The History of the Indian Revolt and of the Expeditions to Persia, China and Japan, 1856-7-8

by George Dodd

Note.

Native Police of India.—So peculiar was the position of the native police of India—as a medium between the military and the civilians, and between the government and the people—that it may be desirable to say a few words on the organisation of that body. All parties agreed that this organisation was defective in many points, and numerous reforms were suggested; but the Revolt found the police system still in force unreformed. The information here given is obtained chiefly from a dispatch sent from the India House about six months before the Revolt began, at a time when few or none saw the dark shadow that was hovering over our eastern empire.

In Bengal, each district was subdivided into smaller jurisdictions, each having its local police. The police were charged with duties both preventive and detective. They were prohibited from inquiring into cases of a petty nature; but complaints in cases of a more serious character were usually laid before the police darogah—whose duties were something more than those of an English police superintendent, something less than those of an English magistrate. The darogah was authorised to examine the complaints brought before him, to issue process of arrest, to summon witnesses, to examine the accused, and to forward the case to the magistrate or collector-magistrate, or submit a report of his proceedings, according as the evidence seemed to warrant the one or the other course.

In the Northwest Provinces the native revenue-officers called tehsildars were, at the discretion of the government, invested with the powers of police darogahs; whereas in Bengal the revenue service was kept wholly distinct from the police or magisterial.

In the Madras presidency, the duties ordinarily performed in Bengal by the police darogahs were, even more generally than in the Northwest Provinces, performed by the tehsildar; indeed it was a recognised part of the system that the tehsildar and the darogah were the same person. This double function carried with it an increase of power. The Madras tehsildar-darogah was authorised, not only to inquire into petty cases (which the Bengal darogah was prohibited from doing), but also to proceed in certain specified instances to judgment, sentence, and the infliction of punishment.

In the Bombay presidency, the revenue and police functions were, until a recent period, combined in the same way as in Madras. The tehsildars, besides their revenue duties, were authorised in their police capacity to investigate all complaints of a criminal nature, and to exercise a penal jurisdiction in respect of certain petty offences. Within a few months before the Revolt, however, a change was made in the organisation. A new officer, a superintendent of police, was placed under the magistrate. The magistrate, confining himself for the most part to judicial and administrative matters, left to his superintendent of police the control of the executive police and the command of the entire stipendiary body, with the initiative in the prevention and detection of crime. To aid this superintendent in the supervision of the district police, there was placed in each police division an officer called joint-police amildar; whose duties, in regard to the preservation of the public peace and the investigation of serious crimes, were nearly similar to those of the Bengal darogah, but without including any power of punishing even for the most trivial offences.

It thus appears that, apart from the penal powers exercised by the Madras district police, the Bengal darogah, the Madras tehsildar, and the Bombay amildar, all acted to a certain extent judicially when engaged in investigating crimes of a serious nature. They examined the parties and the evidence, and they formed a judgment on the case to the extent of deciding whether it was one for the immediate arrest of the accused and transmission to the magistrate, or otherwise.

No doubt the founders of this police system anticipated beneficial results from it; but those results were not obtained. It was very inefficient for the detection of crime, and almost useless for prevention. There were defects both in organisation and in procedure. The police force attached to each division was too much localised and isolated; and the notion of combination between any separate parts of it, with a view of accomplishing extensive police objects, was seldom entertained. Although unable to check crime to the extent intended and hoped for, the police were very unscrupulous in their mode of wielding their authority, and bore a very general character for oppression and corruption. The great source of mischief was found to be, the want of efficient control and overlooking. The native police had a proneness to oriental modes of administering justice, in which bribery and barbarity perform a great part: this tendency required to be constantly checked by Europeans; and if the magistrate or collector-magistrate found his time too fully occupied to exercise this supervision, the police wrought much mischief, and brought the English ‘raj’ into disfavour. Where the district was smaller than usual, or where the magistrate was more than commonly zealous and active, the police were found to be more efficient through more supervision. Whenever it was found necessary to grapple effectually with any particular crimes, such as thuggee or dacoitee, the ordinary police proved to be wholly useless; an entirely separate instrumentality was needed. Besides the want of effective supervision, the native police were underpaid, and had therefore an excuse for listening to the temptations of bribery.

In the dispatch already adverted to, written by the Court of Directors, a course of improvement was pointed out, without which the native police, it was affirmed, could not rise to the proper degree of efficiency. The suggestions were briefly as follows: To separate the police from the administration of the land-revenue, in those provinces where those duties had been customarily united; in order that the native officer should not be intrusted with double functions, each of which would interfere with the other. To subject all the police to frequent visit and inspection, that they might feel the influence of a vigilant eye over them. To relieve the collector-magistrate from this addition to his many duties, by appointing in each district a European officer with no other duty than that of managing the police of the district, subject to a general superintendent of police for each presidency. To increase the salaries of the police, in order that the office might have a higher dignity in the estimation of the natives, and in order that the official might be less tempted to extortion or bribery. To empower the authorities to punish and degrade, more readily than was before possible, those police who oppressed the people or otherwise displayed injustice; and to reward those who displayed more than ordinary intelligence and honesty, a further suggestion was made, arising out of the organisation of the Punjaub under the Lawrences and their coadjutors; in which there was a preventive police with a military organisation, and a wholly distinct detective police with a civil organisation. This system was found to work so well, that the Court of Directors submitted to the Calcutta government an inquiry whether the police generally might not with advantage be thus separated into two parts, preventive and detective, each exercised by a different set of men.

The Revolt broke out before the reform of the police system could commence; and then, like other reforms, it was left to be settled in more peaceful days.

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[165]. The following will give an idea of the mode in which the Gazette announcements were made: ‘24th Bombay N. I.—Lieutenant William Alexander Kerr; date of act of bravery, July 10, 1857.—On the breaking out of a mutiny in the 27th Bombay N. I. in July 1857, a party of the mutineers took up a position in the stronghold or paga near the town of Kolapore, and defended themselves to extremity. “Lieutenant Kerr, of the Southern Mahratta Irregular Horse, took a prominent share in the attack on the position; and at the moment when its capture was of great public importance, he made a dash at one of the gateways, with some dismounted horsemen, and forced an entrance by breaking down the gate. The attack was completely successful, and the defenders were either killed, wounded, or captured—a result that may with perfect justice be attributed to Lieutenant Kerr’s dashing and devoted bravery.” (Letter from the Political Superintendent at Kolapore to the Adjutant-general of the Army, dated September 10, 1857.)’

[166]. ‘Of the dust it is quite beyond the powers of writing to give a description. It is so fine and subtle, that long after the causes which raised it have ceased to exert their influence, you may see it like a veil of gauze between your eyes and every object. The sun, while yet six or seven degrees above the horizon, is hid from sight by it as though the luminary were enveloped in a thick fog; and at early morning and evening, this vapour of dust suspended high in air seems like a rain-cloud clinging to a hillside. When this dust is set rapidly in motion by a hot wind, and when the grosser sand, composed of minute fragments of talc, scales of mica, and earth, is impelled in quick successive waves through the heated atmosphere, the effect is quite sufficient to make one detest India for ever. Every article in your tent, your hair, eyes, and nose, are filled and covered with this dust, which deposits a coating half an inch thick all over the tent.’—W. H. Russell.

[167]. It may here be remarked that the difficulty of moving heavy ordnance over the bad roads and roadless tracts of India, painfully felt by the artillery officers engaged in the war, suggested to the East India Company an inquiry into the possibility of employing locomotives for such a purpose. A machine, called ‘Boydell’s Traction Engine,’ patented some time before in England, was tested with a view to ascertain the degree of its availability for this purpose. The peculiarity of this engine was, that it was a locomotive carrying its own railway. Six flat boards were ranged round each of the great wheels in such a way that each board came in succession under the wheel, and formed, for a few feet, a flat plankroad or tramway for the wheel to roll upon. It was supposed that the vehicle would move much more easily by this contrivance, than if the narrow periphery of the wheel ran upon soft mud or irregular pebbles and gravel. The motion of the wheel placed each plank down at its proper time and place, and lifted it up again, in such a way that there was always one of the boards flat on the ground, beneath the wheel. Colonel Sir Frederick Abbott and Colonel Sir Proby Cautley, on the part of the directors, tested this machine at Woolwich—where it drew forty tons of ordnance along a common road, uphill as well as upon the level. Another road-locomotive, by Messrs Napier, was tested for a similar purpose. The results were of good augury for the future; but the machines were not perfected early enough to be made applicable for the wars of the mutiny.

[168]. ‘Allahabad, April 30.—It is the melancholy duty of the Right Honourable the Governor-general to announce the death of that most distinguished officer, Captain Sir William Peel, K.C.B., late in command of her Majesty’s ship Shannon, and of the Naval Brigade in the Northwest Provinces.

‘Sir William Peel died at Cawnpore, on the 27th instant, of small-pox. He had been wounded at the commencement of the last advance upon Lucknow, but had nearly recovered from the wound, and was on his way to Calcutta, when struck by the disease which has brought his honourable career to an early close.

‘Sir William Peel’s services in the field during the last seven months are well known in India and in England. But it is not so well known how great the value of his presence and example has been wherever during this eventful period his duty has led him.

‘The loss of his daring but thoughtful courage, joined with eminent abilities, is a very heavy one to his country; but it is not more to be deplored than the loss of that influence which his earnest character, admirable temper, and gentle kindly bearing exercised over all within his reach—an influence which was exerted unceasingly for the public good, and of which the governor-general believes that it may with truth be said that there is not a man of any rank or profession who, having been associated with Sir William Peel in these times of anxiety and danger, has not felt and acknowledged it.’

[169]. Chap. vii., Notes, p. [119].

[170]. Chap. xxvi., p. [441].

Summer Costumes, Indian Army.

CHAPTER XXIX.
PROGRESS OF EVENTS IN MAY.

When, on the 10th of May 1858, the course of twelve months had been completed since the commencement of the mutiny, the nation looked back at the events of that period as a terrible episode in the history of British dominion. Into how many thousands of families mourning had been introduced by it, no one correctly knew; the problem was a dismal one, which few had the heart to investigate. Those who, not affected by private grief, or hiding their grief in a sense of public duty, viewed the twelvemonth’s conflict in a national sense, saw in it a mingled cause for humiliation and pride—humiliation that British rule should be so trampled on by those who had been long and peacefully under it; pride that so many public servants, so many private persons, should have proved worthy of their country in a time of severe and bitter trial. In military matters, the once great Bengal native army had almost ceased to exist. Twenty thousand disarmed sepoys were in and near the Punjaub, carefully watched lest they should join the ranks of the insurgents; disarmed regiments were similarly detained elsewhere; others had been almost annihilated by twelve months of fierce warfare; others were still engaged as the nuclei of rebel armies; while the number of Bengal sepoys was very small indeed, reckoned by hundreds rather than thousands, who still fought faithfully on the side of the British. The Madras and Bombay troops had, happily for India and England’s interest therein, remained almost wholly ‘true to their salt;’ enabling the governors of those two presidencies to send gallant field-forces into the disturbed northern and central provinces. Sikhs, Punjaubees, Moultanese, Scindians, Beloochees, and hill-men on the Afghan frontier, had rendered services of such lasting importance in Hindostan, that they may almost be regarded as the preservers of the English ‘raj;’ this they had been enabled to do from two causes—the want of sympathy between the mutineers and those northwestern tribes; and the admirable system of Punjaub government organised by the Lawrences. In civil matters, India had witnessed the almost total breaking up of the ordinary revenue and magisterial arrangements, in provinces containing at least fifty millions of souls; Europeans driven into hiding-places, even if not murdered; and treasuries plundered by bands of ruffians, who gladly hailed the state of anarchy brought on by the mutiny of the sepoy regiments. Among the superior members of the government, Viscount Canning still maintained his position, battling against unnumbered difficulties; Sir Colin Campbell still remained at the head of the army, well aware that his utmost skill as a military commander would long be needed; and Sir John Lawrence still held the Punjaub in his wonderful grasp, displaying governing powers of the very highest order at an eminently critical time. On the other hand, the Anglo-Indians had to mourn over a sad death-list. Henry Lawrence, Havelock, Colvin, Neill, Venables, Nicholson, William Peel, Adrian Hope, Wheeler, Barnard, Banks, Battye—all, and a vast many more gallant spirits, had sunk under the terrible pressure of the past twelve months.

Appropriating the present chapter to a rapid glance at the progress of events in the month of May, and beginning (as usual) with the Bengal regions, we may conveniently notice two or three arrangements made by the Calcutta government, bearing relation either to the state of the army, or to the condition of civilians affected by the mutiny.

Among the earliest measures taken to reconstruct the Bengal army, so shattered by the mutiny, was one announced in a government notification on the 7th of May. It was to the effect that four regiments of Bengal European cavalry should be formed, in lieu of eight regiments of Bengal native cavalry, erased from the list of the establishment for mutinous conduct. Each regiment was to consist of 1 colonel, 2 lieutenant-colonels, 2 majors, 14 captains, 18 lieutenants, 8 cornets, 1 adjutant, 1 interpreter and quartermaster, 4 surgeons and assistants, 119 non-commissioned and subordinate officers of various kinds, and 700 privates; making a total of 870—an unusually large number for a cavalry regiment. In addition to these, there were to be native syces, grass-cutters, and quarter-masters, attached to each regiment; and various persons employed at the depôt. The pay was to be the same as in the royal dragoon regiments. Each regiment was to be divided into ten troops. As the officers were to be about doubly as numerous as the English officers in the disbanded native regiments, it was calculated that the four new would absorb the officers of eight old regiments. The regiments thus extinguished by this first process, were the 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 6th, 7th, 9th, and 10th Bengal native cavalry; the 5th and the 8th were left to be dealt with at some subsequent period. As for any larger measures connected with the reconstruction of a native Bengal army, these were left for determination at a later period, after collating the opinions of the most experienced authorities in India.

The distress experienced by the British troops from the intense heat of the Indian sun, and the severe strictures passed by the press and by members of the legislature on those regimental officers who permitted or compelled their soldiers to swelter in red cloth, led to the issuing of orders concerning light summer clothing. It was found that a kind of gray or dust-coloured linen called khakee or carkey was better suited than anything else—even white—as a material for clothing in the hot season; and hence the issuing of an order by the adjutant-general, on the 21st of May, to the effect noted below.[^[171]] This question concerning appropriate clothing had long been discussed by military men in India: the officers of greatest experience being those who most disapproved the wearing of closely fitting garments in such a climate. General Jacob had resolutely contended against the adoption of English uniforms by the sepoys of the Company’s army. He said: ‘A sepoy of the line, dressed in a tight coat; trousers in which he can scarcely walk, and cannot stoop at all; bound to an immense and totally useless knapsack, so that he can scarcely breathe; strapped, belted, and pipe-clayed within an inch of his life; with a rigid basket-shako on his head, which requires the skill of a juggler to balance, and which cuts deep into his brow if worn for an hour; and with a leather-stock round his neck, to complete his absurd costume—when compared with the same sepoy, clothed, armed, and accoutred solely with regard to his comfort and efficiency—forms the most perfect example of what is madly called the “regular” system with many European officers, contrasted with the system of common sense now recommended for adoption.’ The graphic description by Mr Russell, of the officers and men in Sir Colin Campbell’s army of Oude, shews how eager soldiers are to get rid of their irksome uniforms when permitted, under the influence of a heat denoted by the cabalistic mark 100° F. or 110° F.: ‘Except the Highlanders—and when they left Lucknow they were panting for their summer clothes, and had sent officers to Cawnpore to hurry them—not a corps that I have seen sport a morsel of pink or shew a fragment of English scarlet. The Highlanders wear eccentric shades of gray linen over their bonnets—the kilt is discarded, or worn out in some regiments; and flies, mosquitoes, and the sun are fast rendering it impossible in the others. Already many officers who can get trews have discarded the ponderous folds of woollen stuff tucked into massive wads over the hips, and have provided some defence against the baking of their calves by day, and have sought to protect their persons against the assaults of innumerable entomological enemies by night. The artillery had been furnished with excellent head-covers and good frocks of light stuff.... The 7th Hussars, the Military Train, have vestiary idiosyncrasies of their own; but there is some sort of uniformity among the men. Among the officers, individual taste and fantasy have full play. The infantry regiments, for the most part, are dressed in linen frocks, dyed carkey or gray slate-colour—slate-blue trousers, and shakos protected by puggerees, or linen covers, from the sun. The peculiarity of carkey is that the dyer seems to be unable to match it in any two pieces, and that it exhibits endless varieties of shade, varying with every washing, so that the effect is rather various than pleasing on the march or on the parade-ground. But the officers, as I have said, do not confine themselves to carkey or anything else. It is really wonderful what fecundity of invention in dress there is, after all, in the British mind when its talents can be properly developed. To begin with the head-dress. The favourite wear is a helmet of varying shape, but of uniform ugliness.... Whatever it might be in polished steel or burnished metal, the helmet is a decided failure in felt, or wicker-work, or pith, so far as external effect is concerned. It is variously fabricated, with many varieties of interior ducts and passages leading to escape-holes for imaginary hot air in the front or top, and around it are twisted infinite colours and forms of turbans with fringed ends and laced fringes. When a peacock’s feather, with the iris end displayed, is inserted in the hole in the top of the helmet, or is stuck in the puggeree around it, the effect of the covering is much enhanced; and this style is rather patronised by some of the staff. The coat may be of any cut or material, but shooting-jackets hold their own in the highest posts; and a carkey-coloured jerkin, with a few inches of iron curb-chain sewed on the shoulders to resist sabre-cuts, is a general favourite.... As to the clothing of the nether man, nothing but a series of photographs could give the least notion of the numerous combinations which can be made out of a leg, leather, pantaloons, and small-clothes. Long stage-boots of buff-coloured leather—for the manufacture of which Cawnpore is famous—pulled up over knee-breeches of leather or regimental trousers, are common. There are officers who prefer wearing their Wellingtons outside their pantaloons, thus exhibiting tops of very bright colours; and the boot and baggy trousers of the Zouave officer are not unknown.’

The next point to be adverted to affected civilians and private traders more extensively than the military. The compensation to sufferers by the mutiny, a much-disputed question for nearly twelve months, was put into a train for settlement by a government order issued at Calcutta in May. This order applied to Bengal only, as being a region quite large enough to be brought within one set of official rules. The compensation was to be for loss of property and effects, leaving losses affecting life or health to be settled by a distinct machinery. A Mr E. Jackson was appointed at Calcutta as commissioner to inquire into claims for compensation. A limit was named, the 26th of August, after which no claims would be received from persons resident in India: an extension of time being allowed for those who were not in that country. In cases where the amount claimed did not exceed fifty thousand rupees, the application to the commissioner was to be accompanied by a detailed statement of the particulars of the claim, and of the evidence adducible in support of it; but where the property was of higher amount, the regulation required only a general estimate to accompany the application, a further period of three months being allowed for the preparation and submission of the detailed statement of losses. It was at the same time very pointedly mentioned that these preliminary operations did not constitute an actual claim on the Company for any compensation whatever. ‘It is to be understood that the registry of applications above provided for does not imply any recognition of claims to compensation; the Honourable Court of Directors having expressly reserved their final decision upon the question, whether or not compensation for losses sustained by the mutiny shall be awarded.’ The Company probably deemed it wise, in the uncertainty how large might be the total aggregate sum claimed, to avoid any formal pledge that these compensations could be rightfully demanded and would be really paid. The above, we have said, applied to Bengal; but about the same time a similar notification appeared at Allahabad, applicable to the Northwest Provinces. Mr C. Grant and Mr E. H. Longden were named commissioners to record and register claims. The conditions were generally the same as those in Bengal; and to them was added an announcement that ‘Applications will be received, subject to the same rules, from natives of the country for compensation, on account of loss of property caused by their known loyalty and attachment to the British government.’ A similar announcement was afterwards made, extending the boon to the province of Oude.

Superadded to the arrangements made for the succour of those who had borne pecuniary loss by the mutiny, was one dated May 25th. This was to the effect that some provision would be made for the relief of the destitute families of persons who had died after the loss of their property, even though the death were not occasioned by the mutiny. It was thereupon determined that grants of money should be given to families rendered impoverished by this double calamity; the grants to be regulated on the same principle as those allowed to European and native officers of the government.

Dacca.

One of the resolutions arrived at by the authorities at Calcutta gave very general satisfaction—except to a few officers jealous of any encroachments on the privileges of the army. Whether suggested at home, or in India, the movement was in the right direction. The regulation was to the effect that civilians who had distinguished themselves in the field since the commencement of the mutiny, or who should so distinguish themselves before the mutiny ended, should be allowed to participate in the honours which had hitherto been considered peculiar to the military service. The civil servants of the Company, as a body, greatly raised themselves in the estimation of the nation by the gallantry which many of them displayed under circumstances of great peril—not only in defending their posts against large bodies of insurgents, but in sharing those field and siege operations which are more immediately sources of honour to military men. What those honours were to be, depended partly on the crown, partly on the Company; but the object of the order was to shew that the civil position of a gallant man should not necessarily be a bar to his occupancy of an honoured place among military men.

In entering now upon the military operations of the month, it is satisfactory to know that nothing important presents itself for record in connection with the eastern regions of Bengal. There were few or no actual mutinies, for reasons more than once assigned in former chapters. Notwithstanding this safety, however—partly through the superstitious character of the natives of India, and partly through the uneasy feeling prevailing in the minds of Europeans during the mutiny—the newspapers were frequently engaged in discussing mysteries, rumours, and prophecies of a strange character. One, connected more with Bengal than with the other provinces, related to ‘something white,’ which was to be ominous of British rule in India. Where it arose, or how, remained as undiscoverable as the chupatty mystery; but the rumour put on various forms at different times and places. At Tipperah, the native story told of a ‘white thing’ which would be unprocurable after some time. At Chittagong, a particular day was named, when, ‘out of four things, three would be given and one withheld;’ and at Jessore, the bazaar-people became so excited concerning a prophetic rumour of an equally enigmatical kind, that the magistrate endeavoured to elicit something from his police-darogah that might explain it; but the man either could not or would not tell how the story arose. In Dacca and other places the prediction assumed this form—that after a certain period, a certain ‘white thing’ would cease to exist in India; and in some instances the exact interval was named, ‘three months and thirteen days.’

Occasionally, the authorities found it necessary to watch very closely the proceedings of Mohammedan fanatics; who, at Burdwan, Jessore, Rungpoor, and other places, were detected in attempts to rouse up the people to a religious war. Fortunately, the townsmen and villagers did not respond to these appeals. Southwest of Calcutta, the Sumbhulpore district, disturbed occasionally by rebel bands intent on plunder, was kept for the most part tranquil by the firm management of Colonel Forster. In the month of May he hit upon the plan of inviting the still faithful chieftains of the districts to furnish each a certain number of soldiers to defend British interests, on promise of a due recognition of their services afterwards. The chieftains raised two thousand matchlockmen among them, and took up such positions as Colonel Forster indicated—a measure which completely frustrated and cowed the rebels.

We may pass at once to a consideration of the state of affairs in Behar or Western Bengal, comprising the districts around what may be called the Middle Ganges. This region, as former chapters have sufficiently told, and as a glance at a map will at once shew, contains many important cities and towns, which were thrown into great commotion by the mutiny—such as Patna, Dinapoor, Arrah, Buxar, Azimghur, Goruckpore, Ghazeepore, Jounpoor, Sasseram, Benares, Chunargur, and Mirzapore. It is true that many of these were formerly included within the government of the ‘Northwest Provinces,’ and then in that of the ‘Central Provinces;’ but this is a matter of little consequence to our present purpose; if we consider them all to belong to the Mid-Ganges region, it will suffice for the present purpose.

The condition of the region just defined, during May, depended mainly on the relation between Sir Edward Lugard on the one hand, and the Jugdispore rebels on the other. How it fared with this active general and the troops under his command, when April closed, we have already seen. It will be remembered that about the middle of that month, Koer Singh took up a strong position at Azimutgurh, from which Lugard deemed it necessary to dislodge him; that Lugard himself remained encamped at Azimghur with the bulk of his Azimghur field-force, in order that he might watch the proceedings of numerous bands of rebels under the Rajahs of Nuhurpoor and Naweejer and Gholam Hossein, hovering about the districts of Sandah, Mundoree, and Koelser; but that he made up a strong column to pursue Koer Singh. This column, placed under the command of Brigadier Douglas, consisted of the following troops: H.M. 4th foot; a wing of the 37th foot; a detachment of Punjaub Sappers; two squadrons of Sikh cavalry; a squadron of the Military Train; and nine guns and mortars. Then followed the series of cross-purposes, in which Koer Singh was permitted or enabled to work much more mischief than Sir Edward had anticipated. The events may briefly be recapitulated thus: On the 17th and 18th, Douglas, after starting with his column from Azimghur, came up with the rebels, defeated them at Azimutgurh, and chased them to Ghosee, Nugra, and Secunderpore. On the 19th he found that they intended to cross the Gogra before he could come up to them in pursuit—an intention which he strove to render nugatory. On the 20th he encountered them again, at Muneer Khas, defeated them with great slaughter, captured most of their munitions of war, and dispersed the rebels, the main body of whom fled towards Bullah and Beyriah. On the 21st, Douglas had the mortification, on reaching Sheopore, of finding that Koer Singh had outwitted the officer who had been ordered to guard the passage of the Ganges in the vicinity of Ghazeepore with about nine hundred men; the wily chief of Jugdispore had got in the rear of the detachment by a flank-movement, and had crossed the Ganges at an undefended spot. Then followed Captain Le Grand’s disastrous expedition to Jugdispore on the 23d; the crossing of the Ganges on the 25th by Douglas, with his column; and the advance towards Arrah and Jugdispore to retrieve the disaster. To what results these operations led in the month of May, we have now to see.

Brigadier Douglas arrived at Arrah with a part of his force on the 1st of May, the rest having arrived two days earlier; but Douglas not being in sufficient force to effectually encompass the enemy, and the importance of thoroughly routing Koer Singh being evident, Sir Edward Lugard, leaving a few troops to guard Azimghur, set out for the Ganges with his main column, crossed over into the Shahabad district on the 3d and following days, and prepared for operations in the direction of Arrah and Jugdispore. The rebels, estimated at seven or eight thousand, were supposed to be intrenching themselves, and getting in supplies. On the 8th, Sir Edward arrived in the vicinity of Jugdispore, and came in sight of some of the rebels. Two companies of the 84th foot, with detachments of Madras Rifles, and Sikh horse, aided by two horse-artillery guns, were sent back to Arrah, to protect that place while operations were being directed against Jugdispore. The commissioner of Patna at the same time sent the steamer Patna up the Ganges, to watch the ghâts or ferries. On the 9th, Sir Edward marched his force from Beheea to an open plain a little to the west of Jugdispore. Here he intended to encamp for a while, to allow Colonel Corfield to come up with some additional troops from Sasseram. Circumstances occurred, however, to change his plan. In the afternoon of this day a large body of rebels formed outside the jungle, and moved in the direction of Arrah; but these were quickly followed by cavalry and horse-artillery, and driven back into the jungle. Another body, much more numerous, began to fire into Sir Edward’s camp before he could get his baggage well up and tents fixed. This determined him to attack them at once. Dividing his force into three columns, he planned an assault on Jugdispore on three points at once. The place was carried after a little skirmishing, the rebels making only a slight resistance; they retired to Lutwarpore, in the jungle district, taking with them two guns which they had captured from the British in the preceding month. The loss on both sides was trifling. Leaving a strong party to retain Jugdispore, Lugard returned to his camp in the evening. According to the rumours prevalent, Koer Singh, who had so long been a source of annoyance to the British, had died of his wounds; and the rebels, under his brother Ummer Singh, were ill supplied and in much confusion. A nephew of Koer Singh, named Ritbhunghur Singh, gave himself up to the British a short time afterwards—hopeful of insuring forgiveness by being able to shew that, in earlier months, he had befriended certain Europeans in a time of great peril. On the 10th, after ordering all the fortifications at Jugdispore, and all the buildings which had belonged to Koer Singh, to be destroyed, Lugard prepared to follow the rebels into the jungle. He arranged that Colonel Corfield, with the Sasseram force, should approach Lutwarpore in one direction, while he himself intended to advance upon it from Jugdispore. On the 11th and 12th much fighting took place. Sir Edward took the rebels by surprise; they expected to be attacked from Arrah or Beheea, but he marched westward through a belt of jungle to Hettumpore, and attacked them on a side which they believed to be quite safe. Lugard and Corfield were everywhere successful. It was, however, a harassing kind of warfare, bringing more fatigue than glory; the rebels, though chastised everywhere, avoided a regular engagement, and retreated into the jungle after every partial skirmish. At Arrah, Jugdispore, Lutwarpore, Hettumpore, Beheea, Peroo, and Chitowra, Lugard defeated and cut them up at various times in the course of the month; yet he could not prevent them from recombining, and collecting around them a rabble of budmashes and jail-felons. Sir Edward hoped, at any rate, to be able so to employ a strong detachment of cavalry as to prevent the rebels from crossing the river Sone, and carrying anarchy into other districts. They nevertheless continued to harass the neighbourhood by freebooting expeditions, if not by formidable military projects. After Lugard’s defeat of the main force, some of the insurgents broke up into bands of a few hundreds each, and were joined by budmashes from the towns and revolted villages. One party attacked an indigo factory near Dumoran, and burned it to the ground; another effected a murderous outbreak at the village of Rajpore, near Buxar; another threatened the railway-bridge works at Karminassa. These mischievous proceedings naturally threw the whole district into agitation. The threat against the railway-works was fully carried out about the end of the month; for the devastators destroyed the engineers’ bungalows and the workmen’s sheds, set fire to all the wood and coal collected for brick-burning, destroyed everything they could easily lay their hands on, and effectually stopped the works for a time. Nothing could be done to quell these disturbances, until a British force appeared.

Practically, therefore, the ‘Azimghur field-force,’ under Sir Edward Lugard, succeeded in breaking down the military organisation of the rebels in that part of India, without being able to prevent the formation of roaming bands bent on slaughter and devastation. And even the limited amount of advantage gained was purchased at a high price; for the tremendous heat of the sun struck down the poor soldiers with fatal certainty; numbers of them were carried from Jugdispore to Arrah, towards the close of the month—prostrated by sickness, wounds, fatigue from jungle fighting, and sun-stroke.

Somewhat further to the north, in the Goruckpore district, another group of rebels continued to harass the country, disturbing the operations of peaceful planters and traders. About the end of May, the rebel leader Mahomed Hussein, with four thousand men, suddenly made an attack upon the Rajah of Bansee, one of those who had remained faithful to the British government. The rajah was obliged to flee to a stronghold in a neighbouring jungle; and then his palace, with the town of Bansee, were plundered by the rebels. Mr Wingfield, the commissioner of Goruckpore, immediately started forth with two hundred and fifty Europeans and some guns to the relief of the rajah, whom he found besieged in his stronghold. The enemy fled precipitately on hearing of Wingfield’s approach, notwithstanding the immense disparity of force. The energetic commissioner then proceeded with the rajah to attack some rebel villages; while a simultaneous advance was made on Amood by Colonel Rowcroft. The object of these demonstrations was to keep the rebels in check until the rains set in, and the waters of the Gogra rose. Towards the end of the month, four Europeans came into Goruckpore from a neighbouring station, where they had been suddenly attacked by a body of rabble under one Baboo Surdoun Singh, and other leaders. This was one among many evidences of a still disturbed condition of the Goruckpore district. The district was in a slight degree protected by the passage of a body of troops who, though retiring rather than fighting, exerted some kind of influence on the evildoer of the country. We speak of the Goorkhas of Jung Bahadoor’s Nepaulese contingent. These troops retreated slowly from Oude towards their own country, neither receiving nor giving satisfaction from their late share in the warlike operations. After a sojourn of some time at Goruckpore, they resumed their march on the 17th of May, proceeding by brigades, and consuming much time in arranging and dragging their enormous supply of vehicles. They crossed the river Gunduck at Bagaha, with much difficulty. A distance of about thirty miles then brought them to Bettiah, and fourteen more to Segowlie—very near the frontier of the British dominions. It was early in the following month when the Goorkhas finally reached their native country, Nepaul—their leader Jung Bahadoor being, though still faithful as an ally, somewhat dissatisfied by his failure in obtaining notable advantage from the governor-general in return for services rendered. Viscount Canning had, many months earlier, received fierce newspaper abuse for not having availed himself more promptly of aid offered by Jung Bahadoor; but there now appeared much probability that caution had been all along necessary in dealing with this ambitious chieftain.

Directing attention next to the region of the Jumna and the Upper Ganges, we have to notice the continuance of insubordination around the Allahabad region, almost in the very presence of the governor-general himself, who still remained, with his staff, in that station. One of the most vexing symptoms of mischief at this place was the occurrence of incendiarism—the burning of buildings by miscreants who could not be discovered. On the 24th of May a new range of barracks was found to be on fire, and six bungalows were completely destroyed. The prevalence of a fierce wind, and the scarcity of water, frustrated for some time all attempts to extinguish the flames. One poor invalid soldier was burned to death, and many others injured. Beyond the limits of the city itself, it was a state of things very unexpected by the supreme authorities, that the road from Allahabad through Futtehpoor to Cawnpore—a road more traversed than any other by British troops throughout twelve months of anarchy—should in the middle of May be scarcely passable without a strong escort. Yet such was the case. The opposition to the British raj, though it had assumed a guerrilla character, was very harassing to deal with. The British were strong in a few places; but the rebels were in numerous small bodies, scattered all over the surrounding country; and these bodies occasioned temporary panics at spots where there was no force to meet them. The thorough knowledge of the country, possessed by some of the leaders, enabled them to baffle the pursuers; and thus it arose that these petty bands occasioned alarms disproportionate to the number of men comprising them. Sometimes they would occupy the great trunk-road, between Allahabad and Cawnpore, and close up all means of transit unless attacked and driven away by force. On the other hand, this district exhibited a remarkable union of the new with the old, the European with the oriental, the practical with the primitive—arising out of the opening of a railway through a part of the route. After reading, as we so often have in this volume, of toilsome marches by sunburnt and exhausted troops over rough roads and through jungle-thickets, it is with a peculiar feeling of interest that we find an announcement to the effect, that ‘on the 26th of May a special train left Allahabad with a party of Sikhs to reinforce Futtehpoor, which was said to be threatened by a large force of the enemy.’ Had this railway been opened when or soon after the Revolt began, there is at least a fair probability that the Cawnpore massacre might have been prevented—provided always that the railway itself, with its locomotives and carriages, were not in rebels’ hands.

Allahabad, about the period now under notice, was made the subject of a very important project, one of many arising out of the mutiny. The Indian government had long and fully considered the various advantages likely to be derived from the founding of a great Anglo-Indian capital at some spot far removed from the three older presidential cities of Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay. The spot selected was Allahabad. The peculiarities of this very important station, before and during the mutiny, have been frequently noticed in past chapters. Occupying the point of the peninsula formed by the junction of the two grand rivers Ganges and Jumna, Allahabad is scarcely paralleled for situation by any other city in India. The one river brings down to it a stream of traffic from Kumaon, Rohilcund, Furruckabad, Cawnpore, Futtehpoor, and the southwestern districts of Oude; while the other brings down that from Kurnaul, Roorkee, Meerut, Delhi, Muttra, Agra, Calpee, and a wide range of country in Rajpootana, Bundelcund, and the Doab. On the other sides, too, it has an extraordinary number of large military and commercial towns within easy reach (in peaceful times), such as Lucknow, Fyzabad, Sultanpore, Goruckpore, Azimghur, Jounpoor, Benares, Ghazeepore, Mirzapore, Dinapoor, and Patna. Agra was at one time intended to have been converted into a presidential city, the capital of an Agra presidency; but the intention was not fully carried out; the Northwest Provinces were formed into a lieutenant-governorship, with Agra as the seat of government; but the events of the mutiny shewed the necessity of holding with a strong hand the position of Allahabad, as a centre of great influence; and Agra began to fall in relative importance.

Fyzabad.

It has been remarked that England has seldom built cities as a nation, as a government; cities have grown, like the constitution, without those preconceived theories of centralised organisation which are so prevalent on the continent of Europe. It has been much the same in India as in England. The three presidential capitals—Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay—became what they are, not from the development of a plan, but from a series of incidents having little relative connection. ‘Our three capitals are congeries of houses, without order, or beauty, or healthiness other than nature may have supplied. Our cantonments, which sometimes grow into cities, are generally stuck down in a plain as a kind of petrified encampment. Even when founding, as in Rangoon, it is with the utmost difficulty we can compel successive governors to care whether the original plan be not set aside.’ A problem arose whether Allahabad might not be an exception to this rule. Standing at the extreme end of the Doab, and bounded by two fine rivers on the north, south, and east, it is susceptible of any degree of enlargement by including additional ground on the west; it might be made one of the strongest forts in India; and its rivers, aided by the railway when finished, might make it a great centre of trade. Most of the conditions, therefore, were favourable to the building of a fine Anglo-Indian city on that spot. The river frontages, it is easily seen, might easily be defended against any attacks which orientals could bring against them. On the west or land side, it was proposed to construct a line of intrenchment, or a sort of intrenched camp, four miles in length, from river to river. This fortification would consist mainly of two great redoubts on the river-banks, each capable of holding an entire regiment, but each defensible by a small force if necessary. With these two redoubts, and one midway between them, and earthern embankments to connect the three, it would be possible to render Allahabad impregnable to any hostile force likely to be brought against it. Within the space thus marked out by the embankment and the rivers would be included a cantonment, a European town, and a native town. The cantonment, a complete military establishment for four or five regiments, would be near the western boundary, on the Jumna side. Eastward of this would be the new English town, built in plots of ground let on lease to builders (native or European), who would be required, in building houses, shops, and hotels, to conform to some general plan, having reference to the railway station as a centre of trade. Nearer the Ganges would be the native town; while at the point of junction of the two rivers would be the existing fort, extended and enlarged so as to form if needed a last stronghold for all the Europeans in Allahabad. Many of the details in the plan were suggested during a period of panic fear, when the natives were looked upon as if they were permanently bitter enemies; and, during the long course of years necessary for working out the idea, great modification in these details might be expected; but the general character of the scheme, as developed about the period to which this chapter relates, may be understood from the above brief sketch.

It was on the 5th of May that a notification appeared at Allahabad, signed by Mr Thornhill, officiating commissioner under the governor-general, concerning the leasing of land in that city for building purposes. The terms were evidently framed with the intention of attracting the notice of commercial firms, at Calcutta and elsewhere, to Allahabad as a future emporium of commerce. The regulations may be summarily noticed as follow: A new civil European town to be formed near the railway station at Allahabad, distinct from the cantonment, the native town, and the fort. Land, in plots of three acres each, to be let on lease by the government, for the erection of shops, hotels, warehouses, and other buildings requisite for a European population. Each plot to have a frontage of three hundred feet on a public road, with a smaller road in the rear. Some of the plots to be let for dwelling-houses; and these, as well as the hotels and shops, to receive a certain systematic arrangement, laid down by the authorities for the general convenience of the whole community. Priority of choice to be given to those who intend to construct hotels, on account of the great necessity for that species of accommodation in a newly collected community. Plots, competed for by two or more persons, to be sold by auction to the highest bidder. The lease to be for fifty years, unless a shorter time be specified by agreement; and the lessee to have the privilege of renewal, under approval as to conditions, but not with any rise of rental. The rent to be thirty rupees (about £3) per acre per annum. Leases to be transferable, and sub-letting to be permitted, on payment of a registration fee; provided the transferree or sublessee enter into an engagement to fulfil the necessary conditions to the government. Every lessee to specify the kind of structures he intends to build on his plot; to commence building within one year after obtaining the lease; and to finish in three years—on forfeiture both of the lease and of a money penalty, if the building fail in kind, value, or time. Lessees to be subject to such rates and taxes as may be imposed for municipal purposes, and to all regulations of police and conservancy. Lessees to be placed under stringent rules, concerning the employment of thatch or other inflammable materials for the roofs of buildings. As a general rule, one plot to one lessee; but if a special application be made, and supported on sufficient grounds, two or more plots to be leased together.—Such were the general regulations. At the time of issuing the order, there were about forty plots set out as a commencement to the system.

The turbulent province of Oude next calls for attention; and as Sir Colin Campbell’s operations bore almost equal reference to Oude and Rohilcund, we will treat both provinces together.

It will be remembered, from the details given in the last chapter, that after the great conquest of Lucknow in March, a considerable time elapsed before any effective attempts were made to overtake and defeat the rebels who had escaped from that city. A few troopers and a few guns were, it is true, sent in pursuit, but with no resources for a long series of marchings and encampings. We have seen that Brigadier John Jones, with the Roorkee field-force, about three thousand strong—H.M. 60th Rifles, 1st Sikh infantry, Coke’s Rifles, 17th Punjaub infantry, the Moultan Horse, and detachments of artillery and engineers—advanced into the heart of Rohilcund from the northwest, while Sir Colin Campbell and General Walpole operated from the Oude or southeastern side: the object being to hem in such of the rebels as had assembled in any force in Rohilcund. Recapitulating the narrative in a few words, we may remind the reader that Jones started from Roorkee on the 15th of the month; crossed the Ganges on the 17th; defeated a body of rebels at Nagul on the same day; and advanced during the next four days steadily on the road to Mooradabad. On the 22d, he fought and won the battle of Nageena; on the 23d, at Noorpoor, he struck into the high road from Mozuffernugger to Mooradabad, with a view of protecting one of the ghâts or ferries of the Ganges; on the 24th, he reached Chujlite, where he learned that Feroze Shah, one of the numerous princes of the House of Delhi, had taken and entered Mooradabad two days before; and on the 25th he reached that town, which had been hastily evacuated by Feroze Shah on the news of Jones’s approach. Encamping outside the town, Jones ordered Lieutenant-colonel (formerly Major) Coke, who commanded the infantry portion of his force, to march into Mooradabad, and make a diligent search for a number of rebel chieftains believed to be hidden there. This search was attended with unexpected success. Coke placed parties of the Moultan cavalry at all the outlets of the city, to prevent escapes, and then he attacked and searched all the houses in which rebel chieftains were believed to be concealed. The capture of one of them was marked by a daring act of intrepidity on the part of an English officer. Nawab Mujjoo Khan, the chief of the rebels hereabouts, had caused himself to be proclaimed Nawab of Mooradabad, and had instigated the people to murder and plunder the Europeans in the place, many months earlier. To capture this villain was a point of some importance. Coke proceeded to the Nawab’s house with two guns, a party of Sappers, and the 1st Punjaub infantry. The soldiers of the Nawab’s guard making a stout resistance, many of them were shot down, including the son and nephew of the Nawab. Lieutenant Angelo then burst open the door of the room in which the Nawab and another of his sons were concealed, and captured them. While so occupied, he was fired upon by some of the Nawab’s guard, from an upper room; whereupon he rushed up stairs, burst open the door, entered the room single-handed, and shot three men in succession with his revolver; some of his troops then coming up, he captured the rest of the guard. In short, the search was thoroughly successful. The names and titles of twenty-one rebel chieftains captured, containing many repetitions of Khan, Sheik, Ali, Hossein, Beg, and Shah, shewed that these evildoers were mostly Mohammedans—the Hindoos of Rohilcund having been much less extensively involved in rebellion. While Jones was thus operating in the northwest, Walpole was engaged, though less successfully, in the southeast. He started on the 9th from Lucknow, with the ‘Rohilcund Field-force,’ five thousand strong; received a mortifying discomfiture on the 14th at Fort Rhodamow, rendered more distressing by the death of Brigadier Adrian Hope; defeated the rebels at Sirsa on the 22d; and crossed the Ramgunga at Allygunje on the 23d. The commander-in-chief himself left Lucknow about the middle of the month; started from Cawnpore at the head of a small column on the 18th; advanced to Kilianpore, Poorah, Urrowl, Meerun-ke-serai, Gosaigunje, and Kamalgunje between that date and the 24th; entered Furruckabad and Futteghur on the 25th; crossed the Ganges on the 26th and 27th; joined Walpole’s field-force on the banks of the Ramgunga on the 28th; marched to Kanth on the 29th; and reached Shahjehanpoor on the 30th, in force sufficient to retake that city, but not in time to capture the rebel Moulvie of Fyzabad, who escaped to work mischief elsewhere.—We thus call to mind that, at the end of April, Campbell and Walpole had advanced from the southeast as far as Shahjehanpoor; while Jones had advanced from the northwest to Mooradabad—the two forces being separated by the city of Bareilly, and a wide expanse of intervening country. About the same time General Penny was planning a march with a third column towards a point between Bareilly and Shahjehanpoor, after crossing the Ganges at Nudowlee; he was to march through the Budayoon district, and to unite his column with Sir Colin’s main force at Meeranpore Kutra, six marches distant from Futteghur. Bareilly, the chief city of Rohilcund Proper, became the point to which the attention of the commanders of all three forces were directed. We have now to see to what result these combinations led in the following month.

On the 2d of May the Rohilcund field-force, of which Sir Colin Campbell now assumed the command in person, started from Shahjehanpoor, to commence operations against Bareilly. A small force was left behind for the defence of Shahjehanpoor, comprising one wing of the 82d foot, De Kantzow’s Irregular Horse, four guns, and a few artillerymen and sappers, under Colonel Hall. What befel this small force will presently appear. Sir Colin marched on the 2d to Tilmul, over a fertile flat country, diversified with topes of trees, but nearly overwhelmed with dust, and inhabited by villagers who were thrown into great doubt by the approach of what they feared might be a hostile force. On the 3d he advanced from Tilmul to Futtehgunje; where he was joined by the force which General Penny had undertaken to bring into Rohilcund from the west.

At this point it is desirable, before tracing the further operations of the commander-in-chief, to notice the course of events which led to the death of General Penny. Being at Nerowlee, on the 29th of April, and believing that the rebels were in some force at the town of Oosait, Penny set out with a column for service in that direction. This column consisted of something under 1500 men: namely, 200 Carabiniers, 350 H.M. 64th, 250 Moultan Horse, 360 Belooch 1st battalion, 300 Punjaub 2d infantry, a heavy field-battery, and a light field-battery with four guns. The column left Nerowlee about nine in the evening; but various delays prevented Penny from reaching Oosait, seven miles distant, until midnight. It then appeared that the enemy had retired from Oosait, and, as native rumour said, had retreated to Datagunje. The column advanced deliberately, under the impression that no enemy was near; but when arrived at Kukerowlee, it suddenly fell into an ambuscade. From the language used by Colonel Jones of the Carabiniers, whose lot it was to write the official account of this affair, it is evident that General Penny had been remiss in precautionary measures; he shared the belief of Mr Wilson, a political resident who accompanied him, that no enemy was near, and under the influence of this belief he relaxed the systematic order of march which had been maintained until Oosait was reached. ‘From this point,’ we are told, ‘military precautions were somewhat neglected, the mounted portion of the column being allowed very considerably to outmarch the infantry; and eventually, though an advanced-guard was kept up, it was held back immediately in front of the artillery.’ Penny with his staff, and Mr Wilson, were riding at the head of the advanced-guard; when at four o’clock, near Kukerowlee, they came into the midst of a wholly unexpected body of the enemy; who poured out grape and round shot at not more than forty yards’ distance, charged down from the left with horsemen, and opened fire with musketry in front. One of the first who fell was General Penny, brought low by grape-shot. Colonel H. R. Jones, who now took the command, made the best arrangements he could to meet the emergency. The four guns of the light field-battery were quickly ordered up to the front, and the cavalry were brought forward ready for a charge. There were, however, many difficulties to contend against. The enemy’s right occupied a mass of sand-hills; their left was protected by thick groves of trees; the town of Kukerowlee was in their rear to fall back upon; and the dimness of the light rendered it impossible rightly to judge the number and position of the rebels. Under these circumstances, Colonel Jones deemed it best merely to hold his ground until daylight should suggest the most fitting course of procedure, and until the infantry should have arrived. When the 64th came up with the cavalry and artillery which Penny had imprudently allowed to go so far ahead, Colonel Bingham at once charged the enemy in front, and drove them into the town. This done, Jones ordered the artillery to shell the town; this completely paralysed the rebels, who soon began to escape from the opposite side. Hereupon Jones sent his cavalry in pursuit; many of the enemy were cut up, and one gun taken; but it was not deemed prudent to continue this pursuit to any great distance, in a district imperfectly known. This battle of Kukerowlee was thus, like nearly all the battles, won by the British; and had it not been for the unfortunate want of foresight on the part of General Penny, he might have been spared to write the dispatch which described it. He was the only officer killed. Those wounded were Captains Forster and Betty, Lieutenants Eckford, Davies, and Graham. Eckford’s escape from death was very extraordinary. The first fire opened by the rebels shot his horse from under him; he then mounted an artillery-horse; a party of Ghazees—fanatics who have sworn to die for their ‘deen’ or faith—attacked him, wounded him, and stabbed his horse; Eckford fell off; and a Ghazee gave him a tremendous cut over the back of the right shoulder, and left him for dead; Surgeon Jones came up, and helped the wounded lieutenant along; but the enemy pursuing, Eckford was made to lie down flat on his face as if dead; the enemy passed on without noticing him, and he was afterwards rescued by some of his companions. Three days after this encounter with the rebels, Colonel Jones succeeded in bringing poor Penny’s column into safe junction with Sir Colin’s force at Futtehgunje—the mutineers and ruffians from the district of Budayoon retiring before him, and swelling the mass of insurgents at Bareilly.

While this was doing, another Jones was marching through Rohilcund in a different direction. It is necessary to avoid confusion in this matter, by bearing in mind that Brigadier John Jones commanded the ‘Roorkee field-force;’ while Colonel H. R. Jones held the temporary command of the column lately headed by General Penny. The brigadier, in pursuance of a plan laid down by Sir Colin, directed his march so that both might reach Bareilly on the same day, the one from Mooradabad and the other from Shahjehanpoor. While on his march, Jones expected to come up with the rebels at Meergunje, a place within a few miles of Bareilly. He found, however, that after constructing two batteries at the first-named place, they had apparently misdoubted their safety, and retreated to Bareilly. Cavalry, sent on in pursuit, overtook the rear of the rebels, cut down great numbers of them, and captured two guns. At an early hour on the 6th, the brigadier with his force arrived within a mile and a half of a bridge contiguous to Bareilly, known as Bahadoor Singh’s bridge. His reconnoitring party was fired upon. A skirmish at once ensued, which lasted three hours, and ended in the capture of the bridge; the rebels were driven back with great slaughter into Bareilly. Just as Jones reached the margin of the city, he heard a cannonading which denoted the arrival of the commander-in-chief from the opposite direction.

Having thus noticed the coalescence of the forces under the two Joneses, we shall be prepared to trace the march of Sir Colin Campbell towards the common centre to which the attention of all was now directed.

After being reinforced at Futtehgunje by the column recently under the command of Penny, Sir Colin resumed his march on the 3d of May. As he advanced, he received news that the rebels were in much disorder. Several of the chiefs had left them; and Nena Sahib, a coward throughout, had sought safety by fleeing towards the border-region between Oude and Nepaul. The main body had been some time at Fureedpore; but when they heard of Sir Colin being at Futtehgunje they retreated to Bareilly—thereby running into the power of another column. The villagers, mostly Hindoos, told distressing tales of the extortions and wrongs they had suffered at the hands of the Mohammedan chieftains, during the twelve months that Rohilcund had been in the power of the rebels; they made great profession of their joy at seeing the arrival of an English army; but past experience had shewn that such profession should be received with much qualification. Certain it was, that Sir Colin Campbell, during his marches through Oude, the Doab, and Rohilcund, received very little aid, and very little correct information, from the villagers of the districts through which he passed; they were either timid, or double-dealing, or both. In one of his dispatches he said: ‘In spite of the assumed friendship of the Hindoo portion of the population, I have not found it easier to obtain information in Rohilcund, on which trust could be put, than has been the case in dealing with the insurrection in other parts of the empire.’ On the 4th, the commander-in-chief advanced from Futtehgunje to Fureedpore, only one march from Bareilly. Rumours now arrived that not only Nena Sahib, but the Delhi prince Feroze Shah, had sought safety by flight from Bareilly; but that Khan Mahomed Khan still remained at the head of the rebels. On this point, however, and on the number of the enemy’s forces, no information was obtained that could be relied upon. As for Bareilly itself, supposing no fortifications to have been thrown up by the rebels, it could not long maintain a siege; seeing that, with the exception of a stream with rather steep banks, there was no obstacle to the entrance of a force from without. The city itself consisted mainly of a street two miles long, with numerous narrow streets and lanes branching off to the right and left; outside these streets and lanes were large suburbs of detached houses, walled gardens, plantations, and enclosures; and outside the suburbs were wide plains intersected by nullahs. It was at present uncertain whether the two forces, from Shahjehanpoor and Mooradabad, could prevent the escape of the enemy over these lateral suburbs and plains; but such was certainly the hope and wish of the commander-in-chief.

Hindoo Fruit-girl.

Early in the morning of the 5th, Sir Colin left his camping-ground at Fureedpore, and advanced towards Bareilly. After a brief halt, the videttes detected a body of rebel cavalry in the distance; and Sir Colin at once marshalled his forces for an attack. The whole force was brigaded into two brigades of cavalry, under Jones and Hagart; one of artillery, under Brind; and two of infantry, under Hay and Stisted.[^[172]] Without reference to the brigades, however, the order of advance was thus arranged: the 2d Punjaub cavalry formed a line of skirmishers on the left of the main-road; the Lahore light horse formed a similar line on the right; while across the road, and in support of these skirmishers, was a line formed by troops of the 9th Lancers and the 1st Punjaub cavalry, a troop of horse-artillery, and several field-guns. Then came the 78th Highlanders, and a body of Sappers and Engineers, along the road; the 93d foot on the right of the road; and the 42d Highlanders on the left. Next, supporting and flanking these, were the 79th foot, the Carabiniers, the Moultan Horse, the remainder of the 9th Lancers and of the Punjaub cavalry, and a wing of the Belooch battalion. Then came the siege-train and the enormous array of baggage; flanked by the 64th foot, a wing of the 82d, the 2d Punjaub infantry, and the 4th Punjaub rifles. Lastly came the rear-guard, comprising the 22d Punjaub infantry, the 17th irregular cavalry, a squadron of the 5th Punjaub cavalry, and a troop of horse-artillery. As this strong force advanced, the rebels fired a few shot from a battery set up at the entrance to Bareilly; but they made scarcely any attempt to fortify or defend either the stream that crossed the high road, or the bridge over the stream. The enemy’s infantry appeared to be mostly congregated in the old cantonment or sepoy-lines, while the cavalry were hovering about in topes of trees. The infantry scarcely shewed; but the cavalry, aided by horse-artillery, made demonstrations as if about to attack, in numbers estimated at two or three thousand. This did not stay the progress of Sir Colin, who was too strong to be affected by such an attempt. Advancing through a suburb on one side of the city, he ordered the 42d, the 79th, and a Sikh or Punjaub regiment, to explore a ruined mass of one-storied houses. What followed may best be told in the language of Mr Russell, who was with the army at the time: ‘As soon as the Sikhs got into the houses, they were exposed to a heavy fire from a large body of matchlockmen concealed around them. They either retired of their own accord, or were ordered to do so; at all events, they fell back with rapidity and disorder upon the advancing Highlanders. And now occurred a most extraordinary scene. Among the matchlockmen, who, to the number of seven or eight hundred, were lying behind the walls of the houses, was a body of Ghazees or Mussulman fanatics, who, like the Roman Decii, devote their lives with solemn oaths to their country or their faith. Uttering loud cries, “Bismillah, Allah, deen, deen!” one hundred and thirty of these fanatics, sword in hand, with small circular bucklers on the left arm, and green cummerbungs, rushed out after the Sikhs, and dashed at the left of the right wing of the Highlanders. With bodies bent and heads low, waving their tulwars with a circular motion in the air, they came on with astonishing rapidity. At first they were mistaken for Sikhs, whose passage had already somewhat disordered our ranks. Fortunately, Sir Colin Campbell was close up with the 42d; his keen, quick eye detected the case at once. “Steady, men, steady; close up the ranks. Bayonet them as they come on.” It was just in time; for these madmen, furious with bang, were already among us, and a body of them sweeping around the left of the right wing got into the rear of the regiment. The struggle was sanguinary but short. Three of them dashed so suddenly at Colonel Cameron that they pulled him off his horse ere he could defend himself. His sword fell out of its sheath, and he would have been hacked to pieces in another moment but for the gallant promptitude of Colour-sergeant Gardiner, who, stepping out of the ranks, drove his bayonet through two of them in the twinkling of an eye. The third was shot by one of the 42d. Brigadier Walpole had a similar escape; he was seized by two or three of the Ghazees, who sought to put him off his horse, while others cut at him with their tulwars. He received two cuts on the hand, but he was delivered from the enemy by the quick bayonets of the 42d. In a few minutes the dead bodies of one hundred and thirty-three of these Ghazees, and some eighteen or twenty wounded men of ours, were all the tokens left of the struggle.’

Sir Colin had not yet reached Bareilly. The little skirmishing that had occurred was in one of the suburbs. The enemy’s cavalry, though powerless for any serious attack, succeeded in creating, by a dash across the plain towards the baggage, an indescribable amount of alarm among the camp-followers, bazaar-traders, horses, camels, bullocks, and elephants. There was not much real fighting throughout the day; but the heat was so intense, the poor soldiers suffered so much from thirst, so many were brought low by sun-stroke, and all were so fatigued, that Sir Colin resolved to bivouac on the plain for the night, postponing till the next day an advance into, and the capture of, the city of Bareilly.

Whether this delay on the road to victory was sound or not in a military sense, it afforded the enemy an opportunity to escape, which they did not fail to take advantage of. On the morning of the 6th, it was ascertained that many of the leaders, and a large body of rebel troops, had quietly left the place. Guns were brought to bear upon certain buildings in the city, known or suspected to be full of insurgents; and it was while this cannonade was in progress that Sir Colin became aware of the arrival of Brigadier Jones, already adverted to. On the 7th the two forces advanced into the city, and took complete possession of it, but without capturing any of the leaders, or preventing the escape of the main body of rebels. A large quantity of artillery, mostly of recent native manufacture, fell into the hands of the victors, together with a great store of shell, shot, and powder, for the manufacture of which, materials and machinery had been provided by the rebels.

Before proceeding with the narrative of Bareilly affairs, it will be necessary to notice a very remarkable episode at Shahjehanpoor. It will be remembered that when Sir Colin Campbell started from that place on the 2d of May, to advance on Bareilly, he left behind him a small defensive force. In his dispatch he said: ‘When I passed through Shahjehanpoor, I was informed that the Fyzabad Moulvie, and the Nawab of the former place, were at Mohumdee, with a considerable body of men who had retired from Shahjehanpoor; and I thought it would be impolitic to leave the district without evidence of our presence.’ He therefore told off a small defensive force; comprising a wing of the 82d foot, Lieutenant De Kantzow’s irregular horse, a few artillerymen, and four guns. In obedience to orders left by Sir Colin, Colonel Hall, of the 82d, marched this small force from the camp at Azeezgunje, to occupy the jail in the cantonment of Shahjehanpoor as a military post. There being no shade within the cantonment, he pitched his camp for a time in a tope of trees near the jail. He next formed the jail into a small intrenched position, with four guns, and as large a supply of provisions as he could procure. All this was done in one day, the 2d of May; and, indeed, not an hour was to be lost; for a spy appeared on the following morning to announce that a large body of rebels had arrived within four miles of the place. This announcement proved to be correct. A strong band of insurgents from Mohumdee in Oude, taking advantage of Sir Colin’s departure from Shahjehanpoor, were advancing to regain possession of that station. Colonel Hall immediately sent his baggage and provisions into the jail, and ordered four companies of the 82d to guard the camp during this transfer. Going out to reconnoitre, he saw the enemy’s cavalry approaching. Lieutenant De Kantzow would willingly have charged the enemy with his small body of horse; but the colonel, knowing the overwhelming force of the rebels, and noting his instructions to act on the defensive, forbade this charge. Both went into the jail, with their handful of troops, and prepared for a resolute defence. The rebels arrived, seized the old fort, plundered the town, put many of the principal inhabitants to death, and established patrols on the river’s bank. It was computed that they were little less than eight thousand strong, with twelve guns. Against this strong force, Hall held his position for eight days and nights, sustaining a continuous bombardment, without thinking for an instant of yielding. Not until the 7th of the month did the commander-in-chief hear of this disaster at Shahjehanpoor. He at once made up a brigade; consisting of the 60th Rifles, the 79th Highlanders, a wing of the 82d foot, the 22d Punjaub infantry, two squadrons of Carabiniers, Cureton’s Horse, with some artillery and guns. Brigadier Jones, who commanded this brigade, received at the same time from Sir Colin discretionary power to attack the enemy at Mohumdee after the relief of Hall at Shahjehanpoor, if he should so deem it expedient. Jones, at the head of his brigade, started from Bareilly on the 8th, and reached Shahjehanpoor on the 11th. At daybreak, a body of the enemy having been seen, Jones sent out the Mooltan Horse to pursue them; but a heavy mass of troops being now visible, it became necessary to draw up in order of battle. The enemy’s cavalry began the battle; these were driven off by Jones’s howitzers. Then the Highlanders and Rifles were pushed on as skirmishers, supported by horse-artillery; and in a short time the rebels were put to flight—allowing the brigadier to select his own point of entrance into Shahjehanpoor. Fortunately he made himself acquainted with the fact that many buildings in the suburbs had been loopholed for musketry, and with the probability that many others in the heart of the town had been similarly treated; he thereupon avoided the main street, and made a detour through the eastern suburbs. No enemy was visible within the town, until a strong party of troopers were found drawn up near the school-house; these were quickly dispersed by a few shrapnell shells, and a pursuit by the Carabiniers, leaving a gun and some ammunition-wagons behind them. Jones continued his march by the church, and across the parade-ground to the jail, where the gallant little garrison under Colonel Hall had so long defended themselves against an overwhelming force. The bold stand made by this officer was an enterprise that excited little attention amid the various excitements of the period; but Sir Colin Campbell did not fail to see that the defence had been prompt, energetic, and skilful. The adjutant-general, writing to the governor-general, said: ‘I am directed by the commander-in-chief to inform his lordship that the lieutenant-colonel hardly does justice to himself in his report of this defence, which was conducted by him with prudence and skill, and consequently with trifling loss. I am to add that Lieutenant-colonel Hall, although he makes no mention of the fact, was himself wounded by a musket-bullet in the leg, from the effect of which he has not yet (May 29th) recovered.’

To return to Bareilly. After the operations which have now been briefly described, the insurgents were so completely driven out of Mooradabad, Bareilly, and Shahjehanpoor, the principal towns in this province, that it was no longer deemed necessary to keep up the ‘Rohilcund field-force’ in its collected form; the various brigades, cavalry and infantry, were broken up, and Sir Colin gave separate duties to his various officers, according to the tenor of the information received from various parts of the country. Some corps and detachments remained at Bareilly; some went to Lucknow; one or two Punjaub regiments set off towards Meerut; and General Walpole was placed in command in Kumaon and Rohilcund. It was just at this time, the 11th of May, that Sir Colin Campbell received an official notification from the Queen to thank his troops in her name for their gallant services in earlier months. The address was, of course, merely of a customary kind under such circumstances; but it constituted one among the list of honours to which soldiers look as some reward for their hard life.[^[173]] The ‘last stronghold’ adverted to by him was Bareilly; he could not then know that another stronghold, Gwalior, was destined to be the scene of a much more sanguinary struggle.

Among the arrangements more immediately affecting Rohilcund, was the formation of a column for special service in the country districts. This column, placed under the command of Lieutenant-colonel (now Brigadier) Coke, comprised a wing of the 42d Highlanders, the 1st Punjaub rifles, the 1st Sikh infantry, a detachment of the 24th Punjaub infantry, a squadron of Carabiniers, the Moultan Horse, a detachment of the 17th irregular cavalry, and a considerable force of artillery. With three weeks’ supplies for the European troops, and four weeks’ for the native, this column set forth from Bareilly on the 12th of May.

The commander-in-chief, leaving instructions for the formation of efficient defences at Bareilly, started off to some more central station, where he could be in easy communication with the various columns engaged in different parts of Northern India. General Walpole took command of the whole of the Rohilcund troops; having under him Coke’s brigade just adverted to, and Major Lennox to superintend the engineering works at Bareilly. Mr Alexander established himself as civil commissioner, to reorganise a government for that long-distracted province. Being thus satisfied that affairs were in a good train, Sir Colin started on the 15th, taking with him his head-quarters staff, the 64th foot, a wing of the 9th Lancers, and detachments of other troops. The veteran commander bore heat and fatigue in a manner that astonished his subordinates; he got through an amount of work which knocked up his aids-de-camp; and was always ready to advise or command, as if rest and food were contingencies that he cared not about. The natives, when any of them sought for and obtained an interview with him, were often a good deal surprised to see the commander of the mighty British army in shirt-sleeves and a pith-hat; but the keen eye and the cool manner of the old soldier told that he had all his wits about him, and was none the worse from the absence of glitter and personal adornment. His advance in the first instance was to Fureedpore, as a first stage towards Futteghur; his second to Futtehgunje; but here he heard news that changed his plans. To understand what occurred, we must revert to the affairs at Shahjehanpoor.

When Brigadier Jones had relieved Colonel Hall from his difficulties on the 11th, he found that he had been engaged with a fragment only of the enemy’s force; and he prepared for the contingency of a hostile encounter. On the 15th he was attacked with great fury and in great force by the rebels, who were headed by the Moulvie of Fyzabad, the Begum of Oude, the Shahzada of Delhi, and (as some thought) by Nena Sahib. The struggle continued throughout the day, and needed all the activity and resources of the brigadier. So large was the body of rebels, indeed, that he could do nothing more than act on the defensive until reinforcements could reach him. This was the information received by Sir Colin when at Futtehgunje. He immediately re-arranged his forces. Leaving the 47th and 93d foot, the 17th Punjaub infantry, the 2d Sikh cavalry, and some horse and foot artillery, to guard Bareilly; he hastened towards Shahjehanpoor with the 64th foot, the Belooch battalion, the 9th Lancers, and some horse and foot artillery. On the 17th he marched to Tilhur; moving cautiously, for the rebels were known to be in great force not far distant. He rested during the mid-day heat, in a tope of mango-trees beyond the village of Tilhur. In the evening, information arrived that the Moulvie, with a large force, was strongly posted on the Mohumdee road, a few miles northeast of Shahjehanpoor. Mohumdee, which had been made a stronghold by the rebels, comprised a brick-fort, mounted with twelve or fifteen guns, strengthened in various ways, and protected within and without by troops. The Moulvie, as the most skilful of the insurgent leaders, held the chief command in these parts; but the Begum of Oude, and the Shahzada of Delhi, were believed to be near at hand. Mohumdee itself was about twenty miles from Shahjehanpoor; but the whole road was more or less commanded by the rebels. In the early morn of the 18th Sir Colin started again. Arriving at Shahjehanpoor, he passed the old camping-ground, made a partial circuit of the city to the bridge of boats, crossed the bridge, and traversed the city to the other side. It was found that the city had suffered considerably by the cannonading which Brigadier Jones had been compelled to inflict upon it, in his operations for the relief of the little garrison under Colonel Hall; and that many of the respectable inhabitants had deserted the place until more peaceful times, more facilities for quiet trade, should arrive.

When Sir Colin’s force joined that under Brigadier Jones, and the two commanders compared notes, it was found that the brigadier’s troops had suffered intensely from the heat. Mr Russell, who at that time—sick and hurt by a kick from a horse—was carried in a doolie or litter among the ‘baggage’ of Sir Colin’s army, was not sufficiently in front to witness much of the fighting; but his diary is full of vivid pictures of camp-life under a burning sun: ‘In Rose’s attack on the enemy at Koonch, eight men fell dead in the ranks, and upwards of twenty officers and men had to be carried from the field through the heat of the sun. Nineteen of our casualties at Bareilly, ten of which were fatal, were caused in the same way. In fact, every march henceforth after ten o’clock in the morning must be attended with loss of life.’—‘A peep into most of the tents would discover many of the head-quarters’ staff panting on their charpoys, in the nearest possible approach to Adamite costume, and gasping for breath like carp on the banks of a moat. It may readily be imagined—if officers, each of whom has a tent to himself, with kuskus tatties, punkahs, and similar appliances to reduce the temperature, suffer so much from heat—what the men endure, packed ten or twelve in a tent, and in some regiments eighteen or twenty, without such resources, and without change of light clothing; and how heavily picket-duty, outlying and inlying, presses upon them.’ In encamping after a twilight morning march, ‘it may be easily imagined how anxiously each man surveys the trees about his tent as the site is marked out, and calculates what shelter it will give him, and at what time the sun will find out his weak points during the day; for indeed the rays do strike through every interstice like red-hot shot. There is no indecision of shadow, no infirmity of outline; for wherever the sun falls on the side of a tent, it seems to punch out a fervid blazing pattern on the gray ground of the canvas.’—‘The motion of a doolie is by no means unpleasant; but I confess my experience of its comforts has now lasted quite long enough. It is a long cot slung from a bamboo-pole, borne on the shoulders of four men, two in front and two behind, who at a shuffling pace carry you along the road at the rate of four miles an hour; and two spare men follow as a relief. As the bottom of the litter hangs close to the ground, the occupant has more than his share of all the dust that is going; but if the curtains or tilts are let down, the heat becomes insupportable.’—‘The march of Jones’s column to the relief of Shahjehanpoor had told heavily upon the men. Upwards of thirty rank and file of the 79th fell out in marching to and through the city; and the 60th Rifles, accustomed though they be to Indian warfare, were deprived of the services of upwards of forty men from sun-stroke. It was pitiable, I was told, to see the poor fellows lying in their doolies, gasping their last. The veins of the arm were opened, and leeches applied to the temples; but notwithstanding every care, the greater number of the cases were fatal almost immediately; and even among the cases of those who recovered, there are few who are fit for active service again, except after a long interval of rest.’—‘I own I am distressed when I see the 60th Rifles dressed in dark-green tunics, which absorb the heat almost as much as if they were made of black cloth, and their cloth forage-caps poorly covered with a few folds of dark cotton. What shall we say of the 79th Highlanders, who still wear that picturesque and extraordinary head-dress, with the addition of a flap of gray cloth over the ears? If it were white, perhaps it would afford some protection against the sun; but, as it is, this mass of black feathers is surely not the head-dress that would be chosen by any one, except a foolish fantastic savage, for the plains of India.’

Having arrived at Shahjehanpoor on the 18th, the commander-in-chief wished to give his troops a little needful rest during the heat of the day. A cavalry detachment, however, having gone out to reconnoitre, came in sight of a small mud-fort containing four guns; the guns fired upon the cavalry; the report of this firing brought forward a body of the enemy’s troopers; and the appearance of these drew out Sir Colin and nearly the whole of his force. Thus a battle-array was very unexpectedly formed. Among the rebels was a large body of Rohilla troopers—active, determined, well mounted, and well armed; and as these men fought better than was wont among the enemy, and were supported by many guns, there followed a good deal of cavalry and artillery skirmishing. During the firing, a round-shot passed so close to Sir Colin Campbell and General Mansfield as greatly to endanger both, and to increase the desire among the soldiers generally that the commander-in-chief, who was very careful of his men’s lives, would attach a little more value to his own. Although the result of the encounter was to drive off the enemy to a greater distance, it was not wholly satisfactory or decisive; Sir Colin had not intended to resume active service until his troops had been refreshed by a few hours’ rest; but the reconnaissance had been so managed as to precipitate an engagement with the enemy. It was only a small part of the rebel force that was thus encountered on the 18th; the main body, eight or ten thousand strong, was at Mohumdee.

The commander-in-chief, finding himself too weak in cavalry to pursue the enemy with any effect, suspended operations for a few days; remaining at Shahjehanpoor until Brigadier Coke’s column could join him from the district of Pileebheet. Coke, in accordance with a plan already noticed, was preparing to sweep round the country by way of Boodayoun to Mooradabad; but he now joined Sir Colin, on the 22d; and preparations were made for an immediate advance upon the rebel position at Mohumdee. Again were the enemy beaten, and again did the Moulvie and the other leaders escape. When the British marched to that place on the 24th they found that the rebels had evacuated their strong fort, after destroying the defence-works. They had also destroyed Kujoorea, a very strong doubly intrenched position, surrounded by thick bamboo-hedges, and having a citadel. Several guns were dug up at the last-named place; and much property was discovered which had once belonged to the unfortunate Europeans murdered by the rebels nearly twelve months earlier.

Throughout the operations in Oude and Rohilcund, from May 1857 till May 1858, one of the master-spirits among the rebels was the Moulvie of Fyzabad—a man whose name has been so often mentioned: ‘A tall, lean, and muscular man, with lantern jaws, long thin lips, high aquiline nose, deep-set large dark eyes, beetle brows, long beard, and coarse black hair falling in masses over his shoulders.’ During the investigations which were subsequently made into the plans and intrigues of the rebels in Oude, the fact was ascertained that this Moulvie had been known many years before as Ahmed Shah, a sort of inspired fanatic or fakeer. He travelled through the Northwest Provinces on some sort of miraculous mission which was a mystery to the Europeans; his stay at Agra was of considerable duration, and was marked by the exercise of much influence over the Mohammedan natives. Mr Drummond, magistrate of that city, kept an eye on him as a suspicious character; and it was afterwards regarded as a probability that the Moulvie had been engaged in some plotting inimical to the English ‘raj.’ The commencement of the mutiny in May 1857 may have been determined by unforeseen circumstances; but abundant proofs were gradually obtained that some sort of conspiracy had been long before formed, and hence a reasonable inference that the Moulvie may have been one of the conspirators. When the troops mutinied at Fyzabad in June, they placed the Moulvie at their head. He had been in that city in April, attended by several fanatic followers; and here he circulated seditious papers, openly proclaiming a religious war. Although the police on this occasion were ordered to arrest him, he and his followers made an armed resistance which could not be suppressed without military aid. The Moulvie was captured, tried, and condemned for execution; but the Revolt broke out before he could thus be got rid of, and then he suddenly changed character from a felon to a leader of a formidable body of armed men. Though sometimes eclipsed in power by other leaders, he maintained great influence over the rebels throughout the turbulent proceedings of the period. There can be little doubt that he had much of the sincerity of a true religious fanatic; and as he was an able man, and free from the dastardly cruelty that so stained the names of Nena Sahib and other leaders of unenviable notoriety, a certain kind of respect was felt for him by the British whom he opposed.

When the month of May ended, and Sir Colin Campbell had proceeded to Futteghur as a central station whence he could conveniently watch the progress of events, the Rohilcund and Roorkee field-forces were broken up; and the regiments which had composed them were set apart for various detached duties. Brigadier Seaton remained at Shahjehanpoor, with the 60th Rifles, the 82d foot, the 22d Punjaub infantry, Cureton’s cavalry, two squadrons of the 6th Dragoon Guards, and some artillery. The 79th Highlanders, and various detachments of artillery, took their departure for Futteghur. The 64th went to Meerut; the 9th Lancers to Umballa; and Coke’s Sikh brigade to Boodayoun or Pileebheet. At the end of the month all was quiet at and near Shahjehanpoor, and the peaceful portion of the inhabitants were returning; but it was doubtful how soon a new irruption of rebels from Oude would throw everything again into confusion. Indeed there were at that time many rebel leaders at the head of small bodies of insurgents, ready for mischief; among whom were Baboo Ramnarain of Islamnuggur, and Nizam Ali of Shahee—but these men could safely be regarded rather as guerrilla chieftains than as military leaders.

It was on this fitting occasion, when there seemed to be a lull in the din of war, that Sir Colin Campbell issued a congratulatory address to the troops of the Anglo-Indian armies. Although the address was not made publicly known to the troops by the adjutant-general until the following month, it was dated the 28th of May, and ran as follows:

‘In the month of October 1857 the garrison of Lucknow was still shut up, the road from Calcutta to Cawnpore was unsafe, the communications with the northwest were entirely closed, and the civil and military functionaries had disappeared altogether from wide and numerous provinces. Under instructions from the Right Honourable the Governor-general, a large plan was designed, by which the resources of the three presidencies, after the arrival of reinforcements from England, should be made available for combined action. Thus, while the army of Bengal, gathering strength from day to day, has recovered the Gangetic Doab, restored the communications with the northwest of the empire, relieved the old garrison of Lucknow, afterwards taking that city, reoccupying Rohilcund, and finally insuring in a great measure the tranquillity of the old provinces—the three columns put in movement from Bombay and Madras have rendered like great and efficient services in their long and difficult marches on the Jumna, through Central India, and in Rajpootana. These columns, under Major-generals Sir Hugh Rose, K.C.B., Whitlock, and Roberts, have admirably performed their share in the general combination arranged under the orders of his lordship the governor-general. This combination was spread over a surface ranging from the boundaries of Bombay and Madras to the extreme northwest of India. By their patient endurance of fatigue, their unfailing obedience, and their steadfast gallantry, the troops have enabled the generals to fulfil their instructions. In no war has it ever happened that troops have been more often engaged than during the campaigns which have now terminated. In no war has it ever happened that troops should always contend against immense numerical odds, as has been invariably the case in every encounter during the struggle of the last year; and in no war has constant success without a check been more conspicuously achieved. It has not occurred that one column here, another there, has won more honour than the other portions of the army; the various corps have done like hard work, have struggled through the difficulties of a hot-weather campaign, and have compensated for paucity of numbers in the vast area of operations by continuous and unexampled marching, notwithstanding the season. It is probable that much yet remains for the army to perform; but now that the commander-in-chief is able to give the greater part of it rest for a time, he chooses this moment to congratulate the generals and troops on the great results which have attended their labours. He can fairly say that they have accomplished in a few months what was believed by the ill-wishers of England to be either beyond her strength, or to be the work of many years.’

This address is not fully intelligible without taking into account certain brilliant proceedings in Central India, hereafter to be noticed; but it is transcribed here as a suitable termination to the Rohilcund operations in the month of May. The other important affairs bearing relation to it will find their due place of record.

Oude itself has been very little mentioned in this chapter. The reason is, that the most important section of the rebels escaped from that province into Rohilcund, after the great siege of Lucknow, thereby determining the main scene of struggle during May. There was not, however, a total cessation of fighting in Oude. Sir Hope Grant, who had been left at Lucknow by Sir Colin Campbell, had more than one encounter with the rebels in the course of the month. Some of these operations brought him, on the 10th, to a place called Doundea Khera, a fort belonging to the rebel Ram Buksh. This fort, though of mud, was of considerable strength; it was square, with earthen walls and bastions of considerable thickness; it had four guns, and was rendered difficult of approach by a ditch and belt of prickly jungle. The fort was, however, found deserted when Sir Hope arrived. His work then consisted in destroying the fort, and such of the buildings as could be shewn to have belonged to Ram Buksh. This done, he advanced on the 12th to Nuggur. Hearing that two thalookdars or chieftains, Beni Madhoo and Shewrutten Singh, had assembled an army of fifteen thousand infantry, sixteen hundred cavalry, and eleven guns, at Sirsee, a village and fort about five miles off, Grant determined to attack them at once. He left all his baggage, supplies, &c., with tents struck, in a safe position, with a force of cavalry, infantry, and artillery for their protection. From the extreme difficulty of obtaining correct information in that country, Sir Hope was in much doubt concerning the ground occupied by the enemy; and eventually he found it stronger than he had expected. The rebels were drawn up on the banks of a nullah, with an extensive thick jungle in their rear, rendered still stronger by the fortified village of Towrie. At five in the afternoon the enemy’s first gun opened fire; but as soon as Grant had formed his column, with cavalry and horse-artillery covering his right flank, the rebels were attacked with such boldness and vigour that they gave way, and were driven into the jungle, leaving two iron guns behind them. Grant’s column was at one time almost surrounded by the rebels; but a prompt movement of some of the regiments speedily removed this difficulty. The rebels suffered severe loss, including that of one of their leaders, Shewrutten. Sir Hope Grant, deeming it imprudent to allow his troops to enter the jungle, bivouacked for the night on the ground where the battle had been fought, and returned on the morning of the 13th to his camp at Nuggur. During these operations, he found himself within a short distance of the small Hindoo temple in which Lieutenants Delafosse and Thomson, and several other Europeans, sought refuge after their escape from the boat-massacre at Cawnpore, eleven months earlier.[^[174]] Much blood having been spilled on that occasion, one of the objects of the present expedition was to bring certain of the native miscreants to justice. Mr Elliott, assistant-commissioner, who accompanied the column, went on to the temple with a squadron of cavalry, took a few prisoners, and then destroyed the temple—which still exhibited the shot-holes resulting from the dastardly attack of a large body of natives on a few unarmed Europeans.

Towards the close of the month, Hope Grant found that a body of the enemy was threatening Bunnee, and endeavouring to obtain command of the high road between Lucknow and Cawnpore; this necessitated an expedition on his part to frustrate the design. As a means of better controlling approach to the capital, he blew up the stone-bridge over the Goomtee, thus leaving the iron suspension-bridge as the only mode of crossing.

Of Lucknow, little need be said in this chapter. The engineers were employed in constructing such batteries and strongholds, and clearing away such native buildings, as might enable a small British force to defend the place; while Mr Montgomery, the newly appointed chief-commissioner, was cautiously feeling his way towards a re-establishment of civil government. Viscount Canning had given him plenary powers, in reference to the issue of any proclamation to the natives—powers which required much tact in their exercise; for there was still a large amount of fierce opposition and vindictive feeling to contend against.

In the Doab, and the district adjacent to it, several minor affairs took place during the month, sufficient to indicate a very turbulent condition of portions of the population, even if not of great military importance. At one period of the month five thousand rebels, in two bodies, crossed the Kallee Nuddee, and marched along the western boundary of the Futteghur district, burning and destroying villages. They then crossed the Ganges into Oude by the Shorapore Ghât, taking with them several guns. Here, however, they were watched and checked by a small force under Brigadier Carthew, and by Cureton’s Horse. About the same time, a party of a thousand rebels, with four guns, marched from Humeerpore to Asung, on the great trunk-road between Lullutpore and Cawnpore; they commanded that road for several days, until a force could be sent out to dislodge them. Higher up the Doab, the fort and village of Ayana, in the Etawah district, were taken by a party of Alexander’s Horse, and a rebel chief, named Roop Singh, expelled. Colonel Riddell, who commanded a column from Etawah, encountered and defeated small bodies of rebels near Ooriya and Sheregurh, and then descended the Ganges in boats to Calpee, to take part in an important series of operations in which the Central India field-force was mainly concerned. Brigadier Showers, during the greater part of this month, was employed in various ways around Agra as a centre. Among other measures, he organised a corps of Jât cavalry, to defend the ghâts of the Ganges, and prevent rebels from crossing the river. Agra itself, with the brigadier at hand to check rising disturbances, remained free from serious troubles; though from time to time rumours were circulated which threw the Europeans into some uneasiness. As the native inhabitants still possessed a number of old firelocks, swords, and other weapons; it was deemed prudent to issue an order for disarming. An immense collection of queer native weapons was the result—not very formidable to English troops, but mischievous as a possible element of strength to the disaffected. Many of the guns in the fort were kept pointed towards the city, as a menace to evildoers.

In reference to many parts of the Doab, there was ample reason for British officers feeling great uneasiness at the danger which still surrounded them in the Northwest Provinces, wherever they were undefended by troops. The murder of Major Waterfield was a case in point. About the middle of May the major and Captain Fanshawe were travelling towards Allygurh viâ Agra. In the middle of the night, near Ferozabad, a band of a hundred and fifty rebels surrounded the vehicle, shot the driver, and attacked the travellers. The two officers used their revolvers as quickly as they could; but the unfortunate Waterfield received two shots, one in the head and one through the chest, besides a sword-cut across the body; he fell dead on the spot. Fanshawe’s escape was most extraordinary. The rebels got him out of the carriage, and surrounded him; but they pressed together so closely that each prevented his neighbour from striking. Fanshawe quickly drew his sword, and swung it right and left so vigorously that he forced a passage for himself through the cowardly crew; some pursued him, but a severe sword-cut to one of them deterred the rest. The captain ran on at great speed, climbed up a tree, and there remained till the danger was over. His courage and promptness saved him from any further injury than a slight wound in the hand. Poor Waterfield’s remains, when sought for some time afterwards, were found lying among the embers of the burned vehicle; they were carried into Agra, and interred with military honours. The native driver was found dead, with the head nearly severed from the body.

Nynee Tal, Mussouree, and the other hill-stations towards which the sick and the weak looked with so much yearning, were almost wholly free from disturbance during May. One of the few events calling for notice was an expedition from Huldwanee by Captain Crossman. Receiving news that two rebel leaders, Nizam Ali Khan and Kali Khan, were preparing for mischief at a place called Bahonee, he started off on the 8th of May, with two or three companies of his own regiment, and a hundred Goorkhas mounted on elephants. He missed the two leaders, but captured many other rebels, included Kali Khan’s brother—all in the service of the notorious Khan Bahadoor Khan, self-appointed chief of Bareilly. After burning five rebel villages, in which great atrocities had been perpetrated against Christians many months before, Crossman returned to Huldwanee—having been in incessant movement for twenty-six hours.

Fortunately, the other regions of India presented so few instances—with a notable exception, presently to be mentioned—of rebellious proceedings, that a few paragraphs will suffice for their treatment.

During the earlier half of the month of May, minor engagements took place in the Nagpoor territory, for the dispersion of bands of marauders and insurgents. The rebels were so little influential, the troops sent against them so few in number, and the towns and villages so little known, that it is unnecessary to trace these operations in detail. The localities concerned were Arpeillee, Ghote, Ashtee, Koonserra, Chamoorshee, and others equally obscure. The insurgents were a contemptible rabble, headed by refractory zemindars; but as their country was almost a complete jungle, it was very difficult work for Lieutenant Nuttall and Captain Crichton to put them down. The first of these two officers had under him five companies of the Nagpoor irregular infantry, with one gun; the other was deputy-commissioner of the district. A party of two thousand rebels, under the zemindar of Arpeillee—about a hundred miles south of Nagpoor—ravaged many villages; and at one spot they brutally murdered Mr Gartlan and Mr Hall, electric-telegraph inspectors, taking away all the public and private property from the station. The marauders and murderers were gradually put down; and this necessary work, though difficult from the cause above mentioned, was facilitated by the peaceful tendencies of the villagers generally, who rather dreaded than favoured Yenkut Rao, Bapoo Rao, and the other rebel zemindars. It also tended to lessen the duration of the contest, and insure its success, that Milloo Potail, and some other chieftains, sided with the British. Bapoo Rao, the head rebel of the district, was believed to be bending his steps towards the Nizam’s country; but as he would there fall into the hands of an ally of the British, little doubt was entertained that his career would soon be cut short.

The Nizam and his prime-minister kept the large territory of Hyderabad free from any extensive military disturbances; but the country districts were so harassed by bands of marauding Rohilla freebooters, that the Nizam requested the Bombay government to furnish a small force for putting down this evil. Accordingly a corps of a few hundred men were sent to the region between Aurungabad and Jaulnah—with very evident and speedy effect.

It will be remembered that, in connection with the events of the month of April, the intended disarming of the province of Gujerat was adverted to. This critical and important operation was carried out during May. Sir Richmond Shakespear, who held a military as well as a political position in that province, managed the enterprise so firmly and skilfully that village after village was disarmed, and rendered so far powerless for mischief. Many unruly chieftains regarded this affair as very unpalatable. It was a work of great peril, for the turbulent natives were out of all proportion more numerous than any troops Sir Richmond could command; but he brought to bear that wonderful influence which many Englishmen possessed over the natives—influence shewing the predominance of moral over physical power. The native sovereign of Gujerat, the Guicowar, had all along been faithful and friendly to the British; he trusted Sir Richmond Shakespear as fully as Scindia trusted Sir Robert Hamilton, and gave an eager assent to the disarming of his somewhat turbulent subjects. The Nizam, the Guicowar, Scindia, and Holkar—all remained true to the British alliance during the hour of trouble; if they had failed us, the difficulties of reconquest would have been immensely increased, if not insuperable.

Of the Bombay presidency mention may be postponed to the chapter relating to the month of June, so far as concerns the appearance and suppression of slight rebellious symptoms. One of the minor events in Bombay city at this period was the conferring of a baronetcy on a native gentleman, the high-minded liberal Jamsetjee Jejeebhoy. He had long before been knighted; but his continued and valuable assistance to the government through all trials and difficulties now won for him further honour. The Parsee merchant became Sir Jamsetjee Jejeebhoy, Bart.—perhaps the most remarkable among baronets, race and creed considered. Whatever he did, was done in princely style. In order that his new hereditary dignity might not be shamed by any paucity of wealth on the part of his descendants, he at once invested twenty-five lacs of rupees in the Bombay four per cents., to entail an income of ten thousand pounds a year on the holder of the baronetcy. A large mansion at Mazagon was for a like purpose entailed; and the old merchant-prince felt a commendable pride in thinking that Bombay might possibly, for centuries to come, count among its inhabitants a Sir Jamsetjee Jejeebhoy.

The reader will have observed that this chapter is silent concerning the brilliant campaign of Sir Hugh Rose in Central India, and of the subsidiary operations under Generals Roberts and Whitlock. It has been considered advantageous, on account of the great importance of Sir Hugh’s exploits, and of the intimate manner in which his proceedings in June were determined by those of May, to treat those transactions in a separate chapter, apart from those connected with the names of Campbell, Lugard, Douglas, Grant, Walpole, Jones, and Penny. The narrative will next, therefore, take up the affairs of Central India during the months of May and June.