FOOTNOTES:
[36] There were nearly 500 slaves held in Northern States not placed in this census.
CHAPTER X.
THE "BLACK LAWS" OF "BORDER STATES."
Stringent Laws enacted against Free Negroes and Mulattoes.—Fugitive-slave Law respected in Ohio.—A Law to prevent Kidnapping.—The First Constitution of Ohio.—History of the Dred Scott case.—Judge Taney's Opinion in this Case.—Ohio Constitution of 1851 denied Free Negroes the Right to vote.—The Establishment of Colored Schools.—Law in Indiana Territory in Reference to Executions.—An Act for the Introduction of Negroes and Mulattoes into the Territory.—First Constitution of Indiana.—The Illinois Constitution of 1818.—Criminal Code enacted.—Illinois Legislature passes an Act to Prevent the Emigration of Free Negroes into the State.—Free Negroes of the Northern States endure Restriction and Proscription.
ALTHOUGH slavery was excluded from all the new States northwest of the Ohio River, the free Negro was but little better off in Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois than in any of the Southern States. From the earliest moment of the organic existence of the border free States, severe laws were enacted against free Negroes and Mulattoes. At the second session of the first Legislature of the State of Ohio, "An Act to Regulate Black and Mulatto Persons"[37] was passed.
Sec. 1. That no black or mulatto person shall be permitted to settle or reside in this State "without a certificate of his or her actual freedom."
2. Resident blacks and mulattoes to have their names recorded, etc. (Amended in 1834, Jan. 5 1, Curwen, 126.) Proviso, "That nothing in this act contained shall bar the lawful claim to any black or mulatto person."
3. Residents prohibited from hiring black or mulatto persons not having a certificate.
4. Forbids, under penalty, to "harbor or secrete any black or mulatto person the property of any person whatever," or to "hinder or prevent the lawful owner or owners from re-taking," etc.
5. Black or mulatto persons coming to reside in the State with a legal certificate, to record the same.
6. "That in case any person or persons, his or their agent or agents, claiming any black or mulatto person or persons that now are or hereafter may be in this State, may apply, upon making satisfactory proof that such black or mulatto person or persons are the property of him or her who applies, to any associate judge or justice of the peace within the State, the associate judge or justice is hereby empowered and required, by his precept, to direct the sheriff or constable to arrest such black or mulatto person or persons, and deliver the same, in the county or township where such officers shall reside, to the claimant or claimants, or his or their agent or agents, for which service the sheriff or constable shall receive such compensation as he is entitled to receive in other cases for similar services."
7. "That any person or persons who shall attempt to remove or shall remove from this State, or who shall aid and assist in removing, contrary to the provisions of this act, any black or mulatto person or persons, without first proving, as herein before directed, that he, she, or they is or are legally entitled so to do, shall, on conviction thereof before any court having cognizance of the same, forfeit and pay the sum of one thousand dollars, one half to the use of the informer and the other half to the use of the State, to be recovered by the action of debt quitam or indictment, and shall moreover be liable to the action of the party injured."
So here upon free soil, under a State government that did not recognize slavery in its constitution, the Negro was compelled to produce a certificate of freedom. Thus the fugitive-slave law was recognized, but at the same time an unlawful removal of free Negroes from the State was forbidden.
At the session of 1806-7, "An Act to Amend the Act Entitled 'an Act Regulating Black and Mulatto Persons,'" was passed amending the old law. The first act simply required "a certificate of freedom"; the amended law required Negroes and Mulattoes intending to settle in Ohio to give a bond not to become a charge upon the county in which they settled. Section four reads as follows:
"4. That no black or mulatto person or persons shall hereafter be permitted to be sworn or give evidence in any court of record or elsewhere in this State, in any cause depending or matter of controversy where either party to the sale is a white person, or in any prosecution which shall be instituted in behalf of this State, against any white person."[38]
But this law did not apply to persons a shade nearer white than Mulatto [the seven-eighths law].[39] Their testimony was admissible, while that of Negroes and Mulattoes was not admitted against them. In Jordan vs. Smith [1846], 14, Ohio, p. 199: "A black person sued by a white, may make affidavit to a plea so as to put the plaintiff to proof."
Attention has been called to the fact that the fugitive-slave law was respected in Ohio. In 1818-19, a law was passed to prevent the unlawful kidnapping of free Negroes, which, in its preamble, recites the provisions of the law of Congress, passed February 12, 1793, respecting fugitives from service and labor.[40] And in 1839 the Legislature passed another act relating to "fugitives from labor," etc., paving the way by the following recital:
"Whereas, The second section of the fourth article of the Constitution of the United States declares that 'no person' [etc., reciting it]; and whereas the laws now in force within the State of Ohio are wholly inadequate to the protection pledged by this provision of the Constitution to the Southern States of this Union; and whereas it is the duty of those who reap the largest measure of benefits conferred by the Constitution to recognize to their full extent the obligations which that instrument imposes; and whereas it is the deliberate conviction of this General Assembly that the Constitution can only be sustained as it was framed by a spirit of just compromise; therefore."
Sec. 1. Authorizes judges of courts of record, "or any justice of the peace, or the mayor of any city or town corporate," on application, etc., of claimant, to bring the fugitive before a judge within the county where the warrant was issued, or before some State judge with certain cautions as to proving the official character of the officer issuing the warrant; gives the form of warrant, directing the fugitive to be brought before, etc., "to be be dealt with as the law directs."[41]
J. Peck, Esq. [9, Ohio, p. 212], refers to the laws of 1818-19, and 1830-31, as a recognition by the State of Ohio of the power of Congress to pass the act of 1793, though that the act was not specially mentioned.
The first constitution of Ohio [1802] restricted the right of suffrage to "all white male inhabitants." "In all elections, all white male inhabitants above the age of twenty-one years, having resided in the State one year next preceding the election, and who have paid or are charged with a State or county tax, shall enjoy the right of an elector," etc.[42] This was repeated in the Bill of Rights adopted in 1851.[43]
Article iv., Section 2, of the Constitution of the United States says: "The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States." The question as to whether free Negroes were included in the above was discussed at great length in the Dred Scott case, where Chief-Justice Taney took the ground that a Negro was not a citizen under the fourth article of the Constitution. But the fourth article of the Articles of Confederation [1778] recognized free Negroes as citizens. It is given here:
"Art. 4.—The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the people of the different States in this Union, the free inhabitants of each of these States—paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice excepted—shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several States; and the people of each State shall have free ingress and regress to and from any other State, and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and commerce, subject to the same duties, impositions, and restrictions as the inhabitants thereof, respectively; provided that such restrictions shall not extend so far as to prevent the removal of property imported into any State, from any other State, of which the owner is an inhabitant; provided, also, that no imposition, duty, or restriction shall be laid by any State on the property of the United States, or either of them."[44]
By this it is evident that "paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice" were the only persons excluded from the right of citizenship. The following is the history of the Dred Scott case:
"In the year 1834, the plaintiff was a negro slave belonging to Dr. Emerson, who was a surgeon in the army of the United States. In that year, 1834, said Dr. Emerson took the plaintiff from the State of Missouri to the military post at Rock Island, in the State of Illinois, and held him there as a slave until the month of April or May, 1836. At the time last mentioned, said Dr. Emerson removed the plaintiff from said military post at Rock Island to the military post at Fort Snelling, situate on the west bank of the Mississippi River, in the territory known as Upper Louisiana, acquired by the United States of France, and situate north of the latitude of thirty-six degrees thirty minutes north, and north of the State of Missouri. Said Dr. Emerson held the plaintiff in slavery at said Fort Snelling, from said last-mentioned date until the year 1838.
"In the year 1835, Harriet, who is named in the second count of the plaintiff's declaration, was the negro slave of Major Taliaferro, who belonged to the army of the United States. In that year, 1835, said Major Taliaferro took said Harriet to said Fort Snelling, a military post, situated as herein before stated, and kept her there as a slave until the year 1836, and then sold and delivered her as a slave at said Fort Snelling unto the said Dr. Emerson herein before named. Said Dr. Emerson held said Harriet in slavery at said Fort Snelling until the year 1838.
"In the year 1836, the plaintiff and said Harriet at said Fort Snelling, with the consent of said Dr. Emerson, who then claimed to be their master and owner, intermarried, and took each other for husband and wife. Eliza and Lizzie, named in the third count of the plaintiff's declaration, are the fruit of that marriage. Eliza is about fourteen years old, and was born on board the steamboat 'Gipsey,' north of the north line of the State of Missouri, and upon the river Mississippi. Lizzie is about seven years old, and was born in the State of Missouri, at the military post called Jefferson Barracks.
"In the year 1838, said Dr. Emerson removed the plaintiff and said Harriet and their said daughter Eliza from said Fort Snelling to the State of Missouri, where they have ever since resided.
"Before the commencement of this suit, said Dr. Emerson sold and conveyed the plaintiff, said Harriet, Eliza, and Lizzie to the defendant, as slaves, and the defendant has ever since claimed to hold them and each of them as slaves.
"At the time mentioned in the plaintiff's declaration, the defendant, claiming to be owner as aforesaid, laid his hands upon said plaintiff, Harriet, Eliza, and Lizzie, and imprisoned them, doing in this respect, however, no more than what he might lawfully do if they were of right his slaves at such times.
. . . . . . . . .
"It is agreed that Dred Scott brought suit for his freedom in the Circuit Court of St. Louis County; that there was a verdict and judgment in his favor; that on a writ of error to the Supreme Court the judgment below was reversed, and the same remanded to the Circuit Court, where it has been continued to await the decision of this case.
"In May, 1854, the cause went before a jury, who found the following verdict, viz.: 'As to the first issue joined in this case, we of the jury find the defendant not guilty; and as to the issue secondly above joined, we of the jury find that before and at the time when, etc., in the first count mentioned, the said Dred Scott was a negro slave, the lawful property of the defendant; and as to the issue thirdly above joined, we, the jury, find that before and at the time when, etc., in the second and third counts mentioned, the said Harriet, wife of said Dred Scott, and Eliza and Lizzie, the daughters of the said Dred Scott, were negro slaves, the lawful property of the defendant.'
"Whereupon, the court gave judgment for the defendant.
"After an ineffectual motion for a new trial, the plaintiff filed the following bill of exceptions.
"On the trial of this cause by the jury, the plaintiff, to maintain the issues on his part, read to the jury the following agreed statement of facts (see agreement above). No further testimony was given to the jury by either party. Thereupon the plaintiff moved the court to give to the jury the following instructions, viz.:
"'That, upon the facts agreed to by the parties, they ought to find for the plaintiff.' The court refused to give such instruction to the jury, and the plaintiff, to such refusal, then and there duly excepted.
The court then gave the following instruction to the jury, on motion of the defendant:
"'The jury are instructed, that upon the facts in this case, the law is with the defendant.' The plaintiff excepted to this instruction.
"Upon these exceptions, the case came up to the Supreme Court, December term, 1856."[45]
Judge Taney gave the following opinion:
"The question is simply this: Can a negro, whose ancestors were imported into this country and sold as slaves, become a member of the political community formed and brought into existence by the Constitution of the United States, and as such become entitled to all the rights and privileges and immunities guaranteed by that instrument to the citizen? One of which rights is the privilege of suing in a court of the United States in the cases specified in the Constitution.
"It will be observed that the plea applies to that class of persons only whose ancestors were negroes of the African race, and imported into this country, and sold and held as slaves. The only matter in issue before the court, therefore, is, whether the descendants of such slaves, when they shall be emancipated, or who are born of parents who had become free before their birth, are citizens of a State, in the sense in which the word citizen is used in the Constitution of the United States. And this being the only matter in dispute on the pleadings, the court must be understood as speaking in this opinion of that class only, that is, of those persons who are the descendants of Africans who were imported into this country and sold as slaves.
. . . . . . . . .
"We proceed to examine the case as presented by the pleadings.
"The words 'people of the United States' and 'citizens' are synonymous terms, and mean the same thing. They both describe the political body who, according to our republican institutions, form the sovereignty, and who hold the power and conduct the government through their representatives. They are what we familiarly call the 'sovereign people, and every citizen is one of this people, and a constituent member of this sovereignty. The question before us is, whether the class of persons described in the plea in abatement compose a portion of this people, and are constituent members of this sovereignty. We think they are not, and that they are not included, and were not intended to be included, under the word 'citizen' in the Constitution, and can therefore claim none of the rights and privileges which that instrument provides for and secures to citizens of the United States. On the contrary, they were at that time considered as a subordinate [405] and inferior class of beings, who had been subjugated by the dominant race, and, whether emancipated or not, yet remained subject to their authority, and had no rights or privileges but such as those who held the power and the government might choose to grant them.
"It is not the province of the court to decide upon the justice or injustice, the policy or impolicy, of these laws....
"In discussing this question, we must not confound the rights of citizenship which a State may confer within its own limits, and the rights of citizenship as a member of the Union. It does not by any means follow, because he has all the rights and privileges of a citizen of a State, that he must be a citizen of the United States. He may have all of the rights and privileges of the citizen of a State, and yet not be entitled to the rights and privileges of a citizen of any other State. For, previous to the adoption of the Constitution of the United States, every State had the undoubted right to confer on whomsoever it pleased the character of citizen, and to endow him with all its rights. But this character of course was confined to the boundaries of the State, and gave him no rights or privileges in other States beyond those secured to him by the laws of nations and the comity of States. Nor have the several States surrendered the power of conferring these rights and privileges by adopting the Constitution of the United States. Each State may still confer them upon an alien, or any one it thinks proper, or upon any class or description of persons; yet he would not be a citizen in the sense in which that word is used in the Constitution of the United States, nor entitled to sue as such in one of its courts, nor to the privileges and immunities of a citizen in the other States. The rights which he would acquire would be restricted to the State which gave them. The Constitution has conferred on Congress the right to establish an uniform rule of naturalization, and this right is evidently exclusive, and has always been held by this court to be so. Consequently no State, since the adoption of the Constitution, can, by naturalizing an alien, invest him with the rights and privileges secured to a citizen of a State under the Federal Government, although, so far as the State alone was concerned, he would undoubtedly be entitled to the rights of a citizen, and clothed with all the [406] rights and immunities which the Constitution and laws of the State attached to that character.
"It is very clear, therefore, that no State can, by any act or law of its own, passed since the adoption of the Constitution, introduce a new member into the political community created by the Constitution of the United States. It cannot make him a member of this community by making him a member of its own. And, for the same reason, it cannot introduce any person or description of persons who were not intended to be embraced in this new political family, which the Constitution brought into existence, but were intended to be excluded from it.
"The question then arises, whether the provisions of the Constitution, in relation to the personal rights and privileges to which the citizen of a State should be entitled, embraced the negro African race, at that time in this country, or who might afterwards be imported, who had then or should afterwards be made free in any State; and to put it in the power of a single State to make him a citizen of the United States, and indue him with the full rights of citizenship in every other State without their consent. Does the Constitution of the United States act upon him whenever he shall be made free under the laws of a State, and raised there to the rank of a citizen, and immediately clothe him with all the privileges of a citizen in every other State and in its own courts?
"The court think the affirmative of these propositions cannot be maintained. And if it cannot, the plaintiff in error could not be a citizen of the State of Missouri, within the meaning of the Constitution of the United States, and, consequently, was not entitled to sue in its courts."[46]
This decision of the Supreme Court on the plea in abatement that the plaintiff (a Negro, Dred Scott) was not a citizen in the sense of the word in Article iii, Sec. 2 of the Constitution, was based upon an erroneous idea respecting the location of the word citizen in the instrument. The premise of the court was wrong, and hence the feebleness of the reasoning and the false conclusions. Article iii, Section 2 of the Constitution, extends judicial power to all cases, in law and equity, "between citizens of different States, between citizens of the same State," etc. But Article iv, Section 2, declares that "citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States." The plea in abatement was brought under Article iii, but all the judges, except Justice McLean, built their decision upon the word citizen as it stood in Article iv.
By the constitution of Ohio, adopted in 1851, free Negroes were not only denied the right to vote, but were excluded from the militia service. This law was not repealed until 1878.
Neither the constitution of 1802, nor that of 1851, discriminated against free Negroes in matters of education; but separate schools have been maintained in Ohio from the beginning down to the present time, by special acts of the Legislature.
In the territory of Indiana there were quite a number of Negroes from the beginning of the century. Some were slaves. In 1806, the first Legislature, at its second session, passed a law in reference to executions, as follows:
"Sec. 7. And whereas doubts have arisen whether the time of service of negroes and mulattoes, bound to service in this territory, may be sold on execution against the master, Be it therefore enacted that the time of service of such negroes or mulattoes may be sold on execution against the master, in the same manner as personal estate, immediately from which sale the said negroes or mulattoes shall serve the purchaser or purchasers for the residue of their time of service; and the said purchasers and negroes and mulattoes shall have the same remedies against each other as by the laws of the territory are mutually given them in the several cases therein mentioned, and the purchasers shall be obliged to fulfil to the said servants the contracts they made with the masters, as expressed in the indenture or agreement of servitude, and shall, for want of such contract, be obliged to give him or them their freedom due at the end of the time of service, as expressed in the second section of the law of the territory, entitled 'Law concerning servants,' adopted the twenty-second day of September, eighteen hundred and three. This act shall commence and be in force from and after the first day of February next."[47]
This was bold legislation; but it was not all. Negroes were required to carry passes, as in the slave States. And on the 17th of September, 1807, "An Act for the Introduction of Negroes and Mulattoes into" the territory was passed.
"Sec. 1. That it shall and may be lawful for any person being the owner or possessor of any negroes or mulattoes of and above the age of fifteen years, and owning service and labor as slaves in any of the States or territories of the United States, or for any citizens of the said States or territories purchasing the same to bring the said negroes and mulattoes into this territory.
"Sec. 2. The owners or possessors of any negroes or mulattoes as aforesaid, and bringing the same into this territory, shall, within thirty days after such removal, go with the same before the clerk of Court of Common Pleas of proper county, and in presence of said clerk the said owner or possessor shall determine and agree to, and with his or her negro or mulatto, upon the term of years which the said negro or mulatto will and shall serve his or her said owner or possessor, and the clerk shall make a record.
"Sec. 3. If any negro or mulatto removed into this territory as aforesaid shall refuse to serve his or her owner as aforesaid, it shall and may be lawful for such person, within sixty days thereafter, to remove the said negro or mulatto to any place [to] which by the laws of the United States or territory from whence such owner or possessor may [have come] or shall be authorized to remove the same. (As quoted in Phœbe v. Jay, Breese, Ill. R., 208.)
"Sec. 4. An owner failing to act as required in the preceding sections should forfeit all claim and right to the service of such negro or mulatto.
"Sec. 5. Declares that any person removing into this territory and being the owner or possessor of any negro or mulatto as aforesaid, under the age of fifteen years, or if any person shall hereafter acquire a property in any negro or mulatto under the age aforesaid, and who shall bring them into this territory, it shall and may be lawful for such person, owner, or possessor to hold the said negro to service or labor—the males until they arrive at the age of thirty-five, and females until they arrive at the age of thirty-two years.
"Sec. 6. Provides that any person removing any negro or mulatto into this territory under the authority of the preceding sections, it shall be incumbent on such person, within thirty days thereafter, to register the name and age of such negro or mulatto with the clerk of the Court of Common Pleas for the proper county.
"Sec. 7. Requires new registry on removal to another county."
"Secs. 8, 9. Penalties by fine for breach of this act.
"Sec. 10. Clerk to take security that negro be not chargeable when his term expires.
"Sec. 12. Fees.
"Sec. 13. That the children born in said territory of a parent of color owning service or labor, by indenture according to law, should serve the master or mistress of such parent—the males until the age of thirty, and the females until the age of twenty-eight years. (As quoted in Boon v. Juliet, 1836, 1, Scammon, 258.)
"Sec. 14. That an act respecting apprentices misused by their master or mistress should apply to such children. (See the statute cited in Rankin v. Lydia, 2, A. K. Marshall's Ky., 467; and in Jarrot v. Jarrot, 2, Gilman, 19.) This act was repealed in 1810."[48]
Under the first constitution of Indiana, adopted in 1816, Negroes were not debarred from the elective franchise. In Article i, Section 1, of the Bill of Rights, this remarkable language occurs: "That all men are born equally free and independent, and have certain natural, inherent, and unalienable rights," etc. But the very next year the primal rights of the Negro as a citizen were struck down by the following: "No negro, mulatto, or Indian shall be a witness, except in pleas of the State against negroes, mulattoes, or Indians, or in civil cases where negroes, mulattoes, or Indians alone shall be parties."[49]
In 1819 [March 22d], an execution law was passed by which the time of service of Negroes could be sold on execution against the master, in the same manner as personal estate. From the time of the sale, such Negroes or Mulattoes were compelled to serve the buyer until the expiration of the term of service.[50]
In 1831, an act regulating free Negroes and Mulattoes, servants and slaves, declared:
"Sec. 1. Negroes and mulattoes emigrating into the State shall give bond, etc.
"Sec. 2. In failure of this, such negro, etc., may be hired out and the proceeds applied to his benefit, or removed from the State under the poor law.
"Sec. 3. Penalty for committing such without authority.
"Sec. 4. Penalty for harboring such who have not given bond.
"Sec. 5. That the right of any persons to pass through this State, with his, her, or their negroes or mulattoes, servant or servants, when emigrating or travelling to any other State or territory or country, making no unnecessary delay, is hereby declared and secured."[51]
In 1851 the new constitution limited the right of franchise to "white male citizens of the United States." "No negro or mulatto shall have the right of suffrage."
"Art. xii., Sec. 1. The militia shall consist of all able-bodied white male persons, between, etc.
"Art. xiii., Sec. 1. No negro or mulatto shall come into, or settle in the State after the adoption of this Constitution.
"Sec. 2. All contracts made with any negro or mulatto coming into the State contrary to the foregoing section shall be void; and any person who shall employ such negro or mulatto or encourage him to remain in the State shall be fined not less than ten, nor more than five hundred dollars.
"Sec. 3. All fines which may be collected for a violation of the provisions of this article, or of any law hereafter passed for the purpose of carrying the same into execution, shall be set apart and appropriated for the colonization of such negroes and mulattoes and their descendants as may be in the State at the adoption of this Constitution and may be willing to emigrate.
"Sec. 4. The General Assembly shall pass laws to carry out the provisions of this article."
Other severe laws were enacted calculated to modify and limit the rights of free persons of color.
The first constitution of the State of Illinois, adopted in 1818, limited the [Art. ii, Sec. 27] elective franchise to "free white" persons. Article v, Sec. 1, exempted "negroes, mulattoes, and Indians" from service in the militia. In March, 1819, "An Act Respecting Free Negroes, Mulattoes, Servants, and Slaves" passed. Sec. 1 required Negro and Mulatto persons coming into the State to produce a certificate of freedom. Sec. 2 required them to register their family as well as themselves. Sec. 3 required persons bringing slaves into the State, for the purpose of emancipating them, to give bonds. Passes were required of Colored people, and many other hard exactions. The bill above referred to contained twenty-five sections.[52]
On the 6th of January, 1827, a criminal code was enacted for offences committed by Negroes and servants, which contained many cruel features. On the 2d of February a law was passed declaring that all Negroes, Mulattoes, and Indians were incompetent to be witnesses in any court against a white person; and that a person having one fourth part Negro blood shall be adjudged a Mulatto. This law was re-enacted in 1845.[53] In 1853, February 12th, the Legislature of Illinois passed "An Act to Prevent the Immigration of Free Negroes into this State."
"Secs. 1, 2. Fine and imprisonment for bringing slave, for any purpose, into the State. Proviso: 'That this shall not be construed so as to affect persons or slaves, bona fide, travelling through this State from and to any other State in the United States.'
"Sec. 3. Misdemeanor for negro or mulatto, bond or free, to come with intention of residing.
"Sec. 4. Such may be prosecuted and fined or sold, for time, for fine and costs.
"Secs. 5, 6, 7. If such do not afterwards remove, increased fine and like proceedings, etc., etc. Appeal allowed to the circuit.
"Sec. 8. If claimed as fugitive slave, after being thus arrested, a justice of the peace, 'after hearing the evidence, and being satisfied that the person or persons claiming said negro or mulatto is or are the owner or owners of and entitled to the custody of said negro or mulatto, in accordance with the laws of the United States passed upon this subject,' shall give the owner a certificate, after his paying the costs and the negro's unpaid fine, 'and the said owner or agent so claiming shall have a right to take and remove said slave out of the State.'
"Sec. 9. Punishment of justice for nonfeasance, and of witness falsely accusing negro."[54]
While slavery had no legal, constitutional existence in the three border States, there were, in fact, quite a number of slaves within their jurisdiction during the first generation of their existence. And the free people of Color were, first, denied the right of citizenship; second, excluded from the militia service; third, ruled out of the courts whenever their testimony was offered against a white person; fourth, could not come into the free border States without producing a certificate of freedom; and, fifth, were annoyed by many little, mean laws in the exercise of the few rights they were suffered to enjoy. A full description of the infamous "Black Code" of these States would occupy too much space, and, therefore, the dark subject must be dismissed. Posterity shall know, however, how patiently the free Negroes of the Northern States endured the restrictions and proscriptions which law and public sentiment threw across their social and political pathway!