General Frossard Repels a fresh Attack.
The enormous defensive strength of the position held by General Frossard’s Corps does not seem to have been thoroughly understood by anyone except that accomplished engineer. Marshal Bazaine did not perceive its value, for he was perpetually afraid that the Germans would break in upon it, either from the Bois de Vaux or by the high road, and his apprehensions or prejudices were confirmed when a column of troops was seen to be ascending the river-road from Ars towards Jussy, near St. Ruffine. General von Steinmetz, on the other hand, who had peered out from every available height between the Bois des Ognons and Gravelotte, although each attack which he had directed had been repelled, thought he discerned symptoms of weakness and even of retreat. The truth is that Frossard’s men were well hidden, not less by the natural features of the ground than by the trenches which he had dug and the breastworks which he had thrown up. If his batteries were silent or withdrawn it was because, although overpowered in the gun fight, they were yet still able to arrest the onsets of infantry; and if the French fantassins were invisible, it was because they were lying down or arrayed on the reverse of the ridge. The hot-tempered General of the First Army, however, surmised, after the capture of St. Hubert, that troops had been detached to aid the distant right, or that a moment had come when, if pressed home by an attack of all arms, Point du Jour could be carried and the French driven headlong into Metz. Under the influence of this delusion he rode up to General von Goeben, who was watching the battle near Gravelotte. Captain Seton, an Indian officer who was present, noticed the violent gestures and rapid talk of Steinmetz because they offered so strong a contrast to the steady coolness of the younger warrior. At that moment he was expounding opinions and issuing orders which brought on one of the most brilliant and destructive episodes in the battle. Goeben had already sent forward Gneisenau’s brigade, partly on and partly north of the road, but they were needed to feed the combat, support the weakened and scattered companies, and secure St. Hubert.
What Steinmetz now designed was a home-thrust on the French position; and, accordingly, he ordered several batteries of the 7th Corps and Von Hartmann’s cavalry division to cross the Gravelotte defile and plant themselves on the gentle acclivities to the south of the road. Now the highway runs first through a cutting, is then carried on an embankment, and only near St. Hubert are the gentle southern slopes above the gully accessible to horses and guns. But this narrow track swarmed with troops, into the midst of which came the cavalry and artillery. The infantry gave way and four batteries arrived on the opposite side of the defile, followed by the 9th Uhlans. But so deadly was the storm of shot which burst from the French position—for cannon, mitrailleuse, and chassepot went instantly to work—that two of the batteries were at once driven into the ravine below. The Uhlans actually rode out into the open, took up a position, and remained until it was plain to all that the lives of men and horses were being uselessly sacrificed. The other regiments, “well peppered,” had already gone “threes about” before clearing the defile, and the Uhlans, who were dropping fast, rode back, as well as they could, to Gravelotte or the sheltering woods. A more extravagant movement has rarely been attempted in war, or one less justified by the evident facts of the situation as well as by the deadly results. Yet two batteries actually remained, one, under Captain Hasse, in the open, about seven hundred yards from the French lines of musketry; the other, commanded by Captain Gnügge, covered in front by the low wall of the St. Hubert garden, but lending a flank to the adversary at the top of the road. Captain Hasse and his gunners were stubborn men; they fought their battery for two hours, in fact, until nearly all the men and horses were down. Even then Hasse would not retire, and one of his superiors was obliged to hurry up fresh teams and forcibly drag the guns away. But the battery under the wall held on, and did good service by firing on the French about the Moscow farm.
The failure of these mistaken attacks and the retreat of guns and horsemen seems to have shaken the constant German infantry, for they gave ground everywhere but at St. Hubert, and the French came on with such vigour that General Steinmetz himself and his staff were under a heavy fire. Fortunately three fresh battalions plunged into the combat; but they could not do more than sustain it; for every attempt made to approach the French, either towards the Moscow farm or Point du Jour, met with a speedy repulse. Indeed, down to five o’clock, the point of time at which we have arrived, along the whole line, no progress whatever had been made by the German right wing, which held on to St. Hubert, the ravine of the Mance, and the western portion of the Bois de Genivaux, but could not show a rifle or bayonet beyond in any direction. It was only the powerful German artillery which still remained the superb masters of the field, so far as their action was concerned.
It was at this time that King William and his staff, which included Prince Bismarck, rode up to the high ground above Malmaison, where he established his head-quarters in the field, and whence, until nearly dark, he watched the battle. Over against him, concerned respecting his left, and ignorant of the state of the battle on his right, was Marshal Bazaine, in the fort of Plappeville, whither he had returned from St. Quentin, which commanded a wide view to the south and south-west. He says that he gave General Bourbaki discretion to use the Guard wherever it might be wanted. But that officer knew little more than the Commander-in-Chief. An hour or two earlier, taking with him the Grenadier Division of the Guard, he had started towards the north, following a hilly road east of the St. Germain ravine. He had seen the immense mountain of white smoke which towered up in the north-west, but the current of air, hardly a wind, apparently blew from the south-east, since at Plappeville he could not hear the roar of the guns, and the view was so obstructed that he could not obtain even a glimpse of the country about St. Privat. He had to leave behind him the Voltigeurs and Chasseurs of the Guard, who were partly in reserve and partly posted to support Lebœuf, who called up one regiment from Brincourt’s brigade. Bazaine had also sent some guns to support Lapasset in his contest with the troops which Von Golz had marched up from Ars to the woodlands and vineyards opposite St. Ruffine. The French at this stage were still in good spirits. If Lebœuf was a little anxious behind his farmsteads, his woods, and skilfully-disposed re-entering echelons of shelter trenches; Frossard, who soon after relieved his front ranks from the reserve, was content; and De Ladmirault, as was usual with him, believed that he might be almost considered victorious, and only required a few battalions of the Guard to insure his success. The ammunition on both sides was running out here and there; indeed, Canrobert declares that he was compelled to borrow from De Ladmirault; still there was enough to last out the day. Over the seven or eight miles of flame and smoke and tumult, for a brief interval, came what may be called a lull compared with the deafening tempest of sounds which smote on the ear when the rival combatants raged most fiercely.