and I &c.

Mathematicians have some of them good parts—the more is the pity. Had they not been mathematicians they had been good for nothing. They were such fools they knew not how to employ their parts.

The mathematicians could not so much as tell wherein truth & certainty consisted, till Locke told 'em[258]. I see the best of 'em talk of light and colours as if wthout the mind.

By thing I either mean ideas or that wch has ideas[259].

Nullum præclarum ingenium unquam fuit magnus mathematicus. Scaliger[260].

A great genius cannot stoop to such trifles & minutenesses as they consider.

1. [261]All significant words stand for ideas[262].

2. All knowledge about our ideas.

3. All ideas come from without or from within.

4. If from without it must be by the senses, & they are call'd sensations[263].

5. If from within they are the operations of the mind, & are called thoughts.

6. No sensation can be in a senseless thing.

7. No thought can be in a thoughtless thing.

8. All our ideas are either sensations or thoughts[264], by 3, 4, 5.

9. None of our ideas can be in a thing wch is both thoughtless & senseless[265], by 6, 7, 8.

10. The bare passive recognition or having of ideas is called perception.

11. Whatever has in it an idea, tho' it be never so passive, tho' it exert no manner of act about it, yet it must perceive. 10.

12. All ideas either are simple ideas, or made up of simple ideas.

13. That thing wch is like unto another thing must agree wth it in one or more simple ideas.

14. Whatever is like a simple idea must either be another simple idea of the same sort, or contain a simple idea of the same sort. 13.

15. Nothing like an idea can be in an unperceiving thing. 11, 14. Another demonstration of the same thing.

16. Two things cannot be said to be alike or unlike till they have been compar'd.

17. Comparing is the viewing two ideas together, & marking wt they agree in and wt they disagree in.

18. The mind can compare nothing but its own ideas. 17.

19. Nothing like an idea can be in an unperceiving thing. 11, 16, 18.

N. B. Other arguments innumerable, both a priori & a posteriori, drawn from all the sciences, from the clearest, plainest, most obvious truths, whereby to demonstrate the Principle, i.e. that neither our ideas, nor anything like our ideas, can possibly be in an unperceiving thing[266].

N. B. Not one argument of any kind wtsoever, certain or probable, a priori or a posteriori, from any art or science, from either sense or reason, against it.

Mathematicians have no right idea of angles. Hence angles of contact wrongly apply'd to prove extension divisible ad infinitum.

We have got the Algebra of pure intelligences.

We can prove Newton's propositions more accurately, more easily, & upon truer principles than himself[267].

Barrow owns the downfall of geometry. However I'll endeavour to rescue it—so far as it is useful, or real, or imaginable, or intelligible. But for the nothings, I'll leave them to their admirers.

I'll teach any one the whole course of mathematiques in 1/100 part the time that another will.

Much banter got from the prefaces of the mathematicians.

Newton says colour is in the subtil matter. Hence Malbranch proves nothing, or is mistaken, in asserting there is onely figure & motion.

I can square the circle, &c.; they cannot. Wch goes on the best principles?

The Billys[268] use a finite visible line for an 1/m.

Marsilius Ficinus—his appearing the moment he died solv'd by my idea of time[269].

The philosophers lose their abstract or unperceived Matter. The mathematicians lose their insensible sensations. The profane [lose] their extended Deity. Pray wt do the rest of mankind lose? As for bodies, &c., we have them still[270].

N. B. The future nat. philosoph. & mathem. get vastly by the bargain[271].

There are men who say there are insensible extensions. There are others who say the wall is not white, the fire is not hot, &c. We Irishmen cannot attain to these truths.

The mathematicians think there are insensible lines. About these they harangue: these cut in a point at all angles: these are divisible ad infinitum. We Irishmen can conceive no such lines.

The mathematicians talk of wt they call a point. This, they say, is not altogether nothing, nor is it downright something. Now we Irishmen are apt to think something[272] & nothing are next neighbours.

Engagements to P.[273] on account of ye Treatise that grew up under his eye; on account also of his approving my [pg 092] harangue. Glorious for P. to be the protector of usefull tho' newly discover'd truths.

How could I venture thoughts into the world before I knew they would be of use to the world? and how could I know that till I had try'd how they suited other men's ideas?

I publish not this so much for anything else as to know whether other men have the same ideas as we Irishmen. This is my end, & not to be inform'd as to my own particular.

My speculations have the same effect as visiting foreign countries: in the end I return where I was before, but my heart at ease, and enjoying life with new satisfaction.

Passing through all the sciences, though false for the most part, yet it gives us the better insight and greater knowledge of the truth.

He that would bring another over to his opinion, must seem to harmonize with him at first, and humour him in his own way of talking[274].

From my childhood I had an unaccountable turn of thought that way.

It doth not argue a dwarf to have greater strength than a giant, because he can throw off the molehill which is upon him, while the other struggles beneath a mountain.

The whole directed to practise and morality—as appears 1st, from making manifest the nearness and omnipresence of God; 2dly, from cutting off the useless labour of sciences, and so forth.

[pg 095]

An Essay Towards A New Theory Of Vision

First published in 1709

Editor's Preface To The Essay Towards A New Theory Of Vision

Berkeley's Essay towards a New Theory of Vision was meant to prepare the way for the exposition and defence of the new theory of the material world, its natural order, and its relation to Spirit, that is contained in his book of Principles and in the relative Dialogues, which speedily followed. The Essay was the firstfruits of his early philosophical studies at Dublin. It was also the first attempt to show that our apparently immediate Vision of Space and of bodies extended in three-dimensioned space, is either tacit or conscious inference, occasioned by constant association of the phenomena of which alone we are visually percipient with assumed realities of our tactual and locomotive experience.

The first edition of the Essay appeared early in 1709, when its author was about twenty-four years of age. A second edition, with a few verbal changes and an Appendix, followed before the end of that year. Both were issued in Dublin, “printed by Aaron Rhames, at the back of [pg 096] Dick's Coffeehouse, for Jeremy Pepyat, bookseller in Skinner Row.” In March, 1732, a third edition, without the Appendix, was annexed to Alciphron, on account of its relation to the Fourth Dialogue in that book. This was the author's last revision.

In the present edition the text of this last edition is adopted, after collation with those preceding. The Appendix has been restored, and also the Dedication to Sir John Percival, which appeared only in the first edition.

A due appreciation of Berkeley's theory of seeing, and his conception of the visible world, involves a study, not merely of this tentative juvenile Essay, but also of its fuller development and application in his more matured works. This has been commonly forgotten by his critics.

Various circumstances contribute to perplex and even repel the reader of the Essay, making it less fit to be an easy avenue of approach to Berkeley's Principles.

Its occasion and design, and its connexion with his spiritual conception of the material world, are suggested in Sections 43 and 44 of the Principles. Those sections are a key to the Essay. They inform us that in the Essay the author intentionally uses language which seems to attribute a reality independent of all percipient spirit to the ideas or phenomena presented in Touch; it being beside his purpose, he says, to “examine and refute” that “vulgar error” in “a work on Vision.” This studied reticence of a verbally paradoxical conception of Matter, in reasonings about vision which are fully intelligible only under that conception, is one cause of a want of philosophical lucidity in the Essay.

Another circumstance adds to the embarrassment of those who approach the Principles and the three Dialogues through the Essay on Vision. The Essay offers no exception to the lax employment of equivocal words familiar in the early literature of English philosophy, [pg 097] but which is particularly inconvenient in the subtle discussions to which we are here introduced. At the present day we are perhaps accustomed to more precision and uniformity in the philosophical use of language; at any rate we connect other meanings than those here intended with some of the leading words. It is enough to refer to such terms as idea, notion, sensation, perception, touch, externality, distance, and their conjugates. It is difficult for the modern reader to revive and remember the meanings which Berkeley intends by idea and notion—so significant in his vocabulary; and touch with him connotes muscular and locomotive experience as well as the pure sense of contact. Interchange of the terms outward, outness, externality, without the mind, and without the eye is confusing, if we forget that Berkeley implies that percipient mind is virtually coextensive with our bodily organism, so that being “without” or “at a distance from” our bodies is being at a distance from the percipient mind. I have tried in the annotations to relieve some of these ambiguities, of which Berkeley himself warns us (cf. sect. 120).

The Essay moreover abounds in repetitions, and interpolations of antiquated optics and physiology, so that its logical structure and even its supreme generalisation are not easily apprehended. I will try to disentangle them.

The reader must remember that this Essay on Vision is professedly an introspective appeal to human consciousness. It is an analysis of what human beings are conscious of when they see, the results being here and there applied, partly by way of verification, to solve some famous optical or physiological puzzle. The aim is to present the facts, the whole facts, and nothing but the facts of our internal visual experience, as distinguished from supposed facts and empty abstractions, which an irregular exercise of imagination, or abuse of words, had put in their place. [pg 098] The investigation, moreover, is not concerned with Space in its metaphysical infinity, but with finite sections of Space and their relations, which concern the sciences, physical and mathematical, and with real or tangible Distance, Magnitude, and Place, in their relation to seeing.

From the second section onwards the Essay naturally falls into six Parts, devoted successively to the proof of the six following theses regarding the relation of Sight to finite spaces and to things extended:—

I. (Sect. 2-51.) Distance, or outness from the eye in the line of vision, is not seen: it is only suggested to the mind by visible phenomena and by sensations felt in the eye, all which are somehow its arbitrarily constituted and non-resembling Signs.

II. (Sect. 52-87.) Magnitude, or the amount of space that objects of sense occupy, is really invisible: we only see a greater or less quantity of colour, and colour depends upon percipient mind: our supposed visual perceptions of real magnitude are only our own interpretations of the tactual meaning of the colours we see, and of sensations felt in the eye, which are its Signs.

III. (Sect. 88-120.) Situation of objects of sense, or their real relation to one another in ambient space, is invisible: what we see is variety in the relations of colours to one another: our supposed vision of real tangible locality is only our interpretation of its visual non-resembling Signs.

IV. (Sect. 121-46.) There is no object that is presented in common to Sight and Touch: space or extension, which has the best claim to be their common object, is specifically as well as numerically different in Sight and in Touch.

V. (Sect. 147-48.) The explanation of the tactual significance of the visible and visual Signs, upon which human experience proceeds, is offered in the Theory that all visible phenomena are arbitrary signs in what is virtually [pg 099] the Language of Nature, addressed by God to the senses and intelligence of Man.

VI. (Sect. 149-60.) The true object studied in Geometry is the kind of Extension given in Touch, not that given in Sight: real Extension in all its phases is tangible, not visible: colour is the only immediate object of Sight, and colour being mind-dependent sensation, cannot be realised without percipient mind. These concluding sections are supplementary to the main argument.

The fact that distance or outness is invisible is sometimes regarded as Berkeley's contribution to the theory of seeing. It is rather the assumption on which the Essay proceeds (sect. 2). The Essay does not prove this invisibility, but seeks to shew how, notwithstanding, we learn to find outness through seeing. That the relation between the visual signs of outness, on the one hand, and the real distance which they signify, on the other, is in all cases arbitrary, and discovered through experience, is the burden of sect. 2-40. The previously recognised signs of “considerably remote” distances, are mentioned (sect. 3). But near distance was supposed to be inferred by a visual geometry—and to be “suggested,” not signified by arbitrary signs. The determination of the visual signs which suggest outness, near and remote, is Berkeley's professed discovery regarding vision.

An induction of the visual signs which “suggest” distance, is followed (sect. 43) by an assertion of the wholly sensuous reality of colour, which is acknowledged to be the only immediate object of sight. Hence visible extension, consisting in colour, must be dependent for its realisation upon sentient or percipient mind. It is then argued (sect. 44) that this mind-dependent visible outness has no resemblance to the tangible reality (sect. 45). This is the first passage in the Essay in which Touch and its data are formally brought into view. Tactual or [pg 100] locomotive experience, it is implied, is needed to infuse true reality into our conceptions of distance or outness. This cannot be got from seeing any more than from hearing, or tasting, or smelling. It is as impossible to see and touch the same object as it is to hear and touch the same object. Visible objects and ocular sensations can only be ideal signs of real things.

The sections in which Touch is thus introduced are among the most important in the Essay. They represent the outness given in hearing as wholly sensuous, ideal, or mind-dependent: they recognise as more truly real that got by contact and locomotion. But if this is all that man can see, it follows that his visible world, at any rate, becomes real only in and through percipient mind. The problem of an Essay on Vision is thus, to explain how the visible world of extended colour can inform us of tangible realities, which it does not in the least resemble, and with which it has no necessary connexion. That visible phenomena, or else certain organic sensations involved in seeing (sect. 3, 16, 21, 27), gradually suggest the real or tangible outness with which they are connected in the divinely constituted system of nature, is the explanation which now begins to dawn upon us.

Here an ambiguity in the Essay appears. It concludes that the visible world cannot be real without percipient realising mind, i.e. not otherwise than ideally: yet the argument seems to take for granted that we are percipient of a tangible world that is independent of percipient realising mind. The reader is apt to say that the tangible world must be as dependent on percipient mind for its reality as the visible world is concluded to be, and for the same reason. This difficulty was soon afterwards encountered in the book of Principles, where the worlds of sight and touch are put on the same level; and the possibility of unperceived reality in both cases is denied; on the ground that a material world cannot be realised in the total [pg 101] absence of Spirit—human and divine. The term “external” may still be applied to tactual and locomotive phenomena alone, if men choose; but this not because of the ideal character of what is seen, and the unideal reality of what is touched, but only because tactual perceptions are found to be more firm and steady than visual. Berkeley preferred in this way to insinuate his new conception of the material world by degrees, at the risk of exposing this juvenile and tentative Essay on Vision to a charge of incoherence.

The way in which visual ideas or phenomena “suggest” the outness or distance of things from the organ of sight having been thus explained, in what I call the First Part of the Essay, the Second and Third Parts (sect. 52-120) argue for the invisibility of real extension in two other relations, viz. magnitude and locality or situation. An induction of the visual signs of tangible size and situation is given in those sections. The result is applied to solve two problems then notable in optics, viz. (1) the reason for the greater visible size of the horizontal moon than of the moon in its meridian (sect. 67-87); and (2) the fact that objects are placed erect in vision only on condition that their images on the retina are inverted (sect. 88-120). Here the antithesis between the ideal world of coloured extension, and the real world of resistant extension is pressed with vigour. The “high” and “low” of the visible world is not the “high” and “low” of the tangible world (sect. 91-106). There is no resemblance and no necessary relation, between those two so-called extensions; not even when the number of visible objects happen to coincide with the number of tangible objects of which they are the visual signs, e.g. the visible and tangible fingers on the hand: for the born-blind, on first receiving sight, could not parcel out the visible phenomena in correspondence with the tangible.

The next Part of the Essay (sect. 121-45) argues for a specific as well as a numerical difference between the original data of sight and the data of touch and locomotion. Sight and touch perceive nothing in common. Extension in its various relations differs in sight from extension in touch. Coloured extension, which alone is visible, is found to be different in kind from resistant extension, which alone is tangible. And if actually perceived or concrete extensions differ thus, the question is determined. For all extension with which man can be concerned must be concrete (sect. 23). Extension in the abstract is meaningless (sect. 124-25). What remains is to marshal the scattered evidence, and to guard the foregoing conclusions against objections. This is attempted in sections 128-46.

The enunciation of the summary generalisation, which forms the “New Theory of Vision” (sect. 147-8), may be taken as the Fifth and culminating Part of the Essay.

The closing sections (149-60), as I have said, are supplementary, and profess to determine the sort of extension—visible or tangible—with which Geometry is concerned. In concluding that it is tangible, he tries to picture the mental state of Idominians, or unbodied spirits, endowed with visual perceptions only, and asks what their conception of outness and solid extension must be. Here further refinements in the interpretation of visual perception, and its organic conditions, which have not escaped the attention of latter psychologists and biologists, are hinted at.

Whether the data of sight consist of non-resembling arbitrary Signs of the tactual distances, sizes, and situations of things, is a question which some might prefer to deal with experimentally—by trial of the experience of persons in circumstances fitted to supply an answer. [pg 103] Of this sort would be the experience of the born-blind, immediately after their sight has been restored; the conception of extension and its relations found in persons who continue from birth unable to see; the experience (if it could be got) of persons always destitute of all tactual and locomotive perceptions, but familiar with vision; and the facts of seeing observed in infants of the human species, and in the lower animals.

Berkeley did not try to verify his conclusions in this way. Here and there (sect. 41, 42, 79, 92-99, 103, 106, 110, 128, 132-37), he conjectures what the first visual experience of those rescued from born-blindness is likely to be; he also speculates, as we have seen, about the experience of unbodied spirits supposed to be able to see, but unable to touch or move (sect. 153-59); and in the Appendix he refers, in confirmation of his New Theory, to a reported case of one born blind who had obtained sight. But he forms his Theory independently of those delicate and difficult investigations. His testing facts were sought introspectively. Indeed those physiologists and mental philosophers who have since tried to determine what vision in its purity is, by cases either of communicated sight or of continued born-blindness, have illustrated the truth of Diderot's remark—“préparer et interroger un aveugle-né n'eût point été une occupation indigne des talens réunis de Newton, Des Cartes, Locke, et Leibniz[275].”

Berkeley's New Theory has been quoted as a signal example of discovery in metaphysics. The subtle analysis which distinguishes seeing strictly so called, from judgments about extended things, suggested by what we see, [pg 104] appears to have been imperfectly known to the ancient philosophers. Aristotle, indeed, speaks of colour as the only proper object of sight; but, in passages of the De Anima[276] where he names properties peculiar to particular senses, he enumerates others, such as motion, figure, and magnitude, which belong to all the senses in common. His distinction of Proper and Common Sensibles appears at first to contradict Berkeley's doctrine of the heterogeneity of the ideal visible and the real tangible worlds. Aristotle, however, seems to question the immediate perceptibility of Common Sensibles, and to regard them as realised through the activity of intelligence[277].

Some writers in Optics, in mediaeval times, and in early modern philosophy, advanced beyond Aristotle, in explaining the relation of our matured notion of distance to what we originally perceive in seeing, and in the fifteenth century it was discovered by Maurolyco that the rays of light from the object converge to a focus in the eye; but I have not been able to trace even the germ of the New Theory in these speculations.

Excepting some hints by Descartes, Malebranche was among the first dimly to anticipate Berkeley, in resolving our supposed power of seeing outness into an interpretation [pg 105] of visual signs which we learn by experience to understand. The most important part of Malebranche's account of seeing is contained in the Recherche de la Vérité (Liv. I. ch. 9), in one of those chapters in which he discusses the frequent fallaciousness of the senses, and in particular of our visual perceptions of extension. He accounts for their inevitable uncertainty by assigning them not to sense but to misinterpretation of what is seen. He also enumerates various visual signs of distance.

That the Recherche of Malebranche, published more than thirty years before the Essay, was familiar to Berkeley before the publication of his New Theory, is proved by internal evidence, and by his juvenile Commonplace Book. I am not able to discover signs of a similar connexion between the New Theory and the chapter on the mystery of sensation in Glanvill's Scepsis Scientifica (ch. 5), published some years before the Recherche of Malebranche, where Glanvill refers to “a secret deduction,” through which—from motions, &c., of which we are immediately percipient—we “spell out” figures, distances, magnitudes, and colours, which have no resemblance to them.

An approach to the New Theory is found in a passage which first appeared in the second edition of Locke's Essay, published in 1694, to which Berkeley refers in his own Essay (sect. 132-35), and which, on account of its relative importance, I shall here transcribe at length:—

“We are further to consider concerning Perception that the ideas we receive by sensation are often, in grown people, altered by the judgment, without our taking notice of it. When we set before our eyes a round globe of any uniform colour, e.g. gold, alabaster, or jet, it is certain that the idea thereby imprinted in our mind is of a flat circle, variously shadowed, with several degrees of light and brightness coming to our eyes. But, we having by use been accustomed to perceive what kind of appearance convex bodies are wont to make in us, what alterations are made [pg 106] in the reflection of light by the difference in the sensible figures of bodies—the judgment presently, by an habitual custom, alters the appearances into their causes; so that, from that which is truly variety of shadow or colour, collecting the figure, it makes it pass for a mark of figure, and frames to itself the perception of a convex figure and an uniform colour, when the idea we receive from them is only a plane variously coloured, as is evident in painting.

“To which purpose I shall here insert a problem of that very ingenious and studious promoter of real knowledge, the learned and worthy Mr. Molyneux, which he was pleased to send me in a letter some months since, and it is this:—Suppose a man born blind, and now adult, and taught by his touch to distinguish between a cube and a sphere of the same metal, and nighly of the same bigness, so as to tell, when he felt the one and the other, which is the cube and which the sphere. Suppose then the cube and the sphere placed on a table, and the blind man be made to see: quere, whether, by his sight, before he touched them, he could not distinguish and tell, which is the globe and which the cube? To which the acute and judicious proposer answers: ‘Not.’ For, though he has obtained the experience of how a globe, how a cube affects his touch; yet he has not obtained the experience that what affects his touch so and so, must affect his sight so and so; so that a protuberant angle in the cube, that pressed his hand unequally, shall appear to his eye as it does in the cube.—I agree with this thinking gentleman, whom I am proud to call my friend, in his answer to this his problem, and am of opinion that the blind man, at first sight, would not be able to say with certainty which was the globe and which the cube, whilst he only saw them; though he would unerringly name them by his touch, and certainly distinguish them by the difference in their figures felt.

“This I have set down, and leave with my reader, as an [pg 107] occasion for him to consider how much he may be beholden to experience, improvement, and acquired notions, where he thinks he had not the least use of, or help from them: and the rather because this observing gentleman further adds that, having, upon the occasion of my book, proposed this problem to divers very ingenious men, he hardly ever met with one that at first gave the answer to it which he thinks true, till by hearing his reasons they were convinced.

“But this is not I think usual in any of our ideas but those received by sight: because sight, the most comprehensive of the senses, conveying to our minds the ideas of light and colours, which are peculiar only to that sense; and also the far different ideas of space, figure, and motion, the several varieties of which change the appearance of its proper object, i.e. light and colours; we bring ourselves by use to judge of the one by the other. This, in many cases, by a settled habit, in things whereof we have frequent experience, is performed so constantly and so quick, that we take that for the perception of our sensation, which is an idea formed by our judgment; so that one, i.e. that of sensation, serves only to excite the other, and is scarce taken notice of itself; as a man who reads or hears with attention and understanding takes little notice of the character or sounds, but of the ideas that are excited in him by them.

“Nor need we wonder that this is done with so little notice, if we consider how very quick the actions of the mind are performed; for, as itself is thought to take up no space, to have no extension, so its actions seem to require no time, but many of them seem to be crowded into an instant. I speak this in comparison of the actions of the body.... Secondly, we shall not be much surprised that this is done with us in so little notice, if we consider how the facility we get of doing things, by a custom of doing, makes them often pass in us without notice. Habits, [pg 108] especially such as are begun very early, come at last to produce actions in us which often escape our observation.... And therefore it is not so strange that our mind should often change the idea of its sensation into that of its judgment, and make the one serve only to excite the other, without our taking notice of it.” (Essay concerning Human Understanding, Book II. ch. 9. § 8.)

This remarkable passage anticipates by implication the view of an interpretation of materials originally given in the visual sense, which, under the name of “suggestion,” is the ruling factor in the New Theory of Vision.

The following sentences relative to the invisibility of distances, contained in the Treatise of Dioptrics (published in 1690) of Locke's friend and correspondent William Molyneux, whose son was Berkeley's pupil, illustrate Locke's statements, and may be compared with the opening sections of the Essay on Vision:—

“In plain vision the estimate we make of the distance of objects (especially when so far removed that the interval between our two eyes bears no sensible proportion thereto, or when looked upon with one eye only) is rather the act of our judgment than of sense; and acquired by exercise, and a faculty of comparing, rather than natural. For, distance of itself is not to be perceived; for, 'tis a line (or a length) presented to our eye with its end toward us, which must therefore be only a point, and that is invisible. Wherefore distance is chiefly perceived by means of interjacent bodies, as by the earth, mountains, hills, fields, trees, houses, &c. Or by the estimate we make of the comparative magnitude of bodies, or of their faint colours, &c. These I say are the chief means of apprehending the distance of objects that are considerably remote. But as to nigh objects—to whose distance the interval of the eyes bears a sensible proportion—their distance is perceived by the turn of the eyes, or by the angle of the optic axes (Gregorii Opt. Promot. prop. 28). This was the opinion of the ancients, [pg 109] Alhazen, Vitellio, &c. And though the ingenious Jesuit Tacquet (Opt. Lib. I. prop. 2) disapprove thereof, and objects against it a new notion of Gassendus (of a man's seeing only with one eye at a time one and the same object), yet this notion of Gassendus being absolutely false (as I could demonstrate were it not beside my present purpose), it makes nothing against this opinion.

“Wherefore, distance being only a line and not of itself perceivable, if an object were conveyed to the eye by one single ray only, there were no other means of judging of its distance but by some of those hinted before. Therefore when we estimate the distance of nigh objects, either we take the help of both eyes; or else we consider the pupil of one eye as having breadth, and receiving a parcel of rays from each radiating point. And, according to the various inclinations of the rays from one point on the various parts of the pupil, we make our estimate of the distance of the object. And therefore (as is said before), by one single eye we can only judge of the distance of such objects to whose distance the breadth of the pupil has a sensible proportion.... For, it is observed before (prop. 29, sec. 2, see also Gregorii Opt. Promot. prop. 29) that for viewing objects remote and nigh, there are requisite various conformations of the eye—the rays from nigh objects that fall on the eye diverging more than those from more remote objects.” (Treatise of Dioptrics, Part I. prop. 31.)

All this helps to shew the state of science regarding vision about the time Berkeley's Essay appeared, especially among those with whose works he was familiar[278]. I shall next refer to illustrations of the change which the Essay produced.

The New Theory has occasioned some interesting criticism [pg 110] since its appearance in 1709. At first it drew little attention. For twenty years after its publication the allusions to it were few. The account of Cheselden's experiment upon one born blind, published in 1728, in the Philosophical Transactions, which seemed to bring the Theory to the test of scientific experiment, recalled attention to Berkeley's reasonings. The state of religious thought about the same time confirmed the tendency to discuss a doctrine which represented human vision as interpretation of a natural yet divine language, thus suggesting Omnipresent Mind.

Occasional discussions of the New Theory may be found in the Gentleman's Magazine, from 1732 till Berkeley's death in 1753. Some criticisms may also be found in Smith's Optics, published in 1738.

Essential parts of Berkeley's analysis are explained by Voltaire, in his Élémens de la Philosophie de Newton. The following from that work is here given on its own account, and also as a prominent recognition of the new doctrine in France, within thirty years from its first promulgation:—

“Il faut absolument conclure de tout ceci, que les distances, les grandeurs, les situations, ne sont pas, à proprement parler, des choses visibles, c'est-à-dire, ne sont pas les objets propres et immédiats de la vue. L'objet propre et immédiat de la vue n'est autre chose que la lumière colorée: tout le reste, nous ne le sentons qu'à la longue et par expérience. Nous apprenons à voir précisément comme nous apprenons à parler et à lire. La différence est, que l'art de voir est plus facile, et que la nature est également à tous notre maître.

“Les jugements soudains, presque uniformes, que toutes nos âmes, à un certain âge, portent des distances, des grandeurs, des situations, nous font penser qu'il n'y a qu'à ouvrir les yeux pour voir la manière dont nous voyons. On se trompe; il y faut le secours des autres sens. Si les hommes n'avaient que le sens de la vue, ils n'auraient [pg 111]aucun moyen pour connaître l'étendue en longueur, largeur et profondeur; et un pur esprit ne la connaîtrait pas peutêtre, à moins que Dieu ne la lui révélât. Il est très difficile de séparer dans notre entendement l'extension d'un objet d'avec les couleurs de cet objet. Nous ne voyons jamais rien que d'étendu, et de là nous sommes tous portés à croire que nous voyons en effet l'étendue.” (Élémens de la Philos. de Newton, Seconde Partie, ch. 7.)

Condillac, in his Essais sur l'Origine des Connaissances Humaines (Part I. sect. 6), published in 1746, combats Berkeley's New Theory, and maintains that an extension exterior to the eye is immediately discernible by sight; the eye being naturally capable of judging at once of figures, magnitudes, situations, and distances. His reasonings in support of this “prejudice,” as he afterwards allowed it to be, may be found in the section entitled “De quelques jugemens qu'on a attribués à l'âme sans fondement, ou solution d'un problème de métaphysique.” Here Locke, Molyneux, Berkeley, and Voltaire are criticised, and Cheselden's experiment is referred to. Condillac's subsequent recantation is contained in his Traité des Sensations, published in 1754, and in his L'Art de Penser. In the Traité des Sensations (Troisième Partie, ch. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, &c.) the whole question is discussed at length, and Condillac vindicates what he allows must appear a marvellous paradox to the uninitiated—that we only gradually learn to see, hear, smell, taste, and touch. He argues in particular that the eye cannot originally perceive an extension that is beyond itself, and that perception of trinal space is due to what we experience in touch.

Voltaire and Condillac gave currency to the New Theory in France, and it soon became a commonplace with D'Alembert, Diderot, Buffon, and other French philosophers. In Germany we have allusions to it in the Berlin Memoirs and elsewhere; but, although known by name, if not in its distinctive principle and latent idealism, it has not obtained [pg 112] the consideration which its author's developed theory of the material as well as the visible world has received. The Kantian a priori criticism of our cognition of Space, and of our mathematical notions, subsequently indisposed the German mind to the a posteriori reasoning of Berkeley's Essay.

Its influence is apparent in British philosophy. The following passages in Hartley's Observations on Man, published in 1749, illustrate the extent to which some of the distinctive parts of the new doctrine were at that time received by an eminent English psychologist:—

“Distance is judged of by the quantity of motion, and figure by the relative quantity of distance.... And, as the sense of sight is much more extensive and expedite than feeling, we judge of tangible qualities chiefly by sight, which therefore may be considered, agreeably to Bishop Berkeley's remark, as a philosophical language for the ideas of feeling; being, for the most part, an adequate representative of them, and a language common to all mankind, and in which they all agree very nearly, after a moderate degree of experience.

“However, if the informations from touch and sight disagree at any time, we are always to depend upon touch, as that which, according to the usual ways of speaking upon these subjects, is the true representation of the essential properties, i.e. as the earnest and presage of what other tangible impressions the body under consideration will make upon our feeling in other circumstances; also what changes it will produce in other bodies; of which again we are to determine by our feeling, if the visual language should not happen to correspond to it exactly. And it is from this difference that we call the touch the reality, light the representative—also that a person born blind may foretell with certainty, from his present tangible impressions, what others would follow upon varying the circumstances; whereas, if we could suppose a person to be born without [pg 113] feeling, and to arrive at man's estate, he could not, from his present visible impressions, judge what others would follow upon varying the circumstances. Thus the picture of a knife, drawn so well as to deceive his eye, would not, when applied to another body, produce the same change of visible impressions as a real knife does, when it separates the parts of the body through which it passes. But the touch is not liable to these deceptions. As it is therefore the fundamental source of information in respect of the essential properties of matter, it may be considered as our first and principal key to the knowledge of the external world.” (Prop. 30.)

In other parts of Hartley's book (e.g. Prop. 58) the relation of our visual judgments of magnitude, figure, motion, distance, and position to the laws of association is explained, and the associating circumstances by which these judgments are formed are enumerated in detail.

Dr. Porterfield of Edinburgh, in his Treatise on the Eye, or the Manner and Phenomena of Vision (Edinburgh, 1759), is an exception to the consent which the doctrine had then widely secured. He maintains, in opposition to Berkeley, that “the judgments we form of the situation and distance of visible objects, depend not on custom and experience, but on original instinct, to which mind is subject in our embodied state[279].”

Berkeley's Theory of Vision, in so far as it resolves our visual perceptions of distance into interpretation of arbitrary signs, received the qualified approbation of Reid, in his Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense (1764). He criticises it in the Inquiry, where the doctrine of visual signs, of which Berkeley's whole philosophy is a development, is accepted, and to some extent applied. With Reid it is divorced, however, from the Berkeleian conception of the material world, [pg 114] although the Theory of Vision was the seminal principle of Berkeley's Theory of Matter[280].

This Theory of Matter was imperfectly conceived and then rejected by Reid and his followers, while the New Theory of Vision obtained the general consent of the Scottish metaphysicians. Adam Smith refers to it in his Essays (published in 1795) as “one of the finest examples of philosophical analysis that is to be found either in our own or in any other language.” Dugald Stewart characterises it in his Elements as “one of the most beautiful, and at the same time one of the most important theories of modern philosophy.” “The solid additions,” he afterwards remarks in his Dissertation, “made by Berkeley to the stock of human knowledge, were important and brilliant. Among these the first place is unquestionably due to his New Theory of Vision, a work abounding with ideas so different from those commonly received, and at the same time so profound and refined, that it was regarded by all but a few accustomed to deep metaphysical reflection, rather in the light of a philosophical romance than of a sober inquiry after truth. Such, however, has since been the progress and diffusion of this sort of knowledge, that the leading and most abstracted doctrines contained in it form now an essential part of every elementary treatise on optics, and are adopted by the most superficial smatterers in science as fundamental articles of their faith.” The New Theory is accepted by Thomas Brown, who proposes (Lectures, 29) to extend the scope of its reasonings. With regard to perceptions of sight, Young, in his Lectures on Intellectual Philosophy (p. 102), says that “it has been universally admitted, at least since the days of Berkeley, that many of those which appear to us at present to be instantaneous and primitive, can yet be shewn to be [pg 115] acquired; that most of the adult perceptions of sight are founded on the previous information of touch; that colour can give us no conception originally of those qualities of bodies which produce it in us; and that primary vision gives us no notion of distance, and, as I believe, no notion of magnitude.” Sir James Mackintosh, in his Dissertation, characterises the New Theory of Vision as “a great discovery in Mental Philosophy.” “Nothing in the compass of inductive reasoning,” remarks Sir William Hamilton (Reid's Works, p. 182, note), “appears more satisfactory than Berkeley's demonstration of the necessity and manner of our learning, by a slow process of observation and comparison alone, the connexion between the perceptions of vision and touch, and, in general, all that relates to the distance and magnitude of external things[281].”

The New Theory of Vision has in short been generally accepted, so far as it was understood, alike by the followers of Hartley and by the associates and successors of Reid. Among British psychologists, it has recommended itself to rationalists and sensationalists, to the advocates of innate principles, and to those who would explain by accidental association what their opponents attribute to reason originally latent in man. But this wide conscious assent is I think chiefly confined to the proposition that distance is invisible, and hardly reaches the deeper implicates of the theory, on its extension to all the senses, leading to a perception of the final unity [pg 116] of the natural and the supernatural, and the ultimate spirituality of the universe[282].