PURPOSE OF "ENCIRCLEMENT"
Thus England, France, and Russia had, though for different reasons, an aim in common—viz., to overthrow Germany. England wished to do so for commercial-political reasons, France on account of her policy of revenge, Russia because she was a satellite of France and also for reasons of internal politics and because she wished to reach the southern sea. These three great nations, therefore, were bound to act together. The union of these ambitions in a common course of action, duly planned, is what we call the "policy of encirclement."
Added to all this there was also the Gentlemen's Agreement which has only recently come to light and has already been thoroughly discussed in the "Hohenlohe" chapter; concerning this agreement I knew absolutely nothing during my reign, and the German Foreign Office was only superficially and unreliably informed.
When I learned of it, I immediately sought information about it from Herr von Bethmann. He wrote me a rather puzzling letter to the effect that there was surely something about it among the documents of the Foreign Office; that the German ambassador at that time in Washington, von Holleben, had made some confidential report on it, to be sure, but had not given his source of information, wherefore the Foreign Office had not attached any importance to the matter and had not reported further on it to me. Hence the said agreement had actually no influence upon Germany's policy, but it constitutes supplementary proof that the Anglo-Saxon world as far back as 1897 had combined against us, and thereby explains a number of obstacles encountered by Germany in her foreign policy. It also explains America's attitude in the war.
We were quite well acquainted, on the other hand, with the Entente Cordiale, its foundations and purposes, and it decisively influenced the course of our policy.
In view of the grouping of England, France, and Russia—three very strong powers—only one political course lay open to Germany, the threat of deciding Germany's future by force of arms must be avoided until we had secured for ourselves such an economic, military, naval, and national-political position in the world as to make it seem advisable to our opponents to refrain from risking a decision by arms and to yield us the share in the apportionment and management of the world to which our ability entitled us. We neither desired nor were we entitled to jeopardize our hard-won welfare.
The aims of the Entente could be attained only through a war, those of Germany only without a war. It is necessary to hold fast to this basic idea; it is of more decisive value than all accessory matters. Hence I shall not go into detail here, nor take up Belgian or other reports, nor the telegrams sent just before the outbreak of war. The thorough treatment of these details lies in the domain of research.
In Germany our situation was correctly understood, and we acted accordingly.