History of Greece, Volume 08 (of 12)

by George Grote

FOOTNOTES

[1] See Thucyd. v, 36.

[2] Thucyd. viii, 45. Καὶ ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν ἀφικομένης ἐπιστολῆς πρὸς Ἀστύοχον ἐκ Λακεδαίμονος ὥστ᾽ ἀποκτεῖναι (ἦν γὰρ καὶ τῷ Ἄγιδι ἐχθρὸς καὶ ἄλλως ἄπιστος ἐφαίνετο), etc.

[3] Thucyd. viii, 45, 46.

[4] Thucyd. viii, 46-52.

[5] Thucyd. viii, 45. Οἱ δὲ τὰς ναῦς ἀπολείπωσιν, οὐχ ὑπολιπόντες ἐς ὁμήρειαν τὸν προσοφειλόμενον μισθόν.

This passage is both doubtful in the text and difficult in the translation. Among the many different explanations given by the commentators, I adopt that of Dr. Arnold as the least unsatisfactory, though without any confidence that it is right.

[6] Thucyd. viii, 45. Τὰς τε πόλεις δεομένας χρημάτων ἀπήλασεν, αὐτὸς ἀντιλέγων ὑπὲρ τοῦ Τισσαφέρνους, ὡς οἱ μὲν Χῖοι ἀναίσχυντοι εἶεν, πλουσιώτατοι ὄντες τῶν Ἑλλήνων, ἐπικουρίᾳ δὲ ὅμως σωζόμενοι ἀξιοῦσι καὶ τοῖς σώμασι καὶ τοῖς χρήμασιν ἄλλους ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐκείνων ἐλευθερίας κινδυνεύειν.

[7] Thucyd. viii, 46. Τήν τε τροφὴν κακῶς ἐπόριζε τοῖς Πελοποννησίοις καὶ ναυμαχεῖν οὐκ εἴα· ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς Φοινίσσας ναῦς φάσκων ἥξειν καὶ ἐκ περιόντος ἀγωνιεῖσθαι ἔφθειρε τὰ πράγματα καὶ τὴν ἀκμὴν τοῦ ναυτικοῦ αὐτῶν ἀφείλετο, γενομένην καὶ πάνυ ἰσχυρὰν, τά τε ἄλλα, καταφανέστερον ἢ ὥστε λανθάνειν, οὐ προθύμως ξυνεπολέμει.

[8] Thucyd. viii, 47. Τὰ μὲν καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδου προσπέμψαντος λόγους ἐς τοὺς δυνατωτάτους αὐτῶν (Ἀθηναίων) ἄνδρας, ὥστε μνησθῆναι περὶ αὐτοῦ ἐς τοὺς βελτίστους τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὅτι ἐπ᾽ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ βούλεται, καὶ οὐ πονηρίᾳ οὐδὲ δημοκρατίᾳ τῇ ἑαυτὸν ἐκβαλούσῃ, κατελθὼν, etc.

[9] Thucyd. viii, 47.

[10] Thucyd. viii, 48.

[11] It is asserted in an Oration of Lysias (Orat. xxv, Δήμου Καταλύσεως Ἀπολογία, c. 3, p. 766, Reisk.) that Phrynichus and Peisander embarked in this oligarchical conspiracy for the purpose of getting clear of previous crimes committed under the democracy. But there is nothing to countenance this assertion, and the narrative of Thucydidês gives quite a different color to their behavior.

Peisander was now serving with the armament at Samos; moreover, his forwardness and energy—presently to be described—in taking the formidable initiative of putting down the Athenian democracy, is to me quite sufficient evidence that the taunts of the comic writers against his cowardice are unfounded. Xenophon in the Symposion repeats this taunt (ii, 14) which also appears in Aristophanês, Eupolis, Plato Comicus, and others: see the passages collected in Meineke, Histor. Critic. Comicor. Græcorum, vol. i, p. 178, etc.

Modern writers on Grecian history often repeat such bitter jests as if they were so much genuine and trustworthy evidence against the person libelled.

[12] Phrynichus is affirmed, in an Oration of Lysias, to have been originally poor, keeping sheep in the country part of Attica; then, to have resided in the city, and practised what was called sycophancy, or false and vexatious accusation before the dikastery and the public assembly, (Lysias, Orat. xx. pro Polystrato, c. 3, p. 674, Reisk.)

[13] Thucyd. viii, 48. Τάς τε ξυμμαχίδας πόλεις, αἷς ὑπεσχῆσθαι δὴ σφᾶς ὀλιγαρχίαν, ὅτι δὴ καὶ αὐτοὶ οὐ δημοκρατήσονται, εὖ εἰδέναι ἔφη ὅτι οὐδὲν μᾶλλον σφίσιν οὔθ᾽ αἱ ἀφεστηκυῖαι προσχωρήσονται, οὔθ᾽ αἱ ὑπάρχουσαι βεβαιότεραι ἔσονται· οὐ γὰρ βουλήσεσθαι αὐτοὺς μετ᾽ ὀλιγαρχίας ἢ δημοκρατίας δουλεύειν μᾶλλον, ἢ μεθ᾽ ὁποτέρου ἂν τύχωσι τούτων ἐλευθέρους εἶναι. Τούς τε καλοὺς κἀγαθοὺς ὀνομαζομένους οὐκ ἐλάσσω αὐτοὺς νομίζειν σφίσι πράγματα παρέξειν τοῦ δήμου, ποριστὰς ὄντας καὶ ἐσηγητὰς τῶν κακῶν τῷ δήμῳ, ἐξ ὧν τὰ πλείω αὐτοὺς ὠφελεῖσθαι· καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐπ᾽ ἐκείνοις εἶναι, καὶ ἄκριτοι ἂν καὶ βιαιότερον ἀποθνήσκειν, τὸν τε δῆμον σφῶν τε καταφυγὴν εἶναι καὶ ἐκείνων σωφρονιστήν. Καὶ ταῦτα παρ᾽ αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων ἐπισταμένας τὰς πόλεις σαφῶς αὐτὸς εἰδέναι, ὅτι οὕτω νομίζουσι.

In taking the comparison between oligarchy and democracy in Greece, there is hardly any evidence more important than this passage: a testimony to the comparative merit of democracy, pronounced by an oligarchical conspirator, and sanctioned by an historian himself unfriendly to the democracy.

[14] Thucyd. viii, 50, 51.

[15] In the speech made by Theramenês (the Athenian) during the oligarchy of Thirty, seven years afterwards, it is affirmed that the Athenian people voted the adoption of the oligarchy of Four Hundred, from being told that the Lacedæmonians would never trust a democracy (Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 45).

This is thoroughly incorrect, a specimen of the loose assertion of speakers in regard to facts even not very long past. At the moment when Theramenês said this, the question, what political constitution at Athens the Lacedæmonians would please to tolerate, was all-important to the Athenians. Theramenês transfers the feelings of the present to the incidents of the past.

[16] Thucyd. viii, 54. Ὁ δὲ δῆμος τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἀκούων χαλεπῶς ἔφερε τὸ περὶ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας· σαφῶς δὲ διδασκόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ Πεισάνδρου μὴ εἶναι ἄλλην σωτηρίαν, δείσας, καὶ ἅμα ἐλπίζων ὡς καὶ μεταβαλεῖται, ἐνέδωκε.

“Atheniensibus, imminente periculo belli, major salutis quam dignitatis cura fuit. Itaque, permittente populo, imperium ad Senatum transfertur,” (Justin, v, 3).

Justin is correct, so far as this vote goes: but he takes no notice of the change of matters afterwards, when the establishment of the Four Hundred was consummated without the promised benefit of Persian alliance, and by simple terrorism.

[17] Οἱ βέλτιστοι, οἱ καλοκἀγαθοὶ, οἱ χαριέντες, οἱ γνώριμοι, οἱ σώφρονες, etc.: le parti honnête et modéré, etc.

[18] About these ξυνωμοσίαι ἐπὶ δίκαις καὶ ἀρχαῖς, political and judicial associations, see above, in this History, vol. iv, ch. xxxvii, pp. 399, 400; vol. vi, ch. li. pp. 290, 291: see also Hermann Büttner, Geschichte der politischen Hetærieen zu Athen. pp. 75, 79, Leipsic, 1840.

There seem to have been similar political clubs or associations at Carthage, exercising much influence, and holding perpetual banquets as a means of largess to the poor, Aristotel. Polit. ii, 8, 2; Livy, xxxiii, 46; xxxiv, 61; compare Kluge, ad Aristotel. De Polit. Carthag. pp. 46-127, Wratisl. 1824.

The like political associations were both of long duration among the nobility of Rome, and of much influence for political objects as well as judicial success: “coitiones (compare Cicero pro Cluentio, c. 54, s. 148) honorum adipiscendorum causâ factæ, factiones, sodalitates.” The incident described in Livy (ix. 26) is remarkable. The senate, suspecting the character and proceedings of these clubs, appointed the dictator Mænius (in 312 B.C.) as commissioner with full power to investigate and deal with them. But such was the power of the clubs, in a case where they had a common interest and acted in coöperation (as was equally the fact under Peisander at Athens), that they completely frustrated the inquiry, and went on as before. “Nec diutius, ut fit, quam dum recens erat, quæstio per clara nomina reorum viguit: inde labi cœpit ad viliora capita, donec coitionibus factionibusque, adversus quas comparata erat, oppressa est.” (Livy. ix, 26.) Compare Dio. Cass. xxxvii, 57, about the ἑταιρικὰ of the Triumvirs at Rome. Quintus Cicero (de Petition. Consulat. c. 5) says to his brother, the orator: “Quod si satis grati homines essent, hæc omnia (i.e. all the subsidia necessary for success in his coming election) tibi parata esse debebant, sicut parata esse confido. Nam hoc biennio quatuor sodalitates civium ad ambitionem gratiosissimorum tibi obligasti.... Horum in causis ad te deferundis quidnam eorum sodales tibi receperint et confirmarint, scio; nam interfui.”

See Th. Mommsen, De Collegiis et Sodaliciis Romanorum, Kiel, 1843, ch. iii, sects. 5, 6, 7; also the Dissertation of Wunder, inserted in the Onomasticon Tullianum of Orelli and Baiter, in the last volume of their edition of Cicero, pp. 200-210, ad Ind. Legum; Lex Licinia de Sodalitiis.

As an example of these clubs or conspiracies for mutual support in ξυνωμοσίαι ἐπὶ δίκαις (not including ἀρχαῖς, so far as we can make out), we may cite the association called οἱ Εἰκαδεῖς, made known to us by an Inscription recently discovered in Attica, and published first in Dr. Wordsworth’s Athens and Attica, p. 223; next in Ross, Die Demen von Attica, Preface, p. v. These Εἰκαδεῖς are an association, the members of which are bound to each other by a common oath, as well as by a curse which the mythical hero of the association, Eikadeus, is supposed to have imprecated (ἐνάντιον τῇ ἄρᾳ ἣν Εἰκαδεὺς ἐπηράσατο); they possess common property, and it was held contrary to the oath for any of the members to enter into a pecuniary process against the κοινόν: compare analogous obligations among the Roman Sodales, Mommsen, p. 4. Some members had violated their obligation upon this point: Polyxenus had attacked them at law for false witness: and the general body of the Eikadeis pass a vote of thanks to him for so doing, and choose three of their members to assist him in the cause before the dikastery (οἳτινες συναγωνιοῦνται τῷ ἐπεσκημμένῳ τοῖς μάρτυσι): compare the ἑταιρίαι alluded to in Demosthenês (cont. Theokrin. c. 11, p. 1335) as assisting Theokrinês before the dikastery, and intimidating the witnesses.

The Guilds in the European cities during the Middle Ages, usually sworn to by every member, and called conjurationes Amicitiæ, bear in many respects a resemblance to these ξυνωμοσίαι; though the judicial proceedings in the mediæval cities, being so much less popular than at Athens, narrowed their range of interference in this direction: their political importance, however, was quite equal. (See Wilda, Das Gilden Wesen des Mittelalters, Abschn. ii, p. 167, etc.)

“Omnes autem ad Amicitiam pertinentes villæ per fidem et sacramentum firmaverunt, quod unus subveniat alteri tanquam fratri suo in utili et honesto,” (ib. p. 148.)

[19] The person described by Krito, in the Euthydêmus of Plato (c. 31, p. 305, C.), as having censured Sokratês for conversing with Euthydêmus and Dionysodorus, is presented exactly like Antiphon in Thucydidês: ἥκιστα νὴ τὸν Δία ῥήτωρ· οὐδὲ οἶμαι πώποτε αὐτὸν ἐπὶ δικαστήριον ἀναβεβηκέναι· ἀλλ᾽ ἐπαΐειν αὐτόν φασι περὶ τοῦ πράγματος, νὴ τὸν Δία, καὶ δεινὸν εἶναι καὶ δεινοὺς λόγους ξυντιθέναι.

Heindorf thinks that Isokratês is here meant: Groen van Prinsterer talks of Lysias; Winkelmann, of Thrasymachus. The description would fit Antiphon as well as either of these three: though Stallbaum may perhaps be right in supposing no particular individual to have been in the mind of Plato.

Οἱ συνδικεῖν ἐπιστάμενοι, whom Xenophon specifies as being so eminently useful to a person engaged in a lawsuit, are probably the persons who knew how to address the dikastery effectively in support of his case (Xenoph. Memorab. i, 2, 51).

[20] Thucyd. viii, 55, 56.

[21] Thucyd. viii, 61. ἔτυχον δὲ ἔτι ἐν Ῥόδῳ ὄντος Ἀστυόχου ἐκ τῆς Μιλήτου Λέοντά τε ἄνδρα Σπαρτιάτην, ὃς Ἀντισθένει ἐπιβάτης ξυνέπλει, τοῦτον κεκομισμένοι μετὰ τὸν Πεδαρίτου θάνατον ἄρχοντα, etc.

I do not see why the word ἐπιβάτης should not be construed here, as elsewhere, in its ordinary sense of miles classiarius. The commentators, see the notes of Dr. Arnold, Poppo, and Göller start difficulties which seem to me of little importance; and they imagine divers new meanings, for none of which any authority is produced. We ought not to wonder that a common miles classiarius, or marine, being a Spartan citizen, should be appointed commander at Chios, when, a few chapters afterwards, we find Thrasybulus at Samos promoted, from being a common hoplite in the ranks, to be one of the Athenian generals (viii. 73).

The like remark may be made on the passage cited from Xenophon (Hellenic. i. 3, 17), about Hegesandridas—ἐπιβάτης ὢν Μινδάρου, where also the commentators reject the common meaning (see Schneider’s note in the Addenda to his edition of 1791, p. 97). The participle ὢν in that passage must be considered as an inaccurate substitute for γεγενημένος, since Mindarus was dead at the time. Hegesandridas had been among the epibatæ of Mindarus, and was now in command of a squadron on the coast of Thrace.

[22] Thucyd. viii, 56. Ἰωνίαν τε γὰρ πᾶσαν ἠξίουν δίδοσθαι, καὶ αὖθις νήσους τε ἐπικειμένας καὶ ἄλλα, οἷς οὐκ ἐναντιουμένων τῶν Ἀθηναίων, etc.

What this et cetera comprehended, we cannot divine. The demand was certainly ample enough without it.

[23] Thucyd. viii, 56. ναῦς ἠξίου ἐᾷν βασιλέα ποιεῖσθαι, καὶ παραπλεῖν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γῆν, ὅπη ἂν καὶ ὅσαις ἂν βούληται.

In my judgment ἑαυτοῦ is decidedly the proper reading here, not ἑαυτῶν. I agree in this respect with Dr. Arnold, Bekker, and Göller.

In a former volume of this History, I have shown reasons for believing, in opposition to Mitford, Dahlmann, and others, that the treaty called by the name of Kallias, and sometimes miscalled by the name of Kimon, was a real fact and not a boastful fiction: see vol. v, ch. xlv, p. 340.

The note of Dr. Arnold, though generally just, gives an inadequate representation of the strong reasons of Athens for rejecting and resenting this third demand.

[24] Thucyd. viii, 63. Καὶ ἐν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ἅμα οἱ ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ τῶν Ἀθηναίων κοινολογούμενοι ἐσκέψαντο, Ἀλκιβιάδην μέν, ἐπειδήπερ οὐ βούλεται, ἐᾷν (καὶ γὰρ οὐκ ἐπιτήδειον αὐτὸν εἶναι ἐς ὀλιγαρχίαν ἐλθεῖν), etc.

[25] Thucyd. viii, 44-57. In two parallel cases, one in Chios, the other in Korkyra, the seamen of an unpaid armament found subsistence by hiring themselves out for agricultural labor. But this was only during the summer (see Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 1, 1; vi, 2, 37), while the stay of the Peloponnesians at Rhodes was from January to March.

[26] Thucyd. viii, 58.

[27] Thucyd. viii, 58. χώραν τὴν βασιλέως, ὅση τῆς Ἀσίας ἐστὶ, βασιλέως εἶναι· καὶ περὶ τῆς χώρας τῆς ἑαυτοῦ βουλευέτω βασιλεὺς ὅπως βούλεται.

[28] Thucyd. viii, 59.

[29] Thucyd. viii, 60.

[30] See Aristotel. Politic. v, 3, 8. He cites this revolution as an instance of one begun by deceit and afterwards consummated by force: οἷον ἐπὶ τῶν τετρακοσίων τὸν δῆμον ἐξηπάτησαν, φάσκοντες τὸν βασιλέα χρήματα παρέξειν πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον τὸν πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους· ψευσάμενοι δὲ, κατέχειν ἐπειρῶντο τὴν πολιτείαν.

[31] Thucyd. viii, 63. Αὐτοὺς δὲ ἐπὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν, ὡς ἤδη καὶ κινδυνεύοντας, ὁρᾷν ὅτῳ τρόπῳ μὴ ἀνεθήσεται τὰ πράγματα, καὶ τὰ τοῦ πολέμου ἅμα ἀντέχειν, καὶ ἐσφέρειν αὐτοὺς προθύμως χρήματα καὶ ἤν τι ἄλλο δέῃ, ὡς οὐκέτι ἄλλοις ἢ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ταλαιπωροῦντας.

[32] Thucyd. viii, 73. Καὶ Ὑπέρβολόν τέ τινα τῶν Ἀθηναίων, μοχθηρὸν ἄνθρωπον, ὠστρακισμένον οὐ διὰ δυνάμεως καὶ ἀξιώματος φόβον, ἀλλὰ διὰ πονηρίαν καὶ αἰσχύνην τῆς πόλεως, ἀποκτείνουσι μετὰ Χαρμίνου τε ἑνὸς τῶν στρατηγῶν καί τινων τῶν παρὰ σφίσιν Ἀθηναίων, πίστιν διδόντες αὐτοῖς, καὶ ἄλλα μετ᾽ αὐτῶν τοιαῦτα ξυνέπραξαν, τοῖς τε πλείοσιν ὥρμηντο ἐπιτίθεσθαι.

I presume that the words, ἄλλα τοιαῦτα ξυνέπραξαν, must mean that other persons were assassinated along with Hyperbolus.

The incorrect manner in which Mr. Mitford recounts these proceedings at Samos has been properly commented on by Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. Gr. ch. xxviii, vol. iv, p. 30). It is the more surprising, since the phrase μετὰ Χαρμίνου, which Mr. Mitford has misunderstood, is explained in a special note of Duker.

[33] Thucyd. viii, 73, 74. οὐκ ἠξίουν περιϊδεῖν αὐτοὺς σφᾶς τε διαφθαρέντας, καὶ Σάμον Ἀθηναίοις ἀλλοτριωθεῖσαν, etc.

... οὐ γὰρ ᾔδεσάν πω τοὺς τετρακοσίους ἄρχοντας, etc.

[34] Thucyd. viii, 73. καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα τοὺς Παράλους, ἄνδρας Ἀθηναίους τε καὶ ἐλευθέρους πάντας ἐν τῇ νηῒ πλέοντας, καὶ ἀεὶ δήποτε ὀλιγαρχίᾳ καὶ μὴ παρούσῃ ἐπικειμένους.

Peitholaus called the paralus ῥόπαλον τοῦ δήμου, “the club, staff, or mace of the people.” (Aristotel. Rhetoric, iii, 3.)

[35] Thucyd. viii, 73. Καὶ τριάκοντα μέν τινας ἀπέκτειναν τῶν τριακοσίων, τρεῖς δὲ τοὺς αἰτιωτάτους φυγῇ ἐζημίωσαν· τοῖς δ᾽ ἄλλοις οὐ μνησικακοῦντες δημοκρατούμενοι τὸ λοιπὸν ξυνεπολίτευον.

[36] Thucyd. viii. 74.

[37] Thucyd. viii, 1. About the countenance which all these probûli lent to the conspiracy, see Aristotle, Rhetoric, iii, 18, 2.

Respecting the activity of Agnon, as one of the probûli, in the same cause, see Lysias, Orat. xii, cont. Eratosthen. c. 11, p. 426, Reisk. sect. 66.

[38] Thucyd. viii, 69. Οἱ εἴκοσι καὶ ἑκατὸν μετ᾽ αὐτῶν (that is, along with the Four Hundred) Ἕλληνες νεανίσκοι, οἷς ἐχρῶντο εἴ τί που δέοι χειρουργεῖν.

Dr. Arnold explains the words Ἕλληνες νεανίσκοι to mean some of the members of the aristocratical clubs, or unions, formerly spoken of. But I cannot think that Thucydidês would use such an expression to designate Athenian citizens: neither is it probable that Athenian citizens would be employed in repeated acts of such a character.

[39] Even Peisander himself had professed the strongest attachment to the democracy, coupled with exaggerated violence against parties suspected of oligarchical plots, four years before, in the investigations which followed on the mutilation of the Hermæ at Athens (Andokidês de Myster. c. 9, 10, sects. 36-43).

It is a fact that Peisander was one of the prominent movers on both these two occasions, four years apart. And if we could believe Isokratês (de Bigis, sects. 4-7, p. 347), the second of the two occasions was merely the continuance and consummation of a plot which had been projected and begun on the first, and in which the conspirators had endeavored to enlist Alkibiadês. The latter refused, so his son, the speaker in the above-mentioned oration, contends, in consequence of his attachment to the democracy; upon which the oligarchical conspirators, incensed at his refusal, got up the charge of irreligion against him and procured his banishment.

Though Droysen and Wattenbach (De Quadringentorum Athenis Factione, pp. 7, 8, Berlin, 1842) place confidence, to a considerable extent, in this manner of putting the facts, I consider it to be nothing better than complete perversion; irreconcilable with Thucydidês, confounding together facts unconnected in themselves as well as separated by a long interval of time, and introducing unreal causes, for the purpose of making out, what was certainly not true, that Alkibiadês was a faithful friend of the democracy, and even a sufferer in its behalf.

[40] Thucyd. viii, 66.

[41] Thucyd. viii. 68. νομίζων οὐκ ἄν ποτε αὐτὸν (Alkibiadês) κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ὑπ᾽ ὀλιγαρχίας κατελθεῖν, etc.

[42] Thucyd. viii, 64.

[43] Thucyd. viii, 65. Οἱ δὲ ἀμφὶ τὸν Πείσανδρον παραπλέοντές τε, ὥσπερ ἐδέδοκτο, τοὺς δήμους ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι κατέλυον, καὶ ἅμα ἔστιν ἀφ᾽ ὧν χωρίων καὶ ὁπλίτας ἔχοντες σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ξυμμάχους ἦλθον ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας. Καὶ καταλαμβάνουσι τὰ πλεῖστα τοῖς ἑταίροις προειργασμένα.

We may gather from c. 69 that the places which I have named in the text were among those visited by Peisander: all of them lay very much in his way from Samos to Athens.

[44] Thucyd. viii, 67. Καὶ πρῶτον μὲν τὸν δῆμον ξυλλέξαντες εἶπον γνώμην, δέκα ἄνδρας ἑλέσθαι ξυγγραφέας αὐτοκράτορας, τούτους δὲ ξυγγράψαντας γνώμην ἐσενεγκεῖν ἐς τὸν δῆμον ἐς ἡμέραν ῥητὴν, καθ᾽ ὅτι ἄριστα ἡ πόλις οἰκήσεται.

In spite of certain passages found in Suidas and Harpokration (see K. F. Hermann, Lehrbuch der Griechischen Staats Alterthümer, sect. 167, note 12: compare also Wattenbach, De Quadringentor. Factione, p. 38), I cannot think that there was any connection between these ten ξυγγραφεῖς, and the Board of πρόβουλοι mentioned as having been before named (Thucyd. viii, 1). Nor has the passage in Lysias, to which Hermann makes allusion, anything to do with these ξυγγραφεῖς. The mention of Thirty persons by Androtion and Philochorus, seems to imply that they, or Harpokration, confounded the proceedings ushering in this oligarchy of Four Hundred, with those before the subsequent oligarchy of Thirty. The σύνεδροι, or ξυγγραφεῖς, mentioned by Isokratês (Areopagit. Or. vii, sect. 67) might refer either to the case of the Four Hundred or to that of the Thirty.

[45] Thucyd. viii, 67. Ἔπειτα, ἐπειδὴ ἡ ἡμέρα ἐφῆκε, ξυνέκλῃσαν τὴν ἐκκλησίαν ἐς τὸν Κόλωνον (ἔστι δ᾽ ἱερὸν Ποσειδῶνος ἔξω πόλεως, ἀπέχον σταδίους μάλιστα δέκα), etc.

The very remarkable word ξυνέκλῃσαν, here used respecting the assembly, appears to me to refer (not, as Dr. Arnold supposes in his note, to any existing practice observed even in the usual assemblies which met in the Pnyx, but rather) to a departure from the usual practice, and the employment of a stratagem in reference to this particular meeting.

Kolônus was one of the Attic demes: indeed, there seems reason to imagine that two distinct demes bore this same name (see Boeckh, in the Commentary appended to his translation of the Antigonê of Sophoklês, pp. 190, 191: and Ross, Die Demen von Attika, pp. 10, 11). It is in the grove of the Eumenides, hard by this temple of Poseidon, that Sophoklês has laid the scene of his immortal drama, the Œdipus Koloneus.

[46] Compare the statement in Lysias (Orat. xii, cont. Eratosth. s. 76, p. 127) respecting the small numbers who attended and voted at the assembly by which the subsequent oligarchy of Thirty was named.

[47] Thucyd. viii, 68. Ἐλθόντας δὲ αὐτοὺς τετρακοσίους ὄντας ἐς τὸ βουλευτήριον, ἄρχειν ὅπῃ ἂν ἄριστα γιγνώσκωσιν, αὐτοκράτορας, καὶ τοὺς πεντακισχιλίους δὲ ξυλλέγειν, ὁπόταν αὐτοῖς δοκῇ.

[48] Thucyd. viii, 66. ἦν δὲ τοῦτο εὐπρεπὲς πρὸς τοὺς πλείους, ἐπεὶ ἕξειν γε τὴν πόλιν οἵπερ καὶ μεθιστάναι ἔμελλον.

Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 26.

[49] Thucyd. viii, 72. Πέμπουσι δὲ ἐς τὴν Σάμον δέκα ἄνδρας ... διδάξοντας—πεντακισχίλιοι δὲ ὅτι εἶεν, καὶ οὐ τετρακόσιοι μόνον, οἱ πράσσοντες.

viii, 86. Οἱ δ᾽ ἀπήγγελλον ὡς οὔτε ἐπὶ διαφθορᾷ τῆς πόλεως ἡ μετάστασις γένοιτο, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ ... τῶν δὲ πεντακισχιλίων ὅτε πάντες ἐν τῷ μέρει μεθέξουσιν, etc.

viii, 89. ἀλλὰ τοὺς πεντακισχιλίους ἔργῳ καὶ μὴ ὀνόματι χρῆναι ἀποδεικνύναι, καὶ τὴν πολιτείαν ἰσαιτέραν καθιστάναι.

viii, 92. (After the Four Hundred had already been much opposed and humbled, and were on the point of being put down)—ἦν δὲ πρὸς τὸν ὄχλον ἡ παράκλησις ὡς χρὴ, ὅστις τοὺς πεντακισχιλίους βούλεται ἄρχειν ἀντὶ τῶν τετρακοσίων, ἰέναι ἐπὶ τὸ ἔργον. Ἐπεκρύπτοντο γὰρ ὅμως ἔτι τῶν πεντακισχιλίων τῷ ὀνόματι, μὴ ἄντικρυς δῆμον ὅστις βούλεται ἄρχειν ὀνομάζειν—φοβούμενοι μὴ τῷ ὄντι ὦσι, καὶ πρός τινα εἰπών τίς τι δι᾽ ἀγνοίαν σφαλῇ. Καὶ οἱ τετρακόσιοι διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἤθελον τοὺς πεντακισχιλίους οὔτε εἶναι, οὔτε μὴ ὄντας δήλους εἶναι· τὸ μὲν καταστῆσαι μετόχους τοσούτους, ἄντικρυς ἂν δῆμον ἡγούμενοι, τὸ δ᾽ αὖ ἀφανὲς φόβον ἐς ἀλλήλους παρέξειν.

viii, 93. λέγοντες τούς τε πεντακισχιλίους ἀποφανεῖν, καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἐν μέρει, ᾗ ἂν τοῖς πεντακισχιλίοις δοκῇ, τοὺς τετρακοσίους ἔσεσθαι, τέως δὲ τὴν πόλιν μηδενὶ τρόπῳ διαφθείρειν, etc.

Compare also c. 97.

[50] Compare the striking passage (Thucyd. viii, 92) cited in my previous note.

[51] See the jests of Aristophanês, about the citizens all in armor, buying their provisions in the market-place and carrying them home, in the Lysistrata, 560: a comedy represented about December 412 or January 411 B.C., three months earlier than the events here narrated.

[52] Thucyd. viii, 69, 70.

[53] This striking and deep-seated regard of the Athenians for all the forms of an established constitution, makes itself felt even by Mr. Mitford (Hist. Gr. ch. xix. sect. v, vol. iv, p. 235).

[54] See Plutarch, Periklês, c. 10; Diodor. xi, 77; and vol. v, of this History chap. xlvi, p. 370.

[55] Thucyd. viii, 70. I imagine that this must be the meaning of the words τὰ τε ἄλλα ἔνεμον κατὰ κράτος τὴν πόλιν.

[56] Thucyd. viii, 71.

[57] Thucyd. viii, 72. This allegation, respecting the number of citizens who attended in the Athenian democratical assemblies, has been sometimes cited as if it carried with it the authority of Thucydidês; which is a great mistake, duly pointed out by all the best recent critics. It is simply the allegation of the Four Hundred, whose testimony, as a guarantee for truth, is worth little enough.

That no assembly had ever been attended by so many as five thousand (οὐδεπώποτε) I certainly am far from believing. It is not improbable, however, that five thousand was an unusually large number of citizens to attend.

Dr. Arnold, in his note, opposes the allegation in part, by remarking that “the law required not only the presence but the sanction of at least six thousand citizens to some particular decrees of the assembly.” It seems to me, however, quite possible that, in cases where this large number of votes was required, as in the ostracism, and where there was no discussion carried on immediately before the voting, the process of voting may have lasted some hours, like our keeping open of a poll. So that though more than six thousand citizens must have voted, altogether, it was not necessary that all should have been present in the same assembly.

[58] Thucyd. viii, 75. Μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο, λαμπρῶς ἤδη ἐς δημοκρατίαν βουλόμενοι μεταστῆσαι τὰ ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ ὅ τε Θρασύβουλος καὶ Θράσυλλος, ὥρκωσαν πάντας τοὺς στρατιώτας τοὺς μεγίστους ὅρκους, καὶ αὐτοὺς τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας μάλιστα, ἦ μὴν δημοκρατήσεσθαι τε καὶ ὁμονοήσειν, καὶ τὸν πρὸς Πελοποννησίους πόλεμον προθύμως διοίσειν, καὶ τοῖς τετρακοσίοις πολέμιοί τε ἔσεσθαι καὶ οὐδὲν ἐπικηρυκεύεσθαι. Ξυνώμνυσαν δὲ καὶ Σαμίων πάντες τὸν αὐτὸν ὅρκον οἱ ἐν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ, καὶ τὰ πράγματα πάντα καὶ τὰ ἀποβησόμενα ἐκ τῶν κινδύνων ξυνεκοινώσαντο οἱ στρατιῶται τοῖς Σαμίοις, νομίζοντες οὔτε ἐκείνοις ἀποστροφὴν σωτηρίας οὔτε σφίσιν εἶναι, ἀλλ᾽ ἐάν τε οἱ τετρακόσιοι κρατήσωσιν ἐάν τε οἱ ἐκ Μιλήτου πολέμιοι, διαφθαρήσεσθαι.

[59] Thucyd. viii, 76. Καὶ παραινέσεις ἄλλας τε ἐποιοῦντο ἐν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ἀνιστάμενοι, καὶ ὡς οὐ δεῖ ἀθυμεῖν ὅτι ἡ πόλις αὐτῶν ἀφέστηκε· τοὺς γὰρ ἐλάσσους ἀπὸ σφῶν τῶν πλεόνων καὶ ἐς πάντα ποριμωτέρων μεθεστάναι.

[60] Thucyd. viii, 76. Βραχὺ δέ τι εἶναι καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄξιον, ᾧ πρὸς τὸ περιγίγνεσθαι τῶν πολεμίων ἡ πόλις χρήσιμος ἦν, καὶ οὐδὲν ἀπολωλεκέναι, οἵ γε μήτε ἀργύριον ἔτι εἶχον πέμπειν, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτοὶ ἐπορίζοντο οἱ στρατιῶται, μήτε βούλευμα χρηστὸν, οὗπερ ἕνεκα πόλις στρατοπέδων κρατεῖ· ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τούτοις τοὺς μὲν ἡμαρτηκέναι, τοὺς πατρίους νόμους καταλύσαντας, αὐτοὶ δὲ σώζειν καὶ ἐκείνους πειράσεσθαι προσαναγκάζειν. Ὥστε οὐδὲ τούτους, οἵπερ ἂν βουλεύοιέν τι χρηστὸν, παρὰ σφίσι χείρους εἶναι.

[61] The application of the Athenians at Samos to Alkibiadês, reminds us of the emphatic language in which Tacitus characterizes an incident in some respects similar. The Roman army, fighting in the cause of Vitellius against Vespasian, had been betrayed by their general Cæcina, who endeavored to carry them over to the latter: his army, however, refused to follow him, adhered to their own cause, and put him under arrest. Being afterwards defeated by the troops of Vespasian, and obliged to capitulate in Cremona, they released Cæcina, and solicited his intercession to obtain favorable terms. “Primores castrorum nomen atque imagines Vitellii amoliuntur; catenas Cæcinæ (nam etiam tum vinctus erat) exsolvunt, orantque, ut causæ suæ deprecator adsistat: aspernantem tumentemque lacrymis fatigant. Extremum malorum, tot fortissimi viri, proditoris opem invocantes.” (Tacitus, Histor. iii, 31.)

[62] Thucyd. viii, 48.

[63] Thucydidês does not expressly mention this communication, but it is implied in the words Ἀλκιβιάδην—ἄσμενον παρέξειν, etc. (viii, 76.)

[64] Thucyd. viii, 81. Θρασύβουλος, ἀεί τε τῆς αὐτῆς γνώμης ἐχόμενος, ἐπειδὴ μετέστησε τὰ πράγματα, ὥστε κατάγειν Ἀλκιβιάδην, καὶ τέλος ἐπ᾽ ἐκκλησίας ἔπεισε τὸ πλῆθος τῶν στρατιωτῶν, etc.

[65] Thucyd. viii, 81. γενομένης δὲ ἐκκλησίας τήν τε ἰδίαν ξυμφορὰν τῆς φυγῆς ἐπῃτιάσατο καὶ ἀνωλοφύρατο ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης, etc.

Contrast the different language of Alkibiadês, vi, 92: viii, 47.

For the word ξυμφορὰν, compare i, 127.

Nothing can be more false and perverted than the manner in which the proceedings of Alkibiadês, during this period, are presented in the Oration of Isokratês de Bigis, sects. 18-23.

[66] Thucyd. viii, 82, 83, 87.

[67] Thucyd. viii, 77-86.

[68] Thucyd. viii, 86. Εἰ δὲ ἐς εὐτέλειάν τι ξυντέτμηται, ὥστε τοὺς στρατιώτας ἔχειν τροφὴν, πάνυ ἐπαινεῖν.

This is a part of the answer of Alkibiadês to the envoys, and therefore indicates what they had urged.

[69] Thucyd. viii, 86. τῶν τε πεντακισχιλίων ὅτι πάντες ἐν τῷ μέρει μεθέξουσιν, etc. I dissent from Dr. Arnold’s construction of this passage, which is followed both by Poppo and by Göller. He says, in his note: “The sense must clearly be, ‘that all the citizens should be of the five thousand in their turn,’ however strange the expression may seem, μεθέξουσι τῶν πεντακισχιλίων. But without referring to the absurdity of the meaning, that all the Five Thousand should partake of the government in their turn,—for they all partook of it as being the sovereign assembly,—yet μετέχειν, in this sense, would require τῶν πραγμάτων after it, and would be at least as harsh, standing alone, as in the construction of μεθέξουσι τῶν πεντακισχιλίων.”

Upon this remark, 1. Μετέχειν may be construed with a genitive case not actually expressed, but understood out of the words preceding; as we may see by Thucyd. ii, 16, where I agree with the interpretation suggested by Matthiæ (Gr. Gr. § 325), rather than with Dr. Arnold’s note.

2. In the present instance, we are not reduced to the necessity of gathering a genitive case for μετέχειν by implication out of previous phraseology: for the express genitive case stands there a line or two before—τῆς πόλεως, the idea of which is carried down without being ever dropped: οἱ δ᾽ ἀπήγγελλον, ὡς οὔτε ἐπὶ διαφθορᾷ τῆς πόλεως ἡ μετάστασις γένοιτο, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ, οὔθ᾽ ἵνα τοῖς πολεμίοις παραδοθῇ (i. e., ἡ πόλις) ... τῶν τε πεντακισχιλίων ὅτι πάντες ἐν τῷ μέρει μεθέξουσιν (i. e., τῆς πόλεως).

There is therefore no harshness of expression; nor is there any absurdity of meaning, as we may see by the repetition of the very same in viii, 93, λέγοντες τούς τε πεντακισχιλίους ἀποφανεῖν, καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἐν μέρει, ᾗ ἂν τοῖς πεντακισχιλίοις δοκῇ, τοὺς τετρακοσίους ἔσεσθαι, etc.

Dr. Arnold’s designation of these Five Thousand as “the sovereign assembly,” is not very accurate. They were not an assembly at all: they had never been called together, nor had anything been said about an intention of calling them together: in reality, they were but a fiction and a name; but even the Four Hundred themselves pretended only to talk of them as partners in the conspiracy and revolution, not as an assembly to be convoked—πεντακισχίλιοι—οἱ πράσσοντες (viii, 72).

As to the idea of bringing all the remaining citizens to equal privileges, in rotation, with the Five Thousand, we shall see that it was never broached until considerably after the Four Hundred had been put down.

[70] Plutarch, Alkibiadês, c. 26.

[71] Thucyd. viii. 86. Καὶ τἄλλα ἐκέλευεν ἀντέχειν, καὶ μηδὲν ἐνδιδόναι τοῖς πολεμίοις· πρὸς μὲν γὰρ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς σωζομένης τῆς πόλεως πολλὴν ἐλπίδα εἶναι καὶ ξυμβῆναι, εἰ δὲ ἅπαξ τὸ ἕτερον σφαλήσεται ἢ τὸ ἐν Σάμῳ ἢ ἐκεῖνοι, οὐδὲ ὅτῳ διαλλαγήσεταί τις ἔτι ἔσεσθαι.

[72] Thucyd. viii. 86. It is very probable that the Melêsias here mentioned was the son of that Thucydidês who was the leading political opponent of Periklês. Melêsias appears as one of the dramatis personæ in Plato’s dialogue called Lachês.

[73] Lysias cont. Eratosthen. sect. 43, c. 9, p. 411, Reisk. οὐ γὰρ νῦν πρῶτον (Eratosthenês) τῷ ὑμετέρῳ πλήθει τὰ ἐναντία ἔπραξεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν Τετρακοσίων ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ ὀλιγαρχίαν καθιστὰς ἔφευγεν ἐξ Ἑλλησπόντου τριηράρχος καταλιπὼν τὴν ναῦν, μετὰ Ἰατροκλέους καὶ ἑτέρων ... ἀφικόμενος δὲ δεῦρο τἀναντία τοῖς βουλομένοις δημοκρατίαν εἶναι ἔπραττε.

[74] Thucyd. viii, 64.

[75] Thucyd. viii, 89, 90. The representation of the character and motives of Theramenês, as given by Lysias in the Oration contra Eratosthenem (Orat. xii, sects. 66, 67, 79; Orat. xiii, cont. Agorat. sects. 12-17), is quite in harmony with that of Thucydidês (viii, 89): compare Aristophan. Ran. 541-966; Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 27-30.

[76] Thucyd. viii, 89. ἦν δὲ τοῦτο μὲν σχῆμα πολιτικὸν τοῦ λόγου αὐτοῖς, κατ᾽ ἰδίας δὲ φιλοτιμίας οἱ πολλοὶ αὐτῶν τῷ τοιούτῳ προσέκειντο, ἐν ᾧπερ καὶ μάλιστα ὀλιγαρχία ἐκ δημοκρατίας γενομένη ἀπόλλυται. Πάντες γὰρ αὐθημερὸν ἀξιοῦσιν οὐχ ὅπως ἴσοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ πολὺ πρῶτος αὐτὸς ἕκαστος εἶναι· ἐκ δὲ δημοκρατίας αἱρέσεως γιγνομένης, ῥᾷον τὰ ἀποβαίνοντα, ὡς οὐκ ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων, ἐλασσούμενός τις φέρει.

I give in the text what appears to me the proper sense of this passage, the last words of which are obscure: see the long notes of the commentators, especially Dr. Arnold and Poppo. Dr. Arnold considers τῶν ὁμοίων as a neuter, and gives the paraphrase of the last clause as follows: “Whereas under an old-established government, they (ambitious men of talent) are prepared to fail: they know that the weight of the government is against them, and are thus spared the peculiar pain of being beaten in a fair race, when they and their competitors start with equal advantages, and there is nothing to lessen the mortification of defeat. Ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐλασσούμενος, is, being beaten when the game is equal, when the terms of the match are fair.”

I cannot concur in Dr. Arnold’s explanation of these words, or of the general sense of the passage. He thinks that Thucydidês means to affirm what applies generally “to an opposition minority when it succeeds in revolutionizing the established government, whether the government be a democracy or a monarchy; whether the minority be an aristocratical party or a popular one.” It seems to me, on the contrary, that the affirmation bears only on the special case of an oligarchical conspiracy subverting a democracy, and that the comparison taken is applicable only to the state of things as it stood under the preceding democracy.

Next, the explanation given of the words by Dr. Arnold, assumes that “to be beaten in a fair race, or when the terms of the match are fair,” causes to the loser the maximum of pain and offence. This is surely not the fact: or rather, the reverse is the fact. The man who loses his cause or his election through unjust favor, jealousy, or antipathy, is more hurt than if he had lost it under circumstances where he could find no injustice to complain of. In both cases, he is doubtless mortified; but if there be injustice, he is offended and angry as well as mortified: he is disposed to take vengeance on men whom he looks upon as his personal enemies. It is important to distinguish the mortification of simple failure, from the discontent and anger arising out of belief that the failure has been unjustly brought about: it is this discontent, tending to break out in active opposition, which Thucydidês has present to his mind in the comparison which he takes between the state of feeling which precedes and follows the subversion of the democracy.

It appears to me that the words τῶν ὁμοίων are masculine, and that they have reference, like πάντες and ἴσοι, in the preceding line, to the privileged minority of equal confederates who are supposed to have just got possession of the government. At Sparta, the word οἱ ὅμοιοι acquired a sort of technical sense, to designate the small ascendent minority of wealthy Spartan citizens, who monopolized in their own hands political power, to the practical exclusion of the remainder (see Xenoph. Hellen. iii. 3, 5; Xenoph. Resp. Lac. x, 7; xiii, 1; Demosth. cont. Lept. s. 88). Now these ὅμοιοι, or peers, here indicated by Thucydidês as the peers of a recently-formed oligarchy, are not merely equal among themselves, but rivals one with another, and personally known to each other. It is important to bear in mind all these attributes as tacitly implied, though not literally designated or connoted by the word ὅμοιοι, or peers; because the comparison instituted by Thucydidês is founded on all the attributes taken together; just as Aristotle (Rhetoric, ii, 8; ii, 13, 4), in speaking of the envy and jealousy apt to arise towards τοὺς ὁμοίους, considers them as ἀντεράστας and ἀνταγωνίστας.

The Four Hundred at Athens were all peers,—equals, rivals, and personally known among one another,—who had just raised themselves by joint conspiracy to supreme power. Theramenês, one of the number, conceives himself entitled to preëminence, but finds that he is shut out from it, the men who shut him out being this small body of known equals and rivals. He is inclined to impute the exclusion to personal motives on the part of this small knot; to selfish ambition on the part of each; to ill-will, to jealousy, to wrongful partiality; so that he thinks himself injured, and the sentiment of injury is embittered by the circumstance that those from whom it proceeds are a narrow, known, and definite body of colleagues. Whereas, if his exclusion had taken place under the democracy, by the suffrage of a large, miscellaneous, and personally unknown collection of citizens, he would have been far less likely to carry off with him a sense of injury. Doubtless he would have been mortified; but he would not have looked upon the electors in the light of jealous or selfish rivals, nor would they form a definite body before him for his indignation to concentrate itself upon. Thus Nikomachidês—whom Sokratês (see Xenophon, Memor. iii, 4) meets returning mortified because the people had chosen another person and not him as general—would have been not only mortified, but angry and vindictive besides, if he had been excluded by a few peers and rivals.

Such, in my judgment, is the comparison which Thucydidês wishes to draw between the effect of disappointment inflicted by the suffrage of a numerous and miscellaneous body of citizens, compared with disappointment inflicted by a small knot of oligarchical peers upon a competitor among their own number, especially at a moment when the expectations of all these peers are exaggerated, in consequence of the recent acquisition of their power. I believe the remark of the historian to be quite just; and that the disappointment in the first case is less intense, less connected with the sentiment of injury, and less likely to lead to active manifestation of enmity. This is one among the advantages of a numerous suffrage.

I cannot better illustrate the jealousies pretty sure to break out among a small number of ὅμοιοι, or rival peers, than by the description which Justin gives of the leading officers of Alexander the Great, immediately after that monarch’s death (Justin, xii, 2):—

“Cæterum, occiso Alexandro, non, ut læti, ita et securi fuere, omnibus unum locum competentibus: nec minus milites invicem se timebant, quorum et libertas solutior et favor incertus erat. Inter ipsos vero æqualitas discordiam augebat, nemine tantum cæteros excedente, ut ei aliquis se submitteret.”

Compare Plutarch, Lysander, c. 23.

Haack and Poppo think that ὁμοίων cannot be masculine, because ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐλασσούμενος would not then be correct, but ought to be ὑπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐλασσούμενος. I should dispute, under all circumstances, the correctness of this criticism: for there are quite enough parallel cases to defend the use of ἀπὸ here, (see Thucyd. i, 17; iii, 82; iv, 115; vi, 28, etc.) But we need not enter into the debate; for the genitive τῶν ὁμοίων depends rather upon τὰ ἀποβαίνοντα which precedes, than upon ἐλασσούμενος which follows; and the preposition ἀπὸ is what we should naturally expect. To mark this, I have put a comma after ἀποβαίνοντα as well as after ὁμοίων.

To show that an opinion is not correct, indeed, does not afford certain evidence that Thucydidês may not have advanced it: for he might be mistaken. But it ought to count as good presumptive evidence, unless the words peremptorily bind us to the contrary, which in this case they do not.

[77] Thucyd. viii, 86, 2. Of this sentence, from φοβούμενοι down to καθιστάναι, I only profess to understand the last clause. It is useless to discuss the many conjectural amendments of a corrupt text, none of them satisfactory.

[78] Thucyd. viii, 86-89. It is alleged by Andokidês (in an oration delivered many years afterwards before the people of Athens, De Reditu suo, sects. 10-15), that during this spring he furnished the armament at Samos with wood proper for the construction of oars, only obtained by the special favor of Archelaus king of Macedonia, and of which the armament then stood in great need. He farther alleges, that he afterwards visited Athens, while the Four Hundred were in full dominion; and that Peisander, at the head of this oligarchical body, threatened his life for having furnished such valuable aid to the armament, then at enmity with Athens. Though he saved his life by clinging to the altar, yet he had to endure bonds and manifold hard treatment.

Of these claims, which Andokidês prefers to the favor of the subsequent democracy, I do not know how much is true.

[79] Thucyd. viii, 89. σαφέστατα δὲ αὐτοὺς ἐπῆρε τὰ ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου ἰσχυρὰ ὄντα, καὶ ὅτι αὐτοῖς οὐκ ἐδόκει μόνιμον τὸ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας ἔσεσθαι. ἠγωνίζετο οὖν εἷς ἕκαστος προστάτης τοῦ δήμου ἔσεσθαι.

This is a remarkable passage, as indicating what is really meant by προστάτης τοῦ δήμου: “the leader of a popular opposition.” Theramenês, and the other persons here spoken of, did not even mention the name of the democracy,—they took up simply the name of the Five Thousand,—yet they are still called πρόσταται τοῦ δήμου, inasmuch as the Five Thousand were a sort of qualified democracy, compared to the Four Hundred.

The words denote the leader of a popular party, as opposed to an oligarchical party (see Thucyd. iii, 70; iv, 66; vi, 35), in a form of government either entirely democratical, or at least, in which the public assembly is frequently convoked and decides on many matters of importance. Thucydidês does not apply the words to any Athenian except in the case now before us respecting Theramenês: he does not use the words even with respect to Kleon, though he employs expressions which seem equivalent to it (iii, 36; iv, 21)—ἀνὴρ δημαγωγὸς κατ᾽ ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον ὢν καὶ τῷ πλήθει πιθανώτατος, etc. This is very different from the words which he applies to Periklês—ὢν γὰρ δυνατώτατος τῶν καθ᾽ ἑαυτὸν καὶ ἄγων τὴν πολιτείαν (i, 127). Even in respect to Nikias, he puts him in conjunction with Pleistoanax at Sparta, and talks of both of them as σπεύδοντες τὰ μάλιστα τὴν ἡγεμονίαν (v, 16).

Compare the note of Dr. Arnold on vi, 35.

[80] Thucyd. viii, 92. τὸ μὲν καταστῆσαι μετόχους τοσούτους, ἄντικρυς ἂν δῆμον ἡγούμενοι, etc.

Aristotle (Polit. v, 5, 4) calls Phrynichus the demagogue of the Four Hundred; that is, the person who most strenuously served their interests and struggled for their favor.

[81] Thucyd. viii, 90-92. τὸ τεῖχος τοῦτο, καὶ πυλίδας ἔχον, καὶ ἐσόδους, καὶ ἐπεισαγωγὰς τῶν πολεμίων, etc.

I presume that the last expression refers to facilities for admitting the enemy either from the sea-side, or from the land-side; that is to say, from the northwestern corner of the old wall of Peiræus, which formed one side of the new citadel.

See Leake’s Topographie Athens, pp. 269, 270, Germ. transl.

[82] Thucyd. viii, 90. διῳκοδόμησαν δὲ καὶ στοὰν, etc.

I agree with the note in M. Didot’s translation, that this portico, or halle, open on three sides, must he considered as preëxisting; not as having been first built now; which seems to be the supposition of Colonel Leake, and the commentators generally.

[83] Thucyd. viii, 91, 92. Ἀλεξικλέα, στρατηγὸν ὄντα ἐκ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ μάλιστα πρὸς τοὺς ἑταίρους τετραμμένον, etc.

[84] Thucyd. viii, 91. Ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς πολεμίους ἐσαγαγόμενοι ἄνευ τειχῶν καὶ νεῶν ξυμβῆναι, καὶ ὁπωσοῦν τὰ τῆς πόλεως ἔχειν, εἰ τοῖς γε σώμασι σφῶν ἄδεια ἔσται.

Ibid. ἐπειδὴ οἱ ἐκ τῆς Λακεδαίμονος πρέσβεις οὐδὲν πράξαντες ἀνεχώρησαν τοῖς πᾶσι ξυμβατικὸν, etc.

[85] Thucyd. viii, 91. ἦν δέ τι καὶ τοιοῦτον ἀπὸ τῶν τὴν κατηγορίαν ἐχόντων, καὶ οὐ πάνυ διαβολὴ μόνον τοῦ λόγου.

The reluctant language, in which Thucydidês admits the treasonable concert of Antiphon and his colleagues with the Lacedæmonians, deserves notice; also c. 94. τάχα μέν τι καὶ ἀπὸ ξυγκειμένου λόγου, etc.

[86] Thucyd. viii, 91. The statement of Plutarch is in many respects different (Alkibiadês, c. 25).

[87] Thucyd. viii, 92. τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, τῶν ὁπλιτῶν τὸ στῖφος ταῦτα ἐβούλετο.

[88] Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 26, represents Hermon as one of the assassins of Phrynichus.

[89] See Lysias, Orat. xx, pro Polystrato. The fact that Polystratus was only eight days a member of the Four Hundred, before their fall, is repeated three distinct times in this Oration (c. 2, 4, 5, pp. 672, 674, 679, Reisk.), and has all the air of truth.

[90] Thucyd. viii, 92, 93. In the Oration of Demosthenês, or Deinarchus, against Theokrinês (c. 17, p. 1343), the speaker, Epicharês, makes allusion to this destruction of the fort at Ectioneia by Aristokratês uncle of his grandfather. The allusion chiefly deserves notice from its erroneous mention of Kritias and the return of the Demos from exile, betraying a complete confusion between the events in the time of the Four Hundred and those in the time of the Thirty.

[91] Lysias, Orat. xx, pro Polystrato, c. 4, p. 675, Reisk.

This task was confided to Polystratus, a very recent member of the Four Hundred, and therefore probably less unpopular than the rest. In his defence after the restoration of the democracy, he pretended to have undertaken the task much against his will, and to have drawn up a list containing nine thousand names instead of five thousand.

It may probably have been in this meeting of the Four Hundred, that Antiphon delivered his oration strongly recommending concord, Περὶ ὁμονοίας. All his eloquence was required just now, to bring back the oligarchical party, if possible, into united action. Philostratus (Vit. Sophistar. c. xv, p. 500, ed. Olear.) expresses great admiration for this oration, which is several times alluded to both by Harpokration and Suidas. See Westermann, Gesch. der Griech. Beredsamkeit, Beilage ii, p. 276.

[92] Thucyd. viii, 93. Τὸ δὲ πᾶν πλῆθος τῶν ὁπλιτῶν, ἀπὸ πολλῶν καὶ πρὸς πολλοὺς λόγων γιγνομένων, ἠπιώτερον ἦν ἢ πρότερον, καὶ ἐφοβεῖτο μάλιστα περὶ τοῦ παντὸς πολιτικοῦ.

[93] Thucyd. viii, 93. ξυνεχώρησαν δὲ ὥστ᾽ ἐς ἡμέραν ῥητὴν ἐκκλησίαν ποιῆσαι ἐν τῷ Διονυσίῳ περὶ ὁμονοίας.

The definition of time must here allude to the morrow, or to the day following the morrow; at least it seems impossible that the city could be left longer than this interval without a government.

[94] Thucyd. viii, 94.

[95] Lysias, Orat. xx, pro Polystrato, c. 4, p. 676, Reisk.

From another passage in this oration, it would seem that Polystratus was in command of the fleet, possibly enough, in conjunction with Thymocharês, according to a common Athenian practice (c. 5, p. 679). His son, who defends him, affirms that he was wounded in the battle.

Diodorus (xiii, 34) mentions the discord among the crews on board these ships under Thymocharês, almost the only point which we learn from his meagre notice of this interesting period.

[96] Thucyd. viii, 5; viii, 95.

[97] Thucyd. viii, 95. To show what Eubœa became at a later period, see Demosthenês, De Fals. Legat. c. 64, p. 409: τὰ ἐν Εὐβοίᾳ κατασκευασθησόμενα ὁρμητήρια ἐφ᾽ ὑμᾶς, etc.; and Demosthenês, De Coronâ, c. 71; ἄπλους δ᾽ ἡ θάλασσα ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκ τῆς Εὐβοίας ὁρμωμένων λῃστῶν γέγονε, etc.

[98] Thucyd. viii, 96. Μάλιστα δ᾽ αὐτοὺς καὶ δι᾽ ἐγγυτάτου ἐθορύβει, εἰ οἱ πολέμιοι τολμήσουσι νενικηκότες εὐθὺς σφῶν ἐπὶ τὸν Πειραιᾶ ἔρημον ὄντα νεῶν πλεῖν· καὶ ὅσον οὐκ ἤδη ἐνόμιζον αὐτοὺς παρεῖναι. Ὅπερ ἄν, εἰ τολμηρότεροι ἦσαν, ῥᾳδίως ἂν ἐποίησαν· καὶ ἢ διέστησαν ἂν ἔτι μᾶλλον τὴν πόλιν ἐφορμοῦντες, ἤ εἰ ἐπολιόρκουν μένοντες, καὶ τὰς ἀπ᾽ Ἰωνίας ναῦς ἠνάγκασαν ἂν βοηθῆσαι, etc.

[99] Thucyd. viii, 96; vii, 21-55.

[100] Thucyd. viii, 97.

[101] It is to this assembly that I refer, with confidence, the remarkable dialogue of contention between Peisander and Sophoklês, one of the Athenian probûli, mentioned in Aristotel. Rhetoric. iii, 18, 2. There was no other occasion on which the Four Hundred were ever publicly thrown upon their defence at Athens.

This was not Sophoklês the tragic poet, but another person of the same name, who appears afterwards as one of the oligarchy of Thirty.

[102] Thucyd. viii, 97. Καὶ ἐκκλησίαν ξυνέλεγον, μίαν μὲν εὐθὺς τότε πρῶτον ἐς τὴν Πνύκα καλουμένην, οὗπερ καὶ ἄλλοτε εἰώθεσαν, ἐν ᾗπερ καὶ τοὺς τετρακοσίους καταπαύσαντες τοῖς πεντακισχιλίοις ἐψηφίσαντο τὰ πράγματα παραδοῦναι· εἶναι δὲ αὐτῶν, ὁπόσοι καὶ ὅπλα παρέχονται· καὶ μισθὸν μηδένα φέρειν, μηδεμιᾷ ἀρχῇ, εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἐπάρατον ἐποιήσαντο. Ἐγίγνοντο δὲ καὶ ἄλλαι ὕστερον πυκναὶ ἐκκλησίαι, ἀφ᾽ ὧν καὶ νομοθέτας καὶ τἄλλα ἐψηφίσαντο ἐς τὴν πολιτείαν.

In this passage I dissent from the commentators on two points. First, they understand this number Five Thousand as a real definite list of citizens, containing five thousand names, neither more nor less. Secondly, they construe νομοθέτας, not in the ordinary meaning which it bears in Athenian constitutional language, but in the sense of ξυγγραφεῖς (c. 67), “persons to model the constitution, corresponding to the ξυγγραφεῖς appointed by the aristocratical party a little before,” to use the words of Dr. Arnold.

As to the first point, which is sustained also by Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. Gr. ch. xxviii, vol. iv, p. 51, 2d ed.), Dr. Arnold really admits what is the ground of my opinion, when he says: “Of course the number of citizens capable of providing themselves with heavy arms must have much exceeded five thousand: and it is said in the defence of Polystratus, one of the Four Hundred (Lysias, p. 675, Reisk.), that he drew up a list of nine thousand. But we must suppose that all who could furnish heavy arms were eligible into the number of the Five Thousand, whether the members were fixed on by lot, by election, or by rotation; as it had been proposed to appoint the Four Hundred by rotation out of the Five Thousand (viii, 93).”

Dr. Arnold here throws out a supposition which by no means conforms to the exact sense of the words of Thucydidês—εἶναι δὲ αὐτῶν, ὁπόσοι καὶ ὅπλα παρέχονται. These words distinctly signify, that all who furnished heavy arms should be of the Five Thousand, should belong of right to that body, which is something different from being eligible into the number of the Five Thousand, either by lot, rotation, or otherwise. The language of Thucydidês, when he describes, in the passage referred to by Dr. Arnold, c. 93, the projected formation of the Four Hundred by rotation out of the Five Thousand, is very different: καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἐν μέρει τοὺς τετρακοσίους ἔσεσθαι, etc. M. Boeckh (Public Economy of Athens, bk. ii, ch. 21, p. 268, Eng. Tr.) is not satisfactory in his description of this event.

The idea which I conceive of the Five Thousand, as a number existing from the commencement only in talk and imagination, neither realized nor intended to be realized, coincides with the full meaning of this passage of Thucydidês, as well as with everything which he had before said about them.

I will here add that ὁπόσοι ὅπλα παρέχονται means persons furnishing arms, not for themselves alone, but for others also (Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 4, 15.)

As to the second point, the signification of νομοθέτας, I stand upon the general use of that word in Athenian political language: see the explanation earlier in this History, vol. v, ch. xlvi, p. 373. It is for the commentators to produce some justification of the unusual meaning which they assign to it: “persons to model the constitution; commissioners who drew up the new constitution,” as Dr. Arnold, in concurrence with the rest, translates it. Until some justification is produced, I venture to believe that νομοθέται, is a word which would not be used in that sense with reference to nominees chosen by the democracy, and intended to act with the democracy; for it implies a final, decisive, authoritative determination; whereas the ξυγγραφεῖς, or “commissioners to draw up a constitution,” were only invested with the function of submitting something for approbation to the public assembly or competent authority; that is, assuming that the public assembly remained an efficient reality.

Moreover, the words καὶ τἄλλα would hardly be used in immediate sequence to νομοθέτας, if the latter word meant that which the commentators suppose: “Commissioners for framing a constitution, and the other things towards the constitution.” Such commissioners are surely far too prominent and initiative in their function to be named in this way. Let us add, that the most material items in the new constitution, if we are so to call it, have already been distinctly specified as settled by public vote, before these νομοθέται are even named.

It is important to notice, that even the Thirty, who were named six years afterwards to draw up a constitution, at the moment when Sparta was mistress of Athens, and when the people were thoroughly put down, are not called Νομοθέται, but are named by a circumlocution equivalent to Ἔδοξε τῷ δήμῳ, τριάκοντα ἄνδρας ἑλέσθαι, οἳ τοὺς πατρίους νόμους συγγράψουσι, καθ᾽ οὓς πολιτεύσουσι.—Αἱρεθέντες δὲ, ἐφ᾽ ᾧ τε συγγράψαι νόμους καθ᾽ οὕστινας πολιτεύσοιντο, τούτους μὲν ἀεὶ ἔμελλον ξυγγράφειν τε καὶ ἀποδεικνύναι, etc. (Xenophon, Hellen. ii, 3, 2-11.) Xenophon calls Kritias and Chariklês the nomothetæ of the Thirty (Memor. i, 2, 30), but this is not democracy.

For the signification of Νομοθέτης (applied most generally to Solon, sometimes to others, either by rhetorical looseness or by ironical taunt), or Νομοθέται, a numerous body of persons chosen and sworn, see Lysias cont. Nikomach. sects. 3, 33, 37; Andokidês de Mysteriis, sects. 81-85, c. 14, p. 38, where the nomothetæ are a sworn body of Five Hundred, exercising, conjointly with the senate, the function of accepting or rejecting laws proposed to them.

[103] Plutarch, Alkibiadês, c. 33. Cornelius Nepos (Alkibiad. c. 5, and Diodorus, xiii, 38-42) mentions Theramenês as the principal author of the decree for restoring Alkibiadês from exile. But the precise words of the elegy composed by Kritias, wherein the latter vindicates this proceeding to himself, are cited by Plutarch, and are very good evidence. Doubtless many of the leading men supported, and none opposed, the proposition.

[104] Thucyd. viii, 97. Καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα δὴ τὸν πρῶτον χρόνον ἐπί γε ἐμοῦ Ἀθηναῖοι φαίνονται εὖ πολιτεύσαντες· μετρία γὰρ ἥ τε ἐς τοὺς ὀλίγους καὶ τοὺς πολλοὺς ξύγκρασις ἐγένετο, καὶ ἐκ πονηρῶν τῶν πραγμάτων γενομένων τοῦτο πρῶτον ἀνήνεγκε τὴν πόλιν.

I refer the reader to a note on this passage in one of my former volumes, and on the explanation given of it by Dr. Arnold (see vol. v, ch. xlv, p. 330.)

[105] The words of Thucydidês (viii, 97), εἶναι δὲ αὐτῶν, ὁπόσοι καὶ ὅπλα παρέχονται, show that this body was not composed exclusively of those who furnished panoplies. It could never have been intended, for example, to exclude the hippeis, or knights.

[106] Lysias, Orat. xx, pro Polystrato, c. 4, p. 675, Reisk.

[107] Thucyd. viii, 86.

[108] Thucyd. viii, 92. τὸ μὲν καταστῆσαι μετόχους τοσούτους, ἄντικρυς ἂν δῆμον ἡγούμενοι, etc.

[109] See the valuable financial inscriptions in M. Boeckh’s Corpus Inscriptionum, part i, nos. 147, 148, which attest considerable disbursements for the diobely in 410-409 B.C.

Nor does it seem that there was much diminution during these same years in the private expenditure and ostentation of the Chorêgi at the festivals and other exhibitions: see the Oration xxi, of Lysias—Ἀπολογία Δωροδοκίας, c. 1, 2, pp. 698-700, Reiske.

[110] About the date of this psephism, or decree, see Boeckh, Staatshaushaltung der Athener, vol. ii, p. 168, in the comment upon sundry inscriptions appended to his work, not included in the English translation by Mr Lewis; also Meier, De Bonis Damnatorum, sect. ii, pp. 6-10. Wachsmuth erroneously places the date of it after the Thirty; see Hellen. Alterth. ii, ix, p. 267.

[111] Andokidês de Mysteriis, sects. 95-99. (c. 16, p. 48, R.)—Ὁ δ᾽ ἀποκτείνας τὸν ταῦτα ποιήσαντα, καὶ ὁ συμβουλεύσας, ὅσιος ἔστω καὶ εὐαγής. Ὀμόσαι δ᾽ Ἀθηναίους ἅπαντας καθ᾽ ἱερῶν τελείων, κατὰ φυλὰς καὶ κατὰ δήμους, ἀποκτείνειν τὸν ταῦτα ποιήσαντα.

The comment of Sievers (Commentationes De Xenophontis Hellenicis, Berlin, 1833, pp. 18, 19) on the events of this time, is not clear.

[112] Andokidês de Mysteriis, sects. 95-99. (c. 16, p. 48, R.) Ὁπόσοι δ᾽ ὅρκοι ὀμώμονται Ἀθήνῃσιν ἢ ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ ἢ ἄλλοθί που ἐναντίοι τῷ δήμῳ τῷ Ἀθηναίων, λύω καὶ ἀφίημι.

To what particular anti-constitutional oaths allusion is here made, we cannot tell. All those of the oligarchical conspirators, both at Samos and at Athens, are doubtless intended to be abrogated: and this oath, like that of the armament at Samos (Thucyd. viii, 75), is intended to be sworn by every one, including those who had before been members of the oligarchical conspiracy. Perhaps it may also be intended to abrogate the covenant sworn by the members of the political clubs or ξυνωμοσίαι among themselves, in so far as it pledged them to anti-constitutional acts (Thucyd. viii, 54-81).

[113] Andokidês de Mysteriis, sects. 95-99, (c. 16, p. 48, R.) Ταῦτα δὲ ὀμοσάντων Ἀθηναῖοι πάντες καθ᾽ ἱερῶν τελείων, τὸν νόμιμον ὅρκον, πρὸ Διονυσίων, etc.

[114] Those who think that a new constitution was established, after the deposition of the Four Hundred, are perplexed to fix the period at which the old democracy was restored. K. F. Hermann and others suppose, without any special proof, that it was restored at the time when Alkibiadês returned to Athens in 407 B.C. See K. F. Hermann, Griech. Staats Alterthümer, s. 167, note 13.

[115] Lykurgus adv. Leokrat. sect. 131, c. 31, p. 225: compare Demosthen. adv. Leptin. sect. 138, c. 34, p. 506.

If we wanted any proof, how perfectly reckless and unmeaning is the mention of the name of Solon by the orators, we should find it in this passage of Andokidês. He calls this psephism of Demophantus a law of Solon (sect. 96): see above in this History, vol. iii, ch. xi, p. 122.

[116] Thucyd. viii, 98. Most of these fugitives returned six years afterwards, after the battle of Ægospotami, when the Athenian people again became subject to an oligarchy in the persons of the Thirty. Several of them became members of the senate which worked under the Thirty (Lysias cont. Agorat. sect. 80, c. 18, p. 495).

Whether Aristotelês and Chariklês were among the number of the Four Hundred who now went into exile, as Wattenbach affirms (De Quadringent. Ath. Factione, p. 66), seems not clearly made out.

[117] Thucyd. viii, 89, 90. Ἀρίσταρχος, ἀνὴρ ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα καὶ ἐκ πλείστου ἐναντίος τῷ δήμῳ, etc.

[118] Lysias cont. Eratosthen., c. 11, p. 427, sects. 66-68. Βουλόμενος δὲ (Theramenês) τῷ ὑμετέρῳ πλήθει πιστὸς δοκεῖν εἶναι, Ἀντιφῶντα καὶ Ἀρχεπτόλεμον, φιλτάτους ὄντας αὑτῷ, κατηγορῶν ἀπέκτεινεν· εἰς τοσοῦτον δὲ κακίας ἦλθεν, ὥστε ἅμα μὲν διὰ τὴν πρὸς ἐκείνους πίστιν ὑμᾶς κατεδουλώσατο, διὰ δὲ τὴν πρὸς ὑμᾶς τοὺς φίλους ἀπώλεσεν.

Compare Xenophon, Hellen., ii, 3, 30-33.

[119] That these votes, respecting the memory and the death of Phrynichus, preceded the trial of Antiphon, we may gather from the concluding words of the sentence passed upon Antiphon: see Plutarch, Vit. x, Oratt. p. 834, B: compare Schol. Aristoph. Lysistr. 313.

Both Lysias and Lykurgus, the orators, contain statements about the death of Phrynichus which are not in harmony with Thucydidês. Both these orators agree in reporting the names of the two foreigners who claimed to have slain Phrynichus, and whose claim was allowed by the people afterwards, in a formal reward and vote of citizenship, Thrasybulus of Kalydon, Apollodorus of Megara (Lysias cont. Agorat. c. 18, 492; Lykurg. cont. Leokrat. c. 29, p. 217).

Lykurgus says that Phrynichus was assassinated by night, “near the fountain, hard by the willow-trees:” which is quite contradictory to Thucydidês, who states that the deed was done in daylight, and in the market-place. Agoratus, against whom the speech of Lysias is directed, pretended to have been one of the assassins, and claimed reward on that score.

The story of Lykurgus, that the Athenian people, on the proposition of Kritias, exhumed and brought to trial the dead body of Phrynichus, and that Aristarchus and Alexiklês were put to death for undertaking its defence, is certainly in part false, and probably wholly false. Aristarchus was then at Œnoê, Alexiklês at Dekeleia.

[120] Onomaklês had been one of the colleagues of Phrynichus, as general of the armament in Ionia, in the preceding autumn (Thucyd. viii, 25).

In one of the Biographies of Thucydidês (p. xxii, in Dr. Arnold’s edition), it is stated that Onomaklês was executed along with the other two; but the document cited in the Pseudo-Plutarch contradicts this.

[121] Plutarch, Vit. x, Oratt. p. 834; compare Xenophon, Hellenic. i, 7, 22.

Apolêxis was one of the accusers of Antiphon: see Harpokration, v. Στασιώτης.

[122] Thucyd. viii, 68; Aristotel. Ethic. Eudem. iii, 5.

Rühnken seems quite right (Dissertat. De Antiphont. p. 818, Reisk.) in considering the oration περὶ μεταστάσεως to be Antiphon’s defence of himself; though Westermann (Geschichte der Griech. Beredsamkeit, p. 277) controverts this opinion. This oration is alluded to in several of the articles in Harpokration.

[123] So, Themistoklês, as a traitor, was not allowed to be buried in Attica (Thucyd. i, 138; Cornel. Nepos, Vit. Themistocl. ii, 10). His friends are said to have brought his bones thither secretly.

[124] It is given at length in Pseudo-Plutarch, Vit. x, Oratt. pp. 833, 834. It was preserved by Cæcilius, a Sicilian and rhetorical teacher, of the Augustan age; who possessed sixty orations ascribed to Antiphon, twenty-five of which he considered spurious.

Antiphon left a daughter, whom Kallæschrus sued for in marriage, pursuant to the forms of law, being entitled to do so on the score of near relationship (ἐπεδικάσατο). Kallæschrus was himself one of the Four Hundred, perhaps a brother of Kritias. It seems singular that the legal power of suing at law for a female in marriage, by right of near kin (τοῦ ἐπιδικάζεσθαι), could extend to a female disfranchised and debarred from all rights of citizenship.

If we may believe Harpokration, Andron, who made the motion in the senate for sending Antiphon and Archeptolemus to trial, had been himself a member of the Four Hundred oligarchs, as well as Theramenês (Harp. v. Ἄνδρων).

The note of Dr. Arnold upon that passage (viii, 68) wherein Thucydidês calls Antiphon ἀρετῇ οὐδενὸς ὕστερος, “inferior to no man in virtue,” well deserves to be consulted. This passage shows, in a remarkable manner, what were the political and private qualities which determined the esteem of Thucydidês. It shows that his sympathies went along with the oligarchical party; and that, while the exaggerations of opposition-speakers, or demagogues, such as those which he imputes to Kleon and Hyperbolus, provoked his bitter hatred, exaggerations of the oligarchical warfare, or multiplied assassinations, did not make him like a man the worse. But it shows, at the same time, his great candor in the narration of facts: for he gives an undisguised revelation both of the assassinations, and of the treason, of Antiphon.

[125] Xenoph. Hellenic. i, 7, 28. This is the natural meaning of the passage; though it may also mean that a day for trial was named, but that Aristarchus did not appear. Aristarchus may possibly have been made prisoner in one of the engagements which took place between the garrison of Dekeleia and the Athenians. The Athenian exiles in a body established themselves at Dekeleia, and carried on constant war with the citizens at Athens: see Lysias, De Bonis Niciæ Fratris, Or. xviii, ch. 4, p. 604: Pro Polystrato, Orat. xx, c. 7, p. 688; Andokidês de Mysteriis, c. 17, p. 50.

[126] Lysias, De Oleâ Sacrâ, Or. vii, ch. ii, p. 263, Reisk.

[127] “Quadringentis ipsa dominatio fraudi non fuit; imo qui cum Theramene et Aristocrate steterant, in magno honore habiti sunt: omnibus autem rationes reddendæ fuerunt; qui solum vertissent, proditores judicati sunt, nomina in publico proposita.” (Wattenbach, De Quadringentorum Athenis Factione, p. 65.)

From the psephism of Patrokleidês, passed six years subsequently, after the battle of Ægospotamos, we learn that the names of such among the Four Hundred as did not stay to take their trial, were engraved on pillars distinct from those who were tried and condemned either to fine or to various disabilities; Andokidês de Mysteriis, sects. 75-78: Καὶ ὅσα ὀνόματα τῶν τετρακοσίων τινὸς ἐγγέγραπται, ἢ ἄλλο τι περὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ πραχθέντων ἔστι που γεγραμμένον, πλὴν ὁπόσα ἐν στήλαις γέγραπται τῶν μὴ ἐνθάδε μεινάντων, etc. These last names, as the most criminal, were excepted from the amnesty of Patrokleidês.

We here see that there were two categories among the condemned Four Hundred: 1. Those who remained to stand the trial of accountability, and were condemned either to a fine which they could not pay, or to some positive disability. 2. Those who did not remain to stand their trial, and were condemned par contumace.

Along with the first category we find other names besides those of the Four Hundred, found guilty as their partisans: ἄλλο τι (ὄνομα) περὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ πραχθέντων. Among these partisans we may rank the soldiers mentioned a little before, sect. 75: οἱ στρατιῶται, οἷς ὅτι ἐπέμειναν ἐπὶ τῶν τυράννων ἐν τῇ πόλει, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἦν ἅπερ τοῖς ἄλλοις πολίταις, εἰπεῖν δ᾽ ἐν τῷ δήμῳ οὐκ ἐξῆν αὐτοῖς οὐδὲ βουλεῦσαι, where the preposition ἐπὶ seems to signify not simply contemporaneousness, but a sort of intimate connection, like the phrase ἐπὶ προστάτου οἰκεῖν (see Matthiæ, Gr. Gr. sect. 584; Kühner, Gr. Gr. sect. 611).

The oration of Lysias pro Polystrato is on several points obscure: but we make out that Polystratus was one of the Four Hundred who did not come to stand his trial of accountability, and was therefore condemned in his absence. Severe accusations were made against him, and he was falsely asserted to be the cousin, whereas he was in reality only fellow-demot, of Phrynichus (sects. 20, 24, 11). The defence explains his non-appearance, by saying that he had been wounded at the battle of Eretria, and that the trial took place immediately after the deposition of the Four Hundred (sects. 14, 24). He was heavily fined, and deprived of his citizenship (sects. 15, 33, 38). It would appear that the fine was greater than his property could discharge; accordingly this fine, remaining unpaid, would become chargeable upon his sons after his death, and unless they could pay it, they would come into the situation of insolvent public debtors to the state, which would debar them from the exercise of the rights of citizenship, so long as the debt remained unpaid. But while Polystratus was alive, his sons were not liable to the state for the payment of his fine; and they therefore still remained citizens, and in the full exercise of their rights, though he was disfranchised. They were three sons, all of whom had served with credit as hoplites, and even as horsemen, in Sicily and elsewhere. In the speech before us, one of them prefers a petition to the dikastery, that the sentence passed against his father may be mitigated; partly on the ground that it was unmerited, being passed while his father was afraid to stand forward in his own defence, partly as recompense for distinguished military services of all the three sons. The speech was delivered at a time later than the battle of Kynossêma, in the autumn of this year (sect. 31), but not very long after the overthrow of the Four Hundred, and certainly, I think, long before the Thirty; so that the assertion of Taylor (Vit. Lysiæ, p. 55) that all the extant orations of Lysias bear date after the Thirty, must be received with this exception.

[128] This testimony of Thucydidês is amply sufficient to refute the vague assertions in the Oration xxv, of Lysias (Δήμου Καταλυσ. Ἀπολ. sects. 34, 35), about great enormities now committed by the Athenians; though Mr. Mitford copies these assertions as if they were real history, referring them to a time four years afterwards (History of Greece, ch. xx, s. 1, vol. iv, p. 327).

[129] Thucyd. viii, 68.

[130] See about the events in Korkyra, vol. vi, ch. 1, p. 283.

[131] Thucyd. viii, 75.

[132] Thucyd. viii, 44, 45.

[133] Thucyd. viii, 61, 62 οὐκ ἔλασσον ἔχοντες means a certain success, not very decisive.

[134] Thucyd. viii, 63.

[135] Thucyd. viii, 78, 79.

[136] Thucyd. viii, 62.

[137] Thucyd. viii, 79.

[138] Thucyd. viii, 80-99.

[139] Thucyd. viii, 83, 84.

[140] Thucyd. viii, 84. Ὁ μέντοι Λίχας οὔτε ἠρέσκετο αὐτοῖς, ἔφη τε χρῆναι Τισσαφέρνει καὶ δουλεύειν Μιλησίους καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐν τῇ βασιλέως τὰ μέτρια, καὶ ἐπιθεραπεύειν ἕως ἂν τὸν πόλεμον εὖ θῶνται. Οἱ δὲ Μιλήσιοι ὠργίζοντό τε αὐτῷ καὶ διὰ ταῦτα καὶ δι᾽ ἄλλα τοιουτότροπα, etc.

[141] Thucyd. viii, 85.

[142] Thucyd. viii, 87.

[143] Thucyd. viii, 87. This greater total, which Tissaphernês pretended that the Great King purposed to send, is specified by Diodorus at three hundred sail. Thucydidês does not assign any precise number (Diodor. xiii, 38, 42, 46).

On a subsequent occasion, too, we hear of the Phenician fleet as intended to be augmented to a total of three hundred sail (Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 4, 1). It seems to have been the sort of standing number for a fleet worthy of the Persian king.

[144] Thucyd. viii, 87, 88, 99.

[145] Diodor. xiii, 38.

[146] Thucyd. viii, 100. Αἰσθόμενος δὲ ὅτι ἐν τῇ Χίῳ εἴη, καὶ νομίσας αὐτὸν καθέξειν αὐτοῦ, σκοποὺς μὲν κατεστήσατο καὶ ἐν τῇ Λέσβῳ, καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀντιπέρας ἠπείρῳ, εἰ ἄρα ποι κινοῖντο αἱ νῆες, ὅπως μὴ λάθοιεν, etc.

I construe τῇ ἀντιπέρας ἠπείρῳ, as meaning the mainland opposite Chios, not opposite Lesbos. The words may admit either sense, since Χίῳ and αὐτοῦ follow so immediately before: and the situation for the scouts was much more suitable, opposite the northern portion of Chios.

[147] Thucyd. viii, 101. The latter portion of this voyage is sufficiently distinct; the earlier portion less so. I describe it in the text differently from all the best and most recent editors of Thucydidês; from whom I dissent with the less reluctance, as they all here take the gravest liberty with his text, inserting the negative οὐ on pure conjecture, without the authority of a single MS. Niebuhr has laid it down as almost a canon of criticism that this is never to be done: yet here we have Krüger recommending it, and Haack, Göller, Dr. Arnold, Poppo, and M. Didot, all adopting it as a part of the text of Thucydidês; without even following the caution of Bekker in his small edition, who admonishes the reader, by inclosing the word in brackets. Nay, Dr. Arnold goes so far as to say in note, “This correction is so certain and so necessary, that it only shows the inattention of the earlier editors that it was not made long since.”

The words of Thucydidês, without this correction, and as they stood universally before Haack’s edition (even in Bekker’s edition of 1821), are:—

Ὁ δὲ Μίνδαρος ἐν τούτῳ καὶ αἱ ἐκ τῆς Χίου τῶν Πελοποννησίων νῆες ἐπισιτισάμεναι δυσῖν ἡμέραις, καὶ λαβόντες παρὰ τῶν Χίων τρεῖς τεσσαρακοστὰς ἕκαστος Χίας τῇ τρίτῃ διὰ ταχέων ἀπαίρουσιν ἐκ τῆς Χίου πελάγιαι, ἵνα μὴ περιτύχωσι ταῖς ἐν τῇ Ἐρέσῳ ναυσίν, ἀλλὰ ἐν ἀριστερᾷ τὴν Λέσβον ἔχοντες ἔπλεον ἐπὶ τὴν ἤπειρον. Καὶ προσβαλόντες τῆς Φωκαΐδος ἐς τὸν ἐν Καρτερίοις λιμένα, καὶ ἀριστοποιησάμενοι, παραπλεύσαντες τὴν Κυμαίαν δειπνοποιοῦνται ἐν Ἀργενούσαις τῆς ἠπείρου, ἐν τῷ ἀντιπέρας τῆς Μιτυλήνης, etc.

Haack and the other eminent critics just mentioned, all insist that these words as they stand are absurd and contradictory, and that it is indispensable to insert οὐ before πελάγιαι; so that the sentence stands in their editions ἀπαίρουσιν ἐκ τῆς Χίου οὐ πελάγιαι. They all picture to themselves the fleet of Mindarus as sailing from the town of Chios northward, and going out at the northern strait. Admitting this, they say, plausibly enough, that the words of the old text involve a contradiction, because Mindarus would be going in the direction towards Eresus, and not away from it; though even then, the propriety of their correction would be disputable. But the word πελάγιος, when applied to ships departing from Chios,—though it may perhaps mean that they round the northeastern corner of the island and then strike west round Lesbos,—yet means also as naturally, and more naturally, to announce them as departing by the outer sea, or sailing on the sea-side (round the southern and western coast) of the island. Accept this meaning, and the old words construe perfectly well. Ἀπαίρειν ἐκ τῆς Χίου πελάγιος is the natural and proper phrase for describing the circuit of Mindarus round the south and west coast of Chios. This, too, was the only way by which he could have escaped the scouts and the ships of Thrasyllus: for which same purpose of avoiding Athenian ships, we find (viii, 80) the squadron of Klearchus, on another occasion, making a long circuit out to sea. If it be supposed, which those who read οὐ πελάγιαι must suppose, that Mindarus sailed first up the northern strait between Chios and the mainland, and then turned his course east towards Phokæa, this would have been the course which Thrasyllus expected that he would take; and it is hardly possible to explain why he was not seen both by the Athenian scouts as well as by the Athenian garrison at their station of Delphinium on Chios itself. Whereas, by taking the circuitous route round the southern and western coast, he never came in sight either of one or the other: and he was enabled, when he got round to the latitude north of the island, to turn to the right and take a straight easterly course, with Lesbos on his left hand, but at a sufficient distance from land to be out of sight of all scouts. Ἀνάγεσθαι ἐκ τῆς Χίου πελάγιος (Xen. Hellen. ii, 1, 17), means to strike into the open sea, quite clear of the coast of Asia: that passage does not decisively indicate whether the ships rounded the southeast or the northeast corner of the island.

We are here told that the seamen of Mindarus received from the Chians per head three Chian tessarakostæ. Now this is a small Chian coin, nowhere else mentioned; and it is surprising to find so petty and local a denomination of money here specified by Thucydidês, contrasted with the different manner in which Xenophon describes Chian payments to the Peloponnesian seamen (Hellen. i, 6, 12; ii, 1, 5). But the voyage of Mindarus round the south and west of the island explains the circumstance. He must have landed twice on the island during this circumnavigation (perhaps starting in the evening), for dinner and supper: and this Chian coin, which probably had no circulation out of the island, served each man to buy provisions at the Chian landing-places. It was not convenient to Mindarus to take aboard more provisions in kind, at the town of Chios; because he had already aboard a stock of provisions for two days, the subsequent portion of his voyage, along the coast of Asia to Sigeium, during which he could not afford time to halt and buy them, and where indeed the territory was not friendly.

It is enough if I can show that the old text of Thucydidês will construe very well, without the violent intrusion of this conjectural οὐ. But I can show more: for this negative actually renders even the construction of the sentence awkward at least, if not inadmissible. Surely, ἀπαίρουσιν οὐ πελάγιαι, ἀλλὰ, ought to be followed by a correlative adjective or participle belonging to the same verb ἀπαίρουσιν: yet if we take ἔχοντες as such correlative participle, how are we to construe ἔπλεον? In order to express the sense which Haack brings out, we ought surely to have different words, such as: οὐκ ἄπῃραν ἐκ τῆς Χίου πελάγιαι, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν ἀριστέρᾳ τὴν Λέσβον ἔχοντες ἔπλεον ἐπὶ τὴν ἤπειρον. Even the change of tense from present to past, when we follow the construction of Haack, is awkward; while if we understand the words in the sense which I propose, the change of tense is perfectly admissible, since the two verbs do not both refer to the same movement or to the same portion of the voyage. “The fleet starts from Chios out by the sea-side of the island; but when it came to have Lesbos on the left hand, it sailed straight to the continent.”

I hope that I am not too late to make good my γραφὴν ξενίας, or protest, against the unwarranted right of Thucydidean citizenship which the recent editors have conferred upon this word οὐ, in c. 101. The old text ought certainly to be restored; or, if these editors maintain their views, they ought at least to inclose the word in brackets. In the edition of Thucydidês, published at Leipsic, 1845, by C. A. Koth, I observe that the text is still correctly printed, without the negative.

[148] Thucyd. viii, 102. Οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐν τῇ Σηστῷ, ... ὡς αὐτοῖς οἵ τε φρυκτωροὶ ἐσήμαινον, καὶ ᾐσθάνοντο τὰ πυρὰ ἐξαίφνης πολλὰ ἐν τῇ πολεμίᾳ φανέντα, ἔγνωσαν ὅτι ἐσπλέουσιν οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι. Καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ταύτης νυκτὸς, ὡς εἶχον τάχους, ὑπομίξαντες τῇ Χερσονήσῳ, παρέπλεον ἐπ᾽ Ἐλαιοῦντος, βουλόμενοι ἐκπλεῦσαι ἐς τὴν εὐρυχωρίαν τὰς τῶν πολεμίων ναῦς. Καὶ τὰς μὲν ἐν Ἀβύδῳ ἑκκαίδεκα ναῦς ἔλαθον, προειρημένης φυλακῆς τῷ φιλίῳ ἐπίπλῳ, ὅπως αὐτῶν ἀνακῶς ἕξουσιν, ἢν ἐκπλέωσι· τὰς δὲ μετὰ τοῦ Μινδάρου ἅμα ἕῳ κατιδόντες, etc.

Here, again, we have a difficult text, which has much perplexed the commentators, and which I venture to translate, as it stands in my text, differently from all of them. The words, προειρημένης φυλακῆς τῷ φιλίῳ ἐπίπλῳ, ὅπως αὐτῶν ἀνακῶς ἕξουσιν, ἢν ἐκπλέωσι, are explained by the Scholiast to mean: “Although watch had been enjoined to them (i.e. to the Peloponnesian guard-squadron at Abydos) by the friendly approaching fleet (of Mindarus), that they should keep strict guard on the Athenians at Sestos, in case the latter should sail out.”

Dr. Arnold, Göller, Poppo, and M. Didot, all accept this construction, though all agree that it is most harsh and confused. The former says: “This again is most strangely intended to mean, προειρημένου αὐτοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπιπλεόντων φίλων φυλάσσειν τοὺς πολεμίους.”

To construe τῷ φιλίῳ ἐπίπλῳ as equivalent to ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπιπλεόντων φίλων, is certainly such a harshness as we ought to be very glad to escape. And the construction of the Scholiast involves another liberty which I cannot but consider as objectionable. He supplies, in his paraphrase, the word καίτοι, although, from his own imagination. There is no indication of although, either express or implied, in the text of Thucydidês; and it appears to me hazardous to assume into the meaning so decisive a particle without any authority. The genitive absolute, when annexed to the main predication affirmed in the verb, usually denotes something naturally connected with it in the way of cause, concomitancy, explanation, or modification, not something opposed to it, requiring to be prefaced by an although; if this latter be intended, then the word although is expressed, not left to be understood. After Thucydidês has told us that the Athenians at Sestos escaped their opposite enemies at Abydos, when he next goes on to add something under the genitive absolute, we expect that it should be a new fact which explains why or how they escaped: but if the new fact which he tells us, far from explaining the escape, renders it more extraordinary (such as, that the Peloponnesians had received strict orders to watch them), he would surely prepare the reader for this new fact by an express particle, such as although or notwithstanding: “The Athenians escaped, although the Peloponnesians had received the strictest orders to watch them and block them up.” As nothing equivalent to, or implying, the adversative particle although is to be found in the Greek words, so I infer, as a high probability, that it is not to be sought in the meaning.

Differing from the commentators, I think that these words, προειρημένης φυλακῆς τῷ φιλίῳ ἐπίπλῳ, ὅπως αὐτῶν ἀνακῶς ἕξουσιν, ἢν ἐκπλέωσι, do assign the reason for the fact which had been immediately before announced, and which was really extraordinary; namely, that the Athenian squadron was allowed to pass by Abydos, and escape from Sestos to Elæûs. That reason was, that the Peloponnesian guard-squadron had before received special orders from Mindarus, to concentrate its attention and watchfulness upon his approaching squadron; hence it arose that they left the Athenians at Sestos unnoticed.

The words τῷ φιλίῳ ἐπίπλῳ are equivalent to τῷ τῶν φίλων ἐπίπλῳ, and the pronoun αὐτῶν, which immediately follows, refers to φίλων (the approaching fleet of Mindarus), not to the Athenians at Sestos, as the Scholiast and the commentators construe it. This mistake about the reference of αὐτῶν seems to me to have put them all wrong.

That τῷ φιλίῳ ἐπίπλῳ must be construed as equivalent to τῷ τῶν φίλων ἐπίπλῳ is certain; but it is not equivalent to ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπιπλεόντων φίλων; nor is it possible to construe the words as the Scholiast would understand them: “orders had been previously given by the approach (or arrival) of their friends;” whereby we should turn ὁ ἐπίπλους into an acting and commanding personality. The “approach of their friends” is an event, which may properly be said “to have produced an effect,” but which cannot be said “to have given previous orders.” It appears to me that τῷ φιλίῳ ἐπίπλῳ is the dative case, governed by φυλακῆς; “a look-out for the arrival of the Peloponnesians,” having been enjoined upon these guardships at Abydos: “They had been ordered to watch for the approaching voyage of their friends.” The English preposition for, expresses here exactly the sense of the Greek dative; that is, the object, purpose, or persons whose benefit is referred to.

The words immediately succeeding, ὅπως αὐτῶν (τῶν φίλων) ἀνακῶς ἕξουσιν, ἢν ἐκπλέωσι, are an expansion of consequences intended to follow from φυλακῆς τῷ φιλίῳ ἐπίπλῳ. “They shall watch for the approach of the main fleet, in order that they may devote special and paramount regard to its safety, in case it makes a start.” For the phrase ἀνακῶς ἔχειν, compare Herodot. i, 24; viii, 109. Plutarch, Theseus, c. 33: ἀνακῶς, φυλακτῶς, προνοητικῶς, ἐπιμελῶς, the notes of Arnold and Göller here; and Kühner, Gr. Gr. sect. 533, ἀνακῶς ἔχειν τινός, for ἐπιμελεῖσθαι. The words ἀνακῶς ἔχειν express the anxious and special vigilance which the Peloponnesian squadron at Abydos was directed to keep for the arrival of Mindarus and his fleet, which was a matter of doubt and danger: but they would not be properly applicable to the duty of that squadron as respects the opposite Athenian squadron at Sestos, which was hardly of superior force to themselves, and was besides an avowed enemy, in sight of their own port.

Lastly, the words ἢν ἐκπλέωσι refer to Mindarus and his fleet about to start from Chios, as their subject, not to the Athenians at Sestos.

The whole sentence would stand thus, if we dismiss the peculiarities of Thucydidês, and express the meaning in common Greek: Καὶ τὰς μὲν ἐν Ἀβύδῳ ἑκκαίδεκα ναῦς (Ἀθηναῖοι) ἔλαθον· προείρητο γὰρ (ἐκείναις ταῖς ναῦσιν) φυλάσσειν τὸν ἐπίπλουν τῶν φίλων, ὅπως αὐτῶν (τῶν φίλων) ἀνακῶς ἔξουσιν, ἢν ἐκπλέωσι. The verb φυλάσσειν here, and of course the abstract substantive φυλακὴ which represents it, signifies to watch for, or wait for: like Thucyd. ii, 3. φυλάξαντες ἔτι νύκτα, καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ περίορθρον; also viii, 41, ἐφύλασσε.

If we construe the words in this way, they will appear in perfect harmony with the general scheme and purpose of Mindarus. That admiral is bent upon carrying his fleet to the Hellespont, but to avoid an action with Thrasyllus in doing so. This is difficult to accomplish, and can only be done by great secrecy of proceeding, as well as by an unusual route. He sends orders beforehand from Chios, perhaps even from Milêtus, before he quitted that place, to the Peloponnesian squadron guarding the Hellespont at Abydos. He contemplates the possible case that Thrasyllus may detect his plan, intercept him on the passage, and perhaps block him up or compel him to fight in some roadstead or bay on the coast opposite Lesbos, or on the Troad, which would indeed have come to pass, had he been seen by a single hostile fishing-boat in rounding the island of Chios. Now the orders sent forward, direct the Peloponnesian squadron at Abydos what they are to do in this contingency; since without such orders, the captain of the squadron would not have known what to do, assuming Mindarus to be intercepted by Thrasyllus; whether to remain on guard at the Hellespont, which was his special duty; or to leave the Hellespont unguarded, keep his attention concentrated on Mindarus, and come forth to help him. “Let your first thought be to insure the safe arrival of the main fleet at the Hellespont, and to come out and render help to it, if it be attacked in its route; even though it be necessary for that purpose to leave the Hellespont for a time unguarded.” Mindarus could not tell beforehand the exact moment when he would start from Chios, nor was it, indeed, absolutely certain that he would start at all, if the enemy were watching him: his orders were therefore sent, conditional upon his being able to get off (ἢν ἐκπλέωσι). But he was lucky enough, by the well-laid plan of his voyage, to get to the Hellespont without encountering an enemy. The Peloponnesian squadron at Abydos, however, having received his special orders, when the fire-signals acquainted them that he was approaching, thought only of keeping themselves in reserve to lend him assistance if he needed it, and neglected the Athenians opposite. As it was night, probably the best thing which they could do, was to wait in Abydos for daylight, until they could learn particulars of his position, and how or where they could render aid.

We thus see both the general purpose of Mindarus, and in what manner the orders which he had transmitted to the Peloponnesian squadron at Abydos, brought about indirectly the escape of the Athenian squadron without interruption from Sestos.

[149] Thucyd. viii, 105, 106; Diodor. xiii, 39, 40.

The general account which Diodorus gives of this battle, is, even in its most essential features, not reconcilable with Thucydidês. It is vain to try to blend them. I have been able to borrow from Diodorus hardly anything except his statement of the superiority of the Athenian pilots and the Peloponnesian epibatæ. He states that twenty-five fresh ships arrived to join the Athenians in the middle of the battle, and determined the victory in their favor: this circumstance is evidently borrowed from the subsequent conflict a few months afterwards.

We owe to him, however, the mention of the chapel or tomb of Hecuba on the headland of Kynossêma.

[150] Thucyd. viii, 107; Diodor. xiii, 41.

[151] Diodor. xiii, 41. It is probable that this fleet was in great part Bœotian; and twelve seamen who escaped from the wreck commemorated their rescue by an inscription in the temple of Athênê at Korôneia; which inscription was read and copied by Ephorus. By an exaggerated and over-literal confidence in the words of it, Diodorus is led to affirm that these twelve men were the only persons saved, and that every other person perished. But we know perfectly that Hippokratês himself survived, and that he was alive at the subsequent battle of Kyzikus (Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 23).

[152] Diodor. xiii, 47. He places this event a year later, but I agree with Sievers in conceiving it as following with little delay on the withdrawal of the protecting fleet (Sievers, Comment. in Xenoph. Hellen. p. 9; note, p. 66).

See Colonel Leake’s Travels in Northern Greece, for a description of the Euripus, and the adjoining ground, with a plan, vol. ii, ch. xiv, pp. 259-265.

I cannot make out from Colonel Leake what is the exact breadth of the channel. Strabo talks in his time of a bridge reaching two hundred feet (x, p. 400). But there must have been material alterations made by the inhabitants of Chalkis during the time of Alexander the Great (Strabo, x, p. 447). The bridge here described by Diodorus, covering an open space broad enough for one ship, could scarcely have been more than twenty feet broad; for it was not at all designed to render the passage easy. The ancient ships could all lower their masts. I cannot but think that Colonel Leake (p. 259) must have read, in Diodorus, xiii, 47, οὐ in place of ὁ.

[153] Thucyd. viii, 107.

[154] Xenoph. Hellen. v, 1, 17. Compare a like exclamation, under nobler circumstances, from the Spartan Kallikratidas, Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6, 7; Plutarch, Lysander, c. 6.

[155] Thucyd. viii, 108; Diodor. xiii, 42.

[156] Thucyd. viii, 109.

[157] Diodor. xiii, 46. This is the statement of Diodorus, and seems probable enough, though he makes a strange confusion in the Persian affairs of this year, leaving out the name of Tissaphernês, and jumbling the acts of Tissaphernês with the name of Pharnabazus.

[158] Thucyd. viii, 109. It is at this point that we have to part company with the historian Thucydidês, whose work not only closes without reaching any definite epoch or limit, but even breaks off, as we possess it, in the middle of a sentence.

The full extent of this irreparable loss can hardly be conceived, except by those who have been called upon to study his work with the profound and minute attention required from an historian of Greece. To pass from Thucydidês to the Hellenica of Xenophon, is a descent truly mournful; and yet, when we look at Grecian history as a whole, we have great reason to rejoice that even so inferior a work as the latter has reached us. The historical purposes and conceptions of Thucydidês, as set forth by himself in his preface, are exalted and philosophical to a degree altogether wonderful, when we consider that he had no preëxisting models before him from which to derive them; nor are the eight books of his work, in spite of the unfinished condition of the last, unworthy of these large promises, either in spirit or in execution. Even the peculiarity, the condensation, and the harshness, of his style, though it sometimes hides from us his full meaning, has the general effect of lending great additional force and of impressing his thoughts much more deeply upon every attentive reader.

During the course of my two last volumes, I have had frequent occasion to notice the criticisms of Dr. Arnold in his edition of Thucydidês, most generally on points where I dissented from him. I have done this, partly because I believe that Dr. Arnold’s edition is in most frequent use among all English readers of Thucydidês, partly because of the high esteem which I entertain for the liberal spirit, the erudition, and the judgment, which pervade his criticisms generally throughout the book. Dr. Arnold deserves, especially, the high commendation, not often to be bestowed even upon learned and exact commentators, of conceiving and appreciating antiquity as a living whole, and not merely as an aggregate of words and abstractions. His criticisms are continually adopted by Göller in the second edition of his Thucydidês, and to a great degree also by Poppo. Desiring, as I do sincerely, that his edition may long maintain its preëminence among English students of Thucydidês, I have thought it my duty at the same time to indicate many of the points on which his remarks either advance or imply views of Grecian history different from my own.

[159] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 9.

[160] Thucyd. viii, 108. Diodorus (xiii, 38) talks of this influence of Alkibiadês over the satrap as if it were real. Plutarch (Alkibiad. c. 26) speaks in more qualified language.

[161] Thucyd. viii, 108. πρὸς τὸ μετόπωρον. Haack and Sievers (see Sievers, Comment. ad Xenoph. Hellen. p. 103) construe this as indicating the middle of August, which I think too early in the year.

[162] Diodorus (xiii, 46) and Plutarch (Alkib. c. 27) speak of his coming to the Hellespont by accident, κατὰ τύχην, which is certainly very improbable.

[163] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 6, 7.

[164] Diodor. xiii, 47-49.

[165] Diodor. xiii, 48. Sievers (Commentat. ad Xenoph. Hellen. p. 12; and p. 65, note 58) controverts the reality of these tumults in Korkyra, here mentioned by Diodorus, but not mentioned in the Hellenika of Xenophon, and contradicted, as he thinks, by the negative inference derivable from Thucyd. iv, 48, ὅσα γε κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον τόνδε. But it appears to me that F. W. Ullrich (Beiträge zur Erklärung des Thukydides, pp. 95-99), has properly explained this phrase of Thucydidês as meaning, in the place here cited, the first ten years of the Peloponnesian war, between the surprise of Platæa and the Peace of Nikias.

I see no reason to call in question the truth of these disturbances in Korkyra, here alluded to by Diodorus.

[166] Xenoph. Hellen. vi, 2, 25.

[167] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 9; Plutarch, Alkibiadês, c. 27.

[168] Diodor. xiii, 49. Diodorus specially notices this fact, which must obviously be correct. Without it, the surprise of Mindarus could not have been accomplished.

[169] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 14-20; Diodor. xiii, 50, 51.

The numerous discrepancies between Diodorus and Xenophon, in the events of these few years, are collected by Sievers, Commentat. in Xenoph. Hellen. note, 62, pp. 65, 66, seq.

[170] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 23. Ἔῤῥει τὰ κᾶλα· Μίνδαρος ἀπεσσούα· πεινῶντι τὤνδρες· ἀπορέομες τί χρὴ δρᾷν.

Plutarch, Alkib. c. 28.

[171] Diodor. xiii, 52.

[172] Diodor. xiii, 53.

[173] See the preceding vol. vi, ch. liv, p. 455.

[174] Diodor. xiii, 52.

[175] Philochorus (ap. Schol. ad Eurip. Orest. 371) appears to have said that the Athenians rejected the proposition as insincerely meant: Λακεδαιμονίων πρεσβευσαμένων περὶ εἰρήνης ἀπιστήσαντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐ προσήκαντο; compare also Schol. ad Eurip. Orest. 772, Philochori Fragment.

[176] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 24-26; Strabo, xiii, p. 606.

[177] See Demosthen. de Coronâ, c. 71; and Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 22. καὶ δεκατευτήριον κατεσκεύασαν ἐν αὐτῇ (Χρυσοπόλει), καὶ τὴν δεκάτην ἐξέλεγοντο τῶν ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου πλοίων: compare iv, 8, 27; and v, 1, 28; also Diodor. xiii, 64.

The expression, τὴν δεκάτην, implies that this tithe was something known and preëstablished.

Polybius (iv, 44) gives credit to Alkibiadês for having been the first to suggest this method of gain to Athens. But there is evidence that it was practised long before, even anterior to the Athenian empire, during the times of Persian preponderance (see Herodot. vi, 5).

See a striking passage, illustrating the importance to Athens of the possession of Byzantium, in Lysias, Orat. xxviii, cont. Ergokl. sect. 6.

[178] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 32; Demosthen. cont. Leptin. s. 48, c. 14, p. 474.

[179] Thucyd. viii, 64.

[180] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 32.

[181] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 35-36. He says that the ships of Klearchus, on being attacked by the Athenians in the Hellespont, fled first to Sestos, and afterwards to Byzantium. But Sestos was the Athenian station. The name must surely be put by inadvertence for Abydos, the Peloponnesian station.

[182] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 34; i, 2, 1. Diodorus (xiii, 64) confounds Thrasybulus with Thrasyllus.

[183] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 2, 5-11. Xenophon distinguishes these twenty-five Syracusan triremes into τῶν προτέρων εἴκοσι νεῶν, and then αἱ ἕτεραι πέντε, αἱ νεωστὶ ἥκουσαι. But it appears to me that the twenty triremes, as well as the five, must have come to Asia since the battle of Kyzikus, though the five may have been somewhat later in their period of arrival. All the Syracusan ships in the fleet of Mindarus were destroyed; and it seems impossible to imagine that that admiral can have left twenty Syracusan ships at Ephesus or Milêtus in addition to those which he took with him to the Hellespont.

[184] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 2, 8-15.

[185] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 2, 13-17; Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 29.

[186] Diodor. xiii, 64. The slighting way in which Xenophon (Hellen. i, 2, 18) dismisses this capture of Pylos, as a mere retreat of some runaway Helots from Malea, as well as his employment of the name Koryphasion, and not of Pylos, prove how much he wrote after Lacedæmionian informants.

[187] Diodor. xiii, 64; Plutarch, Coriolan. c. 14.

Aristotle, Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία, ap. Harpokration, v. Δεκάζων, and in the Collection of Fragment. Aristotel. no. 72, ed. Didot (Fragment. Historic. Græc. vol. ii, p. 127).

[188] Diodor. xiii, 65.

[189] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 1, 36.

[190] Polyb. iv, 44-45.

[191] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 3, 5-7; Diodor. xiii, 66.

[192] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 3, 9. Ὑποτελεῖν τὸν φόρον Καλχηδονίους Ἀθηναίοις ὅσονπερ εἰώθεσαν, καὶ τὰ ὀφειλόμενα χρήματα ἀποδοῦναι· Ἀθηναίους δὲ μὴ πολεμεῖν Καλχηδονίοις, ἕως ἂν οἱ παρὰ βασιλέα πρέσβεις ἔλθωσιν.

This passage strengthens the doubts which I threw out in a former chapter, whether the Athenians ever did or could realize their project of commuting the tribute, imposed upon the dependent allies, for an ad valorem duty of five per cent. on imports and exports, which project is mentioned by Thucydidês (vii, 28) as having been resolved upon at least, if not carried out, in the summer of 413 B.C. In the bargain here made with the Chalkêdonians, it seems implied that the payment of tribute was the last arrangement subsisting between Athens and Chalkêdon, at the time of the revolt of the latter.

Next, I agree with the remark made by Schneider, in his note upon the passage, Ἀθηναίους δὲ μὴ πολεμεῖν Καλχηδονίοις. He notices the tenor of the covenant as it stands in Plutarch, τὴν Φαρναβάζου δὲ χώραν μὴ ἀδικεῖν (Alkib. c. 31), which is certainly far more suitable to the circumstances. Instead of Καλχηδονίοις, he proposes to read Φαρναβάζῳ. At any rate, this is the meaning.

[193] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 3, 15-22; Diodor. xiii, 67; Plutarch, Alkib. c. 31.

The account given by Xenophon of the surrender of Byzantium, which I have followed in the text, is perfectly plain and probable. It does not consist with the complicated stratagem described in Diodorus and Plutarch, as well as in Frontinus, iii, xi, 3; alluded to also in Polyænus, i, 48, 2.

[194] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 4, 1.

[195] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 4, 2-3.

[196] The Anabasis of Xenophon (i, 1, 6-8; i, 9, 7-9) is better authority, and speaks more exactly, than the Hellenica, i, 4, 3.

[197] See the anecdote of Cyrus and Lysander in Xenoph. Œconom. iv, 21-23.

[198] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 4, 3-8. The words here employed respecting the envoys, when returning after their three years’ detention, ὅθεν πρὸς τὸ ἄλλο στρατόπεδον ἀπέπλευσαν, appear to me an inadvertence. The return of the envoys must have been in the spring of 404 B.C., at a time when Athens had no camp: the surrender of the city took place in April 404 B.C. Xenophon incautiously speaks as if that state of things which existed when the envoys departed, still continued at their return.

[199] The words of Thucydidês (ii, 65) imply this as his opinion, Κύρῳ τε ὕστερον βασιλέως παιδὶ προσγενομένῳ, etc.

[200] The commencement of Lysander’s navarchy, or year of maritime command, appears to me established for this winter. He had been some time actually in his command before Cyrus arrived at Sardis: Οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, πρότερον τούτων οὐ πολλῷ χρόνῳ Κρατησιππίδᾳ τῆς ναυαρχίας παρεληλυθυίας, Λύσανδρον ἐξέπεμψαν ναύαρχον. Ὁ δὲ ἀφικόμενος εἰς Ῥόδον καὶ ναῦς ἐκεῖθεν λαβών, ἐς Κῶ καὶ Μίλητον ἔπλευσεν· ἐκεῖθεν δὲ ἐς Ἔφεσον· καὶ ἐκεῖ ἔμεινε, ναῦς ἔχων ἑβδομήκοντα, μέχρις οὗ Κῦρος ἐς Σάρδεις ἀφίκετο (Xenoph. Hellen. i, 5, 1).

Mr. Fynes Clinton (Fast. H. ad ann. 407 B.C.) has, I presume, been misled by the first words of this passage, πρότερον τούτων οὐ πολλῷ χρόνῳ, when he says: “During the stay of Alcibiadês at Athens, Lysander is sent as ναύαρχος, Xen. Hell. i, 5, 1. Then followed the defeat of Antiochus, the deposition of Alcibiadês, and the substitution of ἄλλους δέκα, between September 407 and September 406, when Callicratidas succeeded Lysander.”

Now Alkibiadês came to Athens in the month of Thargelion, or about the end of May, 407, and stayed there till the beginning of September, 407. Cyrus arrived at Sardis before Alkibiadês reached Athens, and Lysander had been some time at his post before Cyrus arrived; so that Lysander was not sent out “during the stay of Alcibiadês at Athens,” but some months before. Still less is it correct to say that Kallikratidas succeeded Lysander in September, 406. The battle of Arginusæ, wherein Kallikratidas perished, was fought about August, 406, after he had been admiral for several months. The words πρότερον τούτων, when construed along with the context which succeeds, must evidently be understood in a large sense; “these events,” mean the general series of events which begins i, 4, 8; the proceedings of Alkibiadês, from the beginning of the spring of 407.

[201] Ælian, V. H. xii, 43; Athenæus, vi, p. 271. The assertion that Lysander belonged to the class of mothakes is given by Athenæus as coming from Phylarchus, and I see no reason for calling it in question. Ælian states the same thing respecting Gylippus and Kallikratidas, also; I do not know on what authority.

[202] Theopompus, Fragm. 21, ed. Didot; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 30.

[203] Plutarch, Lysander, c. 8.

[204] Diodor. xiii, 65; Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 2, 11. I presume that this conduct of Kratesippidas is the fact glanced at by Isokratês de Pace, sect. 128, p. 240, ed. Bekk.

[205] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 5, 3-4; Diodor. xiii, 70; Plutarch, Lysander, c. 4. This seems to have been a favorite metaphor, either used by, or at least ascribed to, the Persian grandees; we have already had it, a little before, from the mouth of Tissaphernês.

[206] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 5, 5. εἶναι δὲ καὶ τὰς συνθήκας οὕτως ἐχούσας, τριάκοντα μνᾶς ἑκάστῃ νηῒ τοῦ μηνὸς διδόναι, ὁπόσας ἂν βούλοιντο τρέφειν Λακεδαιμόνιοι.

This is not strictly correct. The rate of pay is not specified in either of the three conventions, as they stand in Thucyd. viii, 18, 37, 58. It seems to have been, from the beginning, matter of verbal understanding and promise; first, a drachma per day was promised by the envoys of Tissaphernês at Sparta; next, the satrap himself, at Milêtus, cut down this drachma to half a drachma, and promised this lower rate for the future (viii, 29).

Mr. Mitford says: “Lysander proposed that an Attic drachma, which was eight oboli, nearly tenpence sterling, should be allowed for daily pay to every seaman.”

Mr. Mitford had in the previous sentence stated three oboli as equal to not quite fourpence sterling. Of course, therefore, it is plain that he did not consider three oboli as the half of a drachma (Hist. Greece, ch. xx, sect. i. vol. iv, p. 317, oct. ed. 1814).

That a drachma was equivalent to six oboli, that is, an Æginæan drachma to six Æginæan oboli, and an Attic drachma to six Attic oboli, is so familiarly known, that I should almost have imagined the word eight, in the first sentence here cited, to be a misprint for six, if the sentence cited next had not clearly demonstrated that Mr. Mitford really believed a drachma to he equal to eight oboli. It is certainly a mistake surprising to find.

[207] Thucyd. viii, 29.

[208] See the former volume vi, ch. li, p. 287.

[209] See the remarkable character of Cyrus the younger, given in the Anabasis of Xenophon, i, 9, 22-28.

[210] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 1, 13; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 4-9.

[211] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 5, 10.

[212] Diodor. xiii, 70; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 5.

[213] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 4, 8-10; Diodor. xiii, 72. The chronology of Xenophon, though not so clear as we could wish, deserves unquestionable preference over that of Diodorus.

[214] Diodor. xiii, 68; Plutarch, Alkib. c. 31; Athenæ. xii, p. 535.

[215] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 4, 18, 19. Ἀλκιβιάδης δὲ, πρὸς τὴν γῆν ὁρμισθεὶς, ἀπέβαινε μὲν οὐκ εὐθέως, φοβούμενος τοὺς ἐχθρούς· ἐπαναστὰς δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ καταστρώματος, ἐσκόπει τοὺς αὑτοῦ ἐπιτηδείους, εἰ παρείησαν. Κατιδὼν δὲ Εὐρυπτόλεμον τὸν Πεισιάνακτος, ἑαυτοῦ δὲ ἀνεψιὸν, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους οἰκείους καὶ φίλους μετ᾽ αὐτῶν, τότε ἀποβὰς ἀναβαίνει ἐς τὴν πόλιν, μετὰ τῶν παρεσκευασμένων, εἴ τις ἅπτοιτο, μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν.

[216] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 4, 20; Plutarch, Alkib. c. 33; Diodor. xiii, 69.

[217] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 4, 14-16.

[218] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 4, 15.

[219] This point is justly touched upon, more than once, by Cornelius Nepos, Vit. Alcibiad. c. 6: “Quanquam Theramenês et Thrasybulus eisdem rebus præfuerant.” And again, in the life of Thrasybulus (c. 1). “Primum Peloponnesiaco bello multa hic (Thrasybulus) sine Alcibiade gessit; ille nullam rem sine hoc.”

[220] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 4, 20. λεχθέντων δὲ καὶ ἄλλων τοιούτων, καὶ οὐδενὸς ἀντειπόντος, διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀνασχέσθαι ἂν τὴν ἐκκλησίαν, etc.

[221] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 4, 21. Both Diodorus (xiii, 69) and Cornelius Nepos (Vit. Alcib. c. 7) state Thrasybulus and Adeimantus as his colleagues: both state also that his colleagues were chosen on his recommendation. I follow Xenophon as to the names, and also as to the fact, that they were named as κατὰ γῆν στρατηγοί.

[222] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 4, 20; Plutarch, Alkib. c. 34. Neither Diodorus nor Cornelius Nepos mentions this remarkable incident about the escort of the Eleusinian procession.

[223] Diodor. xiii, 72, 73.

[224] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 4, 22; i, 5, 18; Plutarch, Alkib. c. 35; Diodor. xiii, 69. The latter says that Thrasybulus was left at Andros, which cannot be true.

[225] Xenophon, Hellen. i, 5, 9; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 4. The latter tells us that the Athenian ships were presently emptied by the desertion of the seamen; a careless exaggeration.

[226] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 9. I venture to antedate the statements which he there makes, as to the encouragements from Cyrus to Lysander.

[227] Diodor. xiii, 73. I follow Diodorus in respect to this story about Kymê which he probably copied from the Kymæan historian Ephorus. Cornelius Nepos (Alcib. c. 7) briefly glances at it.

Xenophon (Hellen. i, 5, 11) as well as Plutarch (Lysand. c. 5) mention the visit of Alkibiadês to Thrasybulus at Phokæa. They do not name Kymê, however: according to them, the visit to Phokæa has no assignable purpose or consequences. But the plunder of Kymê is a circumstance both sufficiently probable in itself, and suitable to the occasion.

[228] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 5, 12-15: Diodor. xiii, 71: Plutarch, Alkib. c. 35; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 5.

[229] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 5, 15; Diodor. xiii, 76.

I copy Diodorus, in putting Teos, pursuant to Weiske’s note, in place of Eion, which appears in Xenophon. I copy the latter, however, in ascribing these captures to the year of Lysander, instead of to the year of Kallikratidas.

[230] Plutarch. Alkib. c. 36. He recounts, in the tenth chapter of the same biography, an anecdote, describing the manner in which Antiochus first won the favor of Alkibiadês, then a young man, by catching a tame quail, which had escaped from his bosom.

[231] A person named Thrason is mentioned in the Choiseul Inscription (No. 147, pp. 221, 222, of the Corp. Inscr. of Boeckh) as one of the Hellenotamiæ in the year 410 B.C. He is described by his Deme as Butades; he is probably enough the father of this Thrasybulus.

[232] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 5, 16-17. Ἀλκιβιάδης μὲν οὖν, πονηρῶς καὶ ἐν τῇ στρατιᾷ φερόμενος, etc. Diodor. xiii, 73. ἐγένοντο δὲ καὶ ἄλλαι πολλαὶ διαβολαὶ κατ᾽ αὐτοῦ, etc.

Plutarch Alkib. c. 36.

One of the remaining speeches of Lysias (Orat. xxi, Ἀπολογία Δωροδοκίας) is delivered by the trierarch in this fleet, on board of whose ship Alkibiadês himself chose to sail. This trierarch complains of Alkibiadês as having been a most uncomfortable and troublesome companion (sect. 7). His testimony on the point is valuable; for there seems no disposition here to make out any case against Alkibiadês. The trierarch notices the fact, that Alkibiadês preferred his trireme, simply as a proof that it was the best equipped, or among the best equipped, of the whole fleet. Archestratus and Erasinidês preferred it afterwards, for the same reason.

[233] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 5, 16. Οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡς ἠγγέλθη ἡ ναυμαχία, χαλεπῶς εἶχον τῷ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ, οἰόμενοι δι᾽ ἀμέλειάν τε καὶ ἀκράτειαν ἀπολωλεκέναι τὰς ναῦς.

The expression which Thucydidês employs in reference to Alkibiadês requires a few words of comment: (vi, 15) καὶ δημοσίᾳ κράτιστα διαθέντα τὰ τοῦ πολέμου, ἰδίᾳ ἕκαστοι τοῖς ἐπιτηδεύμασιν αὐτοῦ ἀχθεσθέντες, καὶ ἄλλοις ἐπιτρέψαντες (the Athenians), οὐ διὰ μακροῦ ἔσφηλαν τὴν πόλιν.

The “strenuous and effective prosecution of warlike business” here ascribed to Alkibiadês, is true of all the period between his exile and his last visit to Athens (about September B.C. 415 to September B.C. 407). During the first four years of that time, he was very effective against Athens; during the last four, very effective in her service.

But the assertion is certainly not true of his last command, which ended with the battle of Notium; nor is it more than partially true, at least, it is an exaggeration of the truth, for the period before his exile.

[234] To meet the case of Nikias, it would be necessary to take the converse of the judgment of Thucydidês respecting Alkibiadês, cited in my last note, and to say: καὶ δημοσίᾳ κάκιστα διαθέντα τὰ τοῦ πολέμου, ἰδίᾳ ἕκαστοι τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα αὐτοῦ ἀγασθέντες, καὶ αυτῷ ἐπιτρέψαντες, οὐ διὰ μακροῦ ἔσφηλαν τὴν πόλιν.

The reader will of course understand that these last Greek words are not an actual citation, but a transformation of the actual words of Thucydidês, for the purpose of illustrating the contrast between Alkibiadês and Nikias.

[235] Thucyd. viii, 48. τὸν δὲ δῆμον, σφῶν τε, of the allied dependencies, καταφυγὴν, καὶ ἐκείνων, i.e. of the high persons called καλοκἀγαθοὶ, or optimates σωφρονιστήν.

[236] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 5, 18; Diodor. xiii, 74.

[237] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 5, 19; Pausan. vi, 7, 2.

[238] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 5, 20; compare i, 6, 16; Diodor. xiii, 77.

[239] Virgil, Æneid, vi, 870.

Ostendent terris hunc tantum fata, neque ultra

Esse sinent.

[240] How completely this repayment was a manœuvre for the purpose of crippling his successor,—and not an act of genuine and conscientious obligation to Cyrus, as Mr. Mitford represents it,—we may see by the conduct of Lysander at the close of the war. He then carried away with him to Sparta all the residue of the tributes from Cyrus which he had in his possession, instead of giving them back to Cyrus (Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 8). This obligation to give them back to Cyrus was greater at the end of the war than it was at the time when Kallikratidas came out, and when war was still going on; for the war was a joint business, which the Persians and the Spartans had sworn to prosecute by common efforts.

[241] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6, 5. ὑμεῖς δὲ, πρὸς ἃ ἐγώ τε φιλοτιμοῦμαι, καὶ ἡ πόλις ἡμῶν αἰτιάζεται (ἴστε γὰρ αὐτὰ, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐγὼ), ξυμβουλεύετε, etc.

[242] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6, 7; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 6.

[243] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6, 9. ὑμᾶς δὲ ἐγὼ ἀξιῶ προθυμοτάτους εἶναι ἐς τὸν πόλεμον, διὰ τὸ οἰκοῦντας ἐν βαρβάροις πλεῖστα κακὰ ἤδη ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν πεπονθέναι.

[244] Plutarch, Apophthegm. Laconic. p. 222, C, Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6, 12.

[245] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6, 34.

[246] Diodor. xiii, 99.

[247] I infer this from the fact, that at the period of the battle of Arginusæ, both these towns appear as adhering to the Peloponnesians; whereas during the command of Alkibiadês they had been both Athenian (Xenoph. Hellen. i, 5, 11; i, 6, 33; Diodor. xiii, 73-99).

[248] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6, 14. Καὶ κελευόντων τῶν ξυμμάχων ἀποδόσθαι καὶ τοὺς Μηθυμναίους, οὐκ ἔφη ἑαυτοῦ γε ἄρχοντος οὐδένα Ἑλλήνων ἐς τοὐκείνου δυνατὸν ἀνδραποδισθῆναι.

Compare a later declaration of Agesilaus, substantially to the same purpose, yet delivered under circumstances far less emphatic, in Xenophon, Agesilaus, vii, 6.

[249] The sentiment of Kallikratidas deserved the designation of Ἑλληνικώτατον πολίτευμα, far more than that of Nikias, to which Plutarch applies those words (Compar. of Nikias and Crassus, c. 2).

[250] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6, 15. Κόνωνι δὲ εἶπεν, ὅτι παύσει αὐτὸν μοιχῶντα τὴν θάλασσαν, etc. He could hardly say this to Konon, in any other way than through the Athenian prisoners.

[251] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6, 17; Diodor. xiii, 78, 79.

Here, as on so many other occasions, it is impossible to blend these two narratives together. Diodorus conceives the facts in a manner quite different from Xenophon, and much less probable. He tells us that Konon practised a stratagem during his flight (the same in Polyænus, i, 482), whereby he was enabled to fight with and defeat the foremost Peloponnesian ships before the rest came up: also, that he got into the harbor in time to put it into a state of defence before Kallikratidas came up. Diodorus then gives a prolix description of the battle by which Kallikratidas forced his way in.

The narrative of Xenophon, which I have followed, plainly implies that Konon could have had no time to make preparations for defending the harbor.

[252] Thucyd. viii, 6. τοὺς ἐφόρμους ἐπ᾽ ἀμφοτέροις τοῖς λιμέσιν ἐποιοῦντο (Strabo, xiii, p. 617). Xenophon talks only of the harbor, as if it were one; and possibly, in very inaccurate language, it might be described as one harbor with two entrances. It seems to me, however, that Xenophon had no clear idea of the locality.

Strabo speaks of the northern harbor as defended by a mole, the southern harbor, as defended by triremes chained together. Such defences did not exist in the year 406 B.C. Probably, after the revolt of Mitylênê in 427 B.C., the Athenians had removed what defences might have been before provided for the harbor.

[253] Plutarch, Apophth. Laconic. p. 222, E.

[254] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6, 19. Καθελκύσας (Konon) τῶν νεῶν τὰς ἄριστα πλεούσας δύο, ἐπλήρωσε πρὸ ἡμέρας, ἐξ ἁπασῶν τῶν νεῶν τοὺς ἀρίστους ἐρέτας ἐκλέξας, καὶ τοὺς ἐπιβάτας εἰς κοίλην ναῦν μεταβιβάσας, καὶ τὰ παραῤῥύματα παραβαλών.

The meaning of παραῤῥύματα is very uncertain. The commentators give little instruction; nor can we be sure that the same thing is meant as is expressed by παραβλήματα (infra, ii, 1, 22). We may be quite sure that the matters meant by παραῤῥύματα were something which, if visible at all to a spectator without, would at least afford no indication that the trireme was intended for a speedy start; otherwise, they would defeat the whole contrivance of Konon, whose aim was secrecy. It was essential that this trireme, though afloat, should be made to look as much as possible like to the other triremes which still remained hauled ashore; in order that the Peloponnesians might not suspect any purpose of departure. I have endeavored in the text to give a meaning which answers this purpose, without forsaking the explanations given by the commentators: see Boeckh, Ueber das Attische Seewesen, ch. x, p. 159.

[255] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6, 22. Διομέδων δὲ βοηθῶν Κόνωνι πολιορκουμένῳ δώδεκα ναυσὶν ὡρμίσατο ἐς τὸν εὔριπον τὸν τῶν Μυτιληναίων.

The reader should look at a map of Lesbos, to see what is meant by the Euripus of Mitylênê, and the other Euripus of the neighboring town of Pyrrha.

Diodorus (xiii, 79) confounds the Euripus of Mitylênê with the harbor of Mitylênê, with which it is quite unconnected. Schneider and Plehn seem to make the same confusion (see Plehn, Lesbiaca, p. 15).

[256] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6, 24-25; Diodor. xiii, 97.

[257] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6, 32; Diodor. xiii, 97, 98; the latter reports terrific omens beforehand for the generals.

The answer has been a memorable one, more than once adverted to, Plutarch, Laconic. Apophthegm. p. 832; Cicero, De Offic. i, 24.

[258] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6, 31. Οὕτω δ᾽ ἐτάχθησαν (οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι) ἵνα μὴ διέκπλουν διδοῖεν· χεῖρον γὰρ ἔπλεον. Αἱ δὲ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἀντιτεταγμέναι ἦσαν ἅπασαι ἐπὶ μιᾶς, ὡς πρὸς διέκπλουν καὶ περίπλουν παρεσκευασμέναι, διὰ τὸ βέλτιον πλεῖν.

Contrast this with Thucyd. ii, 84-89 (the speech of Phormion), iv, 12; vii, 36.

[259] See Thucyd. iv, 11.

[260] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6, 33. ἐπεὶ δὲ Καλλικρατίδας τε ἐμβαλούσης τῆς νεὼς ἀποπεσὼν ἐς τὴν θάλασσαν ἠφανίσθη, etc.

The details given by Diodorus about this battle and the exploits of Kallikratidas are at once prolix and unworthy of confidence. See an excellent note of Dr. Arnold on Thucyd. iv, 12, respecting the description given by Diodorus of the conduct of Brasidas at Pylos.

[261] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6, 34; Diodor. xiii, 99, 100.

[262] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6, 38; Diodor. xiii, 100.

[263] See the narrative of Diodorus (xiii, 100, 101, 102), where nothing is mentioned except about picking up the floating dead bodies; about the crime, and offence in the eyes of the people, of omitting to secure burial to so many dead bodies. He does not seem to have fancied that there were any living bodies, or that it was a question between life and death to so many of the crews. Whereas, if we follow the narrative of Xenophon (Hellen. i, 7), we shall see that the question is put throughout about picking up the living men, the shipwrecked men, or the men belonging to, and still living aboard of, the broken ships, ἀνελέσθαι τοὺς ναυαγοὺς, τοὺς δυστυχοῦντας, τοὺς καταδύντας (Hellen. ii, 3, 32): compare, especially, ii, 3, 35, πλεῖν ἐπὶ τὰς καταδεδυκυίας ναῦς καὶ τοὺς ἐπ᾽ αὐτῶν ἀνθρώπους (i, 6, 36). The word ναυαγὸς does not mean a dead body, but a living man who has suffered shipwreck: Ναυαγὸς ἥκω, ξένος, ἀσύλητον γένος (says Menelaus, Eurip. Helen. 457); also 407, Καὶ νῦν τάλας ναυαγὸς, ἀπολέσας φίλους Ἐξέπεσον ἐς γῆν τήνδε etc.; again, 538. It corresponds with the Latin naufragus: “mersâ rate naufragus assem Dum rogat, et pictâ se tempestate tuetur,” (Juvenal, xiv, 301.) Thucydidês does not use the word ναυαγοὺς, but speaks of τοὺς νεκροὺς καὶ τὰ ναυαγία, meaning by the latter word the damaged ships, with every person and thing on board.

It is remarkable that Schneider and most other commentators on Xenophon, Sturz in his Lexicon Xenophonteum (v. ἀναίρεσις), Stallbaum ad Platon. Apol. Socrat. c. 20, p. 32, Sievers, Comment. ad Xenoph. Hellen. p. 31, Forchhammer, Die Athener und Sokratês, pp. 30-31, Berlin, 1837, and others, all treat this event as if it were nothing but a question of picking up dead bodies for sepulture. This is a complete misinterpretation of Xenophon; not merely because the word ναυαγὸς, which he uses four several times, means a living person, but because there are two other passages, which leave absolutely no doubt about the matter: Παρῆλθε δὲ τις ἐς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν, φάσκων ἐπὶ τεύχους ἀλφίτων σωθῆναι· ἐπιστέλλειν δ᾽ αὐτῷ τοὺς ἀπολλυμένους, ἐὰν σωθῂ, ἀπαγγεῖλαι τῷ δήμῳ, ὅτι οἱ στρατηγοὶ οὐκ ἀνείλοντο τοὺς ἀρίστους ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος γενομένους. Again (ii, 3, 35), Theramenês, when vindicating himself before the oligarchy of Thirty, two years afterwards, for his conduct in accusing the generals, says that the generals brought their own destruction upon themselves by accusing him first, and by saying that the men on the disabled ships might have been saved with proper diligence: φάσκοντες γὰρ (the generals) οἷον τε εἶναι σῶσαι τοὺς ἄνδρας, προέμενοι αὐτοὺς ἀπολέσθαι, ἀποπλέοντες ᾤχοντο. These passages place the point beyond dispute, that the generals were accused of having neglected to save the lives of men on the point of being drowned, and who by their neglect afterwards were drowned, not of having neglected to pick up dead bodies for sepulture. The misinterpretation of the commentators is here of the gravest import. It alters completely the criticisms on the proceedings at Athens.

[264] See Thucyd. i, 50, 51.

[265] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6, 34. Ἀπώλοντο δὲ τῶν μὲν Ἀθηναίων νῆες πέντε καὶ εἴκοσιν αὐτοῖς ἀνδράσιν, ἐκτὸς ὀλίγων τῶν πρὸς τὴν γῆν προσενεχθέντων.

Schneider in his note, and Mr. Mitford in his History, express surprise at the discrepancy between the number twelve, which appears in the speech of Euryptolemus, and the number twenty-five, given by Xenophon.

But, first, we are not to suppose Xenophon to guarantee those assertions, as to matters of fact which he gives, as coming from Euryptolemus; who as an advocate, speaking in the assembly, might take great liberties with the truth.

Next, Xenophon speaks of the total number of ships ruined or disabled in the action: Euryptolemus speaks of the total number of wrecks afloat and capable of being visited so as to rescue the sufferers, at the subsequent moment, when the generals directed the squadron under Theramenês to go out for the rescue. It is to be remembered that the generals went back to Arginusæ from the battle, and there determined, according to their own statement, to send out from thence a squadron for visiting the wrecks. A certain interval of time must therefore have elapsed between the close of the action and the order given to Theramenês. During that interval, undoubtedly, some of the disabled ships went down, or came to pieces: if we are to believe Euryptolemus, thirteen out of the twenty-five must have thus disappeared, so that their crews were already drowned, and no more than twelve remained floating for Theramenês to visit, even had he been ever so active and ever so much favored by weather.

I distrust the statement of Euryptolemus, and believe that he most probably underrated the number. But assuming him to be correct, this will only show how much the generals were to blame, as we shall hereafter remark, for not having seen to the visitation of the wrecks before they went back to their moorings at Arginusæ.

[266] Boeckh, in his instructive volume, Urkunden über das Attische See-Wesen (vii, p. 84, seq.), gives, from inscriptions, a long list of the names of Athenian triremes, between B.C. 356 and 322. All the names are feminine: some curious. We have a long list also of the Athenian ship-builders; since the name of the builder is commonly stated in the inscription along with that of the ship: Ἐυχáρις, Ἀλεξιμάου ἔργον; Σειρὴν, Ἀριστοκράτους ἔργον; Ἐλευθερία, Ἀρχενέω ἔργον; Ἐπίδειξις, Λυσιστράτου ἔργον; Δημοκρατία, Χαιρεστράτου ἔργον, etc.

[267] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 7, 4. Ὅτι μὲν γὰρ οὐδενὸς ἄλλου καθήπτοντο (οἱ στρατηγοὶ) ἐπιστολὴν ἐπεδείκνυε (Theramenês) μαρτύριον· ἣν ἔπεμψαν οἱ στρατηγοὶ εἰς τὴν βουλὴν καὶ εἰς τὸν δῆμον, ἄλλο οὐδὲν αἰτιώμενοι ἢ τὸν χειμῶνα.

[268] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 7, 1; Diodor. xiii, 101: ἐπὶ μὲν τῇ νίκῃ τοὺς στρατηγοὺς ἐπῄνουν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ περιϊδεῖν ἀτάφους τοὺς ὑπὲρ τῆς ἡγεμονίας τετελευτηκότας χαλεπῶς διετέθησαν.

I have before remarked that Diodorus makes the mistake of talking about nothing but dead bodies, in place of the living ναυαγοὶ spoken of by Xenophon.

[269] Lysias, Orat. xxi (Ἀπολογία Δωροδοκίας), sect. vii.

[270] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 7, 2. Archedêmus is described as τῆς Δεκελείας ἐπιμελούμενος. What is meant by these words, none of the commentators can explain in a satisfactory manner. The text must be corrupt. Some conjecture like that of Dobree seems plausible; some word like τῆς δεκάτης or τῆς δεκατεύσεως, having reference to the levying of the tithe in the Hellespont; which would furnish reasonable ground for the proceeding of Archedêmus against Erasinidês.

The office held by Archedêmus, whatever it was, must have been sufficiently exalted to confer upon him the power of imposing the fine of limited amount called ἐπιβολή.

I hesitate to identify this Archedêmus with the person of that name mentioned in the Memorabilia of Xenophon, ii, 9. There seems no similarity at all in the points of character noticed.

The popular orator Archedêmus was derided by Eupolis and Aristophanês as having sore eyes, and as having got his citizenship without a proper title to it (see Aristophan. Ran. 419-588, with the Scholia). He is also charged, in a line of an oration of Lysias, with having embezzled the public money (Lysias cont. Alkibiad. sect. 25, Orat. xiv).

[271] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 7, 3. Τιμοκράτους δ᾽ εἰπόντος, ὅτι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους χρὴ δεθέντας ἐς τὸν δῆμον παραδοθῆναι, ἡ βουλὴ ἔδησε.

[272] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 7, 4.

[273] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 7, 4. Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα, ἐκκλησία ἐγένετο, ἐν ᾗ τῶν στρατηγῶν κατηγόρουν ἄλλοι τε καὶ Θηραμένης μάλιστα, δικαίους εἶναι λέγων λόγον ὑποσχεῖν, διότι οὐκ ἀνείλοντο τοὺς ναυαγούς. Ὅτι μὲν γὰρ οὐδενὸς ἄλλου καθήπτοντο, ἐπιστολὴν ἐπεδείκνυε μαρτύριον· καὶ ἔπεμψαν οἱ στρατηγοὶ ἐς τὴν βουλὴν καὶ ἐς τὸν δῆμον, ἄλλο οὐδὲν αἰτιώμενοι ἢ τὸν χειμῶνα.

[274] That Thrasybulus concurred with Theramenês in accusing the generals, is intimated in the reply which Xenophon represents the generals to have made (i, 7, 6): Καὶ οὐχ, ὅτι γε κατηγοροῦσιν ἡμῶν, ἔφασαν, ψευσόμεθα φάσκοντες αὐτοὺς αἰτίους εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ χειμῶνος εἶναι τὸ κωλῦσαν τὴν ἀναίρεσιν.

The plural κατηγοροῦσιν shows that Thrasybulus as well as Theramenês stood forward to accuse the generals, though the latter was the most prominent and violent.

[275] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 7, 17. Euryptolemus says: Κατηγορῶ μὲν οὖν αὐτῶν ὅτι ἔπεισαν τοὺς ξυνάρχοντας, βουλομένους πέμπειν γράμματα τῇ τε βουλῇ καὶ ὑμῖν ὅτι ἐπέταξαν τῷ Θηραμένει καὶ Θρασυβούλῳ τετταράκοντα καὶ ἑπτὰ τριήρεσιν ἀνελέσθαι τοὺς ναυαγοὺς, οἱ δὲ οὐκ ἀνείλοντο. Εἶτα νῦν τὴν αἰτίαν κοινὴν ἔχουσιν, ἐκείνων ἰδίᾳ ἁμαρτόντων· καὶ ἀντὶ τῆς τότε φιλανθρωπίας, νῦν ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνων τε καὶ τινων ἄλλων ἐπιβουλευόμενοι κινδυνεύουσιν ἀπολέσθαι.

We must here construe ἔπεισαν as equivalent to ἀνέπεισαν or μετέπεισαν placing a comma after ξυνάρχοντας. This is unusual, but not inadmissible. To persuade a man to alter his opinion or his conduct, might be expressed by πείθειν, though it would more properly be expressed by ἀναπείθειν; see ἐπείσθη, Thucyd. iii, 32.

[276] Diodor. xiii, 100, 101.

[277] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 35. If Theramenês really did say, in the actual discussions at Athens on the conduct of the generals, that which he here asserts himself to have said, namely, that the violence of the storm rendered it impossible for any one to put to sea, his accusation against the generals must have been grounded upon alleging that they might have performed the duty at an earlier moment; before they came back from the battle; before the storm arose; before they gave the order to him. But I think it most probable that he misrepresented at the later period what he had said at the earlier, and that he did not, during the actual discussions, admit the sufficiency of the storm as fact and justification.

[278] The total number of ships lost with all their crews was twenty-five, of which the aggregate crews, speaking in round numbers, would be five thousand men. Now we may fairly calculate that each one of the disabled ships would have on board half her crew, or one hundred men, after the action; not more than half would have been slain or drowned in the combat. Even ten disabled ships would thus contain one thousand living men, wounded and unwounded. It will be seen, therefore, that I have understated the number of lives in danger.

[279] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6, 33.

[280] We read in Thucydidês (vii, 73) how impossible it was to prevail on the Syracusans to make any military movement after their last maritime victory in the Great Harbor, when they were full of triumph, felicitation, and enjoyment.

They had visited the wrecks and picked up both the living men on board and the floating bodies before they went ashore. It is remarkable that the Athenians on that occasion were so completely overpowered by the immensity of their disaster, that they never even thought of asking permission, always granted by the victors when asked, to pick up their dead or visit their wrecks (viii, 72).

[281] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 32. The light in which I here place the conduct of Theramenês is not only coincident with Diodorus, but with the representations of Kritias, the violent enemy of Theramenês under the government of the Thirty, just before he was going to put Theramenês to death: Οὗτος δέ τοι ἐστὶν, ὃς ταχθεὶς ἀνελέσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν στρατηγῶν τοὺς καταδύντας Ἀθηναίων ἐν τῇ περὶ Λέσβον ναυμαχίᾳ, αὐτὸς οὐκ ἀνελόμενος ὅμως τῶν στρατηγῶν κατηγορῶν ἀπέκτεινεν αὐτοὺς, ἵνα αὐτὸς περισωθείη. (Xen. ut sup.)

Here it stands admitted that the first impression at Athens was, as Diodorus states expressly, that Theramenês was ordered to pick up the men on the wrecks, might have done it if he had taken proper pains, and was to blame for not doing it. Now how did this impression arise? Of course, through communications received from the armament itself. And when Theramenês, in his reply, says that the generals themselves made communications in the same tenor, there is no reason why we should not believe him, in spite of their joint official despatch, wherein they made no mention of him, and in spite of their speech in the public assembly afterwards, where the previous official letter fettered them, and prevented them from accusing him, forcing them to adhere to the statement first made, of the all-sufficiency of the storm.

The main facts which we here find established, even by the enemies of Theramenês, are: 1. That Theramenês accused the generals because he found himself in danger of being punished for the neglect. 2. That his enemies, who charged him with the breach of duty, did not admit the storm as an excuse for him.

[282] Strabo, xiii, p. 617.

[283] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 6, 37. Ἐτεόνικος δὲ, ἐπειδὴ ἐκεῖνοι (the signal-boat, with news of the pretended victory) κατέπλεον, ἔθυε τὰ εὐαγγέλια, καὶ τοῖς στρατιώταις παρήγγειλε δειπνοποιεῖσθαι, καὶ τοῖς ἐμπόροις, τὰ χρήματα σιωπῇ ἐνθεμένους ἐς τὰ πλοῖα ἀποπλεῖν ἐς Χίον, ἦν δὲ τὸ πνεῦμα οὔριον, καὶ τὰς τριήρεις τὴν ταχίστην. Αὐτὸς δὲ τὸ πεζὸν ἀπῆγεν ἐς τὴν Μήθυμνην, τὸ στρατόπεδον ἐμπρήσας. Κόνων δὲ καθελκύσας τὰς ναῦς, ἐπεὶ οἵ τε πολέμιοι ἀπεδεδράκεσαν, καὶ ὁ ἄνεμος εὐδιαίτερος ἦν, ἀπαντήσας τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἤδη ἀνηγμένοις ἐκ τῶν Ἀργινουσῶν, ἔφρασε τὰ περὶ τοῦ Ἐτεονίκου.

One sees, by the expression used by Xenophon respecting the proceedings of Konon, that he went out of the harbor “as soon as the wind became calmer;” that it blew a strong wind, though in a direction favorable to carry the fleet of Eteonikus to Chios. Konon was under no particular motive to go out immediately: he could afford to wait until the wind became quite calm. The important fact is, that wind and weather were perfectly compatible with, indeed even favorable to, the escape of the Peloponnesian fleet from Mitylênê to Chios.

[284] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 7, 5-7. Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα οἱ στρατηγοὶ βραχέα ἕκαστος ἀπελογήσατο, οὐ γὰρ προὐτέθη σφίσι λόγος κατὰ τὸν νόμον....

Τοιαῦτα λέγοντες ἔπειθον τὸν δῆμον. The imperfect tense ἔπειθον must be noticed: “they were persuading,” or, seemed in the way to persuade, the people; not ἔπεισαν the aorist, which would mean that they actually did satisfy the people.

The first words here cited from Xenophon, do not imply that the generals were checked or abridged in their liberty of speaking before the public assembly, but merely that no judicial trial and defence were granted to them. In judicial defence, the person accused had a measured time for defence—by the clepsydra, or water-clock—allotted to him, during which no one could interrupt him; a time doubtless much longer than any single speaker would be permitted to occupy in the public assembly.

[285] Lysias puts into one of his orations a similar expression respecting the feeling at Athens towards these generals; ἡγούμενοι χρῆναι τῇ τῶν τεθνεώτων ἀρετῇ παρ᾽ ἐκείνων δίκην λαβεῖν; Lysias cont. Eratosth. s. 37.

[286] Xenoph. Hellen. i. 7, 8. Οἱ οὖν περὶ τὸν Θηραμένην παρεσκεύασαν ἀνθρώπους μέλανα ἱμάτια ἔχοντας, καὶ ἐν χρῷ κεκαρμένους πολλοὺς ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἑορτῇ, ἵνα πρὸς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν ἥκοιεν, ὡς δὴ ξυγγενεῖς ὄντες τῶν ἀπολωλότων.

Here I adopt substantially the statement of Diodorus, who gives a juster and more natural description of the proceeding; representing it as a spontaneous action of mournful and vindictive feeling on the part of the kinsmen of the deceased (xiii, 101).

Other historians of Greece, Dr. Thirlwall not excepted (Hist. of Greece, ch. xxx, vol. iv, pp. 117-125), follow Xenophon on this point. They treat the intense sentiment against the generals at Athens as “popular prejudices;” “excitement produced by the artifices of Theramenês,” (Dr. Thirlwall, pp. 117-124.) “Theramenês (he says) hired a great number of persons to attend the festival, dressed in black, and with their heads shaven, as mourning for kinsmen whom they had lost in the sea-fight.”

Yet Dr. Thirlwall speaks of the narrative of Xenophon in the most unfavorable terms; and certainly in terms no worse than it deserves (see p. 116, the note): “It looks as if Xenophon had purposely involved the whole affair in obscurity.” Compare also p. 123, where his criticism is equally severe.

I have little scruple in deserting the narrative of Xenophon, of which I think as meanly as Dr. Thirlwall, so far as to supply, without contradicting any of his main allegations, an omission which I consider capital and preponderant. I accept his account of what actually passed at the festival of the Apaturia, but I deny his statement of the manœuvres of Theramenês as the producing cause.

Most of the obscurity which surrounds these proceedings at Athens arises from the fact, that no notice has been taken of the intense and spontaneous emotion which the desertion of the men on the wrecks was naturally calculated to produce on the public mind. It would, in my judgment, have been unaccountable if such an effect had not been produced, quite apart from all instigations of Theramenês. The moment that we recognize this capital fact, the series of transactions becomes comparatively perspicuous and explicable.

Dr. Thirlwall, as well as Sievers (Commentat. de Xenophontis Hellen. pp. 25-30), suppose Theramenês to have acted in concert with the oligarchical party, in making use of this incident to bring about the ruin of generals odious to them, several of whom were connected with Alkibiadês. I confess, that I see nothing to countenance this idea: but at all events, the cause here named is only secondary, not the grand and dominant fact of the period.

[287] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 7, 8, 9.

[288] Xenoph. Hellen. i. 7, 34.

[289] I cannot concur with the opinion expressed by Dr. Thirlwall in Appendix iii. vol. iv, p. 501, of his History, on the subject of the psephism of Kannônus. The view which I give in the text coincides with that of the expositors generally, from whom Dr. Thirlwall dissents.

The psephism of Kannônus was the only enactment at Athens which made it illegal to vote upon the case of two accused persons at once. This had now grown into a practice in the judicial proceedings at Athens; so that two or more prisoners, who were ostensibly tried under some other law, and not under the psephism of Kannônus, with its various provisions, would yet have the benefit of this its particular provision, namely, severance of trial.

In the particular case before us, Euryptolemus was thrown back to appeal to the psephism itself; which the senate, by a proposition unheard of at Athens, proposed to contravene. The proposition of the senate offended against the law in several different ways. It deprived the generals of trial before a sworn dikastery; it also deprived them of the liberty of full defence during a measured time: but farther, it prescribed that they should all be condemned or absolved by one and the same vote; and, in this last respect, it sinned against the psephism of Kannônus. Euryptolemus in his speech, endeavoring to persuade an exasperated assembly to reject the proposition of the senate and adopt the psephism of Kannônus as the basis of the trial, very prudently dwells upon the severe provisions of the psephism, and artfully slurs over what he principally aims at, the severance of the trials, by offering his relative Periklês to be tried first. The words δίχα ἕκαστον (sect. 37) appear to me to be naturally construed with κατὰ τὸ Καννώνου ψήφισμα, as they are by most commentators, though Dr. Thirlwall dissents from it. It is certain that this was the capital feature of illegality, among many, which the proposition of the senate presented, I mean the judging and condemning all the generals by one vote. It was upon this point that the amendment of Euryptolemus was taken, and that the obstinate resistance of Sokratês turned (Plato, Apol. 20; Xenoph. Memor. i, 1, 18).

Farther, Dr. Thirlwall, in assigning what he believes to have been the real tenor of the psephism of Kannônus, appears to me to have been misled by the Scholiast in his interpretation of the much-discussed passage of Aristophanês, Ekklezias. 1089:—

Τουτὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα κατὰ τὸ Καννώνου σαφῶς

Ψήφισμα, βινεῖν δεῖ με διαλελημμένον,

Πῶς οὖν δικωπεῖν ἀμφοτέρας δυνήσομαι;

Upon which Dr. Thirlwall observes, “that the young man is comparing his plight to that of a culprit, who, under the decree of Cannônus, was placed at the bar held by a person on each side. In this sense the Greek Scholiast, though his words are corrupted, clearly understood the passage.”

I cannot but think that the Scholiast understood the words completely wrong. The young man in Aristophanês does not compare his situation with that of the culprit, but with that of the dikastery which tried culprits. The psephism of Kannônus directed that each defendant should be tried separately: accordingly, if it happened that two defendants were presented for trial, and were both to be tried without a moment’s delay, the dikastery could only effect this object by dividing itself into two halves, or portions; which was perfectly practicable, whether often practised or not, as it was a numerous body. By doing this, κρίνειν διαλελημμένον, it could try both the defendants at once: but in no other way.

Now the young man in Aristophanês compares himself to the dikastery thus circumstanced; which comparison is signified by the pun of βινεῖν διαλελημμένον in place of κρίνειν διαλελημμένον. He is assailed by two obtrusive and importunate customers, neither of whom will wait until the other has been served. Accordingly he says: “Clearly, I ought to be divided into two parts, like a dikastery acting under the psephism of Kannônus, to deal with this matter: yet how shall I be able to serve both at once?”

This I conceive to be the proper explanation of the passage in Aristophanês; and it affords a striking confirmation of the truth of that which is generally received as purport of the psephism of Kannônus. The Scholiast appears to me to have puzzled himself, and to have misled every one else.

[290] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 7. Τὸν δὲ Καλλίξενον προσεκαλέσαντο παράνομα φάσκοντες ξυγγεγραφέναι Εὐρυπτόλεμός τε καὶ ἄλλοι τινες· τοῦ δὲ δήμου ἔνιοι ταῦτα ἐπῄνουν· τὸ δὲ πλῆθος ἐβόα δεινὸν εἶναι, εἰ μή τις ἐάσει τὸν δῆμον πράττειν, ὃ ἂν βούληται. Καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις εἰπόντος Λυκίσκου, καὶ τούτους τῇ αὐτῇ ψήφῳ κρίνεσθαι, ᾗπερ καὶ τοὺς στρατηγοὺς, ἐὰν μὴ ἀφῶσι τὴν ἐκκλησίαν, ἐπεθορύβησε πάλιν ὁ δῆμος, καὶ ἠναγκάσθησαν ἀφιέναι τὰς κλήσεις.

All this violence is directed to the special object of getting the proposition discussed and decided on by the assembly, in spite of constitutional obstacles.

[291] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 7, 11. Παρῆλθε δέ τις ἐς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν φάσκων, ἐπὶ τεύχους ἀλφίτων σωθῆναι· ἐπιστέλλειν δ᾽ αὐτῷ τοὺς ἀπολλυμένους, ἐὰν σωθῇ, ἀπαγγεῖλαι τῷ δήμῳ, ὅτι οἱ στρατηγοὶ οὐκ ἀνείλοντο τοὺς ἀρίστους ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος γενομένους.

I venture to say that there is nothing in the whole compass of ancient oratory, more full of genuine pathos and more profoundly impressive, than this simple incident and speech; though recounted in the most bald manner, by an unfriendly and contemptuous advocate.

Yet the whole effect of it is lost, because the habit is to dismiss everything which goes to inculpate the generals, and to justify the vehement emotion of the Athenian public, as if it was mere stage-trick and falsehood. Dr. Thirlwall goes even beyond Xenophon, when he says (p. 119, vol. iv): “A man was brought forward, who pretended he had been preserved by clinging to a meal-barrel, and that his comrades,” etc. So Mr. Mitford: “A man was produced,” etc. (p. 347).

Now παρῆλθε does not mean, “he was brought forward:” it is a common word employed to signify one who comes forward to speak in the public assembly (see Thucyd. iii, 44, and the participle παρελθὼν, in numerous places).

Next, φάσκων while it sometimes means pretending, sometimes also means simply affirming: Xenophon does not guarantee the matter affirmed, but neither does he pronounce it to be false. He uses φάσκων in various cases where he himself agrees with the fact affirmed (see Hellen. i, 7, 12; Memorab. i, 2, 29; Cyropæd. viii, 3, 41; Plato, Ap. Socr. c. 6, p. 21).

The people of Athens heard and fully believed this deposition; nor do I see any reason why an historian of Greece should disbelieve it. There is nothing in the assertion of this man which is at all improbable; nay, more, it is plain that several such incidents must have happened. If we take the smallest pains to expand in our imaginations the details connected with this painfully interesting crisis at Athens, we shall see that numerous stories of the same affecting character must have been in circulation; doubtless many false, but many also perfectly true.

[292] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 7, 14, 15; Plato, Apol. Socr. c. 20; Xenoph. Memor. i, 1, 18; iv, 4, 2.

In the passage of the Memorabilia, Xenophon says that Sokratês was epistatês, or presiding prytanis, for that actual day. In the Hellenica, he only reckons him as one among the prytanes. It can hardly be accounted certain that he was epistatês, the rather as this same passage of the Memorabilia is inaccurate on another point: it names nine generals as having been condemned, instead of eight.

[293] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 7, 16. Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα, that is, after the cries and threats above recounted, ἀναβὰς Εὐρυπτόλεμος ἔλεξεν ὑπὲρ τῶν στρατηγῶν τάδε, etc.

[294] It is this accusation of “reckless hurry,” προπέτεια, which Pausanias brings against the Athenians in reference to their behavior toward the six generals (vi, 7, 2).

[295] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 7, 30. Μὴ ὑμεῖς γε, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀλλ᾽ ἑαυτῶν ὄντας τοὺς νόμους, δι᾽ οὓς μάλιστα μέγιστοί ἐστε, φυλάττοντες, ἄνευ τούτων μηδὲν πράττειν πειρᾶσθε.

[296] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 7, 35. τούτων δὲ μάρτυρες οἱ σωθέντες ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου, ὧν εἷς τῶν ὑμετέρων στρατηγῶν ἐπὶ καταδύσης νεὼς σωθεὶς, etc.

[297] The speech is contained in Xenoph. Hellen. i, 7, 16-36.

[298] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 7, 38. Τούτων δὲ διαχειροτονουμένων, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἔκριναν τὴν Εὐρυπτολέμου· ὑπομοσαμένου δὲ Μενεκλέους, καὶ πάλιν διαχειροτονίας γενομένης, ἔκριναν τὴν τῆς βουλῆς.

I cannot think that the explanations of this passage given either by Schömann (De Comitiis Athen. part ii, 1, p. 160, seq.) or by Meier and Schömann (Der Attische Prozess, b. iii, p. 295; b. iv, p. 696) are satisfactory. The idea of Schömann, that, in consequence of the unconquerable resistance of Sokratês, the voting upon this question was postponed until the next day, appears to me completely inconsistent with the account of Xenophon; and, though countenanced by a passage in the Pseudo-Platonic dialogue called Axiochus (c. 12), altogether loose and untrustworthy. It is plain to me that the question was put without Sokratês, and could be legally put by the remaining prytanes, in spite of his resistance. The word ὑπομοσία must doubtless bear a meaning somewhat different here to its technical sense before the dikastery; and different also, I think, to the other sense which Meier and Schömann ascribe to it, of a formal engagement to prefer at some future time an indictment, or γραφὴ παρανόμων. It seems to me here to denote, an objection taken on formal grounds, and sustained by oath either tendered or actually taken, to the decision of the prytanes, or presidents. These latter had to declare on which side the show of hands in the assembly preponderated: but there surely must have been some power of calling in question their decision, if they declared falsely, or if they put the question in a treacherous, perplexing, or obscure manner. The Athenian assembly did not admit of an appeal to a division, like the Spartan assembly or like the English House of Commons; though there were many cases in which the votes at Athens were taken by pebbles in an urn, and not by show of hands.

Now it seems to me that Meneklês here exercised the privilege of calling in question the decision of the prytanes, and constraining them to take the vote over again. He may have alleged that they did not make it clearly understood which of the two propositions was to be put to the vote first; that they put the proposition of Kallixenus first, without giving due notice; or perhaps that they misreported the numbers. By what followed, we see that he had good grounds for his objection.

[299] Diodor. xiii, 101. In regard to these two component elements of the majority, I doubt not that the statement of Diodorus is correct. But he represents, quite erroneously, that the generals were condemned by the vote of the assembly, and led off from the assembly to execution. The assembly only decreed that the subsequent urn-voting should take place, the result of which was necessarily uncertain beforehand. Accordingly, the speech which Diodorus represents Diomedon to have made in the assembly, after the vote of the assembly had been declared, cannot be true history: “Athenians, I wish that the vote which you have just passed may prove beneficial to the city. Do you take care to fulfil those vows to Zeus Soter, Apollo, and the Venerable Goddesses, under which we gained our victory since fortune has prevented us from fulfilling them ourselves.” It is impossible that Diomedon can have made a speech of this nature, since he was not then a condemned man; and after the condemnatory vote, no assembly was held.

[300] I translate here literally the language of Sokratês in his Defence (Plato, Apol. c. 20), παρανόμως, ὡς ἐν τῷ ὑστέρῳ χρόνῳ πᾶσιν ὑμῖν ἔδοξε.

[301] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 7, 39. This vote of the public assembly was known at Athens by the name of Probolê. The assembled people discharged on this occasion an ante-judicial function, something like that of a Grand Jury.

[302] Xenophon. Hellen. i, 7, 40. μισούμενος ὑπὸ πάντων, λίμῳ ἀπέθανεν.

[303] This is the supposition of Sievers, Forchhammer, and some other learned men; but, in my opinion, it is neither proved nor probable.

[304] If Thucydidês had lived to continue his history so far down as to include this memorable event, he would have found occasion to notice τὸ ξυγγενὲς, kinship, as being not less capable of ἀπροφάσιστος τόλμα, unscrupulous daring, than τὸ ἑταιρικόν, faction. In his reflections on the Korkyræan disturbances (iii, 82), he is led to dwell chiefly on the latter, the antipathies of faction, of narrow political brotherhood or conspiracy for the attainment and maintenance of power, as most powerful in generating evil deeds: had he described the proceedings after the battle of Arginusæ, he would have seen that the sentiment of kinship, looked at on its antipathetic or vindictive side, is pregnant with the like tendencies.

[305] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 7, 31. Ἐπειδὴ γὰρ κρατήσαντες τῇ ναυμαχίᾳ πρὸς τὴν γῆν κατέπλευσαν, Διομέδων μὲν ἐκέλευεν, ἀναχθέντας ἐπὶ κέρως ἅπαντας ἀναιρεῖσθαι τὰ ναυάγια καὶ τοὺς ναυαγοὺς, Ἐρασινίδης δὲ, ἐπὶ τοὺς ἐς Μυτιλήνην πολεμίους τὴν ταχίστην πλεῖν ἅπαντας· Θράσυλλος δ᾽ ἀμφότερα ἔφη γενέσθαι, ἂν τὰς μὲν αὐτοῦ καταλίπωσι, ταῖς δὲ ἐπὶ τοὺς πολεμίους πλέωσι· καὶ δοξάντων τούτων, etc.

I remarked, before, that the case of Erasinidês stood in some measure apart from that of the other generals. He proposed, according to this speech of Euryptolemus, that all the fleet should at once go again to Mitylênê; which would of course have left the men on the wrecks to their fate.

[306] The statement rests on the authority of Aristotle, as referred to by the Scholiast on the last verse of the Ranæ of Aristophanês. And this, so far as I know, is the only authority: for when Mr. Fynes Clinton (Fast. Hellen. ad ann. 406) says that Æschinês (De Fals. Legat. p. 38, c. 24) mentions the overtures of peace, I think that no one who looks at that passage will be inclined to found any inference upon it.

Against it, we may observe:—

1. Xenophon does not mention it. This is something, though far from being conclusive when standing alone.

2. Diodorus does not mention it.

3. The terms alleged to have been proposed by the Lacedæmonians, are exactly the same as those said to have been proposed by them after the death of Mindarus at Kyzikus, namely:—

To evacuate Dekeleia, and each party to stand as they were. Not only the terms are the same, but also the person who stood prominent in opposition is in both cases the same, Kleophon. The overtures after Arginusæ are in fact a second edition of those after the battle of Kyzikus.

Now, the supposition that on two several occasions the Lacedæmonians made propositions of peace, and that both are left unnoticed by Xenophon, appears to me highly improbable. In reference to the propositions after the battle of Kyzikus, the testimony of Diodorus outweighed, in my judgment, the silence of Xenophon; but here Diodorus is silent also.

In addition to this, the exact sameness of the two alleged events makes me think that the second is only a duplication of the first, and that the Scholiast, in citing from Aristotle, mistook the battle of Arginusæ for that of Kyzikus, which latter was by far the more decisive of the two.

[307] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 1, 1-4.

[308] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 1, 10-12.

[309] Diodor. xiii, 104; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 8.

[310] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 1, 14; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 9.

[311] Lysias, Orat. xiii, cont. Agorat. sect. 13.

[312] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 1, 15, 16.

[313] This flying visit of Lysander across the Ægean to the coasts of Attica and Ægina is not noticed by Xenophon, but it appears both in Diodorus and in Plutarch (Diodor. xiii, 104: Plutarch, Lysand. c. 9).

[314] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 1, 18, 19; Diodor. xiii, 104; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 9.

[315] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 1, 20, 21.

[316] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 1, 22-24; Plutarch. Lysand. c. 10; Diodor. xiii, 105.

[317] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 1, 25; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 10; Plutarch, Alkib. c. 36.

Diodorus (xiii, 105) and Cornelius Nepos (Alkib. c. 8) represent Alkibiadês as wishing to be readmitted to a share in the command of the fleet, and as promising, if that were granted, that he would assemble a body of Thracians, attack Lysander by land, and compel him to fight a battle or retire. Plutarch (Alkib. c. 37) alludes also to promises of this sort held out by Alkibiadês.

Yet it is not likely that Alkibiadês should have talked of anything so obviously impossible. How could he bring a Thracian land-force to attack Lysander, who was on the opposite side of the Hellespont? How could he carry a land-force across in the face of Lysander’s fleet?

The representation of Xenophon (followed in my text) is clear and intelligible.

[318] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 1, 29; Lysias, Orat. xxi, (Ἀπολ. Δωροδ.) s. 12.

[319] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 1, 28; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 11; Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 36; Cornel. Nepos, Lysand. c. 8; Polyæn. i, 45, 2.

Diodorus (xiii, 106) gives a different representation of this important military operation; far less clear and trustworthy than that of Xenophon.

[320] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 1, 28. τὰς δ᾽ ἄλλας πάσας (ναῦς) Λύσανδρος ἔλαβε πρὸς τῇ γῇ· τοὺς δὲ πλείστους ἄνδρας ἐν τῇ γῇ ξυνέλεξεν· οἱ δὲ καὶ ἔφυγον ἐς τὰ τειχύδρια.

[321] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 1, 29; Diodor. xiii, 106: the latter is discordant, however, on many points.

[322] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 1, 31. This story is given with variations in Plutarch, Lysand. c. 9. and by Cicero de Offic. iii, 11. It is there the right thumb which is to be cut off, and the determination is alleged to have been taken in reference to the Æginetans.

[323] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 1, 32; Pausan. ix, 32, 6; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 13.

[324] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 1. 32; Lysias cont. Alkib. A. s. 38; Pausan. iv, 17, 2; x, 9, 5; Isokratês ad Philipp. Or. v, sect. 70. Lysias, in his Λόγος Ἐπιτάφιος (s. 58), speaks of the treason, yet not as a matter of certainty.

Cornelius Nepos (Lysand. c. 1; Alcib. c. 8) notices only the disorder of the Athenian armament, not the corruption of the generals, as having caused the defeat. Nor does Diodorus notice the corruption (xiii, 105).

Both these authors seem to have copied from Theopompus, in describing the battle of Ægospotami. His description differs on many points from that of Xenophon (Theopomp. Fragm. 8, ed. Didot).

[325] Demosthen. de Fals. Legat. p. 401, c. 57.

[326] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 3; Diodor. xiii, 107.

[327] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 2; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 13.

[328] Cornelius Nepos, Lysand. c. 2; Polyæn. i, 45, 4. It would appear that this is the same incident which Plutarch (Lysand. c. 19) recounts as if the Milesians, not the Thasians, were the parties suffering. It cannot well be the Milesians, however, it we compare chapter 8 of Plutarch’s Life of Lysander.

[329] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 13. πολλαῖς δὲ παραγινόμενος αὐτὸς σφαγαῖς καὶ συνεκβάλλων τοὺς τῶν φίλων ἐχθροὺς, etc.

[330] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 6. εὐθὺς δὲ καὶ ἡ ἄλλη Ἑλλὰς ἀφειστήκει Ἀθηναίων, πλὴν Σαμίων· οὗτοι δὲ, σφαγὰς τῶν γνωρίμων ποιήσαντες, κατεῖχον τὴν πόλιν.

I interpret the words σφαγὰς τῶν γνωρίμων ποιήσαντες to refer to the violent revolution at Samos, described in Thucyd. viii, 21, whereby the oligarchy were dispossessed and a democratical government established. The word σφαγὰς is used by Xenophon (Hellen. v, 4, 14), in a subsequent passage, to describe the conspiracy and revolution effected by Pelopidas and his friends at Thebes. It is true that we might rather have expected the preterite participle πεποιηκότες than the aorist ποιήσαντες. But this employment of the aorist participle in a preterite sense is not uncommon with Xenophon: see κατηγορήσας, δόξας, i, 1, 31; γενομένους, i, 7, 11; ii, 2, 20.

It appears to me highly improbable that the Samians should have chosen this occasion to make a fresh massacre of their oligarchical citizens, as Mr. Mitford represents. The democratical Samians must have been now humbled and intimidated, seeing their subjugation approaching; and only determined to hold out by finding themselves already so deeply compromised though the former revolution. Nor would Lysander have spared them personally afterwards, as we shall find that he did, when he had them substantially in his power (ii, 3, 6), if they had now committed any fresh political massacre.

[331] Xenoph. Memorab. ii, 8, 1; ii, 10, 4; Xenoph. Sympos. iv, 31. Compare Demosthen. cont. Leptin. c. 24, p. 491.

A great number of new proprietors acquired land in the Chersonese through the Lacedæmonian sway, doubtless in place of these dispossessed Athenians; perhaps by purchase at a low price, but most probably by appropriation without purchase (Xenoph. Hellen. iv, 8, 5).

[332] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 2, 1; Demosthen. cont. Leptin. c. 14, p. 474. Ekphantus and the other Thasian exiles received the grant of ἀτέλεια, or immunity from the peculiar charges imposed upon metics at Athens.

[333] This interesting decree or psephism of Patrokleidês is given at length in the Oration of Andokidês de Mysteriis, sects. 76-80: Ἃ δ᾽ εἴρηται ἐξαλεῖψαι, μὴ κεκτῆσθαι ἰδίᾳ μηδενὶ ἐξεῖναι, μηδὲ μνησικακῆσαι μηδέποτε.

[334] Andokid. de Myst. s. 76. καὶ πίστιν ἀλλήλοις περὶ ὁμονοίας δοῦναι ἐν ἀκροπόλει.

[335] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 11. τοὺς ἀτίμους ἐπιτίμους ποιήσαντες ἐκαρτέρουν.

[336] Andokidês de Mysteriis, sects. 80-101; Lysias, Orat. xviii, De Bonis Niciæ Fratr. sect. 9.

At what particular moment the severe condemnatory decree had been passed by the Athenian assembly against the exiles serving with the Lacedæmonian garrison at Dekeleia, we do not know. The decree is mentioned by Lykurgus, cont. Leokrat. sects. 122, 123, p. 164.

[337] Isokratês adv. Kallimachum, sect. 71; compare Andokidês de Reditu suo, sect. 21, and Lysias cont. Diogeiton. Or. xxxii, sect. 22, about Cyprus and the Chersonese, as ordinary sources of supply of corn to Athens.

[338] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 9; Diodor. xiii, 107.

[339] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 12-15; Lysias cont. Agorat. sects. 10-12.

[340] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 16; Lysias, Orat. xiii, cont. Agorat. sect. 12; Lysias, Orat. xii, cont. Eratosthen. sects. 65-71.

See an illustration of the great suffering during the siege, in Xenophon Apolog. Socrat. s. 18.

[341] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 15-21; compare Isokratês, Areopagit. Or. vii, sect. 73.

[342] Lysias, Orat. xiii, cont. Agorat. sects. 15, 16, 17; Orat. xxx, cont. Nikomach. sects. 13-17.

This seems the most probable story as to the death of Kleophon, though the accounts are not all consistent, and the statement of Xenophon, especially (Hellen. i, 7, 35), is not to be reconciled with Lysias. Xenophon conceived Kleophon as having perished earlier than this period, in a sedition (στάσεως τινος γενομένης ἐν ᾗ Κλεοφῶν ἀπέθανε), before the flight of Kallixenus from his recognizances. It is scarcely possible that Kallixenus could have been still under recognizance, during this period of suffering between the battle of Ægospotami and the capture of Athens. He must have escaped before that battle. Neither long detention of an accused party in prison before trial, nor long postponement of trial when he was under recognizance were at all in Athenian habits.

[343] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 19; vi, 5, 35-46; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 15.

The Thebans, a few years afterwards, when they were soliciting aid from the Athenians against Sparta, disavowed this proposition of their delegate Erianthus, who had been the leader of the Bœotian contingent serving under Lysander at Ægospotami, honored in that character by having his statue erected at Delphi, along with the other allied leaders who took part in the battle, and along with Lysander and Eteonikus (Pausan. x, 9, 4).

It is one of the exaggerations so habitual with Isokratês, to serve a present purpose, when he says that the Thebans were the only parties, among all the Peloponnesian confederates, who gave this harsh anti-Athenian vote (Isokratês, Orat. Plataic. Or. xiv, sect. 34).

Demosthenês says that the Phocians gave their vote, in the same synod, against the Theban proposition (Demosth. de Fals. Legat. c. 22, p. 361).

It seems from Diodor. xv, 63, and Polyæn. i, 45, 5, as well as from some passages in Xenophon himself, that the motives of the Lacedæmonians, in thus resisting the proposition of the Thebans against Athens, were founded in policy more than in generosity.

[344] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 20; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 14; Diodor. xiii, 107. Plutarch gives the express words of the Lacedæmonian decree, some of which words are very perplexing. The conjecture of G. Hermann, αἱ χρήδοιτε instead of ἃ χρὴ δόντες, has been adopted into the text of Plutarch by Sintenis, though it seems very uncertain.

[345] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 23. Lysias (Orat. xii, cont. Eratosth. s. 71) lays the blame of this wretched and humiliating peace upon Theramenês, who plainly ought not to be required to bear it; compare Lysias, Orat. xiii, cont. Agorat. sects. 12-20.

[346] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 15. He says, however, that this was also the day on which the Athenians gained the battle of Salamis. This is incorrect: that victory was gained in the month Boedromion.

[347] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 18.

[348] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 20; ii, 3, 8; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 14. He gives the contents of the skytalê verbatim.

[349] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 15; Lysias cont. Agorat. sect. 50. ἔτι δὲ τὰ τείχη ὡς κατεσκάφη, καὶ αἱ νῆες τοῖς πολεμίοις παρεδόθησαν, καὶ τὰ νεώρια καθῃρέθη, etc.

[350] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 23. Καὶ τὰ τείχη κατέσκαπτον ὑπ᾽ αὐλητρίδων πολλῇ προθυμίᾳ, νομίζοντες ἐκείνην τὴν ἡμέραν τῇ Ἑλλάδι ἄρχειν τῆς ἐλευθερίας.

Plutarch, Lysand. c. 15.

[351] Lysias cont. Eratosth. Or. xii, sect. 75, p. 431, R.; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 15; Diodor. xiv, 3.

[352] Lysander dedicated a golden crown to Athênê in the acropolis, which is recorded in the inscriptions among the articles belonging to the goddess.

See Boeckh, Corp. Inscr. Attic. Nos. 150-152, p. 235.

[353] Lysias. Or. xiii, cont. Agorat. s. 80.

[354] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 18; ii, 3, 46; Plutarch, Vit. x, Orator. Vit. Lycurg. init.

M. E. Meier, in his Commentary on Lykurgus, construes this passage of Plutarch differently, so that the person therein specified as exile would be, not Aristodemus, but the grandfather of Lykurgus. But I do not think this construction justified: see Meier, Comm. de Lykurg. Vitâ, p. iv, (Halle, 1847).

Respecting Chariklês, see Isokratês, Orat. xvi, De Bigis, s. 52.

[355] See Stallbaum’s Preface to the Charmidês of Plato, his note on the Timæus of Plato, p. 20, E, and the Scholia on the same passage.

Kritias is introduced as taking a conspicuous part in four of the Platonic dialogues; Protagoras, Charmidês, Timæus and Kritias; the last only a fragment, not to mention the Eryxias.

The small remains of the elegiac poetry of Kritias are to be found in Schneidewin, Delect. Poet. Græc. p. 136, seq. Both Cicero (De Orat. ii, 22, 93) and Dionys. Hal. (Judic. de Lysiâ, c. 2, p. 454; Jud. de Isæo, p. 627) notice his historical compositions.

About the concern of Kritias in the mutilation of the Hermæ, as affirmed by Diognêtus, see Andokidês de Mysteriis, s. 47. He was first cousin of Andokidês, by the mother’s side.

[356] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 35.

[357] Xenoph. Hellen ii, 3, 35; Memorab. i, 2, 24.

[358] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2. ἐπεὶ δὲ αὐτὸς μὲν (Kritias) προπετὴς ἦν ἐπὶ τὸ πολλοὺς ἀποκτεῖναι, ἅτε καὶ φυγὼν ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου, etc.

[359] Lysias cont. Agorat. Or. xiii, s. 23, p. 132.

[360] Lysias cont. Eratosth. Or. xii, s. 78, p. 128. Theramenês is described, in his subsequent defence, ὀνειδίζων μὲν τοῖς φεύγουσιν ὅτι δι᾽ αὑτὸν κατέλθοιεν, etc.

The general narrative of Xenophon, meagre as it is, harmonizes with this.

[361] Lysias cont. Eratosth. Or. xii, s. 44, p. 124. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἡ ναυμαχία καὶ ἡ συμφορὰ τῇ πόλει ἐγένετο, δημοκρατίας ἔτι οὔσης, ὅθεν τῆς στάσεως ἦρξαν, πέντε ἄνδρες ἔφοροι κατέστησαν ὑπὸ τῶν καλουμένων ἑταίρων, συναγωγεῖς μὲν τῶν πολιτῶν, ἄρχοντες δὲ τῶν συνωμοτῶν, ἐναντία δὲ τῷ ὑμετέρῳ πλήθει πράττοντες.

[362] Lysias cont. Agorat. Or. xiii, s. 28 (p. 132); s. 35, p. 133. Καὶ παρορμίσαντες δύο πλοῖα Μουνυχίασιν, ἐδέοντο αὐτοῦ (Ἀγοράτου) παντὶ τρόπῳ ἀπελθεῖν Ἀθήνηθεν, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἔφασαν συνεκπλευσεῖσθαι, ἕως τὰ πράγματα κατασταίη, etc.

Lysias represents this accusation of the generals, and this behavior of Agoratus, as having occurred before the surrender of the city, but after the return of Theramenês, bringing back the final terms imposed by the Lacedæmonians. He thus so colors it, that Agoratus, by getting the generals out of the way, was the real cause why the degrading peace brought by Theramenês was accepted. Had the generals remained at large, he affirms, they would have prevented the acceptance of this degrading peace, and would have been able to obtain better terms from the Lacedæmonians (see Lysias cont. Agor. sects. 16-20).

Without questioning generally the matters of fact set forth by Lysias in this oration (delivered a long time afterwards, see s. 90), I believe that he misdates them, and represents them as having occurred before the surrender, whereas they really occurred after it. We know from Xenophon, that when Theramenês came back the second time with the real peace, the people were in such a state of famine, that farther waiting was impossible: the peace was accepted immediately that it was proposed; cruel as it was, the people were glad to get it (Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 22). Besides, how could Agoratus be conveyed with two vessels out of Munychia, when the harbor was closely blocked up? and what is the meaning of ἕως τὰ πράγματα κατασταίη, referred to a moment just before the surrender?

[363] Lysias cont. Agorat. Or. xiii, sects. 38, 60, 68.

[364] Lysias cont. Eratosth. Or. xii, s. 74: compare Aristotle ap. Schol. ad Aristophan. Vesp. 157.

[365] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 2.

[366] Lysias cont. Eratosth. Or. xii, sects. 74-77.

[367] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 6-8.

[368] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 8.

[369] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 16; Diodor. xiii, 106.

[370] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 2, 11: Lysias cont. Agorat. Orat. xiii, sects. 23-80.

Tisias, the brother-in-law of Chariklês, was a member of this senate (Isokratês, Or. xvi, De Bigis, s. 53).

[371] Plato, Epist. vii, p. 324, B.; Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 54.

[372] Isokratês cont. Kallimach. Or. xviii, s. 6, p. 372.

[373] Lysias, Orat. xii, cont. Eratosth. s. 5, p. 121. Ἐπειδὴ δ᾽ οἱ τριάκοντα πονηροὶ μὲν καὶ συκοφάνται ὄντες εἰς τὴν ἀρχὴν κατέστησαν, φάσκοντες χρῆναι τῶν ἀδίκων καθαρὰν ποιῆσαι τὴν πόλιν, καὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς πολίτας ἐπ᾽ ἀρετὴν καὶ δικαιοσύνην τραπέσθαι, etc.

[374] Plato, Epist. vii, p. 324, B.C.

[375] Lysias cont. Agorat. s. 38.

[376] Lysias cont. Agorat. s. 40.

[377] Lysias cont. Agorat. s. 41.

[378] Lysias cont. Eratosth. s. 18; Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 51; Isokrat. Orat. xx, cont. Lochit. s. 15, p. 397.

[379] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 12, 28, 38. Αὐτὸς (Theramenês) μάλιστα ἐξορμήσας ἡμᾶς, τοῖς πρώτοις ὑπαγομένοις ἐς ἡμᾶς δίκην ἐπιτιθέναι, etc.

[380] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 13. ἕως δὴ τοὺς πονηροὺς ἐκποδὼν ποιησάμενοι καταστήσαιντο τὴν πολιτείαν.

[381] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 15, 23, 42; Isokrat. cont. Kallimach. Or. xviii, s. 30, p. 375.

[382] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 42; ii, 4, 14. οἱ δὲ καὶ οὐχ ὅπως ἀδικοῦντες, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἐπιδημοῦντες ἐφυγαδευόμεθα, etc.

Isokratês, Orat. xvi, De Bigis, s. 46, p. 355.

[383] Plutarch, Vit. x, Orator. p. 838.

[384] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 39-41; Lysias, Orat. xviii, De Bonis Niciæ Fratris, sects. 5-8.

[385] Plato, Apol. Sokratês, c. 20, p. 32. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὀλιγαρχία ἐγένετο, οἱ τριάκοντα αὖ μεταπεμψάμενοί με πέμπτον αὐτὸν εἰς τὴν θόλον προσέταξαν ἀγαγεῖν ἐκ Σαλαμῖνος Λέοντα τὸν Σαλαμίνιον, ἵν᾽ ἀποθάνοι· οἷα δὴ καὶ ἄλλοις ἐκεῖνοι πολλοῖς πολλὰ προσέταττον, βουλόμενοι ὡς πλείστους ἀναπλῆσαι αἰτιῶν.

Isokrat. cont. Kallimach. Or. xviii, sect. 23, p. 374. ἐνίοις καὶ προσέταττον ἐξαμαρτάνειν. Compare also Lysias, Or. xii, cont. Eratosth. sect. 32.

We learn, from Andokidês de Myster. sect. 94, that Melêtus was one of the parties who actually arrested Leon, and brought him up for condemnation. It is not probable that this was the same person who afterwards accused Sokratês. It may possibly have been his father, who bore the same name; but there is nothing to determine the point.

[386] Plato, Apol. Sokrat. ut sup.; Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 4, 9-23.

[387] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 17, 19, 48. From sect. 48, we see that Theramenês actually made this proposition: τὸ μέντοι σὺν τοῖς δυναμένοις καὶ μεθ᾽ ἵππων καὶ μετ᾽ ἀσπίδων ὠφελεῖν διὰ τούτων τὴν πολιτείαν, πρόσθεν ἄριστον ἡγούμην εἶναι καὶ νῦν οὐ μεταβάλλομαι.

This proposition, made by Theramenês and rejected by the Thirty, explains the comment which he afterwards made, when they drew up their special catalogue or roll of three thousand; which comment otherwise appears unsuitable.

[388] Thucyd. viii, 89-92. τὸ μὲν καταστῆσαι μετόχους τοσούτους, ἀντικρὺς ἂν δῆμον ἡγούμενοι.

[389] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 8, 19; ii, 4, 2, 8, 24.

[390] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 51.

[391] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 20, 41: compare Lysias. Orat. xii, cont. Eratosth. sect. 41.

[392] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 21; Isokratês adv. Euthynum, sect. 5, p. 401; Isokratês cont. Kallimach. sect. 23, p. 375; Lysias, Or. xxv, Δημ. Καταλ. Ἀπολ. sect. 21, p. 173.

The two passages of Isokratês sufficiently designate what this list, or κατάλογος, must have been; but the name by which he calls it—ὁ μετὰ Λυσάνδρου (or Πεισάνδρου) κατάλογος—is not easy to explain.

[393] Lysias, Orat. vi, cont. Andok. sect. 46; Or. xii, cont. Eratosth. sect 49.

[394] Xenoph. Memor. i, 2, 12. Κριτίας μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐν τῇ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ πάντων κλεπτίστατός τε καὶ βιαιότατος ἐγένετο, etc.

[395] Lysias, Or. xii. cont. Eratosthen. sects. 8, 21. Lysias prosecuted Eratosthenês before the dikastery some years afterwards, as having caused the death of Polemarchus. The foregoing details are found in the oration, spoken as well as composed by himself.

[396] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 56.

[397] See Lysias, Or. xii, cont. Eratosth. s. 66.

[398] Diodor. xiv, 5. Diodorus tells us that Sokratês and two of his friends were the only persons who stood forward to protect Theramenês, when Satyrus was dragging him from the altar. Plutarch (Vit. x, Orat. p. 836) ascribes the same act of generous forwardness to Isokratês. There is no good ground for believing it, either of one or of the other. None but senators were present; and as this senate had been chosen by the Thirty, it is not likely that either Sokratês or Isokratês were among its members. If Sokratês had been a member of it, the fact would have been noticed and brought out in connection with his subsequent trial.

The manner in which Plutarch (Consolat. ad Apollon. c. 6, p. 105) states the death of Theramenês, that he was “tortured to death” by the Thirty is an instance of his loose speaking.

Compare Cicero about the death of Theramenês (Tuscul. Disp. i, 40, 96). His admiration for the manner of death of Theramenês doubtless contributed to make him rank that Athenian with Themistoklês and Periklês (De Orat. iii. 16, 59).

[399] The epithets applied by Aristophanês to Theramenês (Ran. 541-966) coincide pretty exactly with those in the speech just noticed, which Xenophon ascribes to Kritias against him.

[400] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 1; Lysias, Orat. xii, cont. Eratosth. s. 97; Orat. xxxi, cont. Philon. s. 8, 9; Herakleid. Pontic. c. 5; Diogen. Laërt. i, 98.

[401] Xenoph. Hellen. l. c. ἦγον δὲ ἐκ τῶν χωρίων, ἵν᾽ αὐτοὶ καὶ οἱ φίλοι τοὺς τούτων ἀγροὺς ἔχοιεν· φευγόντων δὲ ἐς τὸν Πειραιᾶ, καὶ ἐντεῦθεν πολλοὺς ἄγοντες, ἐνέπλησαν Μέγαρα καὶ Θήβας τῶν ὑποχωρούντων.

[402] Lysias, Or. xii, cont. Eratosth. s. 49; Or. xxv, Democrat. Subvers. Apolog. s. 20; Or. xxvi, cont. Evandr. s. 23.

[403] Æschinês, Fals. Legat. c. 24, p. 266, and cont. Ktesiph. c. 86, p. 455; Isokratês, Or. iv, Panegyr. s. 131; Or. vii, Areopag. s. 76.

[404] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 1; Diodor. xiv, 6; Lysias, Or. xxiv, s. 28; Or. xxxi, cont. Philon. s. 10.

[405] Lysias, Or. xii, cont. Eratosth. sects. 98, 99: παντάχοθεν ἐκκηρυττόμενοι; Plutarch, Lysand. c. 99; Diodor xiv, 6; Demosth. de Rhod. Libert. c. 10.

[406] Xenoph. Memor. i, 2, 31. Καὶ ἐν τοῖς νόμοις ἔγραψε, λόγων τέχνην μὴ διδάσκειν.—Isokratês, cont. Sophist. Or. xiii, s. 12. τὴν παίδευσιν τὴν τῶν λόγων.

Plutarch (Themistoklês, c. 19) affirms that the Thirty oligarchs, during their rule, altered the position of the rostrum in the Pnyx, the place where the democratical public assemblies were held: the rostrum had before looked towards the sea, but they turned it so as to make it look towards the land, because the maritime service and the associations connected with it were the chief stimulants of democratical sentiment. This story has been often copied and reasserted, as if it were an undoubted fact; but M. Forchhammer (Topographie von Athen, p. 289, in Kieler Philol. Studien. 1841) has shown it to be untrue and even absurd.

[407] Aristot. Polit. v, 9, 2.

[408] Xenoph. Memorab. i, 2, 33-39.

[409] Justin (vi, 10) mentions the demand thus made and refused. Plutarch (Lysand. c. 27) states the demand as having been made by the Thebans alone, which I disbelieve. Xenophon, according to the general disorderly arrangement of facts in his Hellenika, does not mention the circumstance in its proper place, but alludes to it on a subsequent occasion as having before occurred (Hellen. iii, 5, 5). He also specifies by name no one but the Thebans as having actually made the demand; but there is a subsequent passage, which shows that not only the Corinthians, but other allies also, sympathized in it (iii, 5, 12).

[410] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 17; Plutarch, Institut. Lacon. p. 239.

[411] Pausan. vi, 3, 6. The Samian oligarchical party owed their recent restoration to Lysander.

[412] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 18, 19.

[413] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 30. Οὕτω δὲ προχωρούντων, Παυσανίας ὁ βασιλεὺς (of Sparta), φθονήσας Λυσάνδρῳ εἰ κατειργασμένος ταῦτα ἅμα μὲν εὐδοκιμήσοι, ἅμα δὲ ἰδίας ποιήσοιτο τὰς Ἀθήνας, πείσας τῶν Ἐφόρων τρεῖς, ἐξάγει φρουράν. Ξυνείποντο δὲ καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι πάντες, πλὴν Βοιωτῶν καὶ Κορινθίων. Οὗτοι δ᾽ ἔλεγον μὲν ὅτι οὐ νομίζοιεν εὐορκεῖν ἂν στρατευόμενοι ἐπ᾽ Ἀθηναίους, μηδὲν παράσπονδον ποιοῦντας· ἔπραττον δὲ ταῦτα, ὅτι ἐγίγνωσκον Λακεδαιμονίους βουλομένους τὴν τῶν Ἀθηναίων χώραν οἰκείαν καὶ πιστὴν ποιήσασθαι. Compare also iii, 5, 12, 13, respecting the sentiments entertained in Greece about the conduct of the Lacedæmonians.

[414] Diodor. xiv, 10-13.

[415] Thucyd. iv.

[416] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 2; Diodor. xiv, 32; Pausan. i, 29, 3; Lysias, Or. xiii, cont. Agorat. sect. 84; Justin, v, 9; Æschinês, cont. Ktesiphon, c. 62, p. 437; Demosth. cont. Timokrat. c. 34, p. 742. Æschinês allots more than one hundred followers to the captors of Phylê.

The sympathy which the Athenian exiles found at Thebes is attested in a fragment of Lysias, ap. Dionys. Hal. Jud. de Lysiâ, p. 594 (Fragm. 47, ed. Bekker).

[417] Lysias, Or. xii, cont. Eratosth. sect. 41, p. 124.

[418] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 2, 5, 14.

[419] See an analogous case of a Lacedæmonian army surprised by the Thebans at this dangerous hour, Xenoph. Hellen. vii, i, 16; compare Xenoph. Magistr. Equit. vii, 12.

[420] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 5, 7. Diodorus (xiv, 32, 33) represents the occasion of this battle somewhat differently. I follow the account of Xenophon.

[421] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 8. I apprehend that ἀπογράφεσθαι here refers to prospective military service; as in vi, 5, 29, and in Cyropæd. ii, 1, 18, 19. The words in the context, πόσης φυλακῆς προσδεήσοιντο, attest that such is the meaning; though the commentators, and Sturz in his Lexicon Xenophonteum, interpret differently.

[422] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 8.

[423] Both Lysias (Orat. xii, cont. Eratosth. s. 53; Orat. xiii, cont. Agorat. s. 47) and Diodorus (xiv, 32) connect together these two similar proceedings at Eleusis and at Salamis. Xenophon mentions only the affair at Eleusis.

[424] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 9. Δείξας δέ τι χωρίον, ἐς τοῦτο ἐκέλευσε φανερὰν φέρειν τὴν ψῆφον. Compare Lysias, Or. xiii, cont. Agorat. s. 40, and Thucyd. iv, 74, about the conduct of the Megarian oligarchical leaders: καὶ τούτων περὶ ἀναγκάσαντες τὸν δῆμον ψῆφον φανερὰν διενεγκεῖν, etc.

[425] Lysias (Orat. xii, cont. Eratosth. s. 53) gives this number.

[426] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 10, 13. ἡμέραν πέμπτην, etc.

[427] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 12.

[428] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 12, 20.

[429] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 19; Cornel. Nepos, Thrasybul. c. 2.

[430] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 22.

[431] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 22; Lysias, Orat. xii, cont. Eratosth. s. 55: οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐκ Πειραιέως κρείττους ὄντες εἴασαν αὐτοὺς ἀπελθεῖν, etc.

[432] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 24.

[433] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 23.

[434] Lysias, Orat. xii, cont. Eratosth. sects. 55, 56: οἱ δοκοῦντες εἶναι ἐναντιώτατοι Χαρικλεῖ καὶ Κριτίᾳ καὶ τῇ τούτων ἑταιρείᾳ, etc.

[435] The facts which I have here set down, result from a comparison of Lysias, Orat. xii, cont. Eratosth. sects. 53, 59, 94: Φείδων, αἱρεθεὶς ὑμᾶς διαλλάξαι καὶ καταγαγεῖν. Diodor. xiv, 32; Justin, v, 9.

[436] Isokratês, Or. xviii, cont. Kallimach. s. 25.

[437] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 24, 28.

[438] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 25.

[439] Plutarch, Vit. x, Orator, p. 835; Lysias, Or. xxxi, cont. Philon. sects. 19-34.

Lysias and his brother had carried on a manufactory of shields at Athens. The Thirty had plundered it; but some of the stock probably escaped.

[440] Demosth. cont. Leptin. c. 32, p. 502; Lysias cont. Nikomach. Or. xxx, s. 29.

[441] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 27.

[442] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 28; Diodor. xiv, 33; Lysias, Orat. xii, cont. Eratosth. s. 60.

[443] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 29. Οὕτω δὲ προχωρούντων, Παυσανίας ὁ βασιλεὺς, φθονήσας Λυσάνδρῳ, εἰ κατειργασμένος ταῦτα ἅμα μὲν εὐδοκιμήσοι, ἅμα δὲ ἰδίας ποιήσοιτο τὰς Ἀθήνας, πείσας τῶν Ἐφόρων τρεῖς, ἐξάγει φρουράν.

Diodor. xiv, 33. Παυσανίας δὲ..., φθονῶν μὲν τῷ Λυσάνδρῳ, θεωρῶν δὲ τὴν Σπάρτην ἀδοξοῦσαν παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησι, etc.

Plutarch, Lysand. c. 21.

[444] Xenoph. Hellen. v, 2, 3.

[445] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 30.

[446] Lysias, Or. xviii, De Bonis Niciæ Frat. sects. 8-10.

[447] Lysias, ut sup. sects. 11, 12. ὅθεν Παυσανίας ἤρξατο εὔνους εἶναι τῷ δήμῳ, παράδειγμα ποιούμενος πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους Λακεδαιμονίους τὰς ἡμετέρας συμφορὰς τῆς τῶν τριάκοντα πονηρίας....

Οὕτω δ᾽ ἠλεούμεθα, καὶ πᾶσι δεινὰ ἐδοκοῦμεν πεπονθέναι, ὥστε Παυσανίας τὰ μὲν παρὰ τῶν τριάκοντα ξένια οὐκ ἠθέλησε λαβεῖν, τὰ δὲ παρ᾽ ἡμῶν ἐδέξατο.

[448] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 31. This seems the meaning of the phrase ἀπιέναι ἐπὶ τὰ ἑαυτῶν; as we may see by s. 38.

[449] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 31-34.

[450] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 35. Διΐστη δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἐν τῷ ἄστει (Pausanias) καὶ ἐκέλευε πρὸς σφᾶς προσιέναι ὡς πλείστους ξυλλεγομένους, λέγοντας, etc.

[451] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 39; Diodor. xiv, 33.

[452] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 40-42.

[453] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 43; Justin, v, 11. I do not comprehend the allusion in Lysias, Orat. xxv, Δημ. Καταλ. Ἀπολ. sect. 11: εἰσὶ δὲ οἵτινες τῶν Ἐλευσῖνάδε ἀπογραψαμένων, ἐξελθόντες μεθ᾽ ὑμῶν, ἐπολιορκοῦντο μετ᾽ αὐτῶν.

[454] Thucyd. i, 97.

[455] See vol. v, of this History, ch. xlv, p 343.

[456] See vol. vi, ch. lii, p. 353 of this History.

[457] This I apprehend to have been in the mind of Xenophon, De Reditibus, v, 6. Ἔπειτ᾽, ἐπεὶ ὠμῶς ἄγαν δόξασα προστατεύειν ἡ πόλις ἐστερήθη τῆς ἀρχῆς, etc.

[458] Thucyd. viii, 48.

[459] “I confess, gentlemen, that this appears to me as bad in the principle, and far worse in the consequences, than an universal suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act.... Far from softening the features of such a principle, and thereby removing any part of the popular odium or natural terrors attending it, I should be sorry that anything framed in contradiction to the spirit of our constitution did not instantly produce, in fact, the grossest of the evils with which it was pregnant in its nature. It is by lying dormant a long time, or being at first very rarely exercised, that arbitrary power steals upon a people. On the next unconstitutional act, all the fashionable world will be ready to say: Your prophecies are ridiculous, your fears are vain; you see how little of the misfortunes which you formerly foreboded is come to pass. Thus, by degrees, that artful softening of all arbitrary power, the alleged infrequency or narrow extent of its operation, will be received as a sort of aphorism; and Mr. Hume will not be singular in telling us that the felicity of mankind is no more disturbed by it, than by earthquakes or thunder, or the other more unusual accidents of nature.” (Burke, Letter to the Sheriffs of Bristol, 1777: Burke’s Works, vol. iii, pp. 146-150 oct. edit.)

[460] Aristot. Polit. v, 7, 19. Καὶ τῷ δήμῳ κακόνους ἔσομαι, καὶ βουλεύσω ὅ,τι ἂν ἔχω κακόν.

The complimentary epitaph upon the Thirty, cited in the Schol. on Æschinês,—praising them as having curbed, for a short time, the insolence of the accursed Demos of Athens,—is in the same spirit: see K. F. Hermann, Staats-Alterthümer der Griechen, s. 70, note 9.

[461] Plato, Epistol. vii, p. 324. Καὶ ὁρῶν δή που τοὺς ἄνδρας ἐν χρόνῳ ὀλίγῳ χρυσὸν ἀποδείξαντας τὴν ἔμπροσθεν πολιτείαν, etc.

[462] Andokidês de Mysteriis, s. 90.

[463] All this may be collected from various passages of the Orat. xii, of Lysias. Eratosthenês did not stand alone on his trial, but in conjunction with other colleagues; though of course, pursuant to the psephism of Kannônus, the vote of the dikasts would be taken about each separately: ἀλλὰ παρὰ Ἐρατοσθένους καὶ τῶν τουτουῒ συναρχόντων δίκην λαμβάνειν.... μηδ᾽ ἀποῦσι μὲν τοῖς τριάκοντα ἐπιβουλεύετε, παρόντας δ᾽ ἀφῆτε· μηδὲ τῆς τύχης, ἣ τούτους παρέδωκε τῇ πόλει, κάκιον ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς βοηθήσητε (sects. 80, 81): compare s. 36.

The number of friends prepared to back the defence of Eratosthenês, and to obtain his acquittal, chiefly by representing that he had done the least mischief of all the Thirty; that all that he had done had been under fear of his own life; that he had been the partisan and supporter of Theramenês, whose memory was at that time popular, may be seen in sections 51, 56, 65, 87, 88, 91.

There are evidences also of other accusations brought against the Thirty before the senate of Areopagus (Lysias, Or. xi, cont. Theomnest. A. s. 31, B. s. 12).

[464] Lysias, Or. xii, cont. Eratosth. s. 36.

[465] Demosth. adv. Bœotum de Dote Matern. c. 6, p. 1018.

[466] Dionys. Hal. Jud. de Lysiâ, c. 32, p. 526; Lysias, Orat. xxxiv, Bekk.

[467] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 41.

[468] Xenoph. Memor. iii, 5, 19.

[469] Andokidês de Mysteriis, s. 83. Ὁπόσων δ᾽ ἂν προσδέῃ (νόμων), οἵδε ᾑρημένοι νομοθέται ὑπὸ τῆς βουλῆς ἀναγράφοντες ἐν σάνισιν ἐκτιθέντων πρὸς τοὺς ἐπωνύμους, σκοπεῖν τῷ βουλομένῳ, καὶ παραδιδόντων ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἐν τῷδε τῷ μηνί. Τοὺς δὲ παραδιδομένους νόμους δοκιμασάτω πρότερον ἡ βουλὴ καὶ οἱ νομοθέται οἱ πεντακόσιοι, οὓς οἱ δημόται εἵλοντο, ἐπειδὴ ὀμωμόκασιν.

Putting together the two sentences in which the nomothetæ are here mentioned, Reiske and F. A. Wolf (Prolegom. ad Demosthen. cont. Leptin. p. cxxix), think that there were two classes of nomothetæ; one class chosen by the senate, the other by the people. This appears to me very improbable. The persons chosen by the senate were invested with no final or decisive function whatever; they were simply chosen to consider what new propositions were fit to be submitted for discussion, and to provide that such propositions should be publicly made known. Now any persons simply invested with this character of a preliminary committee, would not, in my judgment, be called nomothetæ. The reason why the persons here mentioned were so called, was, that they were a portion of the five hundred nomothetæ, in whom the power of peremptory decision ultimately rested. A small committee would naturally be intrusted with this preliminary duty; and the members of that small committee were to be chosen by one of the bodies with whom ultimate decision rested, but chosen out of the other.

[470] Andokidês de Mysteriis, sections 81-85.

[471] Andokidês de Myster. s. 87. ψήφισμα δὲ μηδὲν μήτε βουλῆς μήτε δήμου (νόμου), κυριώτερον εἶναι.

It seems that the word νόμου ought properly to be inserted here: see Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. c. 23, p. 649.

Compare a similar use of the phrase, μηδὲν κυριώτερον εἶναι, in Demosthen. cont. Lakrit. c. 9, p. 937.

[472] Andokidês de Myster. s. 87. We see (from Demosthen. cont. Timokrat. c. 15, p. 718) that Andokidês has not cited the law fully. He has omitted the words, ὁπόσα δ᾽ ἐπὶ τῶν τριάκοντα ἐπράχθη, ἢ ἰδίᾳ ἢ δημοσίᾳ, ἄκυρα εἶναι, these words not having any material connection with the point at which he was aiming. Compare Æschinês cont. Timarch. c. 9, p. 25, καὶ ἔστω ταῦτα ἄκυρα, ὥσπερ τὰ ἐπὶ τῶν τριάκοντα, ἢ τὰ πρὸ Εὐκλείδου, ἢ εἴ τις ἄλλη πώποτε τοιαύτη ἐγένετο προθεσμία....

Tisamenus is probably the same person of whom Lysias speaks contemptuously, Or. xxx, cont. Nikomach. s. 36.

Meier (De Bonis Damnatorum, p. 71) thinks that there is a contradiction between the decree proposed by Tisamenus (Andok. de Myst. s. 83), and another decree proposed by Dioklês, cited in the Oration of Demosth. cont. Timokr. c. 11, p. 713. But there is no real contradiction between the two, and the only semblance of contradiction that is to be found, arises from the fact that the law of Dioklês is not correctly given as it now stands. It ought to be read thus:—

Διοκλῆς εἶπε, Τοὺς νόμους τοὺς πρὸ Εὐκλείδου τεθέντας ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ, καὶ ὅσοι ἐπ᾽ Εὐκλείδου ἐτέθησαν, καὶ εἰσὶν ἀναγεγραμμένοι, [ἀπ᾽ Εὐκλείδου] κυρίους εἶναι· τοὺς δὲ μετ᾽ Εὐκλείδην τεθέντας καὶ τολοιπὸν τιθεμένους κυρίους εἶναι ἀπὸ τῆς ἡμέρας ἧς ἕκαστος ἐτέθη, πλὴν εἴ τῳ προσγέγραπται χρόνος ὅντινα δεῖ ἄρχειν. Ἐπιγράψαι δὲ, τοῖς μὲν νῦν κειμένοις, τὸν γραμματέα τῆς βουλῆς, τριάκοντα ἡμερῶν· τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν, ὃς ἂν τυγχάνῃ γραμματεύων, προσγραφέτω παραχρῆμα τὸν νόμον κύριον εἶναι ἀπὸ τῆς ἡμέρας ἧς ἐτέθη.

The words ἀπ᾽ Εὐκλείδου, which stand between brackets in the second line, are inserted on my own conjecture; and I venture to think that any one who will read the whole law through, and the comments of the orator upon it, will see that they are imperatively required to make the sense complete. The entire scope and purpose of the law is, to regulate clearly the time from which each law shall begin to be valid.

As the first part of the law reads now, without these words, it has no pertinence, no bearing on the main purpose contemplated by Dioklês in the second part, nor on the reasonings of Demosthenês afterwards. It is easy to understand how the words ἀπ᾽ Εὐκλείδου should have dropped out, seeing that ἐπ᾽ Εὐκλείδου immediately precedes: another error has been in fact introduced, by putting ἀπ᾽ Εὐκλείδου in the former case instead of ἐπ᾽ Εὐκλείδου, which error has been corrected by various recent editors, on the authority of some MSS.

The law of Dioklês, when properly read, fully harmonizes with that of Tisamenus. Meier wonders that there is no mention made of the δοκιμασία νόμων by the nomothetæ, which is prescribed in the decree of Tisamenus. But it was not necessary to mention this expressly, since the words ὅσοι εἰσὶν ἀναγεγραμμένοι presuppose the foregone δοκιμασία.

[473] Andokidês de Mysteriis, s. 91. καὶ οὐ δέξομαι ἔνδειξιν οὐδὲ ἀπαγωγὴν ἕνεκα τῶν πρότερον γεγενημένων, πλὴν τῶν φευγόντων.

[474] Andokid. de Mysteriis, s. 91. καὶ οὐ μνησικακήσω, οὐδὲ ἄλλῳ (sc. ἄλλῳ μνησικακοῦντι) πείσομαι, ψηφιοῦμαι δὲ κατὰ τοὺς κειμένους νόμους.

This clause does not appear as part of the Heliastic oath given in Demosthen. cont. Timokrat. c. 36, p. 746. It was extremely significant and valuable for the few years immediately succeeding the renovation of the democracy. But its value was essentially temporary, and it was doubtless dropped within twenty or thirty years after the period to which it specially applied.

[475] The Orat. xviii, of Isokratês, Paragraphê cont. Kallimachum, informs us on these points, especially sections 1-4.

Kallimachus had entered an action against the client of Isokratês for ten thousand drachmæ (sects. 15-17), charging him as an accomplice of Patroklês,—the king-archon under the Ten, who immediately succeeded the Thirty, prior to the return of the exiles,—in seizing and confiscating a sum of money belonging to Kallimachus. The latter, in commencing this action, was under the necessity of paying the fees called prytaneia; a sum proportional to what was claimed, and amounting to thirty drachmæ, when the sum claimed was between one thousand and ten thousand drachmæ. Suppose that action had gone to trial directly, Kallimachus, if he lost his cause, would have to forfeit his prytaneia, but he would forfeit no more. Now according to the paragraphê permitted by the law of Archinus, the defendant is allowed to make oath that the action against him is founded upon a fact prior to the archonship of Eukleidês; and a cause is then tried first, upon that special issue, upon which the defendant is allowed to speak first, before the plaintiff. If the verdict, on this special issue, is given in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff is not only disabled from proceeding further with his action, but is condemned besides to pay to the defendant the forfeit called epobely: that is, one-sixth part of the sum claimed. But if, on the contrary, the verdict on the special issue be in favor of the plaintiff, he is held entitled to proceed farther with his original action, and to receive besides at once, from the defendant, the like forfeit or epobely. Information on these regulations of procedure in the Attic dikasteries may be found in Meier and Schömann, Attischer Prozess, p. 647; Platner, Prozess und Klagen, vol. i, pp. 156-162.

[476] Wachsmuth—who admits into his work, with little or no criticism, everything which has ever been said against the Athenian people, and indeed against the Greeks generally—affirms, contrary to all evidence and probability, that the amnesty was not really observed at Athens. (Wachsm. Hellen. Alterth. ch. ix. sect. 71, vol. ii, p. 267.)

The simple and distinct words of Xenophon, coming as they do from the mouth of so very hostile a witness, are sufficient to refute him: καὶ ὀμόσαντες ὅρκους ἦ μὴν μὴ μνησικακήσειν, ἔτι καὶ νῦν ὁμοῦ γε πολιτεύονται, καὶ τοῖς ὅρκοις ἐμμένει ὁ δῆμος, (Hellen. ii, 4, 43).

The passages to which Wachsmuth makes reference, do not in the least establish his point. Even if actions at law or accusations had been brought, in violation of the amnesty, this would not prove that the people violated it; unless we also knew that the dikastery had affirmed those actions. But he does not refer to any actions or accusations preferred on any such ground. He only notices some cases in which, accusation being preferred on grounds subsequent to Eukleidês, the accuser makes allusion in his speech to other matters anterior to Eukleidês. Now every speaker before the Athenian dikastery thinks himself entitled to call up before the dikasts the whole past life of his opponent, in the way of analogous evidence going to attest the general character of the latter, good or bad. For example, the accuser of Sokratês mentions, as a point going to impeach the general character of Sokratês, that he had been the teacher of Kritias; while the philosopher, in his defence, alludes to his own resolution and virtue as prytanis in the assembly by which the generals were condemned after the battle of Arginusæ. Both these allusions come out as evidences to general character.

[477] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 9.

[478] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 4, 1. ἦγον δὲ ἐκ τῶν χωρίων (οἱ τριάκοντα) ἵν᾽ αὐτοὶ καὶ οἱ φίλοι τοὺς τούτων ἀγροὺς ἔχοιεν.

[479] Isokratês cont. Kallimach. Or. xviii, sect. 30.

Θρασύβουλος μὲν καὶ Ἄνυτος, μέγιστον μὲν δυνάμενοι τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει, πολλῶν δ᾽ ἀπεστερημένοι χρημάτων, εἰδότες δὲ τοὺς ἀπογράψαντας, ὅμως οὐ τολμῶσιν αὐτοῖς δίκας λαγχάνειν οὐδὲ μνησικακεῖν, ἀλλ᾽ εἰ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων μᾶλλον ἑτέρων δύνανται διαπράττεσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ οὖν περί γε τῶν ἐν ταῖς συνθήκαις ἶσον ἔχειν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀξιοῦσιν.

On the other hand, the young Alkibiadês (in the Orat. xvi, of Isokratês, De Bigis, sect. 56) is made to talk about others recovering their property: τῶν ἄλλων κομιζομένων τὰς οὐσίας. My statement in the text reconciles these two. The young Alkibiadês goes on to state that the people had passed a vote to grant compensation to him for the confiscation of his father’s property, but that the power of his enemies had disappointed him of it. We may well doubt whether such vote ever really passed.

It appears, however, that Batrachus, one of the chief informers who brought in victims for the Thirty, thought it prudent to live afterwards out of Attica (Lysias cont. Andokid. Or. vi, sect. 46), though he would have been legally protected by the amnesty.

[480] Andokidês de Mysteriis, sect. 94. Μέλητος δ᾽ αὖ οὑτοσὶ ἀπήγαγεν ἐπὶ τῶν τριάκοντα Λέοντα, ὡς ὑμεῖς ἅπαντες ἴστε, καὶ ἀπέθανεν ἐκεῖνος ἄκριτος.... Μέλητον τοίνυν τοῖς παισὶ τοῖς τοῦ Λέοντος οὐκ ἔστι φόνου διώκειν, ὅτι τοῖς νόμοις δεῖ χρῆσθαι ἀπ᾽ Εὐκλείδου ἄρχοντος· ἐπεὶ ὥς γε οὐκ ἀπήγαγεν, οὐδ᾽ αὐτὸς ἀντιλέγει.

[481] Thucyd. vi, 39. δῆμον, ξύμπαν ὠνομάσθαι, ὀλιγαρχίαν δὲ, μέρος.

[482] Æschylus, Sept. ad Thebas, v, 1047.

Τραχύς γε μέντοι δῆμος ἐκφυγὼν κακά.

[483] Thucyd. viii, 97.

[484] Andokidês de Mysteriis, sect. 88. Τὰς μὲν δίκας, ὦ ἄνδρες, καὶ τὰς διαίτας ἐποιήσατε κυρίας εἶναι, ὁπόσαι ἐν δημοκρατουμένῃ τῇ πόλει ἐγένοντο, ὅπως μήτε χρεῶν ἀποκοπαὶ εἶεν μήτε δίκαι ἀνάδικοι γένοιντο, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἰδίων συμβολαίων αἱ πράξεις εἶεν.

[485] Isokratês, Areopagit. Or. vii, sect. 77; Demosth. cont. Leptin. c. 5, p. 460.

[486] Lysias pro Mantitheo, Or. xvi, sects. 6-8. I accept substantially the explanation which Harpokration and Photius give of the word κατάστασις, in spite of the objections taken to it by M. Boeckh, which appear to me not founded upon any adequate ground. I cannot but think that Reiske is right in distinguishing κατάστασις from the pay, μισθὸς.

See Boeckh, Public Economy of Athens, b. ii, sect. 19, p. 250. In the Appendix to this work, which is not translated into English along with the work itself, he farther gives the Fragment of an inscription, which he considers to bear upon this resumption of κατάστασις from the horsemen, or knights, after the Thirty. But the Fragment is so very imperfect, that nothing can be affirmed with any certainty concerning it: see the Staatshaush. der Athener, Appendix, vol. ii, pp. 207, 208.

[487] Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 1, 4.

[488] Lysias, Or. xvi, pro Mantitheo, sects. 9, 10; Lysias, cont. Evandr. Or. xxvi, sects. 21-25.

We see from this latter oration (sect. 26) that Thrasybulus helped some of the chief persons, who had been in the city, and had resisted the return of the exiles, to get over the difficulties of the dokimasy, or examination into character, previously to being admitted to take possession of any office, to which a man had been either elected or drawn by lot, in after years. He spoke in favor of Evander, in order that the latter might be accepted as king-archon.

[489] I presume confidently that Tisamenus the scribe, mentioned in Lysias cont. Nikomach. sect. 37, is the same person as Tisamenus named in Andokidês de Mysteriis (sect. 83) as the proposer of the memorable psephism.

[490] See M. Boeckh’s Public Economy of Athens, b. ii, c. 8, p. 186, Eng. Tr., for a summary of all that is known respecting these γραμματεῖς, or secretaries.

The expression in Lysias cont. Nikomach. sect. 38, ὅτι ὑπογραμματεῦσαι οὐκ ἔξεστι δὶς τὸν αὐτὸν τῇ ἀρχῇ τῇ αὐτῇ, is correctly explained by M. Boeckh as having a very restricted meaning, and as only applying to two successive years. And I think we may doubt whether, in practice, it was rigidly adhered to; though it is possible to suppose that these secretaries alternated, among themselves, from one board or office to another. Their great usefulness consisted in the fact that they were constantly in the service, and thus kept up the continuous march of the details.

[491] Lysias, Or. xxx, cont. Nikomach. sect. 32.

[492] Lysias, Or. xxx, cont. Nikomach. sect. 33. Wachsmuth calls him erroneously antigrapheus instead of anagrapheus (Hellen. Alterth. vol. ii, ix, p. 269).

It seems by Orat. vii, of Lysias (sects. 20, 36, 39) that Nikomachus was at enmity with various persons who employed Lysias as their logograph, or speech-writer.

[493] Lysias, Or. x, cont. Theomnest. A. sects. 16-20.

[494] See Taylor, Vit. Lysiæ, pp. 53, 54; Franz, Element Epigraphicê Græc. Introd. pp. 18-24.

[495] Lysias cont. Nikom. sect. 3. His employment had lasted six years altogether: four years before the Thirty, two years after them, sect. 7. At least this seems the sense of the orator.

[496] I presume this to be the sense of sect. 21 of the Oration of Lysias against him: εἰ μὲν νόμους ἐτίθην περὶ τῆς ἀναγραφῆς, etc.; also sects. 33-45: παρακαλοῦμεν ἐν τῇ κρίσει τιμωρεῖσθαι τοὺς τὴν ὑμετέραν νομοθεσίαν ἀφανίζοντας, etc.

The tenor of the oration, however, is unfortunately obscure.

[497] Isæus, Or. viii, De Kiron. Sort. sect. 61; Demosthen. cont. Eubulid. c. 10, p. 1307.

[498] Plutarch, Vit. x, Orat. (Lysias) p. 836; Taylor, Vit. Lysiæ, p. 53.

[499] See respecting this change Boeckh, Public Econ. of Athens, ii, 7, p. 180, seq., Eng. Tr.

[500] Lysias, Fragm. Or. xxxiv, De non dissolvendâ Republicâ, sect. 3: ἀλλὰ καὶ Εὐβοεῦσιν ἐπιγαμίαν ἐποιούμεθα, etc.

[501] Æschinês, cont. Ktesiphon. c. 62, p. 437; Cornel. Nepos, Thrasybul. c. 4.

[502] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 3, 12. τόν τε κοινὸν ὅρκον καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἀλλήλοις πίστεις ἐποιοῦντο.

[503] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 4, 7.

[504] Xenoph. Anab. i, 1; Diodor. xiii, 108.

[505] Xenoph. Hellen. ii, 3, 42; Isokratês, Or. xvi, De Bigis, s. 46.

[506] I put together what seems to me the most probable account of the death of Alkibiadês from Plutarch, Alkib. c. 38, 39; Diodorus, xiv, 11 (who cites Ephorus, compare Ephor. Fragm. 126, ed. Didot); Cornelius Nepos, Alkibiad. c. 10; Justin, v, 8; Isokratês, Or. xvi, De Bigis, s. 50.

There were evidently different stories, about the antecedent causes and circumstances, among which a selection must be made. The extreme perfidy ascribed by Ephorus to Pharnabazus appears to me not at all in the character of that satrap.

[507] Cornelius Nepos says (Alcib. c. 11) of Alkibiadês: “Hunc infamatum a plerisque tres gravissimi historici summis laudibus extulerunt: Thucydides, qui ejusdem ætatis fuit; Theopompus, qui fuit post aliquando natus, et Timæus: qui quidem duo maledicentissimi, nescio quo modo, in illo uno laudando conscierunt.”

We have no means of appreciating what was said by Theopompus and Timæus. But as to Thucydidês, it is to be recollected that he extols only the capacity and warlike enterprise of Alkibiadês, nothing beyond; and he had good reason for doing so. His picture of the dispositions and conduct of Alkibiadês is the reverse of eulogy.

The Oration xvi, of Isokratês, De Bigis, spoken by the son of Alkibiadês, goes into a labored panegyric of his father’s character, but is prodigiously inaccurate, if we compare it with the facts stated in Thucydidês and Xenophon. But he is justified in saying: οὐδέποτε τοῦ πατρὸς ἡγουμένου τρόπαιον ὑμῶν ἔστησαν οἱ πολέμιοι (s. 23).

[508] The Œdipus Tyrannus of Sophoklês was surpassed by the rival composition of Philoklês. The Medea of Euripidês stood only third for the prize; Euphorion, son of Æschylus, being first, Sophoklês second. Yet these two tragedies are the masterpieces now remaining of Sophoklês and Euripidês.

[509] The careful examination of Welcker (Griech. Tragödie. vol. i, p. 76) makes out the titles of eighty tragedies unquestionably belonging to Sophoklês, over and above the satyrical dramas in his tetralogies. Welcker has considerably cut down the number admitted by previous authors, carried by Fabricius as high as one hundred and seventy-eight, and even, by Boeckh, as high as one hundred and nine (Welcker, ut sup. p. 62).

The number of dramas ascribed to Euripidês is sometimes ninety-two, sometimes seventy-five. Elmsley, in his remarks on the Argument to the Medea, p. 72, thinks that even the larger of these numbers is smaller than what Euripidês probably composed; since the poet continued composing for fifty years, from 455 to 405 B.C., and was likely during each year to have composed one, if not two, tetralogies; if he could prevail upon the archon to grant him a chorus, that is, the opportunity of representing. The didaskalies took no account of any except such as gained the first, second, or third prize. Welcker gives the titles, and an approximative guess at the contents, of fifty-one lost tragedies of the poet, besides the seventeen remaining (p. 443).

Aristarchus the tragedian is affirmed by Suidas to have composed seventy tragedies, of which only two gained the prize. As many as a hundred and twenty compositions are ascribed to Neophron, forty-four to Achæus, forty to Ion (Welcker, ib. p. 889).

[510] Plato, Symposion, c. 3, p. 175.

[511] For these particulars, see chiefly a learned and valuable compilation—G. C. Schneider, Das Attische Theater-Wesen, Weimar, 1835—furnished with copious notes; though I do not fully concur in all his details, and have differed from him on some points. I cannot think that more than two oboli were given to any one citizen at the same festival; at least, not until the distribution became extended, in times posterior to the Thirty; see M. Schneider’s book, p. 17; also Notes, 29-196.

[512] See Plato, Lachês, c. 6, p. 183, B.; and Welcker, Griech. Tragöd. p. 930.

[513] Upon the point, compare Welcker, Griech. Tragöd. vol. ii, p. 1102.

[514] See Aristophan. Ran. 1046. The Antigonê (780, seq.) and the Trachiniæ (498) are sufficient evidence that Sophoklês did not agree with Æschylus in this renunciation of Aphroditê.

[515] The comparison of Herodot. iii, 119 with Soph. Antig. 905, proves a community of thought which seems to me hardly explicable in any other way. Which of the two obtained the thought from the other, we cannot determine.

The reason given, by a woman whose father and mother were dead, for preferring a brother either to husband or child,—that she might find another husband and have another child, but could not possibly have another brother,—is certainly not a little far-fetched.

[516] See Valckenaer, Diatribe in Eurip. Frag. c. 23. Quintilian, who had before him many more tragedies than those which we now possess, remarks how much more useful was the study of Euripidês, than that of Æschylus or Sophoklês, to a young man preparing himself for forensic oratory:—

“Illud quidem nemo non fateatur, iis qui se ad agendum comparaverint, utiliorem longe Euripidem fore. Namque is et vi et sermone (quo ipsum reprehendunt quibus gravitas et cothurnus et sonus Sophoclis videtur esse sublimior) magis accedit oratorio generi: et sententiis densus, et rebus ipsis; et in iis quæ a sapientibus tradita sunt, pæne ipsis par; et in dicendo et respondendo cuilibet eorum, qui fuerunt in foro diserti, comparandus. In affectibus vero tum omnibus mirus, tum in iis qui miseratione constant, facile præcipuus.” (Quintil. Inst. Orat. x, 1.)

[517] Aristophan. Plutus, 1160:—

Πλούτῳ γὰρ ἐστὶ τοῦτο συμφορώτατον,

Ποιεῖν ἀγῶνας γυμνικοὺς καὶ μουσικούς.

Compare the speech of Alkibiadês, Thuc. vi, 16, and Theophrastus ap. Cic. de Officiis, ii, 16.

[518] See Meineke, Hist. Critic. Comicor. Græcor. vol. i, p. 26, seq.

Grysar and Mr. Clinton, following Suidas, place Chionidês before the Persian invasion; but the words of Aristotle rather countenance the later date (Poetic. c. 3).

[519] See respecting these licentious processions, in connection with the iambus and Archilochus, vol. iv, of this History, ch. xxix, p. 81.

Aristotle (Poetic, c. 4) tells us that these phallic processions, with liberty to the leaders (οἱ ἐξάρχοντες) of scoffing at every one, still continued in many cities of Greece in his time: see Herod. v, 83, and Sêmus apud Athenæum, xiv, p. 622; also the striking description of the rural Dionysia in the Acharneis of Aristophanês, 235, 255, 1115. The scoffing was a part of the festival, and supposed to be agreeable to Dionysus: ἐν τοῖς Διονυσίοις ἐφειμένον αὐτὸ δρᾷν· καὶ τὸ σκῶμμα μέρος τι ἐδόκει τῆς ἑορτῆς· καὶ ὁ θεὸς ἴσως χαίρει, φιλογέλως τις ὤν (Lucian, Piscator. c. 25). Compare Aristophanês, Ranæ, 367, where the poet seems to imply that no one has a right to complain of being ridiculed in the πατρίοις τελεταῖς Διονύσου.

The Greek word for comedy—κωμῳδία, τὸ κωμῳδεῖν—at least in its early sense, had reference to a bitter, insulting, criminative ridicule: κωμῳδεῖν καὶ κακῶς λέγειν (Xenophon, Repub. Ath. ii, 23)—κακηγοροῦντάς τε καὶ κωμῳδοῦντας ἀλλήλους καὶ αἰσχρολογοῦντας (Plato de Repub. iii, 8, p. 332). A remarkable definition of κωμῳδία appears in Bekker’s Anecdota Græca, ii, 747, 10: Κωμῳδία ἐστιν ἡ ἐν μέσῳ λάου κατηγορία, ἤγουν δημοσίευσις; “public exposure to scorn before the assembled people:” and this idea of it as a penal visitation of evil-doers is preserved in Platonius and the anonymous writers on comedy, prefixed to Aristophanês. The definition which Aristotle (Poetic. c. 11) gives of it, is too mild for the primitive comedy: for he tells us himself that Kratês, immediately preceding Aristophanês, was the first author who departed from the ἰαμβικὴ ἰδέα: this “iambic vein” was originally the common character. It doubtless included every variety of ridicule, from innocent mirth to scornful contempt and odium; but the predominant character tended decidedly to the latter.

Compare Will. Schneider, Attisches Theater-Wesen, Notes, pp. 22-25; Bernhardy, Griechische Litteratur, sect. 67, p. 292.

[520]

Χαῖρ᾽, ὦ μέγ᾽ ἀρχειογέλως ὅμιλε ταῖς ἐπίβδαις,

Τῆς ἡμετέρας σοφίας κριτὴς ἄριστε πάντων, etc.

Kratini Fragm. Incert. 51; Meineke, Fr. Com. Græcor. ii, p. 193.

[521] Respecting Kratinus, see Platonius and the other writers on the Attic comedy, prefixed to Aristophanês in Bekker’s edition, pp. vi, ix, xi, xiii, etc.; also Meineke, Historia Comic. Græc. vol. i, p. 50, seq.

... Οὐ γὰρ, ὥσπερ Ἀριστοφάνης, ἐπιτρέχειν τὴν χάριν τοῖς σκώμμασι ποιεῖ (Κρατῖνος), ἀλλ᾽ ἁπλῶς, καὶ, κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν, γυμνῇ τῇ κεφαλῇ τίθησι τᾶς βλασφημίας κατὰ τῶν ἀμαρτανόντων.

[522] See Kratinus—Ἀρχίλοχοι—Frag. 1, and Plutarch, Kimon, 10, Ἡ κωμῳδία πολιτεύεται ἐν τοῖς δράμασι καὶ φιλοσοφεῖ, ἡ τῶν περὶ τὸν Κρατῖνον καὶ Ἀριστοφάνην καὶ Εὔπολιν, etc. (Dionys. Halikarn. Ars Rhetoric. c. 11.)

[523] Aristophan. Equit. 525. seq.

[524] A comedy called Ὀδυσσεῖς (plur. numb. corresponding to the title of another of his comedies, Ἀρχίλοχοι). It had a chorus, as one of the Fragments shows, but few or no choric songs; nor any parabasis, or address by the chorus, assuming the person of the poet, to the spectators.

See Bergk, De Reliquiis Comœd. Antiq. p. 142, seq.; Meineke, Frag. Cratini, vol. ii, p. 93, Ὀδυσσεῖς: compare also the first volume of the same work, p. 43: also Runkel, Cratini Fragm. p. 38 (Leips. 1827).

[525] Aristophanês boasts that he was the first comic composer who selected great and powerful men for his objects of attack: his predecessors, he affirms, had meddled only with small vermin and rags: ἐς τὰ ῥάκια σκώπτοντας ἀεὶ, καὶ τοῖς φθειρσὶν πολεμοῦντας (Pac. 724-736; Vesp. 1030).

But this cannot be true in point of fact, since we know that no man was more bitterly assailed by the comic authors of his day than Periklês. It ought to be added, that though Aristophanês doubtless attacked the powerful men, he did not leave the smaller persons unmolested.

[526] Aristoph. Ran. 1067; also Vesp. 1095. Æschylus reproaches Euripidês:—

Εἶτ᾽ αὖ λαλίαν ἐπιτηδεῦσαι καὶ στωμυλίαν ἐδίδαξας,

Ἣ ᾽ξεκένωσεν τάς τε παλαίστρας, καὶ τὰς πυγὰς ἐνέτριψε

Τῶν μειρακίων στωμυλλομένων, καὶ τοὺς παράλους ἀνέπεισεν

Ἀνταγορεύειν τοῖς ἄρχουσιν. Καίτοι τότε γ᾽, ἡνίκ᾽ ἐγὼ ᾽ζων,

Οὐκ ἠπίσταντ᾽ ἀλλ᾽ ἢ μᾶζαν καλέσαι καὶ ῥυππαπαὶ εἰπεῖν.

Τὸ ῥυππαπαὶ seems to have been the peculiar cry or chorus of the seamen on shipboard, probably when some joint pull or effort of force was required: compare Vespæ, 909.

[527] See about the effect on the estimation of Sokratês, Ranke, Commentat. de Vitâ Aristophanis, p. cdxli.

Compare also the remarks of Cicero (De Repub. iv, 11; vol. iv, p. 476, ed. Orell.) upon the old Athenian comedy and its unrestrained license. The laws of the Twelve Tables at Rome condemned to death any one who composed and published libellous verses against the reputation of another citizen.

Among the constant butts of Aristophanês and the other comic composers, was the dithyrambic poet Kinesias, upon whom they discharged their wit and bitterness, not simply as an indifferent poet, but also on the ground of his alleged impiety, his thin and feeble bodily frame, and his wretched health. We see the effect of such denunciations in a speech of the orator Lysias; composed on behalf of Phanias, against whom Kinesias had brought an indictment, or graphê paranomôn. Phanias treats these abundant lampoons as if they were good evidence against the character of Kinesias: Θαυμάζω δ᾽ εἰ μὴ βαρέως φέρετε ὅτι Κινησίας ἐστὶν ὁ τοῖς νόμοις βοηθὸς, ὃν ὑμεῖς πάντες ἐπίστασθε ἀσεβέστατον ἁπάντων καὶ παρανομώτατον γεγονέναι. Οὐχ οὖτός ἐστιν ὁ τοιαῦτα περὶ θεοὺς ἐξαμαρτάνων, ἃ τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις αἰσχρόν ἐστι καὶ λέγειν, τῶν κωμῳδιδασκάλον δ᾽ ἀκούετε καθ᾽ ἕκαστον ἐνιαυτόν; see Lysias, Fragm. 31, ed. Bekker; Athenæus, xii, p. 551.

Dr. Thirlwall estimates more lightly than I do the effect of these abundant libels of the old comedy: see his review of the Attic tragedy and comedy, in a very excellent chapter of his History of Greece, ch. xviii, vol. iii, p. 42.

[528] The view which I am here combating, is very general among the German writers; in proof of which, I may point to three of the ablest recent critics on the old comedy, Bergk, Meineke, and Ranke; all most useful writers for the understanding of Aristophanês.

Respecting Kratinus, Bergk observes: “Erat enim Cratinus, pariter atque ceteri principes antiquæ comœdiæ, vir egregie moratus, idemque antiqui moris tenax.... Cum Cratinus quasi divinitus videret ex hac libertate mox tanquam ex stirpe aliquâ nimiam licentiam existere et nasci, statim his initiis graviter adversatus est, videturque Cimonem tanquam exemplum boni et honesti civis proposuisse,” etc.

“Nam Cratinus cum esset magno ingenio et eximiâ morum gravitate, ægerrime tulit rem publicam præceps in perniciem ruere: omnem igitur operam atque omne studium eo contulit, ut imagine ipsius vitæ ante oculos positâ omnes et res divinæ et humanæ emendarentur, hominumque animi ad honestatem colendam incenderentur. Hoc sibi primus et proposuit Cratinus, et propositum strenue persecutus est. Sed si ipsam Veritatem, cujus imago oculis obversabatur, oculis subjecisset, verendum erat ne tædio obrueret eos qui spectarent, nihilque prorsus eorum, quæ summo studio persequebatur, obtineret. Quare eximiâ quâdam arte pulchram effigiem hilaremque formam finxit, ita tamen ut ad veritatem sublimemque ejus speciem referret omnia: sic cum ludicris miscet seria, ut et vulgus haberet quî delectaretur; et qui plus ingenio valerent, ipsam veritatem, quæ ex omnibus fabularum partibus perluceret, mente et cogitatione comprehenderent.” ... “Jam vero Cratinum in fabulis componendis id unice spectavisse quod esset verum, ne veteres quidem latuit.... Aristophanes autem idem et secutus semper est et sæpe professus.” (Bergk, De Reliquiis Comœd. Antiq. pp. 1, 10, 20, 233, etc.)

The criticism of Ranke (Commentatio de Vitâ Aristophanis, pp. ccxli, cccxiv, cccxlii, ccclxix, ccclxxiii, cdxxxiv, etc.) adopts the same strain of eulogy as to the lofty and virtuous purposes of Aristophanês. Compare also the eulogy bestowed by Meineke on the monitorial value of the old comedy (Historia Comic. Græc. pp. 39, 50, 165, etc.), and similar praises by Westermann; Geschichte der Beredsamkeit in Griechenland und Rom. sect. 36.

In one of the arguments prefixed to the “Pax” of Aristophanês, the author is so full of the conception of these poets as public instructors or advisers, that he tells us, absurdly enough, they were for that reason called διδάσκαλοι: οὐδὲν γὰρ συμβούλων διέφερον· ὅθεν αὐτοὺς καὶ διδασκάλους ὠνόμαζον· ὅτι πάντα τὰ πρόσφορα διὰ δραμάτων αὐτοὺς ἐδίδασκον (p. 244, ed. Bekk.).

“Eupolis, atque Cratinus, Aristophanesque poetæ,

Atque alii, quorum Comœdia prisca virorum est,

Si quis erat dignus describi, quod malus, aut fur,

Aut mœchus foret, aut sicarius, aut alioqui

Famosus, multâ cum libertate notabant.”

This is the early judgment of Horace (Serm. i, 4, 1): his later opinion on the Fescennina licentia, which was the same in spirit as the old Grecian comedy, is much more judicious (Epistol. ii, 1, 145): compare Art. Poetic. 224. To assume that the persons derided or vilified by these comic authors must always have deserved what was said of them, is indeed a striking evidence of the value of the maxim: “Fortiter calumniare; semper aliquid restat.” Without doubt, their indiscriminate libel sometimes wounded a suitable subject; in what proportion of cases, we have no means of determining: but the perusal of Aristophanês tends to justify the epithets which Lucian puts into the mouth of Dialogus respecting Aristophanês and Eupolis—not to favor the opinions of the authors whom I have cited above (Lucian, Jov. Accus. vol. ii, p. 832). He calls Eupolis and Aristophanês δεινοὺς ἄνδρας ἐπικερτομῆσαι τὰ σεμνὰ καὶ χλευάσαι τὰ καλῶς ἔχοντα.

When we notice what Aristophanês himself says respecting the other comic poets, his predecessors and contemporaries, we shall find it far from countenancing the exalted censorial function which Bergk and others ascribe to them (see the Parabasis in the Nubes, 530, seq., and in the Pax, 723). It seems especially preposterous to conceive Kratinus in that character; of whom what we chiefly know, is his habit of drunkenness, and the downright, unadorned vituperation in which he indulged: see the Fragments and story of his last play, Πυτίνη (in Meineke, vol. ii, p. 116; also Meineke, vol. i, p. 48, seq.).

Meineke copies (p. 46) from Suidas a statement (v. Ἐπείου δειλότερος) to the effect that Kratinus was ταξίαρχος τῆς Οἰνηΐδος φυλῆς. He construes this as a real fact: but there can hardly be a doubt that it is only a joke made by his contemporary comedians upon his fondness for wine; and not one of the worst among the many such jests which seem to have been then current. Runkel also, another editor of the Fragments of Kratinus (Cratini Fragment., Leips. 1827, p. 2, M. M. Runkel), construes this ταξίαρχος τῆς Οἰνηΐδος φυλῆς, as if it were a serious function; though he tells us about the general character of Kratinus: “De vitâ ipsâ et moribus pæne nihil dicere possumus: hoc solum constat, Cratinum poculis et puerorum amori valde deditum fuisse.”

Great numbers of Aristophanic jests have been transcribed as serious matter-of-fact, and have found their way into Grecian history. Whoever follows chapter vii of K. F. Hermann’s Griechische Staats-Alterthümer, containing the Innere Geschichte of the Athenian democracy, will see the most sweeping assertions made against the democratical institutions, on the authority of passages of Aristophanês: the same is the case with several of the other most learned German manuals of Grecian affairs.

[529] Horat. de Art. Poetic. 212-224.

“Indoctus quid enim saperet, liberque laborum,

Rusticus urbano confusus, turpis honesto?...

Illecebris erat et gratâ novitate morandus

Spectator, functusque sacris, et potus, et exlex.”

[530] See the Parabasis of Aristophanês in the Nubes (535, seq.) and in the Vespæ (1015-1045).

Compare also the description of Philippus the γελωτοποῖος, or Jester, in the Symposion of Xenophon; most of which is extremely Aristophanic, ii, 10, 14. The comic point of view is assumed throughout that piece; and Sokratês is introduced on one occasion as apologizing for the intrusion of a serious reflection (τὸ σπουδαιολογεῖν, viii, 41). The same is the case throughout much of the Symposion of Plato; though the scheme and purpose of this latter are very difficult to follow.

[531] Plutarch, Solon, c. 29. See the previous volumes of this History, ch. xxi, vol. ii, p. 145; ch. xxix, vol. iv, pp. 83, 84.

[532] Respecting the rhetorical cast of tragedy, see Plato, Gorgias, c. 57, p. 502, D.

Plato disapproves of tragedy on the same grounds as of rhetoric.

[533] See the discourse of Sokratês, insisting upon this point, as part of the duties of a commander (Xen. Mem. iii, 3, 11).

[534] This necessity of some rhetorical accomplishments, is enforced not less emphatically by Aristotle (Rhetoric. i, 1, 3) than by Kalliklês in the Gorgias of Plato, c. 91, p. 486, B.

[535] See the description which Cicero gives, of his own laborious oratorical training:—

“Ego hoc tempore omni, noctes et dies, in omnium doctrinarum meditatione versabar. Eram cum Stoico Diodoto, qui cum habitavisset apud me mecumque vixisset, nuper est domi meæ mortuus. A quo quum in aliis rebus, tum studiosissime in dialecticâ versabar; quæ quasi contracta et astricta eloquentia putanda est; sine quâ etiam tu, Brute, judicavisti, te illam justam eloquentiam, quam dialecticam dilatatam esse putant, consequi non posse. Huic ego doctori, et ejus artibus variis et multis, ita eram tamen deditus, ut ab exercitationibus oratoriis nullus dies vacaret.” (Cicero, Brutus, 90, 309.)

[536] Aristotel. ap. Diog. Laërt. viii, 57.

[537] See my preceding vol. iv, ch. xxxvii.

[538] Diogen. Laërt. viii, 58, 59, who gives a remarkable extract from the poem of Empedoklês, attesting these large pretensions.

See Brandis, Handbuch der Gr. Röm. Philos. part i. sects. 47, 48, p. 192; Sturz. ad Empedoclis Frag. p. 36.

[539] De Rerum Naturâ, i, 719.

[540] Some striking lines of Empedoklês are preserved by Sextus Empiricus, adv. Mathemat. vii, 115; to the effect that every individual man gets through his short life, with no more knowledge than is comprised in his own slender fraction of observation and experience: he struggles in vain to find out and explain the totality; but neither eye, nor ear, nor reason can assist him:—

Παῦρον δὲ ζωῆς ἀβίον μέρος ἀθρήσαντες,

Ὠκύμοροι, καπνοῖο δίκην ἀρθέντες, ἀπέπταν

Αὐτὸ μόνον πεισθέντες, ὅτῳ προσέκυρσεν ἕκαστος

Πάντοσ᾽ ἐλαυνόμενοι. Τὸ δὲ οὖλον ἐπεύχεται εὑρεῖν

Αὔτως· οὔτ᾽ ἐπιδερκτὰ τάδ᾽ ἀνδράσιν, οὔτ᾽ ἐπακουστὰ,

Οὔτε νόῳ περιληπτά.

[541] See Parmenidis Fragmenta, ed. Karsten, v, 30, 55, 60: also the Dissertation annexed by Karsten, sects. 3, 4, p. 148, seq.; sect. 19, p. 221, seq.

Compare also Mullach’s edition of the same Fragments, annexed to his edition of the Aristotelian treatise, De Melisso, Xenophane, et Gorgiâ, p. 144.

[542] Plato, Parmenidês, p. 128, B. σὺ μὲν (Parmenidês) γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ποιήμασιν ἓν φῂς εἶναι τὸ πᾶν, καὶ τούτων τεκμήρια παρέχεις καλῶς τε καὶ εὖ, etc.

[543] See the remarkable passage in the Parmenidês of Plato, p. 128, B, C, D.

Ἐστὶ δὲ τό γε ἀληθὲς βοήθειά τις ταῦτα τὰ γράμματα τῷ Παρμενίδου λόγῳ πρὸς τοὺς ἐπιχειροῦντας αὐτὸν κωμῳδεῖν, ὡς εἰ ἕν ἐστι, πολλὰ καὶ γελοῖα συμβαίνει πάσχειν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ ἐναντία αὑτῷ. Ἀντιλέγει δὴ οὖν τοῦτο τὸ γράμμα πρὸς τοὺς τὰ πολλὰ λέγοντας, καὶ ἀνταποδίδωσι ταῦτα καὶ πλείω, τοῦτο βουλόμενον δηλοῦν, ὡς ἔτι γελοιότερα πάσχοι ἂν αὐτῶν ἡ ὑπόθεσις—ἡ εἰ πολλὰ ἐστίν—ἢ ἡ τοῦ ἓν εἶναι, εἴ τις ἱκανῶς ἐπεξίοι.

[544] Plato, Phædrus, c. 44, p. 261, D. See the citations in Brandis, Gesch. der Gr. Röm. Philosophie, part i, p. 417, seq.

[545] Parmenid. Fragm. v, 101, ed. Mullach.

[546] See the Fragments of Melissus collected by Mullach, in his publication cited in a previous note, p. 81. seq.

[547] The reader will see this in Bayle’s Dictionary, article, Zeno of Elea.

Simplicius (in his commentary on Aristot. Physic. p. 255) says that Zeno first composed written dialogues, which cannot be believed without more certain evidence. He also particularizes a puzzling question addressed by Zeno to Protagoras. See Brandis, Gesch. der Griech. Röm. Philos. i, p. 409. Zeno ἴδιον μὲν οὐδὲν ἐξέθετο (sc. περὶ τῶν πάντων·), διηπόρησε δὲ περὶ τούτων ἐπὶ πλεῖον. Plutarch. ap. Eusebium, Præpar. Evangel. i, 23, D.

[548] Compare Plutarch, Periklês, c. 3; Plato, Parmenidês, pp. 126, 127; Plato, Alkibiad. i. ch. 14, p. 119, A.

That Sokratês had in his youth conversed with Parmenidês, when the latter was an old man, is stated by Plato more than once, over and above his dialogue called Parmenidês, which professes to give a conversation between the two, as well as with Zeno. I agree with Mr. Fynes Clinton, Brandis, and Karsten, in thinking that this is better evidence, about the date of Parmenidês than any of the vague indications which appear to contradict it, in Diogenes Laërtius and elsewhere. But it will be hardly proper to place the conversation between Parmenidês and Sokratês—as Mr. Clinton places it, Fast. H. vol. ii, App. c. 21, p. 364—at a time when Sokratês was only fifteen years of age. The ideas which the ancients had about youthful propriety, would not permit him to take part in conversation with an eminent philosopher at so early an age as fifteen, when he would not yet be entered on the roll of citizens, or be qualified for the smallest function, military or civil. I cannot but think that Sokratês must have been more than twenty years of age when he thus conversed with Parmenidês.

Sokratês was born in 469 B.C. (perhaps 468 B.C.); he would therefore be twenty years of age in 449: assuming the visit of Parmenidês to Athens to have been in 448 B.C., since he was then sixty-five years of age, he would be born in 513 B.C. It is objected that, if this date be admitted, Parmenidês could not have been a pupil of Xenophanês: we should thus he compelled to admit, which perhaps is the truth, that he learned the doctrine of Xenophanês at second-hand.

[549] Plato, Parmenid. pp. 135, 136.

Parmenidês speaks to Sokratês: Καλὴ μὲν οὖν καὶ θεία, εὖ ἴσθι, ἡ ὁρμὴ, ἣν ὁρμᾷς ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους· ἕλκυσον δὲ σαυτὸν καὶ γυμνάσαι μᾶλλον διὰ τῆς δοκούσης ἀχρήστου εἶναι καὶ καλουμένης ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἀδολεσχίας, ἕως ἔτι νέος εἶ· εἰ δὲ μὴ, σὲ διαφεύξεται ἡ ἀλήθεια. Τίς οὖν ὁ τρόπος, φάναι (τὸν Σωκράτη), ὦ Παρμενίδη, τῆς γυμνασίας; Οὗτος, εἰπεῖν (τὸν Παρμενίδην) ὅνπερ ἤκουσας Ζήνωνος.... Χρὴ δὲ καὶ τόδε ἔτι πρὸς τούτῳ σκοπεῖν, μὴ μόνον, εἰ ἔστιν ἕκαστον, ὑποτιθέμενον, σκοπεῖν τὰ ξυμβαίνοντα ἐκ τῆς ὑποθέσεως—ἀλλὰ καὶ, εἰ μή ἐστι τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ὑποτίθεσθαι—εἰ βούλει μᾶλλον γυμνασθῆναι.... Ἀγνοοῦσι γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ ὅτι ἄνευ ταύτης τῆς διὰ πάντων διεξόδου καὶ πλάνης, ἀδύνατον ἐντυχόντα τῷ ἀληθεῖ νοῦν σχεῖν. See also Plato’s Kratylus, p. 428, E, about the necessity of the investigator looking both before and behind—ἅμα πρόσσω καὶ ὀπίσσω.

See also the Parmenidês, p. 130, E,—in which Sokratês is warned respecting the ἀνθρώπων δόξας, against enslaving himself to the opinions of men: compare Plato, Sophistes, p. 227, B, C.

[550] See Aristotel. De Sophist. Elenchis, c. 11, p. 172, ed. Bekker; and his Topica, ix, 5, p. 154; where the different purposes of dialogue are enumerated and distinguished.

[551] See Isokratês, Orat. x; Helenæ Encomium, sects. 2-7; compare Orat. xv, De Permutatione, of the same author, s. 90.

I hold it for certain, that the first of these passages is intended as a criticism upon the Platonic dialogues (as in Or. v, ad Philip. s. 84), probably the second passage also. Isokratês, evidently a cautious and timid man, avoids mentioning the names of contemporaries, that he may provoke the less animosity.

[552] Isokratês alludes much to this sentiment, and to the men who looked upon gymnastic training with greater favor than upon philosophy, in the Orat. xv, De Permutatione, s. 267, et seq. A large portion of this oration is in fact a reply to accusations, the same as those preferred against mental cultivation by the Δίκαιος Λόγος in the Nubes of Aristophanês, 947, seq.; favorite topics in the mouths of the pugilists “with smashed ears.” (Plato, Gorgias, c. 71, p. 515, E; τῶν τὰ ὦτα κατεαγότων.)

[553] There is but too much evidence of the abundance of such jealousies and antipathies during the times of Plato, Aristotle, and Isokratês; see Stahr’s Aristotelia, ch. iii, vol. i, pp. 37, 68.

Aristotle was extremely jealous of the success of Isokratês, and was himself much assailed by pupils of the latter, Kephisodôrus and others, as well as by Dikæarchus, Eubulidês, and a numerous host of writers in the same tone: στρατὸν ὅλον τῶν ἐπιθεμένων Ἀριστοτέλει; see the Fragments of Dikæarchus, vol. ii, p. 225, ed. Didot. “De ingenio ejus (observes Cicero, in reference to Epicurus, de Finibus, ii, 25, 80) in his disputationibus, non de moribus, quæritur. Sit ista in Græcorum levitate perversitas, qui maledictis insectantur eos, a quibus de veritate dissentiunt.” This is a taint no way peculiar to Grecian philosophical controversy; but it has nowhere been more infectious than among the Greeks, and modern historians cannot be too much on their guard against it.

[554] See Plato (Protagoras, c. 8, p. 316, D.; Lachês, c. 3, p. 180, D.; Menexenus, c. 3, p. 236, A; Alkibiad. i, c. 14, p. 118, C); Plutarch, Periklês, c. 4.

Periklês had gone through dialectic practice in his youth (Xenoph. Memor. i, 2, 46).

[555] Isokratês, Or. xv, De Permutat. sect. 287.

Compare Brandis, Gesch. der Gr. Röm. Philosophie, part i, sect. 48, p. 196.

[556] Isokratês calls both Anaxagoras and Damon, sophists (Or. xv, De Perm. sect. 251), Plutarch, Periklês, c. 4. Ὁ δὲ Δάμων ἐοικεν, ἄκρος ὢν σοφιστὴς, καταδύεσθαι μὲν εἰς τὸ τῆς μουσικῆς ὄνομα, ἐπικρυπτόμενος πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς τὴν δεινότητα.

So Protagoras too (in the speech put into his mouth by Plato, Protag. c. 8, p. 316) says, very truly, that there had been sophists from the earliest times of Greece. But he says also, what Plutarch says in the citation just above, that these earlier men refused, intentionally and deliberately, to call themselves sophists, for fear of the odium attached to the name; and that he, Protagoras, was the first person to call himself openly a sophist.

The denomination by which a man is known, however, seldom depends upon himself, but upon the general public, and upon his critics, friendly or hostile. The unfriendly spirit of Plato did much more to attach the title of sophists specially to these teachers, than any assumption of their own.

[557] Herodot. i, 29; ii, 49; iv, 95. Diogenês of Apollonia, contemporary of Herodotus, called the Ionic philosophers or physiologists by the name sophists: see Brandis, Geschich. der Griech. Röm. Philosoph. c. lvii, note O. About Thamyras, see Welcker, Griech. Tragöd., Sophoklês, p. 421:—

Εἰτ᾽ οὖν σοφιστὴς καλὰ παραπαίων χέλυν, etc.

The comic poet Kratinus called all the poets, including Homer and Hesiod, σοφισταί: see the Fragments of his drama Ἀρχίλοχοι in Meineke, Fragm. Comicor. Græcor. vol. ii, p. 16.

[558] Æschinês cont. Timarch. c. 34. Æschinês calls Demosthenês also a sophist, c. 27.

We see plainly from the terms in Plato’s Politicus, c. 38, p. 299 B, μετεωρολόγον, ἀδολεσχήν τινα σοφιστὴν, that both Sokratês and Plato himself were designated as sophists by the Athenian public.

[559] Aristotel. Metaphysic. iii, 2, p. 996; Xenophon, Sympos. iv, 1.

Aristippus is said to have been the first of the disciples of Sokratês who took money for instruction (Diogen. Laërt. ii, 65).

[560] Xenoph. Memor. iv, 2, 1. γράμματα πολλὰ συνειλεγμένον ποιητῶν τε καὶ σοφιστῶν τῶν εὐδοκιμωτάτων....

The word σοφιστῶν is here used just in the same sense as τοὺς θησαυροὺς τῶν πάλαι σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν, οὓς ἐκεῖνοι κατέλιπον ἐν βιβλίοις γράψαντες, etc. (Memor. i, 6, 14.) It is used in a different sense in another passage (i, 1, 11), to signify teachers who gave instruction on physical and astronomical subjects, which Sokratês and Xenophon both disapproved.

[561] Isokratês, Orat. v, ad Philipp. sect. 14: see Heindorf’s note on the Euthydemus of Plato, p. 305, C. sect. 79.

[562] Diogen. Laërt. ix, 65. Ἔσπετε νῦν μοι, ὅσοι πολυπράγμονές ἐστε σοφισταί (Diogen. Laërt. viii, 74).

Demetrius of Trœzen numbered Empedoklês as a sophist. Isokratês speaks of Empedoklês, Ion, Alkmæon, Parmenidês, Melissus, Gorgias, all as οἱ παλαιοὶ σοφισταί; all as having taught different περιττολογίας about the elements of the physical world (Isok. de Permut. sect. 288).

[563] Eurip. Med. 289:—

Χρὴ δ᾽ οὔποθ᾽ ὅστις ἀρτίφρων πέφυκ᾽ ἀνὴρ,

Παῖδας περισσῶς ἐκδιδάσκεσθαι σοφούς.

Χωρὶς γὰρ ἄλλης, ἧς ἔχουσιν, ἀργίας,

Φθόνον πρὸς ἀστῶν ἀλφάνουσι δυσμενῆ.

The words ὁ περισσῶς σοφὸς seem to convey the same unfriendly sentiment as the word σοφιστής.

[564] Xenoph. Memor. i, 2, 6. In another passage, the sophist Antiphon—whether this is the celebrated Antiphon of the deme Rhamnus, is uncertain; the commentators lean to the negative—is described as conversing with Sokratês, and saying that Sokratês of course must imagine his own conversation to be worth nothing, since he asked no price from his scholars. To which Sokratês replies:—

Ὦ Ἀντιφῶν, παρ᾽ ἡμῖν νομίζεται, τὴν ὥραν καὶ τὴν σοφίαν ὁμοίως μὲν καλὸν, ὁμοίως δὲ αἰσχρὸν, διατίθεσθαι εἶναι. Τήν τε γὰρ ὥραν, ἐὰν μέν τις ἀργυρίου πωλῇ τῷ βουλομένῳ, πόρνον αὐτὸν ἀποκαλοῦσιν· ἐὰν δέ τις, ὃν ἂν γνῷ καλόν τε κἀγαθὸν ἐραστὴν ὄντα, τοῦτον φίλον ἑαυτῷ ποιῆται, σώφρονα νομίζομεν. Καὶ τὴν σοφίαν ὡσαύτως τοὺς μὲν ἀργυρίου τῷ βουλομένῳ πωλοῦντας, σοφιστὰς ὥσπερ πόρνους ἀποκαλοῦσιν· ὅστις δὲ, ὃν ἂν γνῷ εὐφυᾶ ὄντα, διδάσκων ὅ,τι ἂν ἔχῃ ἀγαθὸν, φίλον ποιεῖται, τοῦτον νομίζομεν, ἃ τῷ καλῷ κἀγαθῷ πολίτῃ προσήκει, ταῦτα ποιεῖν (Xenoph. Memor. i, 6, 13).

As an evidence of the manners and sentiment of the age, this passage is extremely remarkable. Various parts of the oration of Æschinês against Timarchus, and the Symposion of Plato, pp. 217, 218, both receive and give light to it.

Among the numerous passages in which Plato expresses his dislike and contempt of teaching for money, see his Sophistes, c. 9, p. 223. Plato, indeed, thought that it was unworthy of a virtuous man to accept salary for the discharge of any public duty: see the Republic, i, 19, p. 347.

[565] Aristot. Rhetoric. i, 1, 4; where he explains the sophist to be a person who has the same powers as the dialectician, but abuses them for a bad purpose: ἡ γὰρ σοφιστικὴ, οὐκ ἐν τῇ δυνάμει, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει.... Ἐκεῖ δὲ, σοφιστὴς μὲν, κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν, διαλεκτικὸς δὲ, οὐ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν. Again, in the first chapter of the treatise de Sophisticis Elenchis: ὁ σοφιστὴς, χρηματιστὴς ἀπὸ φαινομένης σοφίας, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ οὔσης, etc.

[566] Respecting Isokratês, see his Orat. xv, De Permutatione, wherein it is evident that he was not only ranked as a sophist by others, but also considered himself as such, though the appellation was one which he did not like. He considers himself as such, as well as Gorgias: οἱ καλούμενοι σοφισταί; sects. 166, 169, 213, 231.

Respecting Aristotle, we have only to read not merely the passage of Timon cited in a previous note, but also the bitter slander of Timæus (Frag. 70. ed. Didot, Polybius, xii, 8), who called him σοφιστὴν ὀψιμαθῆ καὶ μισητὸν ὑπάρχοντα, καὶ τὸ πολυτίμητον ἰατρεῖον ἀρτίως ἀποκεκλεικότα, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, εἰς πᾶσαν αὐλὴν καὶ σκήνην ἐμπεπηδηκότα· πρὸς δὲ, γαστρίμαργον, ὀψαρτύτην, ἐπὶ στόμα φερόμενον ἐν πᾶσι.

[567] In the general point of view here described, the sophists are presented by Ritter, Geschichte der Griech. Philosophie, vol. i, book vi, chaps. 1-3, p. 577, seq., 629, seq.; by Brandis, Gesch. der Gr. Röm. Philos. sects, lxxxiv-lxxxvii, vol. i, p. 516, seq.; by Zeller, Geschichte der Philosoph. ii. pp. 65, 69, 165, etc.: and, indeed, by almost all who treat of the sophists.

[568] Compare Isokratês, Orat. xiii. cont. Sophistas, sects. 19-21.

[569] Aristot. Sophist. Elench. c. 33; Cicero, Brut. c. 12.

[570] See a striking passage in Plato, Theætet. c. 24, pp. 173, 174.

[571] Isokratês, Orat. v (ad. Philip.), sect. 14; Orat. x (Enc. Hel.), sect. 2; Orat. xiii (adv. Sophist.), sect. 9 (compare Heindorf’s note ad Platon. Euthydem. sect. 79); Orat. xii (Panath.), sect. 126; Orat. xv (Perm.), sect. 90.

Isokratês, in the beginning of his Orat. x, Encom. Helenæ, censures all the speculative teachers; first, Antisthenês and Plato (without naming them, but identifying them sufficiently by their doctrines); next, Protagoras, Gorgias, Melissus, Zeno, etc., by name, as having wasted their time and teaching on fruitless paradox and controversy. He insists upon the necessity of teaching with a view to political life and to the course of actual public events, abandoning these useless studies (sect. 6).

It is remarkable that what Isokratês recommends is just what Protagoras and Gorgias are represented as actually doing—each doubtless in his own way—in the dialogues of Plato, who censures them for being too practical, while Isokratês, commenting on them from various publications which they left, treats them only as teachers of useless speculations.

In the Oration De Permutatione, composed when he was eighty-two years of age (sect. 10, the orations above cited are earlier compositions, especially Orat. xiii, against the sophists, see sect. 206), Isokratês stands upon the defensive, and vindicates his profession against manifold aspersions. It is a most interesting oration, as a defence of the educators of Athens generally, and would serve perfectly well as a vindication of the teaching of Protagoras, Gorgias, Hippias, etc., against the reproaches of Plato.

This oration should be read, if only to get at the genuine Athenian sense of the word sophists, as distinguished from the technical sense which Plato and Aristotle fasten upon it. The word is here used in its largest sense, as distinguished from ἰδιώταις (sect. 159): it meant, literary men or philosophers generally, but especially the professional teachers: it carried, however, an obnoxious sense, and was therefore used as little as possible by themselves; as much as possible by those who disliked them.

Isokratês, though he does not willingly call himself by this unpleasant name, yet is obliged to acknowledge himself unreservedly as one of the profession, in the same category as Gorgias (sects. 165, 179, 211, 213, 231, 256), and defends the general body as well as himself; distinguishing himself of course from the bad members of the profession, those who pretended to be sophists, but devoted themselves to something different in reality (sect. 230).

This professional teaching, and the teachers, are signified indiscriminately by these words: οἱ σοφισταί—οἱ περὶ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν διατρίβοντες—τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ἀδίκως διαβεβλημένην (sects. 44, 157, 159, 179, 211, 217, 219)—ἡ τῶν λόγων παιδεία—ἡ τῶν λόγων μελέτη—ἡ φιλοσοφία—ἡ τῆς φρονήσεως ἄσκησις—τῆς ἐμῆς, εἴτε βούλεσθε καλεῖν δυνάμεως, εἴτε φιλοσοφίας, εἴτε διατρίβης (sects. 53, 187, 189, 193, 196). All these expressions mean the same process of training; that is, general mental training as opposed to bodily (sects. 194, 199), and intended to cultivate the powers of thought, speech, and action: πρὸς τὸ λέγειν καὶ φρονεῖν—τοῦ φρονεῖν εὖ καὶ λέγειν—τὸ λέγειν καὶ πράττειν (sects. 221, 261, 285, 296, 330).

Isokratês does not admit any such distinction between the philosopher and dialectician on the one side, and the sophist on the other, as Plato and Aristotle contend for. He does not like dialectical exercises: yet he admits them to be useful for youth, as a part of intellectual training, on condition that all such speculations shall be dropped, when the youth come into active life (sects. 280, 287).

This is the same language as that of Kalliklês in the Gorgias of Plato, c. 40, p. 484.

[572] Stallbaum, Proleg. ad Platon. Protagor. p. 23: “Hoc vero ejus judicio ita utitur Socrates, ut eum dehinc dialecticâ subtilitate in summam consilii inopiam conjiciat. Colligit enim inde satis captiose rebus ita comparatis justitiam, quippe quæ a sanctitate diversa sit, plane nihil sanctitatis habituram, ac vicissim sanctitati nihil fore commune cum justitiâ. Respondet quidem ad hæc Protagoras, justitiam ac sanctitatem non per omnia sibi similes esse, nec tamen etiam prorsus dissimiles videri. Sed etsi verissima est hæc ejus sententia, tamen comparatione illâ a partibus faciei repetitâ, in fraudem inductus, et quid sit, in quo omnis virtutis natura contineatur, ignarus, sese ex his difficultatibus adeo non potest expedire,” etc.

Again, p. 24: “Itaque Socrates, missâ hujus rei disputatione, repente ad alia progreditur, scilicet similibus laqueis hominem deinceps denuo irretiturus.” ... “Nemini facile obscurum erit, hoc quoque loco, Protagoram argutis conclusiunculis deludi atque callide eo permoveri,” etc. ... p. 25: “Quanquam nemo erit, quin videat callide deludi Protagoram,” etc. ... p. 34: “Quod si autem ea, quæ in Protagorâ Sophistæ ridendi causâ e vulgi atque sophistarum ratione disputantur, in Gorgiâ ex ipsius philosophi mente et sententiâ vel brevius proponuntur vel copiosius disputantur,” etc.

Compare similar observations of Stallbaum, in his Prolegom. ad Theætet. pp. 12, 22; ad Menon. p. 16; ad Euthydemum, pp. 26, 30; ad Lachetem, p. 11; ad Lysidem, pp. 79, 80, 87; ad Hippiam Major. pp. 154-156.

“Facile apparet Socratem argutâ, quæ verbo φαίνεσθαι inest, diologiâ interlocutorem (Hippiam Sophistam) in fraudem inducere.” ... “Illud quidem pro certo et explorato habemus, non serio sed ridendi verandique Sophistæ gratiâ gravissimam illam sententiam in dubitationem vocari, ideoque iis conclusiunculis labefactari, quas quilibet paulo attentior facile intelligat non ad fidem faciendam, sed ad lusum jocumque, esse comparatas.”

[573] Plato, Sophistes, c. 52, p. 268.

[574] Cicero, Academ. iv, 23. Xenophon, at the close of his treatise De Venatione (c. 13), introduces a sharp censure upon the sophists, with very little that is specific or distinct. He accuses them of teaching command and artifice of words, instead of communicating useful maxims; of speaking for purposes of deceit, or for their own profit, and addressing themselves to rich pupils for pay; while the philosopher gives his lessons to every one gratuitously, without distinction of persons. This is the same distinction as that taken by Sokratês and Plato, between the sophist and the philosopher: compare Xenoph. De Vectigal. v, 4.

[575] Plato, Protagoras, c. 16, p. 328, B. Diogenes Laërtius (ix, 58) says that Protagoras demanded one hundred minæ as pay: little stress is to be laid upon such a statement, nor is it possible that he could have had one fixed rate of pay. The story told by Aulus Gellius (v, 10) about the suit at law between Protagoras and his disciple Euathlus, is at least amusing and ingenious. Compare the story of the rhetor Skopelianus, in Philostratus, Vit. Sophist. i, 21, 4.

Isokratês (Or. xv, de Perm. sect. 166) affirms that the gains made by Gorgias, or by any of the eminent sophists, had never been very high; that they had been greatly and maliciously exaggerated; that they were very inferior to those of the great dramatic actors (sect. 168).

[576] Aristot. Rhetoric. ii, 26. Ritter (p. 582) and Brandis (p. 521) quote very unfairly the evidence of the “Clouds” of Aristophanês, as establishing this charge, and that of corrupt teaching generally, against the sophists as a body. If Aristophanês is a witness against any one, he is a witness against Sokratês, who is the person singled out for attack in the “Clouds.” But these authors, not admitting Aristophanês as an evidence against Sokratês, whom he does attack, nevertheless quote him as an evidence against men like Protagoras and Gorgias, whom he does not attack.

[577] Isokratês, Or. xv, (De Permut.) sect. 16, νῦν δὲ λέγει μὲν (the accuser) ὡς ἐγὼ τοὺς ἥττους λόγους κρείττους δύναμαι ποιεῖν, etc.

Ibid. sect. 32. πειρᾶταί με διαβάλλειν, ὡς διαφθείρω τοὺς νεωτέρους, λέγειν διδάσκων καὶ παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσι πλεονεκτεῖν, etc.

Again, sects. 59, 65, 95, 98, 187 (where he represents himself, like Sokratês in his Defence, as vindicating philosophy generally against the accusation of corrupting youth), 233, 256.

[578] Plato, Sok. Apolog. c. 10, p. 23, D. τὰ κατὰ πάντων τῶν φιλοσοφούντων πρόχειρα ταῦτα λέγουσιν, ὅτι τὰ μετέωρα καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς, καὶ θεοὺς μὴ νομίζειν, καὶ τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν (διδάσκω). Compare a similar expression in Xenophon, Memorab. i, 2, 31. τὸ κοινῇ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἐπιτιμώμενον, etc.

The same unfairness, in making this point tell against the sophists exclusively, is to be found in Westermann, Geschichte der Griech. Beredsamkeit sects. 30, 64.

[579] See the last chapter of Aristotle De Sophisticis Elenchis. He notices these early rhetorical teachers, also, in various parts of the treatise on rhetoric.

Quintilian, however, still thought the precepts of Theodôrus and Thrasymachus worthy of his attention (Inst. Orat. iii, 3).

[580] Quintilian, Inst. Orat. iii. 4, 10; Aristot. Rhetor. iii, 5. See the passages cited in Preller, Histor. Philos. ch. iv, p. 132, note d, who affirms respecting Protagoras: “alia inani grammaticorum principiorum ostentatione novare conabatur,” which the passages cited do not prove.

[581] Isokratês, Or. x, Encom. Helen. sect. 3; Diogen. Laërt. ix, 54.

[582] Diogen. Laërt. ix. 51; Sext. Empir. adv. Math. ix. 56. Περὶ μὲν θεῶν οὐκ ἔχω εἰπεῖν, οὔτε εἴ εἰσιν, οὐθ᾽ ὁποίοι τινές εἰσι· πολλὰ γὰρ τὰ κωλύοντα εἰδέναι, ἥ τε ἀδηλότης, καὶ βραχὺς ὢν ὁ βίος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου.

I give the words partly from Diogenes, partly from Sextus, as I think they would be most likely to stand.

[583] Xenophanês ap. Sext. Emp. adv. Mathem. vii, 49.

[584] The satyrical writer Timon (ap. Sext. Emp. ix, 57), speaking in very respectful terms about Protagoras, notices particularly the guarded language which he used in this sentence about the gods; though this precaution did not enable him to avoid the necessity of flight. Protagoras spoke:—

Πᾶσαν ἔχων φυλακὴν ἐπιεικείης· τὰ μὲν οὐ οἱ

Χραίσμησ᾽, ἀλλὰ φυγῆς ἐπεμαίετο ὄφρα μὴ οὕτως

Σωκρατικὸν πίνων ψυχρὸν πότον Ἀΐδα δύῃ.

It would seem, by the last line as if Protagoras had survived Sokratês.

[585] Plato, Theætet. 18, p. 164, E. Οὔτι ἄν, οἶμαι, ὦ φίλε, εἴπερ γε ὁ πατὴρ τοῦ ἑτέρου μύθου ἔζη—ἀλλὰ πολλὰ ἂν ἤμυνε· νῦν δὲ ὄρφανον αὐτὸν ὄντα ἡμεῖς προπηλακίζομεν ... ἀλλὰ δὴ αὐτοὶ κινδυνεύσομεν τοῦ δικαίου ἕνεκ᾽ αὐτῷ βοηθεῖν.

This theory of Protagoras is discussed in the dialogue called Theætetus, p. 152, seq., in a long but desultory way.

See Sextus Empiric. Pyrrhonic. Hypol. i. 216-219, et contra Mathematicos, vii, 60-64. The explanation which Sextus gives of the Protagorean doctrine, in the former passage, cannot be derived from the treatise of Protagoras himself; since he makes use of the word ὕλη in the philosophical sense, which was not adopted until the days of Plato and Aristotle.

It is difficult to make out what Diogenes Laërtius states about other tenets of Protagoras, and to reconcile them with the doctrine of “man being the measure of all things,” as explained by Plato (Diog. Laërt. ix, 51, 57).

[586] Aristotle (in one of the passages of his Metaphysica, wherein he discusses the Protagorean doctrine, x, i, p. 1053, B.) says that this doctrine comes to nothing more than saying, that man, so far as cognizant, or so far as percipient, is the measure of all things; in other words, that knowledge, or perception, is the measure of all things. This, Aristotle says, is trivial, and of no value, though it sounds like something of importance: Πρωταγόρας δ᾽ ἄνθρωπόν φησι πάντων εἶναι μέτρον, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ τὸν ἐπιστήμονα εἰπὼν ἢ τὸν αἰσθανόμενον· τούτους δ᾽ ὅτι ἔχουσιν ὁ μὲν αἴσθησιν ὁ δὲ ἐπιστήμην· ἅ φαμεν εἶναι μέτρα τῶν ὑποκειμένων. Οὐθὲν δὴ λέγων περιττὸν φαίνεταί τι λέγειν.

It appears to me, that to insist upon the essentially relative nature of cognizable truth, was by no means a trivial or unimportant doctrine, as Aristotle pronounces it to be; especially when we compare it with the unmeasured conceptions of the objects and methods of scientific research which were so common in the days of Protagoras.

Compare Metaphysic. iii, 5, pp. 1008, 1009, where it will be seen how many other thinkers of that day carried the same doctrine, seemingly, further than Protagoras.

Protagoras remarked that the observed movements of the heavenly bodies did not coincide with that which the astronomers represented them to be, and to which they applied their mathematical reasonings. This remark was a criticism on the mathematical astronomers of his day—ἐλέγχων τοὺς γεωμέτρας (Aristot. Metaph. iii, 2, p. 998, A). We know too little how far his criticism may have been deserved, to assent to the general strictures of Ritter, Gesch. der Phil. vol. i, p. 633.

[587] See the treatise entitled De Melisso, Xenophane et Gorgiâ in Bekker’s edition of Aristotle’s Works, vol. i, p. 979, seq.; also the same treatise, with a good preface and comments, by Mullach, p. 62 seq.: compare Sextus Emp. adv. Mathemat. vii, 65, 87.

[588] See the note of Mullach, on the treatise mentioned in the preceding note, p. 72. He shows that Gorgias followed in the steps of Zeno and Melissus.

[589] Isokratês De Permutatione, Or. xv, s. 287; Xenoph. Memorab. i, 1, 14.

[590] Aristophan. Equit. 1316-1321.

[591] Isokratês, Or. xv, De Permutation. s. 170.

[592] Thucyd. ii, 64. γνῶτε δ᾽ ὄνομα μέγιστον αὐτὴν (τὴν πόλιν) ἔχουσαν ἐν πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις, διὰ τὸ ταῖς ξυμφοραῖς μὴ εἴκειν.

[593] Thucydidês (iii, 82) specifies very distinctly the cause to which he ascribes the bad consequences which he depicts. He makes no allusion to sophists or sophistical teaching; though Brandis (Gesch. der Gr. Röm. Philos. i, p. 518, not. f.) drags in “the sophistical spirit of the statesmen of that time,” as if it were the cause of the mischief, and as if it were to be found in the speeches of Thucydidês, i, 76, v, 105.

There cannot be a more unwarranted assertion; nor can a learned man like Brandis be ignorant, that such words as “the sophistical spirit,” (Der sophistische Geist,) are understood by a modern reader in a sense totally different from its true Athenian sense.

[594] Xenoph. Memor. ii, 1, 21-34. Καὶ Πρόδικος δὲ ὁ σοφὸς ἐν τῷ συγγράμματι τῷ περὶ Ἡρακλέους, ὅπερ δὴ καὶ πλείστοις ἐπιδείκνυται, ὡσαύτως περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀποφαίνεται, etc.

Xenophon here introduces Sokratês himself as bestowing much praise on the moral teaching of Prodikus.

[595] See Fragment iii, of the Ταγηνισταὶ of Aristophanês, Meineke, Fragment. Aristoph. p. 1140.

[596] Xenophon gives only the substance of Prodikus’s lecture, not his exact words. But he gives what may be called the whole substance, so that we can appreciate the scope as well as the handling of the author. We cannot say the same of an extract given (in the Pseudo-Platonic Dialogue Axiochus, c. 7, 8) from a lecture said to have been delivered by Prodikus, respecting the miseries of human life, pervading all the various professions and occupations. It is impossible to make out distinctly, either how much really belongs to Prodikus, or what was his scope and purpose, if any such lecture was really delivered.

[597] Plato, Protagoras, p. 320, D. c. 11, et seq., especially p. 322, D, where Protagoras lays it down that no man is fit to be a member of a social community, who has not in his bosom both δίκη and αἰδὼς,—that is, a sense of reciprocal obligation and right between himself and others,—and a sensibility to esteem or reproach from others. He lays these fundamental attributes down as what a good ethical theory must assume or exact in every man.

[598] Of the unjust asperity and contempt with which the Platonic commentators treat the sophists, see a specimen in Ast, Ueber Platons Leben und Schriften, pp. 70, 71, where he comments on Protagoras and this fable.

[599] Protagoras says: Τὸ δὲ μάθημά ἐστιν, εὐβουλία περὶ τε τῶν οἰκείων ὅπως ἂν ἄριστα τὴν αὑτοῦ οἰκίαν διοικοῖ, καὶ περὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως, ὅπως τὰ τῆς πόλεως δυνατώτατος εἴη καὶ πράττειν καὶ λέγειν. (Plato, Protagoras, c. 9, p. 318, E.)

A similar description of the moral teaching of Protagoras and the other sophists, yet comprising a still larger range of duties, towards parents, friends, and fellow-citizens in their private capacities, is given in Plato, Meno. p. 91, B, E.

Isokratês describes the education which he wished to convey, almost in the same words: Τοὺς τὰ τοιαῦτα μανθάνοντας καὶ μελετῶντας ἐξ ὧν καὶ τὸν ἴδιον οἶκον καὶ τὰ κοινὰ τὰ τῆς πόλεως καλῶς διοικήσουσιν, ὧνπερ ἕνεκα καὶ πονητέον καὶ φιλοσοφητέον καὶ πάντα πρακτέον ἐστί (Or. xv, De Permutat. s. 304; compare 289).

Xenophon also describes, almost in the same words, the teaching of Sokratês. Kriton and others sought the society of Sokratês: οὐκ ἵνα δημηγορικοὶ ἢ δικανικοὶ γένοιντο, ἀλλ᾽ ἵνα καλοί τε κἀγαθοὶ γενόμενοι, καὶ οἴκῳ καὶ οἰκέταις καὶ οἰκείοις καὶ φίλοις καὶ πόλει καὶ πολίταις δύναιντο καλῶς χρῆσθαι (Memor. i, 2, 48). Again, i, 2, 64: Φανερὸς ἦν Σωκράτης τῶν συνόντων τοὺς πονηρὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἔχοντας, τούτων μὲν παύων, τῆς δὲ καλλίστης καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεστάτης ἀρετῆς, ᾗ πόλεις τε καὶ οἴκοι εὖ οἰκοῦσι, προτρέπων ἐπιθυμεῖν. Compare also i, 6, 15; ii, 1, 19; iv, 1, 2; iv, 5, 10.

When we perceive how much analogy Xenophon establishes—so far as regards practical precept, apart from theory or method—between Sokratês, Protagoras, Prodikus, etc., it is difficult to justify the representations of the commentators respecting the sophists; see Stallbaum, Proleg. ad Platon Menon. p. 8. “Etenim virtutis nomen, cum propter ambitûs magnitudinem valde esset ambiguum et obscurum, sophistæ interpretabantur sic, ut, missâ veræ honestatis et probitatis vi, unice de prudentiâ civili ac domesticâ cogitari vellent, eoque modo totam virtutem ad callidum quoddam utilitatis vel privatim vel publice consequendæ artificium revocarent.” ... “Pervidit hanc opinionis istius perversitatem, ejusque turpitudinem intimo sensit pectore, vir sanctissimi animi, Socratês, etc.” Stallbaum speaks to the same purpose in his Prolegomena to the Protagoras, pp. 10, 11; and to the Euthydemus, pp. 21, 22.

Those who, like these censors on the sophists, think it base to recommend virtuous conduct by the mutual security and comfort which it procures to all parties, must be prepared to condemn on the same ground a large portion of what is said by Sokratês throughout the Memorabilia of Xenophon, Μὴ καταφρόνει τῶν οἰκονομικῶν ἀνδρῶν, etc. (ii, 4, 12); see also his Œconomic. xi, 10.

[600] Stallbaum, Prolegomena ad Platonis Menonem, p. 9: “Etenim sophistæ, quum virtutis exercitationem et ad utilitates externas referent, et facultate quâdam atque consuetudine ejus, quod utile videretur, reperiendi, absolvi statuerent,—Socrates ipse, rejectâ utilitatis turpitudine, vim naturamque virtutis unice ad id quod bonum honestumque est, revocavit; voluitque esse in eo, ut quis recti bonique sensu ac scientâ polleret, ad quam tanquam ad certissimam normam atque regulam actiones suas omnes dirigeret atque poneret.”

Whoever will compare this criticism with the Protagoras of Plato, c. 36, 37, especially p. 357, B, wherein Sokratês identifies good with pleasure and evil with pain, and wherein he considers right conduct to consist in justly calculating the items of pleasure and pain one against the other, ἡ μετρητικὴ τέχνη, will be astonished how a critic on Plato could write what is above cited. I am aware that there are other parts of Plato’s dialogues in which he maintains a doctrine different from that just alluded to. Accordingly, Stallbaum (in his Prolegomena to the Protagoras, p. 30) contends that Plato is here setting forth a doctrine not his own, but is reasoning on the principles of Protagoras, for the purpose of entrapping and confounding him: “Quæ hic de fortitudine disseruntur, ea item cavendum est ne protenus pro decretis mere Platonicis habeantur. Disputat enim Socrates pleraque omnia ad mentem ipsius Protagoræ, ita quidem ut eum per suam ipsius rationem in fraudem et errorem inducat.”

I am happy to be able to vindicate Plato against the disgrace of so dishonest a spirit of argumentation as that which Stallbaum ascribes to him. Plato most certainly does not reason here upon the doctrines or principles of Protagoras; for the latter begins by positively denying the doctrine, and is only brought to admit it in a very qualified manner, c. 35, p. 351, D. He says, in reply to the question of Sokratês: Οὐκ οἶδα ἁπλῶς οὕτως, ὡς σὺ ἐρωτᾷς, εἰ ἐμοὶ ἀποκριτέον ἐστὶν, ὡς τὰ ἡδέα τε ἀγαθά ἐστιν ἅπαντα καὶ τὰ ἀνιαρὰ κακά· ἀλλὰ μοι δοκεῖ οὐ μόνον πρὸς τὴν νῦν ἀπόκρισιν ἐμοὶ ἀσφαλέστερον εἶναι ἀποκρίνασθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς πάντα τὸν ἄλλον βίον τὸν ἐμὸν, ὅτι ἐστὶ μὲν ἃ τῶν ἡδέων οὔκ ἐστιν ἀγαθὰ, ἐστὶ δὲ αὖ καὶ ἃ τῶν ἀνιαρῶν οὐκ ἐστι κακὰ, ἐστὶ δὲ ἃ ἐστι, καὶ τρίτον ἃ οὐδέτερα, οὔτε κακὰ οὔτ᾽ ἀγαθά.

There is something peculiarly striking in this appeal of Protagoras to his whole past life, as rendering it impossible for him to admit what he evidently looked upon as a base theory, as Stallbaum pronounces it to be. Yet the latter actually ventures to take it away from Sokratês, who not only propounds it confidently, but reasons it out in a clear and forcible manner, and of fastening it on Protagoras, who first disclaims it and then only admits it under reserve! I deny the theory to be base, though I think it an imperfect theory of ethics. But Stallbaum, who calls it so, was bound to be doubly careful in looking into his proof before he ascribed it to any one. What makes the case worse is, that he fastens it not only on Protagoras, but on the sophists collectively, by that monstrous fiction which treats them as a doctrinal sect.

[601] See about Hippias, Plato, Protagoras, c. 9, p. 318, E.; Stallbaum, Prolegom. ad Platon. Hipp. Maj. p. 147, seq.; Cicero, de Orator. iii, 33; Plato, Hipp. Minor, c. 10, p. 368, B.

[602] Stallbaum, Proleg. ad Plat. Hipp. Maj. p. 150.

[603] Plato, Hippias Major, p. 286, A, B.

[604] Plato, Menon, p. 95, A.; Foss, De Gorgiâ Leontino, p. 27, seq.

[605] See the observations of Groen van Prinsterer and Stallbaum, Stallbaum ad Platon. Gorg. c. 1.

[606] Plato, Gorgias, c. 17, p. 462, B.

[607] Plato, Gorgias, c. 27, p. 472, A. Καὶ νῦν (say Sokratês) περὶ ὧν σὺ λέγεις ὀλίγου σοι πάντες συμφήσουσι ταῦτα Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ ξένοι—μαρτυρήσουσί σοι, ἐὰν μὲν βούλῃ, Νικίας ὁ Νικηράτου καὶ οἱ ἀδελφοὶ μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ—ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ, Ἀριστοκράτης ὁ Σκελλίου—ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ, ἡ Περικλέους ὅλη οἰκία, ἢ ἄλλη συγγένεια, ἥντινα ἂν βούλῃ τῶν ἐνθάδε ἐκλέξασθαι. Ἀλλ᾽ ἐγώ σοι εἷς ὢν οὐχ ὁμολογῶ.... Ἐγὼ δὲ ἂν μὴ σὲ αὐτὸν ἕνα ὄντα μάρτυρα παράσχωμαι ὁμολογοῦντα περὶ ὧν λέγω, οὐδὲν οἶμαι ἄξιον λόγου μοι πεπεράνθαι περὶ ὧν ἂν ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος ᾖ.

[608] This doctrine asserted by Kalliklês will be found in Plato, Gorgias, c. 39, 40, pp. 483, 484.

[609] See the same matter of fact strongly stated by Sokratês in the Memorab. of Xenophon, ii, 1, 13.

[610] Schleiermacher (in the Prolegomena to his translation of the Theætetus, p. 183) represents that Plato intended to refute Aristippus in the person of Kalliklês; which supposition he sustains, by remarking that Aristippus affirmed that there was no such thing as justice by nature, but only by law and convention. But the affirmation of Kalliklês is the direct contrary of that which Schleiermacher ascribes to Aristippus. Kalliklês not only does not deny justice by nature, but affirms it in the most direct manner,—explains what it is, that it consists in the right of the strongest man to make use of his strength without any regard to others,—and puts it above the justice of law and society, in respect to authority.

Ritter and Brandis are yet more incorrect in their accusations of the sophists, founded upon this same doctrine. The former says (p. 581): “It is affirmed as a common tenet of the sophists, there is no right by nature, but only by convention;” compare Brandis, p. 521. The very passages to which these writers refer, as far as they prove anything, prove the contrary of what they assert; and Preller actually imputes the contrary tenet to the sophists (Histor. Philosoph. c. 4, p. 130, Hamburg, 1838) with just as little authority. Both Ritter and Brandis charge the sophists with wickedness for this alleged tenet; for denying that there was any right by nature, and allowing no right except by convention; a doctrine which had been maintained before them by Archelaus (Diogen. Laërt. ii, 16). Now Plato (Legg. x, p. 889), whom these writers refer to, charges certain wise men—σοφοὺς ἰδιώτας τε καὶ ποιητὰς (he does not mention sophists)—with wickedness, but on the ground directly opposite; because they did acknowledge a right by nature, of greater authority than the right laid down by the legislator; and because they encouraged pupils to follow this supposed right of nature, disobeying the law; interpreting the right of nature as Kalliklês does in the Gorgias!

Teachers are thus branded as wicked men by Ritter and Brandis, for the negative, and by Plato, if he here means the sophists, for the affirmative doctrine.

[611] Plato, Gorgias, c. 37, p. 481, D; c. 41, p. 485, B, D; c. 42, p. 487, C; c. 50, p. 495, B; c. 70, p. 515, A. σὺ μὲν αὐτὸς ἄρτι ἄρχει πράττειν τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγματα; compare c. 55, p. 500, C. His contempt for the sophists, c. 75, p. 519, E, with the note of Heindorf.

[612] Plato, Gorgias, c. 38, p. 482, E. ἐκ ταύτης γὰρ αὖ τῆς ὁμολογίας αὐτὸς ὑπὸ σοῦ συμποδισθεὶς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐπεστομίσθη (Polus), αἰσχυνθεὶς ἃ ἐνόει εἰπεῖν· σὺ γὰρ τῷ ὄντι, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰς τοιαῦτα ἄγεις φορτικὰ καὶ δημηγορικὰ, φάσκων τὴν ἀλήθειαν διώκειν ... ἐὰν οὖν τις αἰσχύνηται καὶ μὴ τολμᾷ λέγειν ἅπερ νοεῖ, ἀναγκάζεται ἐναντία λέγειν.

Καὶ μὴν (says Sokratês to Kalliklês, c. 42, p. 487, D.) ὅτι γε οἷος παῤῥησιάζεσθαι καὶ μὴ αἰσχύνεσθαι, αὐτός τε φῂς, καὶ ὁ λόγος, ὃν ὀλίγον πρότερον ἔλεγες, ὁμολογεῖ σοι. Again, c. 47, p. 492, D. Οὐκ ἀγεννῶς γε, ὦ Καλλικλεῖς, ἐπεξέρχει τῷ λόγῳ παῤῥησιαζόμενος· σαφῶς γὰρ σὺ νῦν λέγεις ἃ οἱ ἄλλοι διανοοῦνται μὲν, λέγειν δὲ οὐκ ἐθέλουσι.

Again, from Kalliklês, ὃ ἐγώ σοι νῦν παῤῥησιαζόμενος λέγω, c. 46, p. 491, E.

[613] This quality is imputed by Sokratês to Kalliklês in a remarkable passage of the Gorgias, c. 37, p. 481, D, E, the substance of which is thus stated by Stallbaum in his note: “Carpit Socrates Calliclis levitatem, mobili populi turbæ nunquam non blandientis et adulantis.”

It is one of the main points of Sokratês in the dialogue, to make out that the practice, for he will not call it an art, of sophists, as well as rhetors, aims at nothing but the immediate gratification of the people, without any regard to their ultimate or durable benefit; that they are branches of the widely-extended knack of flattery (Gorgias, c. 19, p. 464, D; c. 20, p. 465, C; c. 56, p. 501, C; c. 75, p. 520, B).

[614] Plato, Gorgias, c. 68, p. 513. Οὐ γὰρ μιμητὴν δεῖ εἶναι, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτοφυῶς ὅμοιον τούτοις, εἰ μέλλεις τι γνήσιον ἀπεργάζεσθαι εἰς φιλίαν τῷ Ἀθηναίων δήμῳ.... Ὅστις οὖν σε τούτοις ὁμοιότατον ἀπεργάσεται, οὗτός σε ποιήσει, ὡς ἐπιθυμεῖς πολιτικὸς εἶναι, πολιτικὸν καὶ ῥητορικόν· τῷ αὐτῶν γὰρ ἤθει λεγομένων τῶν λόγων ἕκαστοι χαίρουσι, τῷ δὲ ἀλλοτρίῳ ἄχθονται.

[615] Plato, Gorgias, c. 46, p. 492, C (the words of Kalliklês). Τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ταῦτ᾽ ἐστὶ τὰ καλλωπίσματα, τὰ παρὰ φύσιν ξυνθήματα, ἀνθρώπων φλυαρία καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄξια.

[616] I omitted to notice the Dialogue of Plato entitled Euthydemus, wherein Sokratês is introduced in conversation with the two persons called sophists, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, who are represented as propounding a number of verbal quibbles, assertions of double sense, arising from equivocal grammar or syntax,—fallacies of mere diction, without the least plausibility as to the sense,—specimens of jests and hoax, p. 278, B. They are described as extravagantly conceited, while Sokratês is painted with his usual affectation of deference and modesty. He himself, during a part of the dialogue, carries on conversation in his own dialectical manner with the youthful Kleinias; who is then handed over to be taught by Euthydemus and Dionysodorus; so that the contrast between their style of questioning, and that of Sokratês, is forcibly brought out.

To bring out this contrast, appears to me the main purpose of the dialogue, as has already been remarked by Socher and others (see Stallbaum, Prolegom. ad Euthydem. pp. 15-65): but its construction, its manner, and its result, previous to the concluding conversation between Sokratês and Kriton separately, is so thoroughly comic, that Ast, on this and other grounds, rejects it as spurious and unworthy of Plato (see Ast, über Platons Leben und Schriften, pp. 414-418).

Without agreeing in Ast’s inference, I recognize the violence of the caricature which Plato has here presented under the characters of Euthydemus and Dionysodorus. And it is for this reason, among many others, that I protest the more emphatically against the injustice of Stallbaum and the commentators generally, who consider these two persons as disciples of Protagoras, and samples of what is called “Sophistica,” the sophistical practice, the sophists generally. There is not the smallest ground for considering these two men as disciples of Protagoras, who is presented to us, even by Plato himself, under an aspect as totally different from them as it is possible to imagine. Euthydemus and Dionysodorus are described, by Plato himself in this very dialogue, as old men who had been fencing-masters, and who had only within the last two years applied themselves to the eristic or controversial dialogue (Euthyd. c. 1, p. 272, C.; c. 3, p. 273, E). Schleiermacher himself accounts their personal importance so mean, that he thinks Plato could not have intended to attack them, but meant to attack Antisthenês and the Megaric school of philosophers (Prolegom. ad Euthydem. vol. iii, pp. 403, 404, of his translation of Plato). So contemptible does Plato esteem them, that Krito blames Sokratês for having so far degraded himself as to be seen talking with them before many persons (p. 305, B, c. 30).

The name of Protagoras occurs only once in the dialogue, in reference to the doctrine, started by Euthydemus, that false propositions or contradictory propositions were impossible, because no one could either think about or talk about that which was not, or the non-existent (p. 284, A; 286, C). This doctrine is said by Sokratês to have been much talked of “by Protagoras, and by men yet earlier than he.” It is idle to infer from such a passage, any connection or analogy between these men and Protagoras, as Stallbaum labors to do throughout his Prolegomena; affirming (in his note on p. 286, C,) most incorrectly, that Protagoras maintained this doctrine about τὸ μὴ ὂν, or the non-existent, because he had too great faith in the evidence of the senses; whereas we know from Plato that it had its rise with Parmenidês, who rejected the evidence of the senses entirely (see Plato, Sophist. 24, p. 237, A, with Heindorf and Stallbaum’s notes). Diogenes Laërtius (ix, 8, 53) falsely asserts that Protagoras was the first to broach the doctrine, and even cites as his witness Plato in the Euthydemus, where the exact contrary is stated. Whoever broached it first, it was a doctrine following plausibly from the then received Realism, and Plato was long perplexed before he could solve the difficulty to his own satisfaction (Theætet. p. 187, D).

I do not doubt that there were in Athens persons who abused the dialectical exercise for frivolous puzzles, and it was well for Plato to compose a dialogue exhibiting the contrast between these men and Sokratês. But to treat Euthydemus and Dionysodorus as samples of “The Sophists,” is altogether unwarranted.

[617] Plato, Gorgias, c. 57, 58; pp. 502, 503.

[618] Plato, Gorgias, c. 72, 73, p. 517 (Sokratês speaks): Ἀληθεῖς ἄρα οἱ ἔμπροσθεν λόγοι ἦσαν, ὅτι οὐδένα ἡμεῖς ἴσμεν ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν γεγονότα τὰ πολιτικὰ ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει.

Ὦ δαιμόνιε, οὐδ᾽ ἐγὼ ψέγω τούτους (Periklês and Kimon) ὥς γε διακόνους εἶναι πόλεως, ἀλλά μοι δοκοῦσι τῶν γε νῦν διακονικώτεροι γεγονέναι καὶ μᾶλλον οἷοί τε ἐκπορίζειν τῇ πόλει ὧν ἐπεθύμει. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ μεταβιβάζειν τὰς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν, πείθοντες καὶ βιαζόμενοι ἐπὶ τοῦτο, ὅθεν ἔμελλον ἀμείνους ἔσεσθαι οἱ πολῖται, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, οὐδὲν τούτων διέφερον ἐκεῖνοι· ὅπερ μόνον ἔργον ἐστὶν ἀγαθοῦ πολίτου.

Ἄνευ γὰρ σωφροσύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης, λιμένων καὶ νεωρίων καὶ τειχῶν καὶ φόρων καὶ τοιούτων φλυαριῶν ἐμπεπλήκασι τὴν πόλιν (c. 74, p. 519, A).

Οἶμαι (says Sokratês, c. 77, p. 521, D.) μετ᾽ ὀλίγων Ἀθηναίων, ἵνα μὴ εἴπω μόνος, ἐπιχειρεῖν τῇ ὡς ἀληθῶς πολιτικῇ τέχνῃ καὶ πράττειν τὰ πολιτικὰ μόνος τῶν νῦν, ἅτε οὖν οὐ πρὸς χάριν λέγων τοὺς λόγους οὓς λέγω ἑκάστοτε, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον, οὐ πρὸς τὸ ἥδιστον, etc.

[619] This passage is in Republ. vi, 6, p. 492, seq. I put the first words of the passage (which is too long to be cited, but which richly deserves to be read, entire) in the translation given by Stallbaum in his note.

Sokratês says to Adeimantus: “An tu quoque putas esse quidem sophistas, homines privatos, qui corrumpunt juventutem in quâcunque re mentione dignâ; nec illud tamen animadvertisti et tibi persuasisti, quod multo magis debebas, ipsos Athenienses turpissimos esse aliorum corruptores?”

Yet the commentator who translates this passage, does not scruple (in his Prolegomena to the Republic, pp. xliv, xlv, as well as to the Dialogues) to heap upon the sophists aggravated charges, as the actual corruptors of Athenian morality.

[620] Plato, Repub. vi, 11, p. 497, B. μηδεμίαν ἀξίαν εἶναι τῶν νῦν κατάστασιν πόλεως φιλοσόφου φύσεως, etc.

Compare Plato, Epistol. vii, p. 325, A.

[621] Anytus was the accuser of Sokratês: his enmity to the sophists may be seen in Plato, Meno. p. 91, C.

[622] Xenoph. Anabas. ii, 6. Πρόξενος—εὐθὺς μὲν μειράκιον ὢν ἐπεθύμει γενέσθαι ἀνὴρ τὰ μεγάλα πράττειν ἱκανός· καὶ διὰ ταύτην τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἔδωκε Γοργίᾳ ἀργύριον τῷ Λεοντίνῳ.... Τοσούτων δ᾽ ἐπιθυμῶν, σφόδρα ἔνδηλον αὖ καὶ τοῦτο εἶχεν, ὅτι τούτων οὐδὲν ἂν θέλοι κτᾶσθαι μετὰ ἀδικίας, ἀλλὰ σὺν τῷ δικαίῳ καὶ καλῷ ᾤετο δεῖν τούτων τυγχάνειν, ἄνευ δὲ τούτων μή.

Proxenus, as described by his friend Xenophon, was certainly a man who did no dishonor to the moral teaching of Gorgias.

The connection between thought, speech, and action, is seen even in the jests of Aristophanês upon the purposes of Sokratês and the sophists:—

Νικᾷν πράττων καὶ βουλεύων καὶ τῇ γλώττῃ πολεμίζων (Nubes, 418).

[623] Plato, Apol. Sokr. c. 10, p. 23, C; Protagoras, p. 328, C.

[624] See Isokr. Or. xv, De Perm. sects. 218, 233, 235, 245, 254, 257.

[625] Plato, Apol. Sokrat. c. 13, p. 25, D.

[626] See these points strikingly put by Isokratês, in the Orat. xv, De Permutatione, throughout, especially in sects. 294, 297, 305, 307; and again by Xenoph. Memorab. i, 2. 10, in reference to the teaching of Sokratês.

[627] See a striking passage in Plato’s Republic, x, c, 4, p. 600, C.

[628] Thucyd. ii. 40. φιλοσοφοῦμεν ἄνευ μαλακίας—οὐ τοὺς λόγους τοῖς ἔργοις βλαβὴν ἡγούμενοι—διαφερόντως δὲ καὶ τόδε ἔχομεν, ὥστε τολμᾷν τε οἱ αὐτοὶ μάλιστα καὶ περὶ ὧν ἐπιχειρήσομεν ἐκλογίζεσθαι.

[629] Pausanias, i, 22, 8; ix, 35, 2.

[630] Plato, Euthydem. c. 24, p. 297, D.

[631] See the Symposion of Plato as well as that of Xenophon, both of which profess to depict Sokratês at one of these jovial moments. Plato, Symposion, c. 31, p. 214, A; c. 35, etc., 39, ad finem; Xenoph. Symp. ii, 26, where Sokratês requests that the wine may he handed round in small glasses, but that they may succeed each other quickly, like drops of rain in a shower.

The view which Plato takes of indulgence in wine, as affording a sort of test of the comparative self-command of individuals, and measuring the facility with which any man may be betrayed into folly and extravagance, and the regulation to which he proposes to submit the practice, may be seen in his treatise De Legibus, i, p. 649; ii, pp. 671-674. Compare Xenoph. Memorab. i, 2, 1; i, 6, 10.

[632] Xenoph. Memorab. i, 2, 4. τὸ μὲν οὖν ὑπερεσθίοντα ὑπερπονεῖν ἀπεδοκίμαζε, etc.

[633] Xenoph. Mem. i, 6, 10. Even Antisthenês (disciple of Sokratês, and the originator of what was called the Cynic philosophy), while he pronounced virtue to be self-sufficient for conferring happiness, was obliged to add that the strength and vigor of Sokratês were required as a farther condition: αὐτάρκη τὴν ἀρετὴν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν, μηδενὸς προσδεομένην ὅτι μὴ τῆς Σωκρατικῆς ἴσχυος; Winckelman, Antisthen. Fragment. p. 47; Diog. Laërt. vi, 11.

[634] See his reply to the invitation of Archelaus, king of Macedonia, indicating the repugnance to accept favors which he could not return (Aristot. Rhetor. ii, 24).

[635] Plato, Sympos. c. 32, p. 215, A; Xenoph. Sympos. c. 5; Plato, Theætet. p. 143, D.

[636] This is one of the traditions which Aristoxenus, the disciple of Aristotle, heard from his father Spintharus, who had been in personal communication with Sokratês. See the Fragments of Aristoxenus, Fragm. 27, 28; ap. Frag. Hist. Græc. p. 280, ed. Didot.

It appears to me that Frag. 28 contains the statement of what Aristoxenus really said about the irascibility of Sokratês; while the expressions of Fragm. 27, ascribed to that author by Plutarch, are unmeasured.

Fragm. 28 also substantially contradicts Fragm. 26, in which Diogenes asserts, on the authority of Aristoxenus,—what is not to be believed, even if Aristoxenus had asserted it,—that Sokratês made a regular trade of his teaching, and collected perpetual contributions: see Xenoph. Memor. i, 2, 6; i, 5, 6.

I see no reason for the mistrust with which Preller (Hist. Philosophie, c. v, p. 139) and Ritter (Geschich. d. Philos. vol. ii, ch. 2, p. 19) regard the general testimony of Aristoxenus about Sokratês.

[637] Xenophon (Mem. i, 4, 1) alludes to several such biographers, or collectors of anecdotes about Sokratês. Yet it would seem that most of these Socratici viri (Cicer. ad Attic. xiv, 9, 1) did not collect anecdotes or conversations of the master, after the manner of Xenophon; but composed dialogues, manifesting more or less of his method and ἦθος, after the type of Plato. Simon the leather-cutter, however, took memoranda of conversations held by Sokratês in his shop, and published several dialogues purporting to be such. (Diog. Laërt. ii, 123.) The Socratici viri are generally praised by Cicero (Tus. D. ii, 3, 8) for the elegance of their style.

[638] Xenophon, Memor. i, 1, 16. Αὐτὸς δὲ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπείων ἀεὶ διελέγετο, σκοπῶν, τί εὐσεβές, τί ἀσεβές· τί καλὸν, τί αἰσχρόν· τί δίκαιον, τί ἄδικον· τί ἀνδρία, τί δειλία· τί πόλις, τί πολιτικός· τί ἀρχὴ ἀνθρώπων, τί ἀρχικὸς ἀνθρώπων, etc.

Compare i, 2, 50; iii, 8, 3, 4; iii, 9; iv, 4, 5; iv, 6, 1. σκοπῶν σὺν τοῖς συνοῦσι, τί ἕκαστον εἴη τῶν ὄντων, οὐδέποτ᾽ ἔληγε.

[639] Aristoph. Nubes, 105, 121, 362, 414; Aves, 1282; Eupolis, Fragment. Incert. ix, x, xi. ap. Meineke, p. 552; Ameipsias, Fragmenta, Konnus, p. 703, Meineke; Diogen. Laërt. ii, 28.

The later comic writers ridiculed the Pythagoreans, as well as Zeno the Stoic, on grounds very similar: see Diogenes Laërt. vii, 1, 24.

[640] Plato, Apol. Sokr. c. 1. Νῦν ἐγὼ πρῶτον ἐπὶ δικαστήριον ἀναβέβηκα, ἔτη γεγονὼς πλείω ἑβδομήκοντα.

[641] Xenoph. Memor. i, 1, 2-20; i, 3, 1-3.

[642] Plato, Apol. Sokr. c. 21, p. 33, A. ἐγὼ δὲ διδάσκαλος μὲν οὐδενὸς πώποτε ἐγενόμην: compare c. 4, p. 19, E.

Xenoph. Memor. iii, 11, 16. Sokratês: ἐπισκώπτων τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀπραφμοσύνην; Plat. Ap. Sok. c. 18, p. 31, B.

[643] Ἀδολεσχεῖν; see Ruhnken’s Animadversiones in Xenoph. Memor. p. 293, of Schneider’s edition of that treatise. Compare Plato, Sophistês, c. 23, p. 225, E.

[644] Xenoph. Mem. i, 1, 10; Plato, Apol. Sok. I, p. 17, D; 18, p. 31. A. οἷον δή μοι δοκεῖ ὁ θεὸς ἐμὲ τῇ πόλει προστεθεικέναι τοιοῦτόν τινα, ὃς ὑμᾶς ἐγείρων καὶ πείθων, καὶ ὀνειδίζων ἕνα ἕκαστον, οὐδὲν παύομαι, τὴν ἡμέραν ὅλην πανταχοῦ προσκαθίζων.

[645] Xen. Mem. iii, 11.

[646] Xenophon in his Memorabilia speaks always of the companions of Sokratês, not of his disciples: οἱ συνόντες αὐτῷ—οἱ συνουσίασται (i, 6, 1)—οἱ συνδιατρίβοντες—οἱ συγγιγνόμενοι—οἱ ἑταῖροι—οἱ ὁμιλοῦντες αὐτῷ—οἱ συνήθεις (iv, 8, 2)—οἱ μεθ᾽ αὐτοῦ (iv, 2, 1)—οἱ ἐπιθύμηται (i, 2, 60). Aristippus also, in speaking to Plato, talked of Sokratês as ὁ ἑταῖρος ἡμῶν; Aristot. Rhetor. ii. 24. His enemies spoke of his disciples, in an invidious sense; Plato, Ap. Sok. c. 21, p. 33, A.

It is not to be believed that any companions can have made frequent visits, either from Megara and Thebes, to Sokratês at Athens, during the last years of the war, before the capture of Athens in 404 B.C. And in point of fact, the passage of the Platonic Theætetus represents Eukleidês of Megara as alluding to his conversations with Sokratês only a short time before the death of the latter (Plato, Theætetus. c. 2. p. 142, E). The story given by Aulus Gellius—that Eukleidês came to visit Sokratês by night, in women’s clothes, from Megara to Athens—seems to me an absurdity, though Deycks (De Megaricarum Doctrinâ, p. 5) is inclined to believe it.

[647] Xenoph. Mem. i, 1, 2, 3.

[648] See the conversation of Sokratês (reported by Xenophon, Mem. i, 4, 15) with Aristodemus, respecting the gods: “What will be sufficient to persuade you (asks Sokratês) that the gods care about you?” “When they send me special monitors, as you say that they do to you (replies Aristodemus); to tell me what to do, and what not to do.” To which Sokratês replied, that they answer the questions of the Athenians, by replies of the oracle, and that they send prodigies (τέρατα) by way of information to the Greeks generally. He further advises Aristodemus to pay assiduous court (θεραπεύειν) to the gods, in order to see whether they will not send him monitory information about doubtful events (i, 4, 18).

So again in his conversation with Euthydemus, the latter says to him: Σοὶ δὲ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐοίκασιν ἔτι φιλικώτερον ἢ τοῖς ἄλλοις χρῆσθαι, οἵγε μηδὲ ἐπερωτώμενοι ὑπὸ σοῦ προσημαίνουσιν, ἅτε χρὴ ποιεῖν καὶ ἃ μὴ (iv, 3, 12).

Compare i, 1, 19; and iv, 8, 11, where this perpetual communication and advice from the gods is employed as an evidence to prove the superior piety of Sokratês.

[649] Plato, Ap. Sok. c. 19, p. 31, D. Τούτου δὲ αἴτιόν ἐστιν (that is, the reason why Sokratês had never entered on public life) ὃ ὑμεῖς ἐμοῦ πολλάκις ἀκηκόατε πολλαχοῦ λέγοντος, ὅτι μοι θεῖόν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον γίγνεται, ὃ δὴ καὶ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ ἐπικωμῳδῶν Μέλητος ἐγράψατο. Ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτ᾽ ἔστιν ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον, φωνή τις γιγνομένη, ἣ ὅταν γένηται, ἀεὶ ἀποτρέπει με τούτου ὃ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν, προτρέπει δὲ οὔποτε. Τοῦτ᾽ ἔστιν ὅ μοι ἐναντιοῦται τὰ πολιτικὰ πράττειν.

Again, c. 31, p. 40, A, he tells the dikasts, after his condemnation: Ἡ γὰρ εἰωθυῖά μοι μαντικὴ ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου ἐν μὲν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ παντὶ πάνυ πυκνὴ ἀεὶ ἦν καὶ πάνυ ἐπὶ σμικροῖς ἐναντιουμένη, εἴ τι μέλλοιμι μὴ ὀρθῶς πράξειν. Νυνὶ δὲ συμβέβηκέ μοι, ἅπερ ὁρᾶτε καὶ αὐτοὶ, ταυτὶ, ἅ γε δὴ οἰηθείη ἄν τις καὶ νομίζεται ἔσχατα κακῶν εἶναι. Ἐμοὶ δὲ οὔτε ἐξιόντι ἕωθεν οἴκοθεν ἠναντιώθη τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σημεῖον, οὔτε ἡνίκα ἀνέβαινον ἐνταυθοῖ ἐπὶ τὸ δικαστήριον, οὔτ᾽ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ οὐδαμοῦ μέλλοντί τι ἐρεῖν· καίτοι ἐν ἄλλοις λόγοις πολλαχοῦ δὴ με ἐπέσχε λέγοντα μεταξύ.

He goes on to infer that his line of defence has been right, and that his condemnation is no misfortune to him, but a benefit, seeing that the sign has not manifested itself.

I agree in the opinion of Schleiermacher (in his Preface to his translation of the Apology of Sokratês, part i, vol. ii, p. 185, of his general translation of Plato’s works), that this defence may be reasonably taken as a reproduction by Plato of what Sokratês actually said to the dikasts on his trial. In addition to the reasons given by Schleiermacher there is one which may be noticed. Sokratês predicts to the dikasts that, if they put him to death, a great number of young men will forthwith put themselves forward to take up the vocation of cross-questioning, who will give them more trouble than he has ever done (Plat. Ap. Sok. c. 30, p. 39, D). Now there is no reason to believe that this prediction was realized. If, therefore, Plato puts an erroneous prophecy into the mouth of Sokratês, this is probably because Sokratês really made one.

[650] The words of Sokratês plainly indicate this meaning: see also a good note of Schleiermacher, appended to his translation of the Platonic Apology, Platons Werke, part i, vol ii, p. 432.

[651] Xenoph. Mem. iv, 8, 5.

[652] Xenoph. Sympos. viii, 5; Plato, Euthydem. c. 5, p. 272, E.

[653] See Plato (Theætet. c. 7, p. 151, A; Phædrus, c. 20, p. 242. C; Republic, vi, 10, p. 496, C)—in addition to the above citations from the Apology.

The passage in the Euthyphron (c. 2, p. 3, B) is somewhat less specific. The Pseudo-Platonic dialogue, Theagês, retains the strictly prohibitory attribute of the voice, as never in any case impelling; but extends the range of the warning, as if it was heard in cases not simply personal to Sokratês himself, but referring to the conduct of his friends also (Theagês, c. 11, 12, pp. 128, 129).

Xenophon also neglects the specific attributes, and conceives the voice generally as a divine communication with instruction and advice to Sokratês, so that he often prophesied to his friends, and was always right (Memor. i, 1, 2-4; iv, 8, 1).

[654] See Dr. Forster’s note on the Euthyphron of Plato, c. 2, p. 3.

The treatise of Plutarch (De Genio Socratis) is full of speculation on the subject, but contains nothing about it which can be relied upon as matter of fact. There are various stories about prophecies made by Sokratês, and verified by the event, c. 11, p. 582.

See also this matter discussed, with abundant references, in Zeller Philosophie der Griechen, v. ii, pp. 25-28.

[655] Plato, Ap. Sok. c. 22, p. 33, C. Ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτο, ὡς ἐγώ φημι, προστέτακται ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ πράττειν καὶ ἐκ μαντείων καὶ ἐξ ἐνυπνίων, καὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ, ᾧπέρ τίς ποτε καὶ ἄλλη θεία μοῖρα ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ὁτιοῦν προσέταξε πράττειν.

[656] Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 5, p. 21, A. Sokratês offers to produce the testimony of the brother of Chærephon, the latter himself being dead, to attest the reality of this question and answer.

[657] Plato, Ap. Sok. c. 7, 8, p. 22.

[658] Plato, Ap. Sok. c. 9, p. 23. I give here the sense rather than the exact words: Οὗτος ὑμῶν σοφώτατός ἐστιν, ὅστις ὥσπερ Σωκράτης ἔγνωκεν ὅτι οὐδενὸς ἄξιός ἐστι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ πρὸς σοφίαν.

Ταῦτ᾽ ἐγὼ μὲν ἔτι καὶ νῦν περιϊὼν ζητῶ καὶ ἐρευνῶ κατὰ τὸν θεὸν, καὶ τῶν ἀστῶν καὶ τῶν ξένων ἄν τινα οἴωμαι σοφὸν εἶναι· καὶ ἐπειδάν μοι μὴ δοκῇ, τῷ θεῷ βοηθῶν ἐνδείκνυμαι ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι σοφός.

[659] Plato, Ap. Sok. c. 9, p. 23, A-C.

... ἐν πενίᾳ μυρίᾳ εἰμὶ, διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν.

[660] Plato. Ap. Sok. c. 17, p. 29. Τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ τάττοντος, ὡς ἐγὼ ᾠήθην καὶ ὑπέλαβον, φιλοσοφοῦντά με δεῖν ζῆν, καὶ ἐξετάζοντα ἐμαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ἐνταῦθα δὲ φοβηθεὶς ἢ θάνατον ἣ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν πρᾶγμα λίποιμι τὴν τάξιν.

[661] Plato, Ap. Sok. c. 17, p. 29, C.

[662] Plato, Ap. Sok. c. 18, p. 30, D.

[663] Plato, Ap. Sok. c. 28, p. 38, A. Ἐάν τε γὰρ λέγω, ὅτι τῷ θεῷ ἀπειθεῖν τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶ, καὶ διὰ τοῦτ᾽ ἀδύνατον ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν, οὐ πείσεσθέ μοι ὡς εἰρωνευομένῳ· ἐάν τ᾽ αὖ λέγω ὅτι καὶ τυγχάνει μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν ὂν ἀνθρώπῳ τοῦτο, ἑκάστης ἡμέρας περὶ ἀρετῆς τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, περὶ ὧν ὑμεῖς ἐμοῦ ἀκούετε διαλεγομένου καὶ ἐμαυτὸν καὶ ἄλλους ἐξετάζοντοσ—ὁ δὲ ἀνεξεταστὸς βίος οὐ βιωτὸς ἀνθρώπῳ (these last striking words are selected by Dr. Hutcheson, as the motto for his Synopsis Philosophiæ Moralis)—ταῦτα δὲ ἔτι ἧττον πείσεσθέ μοι λέγοντι.

[664] Diogen. Laërt. ii, 21.

[665] Plato. Sophistês, c. 1, p. 216; the expression is applied to the Eleatic stranger, who sustains the chief part in that dialogue: Τάχ᾽ ἂν οὖν καὶ σοί τις οὗτος τῶν κρειττόνων συνέποιτο, φαύλους ἡμᾶς ὄντας ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐποψόμενος καὶ ἐλέγξων, θεὸς ὤν τις ἐλεγκτικός.

[666] Xenoph Mem. i, 1, 11. Οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ τῆς τῶν πάντων φύσεως, ἧπερ τῶν ἄλλων οἱ πλεῖστοι, διελέγετο, σκοπῶν ὅπως ὁ καλούμενος ὑπὸ τῶν σοφιστῶν Κόσμος ἔχει, etc.

Plato, Phædon, c. 45, p. 96. B. ταύτης τῆς σοφίας, ἣν δὴ καλοῦσι περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίαν.

[667] Xenoph. Memor. iv, 7, 3-5.

[668] Ion, Chius, Fragm. 9. ap. Didot. Fragm. Historic. Græcor. Diogen. Laërt. ii, 16-19.

Ritter (Gesch. der Philos. vol, ii, ch. 2, p. 19) calls in question the assertion that Sokratês received instruction from Archelaus; in my judgment, without the least reason, since Ion of Chios is a good contemporary witness. He even denies that Sokratês received any instruction in philosophy at all, on the authority of a passage in the Symposion of Xenophon, where Sokratês is made to speak of himself as ἡμᾶς δὲ ὁρᾶς αὐτουργούς τινας τῆς φιλοσοφίας ὄντας (1, 5). But it appears to me that that expression implies nothing more than a sneering antithesis, so frequent both in Plato and Xenophon, with the costly lessons given by Protagoras, Gorgias, and Prodikus. It cannot be understood to deny instruction given to Sokratês in the earlier portion of his life.

[669] I think that the expression in Plato’s Phædo, c. 102, p. 96, A, applies to Sokratês himself, and not to Plato: τὰ γε ἐμὰ πάθη, means the mental tendencies of Sokratês when a young man.

Respecting the physical studies probably sought and cultivated by Sokratês in the earlier years of his life, see the instructive Dissertation of Tychsen, Ueber den Prozess des Sokratês, in the Bibliothek der Alten Literatur und Kunst; Erstes Stück, p. 43.

[670] Plato, Parmenid. p. 128, C. καίτοι ὥσπερ γε αἱ Λάκαιναι σκύλακες, εὖ μεταθεῖς καὶ ἰχνεύεις τὰ λεχθέντα, etc.

Whether Sokratês can be properly said to have been the pupil of Anaxagoras and Archelaus, is a question of little moment, which hardly merited the skepticism of Bayle (Anaxagoras, note R; Archelaus, note A: compare Schanbach, Anaxagoræ Fragmenta, pp. 23, 27). That he would seek to acquaint himself with their doctrines, and improve himself by communicating personally with them, is a matter so probable, that the slenderest testimony suffices to make us believe it. Moreover, as I have before remarked, we have here a good contemporary witness, Ion of Chios, to the fact of his intimacy with Archelaus. In no other sense than this could a man like Sokratês be said to be the pupil of any one.

[671] See the chapter immediately preceding, [p. 472].

[672] See the remarkable passage in Plato’s Parmenidês, p. 135 C to 136 E, of which a portion has already been cited in my note to the preceding chapter, referred to in the note above.

[673] Timon the Sillographer ap. Diogen. Laërt. ix, 25.

Ἀμφοτερογλώσσου δὲ μέγα σθένος οὐκ ἀλαπαδνὸν

Ζήνωνος, πάντων ἐπιλήπτορος, etc.

[674] Xenoph. Mem. iv, 7, 6. Ὅλως δὲ τῶν οὐρανίων, ᾗ ἕκαστα ὁ θεὸς μηχανᾶται, φροντιστὴν γίγνεσθαι ἀπέτρεπεν· οὔτε γὰρ εὑρετὰ ἀνθρώποις αὐτὰ ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι, οὔτε χαρίζεσθαι θεοῖς ἂν ἡγεῖτο τὸν ζητοῦντα, ἃ ἐκεῖνοι σαφηνίσαι οὐκ ἐβουλήθησαν. Κινδυνεῦσαι δ᾽ ἂν ἔφη καὶ παραφρονῆσαι τὸν ταῦτα μεριμνῶντα, οὐδὲν ἧττον ἢ Ἀναξαγόρας παρεφρόνησεν, ὁ τὰ μέγιστα φρονήσας ἐπὶ τῷ τὰς τῶν θεῶν μηχανὰς ἐξηγεῖσθαι.

[675] Xenoph. Mem. i, 1, 16. Αὐτὸς δὲ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπείων ἀεὶ διελέγετο, etc. Compare the whole of this chapter.

[676] Xenoph. Mem. iv, 7, 5.

[677] Xenoph. Mem. i, 1, 12-15. Plato entertained much larger views on the subject of physical and astronomical studies than either Sokratês or Xenophon: see Plato, Phædrus, c. 120, p. 270, A; and Republic, vii, c. 6-11, p. 522, seq.

His treatise De Legibus, however, written in his old age, falls below this tone.

[678] Xenoph. Mem. i, 1, 7. Καὶ τοὺς μέλλοντας οἴκους τε καὶ πόλεις καλῶς οἰκήσειν, μαντικῆς ἔφη προσδεῖσθαι. Τεκτονικὸν μὲν γὰρ, ἢ χαλκευτικὸν, ἢ γεωργικὸν, ἢ ἀνθρώπων ἀρχικὸν, ἢ τῶν τοιούτων ἔργων ἐξεταστικὸν, ἢ λογιστικὸν, ἢ οἰκονομικὸν, ἢ στρατηγικὸν γενέσθαι—πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα μαθήματα καὶ ἀνθρώπου γνώμῃ αἱρετέα ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι. Τὰ δὲ μέγιστα τῶν ἐν τούτοις ἔφη τοὺς θεοὺς ἑαυτοῖς καταλείπεσθαι, ὧν οὐδὲν δῆλον εἶναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, etc.

[679] Xenoph. Mem. i, 1, 9-19. Ἔφη δὲ δεῖν, ἃ μὲν μαθόντας ποιεῖν ἔδωκαν οἱ θεοὶ, μανθάνειν· ἃ δὲ μὴ δῆλα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐστὶ, πειρᾶσθαι διὰ μαντικῆς παρὰ τῶν θεῶν πυνθάνεσθαι· τοὺς γὰρ θεοὺς, οἷς ἂν ἵλεῳ ὦσι, σημαίνειν.

[680] Xenoph. Mem. i, 4, 15; iv, 3, 12. When Xenophon was deliberating whether he should take military service under Cyrus the younger, he consulted Sokratês, who advised him to go to Delphi and submit the case to the oracle (Xen. Anabas. iii, 1, 5).

[681] Xenoph. Mem. iv, 7, 10.

[682] Xenoph. Mem. 1, 9; iv, 7, 6.

[683] Cicero, Tusc. Disp. v, 4, 10.

[684] Ὅττι τοι ἐν μεγάροισι κακὸν τ᾽ ἀγαθόν τε τέτυκται.

[685] Xenoph. Mem. i, 1, 16.

[686] Xenoph. Mem. iv, 5, 11, 12. Ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἐγκρατέσι μόνοις ἔξεστι σκοπεῖν τὰ κράτιστα τῶν πραγμάτων, καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ διαλέγοντας κατὰ γένη, τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ προαιρεῖσθαι, τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἀπέχεσθαι. Καὶ οὕτως ἔφη ἀρίστους τε καὶ εὐδαιμονεστάτους ἄνδρας γίγνεσθαι, καὶ διαλέγεσθαι δυνατωτάτους. Ἔφη δὲ καὶ τὸ διαλέγεσθαι ὀνομασθῆναι, ἐκ τοῦ συνιόντας κοινῇ βουλεύεσθαι διαλέγοντας κατὰ γένη τὰ πράγματα· δεῖν οὖν πειρᾶσθαι ὅτι μάλιστα πρὸς τοῦτο ἕτοιμον ἑαυτὸν παρασκευάζειν, καὶ τούτου μάλιστα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι· ἐκ τούτου γὰρ γίγνεσθαι ἄνδρας ἀρίστους τε καὶ ἡγεμονικωτάτους καὶ διαλεκτικωτάτους.

Surely, the etymology here given by Xenophon or Sokratês, of the word διαλέγεσθαι, cannot be considered as satisfactory.

Again, iv, 6, 1. Σωκράτης δὲ τοὺς μὲν εἰδότας τί ἕκαστον εἴη τῶν ὄντων, ἐνόμιζε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἂν ἐξηγεῖσθαι δύνασθαι· τοὺς δὲ μὴ εἰδότας, οὐδὲν ἔφη θαυμαστὸν εἶναι, αὐτοὺς τε σφάλλεσθαι καὶ ἄλλους σφάλλειν. Ὧν ἕνεκα σκοπῶν σὺν τοῖς συνοῦσι, τί ἕκαστον εἴη τῶν ὄντων, οὐδέποτ᾽ ἔληγε. Πάντα μὲν οὖν, ᾗ διωρίζετο, πολὺ ἂν ἔργον εἴη διεξελθεῖν· ἐν ὅσοις δὲ τὸν τρόπον τῆς ἐπισκέψεως δηλώσειν οἶμαι, τοσαῦτα λέξω.

[687] Aristot. Metaphys. i, 6, 3, p. 987, b. Σωκράτους δὲ περὶ μὲν τὰ ἠθικὰ πραγματευομένου, περὶ δὲ τῆς ὅλης φύσεως οὐδὲν—ἐν μέντοι τούτοις τὸ καθόλου ζητοῦντος καὶ περὶ ὁρισμῶν ἐπιστήσαντος πρώτου τὴν διάνοιαν, etc. Again, xiii, 4, 6-8, p. 1078, b. Δύο γάρ ἐστιν ἅ τις ἂν ἀποδοίη Σωκράτει δικαίως, τοὺς τ᾽ ἐπακτικοὺς λόγους καὶ τὸ ὁρίζεσθαι καθόλου: compare xiii, 9, 35, p. 1086, b; Cicero, Topic. x, 42.

These two attributes, of the discussions carried on by Sokratês, explain the epithet attached to him by Timon the Sillographer, that he was the leader and originator of the accurate talkers:—

Ἐκ δ᾽ ἄρα τῶν ἀπέκλινεν ὁ λιθοξόος, ἐννομολέσχης,

Ἑλλήνων ἐπαοιδὸς ἀκριβολόγους ἀποφῄνας,

Μυκτὴρ, ῥητορόμυκτος, ὑπαττικὸς εἰρωνεύτης.

(ap. Diog. Laërt. ii, 19.)

To a large proportion of hearers of that time, as of other times, accurate thinking and talking appeared petty and in bad taste: ἡ ἀκριβολογία μικροπρεπές (Aristot. Ethic. Nikomach. iv, 4, p. 1122, b; also Aristot. Metaphys. ii, 3, p. 995, a). Even Plato thinks himself obliged to make a sort of apology for it (Theætet. c. 102, p. 184, C). No doubt Timon used the word ἀκριβολόγους in a sneering sense.

[688] How slowly grammatical analysis proceeded among the Greeks, and how long it was before they got at what are now elementary ideas in every instructed man’s mind, may be seen in Gräfenhahn, Geschichte der Klassischen Philologie im Alterthum, sects. 89-92, etc. On this point, these sophists seem to have been decidedly in advance of their age.

[689] This same tendency, to break off from the vague aggregate then conceived as physics, is discernible in the Hippokratic treatises, and even in the treatise De Antiquâ Medicinâ, which M. Littré places first in his edition, and considers to be the production of Hippokratês himself, in which case it would be contemporary with Sokratês. On this subject of authorship, however, other critics do not agree with him: see the question examined in his vol. i, ch. xii, p. 295, seq.

Hippokratês, if he be the author, begins by deprecating the attempt to connect the study of medicine with physical or astronomical hypothesis (c. 2), and he farther protests against the procedure of various medical writers and sophists, or philosophers, such as Empedoklês, who set themselves to make out “what man was from the beginning, how he began first to exist, and in what manner he was constructed,” (c. 20). This does not belong, he says, to medicine, which ought indeed to be studied as a comprehensive whole, but as a whole determined by and bearing reference to its own end: “You ought to study the nature of man; what he is with reference to that which he eats and drinks, and to all his other occupations or habits, and to the consequences resulting from each:” ὅ,τί ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος πρὸς τὰ ἐσθιόμενα καὶ πινόμενα, καὶ ὅ,τι πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ἐπιτηδεύματα, καὶ ὅ,τι ἀφ᾽ ἑκάστου ἑκάστῳ συμβήσεται.

The spirit, in which Hippokratês here approaches the study of medicine, is exceedingly analogous to that which dictated the innovation of Sokratês in respect to the study of ethics. The same character pervades the treatise, De Aëre, Locis et Aquis, a definite and predetermined field of inquiry, and the Hippokratic treatises generally.

[690] Aristotel. Metaphys. i, 5, p. 985, 986. τὸ μὲν τοιόνδε τῶν ἀριθμῶν πάθος δικαιοσύνη, τὸ δὲ τοιόνδε ψυχή καὶ νοῦς, ἕτερον δὲ καιρὸς, etc. Ethica Magna, i. 1. ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἀριθμὸς ἰσάκις ἴσος: see Brandis, Gesch. der Gr. Röm. Philos. lxxxii, lxxxiii, p. 492.

[691] Aristotel. Metaphys. iii, 3, p. 998, A. Οἷον Ἐμπεδοκλῆς πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ τὰ μετὰ τούτων, στοιχεῖά φησιν εἶναι ἐξ ὧν ἐστὶ τὰ ὄντα ἐνυπαρχόντων, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὡς γένη λέγει ταῦτα τῶν ὄντων. That generic division and subdivision was unknown or unpractised by these early men, is noticed by Plato (Sophist. c. 114, p. 267, D).

Aristotle thinks that the Pythagoreans had some faint and obscure notion of the logical genus, περὶ τοῦ τί ἐστιν ἤρξαντο μὲν λέγειν καὶ ὁρίζεσθαι, λίαν δὲ ἁπλῶς ἐπραγματεύθησαν (Metaphys. i, 5, 29, p. 986, B). But we see by comparing two other passages in that treatise (xiii, 4, 6, p. 1078, b, with i, 5, 2, p. 985, b) that the Pythagorean definitions of καιρὸς, τὸ δίκαιον, etc., were nothing more than certain numerical fancies; so that these words cannot fairly be said to have designated, in their view, logical genera. Nor can the ten Pythagorean συστοιχίαι, or parallel series of contraries, be called by that name; arranged in order to gratify a fancy about the perfection of the number ten, which fancy afterwards seems to have passed to Aristotle himself, when drawing up his ten predicaments.

See a valuable Excursus upon the Aristotelian expressions τί ἐστι—τί ἦν εἶναι, etc., appended to Schwegler’s edition of Aristotle’s Metaphysica, vol. ii, p. 369, p. 378.

About the few and imperfect definitions which Aristotle seems also to ascribe to Demokritus, see Trendeleuburg, Comment. ad Aristot. De Animâ, p. 212.

[692] Aristotle remarks about the Pythagoreans, that they referred the virtues to number and numerical relations, not giving to them a theory of their own: τὰς γὰρ ἀρετὰς εἰς τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς ἀνάγων οὐκ οἰκείαν τῶν ἀρετῶν τὴν θεωρίαν ἐποιεῖτο (Ethic. Magn. i, 1).

[693] Plato, Phædon, c. 102, seq., pp. 96, 97.

[694] As one specimen among many, see Plato, Theætet. c. 11, p. 146, D. It is maintained by Brandis, and in part by C. Heyder (see Heyder, Kritische Darstellung und Vergleichung der Aristotelischen und Hegelschen Dialektik, part i, pp. 85, 129), that the logical process, called division, is not to be considered as having been employed by Sokratês along with definition, but begins with Plato: in proof of which they remark that, in the two Platonic dialogues called Sophistês and Politicus, wherein this process is most abundantly employed, Sokratês is not the conductor of the conversation.

Little stress is to be laid on this circumstance, I think; and the terms in which Xenophon describes the method of Sokratês (διαλέγοντας κατὰ γένη τὰ πράγματα, Mem. iv, 5, 12) seem to imply the one process as well as the other: indeed, it was scarcely possible to keep them apart, with so abundant a talker as Sokratês. Plato doubtless both enlarged and systematized the method in every way, and especially made greater use of the process of division, because he pushed the dialogue further into positive scientific research than Sokratês.

[695] Plato, Phædrus, c. 109, p. 265, D; Sophistês, c. 83, p. 253, E.

[696] Aristot. Topic. viii, 14, p. 164, b. 2. Ἐστὶ μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν διαλεκτικὸς, ὁ προτατικὸς καὶ ἐνταστικός. Ἐστὶ δὲ τὸ μὲν προτείνεισθαι, ἓν ποιεῖν τὰ πλείω (δεῖ γὰρ ἓν ὅλως ληφθῆναι πρὸς ὃ ὁ λόγος) τὸ δ᾽ ἐνίστασθαι, τὸ ἓν πολλά· ἢ γὰρ διαιρεῖ ἢ ἀναιρεῖ, τὸ μὲν διδοὺς, το δ᾽ οὐ, τῶν προτεινομένων.

It was from Sokratês that dialectic skill derived its great extension and development (Aristot. Metaphys. xiii, 4, p. 1078, b).

[697] What Plato makes Sokratês say in the Euthyphron, c. 12, p. 11, D, Ἄκων εἰμὶ σοφός, etc., may be accounted as true at least in the beginning of the active career of Sokratês; compare the Hippias Minor, c. 18, p. 376, B; Lachês, c. 33, p. 200, E.

[698] Xenoph. Memor. i, 1, 12-16. Πότερόν ποτε νομίσαντες ἱκανῶς ἤδη τἀνθρώπεια εἰδέναι ἔρχονται (the physical philosophers) ἐπὶ τὸ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων φροντίζειν· ἢ τὰ μὲν ἀνθρώπεια παρέντες, τὰ δὲ δαιμόνια σκοποῦντες, ἡγοῦνται τὰ προσήκοντα πράττειν.... Αὐτὸς δὲ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπείων ἀεὶ διελέγετο σκοπῶν, τί εὐσεβὲς, τί ἀσεβὲς καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἃ τοὺς μὲν εἰδότας ἡγεῖτο καλοὺς κἀγαθοὺς εἶναι, τοὺς δὲ ἀγνοοῦντας ἀνδραποδώδεις ἂν δικαίως κεκλῆσθαι.

Plato, Apolog. Sok. c. 5, p. 20, D. ἥπερ ἐστὶν ἴσως ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία· τῷ ὄντι γὰρ κινδυνεύω ταύτην εἶναι σοφός· οὗτοι δὲ τάχ᾽ ἄν, οὓς ἄρτι ἔλεγον, μείζω τινὰ ἢ κατ᾽ ἄνθρωπον σοφίαν σοφοὶ εἶεν, etc. Compare c. 9, p. 23, A.

[699] It is this narrow purpose that Plutarch ascribes to Sokratês, Quæstiones Platonicæ, p. 999, E; compare also Tennemann, Geschicht. der Philos. part ii, art. i, vol. ii, p. 81.

Amidst the customary outpouring of groundless censure against the sophists, which Tennemann here gives, one assertion is remarkable. He tells us that it was the more easy for Sokratês to put down the sophists, since their shallowness and worthlessness, after a short period of vogue, had already been detected by intelligent men, and was becoming discredited.

It is strange to find such an assertion made, for a period between 420-399 B.C., the era when Protagoras, Prodikus, Hippias, etc., reached the maximum of celebrity.

And what are we to say about the statement, that Sokratês put down the sophists, when we recollect that the Megaric school and Antisthenês, both emanating from Sokratês, are more frequently attacked than any one else in the dialogues of Plato, as having all those skeptical and disputatious propensities with which the sophists are reproached?

[700] Plato, Gorgias, c. 101, p. 491, A.

Kalliklês. Ὡς ἀεὶ ταὐτὰ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες. Sokratês. Οὐ μόνον γε, ὦ Καλλικλεῖς, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν. Kalliklês. Νὴ τοὺς θεοὺς, ἀτεχνῶς γε ἀεὶ σκυτέας καὶ κναφέας καὶ μαγείρους λέγων καὶ ἰατροὺς, οὐδὲν παύῃ. Compare Plato, Symposion, p. 221, E, also Xenoph. Memor. i, 2, 37; iv, 5, 5.

[701] It is not easy to refer to specific passages in manifestation of the contrast set forth in the text, which, however, runs through large portions of many Platonic dialogues, under one form or another: see the Menon, c. 27-33, pp. 90-94; Protagoras, c. 28, 29, pp. 319, 320; Politicus, c. 38, p. 299, D; Lachês, c. 11, 12, pp. 185, 186; Gorgias, c. 121, p. 501, A; Alkibiadês, i, c. 12-14, pp. 108, 109, 110; c. 20, p. 113, C, D.

Xenoph. Mem. iii, 5, 21, 22; iv, 2, 20-23; iv, 4, 5; iv, 6, 1. Of these passages, iv, 2, 20, 23 is among the most remarkable.

It is remarkable that Sokratês (in the Platonic Apology, c. 7, p. 22), when he is describing his wanderings (πλάνην) to test supposed knowledge, first in the statesmen, next in the poets, lastly in the artisans and craftsmen, finds satisfaction only in the answers which these latter made to him on matters concerning their respective trades or professions. They would have been wise men, had it not been for the circumstance that, because they knew those particular things, they fancied that they knew other things also.

[702] Plato, Euthyphrôn, c. 8, p. 7, D; Xen. Mem. iv, 4, 8.

[703] Xenoph. Mem. iv. 2, 2; Plato, Meno, c. 33, p. 94.

[704] Compare Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 4, p. 20, A; Xen. Mem. iv, 2, 25.

[705] Xenoph. Memor. iv, 6, 15. Ὅποτε δὲ αὐτός τι τῷ λόγῳ διεξίοι, διὰ τῶν μάλιστα ὁμολογουμένων ἐπορεύετο, νομίζων ταύτην τὴν ἀσφάλειαν εἶναι λόγου· τοιγαροῦν πολὺ μάλιστα ὧν ἐγὼ οἶδα, ὅτε λέγοι, τοὺς ἀκούοντας ὁμολογοῦντας παρεῖχε.

[706] Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 7. p. 22, C: compare Plato, Ion. pp. 533, 534.

[707] Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν (says Sokratês to Euthydêmus) ἴσως διὰ τὸ σφόδρα πιστεύειν εἰδέναι, οὐδ᾽ ἐσκέψω (Xen. Mem. iv, 2, 36): compare Plato, Alkibiad. i, c. 14, p. 110. A.

[708] “Moins une science est avancée, moins elle a été bien traitée, et plus elle a besoin d’être enseignée. C’est ce qui me fait beaucoup désirer qu’on ne renonce pas en France à l’enseignement des sciences idéologiques, morales, et politiques; qui, après tout, sont des sciences comme les autres—à la difference près, que ceux qui ne les ont pas étudiées sont persuadés de si bonne foi de les savoir, qu’ils se croient en état d’en décider.” (Destutt de Tracy, Elémens d’Idéologie, Préface, p. xxxiv, ed. Paris, 1827.)

[709] “There is no science which, more than astronomy, stands in need of such a preparation, or draws more largely on that intellectual liberality which is ready to adopt whatever is demonstrated, or concede whatever is rendered highly probable, however new and uncommon the points of view may be, in which objects the most familiar may thereby become placed. Almost all its conclusions stand in open and striking contradiction with those of superficial and vulgar observation, and with what appears to every one, until he has understood and weighed the proofs to the contrary, the most positive evidence of his senses. Thus the earth on which he stands, and which has served for ages as the unshaken foundation of the firmest structures either of art or nature, is divested by the astronomer of its attribute of fixity, and conceived by him as turning swiftly on its centre, and at the same time moving onward through space with great rapidity, etc.” (Sir John Herschel, Astronomy, Introduction, sect. 2.)

[710] Xenoph. Memor. iv, 1, 2. Ἐτεκμαίρετο (Sokratês) δὲ τὰς ἀγαθὰς φύσεις, ἐκ τοῦ ταχύ τε μανθάνειν οἷς προσέχοιεν, καὶ μνημονεύειν ἃ ἂν μάθοιεν, καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν τῶν μαθημάτων πάντων, δι᾽ ὧν ἔστιν οἰκίαν τε καλῶς οἰκεῖν καὶ πόλιν, καὶ τὸ ὅλον ἀνθρώποις τε καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρωπίνοις πράγμασιν εὖ χρῆσθαι. Τοὺς γὰρ τοιούτους ἡγεῖτο παιδευθέντας οὐκ ἂν μόνον αὐτούς τε εὐδαίμονας εἶναι καὶ τοὺς ἑαυτῶν οἴκους καλῶς οἰκεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους καὶ πόλεις δύνασθαι εὐδαίμονας ποιῆσαι.

Ib. iii, 2, 4. Καὶ οὕτως ἐπισκοπῶν, τίς εἴη ἀγαθοῦ ἡγεμόνος ἀρετὴ, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα περιῄρει, κατέλειπε δὲ, τὸ εὐδαίμονας ποιεῖν, ὧν ἂν ἡγῆται.

Ib. iii, 8, 3, 4, 5; iv, 6, 8. He explains τὸ ἀγαθὸν to mean τὸ ὠφέλιμον—μέχρι δὲ τοῦ ὠφελίμου πάντα καὶ αὐτὸς συνεπεσκόπει καὶ συνδιεξῄει τοῖς συνοῦσι (iv, 7, 8). Compare Plato, Gorgias, c. 66, 67, p. 474, D; 475, A.

Things are called ἀγαθὰ καὶ καλὰ on the one hand, and κακὰ καὶ αἰσχρὰ on the other, in reference each to its distinct end, of averting or mitigating in the one case, of bringing on or increasing in the other, different modes of human suffering. So again, iii, 9, 4, we find the phrases: ἃ δεῖ πράττειν—ὀρθῶς πράττειν—τὰ συμφορώτατα αὑτοῖς πράττειν, all used as equivalents.

Plato, Symposion, p. 205. A. Κτήσει γὰρ ἀγαθῶν εὐδαίμονες ἔσονται—καὶ οὐκέτι προσδεῖ ἐρέσθαι, ἵνατι δὲ βούλεται εὐδαίμων εἶναι; ἀλλὰ τέλος δοκεῖ ἔχειν ἡ ἀπόκρισις: compare Euthydem. c. 20, p. 279, A; c. 25, p. 281, D.

Plato, Alkibiadês, ii, c. 13, p. 145, C. Ὅστις ἄρα τι τῶν τοιούτων οἶδεν, ἐὰν μὲν παρέπηται αὐτῷ ἡ τοῦ βελτίστου ἐπιστήμη—αὐτὴ δ᾽ ἦν ἡ αὐτὴ δήπου ἥπερ καὶ ἡ τοῦ ὠφελίμου—φρόνιμόν γε αὐτὸν φήσομεν καὶ ἀποχρῶντα σύμβουλον, καὶ τῇ πόλει καὶ αὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ· τὸν δὲ μὴ ποιοῦντα, τἀναντία τούτων: compare Plato, Republic, vi, p. 504, E. The fact that this dialogue, called Alkibiadês II, was considered by some as belonging not to Plato, but to Xenophon or Æschinês Socraticus, does not detract from its value as evidence about the speculations of Sokratês (see Diogen. Laërt. ii, 61, 62; Athenæus, v, p. 220).

Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 17, p. 30, A. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο πράττων περιέρχομαι, ἢ πείθων ὑμῶν καὶ νεωτέρους καὶ πρεσβυτέρους, μήτε σωμάτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι μήτε χρημάτων πρότερον μηδὲ οὕτω σφόδρα, ὡς τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅπως ὡς ἀρίστη ἔσται· λέγων ὅτι οὐκ ἐκ χρημάτων ἀρετὴ γίγνεται, ἀλλ᾽ ἐξ ἀρετῆς χρήματα καὶ τἄλλα ἀγαθὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἅπαντα καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ.

Zeller (Die Philosophie der Griechen, vol. ii, pp. 61-64) admits as a fact this reference of the Sokratic ethics to human security and happiness as their end; while Brandis (Gesch. der Gr. Röm. Philosoph. ii, p. 40, seq.) resorts to inadmissible suppositions, in order to avoid admitting it, and to explain away the direct testimony of Xenophon. Both of these authors consider this doctrine as a great taint in the philosophical character of Sokratês. Zeller even says, what he intends for strong censure, that “the eudæmonistic basis of the Sokratic ethics differs from the sophistical moral philosophy, not in principle, but only in result” (p. 61).

I protest against this allusion to a sophistical moral philosophy, and have shown my grounds for the protest in the preceding chapter. There was no such thing as sophistical moral philosophy. Not only the sophists were no sect or school, but farther, not one of them ever aimed, so far as we know, at establishing any ethical theory: this was the great innovation of Sokratês. But it is perfectly true that, between the preceptorial exhortation of Sokratês, and that of Protagoras or Prodikus, there was no great or material difference; and this Zeller seems to admit.

[711] The existence of cases forming exceptions to each separate moral precept, is brought to view by Sokratês in Xen. Mem. iv, 2, 15-19; Plato, Republic, i, 6, p. 331, C, D, E; ii, p. 382, C.

[712] Plato, Phædon, c. 88, p. 89, E. ἄνευ τέχνης τῆς περὶ τἀνθρώπεια ὁ τοιοῦτος χρῆσθαι ἐπεχειρεῖ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· εἰ γάρ που μετὰ τέχνης ἔχρητο, ὥσπερ ἔχει, οὕτως ἂν ἡγήσατο, etc. ἡ πολιτικὴ τέχνη, Protagor. c. 27, p. 319, A; Gorgias, c. 163, p. 521, D.

Compare Apol. Sok. c. 4, p. 20, A, B; Euthydêmus, c. 50, p. 292, E: τίς ποτ᾽ ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη ἐκείνη, ἣ ἡμᾶς εὐδαίμονας ποιήσειεν;...

The marked distinction between τέχνη, as distinguished from ἄτεχνος τριβὴ—ἄλογος τριβὴ or ἐμπειρία, is noted in the Phædrus, c. 95, p. 260, E, and in Gorgias, c. 42, p. 463, B; c. 45, p. 465, A; c. 121, p. 501, A, a remarkable passage. That there is in every art some assignable end, to which its precepts and conditions have reference, is again laid down in the Sophistês, c. 37, p. 232, A.

[713] This fundamental analogy, which governed the reasoning of Sokratês, between the special professions and social living generally,—transferring to the latter the idea of a preconceived end, a theory, and a regulated practice, or art, which are observed in the former,—is strikingly stated in one of the aphorisms of the emperor Marcus Antoninus, vi, 35: Οὐχ ὁρᾷς, πῶς οἱ βάναυσοι τεχνῖται ἁρμόζονται μὲν ἄχρι τινὸς πρὸς τοὺς ἰδιώτας, οὐδὲν ἧσσον μέντοι ἀντέχονται τοῦ λόγου τῆς τέχνης, καὶ τούτου ἀποστῆναι οὐχ ὑπομένουσιν; Οὐ δεινὸν, εἰ ὁ ἀρχιτέκτων καὶ ὁ ἰατρὸς μᾶλλον αἰδέσονται τὸν τῆς ἰδίας τέχνης λόγον, ἢ ὁ ἄνθρωπος τὸν ἑαυτοῦ, ὃς αὐτῷ κοινός ἐστι πρὸς τοὺς θεούς;

[714] Plato (Phædr. c. 8, p. 229, E; Charmidês, c. 26, p. 164, E; Alkibiad. i, p. 124, A; 129, A; 131, A).

Xenoph. Mem. iv, 2, 24-26. οὕτως ἑαυτὸν ἐπισκεψάμενος, ὁποῖός ἐστι πρὸς τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην χρείαν, ἔγνωκε τὴν αὐτοῦ δύναμιν. Cicero (de Legib. i, 22, 59) gives a paraphrase of this well-known text, far more vague and tumid than the conception of Sokratês.

[715] See the striking conversations of Sokratês with Glaukon and Charmidês especially that with the former, in Xen. Mem. iii, c. 6, 7.

[716] There is no part of Plato in which this doxosophy, or false conceit of wisdom, is more earnestly reprobated than in the Sophistês, with notice of the elenchus, or cross-examining exposure, as the only effectual cure for such fundamental vice of the mind; as the true purifying process (Sophistês, c. 33-35, pp. 230, 231).

See the same process illustrated by Sokratês, after his questions put to the slave of Menon (Plato, Menon, c. 18. p. 84, B; Charmidês, c. 30, p. 166, D).

As the Platonic Sokratês, even in the Defence, where his own personality stands most manifest, denounces as the worst and deepest of all mental defects, this conceit of knowledge without reality, ἡ ἀμαθία αὐτὴ ἡ ἐπονείδιστος, ἡ τοῦ οἴεσθαι εἰδέναι ἃ οὐκ οἶδεν, c. 17, p. 29, B,—so the Xenophontic Sokratês, in the same manner, treats this same mental infirmity as being near to madness, and distinguishes it carefully from simple want of knowledge, or conscious ignorance: Μανίαν γε μὴν ἐναντίον μὲν ἔφη εἶναι σοφίᾳ, οὐ μέντοι γε τὴν ἀνεπιστημοσύνην μανίαν ἐνόμιζεν. Τὸ δὲ ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτὸν, καὶ ἃ μή τις οἶδε δοξάζειν, καὶ οἴεσθαι γιγνώσκειν, ἐγγυτάτω μανίας ἐλογίζετο εἶναι (Mem. iii, 9, 6). This conviction thus stands foremost in the mental character of Sokratês, and on the best evidence, Plato and Xenophon united.

[717] Xenoph. Mem. iv, 2, 40. Πολλοὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν οὕτω διατεθέντων ὑπὸ Σωκράτους οὐκέτι αὐτῷ προσῄεσαν, οὓς καὶ βλακωτέρους ἐνόμιζεν.

[718] Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 9, p. 23, A. Οἴονται γάρ με ἑκάστοτε οἱ παρόντες ταῦτα αὐτὸν εἶναι σοφὸν, ἃ ἂν ἄλλον ἐξελέγξω.

Ibid. c. 10, p. 23, C. Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, οἱ νέοι μοι ἐπακολουθοῦντες, οἷς μάλιστα σχολή ἐστιν, οἱ τῶν πλουσιωτάτων, αὐτόματοι χαίρουσιν ἀκούοντες ἐξεταζομένων τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ αὐτοὶ πολλάκις ἐμὲ μιμοῦνται, εἶτα ἐπιχειροῦσιν ἄλλους ἐξετάζειν, etc.

Compare also ibid. c. 22, p. 33, C; c. 27, p. 37, D.

[719] This is an interesting testimony preserved by Aristoxenus, on the testimony of his father Spintharus, who heard Sokratês (Aristox. Frag. 28, ed. Didot). Spintharus said, respecting Sokratês: ὅτι οὐ πολλοῖς αὐτός γε πιθανωτέροις ἐντετυχηκὼς εἴη· τοιαύτην εἶναι τήν τε φωνὴν καὶ τὸ στόμα καὶ τὸ ἐπιφαινόμενον ἦθος, καὶ πρὸς πᾶσί τε τοῖς εἰρημένοις τὴν τοῦ εἴδους ἰδιότητα.

It seems evident also, from the remarkable passage in Plato’s Symposion, c. 39, p. 215, A, that he too must have been much affected by the singular physiognomy of Sokratês: compare Xenoph. Sympos. iv. 19.

[720] Aristot. de Sophist. Elench. c. 32, p. 183, b. 6. Compare also Plutarch, Quæst. Platonic. p. 999, E. Τὸν οὖν ἐλεγκτικὸν λόγον ὥσπερ καθαρτικὸν ἔχων φάρμακον, ὁ Σωκράτης ἀξιόπιστος ἦν ἑτέρους ἐλέγχων, τῷ μηδὲν ἀποφαίνεσθαι· καὶ μᾶλλον ἥπτετο, δοκῶν ζητεῖν κοινῇ τὴν ἀλήθειαν, οὐκ αὐτὸς ἰδίᾳ δόξῃ βοηθεῖν.

[721] Xenoph. Mem. iv, 4, 9.

Plato, Gorgias, c. 81, p. 481, B. σπουδάζει ταῦτα Σωκράτης ἢ παίζει; Republic, i, c. 11, p. 337, A. αὐτὴ ἐκείνη ἡ εἰωθυῖα εἰρωνεία Σωκράτους, etc (Apol. Sok. c. 28, p. 38, A.)

[722] Diog. Laërt. ii, 16; Cicero, De Nat. Deor. i, 34, 93. Cicero (Brutus, 85, 292) also treats the irony of Sokratês as intended to mock and humiliate his fellow-dialogists, and it sometimes appears so in the dialogues of Plato. Yet I doubt whether the real Sokratês could have had any pronounced purpose of this kind.

[723] The beginning of Xen. Mem. i, 4, 1, is particularly striking on this head: Εἰ δέ τινες Σωκράτην νομίζουσιν (ὡς ἔνιοι γράφουσί τε καὶ λέγουσι περὶ αὐτοῦ τεκμαιρόμενοι) προτρέψασθαι μὲν ἀνθρώπους ἐπ᾽ ἀρετὴν κράτιστον γεγονέναι, προαγαγεῖν δὲ ἐπ᾽ αὐτὴν οὐχ ἱκανόν—σκεψάμενοι μὴ μόνον ἃ ἐκεῖνος κολαστηρίου ἕνεκα τοὺς πάντ᾽ οἰομένους εἰδέναι ἐρωτῶν ἤλεγχεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἃ λέγων συνδιημέρευε τοῖς συνδιατρίβουσιν, δοκιμαζόντων, εἰ ἱκανὸς ἦν βελτίους ποιεῖν τοὺς συνόντας.

[724] Xenophon, after describing the dialogue wherein Sokratês cross-examines and humiliates Euthydêmus, says at the end: Ὁ δὲ (Sokratês) ὡς ἔγνω αὐτὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα, ἥκιστα μὲν αὐτὸν διετάραττεν, ἀπλούστατα δὲ καὶ σαφέστατα ἐξηγεῖτο ἅ τε ἐνόμιζεν εἰδέναι δεῖν, καὶ ἃ ἐπιτηδεύειν κράτιστα εἶναι.

Again, iv, 7, 1. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἁπλῶς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γνώμην ἀπεφαίνετο Σωκράτης πρὸς τοὺς ὁμιλοῦντας αὐτῷ, δοκεῖ μοι δῆλον ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων εἶναι, etc.

His readers were evidently likely to doubt, and required proof, that Sokratês could speak plainly, directly, and positively: so much better known was the other side of his character.

[725] Plato, Sophistês, c. 17, p. 230, A. μετὰ δὲ πολλοῦ πόνου τὸ νουθετητικὸν εἶδος τῆς παιδείας σμικρὸν ἀνύτειν, etc. Compare a fragment of Demokritus, in Mullach’s edition of the Fragm. Demokrit. p. 175. Fr. Moral 59. Τὸν οἰόμενον νόον ἔχειν ὁ νουθετέων ματαιοπονέει.

Compare Plato, Epistol. vii, pp. 343, 344.

[726] Compare two passages in Plato’s Protagoras, c. 49, p. 329, A, and c. 94, p. 348, D; and the Phædrus, c. 138-140, p. 276, A, E.

[727] Plato, Men. c. 13. p. 80, A. ὁμοιότατος τῇ πλατείᾳ νάρκῃ τῇ θαλασσίᾳ.

[728] This tripartite graduation of the intellectual scale is brought out by Plato in the Symposion, c. 29, p. 204, A, and in the Lysis, c. 33, p. 218, A.

The intermediate point of the scale is what Plato here, though not always, expresses by the word φιλόσοφος, in its strict etymological sense, “a lover of knowledge;” one who is not yet wise, but who, having learned to know and feel his own ignorance, is anxious to become wise,—and has thus made what Plato thought the greatest and most difficult step towards really becoming so.

[729] The effect of the interrogatory procedure of Sokratês, in forcing on the minds of youth a humiliating consciousness of ignorance and an eager anxiety to be relieved from it, is not less powerfully attested in the simpler language of Xenophon, than in the metaphorical variety of Plato. See the conversation with Euthydêmus, in the Memorabilia of Xenophon, iv, 2; a long dialogue which ends by the confession of the latter (c. 39): Ἀναγκάζει με καὶ ταῦτα ὁμολογεῖν δηλονότι ἡ ἐμὴ φαυλότης· καὶ φροντίζω μὴ κράτιστον ᾖ μοι σιγᾶν· κινδυνεύω γὰρ ἁπλῶς οὐδὲν εἰδέναι. Καὶ πάνυ ἀθύμως ἔχων ἀπῆλθε· καὶ νομίσας τῷ ὄντι ἀνδράποδον εἶναι: compare i, 1, 16.

This same expression, “thinking himself no better than a slave,” is also put by Plato into the mouth of Alkibiadês, when he is describing the powerful effect wrought on his mind by the conversation of Sokratês (Symposion, c. 39, p. 215, 216): Περικλέους δὲ ἀκούων καὶ ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν ῥητόρων εὖ μὲν ἡγούμην, τοιοῦτον δ᾽ οὐδὲν ἔπασχον, οὐδὲ τεθορύβητό μου ἡ ψυχὴ οὐδ᾽ ἠγανάκτει ὡς ἀνδραποδωδῶς διακειμένου. Ἀλλ᾽ ὑπὸ τούτου τοῦ Μαρσύου πολλάκις δὴ οὕτω διετέθην, ὥστε μοι δόξαι μὴ βιωτὸν εἶναι ἔχοντι ὡς ἔχω.

Compare also the Meno, c. 13, p. 79, E, and Theætet. c. 17, 22, p. 148, E, 151, C, where the metaphor of pregnancy, and of the obstetric art of Sokratês, is expanded: πάσχουσι δὲ δὴ οἱ ἐμοὶ ξυγγιγνόμενοι καὶ τοῦτο ταὐτὸν ταῖς τικτούσαις· ὠδίνουσι γὰρ καὶ ἀπορίας ἐμπίμπλανται νυκτάς τε καὶ ἡμέρας πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ ἐκεῖναι. Ταύτην δὲ τὴν ὠδῖνα ἐγείρειν τε καὶ ἀποπαύειν ἡ ἐμὴ τέχνη δύναται.—Ἐνίοτε δὲ, οἳ ἄν μὴ μοι δόξωσιν πως ἐγκύμονες εἶναι, γνοὺς ὅτι οὐδὲν ἐμοῦ δέονται, πάνυ εὐμενῶς προμνῶμαι, etc.

[730] There is a striking expression of Xenophon, in the Memorabilia, about Sokratês and his conversation (i, 2, 14):—

“He dealt with every one just as he pleased in his discussions,” says Xenophon: τοῖς δὲ διαλεγομένοις αὐτῷ πᾶσι χρώμενον ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ὅπως ἐβούλετο.

[731] I know nothing so clearly illustrating both the subjects and the method chosen by Sokratês, as various passages of the immortal criticisms in the Novum Organon. When Sokratês, as Xenophon tells us, devoted his time to questioning others: “What is piety? What is justice? What is temperance, courage, political government?” etc., we best understand the spirit of his procedure by comparing the sentence which Bacon pronounces upon the first notions of the intellect,—as radically vicious, confused, badly abstracted from things, and needing complete reexamination and revision,—without which, he says, not one of them could be trusted:—

“Quod vero attinet ad notiones primas intellectûs, nihil est eorum, quas intellectus sibi permissus congessit, quin nobis pro suspecto sit, nec ullo modo ratum nisi novo judicio se stiterit, et secundum illud pronuntiatum fuerit.” (Distributio Operis, prefixed to the N. O. p. 168, of Mr. Montagu’s edition.) “Serum sane rebus perditis adhibetur remedium, postquam mens ex quotidianâ vitæ consuetudine, et auditionibus, et doctrinis inquinatis occupata, et vanissimis idolis obsessa fuerit.... Restat unica salus ac sanitas, ut opus mentis universum de integro resumatur; ac mens, jam ab ipso principio, nullo modo sibi permittatur, sed perpetuo regatur.” (Ib. Præfatio, p. 186.) “Syllogismus ex propositionibus constat, propositiones ex verbis, verba notionum tesseræ sunt. Itaque si notiones ipsæ (id quod basis rei est) confusæ sint et temere a rebus abstractæ, nihil in iis quæ superstruuntur est firmitudinis. Itaque spes est una in inductione verâ. In notionibus nihil sani est, nec in logicis, nec in physicis. Non Substantia, non Qualitas, Agere, Pati, ipsum Esse, bonæ, notiones sunt; multo minus Grave, Leve, Der sum, Tenue, Humidum, Siccum, Generatio, Corruptio, Attrahere, Fugare, Elementum, Materia, Forma, et id Genus; sed omnes phantasticæ et male terminatæ. Notiones infimarum specierum, Hominis, Canis, et prehensionum immediatarum sensus, Albi, Nigri, non fallunt magnopere: reliquæ omnes (quibus homines hactenus usi sunt) aberrationes sunt, nec debitis modis a rebus abstractæ et excitatæ.” (Aphor. 14, 15, 16.) “Nemo adhuc tantâ mentis constantiâ et rigore inventus est, ut decreverit et sibi imposuerit, theorias et notiones communes penitus abolere, et intellectum abrasum et æquum ad particularia de integro applicare. Itaque ratio illa quam habemus, ex multâ fide et multo etiam casu, necnon ex puerilibus, quas primo hausimus, notionibus, farrago quædam est et congeries.” (Aphor. 97.) “Nil magis philosophiæ offecisse deprehendimus, quam quod res quæ familiares sunt et frequenter occurrunt, contemplationem hominum non morentur et detineant, sed recipiantur obiter, neque earum causæ quasi soleant; ut non sæpius requiratur informatio de rebus ignotis, quam attentio in notis.” (Aphor. 119.)

These passages, and many others to the same effect which might be extracted from the Novum Organon, afford a clear illustration and an interesting parallel to the spirit and purpose of Sokratês. He sought to test the fundamental notions and generalizations respecting man and society, in the same spirit in which Bacon approached those of physics: he suspected the unconscious process of the growing intellect, and desired to revise it, by comparison with particulars; and from particulars too the most clear and certain, but which, from being of vulgar occurrence, were least attended to. And that which Sokratês described in his language as “conceit of knowledge without the reality,” is identical with what Bacon designates as the primary notions, the puerile notions, the aberrations, of the intellect left to itself, which have become so familiar and appear so certainly known, that the mind cannot shake them off, and has lost all habit, we might almost say all power, of examining them.

The stringent process—or electric shock, to use the simile in Plato’s Menon—of the Sokratic elenchus, afforded the best means of resuscitating this lost power. And the manner in which Plato speaks of this cross-examining elenchus, as “the great and sovereign purification, without which every man, be he the great king himself, is unschooled, dirty, and fall of uncleanness in respect to the main conditions of happiness,”—καὶ τὸν ἔλεγχον λεκτέον ὡς ἄρα μεγίστη καὶ κυριωτάτη τῶν καθάρσεων ἐστὶ, καὶ τὸν ἀνέλεγκτον αὖ νομιστέον, ἂν καὶ τυγχάνῃ μέγας βασιλεὺς ὤν, τὰ μέγιστα ἀκάθαρτον ὄντα· ἀπαίδευτόν τε καὶ αἰσχρὸν γεγονέναι ταῦτα, ἃ καθαρώτατον καὶ κάλλιστον ἔπρεπε τὸν ὄντως ἐσόμενον εὐδαίμονα εἶναι; Plato, Sophist. c. 34, p. 230, E,—precisely corresponds to that “cross-examination of human reason in its native or spontaneous process,” which Bacon specifies as one of the three things essential to the expurgation of the intellect, so as to qualify it for the attainment of truth: “Itaque doctrina ista de expurgatione intellectûs, ut ipse ad veritatem habilis sit, tribus redargutionibus absolvitur; redargutione philosophiarum, redargutione demonstrationum, et redargutione rationis humanæ nativæ.” (Nov. Organ. Distributio Operis, p. 170, ed. Montagu.)

To show further how essential it is in the opinion of the best judges, that the native intellect should be purged or purified, before it can properly apprehend the truths of physical philosophy, I transcribe the introductory passage of Sir John Herschel’s “Astronomy:”—

“In entering upon any scientific pursuit, one of the student’s first endeavors ought to be to prepare his mind for the reception of truth, by dismissing, or at least loosening his hold on, all such crude and hastily adopted notions respecting the objects and relations he is about to examine, as may tend to embarrass or mislead him; and to strengthen himself, by something of an effort and a resolve, for the unprejudiced admission of any conclusion which shall appear to be supported by careful observation and logical argument; even should it prove adverse to notions he may have previously formed for himself, or taken up, without examination on the credit of others. Such an effort is, in fact, a commencement of that intellectual discipline which forms one of the most important ends of all science. It is the first movement of approach towards that state of mental purity which alone can fit us for a full and steady perception of moral beauty as well as physical adaptation. It is the “euphrasy and rue,” with which we must purge our sight before we can receive, and contemplate as they are, the lineaments of truth and nature.” (Sir John Herschel, Astronomy; Introduction.)

I could easily multiply citations from other eminent writers on physical philosophy, to the same purpose. All of them prescribe this intellectual purification: Sokratês not only prescribed it, but actually administered it, by means of his elenchus, in reference to the subjects on which he talked.

[732] See particularly the remarkable passage in the Philêbus, c. 18, p. 16, seq.

[733] See this point instructively set forth in Mr. John Stuart Mill’s System of Logic, vol. ii, book vi, p. 565, 1st edition.

[734] Lord Bacon remarks, in the Novum Organon (Aph. 71):—

“Erat autem sapientia Græcorum professoria, et in disputationes effusa, quod genus inquisitioni veritatis adversissimum est. Itaque nomen illud Sophistarum—quod per contemptum ab iis, qui se philosophos haberi voluerunt, in antiquos rhetores rejectum et traductum est, Gorgiam, Protagoram, Hippiam, Polum—etiam universo generi competit, Platoni, Aristoteli, Zenoni, Epicuro, Theophrasto, et eorum successoribus, Chrysippo, Carneadi, reliquis.”

Bacon is quite right in effacing the distinction between the two lists of persons whom he compares; and in saying that the latter were just as much sophists as the former, in the sense which he here gives to the word, as well as in every other legitimate sense. But he is not justified in imputing to either of them this many-sided argumentation as a fault, looking to the subjects upon which they brought it to bear. His remark has application to the simpler physical sciences, but none to the moral. It had great pertinence and value, at the time when he brought it forward, and with reference to the important reforms which he was seeking to accomplish in physical science. In so far as Plato, Aristotle, or the other Greek philosophers, apply their deductive method to physical subjects, they come justly under Bacon’s censure. But here again, the fault consisted less in disputing too much, than in too hastily admitting false or inaccurate axioms without dispute.

[735] Aristotel. Metaphysic. iii, 1, 2-5, p. 995, a.

The indispensable necessity, to a philosopher, of having before him all the difficulties and doubts of the problem which he tries to solve, and of looking at a philosophical question with the same alternate attention to its affirmative and negative side, as is shown by a judge to two litigants, is strikingly set forth in this passage. I transcribes portion of it: Ἐστὶ δὲ τοῖς εὐπορῆσαι βουλομένοις προὔργου τὸ διαπορῆσαι καλῶς· ἡ γὰρ ὕστερον εὐπορία λύσις τῶν πρότερον ἀπορουμένων ἐστὶ, λύειν δ᾽ οὐκ ἐστιν ἀγνοοῦντας τὸν δεσμόν.... Διὸ δεῖ τὰς δυσχερείας τεθεωρηκέναι πάσας πρότερον, τούτων τε χάριν, καὶ διὰ τὸ τοὺς ζητοῦντας ἄνευ τοῦ διαπορῆσαι πρῶτον, ὁμοίους εἶναι τοῖς ποῖ δεῖ βαδίζειν ἀγνοοῦσι, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις οὐδ᾽ εἴ ποτε τὸ ζητούμενον εὕρηκεν, ἢ μὴ, γιγνώσκειν· τὸ γὰρ τέλος τούτῳ μὲν οὐ δῆλον, τῷ δὲ προηπορηκότι δῆλον. Ἔτι δὲ βέλτιον ἀνάγκη ἔχειν πρὸς τὸ κρίνειν, τὸν ὥσπερ ἀντιδίκων καὶ τῶν ἀμφισβητούντων λόγων ἀκηκοότα πάντων.

A little further on, in the same chapter (iii, 1, 19, p. 996, a), he makes a remarkable observation. Not merely it is difficult, on these philosophical subjects, to get at the truth, but it is not easy to perform well even the preliminary task of discerning and setting forth the ratiocinative difficulties which are to be dealt with: Περὶ γὰρ τούτων ἁπάντων οὐ μόνον χαλεπὸν τὸ εὐπορῆσαι τῆς ἀληθείας, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ τὸ διαπορῆσαι τῷ λόγῳ ῥᾴδιον καλῶς. Διαπορῆσαι means the same as διεξελθεῖν τὰς ἀπορίας (Bonitz. not. ad loc.), “to go through the various points of difficulty.”

This last passage illustrates well the characteristic gift of Sokratês, which was exactly what Aristotle calls τὸ διαπορῆσαι λόγῳ καλῶς; to force on the hearer’s mind those ratiocinative difficulties which served both as spur and as guide towards solution and positive truth; towards comprehensive and correct generalization, with clear consciousness of the common attribute binding together the various particulars included.

The same care to admit and even invite the development of the negative side of a question, to accept the obligation of grappling with all the difficulties, to assimilate the process of inquiry to a judicial pleading, is to be seen in other passages of Aristotle; see Ethic. Nikomach. vii, 1, 5; De Animâ, i, 2. p. 403, b; De Cœlo, i, 10, p. 279, b; Topica, i, 2, p. 101, a: (Χρήσιμος δὲ ἡ διαλεκτικὴ) πρὸς τὰς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν ἐπιστήμας, ὅτι δυνάμενοι πρὸς ἀμφότερα διαπορῆσαι, ῥᾷον ἐν ἑκάστοις κατοψόμεθα τἀληθές τε καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος. Compare also Cicero, Tusc. Disput. ii, 3, 9.

[736] Cicero (de Orator. iii, 16, 61; Tuscul. Disput. v, 4, 11): “Cujus (Socratis) multiplex ratio disputandi, rerumque varietas, et ingenii magnitudo, Platonis ingenio et literis consecrata, plura genera effecit dissentientium philosophorum.” Ten distinct varieties of Sokratic philosophers are enumerated; but I lay little stress on the exact number.

[737] In setting forth the ethical end, the language of Sokratês, as far as we can judge from Xenophon and Plato, seems to have been not always consistent with itself. He sometimes stated it as if it included a reference to the happiness, not merely of the agent himself, but of others besides; both as coördinate elements; at other times, he seems to speak as if the end was nothing more than the happiness of the agent himself, though the happiness of others was among the greatest and most essential means. The former view is rather countenanced by Xenophon, the best witness about his master, so that I have given it as belonging to Sokratês, though it is not always adhered to. The latter view appears most in Plato, who assimilates the health of the soul to the health of the body, an end essentially self-regarding.

[738] Cicero, de Orator. i, 47, 204.

[739] Xenoph. Mem. iii, 9, 4; Aristot. Ethic. Nikomach. vi, 13, 3-5; Ethic. Eudem. i, 5; Ethic. Magn. i, 35.

[740] Xenoph. Mem. iii, 9, 6; iv, 2, 19-22. δικαιότερον δὲ τὸν ἐπιστάμενον τὰ δίκαια τοῦ μὴ ἐπισταμένου. To call him the juster man of the two, when neither are just, can hardly be meant: I translate it according to what seems to me the meaning intended. So γραμματικώτερον, in the sentence before, means, comes nearer to a good orthographer. The Greek derivative adjectives in -ικὸς are very difficult to render precisely.

Compare Plato, Hippias Minor, c. 15, p. 372, D, where the same opinion is maintained. Hippias tells Sokratês, in that dialogue (c. 11, p. 369, B), that he fixes his mind on a part of the truth, and omits to notice the rest.

[741] Xenoph. Memor. iii, 9, 14, 15.

[742] Xenoph. Mem. ii, 6, 39. ὅσαι δ᾽ ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀρεταὶ λέγονται ταύτας πάσας σκοπούμενος εὑρήσεις μαθήσει τε καὶ μελέτῃ αὐξανομένας. Again, the necessity of practise or discipline is inculcated, iii, 9, 1. When Sokratês enumerates the qualities requisite in a good friend, it is not merely superior knowledge which he talks of, but of moral excellence; continence, a self-sufficing temper, mildness, a grateful disposition (c. ii, 6, 1-5).

Moreover, Sokratês laid it down that continence, or self-control, was the very basis of virtue: τὴν ἐγκράτειαν ἀρετῆς κρηπῖδα (i, 5, 4). Also, that continence was indispensable in order to enable a man to acquire knowledge (iv, 5, 10, 11).

Sokratês here plainly treats ἐγκράτειαν (continence, or self-control) as not being a state of the intellectual man, and yet as being the very basis of virtue. He therefore does not seem to have applied consistently his general doctrine, that virtue consisted in knowledge, or in the excellence of the intellectual man, alone. Perhaps he might have said: Knowledge alone will be sufficient to make you virtuous; but before you can acquire knowledge, you must previously have disciplined your emotions and appetites. This merely eludes the objection, without saving the sufficiency of the general doctrine.

I cannot concur with Ritter (Gesch. der Philos. vol. ii, ch. 2, p. 78) in thinking that Sokratês meant by knowledge, or wisdom, a transcendental attribute, above humanity, and such as is possessed only by a god. This is by no means consistent with that practical conception of human life and its ends, which stands so plainly marked in his character.

Why should we think it wonderful that Sokratês should propose a defective theory, which embraces only one side of a large and complicated question? Considering that his was the first theory derived from data really belonging to the subject, the wonder is, that it was so near an approach to the truth.

[743] Xen. Mem. iii, 9, 10, 11.

[744] Xen. Mem. i, 2, 9.

[745] Xen. Mem. iii, 9, 12: compare Plato, Gorgias, c. 56. pp. 469, 470.

[746] Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 2, p. 18, B; c. 16, p. 28, A. Ὃ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἔλεγον, ὅτι πολλή μοι ἀπέχθεια γέγονεν καὶ πρὸς πολλοὺς, εὖ ἴστε ὅτι ἀληθές ἐστιν. Καὶ τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶν ὃ ἐμὲ αἱρήσει, ἐάνπερ αἱρῇ—οὐ Μέλητος οὐδὲ Ἄνυτος, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ τῶν πολλῶν διαβολὴ καὶ φθόνος.

The expression τῶν πολλῶν in this last line is not used in its most common signification, but is equivalent to τούτων τῶν πολλῶν.

[747] Xen. Mem. iv, 2, 40. Πολλοὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν οὕτω διατεθέντων ὑπὸ Σωκράτους οὐκέτι αὐτῷ προσῄεσαν, οὓς καὶ βλακωτέρους ἐνόμιζεν.

[748] Plato, Euthyphron, c. 2, p. 3, C. εἰδὼς ὅτι εὐδιάβολα τὰ τοιαῦτα πρὸς τοὺς πολλούς.

[749] See Xenoph. Apol. Sok. sects. 29, 30. This little piece bears a very erroneous title, and may possibly not be the composition of Xenophon, as the commentators generally affirm; but it has every appearance of being a work of the time.

[750] Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 10, p. 23, C; c. 27, p. 37, E.

[751] Isokrat. Or. xviii, cont. Kallimach. s. 30.

[752] See Plato, Menon, c. 27, 28, pp. 90, 91.

[753] Æschinês, cont. Timarch. c. 34, p. 74. ὑμεῖς Σωκράτη τὸν σοφιστὴν ἀπεκτείνατε, ὅτι Κριτίαν ἐφάνη πεπαιδευκὼς, etc. Xenoph. Mem. i, 2, 12.

[754] See Plato (Charmidês, c. 3, p. 154, C; Lysis, c. 2, p. 201, B; Protagoras, c. 1, p. 309, A), etc.

[755] Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 14, p. 26, C.

[756] Xen. Mem. i. 2, 64; i, 3, 1.

[757] Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 3, p. 19, B.

[758] Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 3, p. 19, C.

[759] Xen. Mem. i. 1, 13.

[760] Xen. Mem. i, 2, 9.

[761] Xen. Mem. i, 2, 12.

[762] Xen. Mem. i, 2, 49-53.

[763] Xen. Mem. i, 2, 56-59.

[764] Xen. Mem. i, 2, 59.

[765] Xen. Mem. i, 2, 55. Καὶ παρεκάλει ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τοῦ ὡς φρονιμώτατον εἶναι καὶ ὠφελιμώτατον, ὅπως, ἐάν τε ὑπὸ πατρὸς ἐάν τε ὑπὸ ἀδελφοῦ ἐάν τε ὑπ᾽ ἄλλου τινὸς βούληται τιμᾶσθαι, μὴ τῷ οἰκεῖος εἶναι πιστεύων ἀμελῇ, ἀλλὰ πειρᾶται, ὑφ᾽ ὧν ἂν βούληται τιμᾶσθαι, τούτοις ὠφέλιμος εἶναι.

[766] Xen. Mem. i, 2, 9. τοὺς δὲ τοιούτους λόγους ἐπαίρειν ἔφη τοὺς νέους καταφρονεῖν τῆς καθεστώσης πολιτείας, καὶ ποιεῖν βιαίους.

[767] Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 5, p. 21. A; c. 20, p. 32, E; Xen. Mem. 1, 2, 31.

[768] Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 25, p. 36, A; Diog. Laërt. ii, 41. Diogenes says that he was condemned by two hundred and eighty-one ψήφοις πλείοσι τῶν ἀπολυούσων. If he meant to assert that the verdict was found by a majority of two hundred and eighty-one above the acquitting votes, this would be contradicted by the “Platonic Apology,” which assures us beyond any doubt that the majority was not greater than five or six, so that the turning of three votes would have altered the verdict. But as the number two hundred and eighty-one seems precise, and is not in itself untrustworthy, some commentators construe it, though the words as they now stand are perplexing, as the aggregate of the majority. Since the “Platonic Apology” proves that it was a majority of five or six, the minority would consequently be two hundred and seventy-six, and the total five hundred and fifty-seven.

[769] Xen. Mem. iv, 8, 4, seq. He learned the fact from Hermogenês, who heard it from Sokratês himself.

[770] Xen. Mem. iv, 8, 9, 10.

[771] Plato, Phædon, c. 60, p. 77, E. ἀλλ᾽ ἴσως ἔνι τις καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν παῖς, ὅστις τὰ τοιαῦτα φοβεῖται. Τοῦτον οὖν πειρώμεθα πείθειν μὴ δεδιέναι τὸν θάνατον, ὥσπερ τὰ μορμολύκεια.

[772] Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 17, p. 29, C.

[773] Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 2, p. 19, A. Βουλοίμην μὲν οὖν ἂν τοῦτο οὕτω γενέσθαι, εἴτι ἄμεινον καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ ἐμοὶ, καὶ πλέον τί με ποιῆσαι ἀπολογούμενον· οἶμαι δὲ αὐτὸ χαλεπὸν εἶναι, καὶ οὐ πάνυ με λανθάνει οἷόν ἐστι. Ὅμως δὲ τοῦτο μὲν ἴτω ὅπῃ τῷ θεῷ φίλον, τῷ δὲ νόμῳ πειστέον καὶ ἀπολογητέον.

[774] Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 5, p. 20, D. Καὶ ἴσως μὲν δόξω τισὶν ὑμῶν παίζειν—εὖ μέντοι ἴστε, πᾶσαν ὑμῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐρῶ. Again, c. 28, p. 37, E. Ἐάν τε γὰρ λέγω, ὅτι τῷ θεῷ ἀπειθεῖν τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶ, καὶ διὰ τοῦτ᾽ ἀδύνατον ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν, οὐ πείσεσθέ μοι ὡς εἰρωνευομένῳ.

[775] Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 17, p. 20, A.

[776] Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 17, p. 30, B.

[777] Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 17, p. 30, A, B. οἴομαι οὐδέν πω ὑμῖν μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει ἢ τὴν ἐμὴν τῷ θεῷ ὑπηρεσίαν.

[778] Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 18, p. 30, B.

[779] Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 18, p. 30, B. καὶ γὰρ, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ὀνήσεσθε ἀκούοντες—ἐὰν ἐμὲ ἀποκτείνητε τοιοῦτον ὄντα οἷον ἐγὼ λέγω, οὐκ ἐμὲ μείζω βλάψετε ἢ ὑμᾶς αὐτούς.

[780] Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 18, p. 30, E. πολλοῦ δέω ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ ἐμαυτοῦ ἀπολογεῖσθαι, ὥς τις ἂν οἴοιτο, ἀλλὰ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν μή τι ἐξαμάρτητε περὶ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ δόσιν ὑμῖν ἐμοῦ καταψηφισάμενοι· ἐὰν γὰρ ἐμὲ ἀποκτείνητε, οὐ ῥᾳδίως ἄλλον τοιοῦτον εὑρήσετε, etc.

[781] Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 20, 21, p. 33.

[782] Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 22.

[783] Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 17, p. 29, B. Contrast this striking and truly Sokratic sentiment about the fear of death, with the common-place way in which Sokratês is represented as handling the same subject in Xenoph. Memor. i, 4, 7.

[784] Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 23, pp. 34, 35. I translate the substance and not the words.

[785] Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 24, p. 35.

[786] These are the striking words of Tacitus (Hist. ii, 54) respecting the last hours of the emperor Otho, after his suicide had been fully resolved upon, but before it had been consummated: an interval spent in the most careful and provident arrangements for the security and welfare of those around him: “ipsum viventem quidem relictum, sed solâ posteritatis curâ, et abruptis vitæ blandimentis.”

[787] Plato. Apol. Sok. c. 25, p. 36, A. Οὐκ ἀνέλπιστόν μοι γέγονεν τὸ γεγονὸς τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον θαυμάζω ἑκατέρων τῶν ψήφων τὸν γεγονότα ἀριθμόν. Οὐ γὰρ ᾤμην ἔγωγε οὕτω παρ᾽ ὀλίγον ἔσεσθαι, ἀλλὰ παρὰ πολὺ, etc.

[788] Xenoph. Mem. iv, 4, 4. Ἐκεῖνος οὐδὲν ἠθέλησε τῶν εἰωθότων ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ παρὰ τοὺς νόμους ποιῆσαι· ἀλλὰ ῥᾳδίως ἂν ἀφεθεὶς ὑπὸ τῶν δικαστῶν, εἰ καὶ μετρίως τι τούτων ἐποίησε, προείλετο μᾶλλον τοῖς νόμοις ἐμμένων ἀποθανεῖν, ἢ παρανομῶν ζῇν.

[789] Cicero (de Orat. i, 54, 231): “Socrates ita in judicio capitis pro se ipse dixit, ut non supplex aut reus, sed magister aut dominus videretur esse judicum.” So Epiktêtus also remarked, in reference to the defence of Sokratês: “By all means, abstain from supplication for mercy; but do not put it specially forward, that you will abstain, unless you intend, like Sokratês, purposely to provoke the judges.” (Arrian, Epiktêt. Diss. ii, 2, 18.)

[790] Quintilian, Inst. Or. ii, 15, 30; xi, 1, 10; Diog. Laërt. ii, 40.

[791] Plato. Apol. Sok. c. 26, 27, 28, pp. 37, 38. I give, as well as I can, the substantive propositions, apart from the emphatic language of the original.

[792] See Plato, Krito, c. 5, p. 45, B.

[793] Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 31, p. 40, B; c. 33, p. 41, D.

[794] Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 32, p. 40, C; p. 41, B.

[795] Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 30, p. 39, C.

[796] Plato, Krito, c. 2, 3, seq.

[797] Plato, Phædon, c. 77, p. 84, E.

[798] Plato, Phædon, c. 155, p. 118, A.

[799] Cicero, Academ. Post. i, 12, 44. “Cum Zenone Arcesilas sibi omne certamen instituit, non pertinaciâ aut studio vincendi (ut mihi quidem videtur), sed earum rerum obscuritate, quæ ad confessionem ignorationis adduxerant Socratem, et jam ante Socratem, Democritum, Anaxagoram, Empedoclem, omnes pene veteres; qui nihil cognosci, nihil percipi, nihil sciri, posse, dixerunt.... Itaque Arcesilas negabat, esse quidquam, quod sciri posset, no illud quidem ipsum, quod Socrates sibi reliquisset: sic omnia latere in occulto.” Compare Academ. Prior. ii, 23, 74; de Nat. Deor. i, 5, 11.

In another passage (Academ. Post. i, 4, 17) Cicero speaks (or rather introduces Varro as speaking) rather confusedly. He talks of “illam Socraticam dubitationem de omnibus rebus, et nullâ affirmatione adhibitâ, consuetudinem disserendi;” but a few lines before, he had said what implies that men might, in the opinion of Sokratês, come to learn and know what belonged to human conduct and human duties.

Again (in Tusc. Disp. i, 4, 8), he admits that Sokratês had a positive ulterior purpose in his negative questioning: “vetus et Socratica ratio contra alterius opinionem disserendi: nam ita facillime, quid veri simillimum esset, inveniri posse Socrates arbitrabatur.”

Tennemann (Gesch. der Philos. ii, 5, vol. ii, pp. 169-175) seeks to make out considerable analogy between Sokratês and Pyrrho. But it seems to me that the analogy only goes thus far, that both agreed in repudiating all speculations not ethical (see the verses of Timon upon Pyrrho, Diog. Laërt. ix, 65). But in regard to ethics, the two differed materially. Sokratês maintained that ethics were matter of science, and the proper subject of study. Pyrrho, on the other hand, seems to have thought that speculation was just as useless, and science just as unattainable, upon ethics as upon physics; that nothing was to be attended to except feelings, and nothing cultivated except good dispositions.

[800] Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 7, p. 22, A. δεῖ δὴ ὑμῖν τὴν ἐμὴν πλάνην ἐπιδεῖξαι, ὥσπερ τινὰς πόνους πονοῦντος, etc.

[801] So Demokritus, Fragm. ed. Mullach, p. 185, Fr. 131. οὔτε τέχνη, οὔτε σοφίη, ἐφιστὸν, ἢν μὴ μάθῃ τις....

[802] Aristotle (Problem. c. 30, p. 953, Bek.) numbers both Sokratês and Plato (compare Plutarch, Lysand. c. 2) among those to whom he ascribes φύσιν μελανχολικὴν, the black bile and ecstatic temperament. I do not know how to reconcile this with a passage in his Rhetoric (ii, 17), in which he ranks Sokratês among the sedate persons (στάσιμον). The first of the two assertions seems countenanced by the anecdotes respecting Sokratês (in Plato, Symposion, p. 175, B; p. 220, C), that he stood in the same posture, quite unmoved, even for several hours continuously, absorbed in meditation upon some idea which had seized his mind.

[803] Dr. Thirlwall has given, in an Appendix to his fourth volume (Append. vii, p. 526, seq.), an interesting and instructive review of the recent sentiments expressed by Hegel, and by some other eminent German authors, on Sokratês and his condemnation. It affords me much satisfaction to see that he has bestowed such just animadversions on the unmeasured bitterness, as well as upon the untenable views, of M. Forchhammer’s treatise respecting Sokratês.

I dissent, however, altogether, from the manner in which Dr. Thirlwall speaks about the sophists, both in this Appendix and elsewhere. My opinion, respecting the persons so called, has been given at length in the preceding chapter.

[804] See Plato, Euthyphron, c. 3, p. 3, D.

[805] Xen. Mem. iv, 8, 3:—

“Denique Democritum postquam matura vetustas

Admonuit memores motus languescere mentis,

Sponte suâ letho sese obvius obtulit ipse.”

(Lucretius, iii, 1052.)

[806] Diodor. xiv. 37, with Wesseling’s note; Diog. Laërt. ii. 43; Argument ad Isokrat. Or. xi, Busiris.

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Transcriber's note

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