REPROACHES FOR JAPAN
The able statesmen of Japan, of whom there are quite a number, must be in some doubt as to whether they ranged their country on the right side in the war. Yes, they will perhaps ask themselves whether it would not have been more advantageous for Japan to have prevented the World War. This would have been within her powers, had she ranged herself firmly and unequivocally on the side of the Central Powers, from which in former times she had learned so willingly and so much.
Had Japan adopted soon enough such an orientation in her foreign policy, and, like Germany, fought by peaceful means for her share in world trade and activity, I should have put the "yellow peril" away in a corner and joyfully welcomed into the circle of peacefully inclined nations the progressive Japanese nation, the "Prussians of the East." Nobody regrets more than I that the "yellow peril" had not already lost its meaning when the crisis of 1914 arose. The experience derived from the World War may yet bring this about.
Germany's joint action with France and Russia at Shimonoseki was based upon Germany's situation in Europe. Wedged in between on-marching Russia, threatening Prussia's frontier, and France, fortifying her borders anew with forts and groups of fortresses, confronted with a friendship between these two nations resembling an alliance, Berlin looked with anxiety into the future. The warlike preparations of the two powers were far ahead of ours, their navies far more modern and powerful than the German navy, which consisted of a few old ships almost without fighting value. Therefore it seemed to us wise to acquiesce in the suggestion of this strong group, in order that it might not—should we decline—turn immediately to England and cause the entry of the latter into the combination. This would have meant the formation, at that time, of the combination of 1914, which would have been a serious matter for Germany. Japan, on the other hand, was about to go over anyhow to England, in her sympathies. Moreover, Germany's making common cause with the Franco-Russian group offered the possibility of achieving gradually a more trusting and less strained relationship in Europe and of living side by side with our two neighbors there in more friendliness, as a result of the common policy, adopted in the Far East. The policy adopted by us at this juncture was also consistently based on the maintenance of world peace.
In the entire Kiao-Chau question, Prince Hohenlohe, despite his age, evinced a capacity for sticking steadily to his purpose and a degree of resolution which must be reckoned as greatly to his credit.
Unfortunately in the matter of the Kruger dispatch his prudence and his vision, so clear on other occasions, abandoned him: only by so assuming is his obstinate insistence on the sending of this dispatch to be understood. The influence of such an energetic and eloquent personage as Herr von Marschall, former State Attorney, may have been so powerful, the siren song of Herr von Holstein so convincing, that the Prince yielded to them. In any event, he did his country an ill turn in this matter, and damaged me seriously both in England and at home.
THE KRUGER TELEGRAM[5]
Since the so-called Kruger dispatch made a big stir and had serious political consequences, I shall tell the story of it in detail.
The Jameson raid caused great and increasing excitement in Germany. The German nation was outraged at this attempt to overpower a little nation, which was Dutch—and, hence, Lower Saxon-German in origin—and to which we were sympathetic because of racial relationship. I was much worried at this violent excitement, which also seized upon the higher classes of society, foreseeing possible complications with England. I believed that there was no way to prevent England from conquering the Boer countries, should she so desire, although I also was convinced that such a conquest would be unjust. But I was unable to overcome the reigning excitement, and was even harshly judged by my intimates on account of the attitude I adopted.
One day when I had gone to my uncle, the Imperial Chancellor, for a conference, at which the Secretary of State for the Navy, Admiral Hollmann, was present, Freiherr Marschall, one of the Secretaries of State, suddenly appeared in high excitement, with a sheet of paper in his hand. He declared that the excitement among the people—in the Reichstag, even—had grown to such proportions that it was absolutely necessary to give it outward expression, and that this could best be done by a telegram to Kruger, a rough draft of which he had in his hand.
I objected to this, being supported by Admiral Hollmann. At first the Imperial Chancellor remained passive in the debate. In view of the fact that I knew how ignorant Freiherr Marschall and the Foreign Office were of English national psychology, I sought to make clear to Freiherr Marschall the consequences which such a step would have among the English; in this, likewise, Admiral Hollmann seconded me. But Marschall was not to be dissuaded.
Then, finally, the Imperial Chancellor took a hand. He remarked that I, as a constitutional ruler, must not stand out against the national consciousness and against my constitutional advisers; otherwise, there was danger that the excited attitude of the German people, deeply outraged in its sense of justice and also in its sympathy for the Dutch, might cause it to break down the barriers and turn against me personally. Already, he said, statements were flying about among the people; it was being said that the Emperor was, after all, half an Englishman, with secret English sympathies; that he was entirely under the influence of his grandmother, Queen Victoria; that the dictation emanating from England must cease once for all; that the Emperor must be freed from English tutelage, etc.