MISSION TO ENGLAND, 1897
I left for England via Montreal on the 31st May, 1897, and expected to arrive in Liverpool a day or two before Sir Wilfrid Laurier, who was to sail some days later from New York on a fast ship. We were delayed for some days by fogs, and did not arrive in Liverpool till after Sir Wilfrid Laurier had left that place. He had arrived in the old world for the first time of his life, and at once fell into the hands of the Liverpool merchants and business men, at that time generally free traders. He had not a colleague with him and naturally was affected by the atmosphere in which he found himself, and in his speech at the great banquet given by the British Empire League with the Duke of Devonshire in the chair, he made a few remarks in reference to preferential tariffs for which he was severely criticised at home. I joined the party at Glasgow two days later, and Sir Wilfrid, who seemed pleased to see me, had a long talk with me between Glasgow and Liverpool on the special train which took the party down. On the following morning the Liverpool papers had cables from Canada giving an account of the discussion in the Canadian House of Commons over the cabled reports of Sir Wilfrid’s speech. He was attacked vehemently by Alexander McNeill, our champion in the House, on one point of his speech at Liverpool, and Sir Richard Cartwright and his colleagues, in defending Sir Wilfrid, did so on the ground that the reports of what he said could not be taken as correct, and asking the House to withhold comment until the full reports should be received. This was a desirable course to adopt, for cable despatches have so often conveyed inaccurate impressions.
The real secret of the trouble was that in the busy rush of his work as leader of the opposition, and then as Premier, Sir Wilfrid had not been able really to master the question, but he soon grasped the subject, and his later speeches were very effective. His reception by the British people was wonderfully favourable, and the impression he made upon them was remarkable. He stood out from all the other Premiers—and there were eleven in all—and he was everywhere the central and striking figure.
On the 5th July, 1897, a meeting of the British Empire League was held in the Merchant Taylors Hall. The Duke of Devonshire was in the chair and made an able speech welcoming the Premiers from the colonies. He was followed by Rt. Hon. R. J. Seddon, Premier of New Zealand, Sir William Whiteway, Premier of Newfoundland, Mr. G. H. Reid, Premier of New South Wales, and Sir Edward Braddon, Premier of Tasmania. Sir Wilfred Laurier had not been able to attend, and as President of the League in Canada I was called upon to speak. As to the treaties, I said:
I have come here from Canada to make one or two suggestions. In the first place in reference to preferential tariffs, we have shown you that we wish to give you a preference in our markets. (Cheers). But treaties interfere with us in the management of our own tariff, and I wish to emphasise the fact that some steps should be taken to place us in absolute freedom to give every advantage we wish to our fellow-countrymen all over the world. (Cheers.) We wish to give that advantage to our own people, and we do not wish to be forced to give it to the foreigner. (Hear, hear.) . . .
Now my last point is this. In Canada we have viewed with considerable alarm the fact that the wealthiest and most powerful nation in all history is at this moment dependent for her daily food for three out of every four of her population upon two foreign nations, who are, I am thankful to say, friendly to her, and who, I hope, will always be friendly, but who, it cannot be denied, might by some possibility be engaged in war with us at some future time. These two nations might then stop your food supply, and that harm to you would spread great distress among the people of our country. I have been deputed by the League in Canada to ask you to look carefully into this question. If there is no real danger, relieve our fears; but if you find there is any danger let me urge upon you as strongly as I can to take some steps to meet that danger. Let the method be what it may, great national granaries, a duty on food, a bounty or what not, but let something be done.
A special meeting of the Council of the League was held on the 7th July, 1897, to meet the deputation of our League. In my address I once more dealt with the question of the German and Belgian treaties. I said, “The Canadian people have now offered, in connection with their desire regarding these treaties, to give what they propose to all nations, but with the express intention of giving an advantage to our own people. I am deputed to ask you to use what influence you can on the Government and people of this country to give us that full control of our own tariff to which we contend we are entitled.”
Lord Salisbury in 1890, although favourable to the idea, was not able to secure the denunciation of the German and Belgian treaties, although I knew from his conversation with me that personally he felt that they should be denounced. In 1892 Lord Knutsford peremptorily refused a request by Canada to denounce the treaties. Lord Ripon was not quite so peremptory in 1894-’95 after the Ottawa Conference, but he refused permission to Mr. Rhodes to arrange a discriminating tariff in Matabeleland. We had been held off for six years, but the action of the Canadian Government brought matters to a head.
During June and July, 1897, in London the most profuse and large-hearted hospitality was shown on every hand to the colonial visitors, and I was fortunate enough to be invited to all the large functions. I felt the importance of taking every opportunity to press upon the leading men in England the necessity for the denunciation of the treaties, and I knew Sir Wilfrid Laurier could not urge it with the freedom or force that I could. Consequently in private conversations I talked very freely on the subject, whenever and wherever I had an opportunity.
I found that in meeting friends, almost the first remark would be an approving comment on the friendliness of the Canadian Parliament in giving the British people a preference in the markets of Canada. My reply always was that it was no more than was right, considering all that Great Britain had done for us. This was usually followed by the remark that the Government were afraid, from the first impression of the law officers of the Crown, that Great Britain would not be able to accept the favour. My reply was very confidently, “Oh yes! you will accept it.” Then the remark would be made that the German and Belgian treaties would prevent it. “Then denounce the treaties,” I would say. “That would be a very serious thing, and would be hardly possible.” My reply was, “You have not fully considered the question, we have.” Then I would be asked what I meant, and would reply somewhat in these terms:
Consider the situation of affairs as they stand. To-day at every port of entry in Canada from Sydney, Cape Breton, to Victoria in the Island of Vancouver, along 3,500 miles of Canadian frontier, German goods are charged one-eighth more duty than goods from Great Britain, and goods from Great Britain one-eighth less duty than on German goods. This was being done yesterday, is being done to-day, and will be done to-morrow, and it is done by the Government of Canada, backed by a unanimous Parliament, and behind it a determined and united people. We have made up our minds and have thought it out, and have our teeth set, and what are you going to do about it?
This did not usually bring out any indication that any clear decision had been arrived at by them, and then I would go on:
Of course we know that you can send a large fleet to our Atlantic ports, and another to our Pacific ports, and blockade them, paralyse our trade, and stop our commerce, until we yield, or you may go farther and bombard our defenceless cities, and kill our women and children. Well, go on and do it, and we will still hold out, for we know that any British Government that would dare to send her fleets to jamb German goods down our throats when we want to buy British, would be turned out of office before the ships could get across the Atlantic. The thing is absurd, the treaties are an outrage, and the only course out of the difficulty is to denounce them.
These arguments carried weight with all to whom I spoke, and I spoke to Ministers, Privy Councillors on the Government side, M.P.’s, and others. Once only the head of one of the great daily newspapers seemed to be annoyed at my aggressive attitude, and said, “You had better not be too sure. We might send the fleet and be very ugly with you.” My reply was, “Well, go on and send it. You lost the southern half of North America by trying to cram tea down their throats, and you may lose the northern half if you try to cram German goods down our throats. I should have hoped you had learned something from history.”
It will be seen that the plan which was, I understand, originated by D’Alton McCarthy, worked out very successfully. There could only be one result, and within a month the treaties were denounced, and I felt that the first great step of our programme had been made. The amusing feature, however, was, that this object for which we fought so hard three years before at the meeting at Lord Avebury’s, when the British Empire League was founded, and which was opposed by nearly all our English friends, was no sooner announced as accomplished, than men of all parties and views seemed to unite in praising the act, and the Cobden Club even went so far as to present the Cobden Medal to Sir Wilfrid Laurier.
Sir Wilfrid Laurier in all his speeches had upheld abstract theories of free trade, and with considerable skill succeeded in allaying the hostility of the free trade element. This, I think, helped to secure the denunciation of the treaties, with the approval of all parties. On my return to Canada I was interviewed in Montreal by the representative of the Toronto Globe. Being asked by the reporter my opinion of the probable effect of the denunciation of the German and Belgian treaties, I said:
The denunciation of these treaties marks an epoch in the history of the British Empire. The power of Canada has made itself felt not only in British but in European diplomacy. It has affected Germany, Belgium, and other countries, and every one of these countries knows that it was Canada’s influence that produced the result. Another point in connection with the denunciation of these treaties is, that it is a tremendous step towards preferential trade within the Empire. Great Britain was going along half asleep. Canada has awakened her, and made her sit up and think. She has been jostled out of the rut she has been following, and is now in a position to proceed in the direction that may be in her own interest and in that of the Empire.
Being then asked if I had any opinions to express in regard to the Premier’s remarks in Great Britain on the question of free trade, I said:
His remarks were general and theoretical. The great point of the whole movement was to secure the denunciation of the treaties. Nothing could be done while these treaties were in existence, and in my opinion it would have been a most indiscreet thing for Sir Wilfrid Laurier to have pursued any line of argument that would have aroused the hostility of the great free trade party in Great Britain. The great point was to secure the united influence of all parties in favouring the denunciation of the treaties, which was an important step in advance.
Being asked to account for the fact that Sir Howard Vincent, of the United Empire Trade League, a strong protectionist, and the Cobden Club both united in applauding the denunciation of the treaties, I replied:
Sir Howard Vincent and his League saw plainly that this action made for a preferential tariff. The Cobden Club are whistling to keep up their courage.
In the Conference of Premiers, held in 1897, it was not possible to secure an arrangement for mutual preferential tariffs. The other colonies were not ready for it, the Imperial Government was not ready for it, nor were the people, but as the German and Belgian Treaties were denounced to take effect the following year, in August, 1898, the path was cleared, and from that date the Canadian Preference came into force, and has since been in operation.
It will be remembered that the deputation of our British Empire League to England, in 1897, was instructed to express the great desire of the Canadian Branch that, as a guarantee of the general safety of the Empire, vigorous steps should at once be taken to provide that the British Food supply should be grown within the Empire. As chairman of the deputation I did all in my power to stir up inquiry on the subject. Being introduced to Principal Ward of Owens College, Manchester, when at that city, I talked freely with him on the point, and he suggested I should discuss it with Mr. Spencer Wilkinson, the well-known author and journalist. He gave me a letter introducing me to Mr. Wilkinson, and we had several interviews. Shortly after reaching London I called to see my friend Lord Wolseley, then Commander-in-Chief. He took me with him to his house to lunch, and as we walked over, I at once broached the subject of the food supply, principally wheat and flour, and he told me that the Government had been urged to look into the matter some two or three years before, and that there had been a careful inquiry by the best experts, and the report was that the command of the sea was a sine quâ non, but if we maintained that, and paid the cost which would be much increased by war prices, the country could get all the grain they would want.
I said suppose a war with Russia and the United States, what would be done if they combined and put an embargo on bread-stuffs? How would it be got then even with full command of the sea? He did not seem himself to have understood the difficulty, or studied the figures, and said, “I cannot explain the matter. All I can say is that the Government obtained the advice of the best men in England on the subject, and that is their report.” My reply was, “I wish you would look into it yourself,” and I dropped the subject.
I met Lord Roberts shortly after and I pressed the matter upon him. He had not known of the Government report, and consequently listened to my arguments attentively and seemed impressed, for I may say that 1897 was the worst year in all our history as to the manner in which the supply of food was distributed among the nations.
Mr. Spencer Wilkinson seemed to be much interested in my talks with him, and one day he said, “I wish you could have a conversation with some great authority on the other side of the question, who would understand the matter and be able to answer you.” I replied, “That is what I should like very much. Tell me the best man you have and I will tackle him. If he throws me over in the gutter in our discussion it will be a good thing, for then I shall learn something.” Mr. Wilkinson laughed at my way of putting it, and said, “If that is what you want, Sir Robert Giffen is the man for you to see.” I said I would try and get a letter of introduction to him. Mr. Wilkinson said he would give me one, and did so.
I called to see Sir Robert Giffen. He received me very kindly, and we had an interesting interview of about an hour. The moment I broached the subject of the food supply he said at once, “That question came up some two or three years ago, and I was called upon to inquire into the whole matter and report upon it, and my report in a few words was, that we must have the command of the sea, and that once that was secured, then, by paying the somewhat enhanced war prices, we could get all the grain required.” My reply was, “Then, as you have fully inquired into the question, you can tell me what you could do under certain conditions. In case of a war between Great Britain and Russia combined with the United States, followed by an embargo on food products, where and how would you get your supplies?” Sir Robert said, “We do not expect to go to war with the United States and Russia at the same time.” I said, “You were within an ace of war with the United States only a year ago over the Venezuelan difficulty, and Great Britain and Russia have been snarling at each other over the Indian Frontier for years, and if you go to war with either, you must count on having the other on your hands.”
Sir Robert then said, “But I said we must have the command of the sea.” I replied, “I will give you the complete, undoubted, absolute command of the sea, everywhere all the time, although you are not likely to have it; and then in case of an embargo on wheat and foodstuffs where are you to get your supplies?” He said, “We would get some from Canada and other countries.” I pointed out that all they sent was only a fraction. Sir Robert then said, “They could not put on an embargo, for it would ruin their trade.” I told him that I was talking about war and not about peace and trade, and said that no desire for trade induced the Germans to sell wheat to Paris during the siege of 1870. His idea had been that, in case of war with Russia or the United States, or both, holding the command of the sea, Great Britain would allow foodstuffs to be exported to neutral countries such as Belgium or Holland, and then England would import from those countries. My answer to that was, that if England had the command of the sea, the United States or Russia would have only one weapon, an embargo, and they would certainly use it. He seemed cornered in the argument, and said, “Well, if we cannot get bread we can eat meat. I eat very little bread.” I said, “The British people use about 360 lbs. per head of wheat per annum, and about 90 lbs. of meat, and a great deal of meat would be stopped too”; and I said on leaving, “I wish you would investigate this thoroughly again, and let the Government know, for I know they are depending upon your report at the War Office”; and then I left him.
When at Liverpool shortly after on my way back to Canada, I asked the manager of the Bank of Liverpool, to whom I had a letter of introduction, if he would introduce me to the highest authority on the corn trade in Liverpool. He introduced me to the late Mr. Paul, ex-President of the Corn Exchange, and I had a long conversation with him on the question of the food supply. As soon as I mentioned the subject he told me that the corn trade people in Liverpool had been asked from London to make a report on the possibility of supplying grain in case of war. Mr. Paul told me that they had considered the matter (I suppose he meant the leading corn merchants), and that their report was practically that they must have the command of the sea, that was essential; but that secured, and the enhanced war prices paid, they could supply all the corn required in any contingency. I questioned him as I had Sir Robert Giffen and found the same underlying belief. The law of supply and demand would settle the question. The corn would be allowed to go in neutral ships to neutral ports, and then be transhipped to England. An embargo had not been considered or treated seriously as a possibility, and when I cornered him so that he could not answer my arguments, he said, “Well, if we could not get wheat we could live on potatoes.” I told him potatoes could not be kept over a year, that a large quantity was imported which would be stopped. I said he had better make another report. The whole thing was very disheartening to me, for I saw how the Government were depending upon peaceful traders for information how to guard against war dangers.
In 1902 when Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, proposed a small tax on wheat and flour, I was pleased to see that Sir Robert Giffen was the first prominent man to write to the Press endorsing and approving of the bread tax, as it was called. It showed me that Sir Robert had carefully considered the question, and was manly enough to advocate what was not altogether a popular idea.
After my return to Canada I prepared an article for the Nineteenth Century on the “Situation in England,” and it appeared in the December number, 1897. In this I pointed out the danger of the condition of the food supply, and the article attracted a considerable amount of attention in the British Press, in comments, notices, letters, etc. Sir Michael Hicks-Beach in a speech at Bristol, in January, 1898, referred to the question, and in a way contradicted the points I had brought out in the Nineteenth Century article. My conversations the summer before with Lord Wolseley, Sir Robert Giffen, and Mr. Paul had so alarmed me at the false security in which the Government were resting, that when I saw Sir Michael Hicks-Beach relying on the same official reports, I determined, although I had never met him, to write him direct, and on the 20th January, 1898, I wrote, drawing his attention to a remark which he was reported to have made that “in any war England would have many friends ready to supply corn,” and I said, “Our League sent a deputation to England last summer to draw attention to the danger of the food supply. I was chairman of it. Since my return I published an article in the Nineteenth Century giving our views. I enclose a reprint which I wish you could read. If you have not time please give me one minute to examine the enclosed diagram (cut out of the Chicago Tribune) showing the corn export of the world. This shows that Russia and the United States control, not including the Danubian ports, nearly 95 per cent. of the world’s needs, and if they were to put an embargo on the export of food of all kinds, where would be the ‘many friends ready to supply England with corn?’”
Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, now Lord St. Aldwyn, with great courtesy wrote me a personal letter, in which he thanked me for my letter, and went on to say:
I do not think that the sentence you quote “that in any war England would have many friends ready to supply corn” quite accurately represents what I said on that subject. The report was necessarily much condensed. But it would be true if (say) we were at war with the United States alone: or if we were at war with one or more of the European Powers and the United States were neutral. In either of such cases the interests of the neutral Powers in access to our market would be so strong, that our enemy would not venture to close it to them, in the only possible way, viz.: by declaring corn contraband of war. And I think that if the United States were the neutral party, self-interest would weigh more with them than their ill feeling towards us, whatever the amount of that feeling may be.
It is possible, though most improbable, that the two great corn-producing countries might be allied against us. If they were, I believe that our navy would still keep the seas open for our supply from other sources, though no doubt there would be comparative scarcity and suffering. I am no believer in the enclosed diagram, the production of corn is constantly increasing in new countries such as the Argentine, and better communication is also increasing the total amount available for export. Bad harvests in the United States and Russia, and good ones in India and the Argentine, would show quite another result to that shown in the enclosed, though, as I have said, I do not believe it is true, even of the year which it professes to represent.
On receipt of this letter I wrote to Mr. Geo. J. S. Broomhall, of Liverpool, editor of the Corn Trade News, and author of the Corn Trade Year Book, and received from him a certificate of the correct figures of corn exports. I forwarded it to Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, showing that in 1897 India and the Argentine only exported 200,000 qrs. and 740,000 qrs. respectively, and that the diagram I sent could not have been a very great way out. In 1902 Sir Michael Hicks-Beach put a tax of one shilling a quarter on imported wheat, and as I have already said, Sir Robert Giffen wrote to the Times approving of it. I was very glad to see this action on the part of both of them.
On the 4th December, 1897, the Hon. George W. Ross gave an address before the British Empire League in St George’s Hall, Toronto, in which he strongly favoured preferential tariffs and came out squarely against reciprocity with the United States. This action was a great encouragement to our cause and attracted considerable attention all over Canada.
On the 8th December, 1897, the National Club gave a complimentary banquet to his Excellency the Earl of Aberdeen, Governor-General. I attended the banquet and sat second to the left of the president of the club, Mr. McNaught. I was under the impression that Mr. Blake, who had been a few years away from Canada, and who had joined the Irish Nationalist party, would be sure to speak in a strain not acceptable to our club. I mentioned this to Dr. Parkin who sat next to me. When Mr. Blake began to speak he very soon uttered sentiments strongly opposed to all that the Canadians had been working for in the Imperial interest. I said to Parkin that as an ex-president of the club, and president of the British Empire League, I would not allow his remarks to pass without comment. I leaned over and told the chairman I intended to speak a few minutes when Mr. Blake finished. He raised some objection, but I told him I must speak. He mentioned it to the Governor-General, who said he would wait for fifteen minutes. I told Dr. Parkin I would divide the time with him.
After Mr. Blake sat down, I said:
I have been a member of this club almost from its foundation. I was for many years on the Board of Directors, and for some years its President, and I feel that I should state that the speech of my friend Mr. Blake does not represent the views nor the national aspirations which have always been characteristic of the National Club. . . .
I agree with what Mr. Blake has said as to the importance of preserving friendly relations with the United States. We hope to live at peace with them, but because we do not wish to beg for reciprocity or make humiliating concessions for the sake of greater trade, it is no reason why we should be charged with wanting war. We want peace, and no one can point to any instance where the Canadian people or Government have been responsible for the irritation. Mr. G. W. Ross pointed this out clearly in his admirable speech of Saturday night. The great causes of irritation have come from the United States. The invasion of 1775, the war of 1812, the Trent affair, and the Venezuelan business were all matters in which we were absolutely free from blame. Nor were we to blame some thirty years ago when I had to turn out with my corps to help defend the frontier of this province from the attacks of bands of Fenians, organised, armed, and equipped, in the United States, who invaded our country, and shot down some of my comrades, who died defending Canada. These raids were maintained by contributions from our worst enemies in the United States, but we drove them out, and now I am glad to say that, while the contributions still go on, the proceeds are devoted to troubling the Empire elsewhere, and I hope they will continue to be expended in that direction rather than against us.
I approve of Mr. Blake’s remarks about the defence of Canada, and the expenditure of money to make our country safer, but I object strongly to the hopeless view he takes. We are 6,000,000 of northern men, and, fighting on our own soil for our rights and freedom, I believe we could hold our own in spite of the odds against us, as our fathers did in days gone by, when the outlook was much more gloomy.
Dr. George R. Parkin followed with an eloquent and powerful speech pointing out the various arguments which showed the growth of the movement for Imperial unity.
It was thought at that time that Mr. Blake had some idea of returning to Canadian politics, but the result of this meeting and the Press comments must have put an end to any such idea if it ever existed.