In Korea with Marquis Ito

by George Trumbull Ladd

FOOTNOTES

[1] For the following description of Seoul, besides my own observations, I am chiefly indebted to a series of articles published during our stay there by Dr. G. Heber Jones in the Seoul Press.

[2] This may seem incredible, but it is a fact that, as late as the spring of 1907, even a basket of fruit could not be sent to the Emperor with the confidence that the eunuchs and palace servants would not steal it all. At every garden-party the dishes and even the chairs had to be carefully watched.

[3] It is now proper to say, since his own abdication and the Convention of July, 1907, have followed, that the Korean Emperor after repeated denials, confessed at the time to a faithful foreign friend (not a Japanese) that he had given to Mr. Hulbert a large sum of money to execute a certain commission the nature of which he kept secret. In spite of this friend’s importunate urging and vivid representation of what the consequences of the act might be to himself and to his family, His Majesty refused to telegraph a recall of the commission. He did, however, so far yield to the same pleading as to agree not to furnish a further sum of money which had been asked in behalf of the influence of another “foreign friend,” the editor of the most violently anti-Japanese newspaper.

[4] This document probably emanated from the same press in Seoul—conducted by a subject of Japan’s friendly ally, Great Britain—from which came the lying bulletin that afterward caused so much bloodshed on the morning of Friday, July 19th. It is a comfort to know that this same editor has since been indicted by his own Government for the crime of stirring up sedition, condemned to give bonds, and threatened with deportation if his offences are repeated.

[5] Hulbert, The History of Korea, I, p. 368.

[6] Japan, I, p. 69 f.

[7] See The History of the Empire of Japan, (volume prepared for the World’s Columbian Exposition at Chicago, 1903), p. 38 f.

[8] Ibid., p. 47.

[9] The History of the Empire of Japan, p. 278 f.

[10] Ibid., p. 280.

[11] See Griffis, The Hermit Nation, p. 159.

[12] See The History of the Empire of Japan, p. 304.

[13] Japan, IV, p. 207.

[14] See The History of the Empire of Japan, p. 403 ff.

[15] This is on the authority of Mr. D. W. Stevens, whose acquaintance with the facts is most accurate and full.

[16] China’s Intercourse with Korea from the XVth Century to 1895, p. 1 f.

[17] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1871, p. 112.

[18] Quoted from the paper referred to above.

[19] For this account, as here given verbatim, I am indebted to the Hon. D. W. Stevens, who was at the time of my visit, “Adviser to the Korean Council of State and Counsellor of the Resident-General.”

[20] The list of these reforms is given in the volume of the U. S. Foreign Relations, containing the report sent to the United States by Minister Sill, September 24, 1894.

[21] International Law and Diplomacy of the Russo-Chinese War, p. 43 f.

[22] Hershey, International Law and Diplomacy of the Russo-Chinese War, p. 44 f.

[23] Ibid., p. 45 f. See also the account of Dr. K. Asakawa, The Russo-Japanese Conflict, p. 263 ff.

[24] So Mr. Whigham, in his admirable book on Manchuria and Korea. (London, Isbiter & Company), p. 123.

[25] The Passing of Korea, p. 167.

[26] See on this and allied points, the lecture delivered by Mr. Rockhill, at the United States Naval War College, Newport, August 5, 1904.

[27] The Passing of Korea, p. 210 f.

[28] Manchuria and Korea, p. 119.

[29] See Appendix A for its text.

[30] See Appendix B.

[31] War and Neutrality in the Far East, p. 216 f.

[32] See especially Hulbert, The Passing of Korea, p. 464 f.

[33] The narrative which follows may be trusted to correct most of these misstatements. But among them, some of the more important may here be categorically contradicted. Such are, for example, the statements that armed force was used; that General Hasegawa half drew his sword to intimidate Mr. Han; that Hagiwara seized the latter with the aid of gendarmes and police; that the Minister of Agriculture continued to hold out; that he and Minister Pak, during the conference, withdrew from the Japanese Legation and betook themselves to the Palace, denouncing the compact (something no one acquainted with the geographical relations of the two places would be likely to assert with a sincere belief); that the Emperor ordered the consenting Ministers to be assassinated; that Japanese troops patrolled the streets all night, etc., etc. One curiously characteristic error of Mr. Hulbert is involved in the statement, published in one of the papers of the United States, which makes his commission by the Korean Emperor to lodge an appeal with President Roosevelt the cause of hastening the Japanese Government in their iniquitous coup d’état. The truth is that the Japanese Government had made all the preparations for Marquis Ito’s departure, and the plan afterward carried out had been carefully formulated, weeks before it was known that Mr. Hulbert was going to the United States. The Marquis was only waiting the return of Baron Komura to Japan before leaving for Korea. No thought whatever was at any time given to Mr. Hulbert. It is, in general, late now to say that the efforts of those “friends of Korea,” who have taken the Korean ex-Emperor’s money while holding out to him the hope of foreign intervention, have done him and his country, rather than Japan, an injury impossible to repair.

[34] In order to understand the following negotiations and all similar transactions conducted in characteristic Korean style, it should be remembered that delay, however reasonable it may seem or really be, is in fact utilized for purposes not of reflection and judicious planning for future emergencies, but the rather for arranging intrigues, securing apparent chances of escape from the really inevitable, with the result of an increasing unsettlement of the Imperial mind.

[35] He was preparing to go when the Minister of the Household called with a message requesting the Marquis to postpone the conclusion of the Treaty two or three days.

[36] None of the party gathered in the council chamber saw Mr. Han after that. It seems from the accounts subsequently given by Palace officials that a little later Mr. Han went upstairs still deeply agitated. His evident purpose was to gain access to the Emperor, which, as he had not requested an audience, was a flagrant violation of etiquette from the Korean point of view. But the poor man in his confusion turned the wrong way and stumbled into Lady Om’s quarters. Some of the officials led him to a small retiring room, where he spent the night. The next morning it was officially announced that he had been dismissed from office in disgrace and would be severely punished. Marquis Ito immediately begged that the Emperor would pardon him, and, in deference to this request, Mr. Han was permitted to go into retirement with no other punishment than the loss of his office. The whole proceeding was one of those things which apparently can happen only in Korea and not excite any one’s special wonder. No one seemed to know precisely why the Minister was punished. He was amiable, not very strong mentally, but well-meaning and of comparatively good repute; he had done his best to carry out the Emperor’s wishes as he understood them, and, having failed, as was inevitable, his grief was the best proof possible of his sincerity; and one would think it might have excited sufficient pity to preclude resentment. However, it should be added that the sincerity manifest in Mr. Han’s grief did not extend to his memory or his powers of narration. At least that is an inference which one may draw from certain published accounts of these occurrences—Mr. Han having seemingly been the fountain-head of the information.

[37] The Marquis’ reasons for refusing hardly need explanation. Japan had already secured some measure of control over the internal administration of Korea by previous arrangements. The acceptance of the proposed amendment would have been virtually an abrogation of these arrangements, notably of the most important portion of the Protocols of February 23 and August 22. To that, of course, the Marquis could not agree. Besides this, the control of Korea’s foreign relations necessarily required some measure of control and guidance over the administration of her internal affairs. The relations between external and internal affairs, their frequent interdependence, is so intimate, that it would have been a grave mistake to assume the obligations which the one imposed without the power to guard against complications which might follow from maladministration of the other. As the case stands, the insertion of the word “primarily,” while soothing Korean susceptibilities, does not affect the control of the Protectorate in any material respect.

[38] The following facts with regard to the possession of the Imperial seal of Korea and its affixing to this important document, are given on the authority of Mr. D. W. Stevens. They are a complete refutation of the charges which have been made regarding this part of the entire transaction. It was the unavoidable delay in bringing the seal to the Palace which gave rise to these extraordinary stories. “What actually happened,” says Mr. Stevens, “was this. While the treaty was being copied, Mr. Pak went to the telephone and directed the clerk in charge of the seal at the Foreign Office to bring it to the Palace. After some delay he went again to the telephone and repeated the order. At the time the only two persons in the office were the clerk in charge of the seal and Mr. Numano, my Japanese assistant. Both were just then reading in the room where the clerk slept and where the seal was kept. The telephone bell rang, and the clerk who answered it informed Mr. Numano that Mr. Pak had ordered the seal to be brought to the Palace. He was putting on his street clothing preparatory to obeying the order when the Chief of the Diplomatic Bureau of the Foreign Office came into the room and asked the clerk where he was going. The clerk informed him, whereupon he went to the telephone and called up Mr. Pak. He implored the latter not to agree to the Treaty and, finally, receiving Mr. Pak’s peremptory order to cease interfering, threw himself down upon the clerk’s bed in great grief. After this, there was no further interruption from any quarter, and the seal was taken quietly to the Palace.”

It throws light upon the control and use of this seal to observe that, when in the summer of 1907 he was committed to the responsibility for the Commission to The Hague Conference by the fact that the commissioners were ready to prove their Imperial authorization by showing the Imperial seal, His Majesty did not admit this as evidence in proof of their claim. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that this use of his seal was also with his knowledge and permission. And, now, in connection with the various details inaugurated under the new Treaty which followed this violation of the Treaty of November, 1905, we are told that henceforth the Imperial seal will be kept in a safe especially prepared for it, and carefully protected from intrusion.

[39] It is a significant fact that this memorial which is here followed very closely—and in the most important places even literally—has received no attention from the hostile critics of Japan. It would seem as though neither Mr. Hulbert nor Mr. Story is aware of the existence of such a memorial. This is the more remarkable in the case of the former, because he was for years resident in Seoul, was familiar with the Korean language, and was gathering material for his written account of the affair while upon the ground.

[40] It will, therefore, clearly appear that no one acquainted with this memorial can honestly place any confidence in His Majesty’s subsequent denials of the significance of these facts. Shall we not also be obliged to add, that no one who is acquainted with the memorial is entitled to the confidence of any one else, if he puts confidence in the denials of the Emperor. Amazement at the audacity of the falsehoods which have been told with regard to this historically important transaction would seem to be the fitting attitude of mind.

[41] This part of the memorial agrees closely with the statements in the first part of the chapter, as to what was then said.

[42] The purpose of this significant Memorial, we repeat, is self-evident. The Ministers, who had agreed to the Treaty by the Emperor’s commands and with his concurrence and approval, were being attacked as traitors. The Emperor himself was secretly favoring the attack and endeavoring to create the impression that he had not agreed to the Treaty, but that it was the work of the recreant Cabinet without his approval. The Memorial forced him to abandon that position once and for all. As before stated, it was officially promulgated with the Imperial sanction, and should have ended all controversy at once. In any country but Korea, and with any but the class of writers whom these incidents have developed, that would have been its result.

[43] An amusing illustration of the ex-Emperor’s way of filling his privy purse is found in the following authentic incident. At one time the large sum of 270,000 yen was wanted in cash to pay a bill for silks and jades which, it was alleged, had been purchased in China for Lady Om. When the request was made to exhibit the precious goods which had cost so enormous a sum, and which were going to make so large an unexpected drain upon insufficient revenues, the show of materials was entirely unsatisfactory. But, if not the goods, at least the bill itself could be produced. A bill was then brought to light, with the items made out in due form, but by a Chinese firm of merchants in Seoul instead of in China. The Chinese Consul-General, on being inquired of, replied that there was indeed such a reputable Chinese firm in the city; and he desired to have the matter further investigated lest the credit and business honor of his countrymen might suffer by connection of this sort with His Majesty’s efforts to obtain ready money. Investigation elicited the fact that a certain Court official had visited this firm and inquired how much such and such things would cost, if purchased in Shanghai. But no goods had been delivered or even actually ordered!

[44] See Hulbert, The History of Korea, II, p. 61 f.

[45] The History of Korea, I, p. 339.

[46] See Hulbert, The History of Korea, II, p. 54.

[47] Hulbert, The Passing of Korea, pp. 50, 58.

[48] The Passing of Korea, p. 67.

[49] The Passing of Korea, pp. 38, 41.

[50] Ibid., p. 43.

[51] See the account of the “Baby War” and “Breast Hunters,” The History of Korea, II., p. 245.

[52] The Passing of Korea, pp. 311, 319, 369.

[53] Ibid., p. 283.

[54] Ibid., p. 247.

[55] Whigham, Manchuria and Korea, p. 185.

[56] See a pamphlet bearing this title as an “Authorized Translation of Official Documents published by the Resident-General, in Seoul, January, 1907,” p. 7.

[57] During all my visit in Korea it was commonly reported by those intimate at Court that the Crown Prince was an imbecile both in body and in mind. But in his boyhood he was rather more than ordinarily bright, and his mother, the murdered Queen, was the most clever and brilliant Korean woman of her time. It is not strange, then, that since his accession to the throne and in view of his obviously sensible way of yielding to good advice from others, in spite of the evil influence of his father, the impression has been made that he might have been feigning imbecility in order to escape plots to assassinate him, which were formed in the interests of a rival claimant to the throne.

[58] Issue of Saturday, March 16, 1907.

[59] So the report on the “State of the Progress of the Reorganization of the Finances of Korea, March, 1907.”

[60] Administrative Reforms in Korea, p. 18.

[61] A cho is nearly 2½ acres.

[62] See Administrative Reforms in Korea, p. 19.

[63] State of the Progress of the Reorganization of the Finances of Korea, March, 1907, p. 20.

[64] Administrative Reforms in Korea, p. 15.

[65] It should be noted in this connection that this appointment is one of the very few which, like that of the Resident-General, proceed directly from the Emperor of Japan himself.

[66] Summary of the Financial Affairs of Korea, p. 5.

[67] In interpreting this it should be remembered that the Japanese sen is equal in value to one-half a cent in American gold, or about one farthing in English currency. 100 sen = 1 yen, and 1,000 rin = 1 yen.

[68] “There had been,” says Mr. D. W. Stevens, “some criticism because such a law was considered necessary; and Japanese legal procedure was accused of being defective, on this account, by certain foreign critics. But in the late seventies the British Court at Yokohama released a man who had been detected counterfeiting Japanese money, on the ground that there was no British law under which to punish him, and that Japanese law against counterfeiting did not apply to British subjects in Japan. And the highest British courts have held that a contract to smuggle goods into a foreign country is a valid contract as between British subjects in Great Britain.” The entire matter is dwelt upon at such length because it illustrates so well the inability of the Koreans for “independent” management of their own internal affairs, and also the animus and propriety of much of the anti-Japanese criticism.

[69] The quotations are from the pamphlet, Administrative Reforms in Korea, p. 11 f.

[70] See Summary of the Financial Affairs of Korea, p. 5.

[71] See the incidents—which are of a sort to be almost indefinitely multiplied—on page 285 f.

[72] Dr. Allen, then American Consul-General, in a report upon Educational Institutions and Methods in Korea, 1898.

[73] See Administrative Reforms in Korea, p. 4 f.

[74] Official Minutes of the Korean Mission Conference, 1906, p. 41.

[75] Korean Review, of February, 1904.

[76] It is significant to notice in this connection that previous to his several commissions from the Korean Emperor, this writer held a quite different view from that which he afterward advocated with regard to the underlying principle of all the recent relations between the two countries. In the same article he says: “The present chaotic state of the national finances and of popular discontent, show something of what Russian influence has accomplished in Korea; and the people are coming to realize the fact. They are passionately attached to the theory of national ‘independence.’ We say theory advisedly. This word ‘independence’ is a sort of fetich to which they bow, but they think that independence means liberation from outside control alone, forgetting that genuine independence means likewise a liberation from evil influences within, and that liberty, so far from being carte blanche to do as one pleases, is in truth the apotheosis of law.”

[77] Among the many falsehoods told by the Koreans and their “Foreign Friends,” in their endeavors to excite pity for themselves, and, possibly, interference with the Japanese Administration in Korea, none is more ridiculous than that the latter were reviving the use of torture. It should be borne in mind that, previous to the Convention of July, 1907, which followed upon the promulgation of this and other more important false charges by the commissioners to The Hague Conference, the Japanese Residency-General’s power did not extend to the interference with the execution of the Korean law upon Korean criminals. Preliminary examination by beating with a stick was then legal; according to credible current report it was practiced upon the vice-Minister of Education, when, during my visit to Korea, he was accused of having contributed money toward effecting the assassination of the Ministry (see [p. 51]). All this is quite different from the retort which might be made to critics from the United States to remember the practice of “water-cure” in the Philippines, etc.

[78] Quoted, as are the following paragraphs bearing quotation marks, from the pamphlet prepared under the supervision of the Resident-General, and published in Seoul, January, 1907, on Administrative Reforms in Korea. [These quotations are made exactly, and without attempt to change the language in accordance with our use of legal terms.]

[79] The following incident illustrates the habitual behavior of the Korean Daily News, edited by Mr. Bethell, in both an English and a native edition. Dr. Jones, one of the most faithful and useful of the Missionary body in Korea, had previously incurred the bitter enmity of this paper by publicly announcing (see [p. 61 f.]) the intention to assist the Resident-General in his plans, so far as his own work as a missionary permitted, for the up-raising of Korea. At the time when the Korean troops, in a wholly unprovoked way, fired upon the crowd in the streets of Seoul, Dr. Jones published in the Seoul Press an account of what he himself saw. The account was not accompanied by any harsh criticism of the conduct of the troops. But “shortly afterwards a Korean attached to the vernacular paper visited him and, attacking him fiercely, denounced him as an enemy of Korea. This was followed by a savage attack in the Korean edition of the News, giving an entirely false account of what Dr. Jones had done and said. It was in fact an invitation to murder.” Dr. Jones at once appealed to the American Consul-General and he to the British. The editor was forced to retract and apologize, but this by no means compensated for the damage his article had done.

[80] This fact has been clearly proven by papers found on the body of Yi-Sei-chik, when he was afterward arrested and detained at headquarters, as well as by his personal statements.

[81] This serious charge was made by the writer and published to a friendly nation, on the basis of no personal knowledge, not to say careful investigation, and after casual conversation with a small number of witnesses who belong to the class peculiarly liable to be deceived both as to facts and as to causes of such alleged incidents.

[82] Deplorable, on account of its effect, direct and indirect, upon the Koreans, upon Marquis Ito’s efforts at reform, and upon the missionary cause in Japan as well as Korea.

[83] It has been asserted that the value of the land staked off by the Japanese military authorities near Seoul was 6,000,000 yen. As the result of a “painstaking and impartial investigation” it was found that, at the highest market price, this land would not have brought more than 750,000 to 1,000,000 yen. The Korean way in such matters is well illustrated by the experience of the Young Men’s Christian Association in Seoul, who, when one small piece of land was needed to complete their site, were obliged to invoke an official order preventing the sale to any other party; and even then paid a price probably two or three times its true market value. Compare also what is said, [p. 98 f.], about the Pyeng-yang affair.

[84] What is the state of the case in certain portions of the West is truthfully told in the following paragraph quoted from a popular journal: “In the matter of cheating Indians and acquiring public lands in ways which bear all the ethical aspects of theft, there is no public or private morality either in Oklahoma or any other of those Western States where Indians and public lands continue to exist.”

[85] On one occasion the British and Chinese Ministers jointly urged the payment of indemnity in the case of two Chinamen, one a British protégé, who had been injured in a fight with tax-collecting officials at a place to which Chinese junks were in the habit of resorting. The British protégé had died of his wounds, both he and his companion having been confined after the fight in the magistrate’s yamen. The Korean local officials contended that only one person had been killed—namely, the wounded Chinaman. When confronted with the fact that, according to their own report, there was a dead Chinaman in the yamen the morning after, they replied that this man was not in the fracas at all; he had merely crawled into the yamen during the night, and had died of some unknown disease. The picture of this shrewd Celestial going to the yamen to die, apparently for the purpose of fraudulently foisting an incriminating corpus delicti upon the innocent Korean official, did not appeal to the British Minister, and he got his indemnity.

[86] See “The Japanese in Korea,” Extracts from The Korean Review, p. 46 f.

[87] The Far East (London, T. Fisher Unwin, 1901), p. 337 f.

[88] Korea (Chas. Scribner’s Sons, 1904), pp. 128 f.; 274 f. Perhaps the underlying reason for much of Mr. Hamilton’s rather vituperative criticism of affairs in Korea may be found in Chapter XII, where Japanese, American, and British merchants, and Lord Salisbury are all severely taken to task because too much of Korea’s trade is falling into other than English hands.

[89] According to the testimony of travellers in the interior of Korea, it is extremely difficult to get any food, accommodation, or service, even when desirous of paying the highest prices, on account of the experience with their own travelling officials, who never expect to pay for anything exacted from the country people.

[90] It furnished Mr. Hulbert and Mr. Bethell, however, with a striking instance of the way in which the Japanese are robbing the Koreans.

[91] An occurrence, which might easily have become a much celebrated instance of a Japanese attempt at robbery and oppression of the Koreans, came to the writer’s notice in a private but entirely trustworthy way. One of the ex-Emperor’s real foreign friends was sent for some time ago and found His Majesty in a state of intense alarm and excitement over a plot of the Residency-General which had just been made known to him. A certain foreigner had authorized the story that the Japanese authorities were trying to purchase three houses owned by a Chinese and situated just opposite the Palace, with a view to tear them down and erect barracks for the Japanese soldiers on the spot. The price offered by the Japanese was 60,000 yen; but if His Majesty would furnish 65,000 yen, this friendly foreigner would buy the property for him, and so defeat the nefarious project of the Japanese. The Emperor wished at once to borrow the money. It was suggested, however, that His Majesty should allow inquiry to be made before parting with so much of his privy purse. Whereupon, the following conversation was held between the Chinese owner and the person to whom the Emperor looked to procure for him the needed sum:

“I understand the three houses you own are offered for sale.”

“Well, I do not particularly wish to sell them; but that Frenchman, Mr. ⸺, has been here and wanted to get them. He said he wished to put up a large store in their place.”

“How much do you ask for the houses?”

“They are worth 13,000 yen; but if any one will take all three of them, he may have them for 12,000 yen in cash.”

“Is that so? I understood the Japanese wanted them to build barracks for their soldiers on the land.”

“I have not heard anything about the Japanese wanting them; it was that Frenchman who said he wanted them, to build a store there.”

The benevolent spirit of this enterprising foreign friend is revealed more intimately when we learn that he threatened to shoot on the spot, if he could only find out who he was, the man that had thwarted his plan for this bit of real-estate speculation. The same intention was avowed by the American miner against the foreign official of the Korean Government whom he regarded as standing in the way of the success of the “Poong Poo” Company (see [p. 361 f.]).

[92] Korea and Her Neighbors, by Isabella Bird Bishop, p. 64.

[93] Quoted from an anonymous letter, signed “Foreigner,” and published in the Seoul Press, date of August 6, 1907. The spirit of this passage is characteristic of the entire letter, which was nearly a column long, and which was, alas! written by a missionary.

[94] Editorial in the Seoul Press, August 8, 1907.

[95] In this connection it should be remembered that the Young Men’s Christian Association in Seoul is heavily subsidized by the Residency-General in recognition of its services for the good of the Koreans; that Marquis Ito sent a message of welcome, accompanied by a gift of 10,000 yen, to the “World’s Christian Student Federation” at its meeting in April, 1907, in Tokyo; and that His Excellency has taken all possible pains to assure the Christian missionaries in Korea of his desire for their active co-operation, by use of the moral and spiritual forces which they wield, with his plan to use the allied economic and educational forces, for the betterment of the Korean nation.

[96] Letter to the Japan Times, published, Tokyo, May 9, 1907.

[97] See Problems of the Far East, by the Hon. George N. Curzon, M.P. (1894), pp. 192-197.

[98] Compare the narratives of Part I, pp. [37-64]; [90-111].

[99] “Abnormal,” i. e., from the point of view of what would be expected from minds of a higher degree of culture and of self-control.

[100] With regard to the personnel of the Korean members of this commission, the head was Yi Sung-sol, who had formerly been a Cabinet Councillor. With him were associated Yi Chun-yong, a Judge of the Supreme Court, and Yi Wi-chong, who was at one time secretary to the Foreign Legation at Russia. The two former seem to have taken the Siberian route to St. Petersburg, where they arrived about April 20th, and were met there by Yi Wi-chong. The Russian Government, being at that time negotiating a treaty with Japan which was to recognize in most explicit terms the Japanese Protectorate over Korea, and give to it a “free hand” in the management of Korean affairs, naturally enough, gave no encouragement to the Koreans or to their “foreign friend.”

In view of the large sum of money which, according to rumor at the time, the Emperor contributed to this purpose, it seems scarcely credible that the Korean delegates should feel compelled at The Hague “to stay at a low-class hotel where the meals cost about 50 sen” (or 25 cents in gold), as the cable despatch reports. No less a sum than 240,000 yen was subsequently traced to expenditure upon this futile scheme; and 100,000 yen additional was suspected on good grounds. In addition to this, as the event proved, it cost the Emperor his crown.

[101] It should be understood that the proposal of Count Inouye did not contemplate taking the Korean Emperor prisoner and carrying him off by force to Japan. It expressed simply the belief on the Count’s part that the shortest way of making Korea accept Japan’s guidance was to cause the Emperor to become acquainted with Japan by personal observation.

[102] The mixture of ignorance and craft of which the ex-Emperor is capable was illustrated in a humorous way by his inquiry of Marquis Ito whether the Japanese Government would not undertake the arrest and punishment of his own emissaries at The Hague! The reply was, of course, that Japan could no more do such a thing in Holland than Korea in Japan.

[103] This double policy of soliciting advice and help from Marquis Ito, as his most true and powerful friend, while acting contrary to the advice when given and rendering the help difficult or impossible, has characterized the Emperor throughout in his relations with the Marquis.

[104] It was subsequently reported that the number of Koreans injured during the disturbances of this Friday was 210; since the majority of these had bullet wounds and the Japanese police were not armed with rifles, the conclusion is inevitable that most of these casualties were occasioned by the firing upon the crowd of the mutinous Korean soldiers.

[105] These quotations are from the article, the publication of which was followed by the incident already narrated ([p. 355, note]). This example is typical of the temper and methods of the anti-Japanese leaders and their foreign friends.

[106] This is perhaps the place to deny, authoritatively and finally, that Marquis Ito procured, counselled, or even gave consent to, the act of abdication. Indeed, the members of the Residency-General, and the Japanese in Seoul generally, who approved of the more strenuous measures to be taken against Korea, regretted to have the abdication take place. To use the expression of one of them: “It dulled the edge of the Japanese sword.”

[107] It should be understood that this office is the most important and influential of all the Korean offices, so far as private transactions with the Emperor are concerned. Now Pak Yong-hio, after a life of idleness and debauchery in Japan, whither he had fled some years before, and where he had been supported by the kindness of Japanese and Korean friends, had recently been pardoned and allowed to return to Korea. In petitioning for permission to return, Pak dwelt in pathetic terms on his “home-sickness,” and expressly promised in the future to refrain from political intrigue. But he had scarcely set foot on the soil of Korea before he began a most dishonest and disgraceful course of political intrigue. A little more than twenty-four hours after his pseudo-appointment as Minister of the Imperial Household, the Cabinet Ministers ordered his arrest, and he was subsequently condemned to be punished with eighty lashes and banished for life to the Island of Quelpart. Such are the vicissitudes of Korean political careers when most free from foreign influence!

[108] For the text of this new Convention, which is remarkable at once for its brevity and its comprehensive indefiniteness, the reader is referred to Appendix C. In view of the claims that the Convention of 1905 could not have been consented to by the Emperor because it does not bear his signature, or that it did not have the consent of the Ministers, because they did not all sign it, attention is called to the fact that the new Convention is signed only by Marquis Ito and the Korean Prime Minister.

[109] One of the leaders of the riot of July 19th confessed that he was betrayed into his action by the false report of the Taihan Mai-il Shimpo (or Korean edition of the Korean Daily News—Mr. Bethell’s paper), that the Emperor would be forced to go to Japan to apologize for The Hague incident. On reading the Japanese-Korean Convention, however, he was surprised at the moderation of Japan, and considered himself a fool for being deceived by the paper. This is only one of innumerable instances illustrating the truth that the English editor of this paper, and his American coadjutor have, of late, probably done more mischief to the Korean nation than any other persons except the Emperor and his small coterie of corrupt Court officials.

[110] The word thus translated, however, means “paid” troops rather than volunteers.

[111] How dangerous is prophecy touching the future of the Far East is well illustrated by the following passage quoted from Mr. Whigham’s generally calm and fair book on Manchuria and Korea, p. 49. Speaking of the mistake which Japan made in not preventing Russia from building the Manchurian Railway, Mr. Whigham says: “On the other hand, one is more and more convinced that what used to be talked about a short time ago as the inevitable war between Russia and Japan is destined to end in smoke, since the Japanese have already lost their great opportunity.” This was written as of July, 1901. Less than three years later “the inevitable war” began in the “smoke” of battle, and ended with Japan in possession of this same Manchurian Railway.