Τὸ δαιμόνιον σημεῖον.
Here is one of the points most insisted on by Schleiermacher and Stallbaum, as proving that the Theagês is not the work of Plato. These critics affirm (to use the language of Stallbaum, Proleg. p. 220) “Quam Plato alias de Socratis dæmonio prodidit sententiam, ea longissimè recedit ab illâ ratione, quæ in hoc sermone exposita est”. He says that the representation of the Dæmon of Sokrates, given in the Theagês, has been copied from a passage in the Theætêtus, by an imitator who has not understood the passage, p. 150, D, E. But Socher (p. 97) appears to me to have shown satisfactorily, that there is no such material difference as these critics affirm between this passage of the Theætêtus and the Theagês. In the Theætêtus, Sokrates declares, that none of his companions learnt any thing from him, but that all of them οἷσπερ ἂν ὁ θεὸς παρείκῃ (the very same term is used at the close of the Theagês — 131 A, ἐὰν μὲν παρείκῃ ἡμῖν — τὸ δαιμόνιον) made astonishing progress and improvement in his company. Stallbaum says, “Itaque ὁ θεὸς, qui ibi memoratur, non est Socratis dæmonium, sed potius deus i.e. sors divina. Quod non perspiciens noster tenebrio protenus illud dæmonium, quod Socrates sibi semper adesse dictitabat, ad eum dignitatis et potentiæ gradum evexit, ut, &c.” I agree with Socher in thinking that the phrase ὁ θεὸς in the Theætêtus has substantially the same meaning as τὸ δαιμόνιον in the Theagês. Both Schleiermacher (Notes on the Apology, p. 432) and Ast (p. 482), have notes on the phrase τὸ δαιμόνιον — and I think the note of Ast is the more instructive of the two. In Plato and Xenophon, the words τὸ δαιμόνιον, τὸ θεῖον, are in many cases undistinguishable in meaning from ὁ δαίμων, ὁ θεός. Compare the Phædrus, 242 E, about θεὸς and θεῖόν τι. Sokrates, in his argument against Meletus in the Apology (p. 27) emphatically argues that no man could believe in any thing δαιμόνιον, without also believing in δαιμόνες. The special θεῖόν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον (Apol. p. 31 C), which presented itself in regard to him and his proceedings, was only one of the many modes in which (as he believed) ὁ θεός commanded and stimulated him to work upon the minds of the Athenians:— ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτο, ὡς ἐγώ φημι, προστέτακται ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ πράττειν καὶ ἐκ μαντειῶν καὶ ἐξ ἐνυπνίων καὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ, ᾧπέρ τίς ποτε καὶ ἄλλη θεία μοῖρα ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ὁτιοῦν προσέταξε πράττειν (Apol. p. 33 C). So again in Apol. p. 40 A, B, ἡ εἰωθυῖά μοι μαντικὴ ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου — and four lines afterwards we read the very same fact intimated in the words, τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σημεῖον, where Sokratis dæmonium — and Deus — are identified: thus refuting the argument above cited from Stallbaum. There is therefore no such discrepancy, in reference to τὸ δαιμόνιον, as Stallbaum and Schleiermacher contend for. We perceive indeed this difference between them — that in the Theætêtus, the simile of the obstetric art is largely employed, while it is not noticed in the Theagês. But we should impose an unwarrantable restriction upon Plato’s fancy, if we hindered him from working out his variety and exuberance of metaphors, and from accommodating each dialogue to the metaphor predominant with him at the time.
Moreover, in respect to what is called the Dæmon of Sokrates, we ought hardly to expect that either Plato or Xenophon would always be consistent even with themselves. It is unsafe for a modern critic to determine beforehand, by reason or feelings of his own, in what manner either of them would speak upon this mysterious subject. The belief and feeling of a divine intervention was very real on the part of both, but their manner of conceiving it might naturally fluctuate: and there was, throughout all the proceedings of Sokrates, a mixture of the serious and the playful, of the sublime and the eccentric, of ratiocinative acuteness with impulsive superstition — which it is difficult to bring into harmonious interpretation. Such heterogeneous mixture is forcibly described in the Platonic Symposium, pp. 215-222. When we consider how undefined, and undefinable, the idea of this δαιμόνιον was, we cannot wonder if Plato ascribes to it different workings and manifestations at different times. Stallbaum affirms that it is made ridiculous in the Theagês: and Kühner declares that Plutarch makes it ridiculous, in his treatise De Genio Sokratia (Comm. ad. Xenoph. Memor. p. 23). But this is because its agency is described more in detail. You can easily present it in a ridiculous aspect, by introducing it as intervening on petty and insignificant matters. Now it is remarkable, that in the Apology, we are expressly told that it actually did intervene on the most trifling occasions — πάνυ ἐπὶ σμικροῖς ἐναντιουμένη. The business of an historian of philosophy is, to describe it as it was really felt and believed by Sokrates and Plato — whether a modern critic may consider the description ridiculous or not.
When Schleiermacher says (Einleitung, p. 248), respecting the falsarius whom he supposes to have written the Theagês — “Damit ist ihm begegnet, auf eine höchst verkehrte Art wunderbar zusammenzurühren diese göttliche Schickung, und jenes persönliche Vorgefühl welches dem Sokrates zur göttlichen Stimme ward”. — I contend that the mistake is chargeable to Schleiermacher himself, for bisecting into two phenomena that which appears in the Apology as the same phenomenon under two different names — τὸ δαιμόνιον — τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σημεῖον. Besides, to treat the Dæmon as a mere “personal presentiment” of Sokrates, may be a true view:— but it is the view of one who does not inhale the same religious atmosphere as Sokrates, Plato, and Xenophon. It cannot therefore be properly applied in explaining their sayings or doings. Kühner, who treats the Theagês as not composed by Plato, grounds this belief partly on the assertion, that the δαιμόνιον of Sokrates is described therein as something peculiar to Sokrates; which, according to Kühner, was the fiction of a subsequent time. By Sokrates and his contemporaries (Kühner says) it was considered “non sibi soli tanquam proprium quoddam beneficium a Diis tributum, sed commune sibi esse cum cæteris hominibus” (pp. 20-21). I dissent entirely from this view, which is contradicted by most of the passages noticed even by Kühner himself. It is at variance with the Platonic Apology, as well as with the Theætêtus (150 D), and Republic (vi. 496 C). Xenophon does indeed try, in the first Chapter of the Memorabilia, as the defender of Sokrates, to soften the invidia against Sokrates, by intimating that other persons had communications from the Gods as well as he. But we see plainly, even from other passages of the Memorabilia, that this was not the persuasion of Sokrates himself, nor of his friends, nor of his enemies. They all considered it (as it is depicted in the Theagês also) to be a special privilege and revelation.
CHAPTER XVI.
ERASTÆ OR ANTERASTÆ — RIVALES.
The main subject of this short dialogue is — What is philosophy? ἡ φιλοσοφία — τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν. How are we to explain or define it? What is its province and purport?
Erastæ — subject and persons of the dialogue — dramatic introduction — interesting youths in the palæstra.
Instead of the simple, naked, self-introducing, conversation, which we read in the Menon, Hipparchus, Minos, &c. Sokrates recounts a scene and colloquy, which occurred when he went into the house of Dionysius the grammatist or school-master,[1] frequented by many elegant and high-born youths as pupils. Two of these youths were engaged in animated debate upon some geometrical or astronomical problem, in the presence of various spectators; and especially of two young men, rivals for the affection of one of them. Of these rivals, the one is a person devoted to music, letters, discourse, philosophy:— the other hates and despises these pursuits, devoting himself to gymnastic exercise, and bent on acquiring the maximum of athletic force.[2] It is much the same contrast as that between the brothers Amphion and Zethus in the Antiopê of Euripides — which is beautifully employed as an illustration by Plato in the Gorgias.[3]
[1] Plato, Erastæ, 132. εἰς Διονυσίου τοῦ γραμματιστοῦ εἰσῆλθον, καὶ εἶδον αὐτόθι τῶν τε νέων τοὺς ἐπιεικεστάτους δοκοῦντας εἶναι τὴν ἰδέαν καὶ πατέρων εὐδοκίμων καὶ τούτων ἐραστάς.
[2] Plato, Erast. 132 E.
[3] Plato, Gorgias, 485-486. Compare Cicero De Oratore, ii. 37, 156.
Two rival Erastæ — one of them literary, devoted to philosophy — the other gymnastic, hating philosophy.
As soon as Sokrates begins his interrogatories, the two youths relinquish[4] their geometrical talk, and turn to him as attentive listeners. Their approach affects his emotions hardly less than those of the Erastes. He first enquires from the athletic Erastes, What is it that these two youths are so intently engaged upon? It must surely be something very fine, to judge by the eagerness which they display? How do you mean fine (replies the athlete)? They are only prosing about astronomical matters — talking nonsense — philosophising! The literary rival, on the contrary, treats this athlete as unworthy of attention, speaks with enthusiastic admiration of philosophy, and declares that all those to whom it is repugnant are degraded specimens of humanity.
[4] The powerful sentiment of admiration ascribed to Sokrates in the presence of these beautiful youths deserves notice as a point in his character. Compare the beginning of the Charmidês and the Lysis.
Question put by Sokrates — What is philosophy? It is the perpetual accumulation of knowledge, so as to make the largest sum total.
Sokr. — You think philosophy a fine thing? But you cannot tell whether it is fine or not, unless you know what it is.[5] Pray explain to me what philosophy is. Erast. — I will do so readily. Philosophy consists in the perpetual growth of a man’s knowledge — in his going on perpetually acquiring something new, both in youth and in old age, so that he may learn as much as possible during life. Philosophy is polymathy.[6] Sokr. — You think philosophy not only a fine thing, but good? Erast. — Yes — very good. Sokr. — But is the case similar in regard to gymnastic? Is a man’s bodily condition benefited by taking as much exercise, or as much nourishment, as possible? Is such very great quantity good for the body?[7]
[5] Plat. Erast. 133 A-B.
[6] Plato, Erast. 133 D. τὴν φιλοσοφίαν — πολυμάθειαν.
[7] Plato, Erast. 133 E.
In the case of the body, it is not the maximum of exercise which does good, but the proper, measured quantity. For the mind also, it is not the maximum of knowledge, but the measured quantity which is good. Who is the judge to determine this measure?
It appears after some debate (in which the other or athletic Erastes sides with Sokrates[8]) that in regard to exercise and food it is not the great quantity or the small quantity, which is good for the body — but the moderate or measured quantity.[9] For the mind, the case is admitted to be similar. Not the much, nor the little, of learning is good for it but the right or measured amount. Sokr. — And who is the competent judge, how much of either is right measure for the body? Erast. — The physician and the gymnastic trainer. Sokr. — Who is the competent judge, how much seed is right measure for sowing a field? Erast. — The farmer. Sokr. — Who is the competent judge, in reference to the sowing and planting of knowledge in the mind, which varieties are good, and how much of each is right measure?
[8] Plat. Erast. 134 B-C. The literary Erastes says to Sokrates, “To you, I have no objection to concede this point, and to admit that my previous answer must be modified. But if I were to debate the point only with him (the athletic rival), I could perfectly well have defended my answer, and even worse answer still, for he is quite worthless (οὐδὲν γάρ ἐστι).”
This is a curious passage, illustrating the dialectic habits of the day, and the pride felt in maintaining an answer once given.
[9] Plato, Erastæ, 134 B-D. τὰ μέτρια μάλιστα ὠφελεῖν, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὰ πολλὰ μηδὲ τὰ ὀλίγα.
No answer given. What is the best conjecture? Answer of the literary Erastes. A man must learn that which will yield to him the greatest reputation as a philosopher — as much as will enable him to talk like an intelligent critic, though not to practise.
The question is one which none of the persons present can answer.[10] None of them can tell who is the special referee, about training of mind; corresponding to the physician or the farmer in the analogous cases. Sokrates then puts a question somewhat different: Sokr. — Since we have agreed, that the man who prosecutes philosophy ought not to learn many things, still less all things — what is the best conjecture that we can make, respecting the matters which he ought to learn? Erast. — The finest and most suitable acquirements for him to aim at, are those which will yield to him the greatest reputation as a philosopher. He ought to appear accomplished in every variety of science, or at least in all the more important; and with that view, to learn as much of each as becomes a freeman to know:— that is, what belongs to the intelligent critic, as distinguished from the manual operative: to the planning and superintending architect, as distinguished from the working carpenter.[11] Sokr. — But you cannot learn even two different arts to this extent — much less several considerable arts. Erast. — I do not of course mean that the philosopher can be supposed to know each of them accurately, like the artist himself — but only as much as may be expected from the free and cultivated citizen. That is, he shall be able to appreciate, better than other hearers, the observations made by the artist: and farther to deliver a reasonable opinion of his own, so as to be accounted, by all the hearers, more accomplished in the affairs of the art than themselves.[12]
[10] Plato, Erast. 134 E, 135 A.
[11] Plat. Erast. 135 B. ὅσα ξυνέσεως ἔχεται, μὴ ὅσα χειρουργίας.
[12] Plat. Erast. 135 D.
The philosopher is one who is second-best in several different arts — a Pentathlus — who talks well upon each.
Sokr. — You mean that the philosopher is to be second-best in several distinct pursuits: like the Pentathlus, who is not expected to equal either the runner or the wrestler in their own separate departments, but only to surpass competitors in the five matches taken together.[13] Erast. — Yes — I mean what you say. He is one who does not enslave himself to any one matter, nor works out any one with such strictness as to neglect all others: he attends to all of them in reasonable measure.[14]
[13] Plat. Erast. 135 E, 136 A. καὶ οὕτως γίγνεσθαι περὶ πάντα ὕπακρόν τινα ἄνδρα τὸν πεφιλοσοφηκότα. The five matches were leaping, running, throwing the quoit and the javelin, wrestling.
[14] Plat. Erast. 136 B. ἀλλὰ πάντων μετρίως ἐφῆφθαι.
On what occasions can such second-best men be useful? There are always regular practitioners at hand, and no one will call in the second-best man when he can have the regular practitioner.
Upon this answer Sokrates proceeds to cross-examine: Sokr. — Do you think that good men are useful, bad men useless? Erast. — Yes I do. Sokr. — You think that philosophers, as you describe them, are useful? Erast. — Certainly: extremely useful. Sokr. — But tell me on what occasions such second-best men are useful: for obviously they are inferior to each separate artist. If you fall sick will you send for one of them, or for a professional physician? Erast. — I should send for both. Sokr. — That is no answer: I wish to know, which of the two you will send for first and by preference? Erast. — No doubt I shall send for the professional physician. Sokr. — The like also, if you are in danger on shipboard, you will entrust your life to the pilot rather than to the philosopher: and so as to all other matters, as long as a professional man is to be found, the philosopher is of no use? Erast. — So it appears. Sokr. — Our philosopher then is one of the useless persons: for we assuredly have professional men at hand. Now we agreed before, that good men were useful, bad men useless.[15] Erast. — Yes; that was agreed.
[15] Plat. Erast. 136 C-D.
Philosophy cannot consist in multiplication of learned acquirements.
Sokr. — If then you have correctly defined a philosopher to be one who has a second-rate knowledge on many subjects, he is useless so long as there exist professional artists on each subject. Your definition cannot therefore be correct. Philosophy must be something quite apart from this multifarious and busy meddling with different professional subjects, or this multiplication of learned acquirements. Indeed I fancied, that to be absorbed in professional subjects and in variety of studies, was vulgar and discreditable rather than otherwise.[16]
[16] Plato, Erast. 137 B.
Let us now, however (continues Sokrates), take up the matter in another way. In regard to horses and dogs, those who punish rightly are also those who know how to make them better, and to discriminate with most exactness the good from the bad? Erast. — Yes: such is the fact.
Sokrates changes his course of examination — questions put to show that there is one special art, regal and political, of administering and discriminating the bad from the good.
Sokr. — Is not the case similar with men? Is it not the same art, which punishes men rightly, makes them better, and best distinguishes the good from the bad? whether applied to one, few, or many? Erast. — It is so.[17] Sokr. — The art or science, whereby men punish evil-doers rightly, is the judicial or justice: and it is by the same that they know the good apart from the bad, either one or many. If any man be a stranger to this art, so as not to know good men apart from bad, is he not also ignorant of himself, whether he be a good or a bad man? Erast. — Yes: he is. Sokr. — To be ignorant of yourself, is to be wanting in sobriety or temperance; to know yourself is to be sober or temperate. But this is the same art as that by which we punish rightly — or justice. Therefore justice and temperance are the same: and the Delphian rescript, Know thyself, does in fact enjoin the practice both of justice and of sobriety.[18] Erast. — So it appears. Sokr. — Now it is by this same art, when practised by a king, rightly punishing evil-doers, that cities are well governed; it is by the same art practised by a private citizen or house-master, that the house is well-governed: so that this art, justice or sobriety, is at the same time political, regal, economical; and the just and sober man is at once the true king, statesman, house-master.[19] Erast. — I admit it.
[17] Plato, Erast. 137 C-D.
[18] Plato, Erast. 138 A.
[19] Plato, Erast. 138 C.
In this art the philosopher must not only be second-best, competent to talk — but he must be a fully qualified practitioner, competent to act.
Sokr. — Now let me ask you. You said that it was discreditable for the philosopher, when in company with a physician or any other craftsman talking about matters of his own craft, not to be able to follow what he said and comment upon it. Would it not also be discreditable to the philosopher, when listening to any king, judge, or house-master, about professional affairs, not to be able to understand and comment? Erast. — Assuredly it would be most discreditable upon matters of such grave moment. Sokr. — Shall we say then, that upon these matters also, as well as all others, the philosopher ought to be a Pentathlus or second-rate performer, useless so long as the special craftsman is at hand? or shall we not rather affirm, that he must not confide his own house to any one else, nor be the second-best within it, but must himself judge and punish rightly, if his house is to be well administered? Erast. — That too I admit.[20] Sokr. — Farther, if his friends shall entrust to him the arbitration of their disputes, — if the city shall command him to act as Dikast or to settle any difficulty, — in those cases also it will be disgraceful for him to stand second or third, and not to be first-rate? Erast. — I think it will be. Sokr. — You see then, my friend, philosophy is something very different from much learning and acquaintance with multifarious arts or sciences.[21]
[20] Plato, Erast. 138 E. Πότερον οὖν καὶ περὶ ταῦτα λέγωμεν, πένταθλον αὐτὸν δεῖν εἶναι καὶ ὕπακρον, τὰ δευτερεῖα ἔχοντα πάντων, τὸν φιλόσοφον, καὶ ἀχρεῖον εἶναι, ἕως ἂν τούτων τις ᾖ; ἢ πρῶτον μὲν τὴν αὑτοῦ οἰκίαν οὐκ ἀλλῳ ἐπιτρεπτέον οὐδε τὰ δευτερεῖα ἐν τούτῳ ἑκτέον, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸν κολαστέον δικάζοντα ὀρθῶς, εἰ μέλλει εὖ οἰκεῖσθαι αὐτοῦ ἡ οἰκία;
[21] Plato, Erast. 139 A. Πολλοῦ ἄρα δεῖ ἡμῖν, ὦ βέλτιστε, τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν πολυμάθειά τε εἶναι καὶ ἡ περὶ τὰς τέχνας πραγματεία.
Close of the dialogue — humiliation of the literary Erastes.
Upon my saying this (so Sokrates concludes his recital of the conversation) the literary one of the two rivals was ashamed and held his peace; while the gymnastic rival declared that I was in the right, and the other hearers also commended what I had said.
Remarks — animated manner of the dialogue.
The antithesis between the philo-gymnast, hater of philosophy, — and the enthusiastic admirer of philosophy, who nevertheless cannot explain what it is — gives much point and vivacity to this short dialogue. This last person is exhibited as somewhat presumptuous and confident; thus affording a sort of excuse for the humiliating cross-examination put upon him by Sokrates to the satisfaction of his stupid rival. Moreover, the dramatic introduction is full of animation, like that of the Charmidês and Lysis.
Besides the animated style of the dialogue, the points raised for discussion in it are of much interest. The word philosophy has at all times been vague and ambiguous. Certainly no one before Sokrates — probably no one before Plato — ever sought a definition of it. In no other Platonic dialogue than this, is the definition of it made a special topic of research.
Definition of philosophy — here sought for the first time — Platonic conception of measure — referee not discovered.
It is here handled in Plato’s negative, elenchtic, tentative, manner. By some of his contemporaries, philosophy was really considered as equivalent to polymathy, or to much and varied knowledge: so at least Plato represents it as being considered by Hippias the Sophist, contrary to the opinion of Protagoras.[22] The exception taken by Sokrates to a definition founded on simple quantity, without any standard point of sufficiency by which much or little is to be measured, introduces that governing idea of τὸ μέτριον (the moderate, that which conforms to a standard measure) upon which Plato insists so much in other more elaborate dialogues. The conception of a measure, of a standard of measurement — and of conformity thereunto, as the main constituent of what is good and desirable — stands prominent in his mind,[23] though it is not always handled in the same way. We have seen it, in the Second Alkibiadês, indicated under another name as knowledge of Good or of the Best: without which, knowledge on special matters was declared to be hurtful rather than useful.[24] Plato considers that this Measure is neither discernible nor applicable except by a specially trained intelligence. In the Erastæ as elsewhere, such an intelligence is called for in general terms: but when it is asked, Where is the person possessing such intelligence, available in the case of mental training — neither Sokrates nor any one else can point him out. To suggest a question, and direct attention to it, yet still to leave it unanswered — is a practice familiar with Plato. In this respect the Erastæ is like other dialogues. The answer, if any, intended to be understood or divined, is, that such an intelligence is the philosopher himself.
[22] Plato, Protag. 318 E. Compare too, the Platonic dialogues, Hippias Major and Minor.
[23] See about ἡ τοῦ μετρίου φύσις as οὐσία — as ὄντως γιγνόμενον. — Plato, Politikus, 283-284. Compare also the Philêbus, p. 64 D, and the Protagoras, pp. 356-357, where ἡ μετρητικὴ τέχνη is declared to be the principal saviour of life and happiness.
[24] Plato, Alkib. ii. 145-146; supra, [ch. xii. p. 16.]
View taken of the second-best critical talking man, as compared with the special proficient and practitioner.
The second explanation of philosophy here given — that the philosopher is one who is second-best in many departments, and a good talker upon all, but inferior to the special master in each — was supposed by Thrasyllus in ancient times to be pointed at Demokritus. By many Platonic critics, it is referred to those persons whom they single out to be called Sophists. I conceive it to be applicable (whether intended or not) to the literary men generally of that age, the persons called Sophists included. That which Perikles expressed by the word, when he claimed the love of wisdom and the love of beauty as characteristic features of the Athenian citizen — referred chiefly to the free and abundant discussion, the necessity felt by every one for talking over every thing before it was done, yet accompanied with full energy in action as soon as the resolution was taken to act.[25] Speech, ready and pertinent, free conflict of opinion on many different topics — was the manifestation and the measure of knowledge acquired. Sokrates passed his life in talking, with every one indiscriminately, and upon each man’s particular subject; often perplexing the artist himself. Xenophon recounts conversations with various professional men — a painter, a sculptor, an armourer — and informs us that it was instructive to all of them, though Sokrates was no practitioner in any craft.[26] It was not merely Demokritus, but Plato and Aristotle also, who talked or wrote upon almost every subject included in contemporary observation. The voluminous works of Aristotle, — the Timæus, Republic, and Leges, of Plato, — embrace a large variety of subjects, on each of which, severally taken, these two great men were second-best or inferior to some special proficient. Yet both of them had judgments to give, which it was important to hear, upon all subjects:[27] and both of them could probably talk better upon each than the special proficient himself. Aristotle, for example, would write better upon rhetoric than Demosthenes — upon tragedy, than Sophokles. Undoubtedly, if an oration or a tragedy were to be composed — if resolution or action were required on any real state of particular circumstances — the special proficient would be called upon to act: but it would be a mistake to infer from hence, as the Platonic Sokrates intimates in the Erastæ, that the second-best, or theorizing reasoner, was a useless man. The theoretical and critical point of view, with the command of language apt for explaining and defending it, has a value of its own; distinct from, yet ultimately modifying and improving, the practical. And such comprehensive survey and comparison of numerous objects, without having the attention exclusively fastened or enslaved to any one of them, deserves to rank high as a variety of intelligence whether it be adopted as the definition of a philosopher, or not.
[25] Thucyd. ii. 39 fin. — 40. καὶ ἔν τε τούτοις τὴν πόλιν ἀξίαν εἶναι θαυμάζεσθαι, καὶ ἔτι ἐν ἄλλοις. φιλοκαλοῦμεν γὰρ μετ’ εὐτελείας καὶ φιλοσοφοῦμεν ἄνευ μαλακίας, &c., and the remarkable sequel of the same chapter about the intimate conjunction of abundant speech with energetic action in the Athenian character.
[26] Xen. Mem. iii. 10; iii. 11; iii. 12.
[27] The πένταθλος or ὕπακρος whom Plato criticises in this dialogue, coincides with what Aristotle calls “the man of universal education or culture”. — Ethic. Nikom. I. i. 1095, a. 1. ἕκαστος δὲ κρίνει καλῶς ἃ γιγνώσκει, καὶ τούτων ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸς κριτής· καθ’ ἕκαστον ἄρα, ὁ πεπαιδευμένος· ἁπλῶς δέ, ὁ περὶ πᾶν πεπαιδευμένος.
Plato’s view — that the philosopher has a province special to himself, distinct from other specialties — dimly indicated — regal or political art.
Plato undoubtedly did not conceive the definition of the philosopher in the same way as Sokrates. The close of the Erastæ is employed in opening a distant and dim view of the Platonic conception. We are given to understand, that the philosopher has a province of his own, wherein he is not second-best, but a first-rate actor and adviser. To indicate, in many different ways, that there is or must be such a peculiar, appertaining to philosophy — distinct from, though analogous to, the peculiar of each several art — is one leading purpose in many Platonic dialogues. But what is the peculiar of the philosopher? Here, as elsewhere, it is marked out in a sort of misty outline, not as by one who already knows and is familiar with it, but as one who is trying to find it without being sure that he has succeeded. Here, we have it described as the art of discriminating good from evil, governing, and applying penal sanctions rightly. This is the supreme art or science, of which the philosopher is the professor; and in which, far from requiring advice from others, he is the only person competent both to advise and to act: the art which exercises control over all other special arts, directing how far, and on what occasions, each of them comes into appliance. It is philosophy, looked at in one of its two aspects: not as a body of speculative truth, to be debated, proved, and discriminated from what cannot be proved or can be disproved — but as a critical judgment bearing on actual life, prescribing rules or giving directions in particular cases, with a view to the attainment of foreknown ends, recognised as expetenda.[28] This is what Plato understands by the measuring or calculating art, the regal or political art, according as we use the language of the Protagoras, Politikus, Euthydêmus, Republic. Both justice and sobriety are branches of this art; and the distinction between the two loses its importance when the art is considered as a whole — as we find both in the Erastæ and in the Republic.[29]
[28] The difference between the second explanation of philosophy and the third explanation, suggested in the Erastæ, will be found to coincide pretty nearly with the distinction which Aristotle takes much pains to draw between σοφία and φρόνησις. — Ethic. Nikomach. vi. 5, pp. 1140-1141; also Ethic. Magn. i. pp. 1197-1198.
[29] See Republic, iv. 433 A; Gorgias, 526 C; Charmidês 164 B; and Heindorf’s note on the passage in the Charmidês.
Philosopher — the supreme artist controlling other artists.
Here, in the Erastæ, this conception of the philosopher as the supreme artist controlling all other artists, is darkly indicated and crudely sketched. We shall find the same conception more elaborately illustrated in other dialogues; yet never passing out of that state.