The Works of Mr. George Gillespie (Vol. 1 of 2)

by George Gillespie

PREFACE TO THE READER.

As I did not begin this present controversy, so I do not desire to hold up the ball of contention, yet having appeared in it (neither alone, nor without a calling and opportunity offered), I hold it my duty to vindicate the truth of Christ, the solemn league and covenant, the ordinances of Parliament, the church of Scotland, and myself. For this end was I born, and for this end came I into the world, that I might bear witness to the truth, whereunto I am so much the more encouraged, because it appeareth already in this debate, that magna est vis veritatis,—great is the force of truth, and so great, that my antagonists, though men of parts, and such as could do much for the truth, yet, while they have gone about to do somewhat against the truth, they have mired themselves in foul errors; yea, so far is in them lieth, have most dangerously shaken and endangered the authority of magistrates, who are God's vicegerents, and particularly the authority of Parliament, and of parliamentary ordinances. They have stumbled and fallen, and shall not be able to rise but by the acknowledgment of the truth.

In this following reply, I have not touched much of the argumentative part in Mr Hussey's Plea for Christian Magistracy, reserving most of it to another work, unto which this is a prodromus (howbeit much of what he saith is the same with what I did confute in my Nihil Respondes, and his book, coming forth a month after, takes no notice of that second piece of mine, but speaketh only to the first). Meanwhile, let him not believe that his big looking title can, like Gorgon's head, blockify or stonify rational men, so as they shall not perceive the want or weakness of argument. It hath ever been a trick of adversaries to calumniate the way of God and his servants, as being against authority, but I will, by God's assistance, make it appear to any intelligent man, that the reverend brother hath pleaded very much against magistracy, and so hath fallen himself into the ditch which he hath digged for others, whilst I withal escape.[1345]

But, now, what may be the meaning of Mr Coleman's cabalistical title, Male Dicis Maledicis? Great philologists will tell him that maledico is taken in a good sense as well as in a bad, according to the difference of matter and circumstances. If any kind of malediction be justifiable, it is male dicere maledicis,—to speak evil to evil speakers, for “as he loved cursing, so let it come unto him as he delighted not in blessing, so let it be far from him.” But he doth worse, and his title, with a transposition of letters, will more fitly reflect upon himself male dicis de amicus. You, Sir, speak evil of your friends, and of those that never wronged [pg 4-iii] you. For my part, I have not shared with him in evil speaking, nor rendered revilings for revilings. I am sorry that he is so extremely ill of hearing, as to take reason to be railing, and good sayings to be evil sayings. He applieth to himself the Apostle's words, “Being reviled, we bless.” But where to find these blessings of his, those unwritten verities, I know not. I am sure he had spoken more truly if he had said, “Being not reviled, we do revile.”

For the matter and substance of his reply, there are divers particulars in it which serve rather to be matter of mirth than of argument, as that a Parliament parasite cannot be called an abuser of the Parliament, and that passage, “How can a clause delivered in a postscript, concerning my opinion of my way, be abusive to the Parliament?” A great privilege either of postscripts or of his opinions, that they cannot be abusive to the Parliament. Many passages are full of acrimony, many extravagant, and not to the point in hand, many void of matter. Concerning such Lactantius[1346] gives me a good rule, Otiosum est persequi singula,—it is an idle and unprofitable thing to persecute every particular. And much more I have in my eye the Apostle's rule, “Let all things be done to edifying.” 1 Cor. xiv. 26. I have accordingly endeavoured to avoid such jangling, and such debates as are unprofitable and unedifying, making choice of such purposes as may edify, and not abuse the reader.

Peradventure some will think I might have wholly saved myself this labour. I confess I do not look upon that which I make reply unto, as if it were like to weigh much with knowing men, yet the Apostle tells me that some men's mouths must be stopped, and Jerome tells me[1347] there is nothing written without skill, which will not find a reader with as little skill to judge, and some men grow too wise in their own eyes when they pass unanswered. Besides all this, a vindication and clearing of such things as I mentioned in the beginning, may, by God's blessing, anticipate future and further mistakes. Read therefore and consider, and when thou hast done, I trust thou shalt not think that I have lost my labour. I pray the Lord that all our controversies may end in a more cordial union for prosecuting the ends expressed in the covenant and especially the reformation of religion, according to the word of God and the example of the best reformed churches, and more particularly the practical part of reformation, that the ordinances of Jesus Christ may be kept from pollution, profaneness and scandals shamed away, and piety commended and magnified.

CHAPTER I.

THAT MR COLEMAN DOTH STILL CONTRADICT HIMSELF IN THE STATING OF THIS PRESENT CONTROVERSY ABOUT CHURCH GOVERNMENT.

It was before both denied and yielded by Mr Coleman, that there is a church government which is distinct from the civil, and yet not merely doctrinal. He did profess to subscribe heartily to the votes of Parliament, and yet advised the Parliament to do contrary to their votes, as I proved in Nihil Respondes, p. 3. He answereth now, in his Male Dicis, p. 4, “I deny an institution; I assent to prudence; Where is the self-contradiction now?” and, p. 5, “The advice looks to jus divinum; the Parliament votes to prudence.” Sir, you have spoken evil for yourself; you have made the self-contradiction worse. Will you acknowledge your own words, in your sermon, p. 25, “Lay no more burden of government upon the shoulders of ministers than Christ hath plainly laid upon them; have no more hand therein than the Holy Ghost clearly gives them. The ministers have other work to do, and such as will take up the whole man,” &c.; “I fear an ambitious ensnarement,” &c.; and, in your Re-examination, p. 14, “He should have said, I advised the Parliament to lay no burden of government upon them whom he (this Commissioner) thinks church officers, then had he spoken true.” Now let the reverend brother take heed to checkmate, and that three several ways (but let him not grow angry, as bad players use to do). For, 1. Eo ipso that he denies the institution, [pg 4-002] by his principles he denies the prudence; for he that denieth the institution, and adviseth the Parliament to lay no more burden of government upon ministers than Christ hath plainly laid upon them, is against the settling of the thing in a prudential way, because it is not instituted. But Mr Coleman denies the institution, and adviseth the Parliament to lay no more burden of government upon ministers than Christ hath plainly laid upon them; therefore Mr Coleman is against the settling of the thing in a prudential way, because it is not instituted. And how to reconcile this with his denying of the institution and yielding of the prudence, will require a more reconciling head than Manasseh Ben Israel Conciliator himself. 2. He that adviseth the Parliament to lay no burden of government upon ministers, because they have other work to do which will take up the whole man, and because of the fear of an ambitious ensnarement, is against the laying of any burden of corrective government upon ministers, so much as in a prudential way. But Mr Coleman adviseth the Parliament, &c.; therefore the consequence in the proposition is necessary, unless he will say that it is agreeable to the rules of prudence to lay upon them more work besides that which will take up the whole man, or to commit that power unto them which is like to prove an ambitious ensnarement. 3. He that adviseth the Parliament to lay no burden at all of corrective government upon ministers and other officers joined with them in elderships, but to keep that power wholly in their own hands, is against the prudence of the thing, as well as against the institution of it. But [pg 4-003] Mr Coleman adviseth the Parliament to lay no burden at all of corrective government upon these, but to keep that power wholly in their own hands; therefore the proposition is proved by that which himself saith, The Parliament votes look to prudence. So that the Parliament, having voted a power of suspension from the sacrament unto elderships, for so many scandals as are enumerate in the ordinance (which power is a part of that which he calls corrective), he that is against this power in elderships is both against the prudence and against the ordinance of Parliament. The assumption I prove from his Re-examination, p. 14, where, after his denial of the power to those whom we think church officers, being charged with advising the Parliament to take church government wholly into their own hands, his answer was, “If you mean the corrective power, I do so.”

And now, after all this, I must tell the reverend brother that he might have saved himself much labour had he, in his sermon to the Parliament, declared himself (as now he doth) that he was only against the jus divinum, but not against their settling of the thing in a parliamentary and prudential way. Did I not, in my very first examination of his sermon, p. 32, remove this stumbling block?

And, withal, seeing he professeth to deny the jus divinum of a church government differing from magistracy, why doth he hold, p. 19, that the Independents are not so much interested against his principles as the Presbyterians? Did he imagine that the Independents are not so much for the jus divinum of a church government and church censures as the Presbyterians? But, saith he, “The Independents' church power seems to me to be but doctrinal.” But is their excommunication doctrinal? and do they not hold excommunication to be jure divino? Either he had little skill in being persuaded, or some others had great skill in persuading him that the Independents' church power is but doctrinal, and that they are not so much interested against the Erastian principles as the Presbyterians are; as if, forsooth, the ordinance of excommunication (the thing which the Erastian way mainly opposeth) and a church government distinct from magistracy, were not common to them both.

Lastly, If the reverend brother deny the institution of church censures, but assent to [pg 4-004] the prudence, why doth he allege the Zurich divines to be so much for him? Male Dicis, p. 23; for it was upon prudential grounds, and because of the difficulty and (as they conceived) impossibility of the thing, that they were against it, still acknowledging the scriptural warrants for excommunication, as I shall show, yea, have showed already; so that, if Mr Coleman will follow them, he must rather say, “I assent to an institution; I deny a prudence.”

CHAPTER II.

A CONFUTATION OF THAT WHICH MR COLEMAN HATH SAID AGAINST CHURCH GOVERNMENT; SHOWING ALSO THAT HIS LAST REPLY IS NOT MORE, BUT LESS SATISFACTORY THAN THE FORMER, AND FOR THE MOST PART IS BUT A TERGIVERSATION AND FLEEING FROM ARGUMENTS BROUGHT AGAINST HIM, AND FROM MAKING GOOD HIS OWN ASSERTIONS AND ARGUMENTS CONCERNING THE DISTINCTION OF CIVIL AND CHURCH GOVERNMENT.

The reverend brother said in his sermon, “I could never yet see how two coordinate governments, exempt from superiority and inferiority, can be in one state.” To overthrow this general thesis, I brought some instances to the contrary; such as the governments of a general and an admiral, of a master and a father, of a captain and a master in a ship. He being thus put to his vindication, replieth, “The Commissioner acknowledgeth he did not apply them to the Assembly (I said the General Assembly) and Parliament; yet that was the controversy in hand,” Male Dicis, p. 5. But, by his favour, that was not the controversy; for he was not speaking particularly against the distinction of the government of the General Assembly and of the government of the Parliament (neither had he one syllable to that purpose), but generally against the distinction of church government and civil government, and particularly against excommunication; in all which he excluded presbyteries as well as General Assemblies. Wherefore he doth now recede not only from defending his thesis, but from applying it against the [pg 4-005] power of presbyteries. And so far we are agreed.

2. I having confuted his argument grounded on Psal. xxxiii. 15; Prov. xxvii. 19, he shifteth the vindication of it, and still tells me he grounded no argument on those places, but spake “by way of allusion,” Male Dicis, p. 6. Now let the reader judge. His words to the Parliament were these: “Might I measure others by myself, and I know not why I may not (God fashions men's hearts alike; and as in water face answers face, so the heart of man to man), I ingenuously profess I have a heart that knows better how to be governed than govern; I fear an ambitious ensnarement,” &c. This argument, there largely prosecuted, hath no other ground but the parenthesis using the words (though not quoting the places) of Scripture. And now, forsooth, he hath served the Parliament well, when, being put to make good the sole confirmation of his argument, he tells it was but an allusion. But this is not all. I confuted the whole argument drawn from his own heart to the hearts of others, and gave several answers: but neither before, nor now, hath he offered to make good his argument.

3. The reverend brother cited 1 Cor. x. 33, to prove that all government is either a heathenish government, or a Jewish government, or a church government. This I denied: “Because the government of generals, admirals, mayors, sheriffs, is neither a Jewish government, nor a church government, nor a heathenish government.” What saith he to this? “I deny it; a Jewish general is a Jewish government,” &c., Male Dicis, p. 6. Deny it? No, Sir, you must prove (because you are the affirmer) that a Christian general, a Christian admiral, are church governments. For I deny it. You tell us, p. 7, you are persuaded it will trouble the whole world to bound civil and ecclesiastical jurisdiction, the one from the other. You shall have them bounded and distinguished ere long, and the world not troubled neither. Meanwhile you have not made out your assertion from 1 Cor. x. 33.

4. The reverend brother had cited Rom. xiii. 4, to prove that the corrective part of church government belongs to the Christian magistrate. And now he brings in my reply thus: that I said he abuseth the place, “Because spiritual censures belong not to the civil magistrate;” which, saith [pg 4-006] he, begs the question, Male Dicis, p. 7. I replied no such thing upon this argument. Look at my words again. How can the brother answer it,—to shape answers of his own devising as if they were mine? My answer was, That the punitive part, Rom. xiii. 4, belongs to all magistrates, whether Christian or infidel; which he takes notice of in the second place, and bids me prove “that Scripture-commands belong to infidels;” not observing that the question is not of Scripture-commands, but whether a duty mentioned in this or that scripture may not belong to infidels. There are two sorts of duties in Scripture; some which are duties by the law of God, written in man's heart at his creation, some principles and notions whereof remain in the hearts of all nations, even infidels by nature; other duties are such, by virtue of special commands given to the church, which are not contained in the law of nature. The first sort (of which the punishing of evil doers, mentioned Rom. xiii. 4, is one) belongs to those that are without the church as well as those within. The other only to those that are within.

5. The reverend brother had said in his sermon, “Of other governments besides magistracy I find no institution.” I cited 1 Thess. v. 12; 1 Tim. v. 17; Heb. xiii. 7, 17, to prove another government (yea, the institution of another government) besides magistracy. And, in my Nihil Respondes, I told he had laughed, but had not yet loosed the knot. Now hear his two answers: Male Dicis, p. 8, “First, for the institution; for the Commissioner affirms so much. Had he said that these texts hold out an office or officer already instituted, the words would have borne him out,” &c. “But the institution in this place I cannot see.” See the like in Mr Hussey, p. 19, 22. I thank them both. That Scripture which supposeth an institution, and holds out an office already instituted, shall to me (and, I am confident, to others also) prove an institution; for no text of Scripture can suppose or hold out that which is not true. Nay, hath Mr Coleman forgotten that himself proved an institution of magistracy from Rom. xiii. 1, 2? Yet that text doth but hold out the office of magistracy already instituted: but the institution itself is not in that place.

Secondly, Mr Coleman answereth to all these three texts. To that, 1 Thess. v. 12, [pg 4-007] “Them which are over you in the Lord,” he saith that these words prove not that it is not meant of magistracy. But he takes not the strength of the argument. My words were, “Here are some who are no civil magistrates set over the Thessalonians in the Lord.” This the reverend brother must admit to be a good proof, or otherwise say that the civil magistrates set over the Thessalonians, though they were heathens, yet were set over them in the Lord.

For that of 1 Tim. v. 17, he saith it doth not hold out ruling elders. Whether it doth hold ruling elders or not, doth not at all belong to the present question. It is easy to answer something, so that a man will not tie himself to the point. The place was brought by me to prove “another government beside magistracy,” which he denied. Now suppose the place to be meant only of preaching elders, yet here is a rule or government: “Elders that rule well;” and these are no civil magistrates, but such as “labour in the word and doctrine.” Come on now. “But I will deal clearly (saith the brother): These officers are ministers which are instituted not here, but elsewhere,—and these are the rulers here mentioned. And so have I loosed the knot.” Now, Sir, you shall see I will not male dicere, but bene dicere. My blessing on you for it. You have at last loosed the knot so perfectly, that you are come to an agreement with me in this great point, which I thus demonstrate: He that acknowledgeth ministers to be instituted rulers, acknowledgeth another instituted government beside magistracy. But Mr Coleman acknowledgeth ministers to be instituted rulers, therefore Mr Coleman acknowledgeth another instituted government beside magistracy.

To the other texts, Heb. xiii. 7, 17, he saith nothing against my argument, only expounds the rulers to be guides, as Mr Hussey also doth, of which more elsewhere; meanwhile it is certain that ὁ ἡγουμένοις is usually taken for a name of highest authority, yea, given to emperors; for which see learned Salmasius in his Walo Messalinus, p. 219, 220. It is Joseph's highest title to express his government of Egypt, Acts vii. 10. It must the rather be a name of government and authority in this place, Heb. xiii. 17, because subjection and obedience is required: “Obey them that have the rule over you, and submit yourselves.” [pg 4-008] When the word signifieth ὀδηγὸν, seu viæ ducem (and it is very rarely so used by the Septuagints, but frequently, and almost in innumerable places, they use it for a name of rule and authority), obedience and subjection is not due to such an one qua talis; for obedience and subjection cannot be correlata to the leading of the way, when it is without authority and government.

6. I having charged Mr Coleman's doctrine with this consequence, “That there ought to be neither suspension from the sacrament, nor excommunication, nor ordination, nor deposition of ministers, nor receiving of appeals, except all these things be done by the civil magistrate,” which things, I said, “are most of them corrective, and all of them more than doctrinal,”—instead of making answer, the reverend brother expresseth the error, which I objected to him, thus: “That here are no church censures,” which is the quæsitum, saith he, Male Dicis, p. 10. Here, again, he brings an imagination of his own, both for matter and words, instead of that which I said, and doth not take the argument right. If the minister's power be merely doctrinal, and government wholly in the magistrate's hands, then all the particulars enumerated; for instance, suspension from the sacrament, and the receiving of appeals (which he must not bring under the quæsitum, except he bring the ordinance of Parliament under the quæsitum), shall be wholly in the magistrate's hand; and elderships may not suspend from the sacrament; classes and synods may not receive appeals, which yet, by the ordinance, they have power to do. One of the particulars, and but one, the reverend brother hath here touched, and it is this: “For ordination of ministers, I say, it is within the commission of teaching, and so appertains to the doctrinal part.” This is the effect of his zeal to maintain that all ecclesiastical ministerial power is merely doctrinal. But mark the consequence of it: He that holds ordination of ministers to be within the commission of teaching, and to appertain to the doctrinal part, must hold, by consequence, that the power of ordination is given uni as well as unitati; that is, that every single minister hath power to ordain, as well as the classes. But Mr Coleman holds ordination of ministers to be within the commission of teaching, &c. The reason of the proposition is clear, because the commission of teaching belongs to every [pg 4-009] single minister, so that if the power of ordination be within that commission, it must needs belong to every single minister. Quid respondes?

7. The reverend brother having brought an odious argument against me, which did conclude the magistrate to manage his office for and under the devil, if not for and under Christ, I show his syllogism to have four terms, and therefore worthy to be exploded. I get now two replies:

First, “This is an error (if one) in logic, not divinity. Is it an error in divinity to make a syllogism with four terms?” Male Dicis, p. 15. See now if he be a fit man to call others to school, who puts an if in this business—if one. Who did ever doubt of it? And if it be an error in divinity to be fallacious, and to deceive, then it is an error in divinity to make a syllogism with four terms, yea, as foul an error as can be.

Secondly, He admitteth not my distinction of those words, “Under Christ, and for Christ.” I said the Christian magistrate is under Christ, and for Christ, that is, he is serviceable to Christ, but he is not under Christ nor for Christ as Christ's vicegerent, vice Christi, in Christ's stead, as Christ is Mediator. The reverend brother saith, He foresaw that this would be said (the greater fault it was to make his argument so unclear and undistinct), but he rejecteth the distinction as being distinctio sine differentia. “If a magistrate (saith he) be thus far a servant of Christ, as Mediator, that he is to do his work, to take part with him, to be for his glory, then he doth it vice Christi.” He adds the simile of a servant. Hence it follows, by the reverend brother's principles, that the king's cook, because he doth work and service for the king, therefore he doth it vice regis, and as the king's vicegerent. Likewise, that a servant who obeyeth his master's wife, and executeth her commands, because it is his master's will, and for his master's honour, doth therefore obey his master's wife vice domini, as his master's vicegerent; and, by consequence, that the duty of obedience to the wife doth originally belong to the husband; for the capacity of a vicegerent, which he hath by his vicegerentship, is primarily the capacity of him whose vicegerent he is. These, and the like absurd consequences, will unavoidably follow upon the reverend brother's argumentation, that he who doth Christ service doth [pg 4-010] it vice Christi, as Christ's vicegerent; and that to be a man's vicegerent, and to do a man's work or service, which I made two different things, are all one. But, further, observe his tergiversation. I had, p. 13, proved my distinction out of these words of his own: “The Commissioner saith, Magistracy is not derived from Christ. I say, magistracy is given to Christ to be serviceable in his kingdom; so that, though the Commissioner's assertion be sound (which in due place will be discussed), yet it infringeth nothing that I said.” I asked, therefore, qua fide he could confound in his argument brought against me those two things which himself had so carefully distinguished. There is no reply to this in Male Dicis. When the brother thought it for his advantage, he denied that the magistrate's being serviceable to Christ doth enter the derivation of his power by a commission of vicegerentship from Christ (for that was the derivation spoken of), and yielded that the magistrate may be said to be serviceable to Christ, though his power be not derived from Christ. Now he denieth the very same distinction for substance.

8. Whereas the reverend brother had told the Parliament that he seeth not, in the whole Bible, any one act of that church government which is now in controversy, I brought some scriptural instances against his opinion, not losing either the argument from Matt. xviii. (concerning which he asketh what is become of it), or other scriptural arguments, which I intend, by God's assistance, to prosecute elsewhere. Now hear what is replied to the instances which were given. First, To that, 1 Cor. v. 13, “Put away that wicked person from among you,” his answer is, “I say, and it is sufficient against the Commissioner, If this be a church censure, then the whole church jointly, and every particular person, hath power of church censure.” Male Dicis, p. 10. I hope, Sir, it is not sufficient against me that you say it, so long as you say nothing to prove it. I told you that Mr Prynne himself (who holds not that every particular person hath power of church censure) acknowledged that text to be a warrant for excommunication, and when you say “every particular person,” you say more than the Independents say, and I am sure more than the text will admit, for the text saith, “Put away from among you,” therefore this power was given not uni, but [pg 4-011] unitati, and this unitas was the presbytery of Corinth. The sentence was inflicted ὑπὸ τῶν πλείονων,—by many, 2 Cor. ii. 6, it is not said by all. I might say much for this, but I will not now leave the argument in hand; for it is enough against Mr Coleman that the place prove an act of church government, flowing from a power not civil but ecclesiastical. To whom the power belonged is another question.

To the next instance, from 2 Cor. ii. 6, which is coincident with the former, a punishment or censure inflicted by many. “It is only a reprehension (saith he),—ἐπιτιμία,—which, by all the places in the New Testament, can amount no higher than to an objurgation, and so is doctrinal.” Ans. 1. He made it even now an act of the whole church jointly, and of every particular person. Why did he not clear himself in this,—how the whole church, men, women, children and all, did doctrinally reprehend him? 2. If the objurgation must be restricted, To whom? Not to a single minister (yet every single minister hath power of doctrinal objurgation), but to the presbytery. It was an act of those πλειόνες I spake of; and this is a ground for that distinction between ministerial and presbyterial admonition, which Mr Coleman, p. 22, doth not admit. 3. If it were granted that ἐπιτιμία in this text amounteth to no more but an objurgation, yet our argument stands good; for the Apostle having, in his first epistle, required the Corinthians to put away from among them that wicked person, which they did accordingly resolve to do (which makes the Apostle commend their obedience, 2 Cor. ii. 9), no doubt either the offender was at this time actually excommunicated and cast out of the church, or (as others think) they were about to excommunicate him, if the Apostle had not, by his second epistle, prevented them, and taken them off with this sufficit: Such a degree of censure is enough, the party is penitent, go no higher. 4. When the reverend brother appealeth to all the places in the New Testament, he may take notice that the word ἐπιτιμία is nowhere found in the New Testament, except in this very text. And if his meaning be concerning the verb ἐπιτιράω he may find it used to express a coercive power, as in Christ's rebuking of the winds and waves, Matt. viii. 26; Mark iv. 39; his rebuking of the fever, Luke iv. 39; his rebuking of the devil (which was not a doctrinal, but a [pg 4-012] coercive rebuke), Mark i. 25; ix. 25; Luke iv. 35; ix. 42. Sometimes it is put for an authoritative charge, laying a restraint upon a man, and binding him from liberty in this or that particular, as Matt. xii. 16; Mark iii. 12; viii. 30; Luke ix. 21. The word ἐπιτιμία I find in the apocryphal book of Wisdom, chap. iii. 10. It is said of the wicked, ἓξουσιν ἐπιτιμίαν, they shall have correction or punishment. The whole chapter maketh an opposition between the godly and the wicked, in reference to punishments and judgments. The Hebrew געד (which, if the observation hold which is made by Arias Montanus, and divers others, following Kimchi, when it is construed with ב signifieth objurgavit, duriter reprehendit; when without ב, it signifieth corrupit, perdidit, or maledixit), the Septuagint do most usually turn it ἐπιτιμάω and that in some places where it is without ב, as Psal. cxix. 21, “Thou hast rebuked the proud that are cursed;” ἐπιτίμησας,—Pagnin, disperdidisti,—thou hast destroyed, so the sense is; it is rebuke, with a judgment or a curse upon them. The second part of the verse, in the Greek, is exegetical to the first part, “Thou hast rebuked the proud, ἐπικατάρατοι, cursed are they,” &c.; so Zech. iii. 2, “The Lord rebuke (ἐπιτιμήσαι) thee, O Satan.” The same phrase is used in Jude, ver. 9, which must needs be meant of a coercive, efficacious, divine power, restraining Satan. The same original word they render by ἀφορίζω, which signifieth to separate and to excommunicate, Mal. ii. 3, “Behold I will corrupt your seed,” &c. In the preceding words, God told them that he would curse them. The same word they render by ἀποσκορανίζω, extermino, Isa. xvii. 13, a place which speaks of a judgment to be inflicted, not of a doctrinal reproof. Yet Aquila readeth there ἐπιτιμήσει; likewise the word which the Septuagint render ἀπώλεια, perdition, Prov. xiii. 6, and θυμὸς, wrath, Isa. li. 20, in other places they render it ἐπιτίμησις: Psal. lxxvi. 6, “At thy rebuke, O God of Jacob, both the chariot and horse are cast into a dead sleep;” lxxx. 16, “They perish at the rebuke of thy countenance.” These are real rebukes, that is, judgments and punishments.

4. What saith Mr Coleman to Pasor, who expounds ἐπιτιμία to be the same with ἐπιτίμιον, mulcta, and that, 2 Cor. ii. 6. it is meant of excommunication; which he proves by this reason, Because, in the same [pg 4-013] place, the Apostle exhorteth the Corinthians to forgive him. Add hereunto Erasmus's observation upon the word κυρῶσαι[1348] (ver. 8, to “confirm your love toward him”); that it implies an authoritative ratification of a thing by judicial suffrage and sentence. Which well agreeth to the πλειόνες, ver. 6; that is, that they who had judicially censured him, should also judicially loose him and make him free. Now, therefore, the circumstances and context being observed, and the practice, 2 Cor. ii. 6, compared with the precept, 1 Cor. v. 13, I conclude, that, whether this ἐπιτιμία was excommunication already inflicted, or whether it was a lesser degree of censure, tending to excommunication,—a censure it was, and more than ministerial objurgation. And it is rightly rendered by the English translators punishment or censure; which well agreeth with the signification of the verb ἐπιτιμάω given us by Hesychius,[1349] and by Julius Pollux;[1350] who makes ἐπιτιμᾶν, to punish or chastise, and ἐπιτίμημα, punishment or chastisement. Clemens Alexandrinus[1351] useth ἐπιτιμία as well as ἐπιτιμιον, [pg 4-014] pro poena vel supplicio. So Stephanus, in Thes. Ling. Gr. From all which it may appear that the text in hand holds forth a corrective church government in the hands of church officers; the thing which Mr Coleman denieth.

To the next instance, from 1 Tim. v. 19, “Against an elder receive not an accusation, but before two or three witnesses,” the reverend brother answereth, “It is either in relation to the judgment of charity, or ministerial conviction, as the verses following.” Ans. 1. That of two or three witnesses is taken from the law of Moses, where it is referred only to a forensical proceeding. But in relation either to the judgment of charity, or ministerial conviction, it is not necessary that there be two or three witnesses. If a scandalous sin be certainly known to a minister, though the thing be not certified by two or three witnesses, yet a minister, upon certain knowledge had of the fact, may both believe it and ministerially convince the offender. But there may not be a consistorial proceeding without two or three witnesses. 2. Since he appealeth to the following verses, let ver. 22 decide it: “Lay hands suddenly on no man.” To whom the laying on of hands or ordination did belong, to them also it did belong to receive an accusation against an elder: but to the presbytery did belong the laying on of hands, or ordination, 1 Tim. iv. 14; therefore to the presbytery did belong the receiving of an accusation against an elder. And so it was not the act of a single minister, as ministerial conviction is.

To the last instance, from Rev. ii. 14, 15, 20, the reverend brother answers, That he had striven to find out how church censures might be there grounded, but was constrained to let it alone. But what is it, in his opinion, which is there blamed in the angels of those churches? Doth he imagine that those who are so much commended by Christ himself for their holding fast of his name, and of the true faith, did not so much as doctrinally or ministerially oppose the foul errors of the Balaamites and of Jezebel? No doubt but this was done: but Christ reproves them, because such scandalous persons were yet suffered to be in the church, and were not cast out. “I have a few things against thee, because thou hast there them that hold the doctrine of Balaam;” and, ver. 20, “Thou sufferest [pg 4-015] that woman Jezebel.” And why was the very having or suffering them in the church a fault, if it had not been a duty to cast them out of the church? which casting out could not be by banishment, but by excommunication. It did not belong to the angel to cast out the Balaamites out of Pergamos, but he might, and ought to have cast them out of the church in Pergamos.

9. Mr Coleman hath another passage against the distinction of church censures and civil punishments. “But what are ecclesiastical censures (saith he)? Let us take a taste. Is deposition from the ministry? This kings have done,” &c., Male Dicis, p. 7. Now similia labra lactucis. But for all that, the taste is vitiated, and doth not put a difference between things that are different. Deposition is sometimes taken, improperly, for expulsion; as Balsamon, in Conc. Nicoen., can. 19, doth observe. And so the Christian magistrate may remove or put away ministers when they deserve to be put away, that is, by a coercive power to restrain them, imprison or banish them, and, in case of capital crimes, punish them with capital punishments. King James, having once heard a dispute in St. Andrews about the deposition of ministers, was convinced that it doth not belong to the civil magistrate, “yet (said he) I can depose a minister's head from his shoulders.” Which was better divinity than this of Mr Coleman. If we take deposition properly, as it is more than the expelling, sequestering or removing of a minister from this or that place, and comprehendeth that which the Council of Ancyra, can. 18, calls Ἀφαιρεισθαι την τιμὴι τον πρεσβυτεριον, the honour of presbytership to be taken away, or a privation of that presbyteratus, the order of a presbyter, and that ἐξουσία, the authority and power of dispensing the word, sacraments, and discipline, which was given in ordination, so none have power to depose who have not power to ordain. It belongeth not to the magistrate either to make or unmake ministers. Therefore, in the ancient church, the bishops had power of the deposition as well as of the ordination of presbyters, yet they were bound up that they might not depose either presbyter or deacon without the concurrence of a presbytery or synod in the business.[1352] Mark, [pg 4-016] of the synod, not of the magistrate. As for the testimonies brought by Mr Coleman, he doth, both here and in divers other places, name his authors, without quoting the places. It seems he hath either found the words cited by others, but durst not trust the quotations, or else hath found somewhat in those places which might make against him. However, all that he can cite of that kind concerning deposition of ministers by emperors, is meant of a coercive expulsion, not of that which we call properly deposition. And to this purpose let him take the observation of a great antiquary.[1353]

And, withal, he may take notice that Protestant writers[1354] do disclaim the magistrate's power of deposing ministers, and hold that deposition is a part of ecclesiastical jurisdiction: ministers being always punishable (as other members of the commonwealth), according to the law of the land, for any offence committed against law.

CHAPTER III.

THAT MR COLEMAN'S AND MR HUSSEY'S OPPOSING OF CHURCH GOVERNMENT NEITHER IS NOR CAN BE RECONCILED WITH THE SOLEMN LEAGUE AND COVENANT.

Mr Coleman's doctrine was by me charged to be a violation of the solemn league [pg 4-017] and covenant. This he acknowledged in his Re-examination, p. 13, 17, to be a very grievous charge, and a greater fault in him than in divers others, if made out; and he desired seriously, yea, challenged it by the right of a Christian, and by the right of a minister, that I should prosecute this charge; whereupon I did, in my Nihil Respondes, prosecute it so far, that, by five strong arguments, I did demonstrate the repugnancy of his doctrine to the covenant. About a month afterward comes out Mr Hussey's book, wherein the charge itself (before desired to be prosecuted) is declined expressly by Mr Coleman in the few lines by him prefixed (which are ranked together with the errata), in which he desires that the argumentative part may be so prosecuted as that the charge of covenant-breaking may be laid aside; which, if it be taken up, he lets me know beforehand it shall be esteemed by them a nihil respondes. It is also declined by Mr Hussey, p. 15: “The argument of the covenant is too low to be thought on in the discourse: we are now in an higher region than the words of the covenant,” &c.:—a tenet looked upon by the reformed churches as proper to those that are inspired with the ghost of Arminius;[1355] for the remonstrants, both at and after the Synod of Dort, did cry down the obligation of all national covenants, oaths, &c., in matters of religion, under the colour of taking the Scripture only for a rule. Well, we see the charge declined as nothing. But this is not all. Almost two months after my proof of the charge, Mr Coleman comes out with his Male Dicis, and declines both the charge itself (which he calls an “impertinent charge,” p. 22), and my five arguments too, without so much as taking notice of them, or offering replies to them; yea, all that I said in my Nihil Respondes, p. 27-34, in prosecution of this argument concerning covenant-breaking, the reverend brother hath skipped over sicco pede in the half of one page, p. 23; all that follows is new and other matter, wherein he did not mind his own answer to the learned viewer, p. 33, “I will keep you to the laws of disputation, and will not answer but as it is to the matter in hand.” I leave it to be judged by men of knowledge and [pg 4-018] piety, whether such an one doth not give them some ground to apprehend that he is αυτοκατάκριτος, that is, self-judged, who first calleth so eagerly for making out a charge against him, and then when it is made out, doth decline the charge, and not answer the arguments; and such as esteem the charge of covenant-breaking to be a nihil respondes, and the argument of the covenant too low to be thought on in a controversy about church government, “O my soul, come not thou into their secret; unto their assembly, mine honour, be not thou united.” It is in vain for them to palliate or shelter their covenant-breaking with appealing from the covenant to the Scripture, for subordinata non pugnant. The covenant is norma recta,—a right rule, though the Scripture alone be norma recti,—the rule of right. If they hold the covenant to be unlawful, or to have anything in it contrary to the word of God, let them speak out. But to profess the breach of the covenant to be a grievous and great fault, and worthy of a severe censure, and yet to decline the charge and proofs thereof, is a most horrible scandal; yea, be astonished, O ye heavens, at this, and give ear, O earth! how small regard is had to the oath of God by men professing the name of God.

As for that little which the reverend brother hath replied unto; first, he takes notice of a passage of his sermon at the taking of the covenant, which I had put him in mind of, but he answereth only to one particular, viz., concerning that clause, “Doubtless many materials of Prelacy must of necessity be retained, as absolutely necessary.” I asked what he understood by this clause? Now observe his answer: “I answer ingenuously, as he desires, and fully, as I conceive, These materials of Prelacy are ordination.” Remember you said, “many materials of Prelacy.” I beseech you, Sir, How many is ordination? Ordination, ordination, ordination; tell on till you think you have made many materials; and, withal, tell us (if this be the meaning, that ordination should be retained without any power of ecclesiastical government in the ministry) how was it imaginable that he could hereby satisfy that scruple which then he spoke to, viz., the scruple about the purging away of the exorbitances of Prelacy, and retaining a regulated Prelacy? And after all this, I shall desire him to [pg 4-019] expound that other clause (which I desired before, but he hath not done it), “Taking away (said he) the exorbitancies, the remaining will be a new government, and no Prelacy.” Either he means this of a new church government distinct from the civil, so that the ministry should have new power of government; or he meant it of the way which now he pleads for. If the former, I have what I would. Mr Coleman himself, as well as other men, took the covenant with an intention to have an ecclesiastical government distinct from the civil. If the latter, then let him answer these two things: 1. What good sense there was in applying such an answer to such a scruple, as if the Erastian way, or the appropriating of all ecclesiastical jurisdiction wholly to the civil magistrate, could be the way to satisfy those who scrupled the total abolition of Prelacy. 2. How will he reconcile himself with himself; for here, p. 22, he saith, That his way was in practice before I was born, “and the constant practice of England always.” This, as it is a most notorious untruth (for the constant practice of England hath granted to the clergy, as he calls them, after the popish dialect, a power of deposition and excommunication, whereas his way denies all corrective power or church censures to the ministry), so, if it were a truth, it is utterly inconsistent with that which he said of the remaining part, namely, that it will be a new government. If it be his way, how will he make it the constant practice of England always, and a new government too?

In the next place, the reverend brother makes short work of my five arguments to prove the repugnancy of his doctrine to the solemn league and covenant. They were too hot for him to be much touched upon: “All is but this much (saith he), the covenant mentioneth and supposeth a distinct church government.” It is hard when arguments are neither repeated nor answered. He repeats a point which was proved (and but a part of that), but not the proofs; and so he answereth (rather to the conclusion than to the arguments) these two things: “First (saith he), the expressions in the covenant are according to the general apprehensions of the times, which took such a thing for granted, yet I believe Mr Gillespie cannot make such a supposition obligatory.” Now you yield, Sir, what before [pg 4-020] you eagerly contended against, viz., that the covenant doth suppose a church government. Remember your simile of the jury sworn to inquire into the felony of a prisoner, which oath doth not suppose the prisoner to be guilty of felony, but he is to be tried, guilty or not guilty. We are now so far agreed, that the covenant doth suppose a church government distinct from the civil government, and yet not merely doctrinal, for that was the point which I proved, and which here he yields. As for the obligation of an oath sworn upon such supposition, I answer, 1. It is more than supposed, the words and expressions of the covenant do plainly hold out the thing as I proved, and as the reverend brother here seems to yield. 2. That which an oath doth necessarily suppose, if the oath be lawful, and the thing supposed lawful, is without all controversy obligatory. Now the reverend brother doth acknowledge both the covenant itself to be a lawful oath, and that which the covenant supposeth, namely, a church government distinct from the civil government, and yet not merely doctrinal, to be a lawful thing; for he professeth to yield it (though not jure divino, yet) in prudence, which he cannot do, if he make the thing unlawful. 3. That which an oath doth suppose is sometimes supposed vi materiæ, or consequentiæ, that is, the words of the oath do necessarily imply such a thing, though it be not intended by the swearer; and here I will tell Mr Coleman one story of Alexander for another: When Alexander was coming against a town to destroy it, he met Anaximenes, who, as he understood, came to make intercession and supplication for sparing the town. Alexander prevented him with an oath that he would not do that thing which Anaximenes should make petition for, whereupon Anaximenes made petition that he would destroy the town. Alexander found himself bound by the plain words of his oath not to do what he intended, and so did forbear. And to add a divine story to an human, Joshua and the princes of Israel did swear to the Gibeonites upon a supposition that was not true, yet they found themselves tied by their oath. So he that sweareth to his own hurt must not change, the oath being otherwise lawful, Psal. xv. 4, yet that self-hurt which is wrapped up in the matter of his oath was not intended in swearing. Sometimes, again, that which is supposed and implied in an oath, lieth also in the thoughts and intentions of [pg 4-021] those that swear. Now, where those two are coincident, that is, where the thing supposed in an oath is both implied necessarily in the words of the oath, and is also according to the apprehensions of those that swear (which is the case here in the covenant, and is acknowledged by the reverend brother), I should think it most strange how any divine can have the least doubt concerning the obligation of such a thing, except he conceive the thing itself to be unlawful.

His second answer is this: “In my way (saith he) the governments, civil and ecclesiastical, are in the subject matter clearly distinct. When the Parliament handles matters of war, it is a military court; when business of state, it is a civil court; when matters of religion, it is an ecclesiastical court.” If this hold good, then it will follow, 1. That the Parliament, when they deliberate about matters of war or matters of religion, are not, at least formally and properly, a civil court, else how makes he these so clearly distinct? 2. That ministers may be called civil officers, for consider his words in his Re-examination, p. 11: “I do not exclude ministers, neither from ecclesiastical nor civil government, in a ministerial way, doctrinally and declaratively.” Compare this with his present answer, it will amount to thus much: That different denominations being taken from the different subject matter, ministers, when they handle doctrinally matters of religion, are ecclesiastical ministers; and when they handle doctrinally matters of civil government, which himself alloweth them to do, they are civil ministers. But now to apply his answer to the argument, How doth all this solve the repugnancy of his doctrine to the covenant? If he had examined my arguments, he had found that most of them prove from the covenant a church government distinct from civil government, subjective as well as objective; that is, another government besides magistracy; different agents as well as different acts; different hands as well as handling of different matters. I know the Christian magistrate may and ought to have a great influence in matters of religion; and whatsoever is due to him by the word of God, or by the doctrine either of the ancient or reformed churches, I do not infringe, but do maintain and strengthen it. But the point in hand is, that the covenant doth undeniably suppose, and clearly hold forth a government in the church distinct [pg 4-022] from magistracy, which is proved by these arguments (which, as they are not yet answered, so I will briefly apply them to the proof of that point which now Mr Coleman sticks at): 1. The church covenant mentioned in the covenant is as distinct from the privileges of parliament, as the first article of the covenant is distinct from the third article. 2. The church government in the first article of the covenant, the reformation whereof we are to endeavour, differeth from church government by archbishops, bishops, &c., mentioned in the second article, as much as a thing to be reformed differeth from a thing to be extirpated; so that the church government formerly used in the church of England is looked upon two ways in the covenant, either qua church government, and so we swear to endeavour the reformation of it (which I hope was not meant of reforming that part of the privileges of Parliament whereby they meddle with religion in a parliamentary way), or qua church government, by archbishops, bishops, &c., and so we swear to endeavour the extirpation of it. This difference between the first and second articles, between reformation and extirpation, proveth that the covenant doth suppose that the church government formerly used in the church of England, in so far as it was a church government, is not eatenus to be abolished, but in so far as it was a corrupt church government, that is, prelatical. 3. Church government, in the covenant, is matched with doctrine, worship, and catechising. Now these are subjectively different from civil government, for the civil magistrate doth not act doctrinally nor catechetically, neither can he dispense the word and sacraments, as Mr Coleman acknowledgeth. 4. In the first part of the first article of the covenant, concerning “the preservation of the reformed religion in the church of Scotland, in doctrine, worship, discipline, and government,” it is uncontroverted, that discipline and government are ecclesiastical, and subjectively different from civil government, that is, though divers who have a hand in the civil government are ruling elders, yet it is as true that divers members of Parliament and inferior civil courts are not church officers; and of the ministry none are civil governors which makes the two governments clearly distinct subjectively. Now the second part of that article concerning “the reformation of religion in the kingdoms [pg 4-023] of England and Ireland, in doctrine, worship, discipline, and government,” cannot so far differ from the first part of that article in the sense of the words, “discipline and government,” as that the same words, in the same article of the same covenant, should signify things differing toto genere, which will follow, unless “discipline and government” in the second branch, and “form of church government” in the third branch, be understood of the power of church officers, and not of the magistrate. 6. We did swear to “endeavour the reformation of religion in the kingdoms of England and Ireland, in doctrine, worship, discipline and government, according to the word of God and the example of the best reformed churches.” Now the word of God holds forth another government besides magistracy; for Mr Coleman himself hath acknowledged, that he finds in the New Testament ministers to be rulers, yea, instituted rulers; and the example of the best reformed churches, without all doubt, leadeth us to an ecclesiastical government different from magistracy. Neither hath the reverend brother so much as once adventured to allege the contrary, except of the church of Israel, which, as it is heterogeneous, being none of the reformed churches mentioned in the covenant, so it shall be discussed in due place; from all which reasons I conclude, that the wit of man cannot reconcile Mr Coleman's doctrine with the covenant. 6. I add a confutation of him out of himself, thus: No such church government as Mr Coleman casts upon an uncertainty, whether the word hold out any such thing, can be, by his principles, the power of magistracy in things ecclesiastical, but another government beside magistracy. But the church government, mentioned in the first article of the covenant, is such a church government as Mr Coleman casts upon an uncertainty, whether the word hold out any such thing; therefore the church government mentioned in the first article of the covenant cannot be, by his principles, the power of magistracy, but another government beside magistracy. The proposition he will easily admit, unless he alter his assertions; the assumption is clear from his Re-examination, p. 15.

CHAPTER IV.

MR COLEMAN AND MR HUSSEY'S ERRORS IN DIVINITY.

Mr Hussey all along calls for divinity schools: I confess himself hath much need of them, that he may be better grounded in his divinity; and that if he will plead any more for Christian magistracy, he may not involve himself into such dangerous heterodoxies as have fallen from his pen in this short tractate. I instance in these:—

First, In his epistle to the Parliament he hath divers passages against synodical votes; he will have no putting to the vote: “For votes (saith he, p. 6) are of no other use but to gather parties, and ought nowhere to be used but by those that have the power of the sword.” And, p. 3, he will have the business of assemblies to be only doctrinal, and “by dispute to find out truth. Their disputes ought to end in a brotherly accord, as in Acts xv., much disputing, but all ended in accord, no putting to the vote.” And, p. 5, he will have things carried “with strength of argument and unanimous consent of the whole clergy.” Behold how he joineth issue with the remonstrants against the contra-remonstrants, to introduce not only an academical, but a sceptical and Pyrrhonian dubitation and uncertainty, so that there shall never be an end of controversy, nor any settlement of truth and of the ordinances of Jesus Christ, so long as there shall be but one tenacious disputer to hold up the ball of contention. One egg is not liker another than Mr Hussey's tenet is like that of the Arminians, for which see the Synod of Dort, sess. 25.[1356] It was the ninth condition which the Arminians required in a lawful and well-constituted synod, that there might be no decision of the controverted articles, but only such an accommodation as both sides might agree to. And, generally, they hold that synods ought not to meet for decision, or determination, but for examining, disputing, discussing; so their Examen Censurae, cap. 25; and their Vindiciae, lib. 2, cap. 6, p. 131, 133.

Secondly, In that same epistle to the [pg 4-025] Parliament, p. 4, he hath this passage: “Will-worship is unlawful, I mean in matters that are essential to God's worship, which are matters of duty; as for circumstantials of time and place, except the Sabbath, which are matters of liberty, in these the commonwealth may vote, &c.; and this is your Christian liberty, that in matters of liberty ye make rules and laws to yourselves, not crossing the ends that you are tied to in duty.” And is the Sabbath only a circumstantial of time contradistinct from matters of duty? It seems he will cry down not only the jus divinum of church censures with the Erastians, but the jus divinum of the Sabbath with the Canterburians. And if will-worship be unlawful only in the essentials of God's worship, why was the argument of will-worship so much tossed, not only between Prelates and Nonconformists, but between Papists and Protestants, even in reference to ceremonies? And whether hath not Mr Hussey here engaged himself to hold it free and lawful to the Christian magistrate, yea, to private Christians (for he calls it Christian liberty, not parliamentary liberty—now Christian liberty belongs to all sorts of Christians), to make laws to themselves for taking the sacrament anniversarily on Christmas, Good-Friday, and Easter, or to appoint a perpetual monthly fast or thanksgiving; yea, another Parliament may, if so it should seem good to them, impose again the surplice and cross in baptism, fonts, railing of communion tables, the reading of divert passages of Apocrypha to the congregations, doxologies, anthems, responsories, &c., as heretofore they were used; or they may appoint all and every one to sit in the church with their faces towards the east, to stand up at the epistles and gospels, &c.; yea, what ceremonies, Jewish, popish, heathenish, may they not impose, provided they only hold the foundation, and keep to those essentials which he calls matters of duty? By restraining the unlawfulness of will-worship to the essentials, he leaves men free to do anything in religion, præter verbum, so that it appear not to them to be contra verbum; anything they may add to the word, or do beside the word, so that the thing cannot be proved contrary to the word.

Thirdly, Mr Hussey, ibid., p. 4, 5, saith, That the Parliament may require such as they receive for preachers of truth, “to send out able men to supply the places, and that [pg 4-026] without any regard to the allowance or disallowance of the people,” where, in the first part of that which he saith, there is either a heterodoxy or a contradiction. A heterodoxy, if he mean that ministers are to be sent out without ordination: a contradiction, if he mean that they must be ordained; for then he gives classes a work which is not merely doctrinal. But most strange it is, that he so far departeth from Protestant divines in point of the church's liberty in choosing ministers. He tells us, p. 14, that Mr Herle, “for want of skill and theological disputations,” hath granted to people a right to choose their minister. Mr Herle's skill, both logical and theological, is greater than it seems he can well judge of; neither can this bold arrogant censure of his derogate from Mr Herle's, but from his own reputation. For the matter itself, it is one, and not the least, of the controversies between the Papists and Protestants, what right the church hath in the vocation of ministers: read Bellarmine, de Cleric., and those that write against him, and see whether it be not so. The Helvetic Confession tells us that the right choosing of ministers is by the consent of the church, and the Belgic Confession saith, “We believe that the ministers, seniors and deacons, ought to be called to those their functions, and by the lawful elections of the church to be advanced into those rooms.” See both these in the Harmony of Confessions, sect. 11. I might here, if it were requisite, bring a heap of testimonies from Protestant writers; the least thing which they can admit of is, that a minister be not obtruded renitente ecclesia. Factum valet, fieri non debet. It may be helped after it is done, without making null or void the ministry; but in a well-constituted church there ought to be no intrusion into the ministry, the church's consent is requisite; for which also I might bring both scripture and antiquity, but that is not my present business. One thing I must needs put Mr Hussey in mind of, that when the prelates did intrude ministers, without any regard to the disallowance of the people, it was cried out against as an oppression and usurpation, and we are often warned by Mr Prynne, by Mr Coleman, and by myself, to cast away the prelates' usurpation with themselves. But who lords it now over the Lord's inheritance, the Presbyterians or the Erastians? Nay, he who will have ministers put in churches [pg 4-027] “without any regard to the allowance or disallowance of people,” falls far short of divers prelatical men, who did much commend the ancient primitive form of calling ministers, not without the church's consent. See Dr Field, Of the Church, lib. 5, cap. 54; Bilson, de Gubern. Eccl., cap. 15, p. 417; the author of The History of Episcopacy, part 2, p. 360.

Fourthly, Mr Hussey, Epist., p. 7, saith, That upon further consideration he found “the minister charged only with preaching and baptising.” The like he hath afterwards, p. 39, “Let any man prove that a minister hath any more to do from Christ than to teach and baptise.” And again, p. 44, he propounds this query, “Whether Christ gave any more government (he should have said any more to do, for preaching and baptising are not acts of government) than is contained in preaching and baptising,” and he holds the negative. If only preaching and baptising, then not praying and reading in the congregation, ministering the Lord's supper, visiting the sick and particular families.

Fifthly, He holdeth, p. 20, That a heathen magistrate is unlawful, “and for his government, if sin be lawful, it is lawful.” A gross heterodoxy. The Apostle exhorteth to be subject even to heathen magistrates, Rom. xiii., for there were no other at that time, and to pray for them, 1 Tim. ii.; so that by Mr Hussey's divinity, the Apostle would have men to be subject unto, and to pray for an unlawful government. It is an anabaptistical tenet, that an heathen magistrate is not from God, which Gerhard, de Magistrate Politico, p. 498, 499, fully confutes.

Sixthly, He saith of Christ, p. 40, “He doth nothing as Mediator which he doth not as God or as man.” It is a dangerous mistake, for take the work of mediation itself, he neither doth it as God, nor as man, but as God-man.

Seventhly, He saith, p. 35, “Nothing can be said of Christ as second person in Trinity, in opposition to Mediator, but in opposition to man there may.” So that he will not admit of this opposition. Christ, as the Second Person in the Trinity, is equal and consubstantial to the Father, but, as Mediator, he is not equal to his Father, but less than his Father, and subject and subordinate to his Father—a distinction used by our divines against the Anti-Trinitarians and [pg 4-028] Socinians. Now by his not admitting of this distinction, he doth by consequence mire himself in Socinianism; for Christ, as Mediator, is the Father's servant, Isa. xlii. 1; and the Father is greater than he, John xiv. 28; and as the head of the man is Christ, so the head of Christ is God, 1 Cor. xi. 3. If, therefore, it cannot be said of Christ, as he is the Second Person in the Trinity, that his Father is not greater than he, and that he is not subordinate to God as his head, then farewell Anti-Socinianism. I dare boldly say, it is impossible to confute the Socinians, or to assert the eternal Godhead of Jesus Christ, except somewhat be affirmed of him as the Second Person of the Trinity, which must be denied of him as he is Mediator, and something be denied of him as he is the Second Person in the Trinity, which must be affirmed of him as he is Mediator.

Eighthly, He saith, p. 36, That Christ, “by his mediation, hath obtained from the Father that he shall not judge any man according to rigour, but as they are in or out of Christ; all deferring of judgment from the wicked is in and for Christ, which otherwise the justice of God would not allow.” Then Christ did thus far make satisfaction to the justice of God in the behalf of the wicked, and die for them, that judgment might be deferred from them, and thus far perform acts of mediation for the savages and Mohammedans, and for them that never heard the gospel, that by such mediation he hath obtained of the Father that they shall be judged not according to rigour, but by the gospel. Which intimateth that Christ hath taken away all their sins against the law, so that all men shall now go upon a new score, and none shall be condemned or judged by the law, but by the gospel only; for if Christ have not taken away their sins against the law, the justice of God will judge them according to the rigour of the law. Must not every jot of the law be fulfilled? And is there not a necessity that every one undergo the curse and rigour of the law, or else that the Mediator hath undergone it for them?

Ninthly, He propounds this query, p. 44: “Whether ministers have any right to those privileges which are given to the church more than another Christian,” and he holds the negative. Now the preaching of the word, the administration of the sacraments, and the power of the keys, are privileges [pg 4-029] given to the church, that is, for the church's good: “For all things are yours (saith the Apostle), whether Paul, or Apollos,” &c., 1 Cor. iii. 21, 22. Therefore, by Mr Hussey's divinity, any other Christian hath as much right to administer word, sacraments, keys, as the minister.

Come on now to Mr Coleman's errors in divinity, not to repeat what was expressed in my Nihil Respondes, but to take off the Male Dicis in the main points.

Tenthly, The tenth heterodoxy shall therefore be this, That whatsoever is given to Christ, he hath it not as the eternal Son of God. Into this ditch did Mr Coleman first fall, and then Mr Hussey, p. 25, after him. I said this tenet leadeth to a blasphemous heresy. For the better understanding whereof let it be remembered what I did promise in my Nihil Respondes, p. 11, in reply to his proposition, “That which is given to Christ he hath it not as God. This (said I) is in opposition to what I said, p. 45, concerning the headship and dignity of Christ, as the natural Son of God, the image of the invisible God, Col. i. 15, and, p. 43, of the dominion of Christ, as he is the eternal Son of God. This being premised,” &c. Mr Coleman, without taking the least notice of that which I did purposely and plainly premise, begins to speak of God essentially; and that if something may be given to Christ as God, then something may be given to God, and then God is not absolutely perfect, &c., Male Dicis, p. 13, 14. Thus he turneth over to the essence and nature of God what I spake of the Second Person in the Trinity, or of Christ as he is the eternal Son of God. Was not the question between him and me, Whether the kingdom and dominion over all things may be said to be given to Christ as he is the eternal Son of God. This is the point which he did argue against, because it takes off his argument first brought to prove that all government, even civil, is given to Christ as he is Mediator. And still from the beginning I spake of Christ as the Second Person in the Trinity, or the eternal Son of God. Thus therefore the case stands: The reverend brother, to prove that an universal sovereignty and government over all things is given to Christ as he is Mediator, and to confute my assertion that it is given to Christ as he is the eternal Son of God, doth frame this [pg 4-030] argument against me, “That which is given to Christ he hath it not as God. But here dignity is given to Christ; therefore not here to be taken as God;” where there is more in the conclusion than in the premises; for the conclusion which naturally follows had been this, Therefore Christ hath not here dignity as God. It seems he was ashamed of the conclusion, yet not of the premises which infer the conclusion. But this by the way. I speak to his proposition, “That which is given to Christ he hath it not as God.” These words “as God,” either he understands οὐσιωδῶς, essentially, or ἐπιστατικῶς, personally; that is, either in regard of the nature and essence of God, which is common to the Son of God with the Father and the Holy Ghost, and in respect whereof they three are one; or in regard of the person of the Word, as Christ is the Second Person in the Trinity, and personally distinct from the Father and the Holy Ghost. If in the former sense, then he must lay aside his whole argument, as utterly impertinent, and making nothing at all against my thesis, which affirmed that an universal dominion and kingdom over all things is given to Christ, not as he is Mediator (in which capacity he is only King of the church), but as he is the eternal Son of God. In opposing of which assertion, as the reverend brother was before nihil respondens, so now he is twice nought. But if in the other sense he understands his proposition (which I must needs suppose he doth, it being in opposition to what I said), then I still aver his proposition will infer a blasphemous heresy, as I proved before by a clear demonstration: That which is given to Christ he hath it not as God. But life, glory, &c., is given to Christ; therefore Christ hath not life, glory, &c., as God. The reverend brother saith, “I acknowledge the conclusion unsound, and I deny not but that the major is mine own, and the minor is the very Scripture.” Yet he denies the conclusion, and clears himself by this simile, “That which was given this poor man he had not before. But a shilling was given this poor man; therefore he had not a shilling before: where both propositions are true, yet the conclusion is false (saith he), contrary to the axiom, Ex veris nil nisi verum.” You are extremely out, Sir: your syllogism of the poor man is fallacia ab amphibolia. [pg 4-031] The major of it is ambiguous, dubious, and fallacious, and cannot be admitted without a distinction. But here you acknowledge the major of my argument to be your own, and so not fallacious in your opinion. You acknowledge the minor to be Scripture. You have not found four terms in my premises, nor charged my major or minor with the least fault in matter or form, and yet, forsooth, you deny the conclusion, and do not admit that incontrovertible maxim in logic, Ex veris nil nisi verum; or, as Kekerman hath it, Ex veris præemissis falsam conclusionem colligi est impossibile,[1357]—It is impossible that a false conclusion should be gathered from true premises. Now let us hear what he would say against my conclusion;—it is concerning the sense of the word hath: “For hath (saith he) by me is used for receiving or having by virtue of the gift, but by him for having fundamentally, originally.” You are still out, Sir. I take it just as you take it. For though the Son of God, as God essentially, or in respect of the nature and essence of God, which is common to all Three Persons in the blessed Trinity, hath originally of himself a kingdom and dominion over all; yet, as he is the Second Person in the Trinity, begotten of, and distinct from the Father, he hath the kingdom and dominion over all not of himself, but by virtue of the gift of his Father. So that the reverend brother is still nihil respondens, and therefore he shall be concluded in this syllogism: He who holds that whatsoever is given to Christ he hath it not by virtue of the gift, as he is the eternal Son of God or Second Person in the Trinity, but only as Mediator,—he holds, by consequence, that Christ hath not glory by virtue of his Father's gift, as he is the eternal Son of God or Second Person in the Trinity. But Mr Coleman holds the former; therefore Mr Coleman holds the latter. The consequence in the proposition is proved from John xvii. 22, “The glory which thou gavest me.” The assumption he will own, or else quit his argument against my distinction of the double kingdom given to Christ, as he is the eternal Son of God, and as Mediator. The conclusion which follows is heretical; for whereas the Nicene Creed said of Christ, in regard of his eternal generation, that he is Deus de Deo, Lumen de lumine,—God [pg 4-032] of God, Light of light, Mr Coleman's argument will infer that he is not only ex seipso Deus, but ex seipso Filius; and so deny the eternal generation of the Son of God, and the communication of the Godhead, and the sovereignty, glory, and attributes thereof, from the Father to the Son. For if Christ, as he is the eternal Son of God, hath not glory by virtue of his Father's gift, then he hath it not by virtue of the eternal generation and communication, but fundamentally and originally of himself.

As for the other branch of Mr Coleman's argument, tending to prove that Christ, as he is the eternal Son of God, cannot be given, which he endeavours to vindicate, p. 14, 15, I answer these two things:

First, Granting all that he saith, he concludes nothing against me; for I did from the beginning expound these words, Eph. i. 22, “And gave him to be the head over all things to the church,” in this sense, That Christ as Mediator is given only to the church, to be her head, but he that is given as Mediator to the church is over all. So that the giving of Christ there spoken of is as Mediator, and he is given to the church only, which I cleared by the Syriac, “And him who is over all he gave to be the head to the church.” But his being over all, there spoken of, if understood of glory, dignity, excellency over all, so Christ is over all as Mediator (yea, in regard of the exaltation of his human nature), and this helpeth not Mr Coleman, who intends to prove from that place that all government, even civil, is given to Christ as Mediator. But if understood of a kingdom and government over all, so he is over all, as he is the eternal Son of God or Second Person of the Trinity, and not as Mediator.

Secondly, The question which the reverend brother falls upon, concerning the personal inhabitation of the Holy Ghost, will never follow from anything which I said, more than God's giving of his Son to us will infer a personal inhabitation of the Son of God in us. That which I said was to this intent, That both the Son of God and the Holy Ghost are given, not as God essentially; that is, in respect of the Godhead itself, or as they are one in nature with the Father (for so the Father that giveth, and the Holy Ghost which is given, could not [pg 4-033] be distinguished), but the Son is given as the Son proceeding from the Father, and the Holy Ghost is given as the Holy Ghost proceeding and sent from the Father and the Son. Whether he be given to dwell personally in us, or by his gracious operations only, is another question, which hath nothing to do with the present argument, and therefore I will not be led out of my way.

Eleventhly, The eleventh heterodoxy is this: “I see no absurdity to hold that every man in authority is either Christ's vicegerent, or the devil's.” Male Dicis, p. 16. Here I make this inference: Heathen and infidel magistrates, either, 1. They are not men in authority; or, 2. They are Christ's vicegerents; or, 3. They are the devil's, Male Dicis. If he say they are not men in authority, he shall contradict the apostle Paul, who calls them higher powers, Rom. xiii. 1, and men in authority, 1 Tim. ii. 2, speaking in reference even to the magistrates of that time, who were infidels. If he say they are Christ's vicegerents, then, 1. He must say, that Christ, as Mediator, reigns without the church, and is a king to those to whom he is neither priest nor prophet. 2. He must find a commission given by Christ to the infidel magistrate. 3. Whom in authority will he make to be the devil's vicegerents if infidel magistrates be Christ's vicegerents? If he say that they are the devil's vicegerents, then it follows, 1. That they who resist the devil's vicegerent resist the ordinance of God; for they that resist an infidel magistrate, and do not submit to his lawful authority (which his infidelity takes not away), is said, Rom. xiii. 2, to resist the ordinance of God. 2. That the apostle Paul bade pray for the devil's vicegerent, 1 Tim. ii. 1, 2. The reverend brother doth but more and more wind himself into a labyrinth of errors, while he endeavours to take away the distinction of the twofold kingdom, and the twofold vicegerentship of God and of Christ.

Twelfthly, The twelfth heterodoxy followeth: “Now it is true that Christ, being God as well as man, hath of himself originally, as God, whatsoever he hath by virtue of gift as Mediator,” Male Dicis, p. 13. Now subsume Christ hath, by virtue of gift, as Mediator, the priestly office; therefore, by Mr Coleman's principles, Christ hath of himself originally, as God, the priestly office. And if Christ hath it of himself originally [pg 4-034] as God, then the Father and the Holy Ghost hath it also; so that by his doctrine the Father and the Holy Ghost shall be the priests of the church as well as Christ, for Christ hath nothing of himself originally as God which the Father and the Holy Ghost have not likewise.

Thirteenthly, The thirteenth and last error concerneth the office of deacons. Not only a widow but a deacon is denied to be a church officer, or to have any warrant from Scripture. “I hold not a widow a church officer (saith he); no more do I a deacon; both having a like foundation in Scripture, which is truly none at all,” Male Dicis, p. 9. If this was his opinion formerly, why did he not in so main a point enter his dissent from the votes of the Assembly concerning deacons, together with his reasons? Well, his opinion is so now, whereby he runneth contrary not only to the reformed churches (which it seems weigh not much in his balance), but to the plain Scripture, which speaks of the office of a deacon, 1 Tim. iii. 10; and this could be no civil office, but an ecclesiastical office, for the deacons were chosen by the church, were ordained with prayer and laying on of hands, and their charge was to take special care of the poor; all which is clear, Acts vi. If he had given us the grounds of his opinion he should have heard more against it.

CHAPTER V.

THE PRELATICAL WAY AND TENETS OF MR COLEMAN AND MR HUSSEY, REPUGNANT ALSO, IN DIVERS PARTICULARS, TO THE VOTES AND ORDINANCES OF PARLIAMENT.

1. Mr Coleman, in his Re-examination, p. 14, makes the Parliament to be church governors and church officers to the whole kingdom. It was an argument used against the prelates, that ecclesiastical and civil government, spiritual and secular administrations, are inconsistent in the same persons, either of which requireth the whole man. It was another exception against the prelate, that he assumed the power of church government and ecclesiastical jurisdiction over the whole diocese, which was much more than he could discharge. How will Mr Coleman avoid the involving the Parliament [pg 4-035] into prelatical guiltiness by his principles, which we avoid by ours?

2. The prelates sought great things for themselves rather than to purge the church of scandals. What other thing was it when Mr Coleman, in his third rule, instead of exhorting to the purging the church, called only for learning and competency, and told it out, that this will “get us an able ministry, and procure us honour enough.” Mr Hussey, in his Epistle to myself, tells me, that our attending on reading, exhortation and doctrine (without government) will obtain the magistrate's love, “more honour, more maintenance:” something for shame he behoved to add of the punishing of sin (yet he will not have the minister called from his study to be troubled or to take any pains in discipline), but behold the love of the magistrate; more honour and more maintenance, are strong ingredients in the Erastian electuary.

3. Mr Hussey will have ministers placed “without any regard to the allowance or disallowance of the people,” Epist. to the Parliament. This is prelatical, or rather more than prelatical.

4. The prelates were great enemies to ruling elders: so are Mr Coleman and Mr Hussey, who acknowledge no warrant from the word of God for that calling, nor admit of any ruling elders who are not magistrates,—a distinction which was used by Saravia and Bilson in reference to the Jewish elders, and by Bishop Hall in reference to the elders of the ancient church who were not preaching elders, Assert. of Episcop. by Divine Right, p. 208, 209, 221,—and now, forsooth, Mr Hussey, in his Epistle to the Parliament, doth earnestly beseech them to “set up classes, consisting only of ministers, whose work should be only to preach the word,” &c. Such classes, I dare say, the prelates themselves will admit of. Sure the Scottish prelates, when they were at their highest, yielded as much.

Mr Coleman and Mr Hussey hold, that ruling elders and a church government distinct from the civil government, in the times of persecution and under pagan magistrates, can be no warrant for the like where the state is Christian. This plea for Christian magistracy was Bishop Whitgift's plea against the ruling elders, Answer to the Admon., p. 114.

6. Mr Hussey, p. 22, saith, That granting [pg 4-036] the incestuous Corinthian to be excommunicated, “the decree was Paul's and not the Corinthians',” and that it no way appertained to them under the notion of a church. This is Saravia's answer to Beza, de Tripl. Epist. Genere, p. 42, 43, yea, the Papists' answer to Protestant writers, by which they would hold up the authority and sole jurisdiction of the prelates, as the apostles' successors, to excommunicate.

They do not more agree with the prelatical principles than they differ from the votes and ordinances of Parliament, which is the other point that I have here undertaken to discover; and I shall do it by the particular instances following:—

First, The ordinance of the Lords and Commons assembled in Parliament, for the calling of an assembly of divines, beginneth thus: “Whereas, among the infinite blessings of Almighty God upon this nation, none is, or can be, more dear unto us than the purity of our religion, and for that as yet many things remain in the liturgy, discipline, and government of the church, which do necessarily require a farther and more perfect reformation than as yet hath been attained: and whereas it hath been declared and resolved, by the Lords and Commons assembled in Parliament, that the present church government, by archbishops, bishops, &c., is evil and justly offensive, &c.; and that, therefore, they are resolved that the same shall be taken away, and that such a government shall be settled in the church as may be most agreeable to God's holy word, and most apt to procure and preserve the peace of the church at home, and nearer agreement with the church of Scotland, and other reformed churches abroad.” After it was resolved and voted in both the honourable houses of Parliament, and sent as one of the propositions to the treaty at Uxbridge, “That many particular congregations shall be under one presbyterial government.” Now, therefore, what can be more contrary to the votes and ordinances of Parliament than that which Mr Coleman and Mr Hussey hold, that there ought to be no ecclesiastical government beside civil magistracy, except we please to take preaching and baptism under the name of government, as if, forsooth, the Parliament had meant, by presbyterial government, Parliamentary government; or as if, by the purity of religion in point of the discipline of government of the church, they had [pg 4-037] intended nothing but their civil rights and privileges; or as if the wise and honourable Houses had understood themselves no better than to intend that for a nearer agreement with the church of Scotland and other reformed churches, which is the widest difference from them, to wit, the Erastian way.

Secondly, In the same ordinance of Parliament for the calling of an assembly of divines, it is ordained that the assembly, after conferring and treating among themselves touching the liturgy, discipline, and government of the church, or vindication and clearing of the doctrine of the same, shall deliver their opinions or advices of or touching the matters aforesaid to both or either of the houses of Parliament, yet Mr Hussey, Epist. to the Parliament, p. 36, will not have classes to put anything to the vote, but to hold on the disputes till all end in accord, and in unanimous consent of the whole clergy. But how can the Assembly, after disputes, express their sense, and deliver their opinions and advice to the Parliament, as they are required, except they do it by putting to the vote? Mr Coleman himself hath consented, yea, sometime called to put things to the vote; and as for classes, will any man imagine, that when both houses of Parliament did vote “that many particular congregations shall be under one presbyterial government,” their meaning was, that the classical presbytery shall only schoolwise dispute, and put nothing to the vote; or that the classical presbytery shall in common dispense the word and sacraments to many congregations, and that either the classical presbytery shall go to the several congregations successively, or the many congregations come to the classical presbytery, for preaching and baptising? I admire what opinion Mr Hussey can have of the Parliamentary vote concerning presbyterial government.

Thirdly, Mr Hussey, Epistle to the Parliament, p. 4, 5, will have ministers placed “without any regard to the allowance and disallowance of the people,” yet the ordinance of Parliament, for giving power to classical presbyteries to ordain ministers, doth appoint that he who is examined and approved by the presbytery shall be “sent to the church or other place where he is to serve (if it may be done with safety and conveniency), there to preach three several days, and to converse with the people, that [pg 4-038] they may have trial of his gifts for their edification, and may have time and leisure to inquire into, and the better to know his life and conversation,” after which the ordinance appointeth public notice to be given, and a day set to the congregation to put in what exceptions they have against him.

Fourthly, Mr Hussey in that Epistle to the Parliament, p. 5, saith, “Oh that this honourable court would hasten to set up classes consisting only of ministers whose work should be only to preach the word, and weekly meet in schools of divinity!” Here is a double contradiction to the ordinances of Parliament, for in the directions of the Lords and Commons for choosing of ruling elders, and speedy settling of presbyterial government, it is appointed that ruling elders shall be members both of classes and synodical assemblies, together with the ministers of the word. Again, the ordinance about suspension of scandalous persons from the sacrament appointeth other work to classes, beside preaching and disputing, namely, the receiving and judging of appeals from the congregational eldership. Mr Coleman, in Male Dicis, p. 12, professeth that he excludeth ruling elders from church government, yet he can hardly be ignorant that as the Parliament hath voted “that many particular congregations shall be under one presbyterial government,” so their votes do commit that government to pastors and ruling elders jointly.

I will not here repeat the particulars wherein I showed in my Nihil Respondes that Mr Coleman hath abused the honourable houses of Parliament, unto which particulars he hath answered as good as nothing. The honourable houses, in their wisdom, will soon observe whether such men, whose avouched tenets are so flatly repugnant to the parliamentary votes and ordinances, are like to be good pleaders for Christian magistracy.

CHAPTER VI.

MR COLEMAN'S WRONGING OF THE CHURCH OF SCOTLAND.

Mr Coleman ends his Male Dicis with a resentment of accusations charged upon him by a stranger, a commissioner from another church. The lot of strangers were very [pg 4-039] hard, if, when they are falsely accused to authority, they may not answer for themselves. He may remember the first accusation was made by himself, when in his sermon to the Parliament, he did flatly impute to the commissioners from the church of Scotland a great part of the fault of hindering union in the Assembly of Divines, as having come biassed with a national determination; his doctrine also at that time being such, as did not only reflect upon the government of the church of Scotland, but tend to the subversion of the covenant in one principal point, without which there can be small or no hopes of attaining the other ends of the covenant. Since that time he did in his Re-examination, and now again in his Male Dicis, fall foully upon the church of Scotland, not only by gross mistakes and misrepresentations of our way, but by most groundless aspersions and most uncharitable and unjust calumnies. I am sure I am not so much a stranger to this doctrine as he is to the church of Scotland, of which notwithstanding he boldly speaks his pleasure in divers particulars, which he will never be able to make good.

First, He hath aspersed that church in the point of promiscuous communicating. This I confuted in my Nihil Respondes: and told him both of the order of the church and practice of conscientious ministers to the contrary. Now what replieth he?

“First, This refining work, I think, is not one year old in Scotland, or much more. I was lately informed that in Edinburgh it is begun: whether anywhere else I know not,” Male Dicis, p. 20. Are not these now good grounds of censuring and aspersing a reformed church (whose name hath been as precious ointment among other churches abroad), “I think; I was informed; whether it be otherwise I know not?” He will sit in Cornhill, and tell the world what he imagines or hears of the church of Scotland, and that, forsooth, must be taken for a truth. Yet there was both rules and practice in the church of Scotland for debarring ignorant and scandalous persons from the sacrament before he was born, though all was put out of course under the prelates.

“Secondly (saith the reverend brother), It is not a very effectual sin-censuring and church-refining government, under which, after fourscore years' constant practice, divers [pg 4-040] thousands in the kingdom, and some hundreds in one particular parish, because of ignorance and scandal, are yet unfit to communicate,” Male Dicis, p. 20. Ans. 1. It is notoriously false that there hath been fourscore years' constant practice of presbyterial government in Scotland; for the prelates there were above thirty years' standing. 2. “Shall the earth be made to bring forth in one day, or shall a nation be born at once?” saith the prophet, Isa. lxvi. 8. It is no easy matter to get a whole nation purged of ignorant and scandalous persons. 3. He may take notice that the apostle Paul, almost in all his epistles, maketh mention of scandalous persons among those to whom he wrote, warning them not to have fellowship with such, to note them, to avoid them. If the apostolic churches were not free of such, what great marvel if we be not? 4. Before he objected promiscuous communicating. This being cleared to be a calumny, now he objecteth that there are such as are unfit to communicate. But while he thus seeketh a quarrel against church government, he doth upon the matter quarrel the preaching of the gospel itself; for he that imputeth it as a fault to the church government that there are still divers thousands who, by reason of ignorance or scandal, are unfit to communicate, doth, by consequence, yea, much more, impute it as a fault to the preaching of the gospel in England, Scotland, Ireland, France, Germany, the Low Countries, Switzerland, Sweden, Poland,—that in all these, and other reformed churches, after fourscore years' constant preaching of the gospel (which is appointed of God to turn unconverted and unregenerate persons from darkness to light, and from the power of Satan to God), there are not only divers thousands, but divers millions, who, by reason of ignorance or scandal, are yet unfit to communicate. If the word do not open the eyes of the ignorant, and convert the scandalous, what marvel that church government cannot do it? Church government is not an illuminating and regenerating ordinance as the word is. But this church government can and will do, yea, hath done, where it is duly executed: It is a most blessed means for keeping the ordinances from visible and known pollution, which doth very much honour God, shame sin, and commend piety; it putteth a visible difference between the precious and the vile, the clean and the unclean, the silver [pg 4-041] and the dross; and may well be, therefore, called a church-refining ordinance.

Secondly, The second calumny was this, “I myself (said he) did hear the presbytery of Edinburgh censure a woman to be banished out of the gates of the city.” I answered him in his own language, “It is at the best a most uncharitable slander:” and told him there is no banishment in Scotland but by the civil magistrate; and that he ought to have inquired and informed himself better.

Now he doth neither adhere to his calumny, or offer to make it good, nor yet quit it, or confess he was mistaken, but propoundeth three new queries (Male Dicis, p. 21), still forgetting his own rule of keeping to the laws of disputation and matter in hand. For the particular in hand he only saith thus much, “I did make inquiry, and from the presbytery itself I received information, but not satisfaction.” He tells not what information he received. If he will say that he received information that the banishment was by the magistrate, how could he then report that it was by the presbytery. If he say that the information he had from the presbytery gave him any ground for the report which he hath made, let him speak it out, and the world shall know the untruth of it. He may remember, withal, that by his principles an accusation may not be received against an elder (much less against an eldership), in reference either to the judgment of charity, or to ministerial conviction, except under two or three witnesses. If, therefore, he would have his accusation believed, let him find two or three witnesses.

Thirdly, Whereas I had rectified a great mistake of the reverend brother when I told him, “It is accidental to the ruling elder to be of the nobility, or to nobles to be ruling elders; there are but some so, and many otherwise,” he is not pleased to be rectified in this, but replieth, “I say, first, It is continually so; secondly, The king's commissioner in the General Assembly, is his presence accidental?” Male Dicis, p. 10. See now here whether he understandeth what he saith, or whereof he affirmeth. That which he saith is continually so, is almost continually otherwise; that is, there are continually some ruling elders who are not nobles, and there are continually some nobles who are not ruling elders. So that, if anything be accidental, [pg 4-042] this is accidental, that an elder be of the nobility, or nobles be elders; they are neither nobles qua elders, nor elders qua nobles. It is no less accidental that the king's commissioner be present in the General Assembly; for there have been General Assemblies in Scotland, both before the erection and since the last casting out of Prelacy, in which there was no commissioner from the king. And when the king sends a commissioner, it is accidental that he be of the nobility; for the king hath sent commissioners to General Assemblies who were not of the nobility.

Fourthly, A fourth injury, not to be passed in silence, is this: Mr Coleman hath endeavoured to make the world believe that the commissioners from the church of Scotland came to the Assembly biassed with something adventitious from without, which he calls a national determination, and that we are not permitted by those that sent us to receive any further light from the word of God. I shall say no more of the bias, because, as I told him before, the standers by see well enough which way the bias runs. But most strange it is, that after I had confuted his calumny, not only from our paper first presented to the grand committee, but from the General Assembly's own letter to the Assembly of Divines, showing that they had ordered the laying aside of some particular customs in the church of Scotland, for the nearer uniformity with the church of England, so much endeared unto them, yet he still adhereth to his former calumny (Male Dicis, p. 20), without taking notice of the evidence which I had given to the contrary. And not content with this, he still quarrelleth with my allegation of certain parallel examples, which are by him so far disesteemed, that he hath not stuck to pass the very same censure upon the foreign divines who came to the Synod of Dort which the Arminians did. The same he saith of Alexander's coming to the Council of Nice, and of Cyril's coming to the Council of Ephesus; all these, I say, he still involveth under the same censure with us; for whereas he had alleged that I justified the bias, this I denied, and called for his proof. His reply now is thus: “Is not the allegation of the examples of the like doing a justification of the act done?” Male Dicis, p. 20. This reply can have no other sense but this, That I justified the thing which he thinks our bias, because I [pg 4-043] justified those other divines who (as he holds) came also biassed in like manner. I am persuaded this one particular, his joining with the Arminians in their exceptions against the Synod of Dort, would make all the reformed churches, if they could all speak to him uno ore, to cry Male audis. And I am as firmly persuaded that the confession which I have extorted from him in this place, that he knoweth no adventitious engagements those divines had, makes him irreconcileably to contradict himself; for he made them but just now biassed in the same manner as he thinks us, and made my allegation of their examples to be a justification of the bias charged by him upon us: as, therefore, he doth must uncharitably and untruly judge us to be biassed with adventitious engagements, so doth he judge of them. Neither can he assoil them while he condemneth us; for the articles concerning predestination, the death of Christ, grace, free will, and perseverance, were determined before the Synod of Dort by most (if not by all) of those reformed churches who sent commissioners thither, as much as presbyterial government was determined in the church of Scotland before the reverend Assembly of Divines was called. And this pre-engagement and predetermination of those reformed churches was the main objection of the Arminians against the foreign divines who came to the Synod of Dort. To conclude this point, Mr Coleman himself, in his Re-examination, p. 7, avoucheth roundly, that the foreign divines came to Dort, not as divines, by dispute and disquisition to find out truth, but as judges, to censure all different opinions as erroneous.

CHAPTER VII.

CALUMNIES CONFUTED, AND THAT QUESTION BRIEFLY CLEARED, WHETHER THE MAGISTRATE BE CHRIST'S VICEGERENT.

Mr Hussey, in his title page, tells us he hath prosecuted the argumentative part without any personal reflections, yet I could instance divers personal reflections in his book which any moderate impartial man will extremely dislike; but what should this be to the edifying of my reader, the end which, next to the glory of God and the promoting of reformation, I have proposed [pg 4-044] to myself? Yet I must needs take notice of some calumnies.

First, In his Epistle, p. 8, he offereth it to be examined whether I was not beside my text, Mal. iii. 2, when I pressed from it reformation by ecclesiastical discipline: whether that refiner's fire and fuller's soap doth not point at another and a nearer operation upon the souls and spirits of men by the blood, word, Spirit, and grace of Christ: and whether such handling of a similitude in a text be to preach the mind of God, or men's own fancy. It is no discontent to me, but I shall rejoice in it, that men of piety and judgment examine my doctrine by the word of God, and hold fast what they find agreeable to the Scriptures, and no more. But is this brotherly, or fair, or conscionable dealing, to offer my sermon to be examined under such a notion, when he hath not only said nothing to confute any of my doctrines, as not arising from my text, or any of my applications, as not arising from my doctrines; but hath also untruly represented my sermon, as coming short of, or not expressing that which indeed it hath most principally and most expressly in it? That of reformation was but a part of my sermon; and that of church censures, against scandalous sinners, was but the least part of that part. And why should not the fuller's soap in the house of God, take off those spots in our feasts? Why should not the refiner's fire purge away the wicked of the earth like dross? so David calls them. That reformation is one part of the Holy Ghost's intendment in that text, is Gualther's opinion as well as mine, yet he thinks Gualther his own. Nay, I proved it from comparing scripture with scripture, which is the best way that I know to clear scripture. Why did he not answer my proofs? But beside all that I said of reformation, had I not other three doctrines out of that text comprehending all that which Mr Hussey hinteth as omitted by me, and yet intended in the text? Dare he say that I did not take in purgation by the word? (though I confess he doth not well prove it from the words which he citeth, “Is not my word an hammer?” But it is proved by the words which he citeth not, “Is not my word like as a fire?”) Did I not expressly say that Christ is to us as a refiner's fire and as fuller's soap three ways,—by reformation, by tribulation, by mortification? Did I not handle the last two as well as the first? Oh [pg 4-045] let no more such gross calumnies be found among those who profess to be brethren!

Secondly, Mr Hussey, in his epistle to myself, gives it out that I say, “We have leave from the civil magistrate to preach the gospel,” which he interprets as if I denied that we preach the word with authority from Christ. It was de facto, not de jure, that I spake it. The magistrate hath power in his hand to hinder both doctrine and discipline, if he be an adversary, though it be the will of Christ that there be both doctrine and discipline, and the authority of both is from Christ. When the magistrate assisteth or countenanceth, or so much as doth not hinder the preaching of the gospel, then he gives leave to it.

Thirdly, Mr Coleman, in his Male Dicis, p. 3, saith, “I am confident the church of Scotland sent this Commissioner to dispute down our reasons, not to revile our persons.” Why did he not, if he could, give instance of some reviling word written by me against his person? I have not so learned Christ. The Lord rebuke every railing and reviling spirit. I have given him reason against railing; he hath given me railing against reason; I spake to his doctrine, he speaks to my place and relation, which is both the alpha and omega of his Male Dicis.

Fourthly, “Knowledge (saith he) is only with Mr Gillespie; others understand neither what they say, nor whereof they affirm,” p. 3. He will sooner bring water out of flint than prove this consequence out of my title-page. Although I confess himself hath affirmed divers things of the church of Scotland which he doth not understand, as I have made plainly to appear. If he take a review of the title-page of his Re-examination, he gives more ground for this consequence,—that Mr Coleman is the only man that denies himself; others seek great things for themselves. Or from the title-page of his Male Dicis this consequence will be as good,—that Mr Coleman is the only man that blesseth; others are revilers.

Fifthly, Thus saith Mr Coleman, “O ye honourable house of Parliament, take you notice that you manage that great place of yours under Christ and for Christ: He is your head, and you are his servants; and take you notice withal that Mr Gillespie accounts this your reproach,” Male Dicis Maledicis, p. 17. But O ye honourable house of Parliament, be pleased to take notice of my own plain expression of my mind [pg 4-046] in my Nihil Respondes. p. 13: “The Christian magistrate manageth his office under and for Christ, that is, so as to be serviceable for the kingdom and glory of Christ.” And now judge whether it be suitable to the sincerity and candour of a minister of the gospel to endeavour to make me odious to authority, by imputing to me that which not only I did not say, but the contrary whereof I did plainly express. The thing which I charged his doctrine with was this, that by holding all government to be given to Christ as Mediator, and from him, as Mediator, derived to the magistrate as his vicegerent, he shaketh the foundation of magistracy. I am sure that which I hold, that all lawful magistrates are powers ordained by God, and are to be honoured and obeyed as God's vicegerents, is a firm and strong foundation for magistracy. But that which Mr Coleman and Mr Hussey hold, viz., that the Christian magistrate holdeth his office of, under, and for Christ, as he is Mediator, and doth act vice Christi, as Christ's vicegerent, gives a most dangerous wound to Christian magistracy, which I can demonstrate in many particulars. I shall now give instance only in these few: First, They must prove from Scripture that Christ, as Mediator, hath given a commission of vicegerentship to Christian magistrates, and appointed them not only to be serviceable to him, and to do his work (for that they must serve Christ, and be for his glory, is not controverted, nay, can never enough be commended to them), but also to govern vice Christi, in Christ's stead, and that not only as he is God, which is not controverted neither, but as he is Mediator. This, I say, they must prove, which they will never be able to do, or otherwise they do, by their doctrine, lead the magistrate into a snare, and leave him in it. For how shall he be acknowledged for a vicegerent who can show no commission nor warrant for his vicegerentship? Secondly, Their doctrine tendeth to the altering of the surest and best known tenure of magistracy, which is from God; for they hold that God hath put all government, and all authority civil, and all, into the hands of Christ as Mediator; if the tenure from Christ fail, then, by their doctrine, the tenure from God shall fail too. Thirdly, The vicegerent cannot act in that capacity, nor assume that power which his sovereign, whose vicegerent he is, ought not to assume if he were [pg 4-047] personally present; so that, by their principles, it will follow that the Christian magistrate can act no farther, nor assume any other power of government, than Christ himself might have assumed when he was on earth, or might now assume and exercise as Mediator if he were on earth. But Christ himself, when he was on earth, neither did exercise, nor was sent to exercise, civil judgment, Luke xii. 14; and the temporal sword, John xviii. 36; nor external observation and state, Luke xvii. 20, 21; and he declined to be an earthly king, John vi. 15. Therefore, by their principles, the Christian magistrate ought to forbear and avoid all these.

A sixth calumny is this: Mr Coleman, descanting upon the governments mentioned 1 Cor. xii. 28, chargeth me with a circular argumentation: “He circularly argues (saith he): they are civil, because God placed them there, and God placed them there because they are civil,” Male Dicis Maledicis, p. 9. I neither argued the one nor the other; they are both, Sir, of your own forging. But this is not your first allegation of this kind. I sometime admire what oscitancy or supine negligence (to judge it no worse) this can be, to fancy to yourself that I have said what you would, and then to bring forth your own apprehensions for my arguments.

CHAPTER VIII.

THAT MR COLEMAN DOTH GREAT VIOLENCE, BOTH TO HIS OWN WORDS AND TO THE WORDS OF OTHERS WHOM HE CITETH.

The reverend brother hath offered extreme violence to his own declaration, of which let the leader now judge, comparing his declaration with his interpretation.—

Declaration

For much of what is reported of my sermon I utterly deny, and refer myself to the sermon itself, for what I have acknowledged to be delivered by me, although it is my judgment, yet because I see it hath given a great deal of offence to this Assembly and the reverend Commissioners of Scotland, I am sorry I have given offence in the delivery thereof; and for the printing, although I have an order, I will forbear, except I be further commanded. THO. COLEMAN.

Interpretation

It is a truth, and a Scripture truth, which I have delivered, and because I see a scripture truth hath given offence to the Commissioners of Scotland, &c. I am sorry. This must needs be the sense; I am sure this was the sense intended, Male Dicis, Maledicis, p. 18.

Surely if such Orleans glosses be admitted upon men's declarations, signed with their hands, and if he who hath subscribed himself sorry that he hath given offence in the delivery of such a doctrine, shall be allowed to expound himself thus; that he meant he was sorry others had taken offence at a Scripture truth, that is, he was sorry for our fault, not for his own. I know not how men shall trust one another's declarations, or how we can practically, as well as doctrinally, confute the Jesuitical equivocations and mental reservations. And if this must needs be the sense which now the reverend brother gives, and was the sense intended, why saith he that he did publicly recal that declaration? He might make a revocation of it, in the sense wherein I understood it: but how could he make a revocation of it as himself understood it, and as he saith the sense must needs be? Was this his sorrow for our taking offence at a Scripture truth, a sorrow to be sorrowed for? Why did he not rather make a second declaration the next day interpreting the former? And whereas he thinks that his revocation ought to have been mentioned together with his declaration, because the whole truth is to be told as well as the truth, his own heart knows that he himself hath not told the whole truth, for he could tell much more if he pleased, how he was brought upon the business, and particularly upon that revocation. Why will he challenge others for not telling the whole truth, when himself doth it not? I should have thought that this revocation was neither here nor there as to the point of scandal, for proof whereof his declaration was brought; and that, as it was not to the business in hand, so it might rather serve for impairing his credit than for anything else. But seeing himself thinks it more for his credit to tell the world of his saying and unsaying, declaring and undeclaring, let him be doing.

In the next place, Will you see how much violence he offereth to divines whom he citeth? I had cited plain and full testimonies of the Zurich divines, showing that Gualther expounds 1 Cor. v. all along of excommunication; that Bullinger holds excommunication to be instituted by Christ, Matt. xviii.; that Aretius saith God was the author of excommunication in the Old Testament, and Christ in the New, all which see in Nihil Respondes, p. 32.

The reverend brother, notwithstanding [pg 4-049] of their plain testimonies, speaking for me and against him in the main controversy between him and me, doth still allege that they are for him, not for me, Male Dicis, p. 23, yet he doth not so much as offer any answer to their testimonies by me cited, only he bringeth three other passages of theirs, intimating that there may be a true church without excommunication; that they thought it not necessary where they lived; that they thought it hard, yea impossible—arduum nec non impossible—to introduce excommunication in those parts, by which citations the brother hath proved nothing against me, but confirmed what I said. Let him remember first, he himself makes the main controversy between him and me about the scriptural warrants of church censures, now in that they are clearly against him. Next Aretius, who thought it hard, yea impossible, to bring in excommunication at that time, saith also, Dabit posterior aetas tractabiliores forte animas,—peradventure the following age shall bring forth more tractable souls; and thereupon he adviseth not to despair of the restitution of excommunication. I cited also other testimonies to show that the Zurich divines did endeavour and long for the discipline of excommunication, though as things stood then and there, they did prudentially supersede the restoring of it where they lived, because of the difficulty and apprehended impossibility of the thing. If Mr Coleman will follow the Zurich divines he must change his tone, and quite alter the state of the question, and make it thus: Whether, as things now stand, it be expedient to settle excommunication in the church of England. Now if he makes this the state of the question, then he must make a revocation of that word, “I deny an institution, I assent to a prudence.” For the tables were turned with the Zurich divines; they assented to an institution; they denied a prudence; they held an affirmative precept for excommunication, but that it doth not bind ad semper, that the thing is not at all times, nor in all places necessary; that weighty inconveniences may warrant the superseding of it.

The reverend brother brings another testimony out of Aretius against suspension from the sacrament: “And further (saith he) for this grand desired power, suspension from sacrament, these are his words,” &c. A testimony three ways falsified: 1. Aretius [pg 4-050] speaks not at all in that place of the power or duty of church officers, of which suspension is a part, but he speaks of private Christians, and what is incumbent to them. 2. He speaks of separation, not of suspension from the sacrament; that a man is not bound to withdraw and lie off from the sacrament, because every one who is to communicate with him is not in his opinion a saint. 3. He speaketh against separation from both word and sacrament, because of the mixture of good and bad in hearing and in communicating; but scandalous sinners are invited to, not suspended from the hearing of the word, wherefore take Aretius's[1358] words as they are, and then let the reverend brother consider what he hath gained.

What hath this now to do with church officers' power of suspension from the sacrament?

Observe another testimony which he addeth out of Augustine, lib. de Fide, Excommunicatio debet supplere locum visibilis gladii, which he Englisheth thus: “Excommunication comes in only to supply the want of the civil sword.” But how comes in your only, Sir? Augustine saith no such thing. And when I have expunged that word, I must tell you farther, that I can find no such passage in Augustine's book de Fide; but I find somewhat to this purpose in another book of his, which is entitled De Fide et Operibus, a book which he wrote against the admission of such persons to baptism, as being instructed in the faith, are, notwithstanding, still scandalous in their lives (which, by the way, will hold a fortiori, for the exclusion of notorious scandalous sinners from the Lord's supper; for they who ought not to be admitted to the sacrament of initiation, ought much less to be admitted to the sacrament of confirmation). Now because divers scriptures speak of a mixture of good and bad in the church, Augustine takes there occasion to reprove those who abused these scriptures against the exercise of discipline and church censures, the necessity whereof he showeth [pg 4-051] to be the greater, because the magistrate doth not punish by death all such crimes as under the law were punished by death, as, namely, adultery, the scandal chiefly by him insisted upon. As for that passage concerning excommunication supplying the place of the sword,[1359] it plainly holds forth excommunication under Christian emperors and magistrates, for such they were at that time, so far it is from making against us. For these are the words which say no such thing as Mr Coleman would make them say: “And Phinehas the priest did thrust through the adulterous persons found together with the avenging sword;” which signified that it should be none by degradations and excommunications in this time, when, in the discipline of the church, the visible sword was to cease.

If the reverend brother had let me know where to find his other testimonies of Origen and Chrysostom, peradventure I had given him as good an account of them. Tertullian's[1360] words which he citeth, Praesident probati seniores, I know very well where to find; and I know also, that if there be a passage in all antiquity against the Erastians, that is one. Which therefore I here offer as it is to be considered.

One instance more of his misalleging and perverting of testimonies. In the close, he citeth a passage of Mr Case's sermon, Aug. 22, 1645. “He (Christ) is king of nations and king of saints. As king of nations he hath a temporal kingdom and government over the world,” &c., “and the rule and regiment of this kingdom he hath [pg 4-052] committed to monarchies,” &c. “Here is Erastianism (saith Mr Coleman, p. 38), a step higher than ever I or Erastus himself went. And I desire to know of Mr Gillespie, if he will own this as good divinity?” Yes, Sir, I own it for very good divinity; for my reverend brother, Mr Case, saith not that Christ, as Mediator, is king of nations, and hath a temporal kingdom in the world, and hath committed rule and regiment to monarchies or other lawful magistrates (which is the point that you and Mr Hussey contend for, being a great heterodoxy in divinity), but he saith of the Son of God, that he is king of nations, and hath committed rule to monarchies, which I own with all my heart. The distinction of the twofold kingdom of Christ,—an universal kingdom, whereby he reigneth over all things as God, and a special economical kingdom, whereby he is king to the church only, and ruleth and governeth it,—is that which, being rightly understood, overturneth, overturneth, overturneth the Erastian principles. Let Mr Coleman but own this distinction, and that which Mr Case addeth concerning the kingdom, which Christ, as king of saints (and so as Mediator), doth exercise both invisibly, in the conscience, and visibly, in the church: First, By conquering a people and visible subjects; secondly, By giving them laws distinct from all the laws and statutes of all the kingdoms and republics in the world, Isa. xxxiii. 22; thirdly, By constituting special officers in the church not only to promulgate these laws, Matt, xviii. 19, but to govern his people according to them, Acts xx. 28; Rom. xii. 8; 1 Cor. xii. 28; xiv. 32; fourthly, In that he hath commanded all his people to obey these ecclesiastical officers, Heb. xiii. 7, 17; fifthly, And hath appointed censures proper to this government, Matt, xviii. 17; 1 Cor. v. 13: I say, let Mr Coleman but own this doctrine of Mr Case, which was printed by order of the honourable House of Commons as well as his was, then we are agreed. And so much for this time.

THE END.

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