VIII.
Contending without a reserve is desperate risk in struggles of all kinds, civil and military. In such predicaments, if fortune frown, well nigh all is lost.
In skirmishes, reserves, including in the first place supports, are not only of great importance as rallying points, in extraordinary cases of misfortune, but also as necessary aids to the ordinary movements of the extended line.
In attacks, supports are useful for filling up accidental gaps in the front line—for prolonging its flanks or covering them obliquely or perpendicularly—for strengthening the skirmishers at any moment that these may find their numbers unequal to important work before them—for relieving them when they or their ammunition become exhausted—for coming up in close order to charge bridges, streets, villages, or other defiles, too strongly occupied to be forced by the skirmishers, and to serve as bases, when time allows it, for the formation of squares against cavalry.
In defences, in addition to the foregoing duties reversed as to bodies retiring, supports have the highly important responsibilities of leading the skirmishers in the true and best line of retreat—of opening that line in all suitable places for their convenient passage, and of taking care that it be not intercepted by the enemy.
Reserves, particularly so called, supply the places of supports when necessary, and go to the front for any object requiring the intervention of a particularly strong, steady, and concentrated force.
Without express orders, supports should not move forward to occupy accidental gaps in the extended line, except on ground so intricate, or under circumstances so emergent, that the skirmishers themselves cannot readily regain their lost communications.
In most movements, set unvarying sentences of command promote alertness and prevent mistakes.
For prolonging in the same direction the flanks of the extended line—for covering them perpendicularly or obliquely—for strengthening the skirmishers by mixing others with them, or for relieving them; the following set, concise orders to supports obviously present themselves:—
No. —— Support.: Prolong the —— Flank.
In the same direction as the general line understood.
Do. —— Do.: Cover the —— Flank,
perpendicularly; with moderate licence, according to the features of the ground, understood.
Do. —— Do.: Cover obliquely the —— Flank.
An obliquity of one-eighth of the circle, with the same licence, understood.
Do. —— Do.: Strengthen No. ——.
To prevent mistakes, the word “strengthen” to be repeated with sufficient distinctness by the officers and non-commissioned officers of the Support to which it is given, when they arrive near to the skirmishers or the skirmishers near to them.
Do. —— Do.: Relieve No. ——.
The word “relieve” to be repeated in like manner, for the same reason.
With regard to strengthening the extended line by mixing its supports with it, it may be objected that, in such cases, when there are no reserves at hand, the great rule of never fighting without them is rejected. It is true, the rule is violated; the party if actually engaged is fighting at a desperate risk, but there are cases in which desperate risks are wise and lawful ventures. These are in the not uncommon events with skirmishers of desperate extremities; at such moments methodical prudence is ill-masked imbecility.
On the 10th of December, 1813, some of the piquets of the light division, in thick weather and a close country, were suddenly assailed by the heads of heavy columns. The division in the rear was scattered in straggling houses. One of the companies on piquet was forced back upon another in support, near the point of junction of two important roads leading directly into the cantonments. Both companies were instantly extended, without any support, into a thick skirmishing line; nothing less would have been effectual. The ground was held with little variation for at least two hours—two heavy attacks were repulsed, every round of ammunition was expended, the brigade immediately in the rear allowed to pack and send off its baggage, and steadily to take up its fighting position, and the piquets to fall back upon it without further molestation. Similar circumstances have no doubt occurred, and may often occur again. The great maxim alluded to therefore has its exceptions, and these, if carefully marked as exceptions, may sometimes with propriety be admitted into instruction skirmishing.
To attack or defend, with concentrated supports, a bridge, the street of a village, or other peculiarly important point, the word is simply passed, “Supports, close on No. ——,” the support in front of, or on, that point. Near this division of formation the officer in command places himself; and as each severally arrives gives his direction—“line,” “double column,” “open,” “close,” “quarter distance,” “half distance column,” or otherwise, as may be thought necessary. The support of formation in all cases standing fast as the basis.
To break up the formation, “Supports to your proper places, threes right and left shoulders forward, quick march,” will speedily restore all to common skirmishing order.
No duties of supports are more important than those in retrograde movements, of leading their skirmishers in proper lines of retreat; and of opening those lines sufficiently, but not more than sufficiently, for their passage. Circumstances have actually occurred, and, in intricate countries, are likely often to be repeated, of fine fellows, slowly retiring before an overwhelming enemy, their whole attention absorbed upon their front, suddenly finding further retreat intercepted by impassable obstacles, with no alternative remaining but to surrender, or fight their way right and left at the risk of almost utter destruction.
The principles advanced in the foregoing remarks, are not, in the main, of a character to be limited to the details of particular movements; but are rather to be kept continually on the mind, for the purpose of being thrown into effect as circumstances may require. Practical differs from formal skirmishing, even more by the style than by the method of its execution.
Not one sentence, it is believed, will be found to stand in opposition to the British established system. The few points in which they may at first sight appear to differ from it, consist simply in an application of principles already established to a practical extent somewhat beyond that usually adopted. If an officer who did not act upon this extent of application, were to succeed in the command of a corps to one who had adopted it, neither he nor those under him would experience any difficulty from the previous practice.
It should not be forgotten, that the thorough spirit of practical skirmishing is not to be communicated or maintained, with only one or two companies at a time, on the level, restricted, drill field. Soldiers, after having been thoroughly grounded in elementary details and permanent principles, should be often taken out in large bodies to skirmish, with strict, universal and incessant attention to the duty, across extensive and intricate tracts of country.
Such tracts are often to be found without restrictions in foreign stations; and at proper seasons of the year, a little management and promises of repairing damages will generally procure access to admirable skirmishing ground from British farmers and landed proprietors.
The writer is conscious that he can have advanced little, if anything, that must not have occurred to officers who have had experience in this branch of warfare, or that may not have been brought into instruction practice by them. He has not, however, seen the foregoing practical application of essential principles thrown broadly into print; and it appears to him important that it should be so exhibited, in order that the spirit of actual skirmishing may not be confined to the regimental locality, or cease with the regimental employment of those who witnessed it.