The State of Affairs at Sundown.
Thus, for the French, terminated another day of error and loss, which left three Corps still on the left bank of the Meuse. When the sun went down, the German horse were close to every one of them except the 12th, which, it will be remembered, was on the right bank near Mouzon. The active cavalry moved in the rear of the 1st Corps, seizing prisoners at Voncq, riding up to Le Chesne, and keeping watch through the night upon the wearied 7th Corps, as it sought repose in the camps of Oches and St. Pierremont. The German Infantry Corps, meantime, had been closing up for the final onslaught. The 12th Corps was in and about Nouart, covered by outposts and patrols, which stretched away to Stenay. The Guard was at Buzancy, the 4th Corps at Remonville; the 5th Corps was at Grand Pré, with the Würtembergers near at hand; the Bavarians had come up to Sommerance and its neighbourhood on both banks of the Aisne; the 11th Corps stood at Monthois on the left, while the 6th Corps was in the rear at Vienne le Chateau. The head-quarters of King William were set up in Grand Pré, under the old gloomy castle, the Prussian Prince was near by at the little village of Senuc, and the Saxon Prince at Bayonville. Thus, in three days, the whole Army had drawn together, facing north, and was ready, at a signal, to spring forward and grapple with the enemy who had committed himself so rashly to a flank march in the face of the most redoubtable generals, and the best instructed, disciplined and rapidly-marching troops in Europe.
Examining attentively the reports which reached him from all points of the extensive curve upon which the cavalry were so active, and poring over the map, General von Moltke at length formed a definite judgment on the position as it appeared to him through this medium. He inferred that the Army of Chalons was marching in a north-west direction towards the Meuse; that its principal forces were then probably between Le Chesne and Beaumont, with strong rear guards to the south; and the practical result of his cogitations was that the German Armies should move upon the line Le Chesne-Beaumont in such a way as might enable them to attack the enemy before he reached the Meuse. Therefore, the Saxon Prince’s Army, except the Guard, which was to become the reserve, was to march early on Beaumont, two Corps of the Third Army were to support the Saxon onset, but the left of that Army was to march on Le Chesne. As a matter of fact, the French, in part at least, were nearer the Meuse than Von Moltke supposed, for the 12th Corps was on the right bank, and the 1st at Raucourt; while the 7th was at Oches, the 5th at Beaumont, and there were no troops at Le Chesne except stragglers. MacMahon took in the situation; he was resolved to pass the river “coûte que coûte”: and his chance of doing so, even then, depended on the rapidity with which his troops could march. The 5th Corps was struck and routed the next day, but the French Army did succeed in effecting a passage over the stream.