LEIBNIZ AND HERDER
IV, 224: Herder calls Leibniz the greatest man that Germany has produced in later times.
IV, 361: Herder calls Leibniz and Plato the two greatest heads for hypotheses.
VIII, 178: Herder says that no one says it better than Leibniz, that bodies as such are only phenomena of substances, as the Milky Way is of stars and the clouds of drops.
IX, 493: Herder regrets that Leibniz was not sufficiently appreciated by the Germans; most of them in the city in which he lies did not even know where his grave was.
IX, 534: Herder cites Leibniz as saying that human wit and humor are never more effective than in play, and uses this in support of his own belief that the human heart expresses itself most effectively in the nature songs of primitive people.
X, 305: Herder sees the flower of Leibniz in Shaftesbury.
XIII, 199: Herder agrees with Leibniz that the soul is a mirror of the “world-all” and he believes there is a deeper truth in Leibniz’ statement than is usually recognized; i.e., all the forces of a “world-all” lie hidden in the soul, and they need only an organization or a succession of organizations to set them into activity.
XIV, 417: Herder finds support in Leibniz for the statement that the Catholic Church considered the king a protective magistrate under the supremacy of the Pope.
XV, 180: Herder says Leibniz pointed out weak sides of Locke’s philosophy.
XVI, 450: Herder makes the following statements:
1. In Leibniz’ mind were associated fruitful conceptions of all sciences and of all the realms of nature.
2. Leibniz said that one must finally, so far as conceptions of bodies are concerned, come to simple substances, which he calls “Monads.”
3. I (Herder) am convinced that among the three ingenious hypotheses with which he has enriched metaphysics the monad is the most fundamental, and will sometime win a place.
4. Without this indivisible working element, the nature of physical bodies cannot be explained.
XVI, 458: Herder calls Leibniz a “Proteus of Science,” who has done much to unify philosophical truths.
XVI, 606: Herder calls Leibniz, “our immortal Leibniz.”
XVII, 331 ff.: Herder eulogizes Leibniz, emphasizing his theories of play, his mildness and sympathy in criticizing others his youthful, impartial soul.
XVIII, 126: Herder says that Leibniz was the most modest among all the reformers of philosophical thought; he thought that all systems of the ancients could be united because each held something good.
XXI, 19: Herder quotes Leibniz as saying that language is the mirror of human understanding.
XXI, 70 ff.: Herder translates Leibniz’ Ueber Philosophie in der Deutschen Sprache.
XXI, 145: Herder mentions Leibniz’ principles of Identity and Causality.
XXI, 319: Herder translates Leibniz’ Vom philosophischen Vortrag.
XXII, 190: Herder translates Leibniz’ Ueber Macht und Anwendung der Musik.
XXIII, 132: Herder recommends Leibniz’ Neue Versuche über den menschlichen Verstand to young men.
XXIII, 479: Herder says, Leibniz, had he lived to see his original plans revived in the Scientific Society in Berlin, probably would have arranged a System der Völker nach Sprachen und Bildungen. This method of studying history by going to natural environments and to the sources is sufficiently in accord with Herder’s ideas to call forth the prophecy that what the past century had omitted in this respect the future would do.
XXIII, 483: Herder, referring to Leibniz’ system of Monaden, prästabilirten Harmonie u. f., says that no one doubts that there is much that is true and beautiful in it; no one dares deny a world of souls and a harmony between mind and body; there is no doubt that there are pure conceptions in which thoughts are considered only as workings or developments of the soul, and, on the other hand, the laws of the world of bodies are considered as mechanical and artificial.
XXIV, 267: Herder notes Leibniz’ romantic attitude, observing that Leibniz regretted the decline in the feeling of courage and honor and that he counseled a return to the deeds and voices and models of the past to reawaken these.
XXV, 88: Herder says if Leibniz found human wit and humor most real and effective in play, certainly he (Herder) is justified, in finding the most faithful reproductions of traditions, language, and customs at the point where truth and delight meet; i.e., in song.
XXX, 135: Herder calls Leibniz the greatest man that Germany has had.
XXX, 258: Herder has remarked frequently upon Leibniz’ theory that the human mind is never more clear-sighted and disposed to activity than in play. He analyzes the thought here, and it is worth considering because it hinges closely upon Herder’s philosophy which causes him to seek genuine Volk character in methods of expression which are natural rather than artificial.
He asks, Why is it that there is this connection between our innermost selves and pleasure and joy? Many forms of play are so difficult and fatiguing, others are subject to such strict rules; just because they demand this is the form of play interesting for those who like it. It becomes pleasant because it keeps both soul and body constantly and interchangeably busied. In the progress of being occupied lies an indefinable pleasure; we feel the happy progressiveness by which our forces are strengthened and grow. The more frequently this interchange takes place, the more do we realize our forces enriched.
XXIII, 154: Herder says Shaftesbury sent to Leibniz the former’s works and that Leibniz found in them his own system.
XXIII, 461: Herder praises Leibniz’ efforts in behalf of the Royal Scientific Society in Berlin.
XXIII, 468 ff.: Herder has written an essay on Leibniz in which he reviews the work of the latter under the following heads: Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: (1) Theologie und Religion; (2) Rechtsgelehrsamkeit und Politik; (3) Geschichte, Alterthümer, Sprachen; (4) Mathematik und Physik; and (5) Die erste Philosophie.
Herder’s own comments in certain parts of this series of expositions are important in this connection.
1. Theology and religion.—Leibniz’ proof of Christianity Herder finds was based upon natural religion; after firmly laying the foundation of this natural religion, one should show the necessity of a revealed religion, then the superior beauty of the Christian religion, surpassing as it does all other religions. Leibniz sees atheism as well as materialism, to say nothing of the disparagement or mockery of Christendom, as the herald of a barbarism with which is bound up the decay of honor and morality. Herder’s comment upon this is: How faithfully have succeeding times proved this to be true! Leibniz, he continues, would rejoice if he could see the Bible so clarified, every one of its books interpreted in the light and spirit of its own time and above all the subtleties foreign to the sense and content of Christianity removed—all this, such as it was in his own day, is Herder’s idea. Important to note here is the return to nature as a foundation for Christianity, and to natural environment for the interpretation of Christian teachings.
2. Jurisprudence and statesmanship.—Here Herder finds that Leibniz became a real teacher der Völker through his work, Codex des allgemeinen Völkerrechts. Just as Leibniz in his opposition to Puffendorf founds man’s natural rights upon eternal principles of right and reason, so he carries these on into the so-called “voluntary rights of peoples” to which he adds in the Christian Republic a divine, positive right.
This divine, positive right Herder admits was, in the beginnings of the Christian republic, conceived of as being embodied in the emperor as head of the state. But, says he, Leibniz’ great thought was true; true in the sense that this divine, positive right is that which made itself evident long before the French Revolution.
He asks, Does Christendom teach anything other than pure humanity? It must be founded upon humanity which is also Leibniz’ Codex des Völkerrechts.
It is clear, continues the commentator, that what a nation demands or wishes from another it must also offer; force, faithlessness, and bold arrogance of one toward the other enrage all nations. This Codex des Völkerrechts is written in the breasts of all human beings. Wherever his view was unobstructed, he saw clearly the political relationships of Europe, and prophesied much that followed.
The natural rights of mankind to be applied to humanity through states and nations, then, is what Herder notes at this point in Leibniz.
3. History, antiquities, languages.—Herder notes here that Leibniz liked above everything else in History the origins of races, Uranfänge der Völker, which led to their antiquities and language stocks. This accounts for his diligence in comparison and derivation of languages and in etymologies. Herder reminds us that a family tree of languages has been established since Leibniz’ time through the Russian journeys in Northern Asia, continuous news from China, the investigations of the English in India, and other studies made in Tibet, Persia, Arabia, Egypt, Africa, America, and the Southern world.
XXXII, 226: Herder’s discussion of Leibniz’ monad:
A monad is said to be able to change its representations (Vorstellungen) and it must change them in accordance with its fundamental force; now if these representations are nothing but external rapports, must there not lie in the fundamental force also the foundation of perceptibility of the external and the foundation of the constantly changing perceptibility?... If therefore, the soul is a living mirror of the universe then it must not reflect this universe from within itself outward.... But there must be an internal cause in every soul which accounts for the part of the universe which the soul looks upon and which cannot be sought in a third being, the cause of both.
Everywhere there is life; everywhere life is connected with organs, and where would the cause of the connection lie? Not in the life; not in the organ. Where then? A Deus ex machina must be called which contains the cause of the connection of both so that neither of these (life, organ) contain anything of this cause, and that is contradiction. One monad is said to rule over the others and over many others without there being in any one the cause of change which is in the other. A monad is said to heighten its forces just so much as its body heightens its own organization.
Now still this interconnected increase is to contain nothing in the one for the other; not causa efficiens, not conditio sine qua non, only simultaneousness. How unbelieveable! If the adjustment of the organs extends to the making of a certain relief or difference, then such a relief or difference in the perceptions and all the connecting comes about without internal cause, only one cause to explain so many effects which are scarcely covered by it. It seems to me the world would be incomparably simpler and more manifold if in every monad were the cause for its connection and all of its changes.
It seems evident that Herder accepts much of Leibniz’ theory of the monad. The important point of departure is expressed in the two sentences:
1. But there must be an internal cause in every soul which accounts for the part of the universe which that soul looks over and which cannot be sought in a third being, the cause of both.
2. The world would be simpler and more manifold if in every monad were the cause for its connection and all its changes. It is at this point of departure that we see Herder’s emphasis on innate potentialities, which are fundamentally different, taking shape. Here are individuality and spontaneity in incipiency.