The Problem of Foreign Policy / A Consideration of Present Dangers and the Best Methods for Meeting Them

by Gilbert Murray

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

We have considered many parts of the world and many aspects of the present world settlement to see what seeds of future war may now be germinating and what means we have of making them harmless. And in every case we are brought back to the one great creative idea which this war has produced, the League of Nations. The earlier notions of the League, as issued, for example, about the year 1909 by certain American bodies, centred upon the development of compulsory mediation or arbitration and the setting up of a recognized permanent Court of International Law. The flaw in this conception, operating alone, is a certain rigidity and barrenness. It left states to work separately until they quarrelled or saw a quarrel approaching, and only then, when the atmosphere was already bad, it expected them to meet and accept arbitration. A great addition to this was Sir Edward Grey's conception, already put in practice during the Balkan Wars, of an extended entente cordiale embracing all Europe and America. In his time France and England, England and America, England and Italy, had formed a habit of cordiality and frank dealing. When any trouble arose, the ambassadors had the habit of meeting freely and discussing the trouble with perfect frankness, almost as members of the same Ministry might do. This tendency was helped by the enormous increase in international conferences, commissions, and bureaux. And during the Balkan crisis of 1912-13 it was in process of being extended to include Germany. Thus there was the habit of frequent coöperation and mutual confidence. Unfortunately, this friendly spirit depended on all parties being generally content with the present condition of affairs; Germany was not content, and so the entente idea was balked. Under the League the nations are already forming a habit of consultation and coöperation on non-controversial matters which should be of immense help in dealing with differences when they arise. Another great formative idea was contributed by General Smuts, the principle of the mandate. He foresaw that there would be at the end of the war an immense appropriation of tropical colonies; he knew that the rivalry of the Great Powers for the possession of such colonies was one of the chief sources of international strife; and he saw that the right outlet was to put an end to the treatment of colonies as "possessions" or mere sources of wealth to the colonizing Power. The populations that are not able to stand alone should be taken in trust by the whole League of Nations, which should appoint a particular Power in each particular case to carry out the trust. Again, the great stirring of discontent among the labouring classes in almost all parts of the world led to the formation of a special International Commission on Labour, which has so far met with great success. It will in general have the effect of raising the conditions of the most backward peoples to something like the level of the best.

And lastly, when all these things were in train, the policy for which both Great Britain and the late Czar of Russia had striven so long and vainly would at last become feasible, and the nations might consent to disarm.

Thus the Covenant of the League, an unpretentious but well-considered document, the result of repeated criticism and study by many of the best minds in Europe and America, attempts to meet and check all the visible and predictable causes of war.

There should be no wars of ambition. They are to be met by absolute coercion. The League can make it certain that deliberate war undertaken for national aggrandizement will end, not in profit, but in ruinous loss.

There should be no wars caused by the irresistible desire to escape from foreign oppression or intolerable conditions. They are made unnecessary by provisions enabling any oppressed nation to lay its case before the Assembly or Council and obtain such redress as the most disinterested tribunal can give.

A war which is caused by the emergence of some clash of interest or unforeseen dispute between two states cannot, in the nature of things, be made absolutely impossible. The League opposes to that danger, not a blank wall, but, as it were, a series of springs calculated to exhaust its force; a court for points of law, mediation for points of policy, compulsory delay and reconsideration for all disputes whatsoever. It will be a strange dispute which, given honest intentions on both sides, lasts through all the checks provided by Articles XII to XVII and plunges nations into war at the end of them.

Wars caused by rivalry for the possession of colonies and rebellions caused in colonies by unjust exploitation are, as far as regards mandated areas, provided against by Article XXII; for the other colonial territories, which do not come under a mandate, at least the way of safety is shown.

Wars caused, or made more likely, by the mutual prejudices of nations, by their habit of working always apart and in secrecy, are met by the immense field of international coöperation which the League proposes, and its absolute insistence upon frank interchange of information.

Wars caused by exclusive tariffs or national monopolies of material are in part provided against by Articles XXII and XXIII and in part by XI.

Wars which might be caused by domestic revolutions, as in Russia, are made less likely by the Labour Commission, which assures a remedy for any labour conditions in a particular country which are so bad as to incur the active condemnation of the world.

But it is impossible by mere enumeration to be sure of meeting all the causes from which some new war may start. The League, in the last resort, falls back on the mutual trust and good-will of its members, and particularly of its members' representatives, secured partly by the common interest in peace and partly by the habit of coöperation for ordinary affairs. The esprit de corps of the League's permanent Secretariat, with a professional interest in the preservation of peace and good-will, is a new and important factor in the world's life. Any member of the League has the right to bring to the attention of the Assembly or Council "any circumstance whatever affecting international relations which threatens to disturb international peace or the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends."

In America the Covenant of the League is apt to be represented as a terribly drastic and tyrannical document. Cartoons show John Bull, or some equally repulsive abstraction, dressed in khaki, dragging away American youths to fight enemies of the League in remote parts of Asia or Africa. But on this side of the Atlantic it is generally criticized for not being drastic enough. It does not make war formally impossible. It does not bind all its members to make war on any Covenant-breaker. It does not even bind any member of the League to accept the decision of the majority. It leaves its members almost as free as if they were outside. They are pledged to accept, if they ask for it, a decision of the International Court; they are pledged to the principle of mandate; they are pledged to boycott any deliberate war-maker. But that is practically all. The League's true weapon is not force, but publicity.

The truth is, and it is a truth of fundamental importance in political matters, that no structure can be more rigid than the material of which it is made. Engagements between human beings must needs be as elastic as human nature itself. Had the Covenant laid down that every member of the League was to make war or peace, or change its foreign policy, in obedience to the majority of the Council or Assembly and in disregard of the wishes of its own parliament, the result would have been either that no nations would join such a League or that, if they did, the League would break at the first strain.

The principles laid down in the Covenant are, in the judgment of the present writer, principles long recognized and absolutely right. If generally acted on, they will prevent war. If generally neglected and broken, they will allow wars to ensue. This fact seems to be pretty generally recognized among the more reputable statesmen of Europe. But it remains unfortunately true that they are principles implying a considerably higher standard of international morality than has hitherto been consistently observed by any nations, even the best. If absolute fidelity to the Covenant by all its signatories were necessary for the peace of the world, the world would have a very poor prospect before it. What we must aim at is as much fidelity as possible. There are great difficulties. America is absent. Germany and Russia are absent. France cannot yet quite escape from her war psychology. But if Great Britain is faithful, it will be hard for other nations to be obviously and grossly false. The European neutrals, like Switzerland, Holland, and Norway, will be clear voices for justice and fair dealing. The beaten nations, when once admitted, will probably be on the same side, since when wrong-doing begins it is the weak who are first to suffer. And, after all, all human beings have a strong dislike of injustice, when they do not directly gain by it. The great majority of the fifty-one members of the League will be disinterested on most questions of dispute, and will therefore form a good tribunal of opinion.

But the mere clash of contrary selfishnesses produces no sound equilibrium. The League will not succeed unless in some of the great nations, above all in Great Britain, there are at the head of affairs statesmen who believe firmly in the principles of the League and are capable both of effort and of self-sacrifice for the sake of them, and behind the statesmen a strong and intelligent determination in the mass of the people to see that the League is made genuinely the leading force in international politics.

The present disorder of the world is one of those in which the remedy is not obscure, but perfectly ascertained. The only difficulty lies in applying it. The nations of the world must coöperate; and for that they must trust one another; and for that the only way is for each Government separately to be worthy of trust.

It will be long, no doubt, before this end is consummated or even approached. The foregoing pages have shown how far from perfect is the practice of even the most stable and advanced nations. And the tendencies set up by the war, with its infinite reactions and ramifications, are almost all such as to make vastly more difficult in each case the necessary effort towards good faith and good-will. Yet, if the difficulties are greater, the necessity is greater also; and after all the war has brought its inspirations as well as its corruptions. The craving for this Peace which has not come is, I believe, still the unspoken and often unconscious motive of millions who seem, at first glance, to be only brawling for revenges or revolutions; it lies, like a mysterious torment, at the heart of this storm-tossed and embittered world, crying for it knows not what.

THE END

FOOTNOTES

[1] The other points were briefly: Evacuation of Russia: restoration of Belgium; of France; transference of Alsace-Lorraine; territorial settlement of Italy; autonomy of peoples of Austria-Hungary; settlement of Balkan States; of Turkey; restoration of Poland; and lastly a League of Nations—though President Wilson never used that somewhat inaccurate phrase. I should like to acknowledge here my indebtedness to the admirable and convenient series of publications issued by the American Association for International Conciliation, 407 West 117th Street, New York.

[2] See Keynes, pp. 60-102. A provision was kept enabling all such private property to be confiscated in case the German Government should "voluntarily fail" to fulfil its engagements. But this also was dropped by the British Government in October, 1920.

[3] The Allies are apparently acting under Part VIII, clause 18, of the treaty. This gives them the right to "take such other measures as the respective Governments may determine to be necessary" in case of "voluntary default" by Germany in the payment of her dues under Part VIII (Reparations). A failure by Germany to disarm sufficiently gives the Allies no right to increase the area of their occupation, since the present occupation is specifically laid down in the treaty negotiations as the means of enforcing disarmament. Nor has Germany yet actually committed a voluntary default in the payment of her reparations, since the first payment, £100,000,000, is not to be completed until May 1, 1921. I am informed on high authority that the Allied case probably rests on the point that they judge by their debtor's manner and by statements which she has made that she intends not to pay by May 1; according to English law this would apparently give them some right of taking immediate action.

[4] The remnants of the more distinguished "intellectuals" are now gathered into two or three "salvage houses" and looked after by Maxim Gorky. [He has now fled.]

[5] Except in Mandates C (Pacific Islands, etc.), where Australia successfully refused to submit to any economic restrictions. See, however, the definite pledge given by the Allied Reply, p. [78], above.

---

BOOKS FOR FURTHER READING

The Series published by the American Association for International Conciliation, 1-150, comprising the text of all the most important official statements, treaties, agreements, etc., dealing with International Affairs.

The League of Nations Union pamphlets for Study Circles: The League and its Guarantees, by Gilbert Murray; The League in the East by Arnold Toynbee; The League and Labour, by Delisle Burns; Economic Functions of the League, by Norman Angell; Mandates and Empire, by Leonard Woolf; The Future of the Covenant, by G. Lowes Dickinson.

The League of Nations, Nine Essays, by Viscount Grey and others. Oxford University Press, 1919.

The Idea of a League of Nations, H. G. Wells and others, for the Research Committee of the League of Nations Union. Oxford Press, 1917.

Economic Foundations of Peace, J. L. Garvin. Macmillan, 1917.

Report of the International Financial Conference, printed for the League of Nations. Brussels, 1920.

Complete Official Proceedings of the same, 3 vols. London and Brussels.

Report of the Economic Conference summoned by the Fight the Famine Council.

Foreign Policy of Sir Edward Grey, Gilbert Murray. Clarendon Press, Oxford.

A Century of British Foreign Policy, G. P. Gooch and Canon Masterman. Allen and Unwin.

Economic Consequences of the Peace Treaty, J. Maynard Keynes. Macmillan, 1919.

The Making of the Reparation and Economic Sections of the Treaty, B. M. Baruch. Harpers, 1920.

The Choice Before Us, G. Lowes Dickinson. Allen and Unwin, 1918.

Causes of International War, G. Lowes Dickinson. Swarthmore Press.

International Politics, Delisle Burns. Methuen, 1920.

International Government, L. S. Woolf. Allen and Unwin.

Empire and Commerce in Africa, L. S. Woolf. Allen and Unwin.

The War of Steel and Gold, H. N. Brailsford. 1913.

After the Peace, by H. N. Brailsford. 1920.

The Eastern Question, J. A. R. Marriott. Oxford Press, 1917.

The Official Reports of the First Meeting of the Assembly of the League of Nations, Nov. 15-Dec. 18, 1920, are most instructive, and will probably be published in book form.

The Riverside Press
CAMBRIDGE . MASSACHUSETTS
U.S.A.

Transcriber's Notes

Original spelling, including that of proper names retained.

Minor punctuation errors and omissions corrected.

Page 105 "for the conside ation" changed to "for the consideration"