FOOTNOTES:
[1] p. 7.
[2] p. 173.
[3] See p. 110.
[4] But see an interesting note in Romanes' Mind and Motion and Monism (Longmans, 1895) p. 111.
[5] Published in Trübner's English and Foreign Philosophical Library in 1878, but written 'several years ago' (preface). 'I have refrained from publishing it,' the author explains, 'lest, after having done so, I should find that more mature thought had modified the conclusions which the author sets forth.'
[6] At times I have sought to make the argument of the chapter more intelligible by introducing references to earlier parts of the book or explanations in my own words. These latter I have inserted in square brackets.
[7] p. 24.
[8] p. 28.
[9] p. 28.
[10] p. 45.
[11] p. 47.
[12] p. 50.
[13] p. 63.
[14] pp. 58 ff.
[15] With reference to the views and arguments of the Candid Examination, it may be interesting to notice here in detail that George Romanes (1) came to attach much more importance to the subjective religious needs and intuitions of the human spirit (pp. 131 ff.); (2) perceived that the subjective religious consciousness can be regarded objectively as a broad human phenomenon (pp. 147 f.); (3) criticized his earlier theory of causation and returned towards the theory that all causation is volitional (pp. 102, 118); (4) definitely repudiated the materialistic account of the origin of mind (pp. 30, 31); (5) returned to the use of the expression 'the argument from design,' and therefore presumably abandoned his strong objection to it; (6) 'saw through' Herbert Spencer's refutation of the wider teleology expressed by Baden Powell, and felt the force of the teleology again (p. 72); (7) recognized that the scientific objections to the doctrine of the freedom of the will are not finally valid (p. 128).
[16] See Mind and Motion and Monism, pp. 36 ff.
[17] In some 'Notes' of the Summer of 1893 I find the statement, 'The result (of philosophical inquiry) has been that in his millennial contemplation and experience man has attained certainty with regard to certain aspects of the world problem, no less secure than that which he has gained in the domain of physical science, e.g.
Logical priority of mind over matter.
Consequent untenability of materialism.
Relativity of knowledge.
The order of nature, conservation of energy and indestructibility of matter within human experience, the principle of evolution and survival of the fittest.'
[18] For the meaning of 'pure' agnosticism see [below]. ff.