THE COSSACK'S TESTIMONY
10. Prince Tundutoff, Hetman of the Calmuck Cossacks living between Tsaritsin and Astrakhan, who was, before and during the war, personal aid of the Grand Duke Nicholas Nicholaievitch, came to General Headquarters at Bosmont in 1918, seeking to establish connection with Germany, since the Cossacks were not Slavs at all and thoroughly hostile to the Bolsheviki.
He stated that he had been sent by Nicholas Nicholaievitch, before the outbreak of war, to the General Staff, in order to keep the Grand Duke posted on happenings there and that he had been a witness of the notorious telephone talks between the Tsar and the Chief of the General Staff, General Januskevitch; that the Tsar, deeply impressed by the earnest telegram of the German Emperor, had resolved to forbid mobilization and had ordered Januskevitch by telephone not to carry out mobilization, i. e., to break it off; that the latter had not obeyed the unmistakable order, but had inquired by telephone of Sazonoff, Minister of Foreign Affairs—with whom, for weeks, he had kept in touch, intrigued and incited to war—what he was to do now; that Sazonoff had answered that the Tsar's order was nonsense, that all the General need do was to carry out mobilization, that he [Sazonoff] would bring the Tsar around again next day and talk him out of heeding the stupid telegram from the German Emperor; that, thereupon, Januskevitch had informed the Tsar that mobilization was already under way and could no longer be broken off.
Prince Tundutoff added: "This was a lie, for I myself saw the mobilization order lying beside Januskevitch on his writing table, which shows that it had not as yet been given out at all."
The psychologically interesting point about the above is that Tsar Nicholas, who helped prepare the World War and had already ordered mobilization, wished to recede at the last moment. My earnest, warning telegram, it seems, made him realize clearly for the first time the colossal responsibility which he was bringing upon himself by his warlike preparations. Therefore, he wished to stop the war machine, the murderer of entire peoples, which he had just set in motion. This would have been possible and peace might have been preserved if Sazonoff had not frustrated his wish.
When I asked whether the Grand Duke, who was known as a German-hater, had incited much to war, the Cossack chief replied that the Grand Duke had certainly worked zealously for war, but that incitement on his part would have been superfluous, since there was already a strong sentiment against Germany all through the Russian officer corps; that this spirit was transmitted, principally, from the French army to the Russian officers; that there had been a desire, in fact, to go to war in 1908-09 (Bosnian Question), but France was not then ready; that, in 1914, Russia, likewise, was not quite ready; that Januskevitch and Sukhomlinoff had really planned the war for 1917, but Sazonoff and Isvolsky, as well as the French, could not be restrained any longer; that the former two were afraid of revolution in Russia and of the influence of the German Emperor on the Tsar, which might dissuade the Tsar from the idea of waging war; and that the French, who were sure, for the time being, of England's help, were afraid that England might come to an understanding later on with Germany at the expense of France.
When I asked whether the Tsar had been aware of the warlike spirit in Russia and had tolerated it, the Cossack Prince answered that it was worthy of note that the Tsar had forbidden once for all, as a matter of precaution, the inviting of German diplomats or military attachés to luncheons or evening meals given by Russian officers at which he himself was to be present.