The Battle of Atlanta / and Other Campaigns, Addresses, Etc.

by Grenville Mellen Dodge

LETTER TO GENERAL RAUM

Correcting Some Statements
In
General Green B. Raum's
Description of the Battle of Atlanta
Published
In the National Tribune, Washington, D. C.
September 25, 1902

My Dear General:

Referring to my conversation with you in Washington, I will endeavor to aid you in getting at the actual facts connected with the Battle of Atlanta, as it has never yet been properly written up.

I delivered an address on September 25th, 1889, to the Army of the Tennessee on that battle, copy of which I am sending to you, and from which I think you can get a good deal of information.

I first want to call your attention to the fact that the battle commenced about fifteen minutes after 12 o'clock, and that the Sixteenth Army Corps fought a long time before the Seventeenth Corps was attacked. You can verify this statement by reading General Strong's account of the battle, which is given in our Army of the Tennessee records, volume 11 to 13, page 242.

It was just 12 o'clock exactly when I reached Fuller's headquarters. Having gone to the front to select my position, Fuller asked me to stop and take luncheon, and I got down from my horse and went into his tent. I had sat down at the table when I heard skirmish firing in the rear. Fuller said it was a lot of the boys out there killing hogs. The stillness had been oppressive as we went clear to the left and front of Blair's line to select my new position. We inquired from the pickets and found that nobody had seen anything of the enemy. It made an impression on us all; so the moment I heard this firing I jumped up, as if by instinct, and told Fuller to get into line, and sent a staff officer towards Sweeney; but before he hardly got out of the tent Sweeney was in line and fighting, so you can see how sudden the attack was.

In volume 11 to 13 of the Army of the Tennessee records, page 243, Strong, in his address on the Battle of Atlanta, has this to say fixing the time of the commencement of the battle, speaking of the time when an officer was sent with an order to me from McPherson:

The officer had hardly disappeared from sight, when a shot was heard to the left and rear of us, then another, followed quickly by a rattling volley of small arms, and at almost the same instant a shell came crashing through the tree-tops near us, followed by a rapid and incessant firing from Dodge's Corps. At the first shots every officer sprang to his feet and called for his horse. The time, I should think, was ten or fifteen minutes past 12 o'clock.

Then after speaking of the fighting of this Division, comes this, on page 243:

After the two attempts to break the Sixteenth Corps had failed, General McPherson sent me to General Blair to ascertain the condition of affairs along his line, and instructed me to say to General Giles A. Smith to hold his position; that he would order up troops to occupy the gap between the Seventeenth and Sixteenth Corps; and also saying as I left him that he would remain with his orderly where he then was (a commanding position on Dodge's right) until I returned. I rode rapidly through the woods towards the Seventeenth Corps and found General Blair with General Giles A. Smith near the extreme left of the Fourth Division (Hall's Brigade).

This conclusively shows that Blair was not attacked until after two attacks had been made upon me, although Hall's report gives the attack upon Blair as at 12 o'clock, that time being before the Sixteenth Corps was attacked. Fuller gives the time of attack upon him as 12:30. By reading all of page 243 you will get a full and clear idea of time and everything. The time was also taken by my staff and record made of it, and that agrees with Strong. This only shows how far apart officers can get as to time in a great battle, and on many things, unless correct data is made of record on the spot.

On page 484, of volume 14 to 16 of Society of the Army of the Tennessee records, General Leggett says:

Both divisions of the Sixteenth Army Corps immediately became hotly engaged.... Just at this time I espied General McPherson upon the high ground in the immediate rear of General Fuller's command, and sent Captain John B. Raymond of my staff to inquire of General McPherson the expediency of having General Giles A. Smith and myself change our line so as to face south, and at the same time I sent Captain George W. Porter to ascertain whether or not the left of General Smith and the right of General Fuller were sufficiently near together to antagonize any force seeking entrance there.... The enemy in front of the Sixteenth Corps rallied in the woods (this is after the first attack) and renewed their attack with increased vigor and bitterness.... The conflict continued for some time, with no appearance on either side of any disposition to yield the ground, when the enemy gave way, and fell back in confusion, followed by the Sixteenth Corps.... The second assault (upon the Sixteenth Corps) was simultaneous with the attack upon General Giles A. Smith's Division, which was the left of the Seventeenth Corps.

You will note from my address that the moment I was attacked I sent an aide, and afterwards a signal officer named Sheffly (I think), who was detailed with me that day, or happened to be with me. These officers had gone to General Giles A. Smith, who commanded Blair's left, Fourth Division, Seventeenth Corps, to get him to refuse his left and join my right. I think the first officer I sent was Captain Jonas of my staff, who returned immediately to me, and General Giles A. Smith sent me word that he would refuse. That was a long time before Cleburn's Division got between us; but, as my paper and your article show, McPherson had sent word to Giles A. Smith without knowing the condition in his front, to hold his position, stating that he would send reinforcements to fill the gap between Fuller and himself. Of course, had McPherson been there earlier and seen what I saw, he would have had Smith's left join my right immediately, which would have put Cleburn in front of us instead of between us. That is one of the things that occur in battle that the person on the ground knows better than the one distant. It was on the third attack on my line that the enemy struck Blair, as Strong did not go to Blair until after the repulse of the second attack. Cleburn's force got right in behind Blair's left and picked up that portion of his line that was refused, and swept back his force so that Blair's left, even before Waglin of the Fifteenth Corps got there, was pretty nearly an extension of but a quarter of a mile away from Fuller's right, and after I got through fighting I had to withdraw my entire right quite a distance to connect with Waglin and Blair, as Cleburn's force had pressed clear beyond me and before he was halted was way in the rear of my right.

After the second attack, Cleburn, as he pressed through the gap between Fuller and Smith, forced Fuller to change front and use part of his force to protect his flank, and the Sixty-fourth Illinois in this movement captured the skirmish-line that killed McPherson, taking from them his field-glass, orders, and other papers that they had taken from McPherson's body; and later in the day I sent these to General Sherman. See report Sixty-fourth Illinois, volume 38, part 3, War Records, page 494. Fuller's maps, page 480, volume 38, part 3, War Records, show where Fuller fought, and where we had to intrench.

Where I stood in my line I could see the entire Confederate force, and all of my own, something that very seldom occurs, and, of course, the scene, as Blair states, was a magnificent one. I saw Fuller do a most gallant act. I sent an aide to him with instructions to charge, but before he got there Walker's division broke the center of Fuller's Brigade, his own regiment, the Twenty-seventh Ohio, falling back. I saw Fuller get down off his horse, grab the colors of the Twenty-seventh, rush to the front with them in his hands, and call upon his regiment to come to the colors; and they rallied and saved his front. It was but a moment later that I saw Walker, who commanded the division that was attacking Fuller, fall from his horse, and the division broke and went into the woods. The action of Fuller was very gallant, and has been painted, and I have a copy of the painting in my room.

Blair in his report has this to say of the fighting, which shows that he watched us a long time before he was attacked; and if you will read his report carefully, you will see that it bears out my statements in full:

I started to go back to my command and witnessed the fearful assault made on the Sixteenth Army Corps, and its prompt and gallant repulse by that command. It was a most fortunate circumstance for the whole army that the Sixteenth Army Corps occupied the position I have attempted to describe at the moment of attack, and although it does not belong to me to report upon the bearing and conduct of the officers and men of that Corps, still I cannot withhold my expression of admiration for the manner in which this command met and repulsed the repeated and persistent attacks of the enemy. The attack upon our flank was made by the whole of Hardee's Corps.

I speak in my address of Mercer's Brigade fighting on three parts of the field. Mercer, after helping to retake the Decatur-road line, camped right in the rear of the Fifteenth Corps, and did not come back to me. When Logan, Blair and myself met that evening, Blair asked Logan for some help to go up to relieve troops at Bald Hill. Logan, seeing Mercer's Brigade there, ordered me to send it up. They went up there and crawled in and relieved the men on Bald Hill. This was very late in the night, and even then fresh men coming in drove out or captured what men there were still lying on the enemy's side of the intrenchments. Mercer never made a report of this battle. You will see by my paper that he was virtually out of the service, awaiting transportation home; but he went in with his regiment the same as though they were still in the service. He was a German, and I do not suppose he knew the importance of reporting; and as it was only a short time later that I had to leave that army, I therefore did not follow it up, and I find no report of Mercer or of the Ninth Illinois; but I think the regimental reports of the Eighty-first Ohio give all these facts. See War Records, volume 38, part 3, page 463, and report Second Brigade, Second Division Sixteenth Army Corps, volume 38, part 3, page 450.

In my address I did not go much into detail, but I have all the data of this battle compiled, and intend some day to put it in shape; but I give you enough so you can, after examining the reports of Blair and the others, make your article historically correct. Most of it is correct and well-stated, but I know you want to get the dates and movements at the left on such an occasion so full that they will stand criticism, as the Battle of Atlanta was the great battle of that campaign.

Your article and many others that I have seen assumes that it was a part of Hardee's Corps that struck Blair's front—that is, his front that was towards Atlanta; but that is not so. Cleburn's Division was the left Division of Hardee's Corps. There were three other Divisions. Maney's (Cheatham's old Division), Bate's, and Walker's. Walker was the next to Cleburn and attacked Fuller. Bate and Maney struck Sweeney. Cleburn's Division was in front of Blair after Cleburn had driven back his left and he had refused it from Leggett's Hill towards my right. What saved Blair was that Cheatham, who commanded Hood's old Corps, whose orders were to attack Blair's front at the same time Hardee struck his rear, in accordance with the plans of both Hood and Hardee, did not attack because Hardee struck me, which was a surprise to them as well as to me, and when Cheatham got ready to attack Blair's front, hitting Leggett's Division, and on down the Fifteenth Corps, two Divisions, Bate's and Walker's, had been whipped, and were virtually out of the fight, because after the third attack upon me, and my breaking up of one of their columns so badly, they did not come again in any force. They went back to the road on the ridge, just south of and parallel to my line. I forget the name of the road, but it was the one that led off to Decatur, and there they intrenched, and when I pushed forward my skirmishers I found them in force. Between 3 and 4 o'clock Maney's Division left my front and went around to help Cleburn.

There have also been many statements that in the first attack two Divisions of Hardee's Corps struck the Sixteenth Corps and two the Seventeenth, Blair's. This is not correct. Three Divisions struck my Corps, and one Division, Cleburn's, struck Blair's Corps, and caught his left and rear; but after the third attack on my front Maney's Division was sent around to join Cleburn, and joined in the fiercest attack of the day, about 4 p. m., upon Leggett's and Smith's Divisions after their line had been refused and formed almost at right angles at Leggett's Hill, and reaching out towards me, with Waglin's Brigade on their left. From all accounts this attack was a fearful one, Maney's men reaching and holding the outside of the intrenchments that were occupied by Blair's men. This line faced almost due south, and both forces fought there off and on until about 7 p. m., some of the enemy remaining in the outside intrenchments until Mercer's Brigade of the Sixteenth Corps went in at near midnight to support that line.

Again, many records have it that Blair was forced back early in the battle. This is a mistake, as his Fourth Division, commanded by General Giles A. Smith, which was on the extreme left, held most of his original intrenched line until between 3 and 4 o'clock, when the attack of Cheatham from the Atlanta side forced them to take a new position to keep them from being crushed by Cleburn in the rear and Cheatham's attack from the Atlanta front.

There is another thing that does not seem to be fully understood, and that is that when Blair got his left refused so as to face Maney and Cleburn in his front they were unable to gain any headway on him in their attacks. In fact, they suffered great loss, and they only damaged Blair when they got in behind his left. Blair had three Regiments there refused at right angles to his front, and it was a portion of two of these Regiments that Cleburn picked up. Blair lost nearly all his prisoners from Giles A. Smith's Division, when Cleburn swept down through the gap and got right in behind them before they knew anybody was on them. In fact, Blair's men had to turn around and fight towards their rear, and, as I have stated, Cleburn got past Fuller's right and commenced shooting into his flank. Just after Walker was killed there was a lull, and Fuller turned two regiments right into Cleburn's main line, and, as Captain Allen of the Signal Corps, says, and my records show, captured that skirmish-line that killed McPherson, and brought it in.

To show McPherson's feeling about Blair's left flank, I sent Fuller's command to that flank the night before on a request from McPherson, who felt anxious about Blair's position, that flank being in the air; but Blair camped Fuller near where he opened the battle in the rear of the Seventeenth Corps instead of connecting his left with it. They camped about a quarter of a mile to his rear and a little back from his extreme left. Blair, no doubt, thought that would protect him, as well as put them in line, but he took one of my batteries (Murray's) and put it in his front line. Now this battery was on the way from Blair to report to me, coming down just as McPherson was going up the road, and the same skirmish-line that killed McPherson killed the horses of that battery and captured a portion of the men, and McPherson really almost fell upon the limber of one of the guns. This was Murray's United States Battery of four pieces. I do not know as I have seen this mentioned in any of the reports, unless it is in mine; but these are the facts of the matter. That is the way a battery of my Corps was reported lost or captured by the enemy. It was passing from Blair to myself, and not captured in line of battle or fighting, as a great many have stated and supposed to be the case.

In your article you speak of Logan taking a part of the Sixteenth Corps and leading it, as though it was right on my front, and then speak of him as leading a portion of the Fifteenth Corps that had been broken through on the Decatur road back into position. The facts are that it was about 4 o'clock in the afternoon when Logan came to me and asked me to send any force I had free to help retake the line that General John C. Brown's Division had broken through the Fifteenth Corps. I sent Mercer's Brigade of the Second Division, and with it sent Captain Jonas of my staff. (See his statement copied in my address.) Logan followed with the command, and it double-quicked the whole distance without stopping. As soon as it got there it found Lightburn's Division drifted back, but holding their line behind the trees, and the enemy in possession of DeGresse's Battery; and as Mercer's Brigade went in on the front, Williamson's Brigade of Wood's Division, which Sherman had directed to make a flank charge, was moving, and they both reached the works together. The men of Mercer's Brigade got hold of DeGresse's guns (see report of Eighty-first Illinois) and turned them on the enemy. There has always been a contest between these two Brigades as to which got there first, but that does not matter, for they got in together and retook the line. General J. C. Brown, who commanded the Confederate Division, was with me afterwards for many years on the Texas and Pacific Railway, and has given me a full account of his attack, and the fury with which he was forced out by this movement from the flank by Wood and the direct assault by Mercer. Mercer in going in had his horse killed under him.

Fighting along the Fifteenth Corps came late, and was all pretty much after the fighting on my front was over, because when General Logan came to me for aid I was intrenching the new line made by the refusal of Blair's left, and took Mercer's Brigade right out of my front to go with him. The fact is I did not happen to have a single man in reserve. Every man I had on the field was in line from the commencement of the fighting. Sweeney's Division stood right up in the road it was marching on, and the two batteries were in the center of his division; the position was a very strong one. If I had had plenty of time to select a position I could not have found a stronger one. It was the first time I ever saw such execution done by artillery. They used canister against those columns with terrible effect.

To show you how small a thing will sometimes change the prospects in a battle, one of Hardee's Divisions coming towards me got entangled in something—at that time I could not tell what, but on going to the ground afterwards I found that it was a mill-pond—that exposed the flank of Maney's Division that was next to Walker's. Seeing this, I rode down to Mercer and told him to take his Brigade and charge right into it, which he did. It was quite a time before I could tell what the result was, but I soon saw prisoners coming back and knew then that Mercer had them. He had that Division at a great disadvantage, and captured a great many prisoners out of it and several battle-flags. See report Second Brigade, Second Division Sixteenth Army Corps, volume 38, part 3, page 450, Army Records. That charge, no doubt, saved my line, because I had a very thin line, and with the most of Hardee's Corps coming at me in double column, as it was, I have no doubt that if it had reached me it would have given me trouble; but they never got to me on any of their attacks. We were fortunate enough to break them before they could reach the line, though on Fuller's front they were right up to it when Walker fell.

There was a great dispute between Hood and Hardee about this movement to the rear, Hood claiming that Hardee should have reached there early in the morning, while Hardee claimed he did not receive the order in time to get there before he did—a very fortunate fact for us, for if he had reached the rear of the Seventeenth and Fifteenth Corps, and Cheatham and Stewart had attacked in the front, it would have been rough times for the old Army of the Tennessee; but no doubt they would have come out of it with honor in some way.

I think there is no doubt about the time McPherson was killed—it was just about two hours after the battle had opened. Of course there are all kinds of time given, but the fact of the stopping of the watch of the signal officer, Sheffly, when he fell against the tree at two minutes past two, is almost conclusive evidence. See his statement, volume 11-13, page 242, records Society Army of the Tennessee. You can judge of that yourself, because even before McPherson got up to my right, where he stood, as Strong says, watching me, I had been fighting some time, for he had to ride from near Sherman's headquarters up there, a distance of two to three miles. If you will read carefully the address I am sending you, and the report Blair made—also the address of Strong—I think you will come to the same conclusions I give you. An article on the death of General McPherson, by W. W. Allen, of San Diego, California, Signal Officer of the Army of the Tennessee, appeared in an issue of the National Tribune some time this year, but of what date I do not know. It goes to prove the time and the hour McPherson was killed, and the capture of the skirmish-line that killed him. Of course a great many of the official reports are misleading as to time, and it is only by these circumstances that we can judge definitely. I notice it was 12:20 o'clock, according to Allen, when they first heard the rattle of musketry and artillery.

When you have read Allen's article please return it to me. I will be very glad to give you any further information you may need if it is possible for me to do so.

Truly and cordially yours,
General Green B. Raum. Grenville M. Dodge.
Chicago, Ill.

---

OLD FORT KEARNEY, NEBRASKA

In the Indian Campaign of 1865.

THE INDIAN CAMPAIGNS
1864 AND 1865

Written in 1874
By Major-General Grenville M. Dodge
and Read to the
Colorado Commandery of the Loyal Legion
of the United States, at Denver
April 21, 1907.

In December, 1864, I was assigned to the command of the Department of the Missouri. In January, 1865, I received a dispatch from General Grant asking if a campaign on the plains could be made in the winter. I answered, "Yes, if the proper preparation was made to clothe and bivouac the troops." A few days after I received a dispatch from General Grant ordering me to Fort Leavenworth. In the meantime the Department of Kansas was merged into the Department of the Missouri, placing under my command Missouri, the Indian Territory, Kansas, Colorado, Utah, Wyoming, and all the country south of the Yellowstone River, and embracing all the overland mail-routes and telegraph-lines to the Pacific.

On reaching Port Leavenworth I found that General Curtis, the former commander of that department, had reported against any campaign during the winter; that the Indians had possession of the entire country crossed by the stage-lines, having destroyed the telegraph-lines; and that the people living in Colorado, Utah, California, Western Nebraska and Western Kansas were without mails, and in a state of panic; that the troops distributed along the routes of travel were inside their stockades, the Indians having in nearly every fight defeated them. This success had brought into hostility with the United States nearly every tribe of Indians from Texas on the south to the Yellowstone on the north. It was a formidable combination, and the friendly Indians were daily leaving the reservations to join their hostile brethren. Two thousand Indians had destroyed over one hundred miles of telegraph, and were in possession of the country between the Arkansas and the North Platte Rivers.

The opinion at Fort Leavenworth before I arrived was that it was impossible to make a successful campaign against these Indians during the winter and successfully open these lines of communication. There were two Regiments of Cavalry in Kansas, mostly idle. There was no communication with any of the posts except by messenger. A dispatch from Colorado showed a panic there, and the people demanded that troops of the Department be stationed there to protect the citizens, instead of their organizing and fighting the Indians, and that martial law had been declared.

I saw, after spending a day at Fort Leavenworth, that it was necessary to change the depressed feeling and temper existing among the troops and the citizens throughout the department. I sent for Bela M. Hughes, agent of the overland stages, and Edward Craighten, general manager and superintendent of the overland telegraph, and consulted fully with them. I selected from my old guides some of the most trusted men, and some of the trusted Indians that I had known, and sent by them to each district commander who could be reached, these two short dispatches:

1. What measures are you taking to keep open the route and protect it? What Indians are engaged in the struggle? Where are their villages? Do their families travel with them? Have you spies in their camps? What action have you taken to repair telegraph-lines? Give me all particulars.

2. Place every mounted man in your command on the South Platte Route. Repair telegraphs; attack any body of Indians you meet, large or small. Stay with them and pound them until they move north of the Platte or south of the Arkansas. I am coming with two Regiments of cavalry to the Platte line and will open and protect it, and whip all the Indians in the way.

I also found that the plains were covered with Indian traders who had permits, under the guise of which they were stealing from the Indians, both friendly and hostile, and were selling them arms and ammunition. I immediately revoked all these permits, and ordered the arrest of all traders who had in their possession Indian or Government stock. I also immediately wired to Major Frank North, who was the interpreter of the Pawnee Indians, and also to the Chief of the Omaha Indians, both of whom had been with me on the plains, and instructed them to select their most trusted men and send them on the plains to ascertain for me the purpose of the hostile Indians, and whether they would head towards the settlements, or if their movements indicated they would attack only the lines of communication and the trains crossing the plains. At the same time we stopped all trains on the plains and ordered them to the nearest military post, instructing the officers to arm and organize them in companies, and place a United States officer over them, and have them move with the army trains.

Having perfected the preliminary organization for moving upon the stage- and telegraph-lines, we saw it was necessary to concentrate on one line. At this time the stage- and telegraph-lines on the north ran from Fort Leavenworth to Fort Kearney, and from Omaha to Fort Kearney, where they were consolidated, running up the Platte Valley to the mouth of the Lodge Pole, the stage-station at that point being known as Julesburg. The lines here separated again, the main telegraph-line running to old Fort Laramie, thence up the Sweetwater through South Pass and thence to Utah. The stage-line ran up the South Platte to Denver, then by the Cache La Poudre to Laramie Plains, over them to Fort Halleck and Bridger, and on to Utah. I concluded to concentrate all our efforts to open the line from Fort Leavenworth and Omaha to Kearney, thence to Denver and on to Utah, known as the South Platte Route.

The overland route from Fort Leavenworth and Omaha crossing the continent had a stage-station about every twelve miles. The troops along the lines were posted at the forts and stockades about every hundred miles, with a few soldiers distributed at each stage-station. Then scattered along the road were ranches, and relay- and feeding-stations for the regular commercial and supply-trains that were continually on the road. The great mining-camps, and all the inhabitants of Colorado, Utah, Wyoming, and Idaho, were dependent upon these trains for their supplies. In winter these trains were generally mule-trains of twenty wagons each, and during the summer were generally ox-trains of fifty to a hundred wagons each. They were in the habit of straggling along through the country, taking care of themselves. Their stock had to be herded at night, and it was a great temptation to the Indians to steal, and a great deal of this had been done, but no actual fighting or attacking of trains or troops occurred until the winter of 1864-65. The stopping of these trains, mail, and supplies, and the destruction of the telegraph wires, caused great consternation in that country and on the Pacific Coast, and the demands upon the Government to open and maintain these lines were persistent.

At Fort Leavenworth there appeared to have been no systematic effort to reopen these lines. It seemed that the troops were taking care of the posts and resisting attacks. They did not seem to appreciate the Indian character; that the only way to strengthen and protect the lines of communication was to go for the Indians. What troops had been sent against the Indians were small and weak parties, and had evidently gone out with the intention of locating the Indians and avoiding them.

Along the south emigrant line from Kansas City, following the Arkansas River to New Mexico, was the line of supplies for all of New Mexico and Southern Colorado. The Indians here were in possession. The travel and traffic along it were not to be compared with that along the northern lines. Then again the citizens of Kansas and Nebraska had settled along these routes as far west as the 100th Meridian, obtaining their living from this great traffic, and the Indians in their raids had picked them up, a family at a time, until they had a great many prisoners, mostly women and children, the men being generally massacred when captured.

I found the Eleventh Kansas Cavalry at Fort Riley, and the Sixteenth Kansas Cavalry at Fort Leavenworth, and immediately placed them en route for Fort Kearney. All the posts were, unfortunately, short of subsistence, forage, and ammunition. The three-months' Regiments enlisted in Colorado for the Indian service had been discharged, their time having expired, and there had been no troops sent to take their places. My only resource was to utilize the Colorado Militia until I could send troops 600 miles to take their places.

I immediately started for Fort Kearney, taking with me a few soldiers in the stage and one of my staff. It was the opinion of all the officers at Fort Leavenworth that it would be impossible for me to make the trip, but I knew it required personal presence among the troops to bring about quick results. The troops that I had ordered to march from Fort Riley refused to march in the winter. I answered to place under arrest all officers of the companies and Regiments that refused to obey the order, and have them report to Fort Leavenworth, intending to replace them with veteran officers of the department whom I knew would move, no matter what the hardship. The next morning I received a report from Fort Kiley that the troops would move. The Regiment that marched from Fort Riley to Fort Kearney lost thirteen men from freezing, as the weather was very severe, and while they were properly clothed, they did not know how to protect themselves from the weather.

On my arrival at Fort Kearney I immediately notified Mr. Hughes, agent of the stage-lines, that I was prepared to protect his stages, and called upon him to replace his stock immediately, ready to start out his stages. I also notified Mr. Craighten, superintendent of the telegraph-lines, to replace his operators, for I would have his lines open in a few days. Both of these orders were made known to the public. I also notified the "press" at Omaha and Fort Leavenworth that all trains which were tied up on the plains would be moved to their destinations during that month. We found it necessary to inspire energy and confidence in these three great interests, as not one of them even thought we would succeed, and, in fact, the "press" comments on our orders showed that they had no faith in them. I found on the line of the Platte the Seventh Iowa Cavalry, and at Fort Laramie and on the Sweetwater the Eleventh Ohio Cavalry.

When we arrived in sight of Fort Kearney the troops were prepared to fight us, thinking it was a band of Indians. We discovered that the troops were depressed from the success of the Indians and the murder and mutilation of their comrades, and that they hardly stuck their heads out of the stockade. Having had experience with Indians, I called the troops together and instructed them how to handle and to fight Indians, telling them that an aggressive war would be made against the Indians, and no matter how large the Indian bands were, or how small the troop, that hereafter they must stand and fight; that if they did the Indians would run. If they did not, the Indians would catch and scalp them, and even if they had to retreat, they must do so with their faces to the enemy.

The Indians, after the Chivington fight on Big Sandy, had concentrated upon the South Platte and on the Sweetwater. The reports showed that they held possession from Julesburg to Valley Junction and to Mud Springs, and held the telegraph-line west of Fort Laramie. They had with them 2,000 head of captured stock and had captured all the stage-stations and many trains, devastated the ranches, butchered many men, women, and children, and destroyed 100 miles of telegraph.

To show more plainly than I can describe the condition of the country, I give the reports of the three commanding officers along the South Platte Route, in answer to the dispatches which I sent by messenger to all commanders the day I arrived at Fort Leavenworth. These answers met me at Fort Kearney.

General Robert Mitchell, who commanded the territory from Omaha to Lodge Pole, replied as follows:

The telegraph from Lodge Pole Creek, twenty-five miles west to Julesburg, on Laramie Route, is destroyed for fifteen miles. Poles cut down and destroyed on the Denver line beyond Julesburg for the first fifty miles. The telegraph is destroyed about ten miles north. We are compelled to haul poles from 130 to 140 miles. Every means in my power is used to have the lines fixed. All the available troops I have at my disposal are in the vicinity of Julesburg, except some small garrisons at posts required to be kept up on the Denver route. My district only extends to Julesburg. I have sent some troops, however, up that route fifty miles since the outbreaks and find everything destroyed. We have no communication with Denver, and have not had since the last outbreak. Neither can I communicate with Fort Laramie in consequence of the lines being down. I have been traversing the country constantly on and adjacent to the mail- and telegraph-lines during the past four months, sending guards on the stages, and, when deemed necessary, mounted guards and patrols on all dangerous portions of the road through my district.

This plan succeeded until an overpowering force attacked Julesburg and drove the troops inside of their works and burned the stage- and telegraph-station, destroying a large amount of stores for both companies. The overland stage cannot run through until they can provide for supplies for stock from Julesburg to the Junction, where overland stage leaves Denver route, everything belonging to the stage company, citizens and government being entirely destroyed. The Indian villages are unknown to us. From the best information I have I believe them to be on the Powder River. I know certainly there is a large village there. There have been no squaws in the country, to my knowledge, since last fall. The tribes engaged are the Cheyennes, Arapahoes, Kiowas, Brule, Ogallala Sioux, a portion of the Blackfeet, and a large portion of what is known as the Missouri River Sioux, the same Indians General Sully made the campaign against last summer. From 3,000 to 5,000 additional troops will be needed to punish the Indians. One column will never be able to overtake them, unless they are willing to give battle. I think three columns of men, 1,000 strong each, with ample garrison on the overland-mail and telegraph lines, well mounted and supplied, can clear out the country of all hostile Indians, if done before grass comes. After that time, in my judgment, it will take twice that number of men.

In addition to the troubles west, I would not be surprised any day to hear of an outbreak in the northern part of my district. I am informed by Indian scouts that there is a large encampment of Indians on the Running Water that are ready to engage in the war against the whites. Among them are some of the Yanktonais Sioux.

Colonel R. R. Livingston reported as follows:

In reply to your inquiries I would respectfully state that in the early part of January last, indications of large parties of Indians moving westward on Republican were reported by the scouts sent to gain information of their movements. On January 7th they had crossed South Fork of Platte River, twenty-three miles west of this post, camped with their families, forming a camp of 400 lodges, containing eight warriors each, many lodges being thirty robes in size. They commenced the work of destruction along the road west as far as Junction Station, 100 miles from here. Their forces in this fight were not less than 2,000, well armed with breech-loading carbines and rifles. A desperate attempt on their part to burn the overland-stage station near this post was made at this time, but was frustrated by the gallantry of Captain N. J. O'Brien, Company F, Seventh Iowa Cavalry. Every ranch and stage-station from Junction Station to this post is burned, and the charred remains of every inmate who failed to escape tells of the brutality they were subjected to. I telegraphed Hon. Sam H. Elbert, acting Governor of Colorado, early in January of the state of things. The troops of Colorado have been withdrawn from Valley, fifty miles west of here, I surmise, to concentrate around Denver. The telegraph-lines to Salt Lake and the Denver branch lines are destroyed for a distance of nearly ten miles on the northern route, and in different points throughout 100 miles along the Denver route.

I have but 360 troops, but so long as human endurance holds out we will work night and day to get the communication perfect with the west.

The Indians engaged in this war are the Cheyennes, Ogallalas, and Brule Sioux. They have gone northward towards Horse Creek and Fort Laramie. Their trail leads in that direction, but they are slow in marching, feeling audacious and indifferent to any effort from the small body of troops in this district. I saw their signals today, probably those of small war parties, on the North Platte. You will hear of continued murders and robberies as long as the road is so poorly protected by troops. No spies can be used now, owing to numerous small war parties being met everywhere in this country. I predict that if more troops are not sent into this district immediately, this road will be stripped of every ranch and white man on it. Should these Indians swing around by Niobrara River and take the Omaha road below Kearney, where settlements are numerous, infinite mischief will result to the settlers. What we need are troops, supplies for them, and a vigorous campaign against these hostile Indians. They must be put on the defensive instead of us. No difficulty can arise in finding them. Over 2,000 cattle accompany them.

Headquarters, District Colorado.
Denver, Colorado Territory, Feb. 2, 1865.

The Indians are bold in the extreme. They have burned every ranch between Julesburg and Valley Station, and nearly all the property at latter place; driven off all stock, both public and private. These Indians are led by white men, and have complete control of all the country outside my district, so that I am hemmed in.

The weather has been very severe here for nearly three weeks; the thermometer 30 degrees below zero, with quite a fall of snow on the ground. I have tried every means in my power to raise volunteers for three months' State service, but as yet have not succeeded, owing to the factional spirit existing in the community.

The Legislature took the matter in hand at my suggestion, appropriating so much money. Territorial bonds, to give the men a bounty and purchase horses to mount them on, as I have none; but the members cannot agree on the spoil likely in their estimation to accrue from such a proceeding, so the bill has not yet passed. I addressed the Speaker of the House yesterday, informing him that unless something was done within forty-eight hours I would be compelled, much against my will, to proclaim martial law and stop all business, forcing every man to enter the ranks and open the line of communication. I have now a city organization of about 100 men organized into companies, so that in case of an attack here I would have something tangible to lay hold of and make a fight. I have had a great deal of trouble in this matter, as there is no concert of action, every man suspecting his fellow of some chicanery.

Fort Lyon is being rapidly fortified, so that 200 men can defend it against 2,000 Indians. Militia companies are being organized all over the settled parts of the country (under penalty of being pressed into service) to defend the frontier settlements southward, and could I but get a Regiment here now I could keep things in a running trim until the arrival of a sufficient force to make a campaign. The Indians are now determined to make it a war of extermination, and nothing short of 5,000 men can make it extermination for them.

Major Wynkoop informed me from Fort Lyon that many warriors were on the headwaters of the Smoky Hill and intended attacking all the settlements as well as Denver. Provisions, owing to the transportation-line being cut off, are at an exorbitant price, as well as labor and forage.

Cannot troops be sent out here immediately, or authority to raise companies, which could be easily done, for one year?

The Santa Fe line has threatened to stop running on account of the Indians. Should such be the case, then all is cut off.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,
Thomas Moonlight,
Colonel Eleventh Kansas Cavalry, Commanding.

Colonel Chivington, from Fort Rankin, reported:

Lieutenant-Colonel Collins, with 200 men of the Eleventh Ohio, and Company D, Seventh Iowa Cavalry, fought Indians from the 4th to the 9th inst., at Mud Springs. The Indians at one time charged our forces in the face of artillery and were nearly successful. Two thousand warriors were engaged in the fight. It is supposed forty Indians were killed. Beaure's and Craighten's herds were driven off. The Indians crossed at Bush Creek, going north. The telegraph poles were gone and wires so inextricably tangled as to be useless. Seven hundred lodges crossed Pole Creek, six miles below Pole Creek crossing.

These Indians were not driven off and the telegraph-lines retaken without severe fighting and loss of many soldiers. Within two weeks the troops drove these Indians north, where a detachment of troops from Fort Laramie attacked them and drove them across the Platte. Finally the Indians saw that a different warfare was being made against them, and they fled to their villages on the Powder River and in the Black Hills country.

There was such energy and such spirit displayed by the troops, that after two weeks' work they had the telegraph-lines replaced between Omaha and Denver, a distance of 600 miles, and this without any additional force to aid them. The progress made in putting up the wires is shown by this report:

My troop is at Moore's ranch; passed there at 2 o'clock. We ran twelve miles of wire and set eight miles of poles, had two severe fights, and marched fifty-five miles in fifty-two hours. Operators furnished valuable service.

E. B. Murphy,
Captain Seventh Iowa Cavalry.

The thermometers all this time were from 5 to 10 degrees below zero. On February 13th telegraphic communication was resumed through to California, and Mr. Craighten notified the Government of the fact.

An inquiry made of Craighten by General Grant, as to where I was located (Craighten being a personal friend of mine who was most skeptical at the start of my accomplishing anything with the material I had, was overjoyed at our success), was answered, "Nobody knows where he is, but everybody knows where he has been."

From the 5th to the 13th of February every mounted man on that line was in the saddle, either assisting the operators or chasing real or imaginary Indians. The moment a scout came in, instructions were given to the officers to send them out and not allow any mounted troops in the stockade until the lines were opened and the Indians driven at least 100 miles away from the line of telegraph, and the only dashes the Indians made after we got fairly at them was to cut off a part of an unguarded train, and at unguarded ranches, and at those stage-stations where only a few soldiers were located; but in every attack the soldiers stood their ground and fought, and when driven they only backed far enough to get a secure place. The troops knew better than to go back to the fortified posts, as they had instructions to keep to the hills, but in nearly every case they were successful, and the daring that some of the troops showed in these fights was remarkable.

Great atrocities were committed by the Indians, scalping the men alive and abusing the women. This caused the troops to stand and fight, preferring to die rather than to fall into their hands. Wherever a fight was successfully made, no matter whether commissioned or non-commissioned officers commanded, I telegraphed him in person thanking him, and to the commanding officer of his Regiment, requesting that he be given the first promotion, and wrote to the Governor of his State.

As soon as this stage-line was opened we concentrated about 500 mounted men, intending to catch the Indians before they left the North Platte; but the Indians fled as soon as they heard of this, and did not stop until they reached Powder River, too far north for us to follow until arrangements were made for supplies for troops and stock, as everything had to be teamed from Fort Leavenworth.

The storms during March were very severe. Snow lay two feet on the level and was crusted so hard that for weeks it was almost impossible to force animals through it. As soon as we heard from my scouts of the departure of the Indians and found they had no intention of molesting the citizens of Nebraska, and had placed themselves on Powder River too far north to return until the return of the grass in May, I distributed the troops along the stage- and telegraph-lines to Salt Lake, and returned to open the South Route to New Mexico.

My experience on the North Route, with the reports from the troops and from my Indians, soon satisfied me that every Indian tribe of any importance from the British Possessions in the north to the Red River in the south, were preparing to engage in open hostilities. These tribes often pretended to be friendly, deceiving the Government and the Indian agent, a crafty trick that was impossible to make the Government understand. For instance, they would go to the Indian agent for provisions, and would make him believe that they were for peace, and would promise to bring to the agency their tribe. Probably by the time the report of the Indian agent reached the Government, this same tribe would be off on the warpath and have captured a train or murdered some settlers, and the troops in return had attacked and destroyed them, and we were called to account for it, as it was claimed by the agents we were attacking peaceable Indians. This went so far that it prevented me from opening the southern emigrant trail several weeks. Finally I took the matter in my own hands, regardless of the action or report of the agents.

While these parleys were going on the Indians suddenly appeared all along the southern emigrant trail in the Arkansas River Valley, attacking trains, posts, and escorts. I threw my troops against the bands of Southern Arapahoes, Cheyennes, Comanches, and Kiowas that were in the vicinity of the trail. The troops had caught on to the severe fighting on the Platte, had heard of the new methods of warfare and victories, and they in all cases stood their ground and defeated the Indians, although they suffered severely in some instances. This was a reception that the Indians did not expect and they fled to the Wichita Mountains, suing for peace, which I knew was simply to prevent us attacking them there, but accomplished its purpose with the Government and finally brought about the treaties that were not worth the paper they were written on, and later on forced the campaigns that Sheridan afterwards made, while if we had been allowed to have followed them up and punish them as we did the northern tribes, we would have conquered a peace that would have been a lasting one.

The Indians of the plains are the best skirmishers in the world. In rapidity of movements, in perfect horsemanship, sudden whirling, protecting the body by clinging to the side of the horse, and rapid movements in open and difficult ground, no trained cavalry in the world can equal them. On foot their ability to hide behind any obstruction, in ravine, along creeks, and under creek and river banks, and in fighting in the open plains or level ground, the faculty to disappear is beyond one's belief except he has experienced it. In skulking and sharpshooting they are adepts, but troops properly instructed are a match for them on foot, and never fail to drive and route them, if they will stand and fight and never retreat except slowly with their faces to them. I have seen several times, when caught in a tight place, bands of Indians held by a few men by holding to ridges and slowly retreating, always using our rifles at every opportunity when an Indian was in range, never wasting a shot on them unless there was a probability of hitting them. The Indians have a mortal fear of such tactics.

In a fight the Indians will select the positions and pick out quickly any vantage ground, and sometimes as high as 200 will concentrate at such a point where we could not concentrate twenty men without exposing them, and from this vantage ground they will pour a deadly fire on the troops, and we cannot see an Indian—only puffs of smoke. By such tactics as this they harass and defeat our troops. Many a fight occurred between Indians and soldiers both watching the smoke to show each other's position. You can watch this kind of a fight and never see a person unless some one is hit and exposes himself, when it is nearly always a sure death. The Indian character is such that he will not stand continual following, pounding, and attacking. Their life and methods are not accustomed to it, and the Indians can be driven by very inferior forces by continually watching, attacking, and following. None of our campaigns have been successful that have not been prepared to follow the Indians day and night, attacking them at every opportunity until they are worn out, disbanded, or forced to surrender, which is the sure result of such a campaign.

The Indians during the months they had been hostile, and especially in their attacks on the stage-stations and ranches, had captured a large number of men, women, and children. These prisoners had made known to the troops, by dropping notes along the trail and through the reports of friendly Indians, their terrible condition and the usage that was being made of them. Their appeals to us to rescue them were pitiful.

I knew the prisoners would be sent far north to the villages, and their winter quarters out of our reach; that these villages were unprotected because every brave and dog-soldier had his warpaint on and was joining the hostile forces attacking along our lines, which were increasing every day. I also knew it would be impossible for any of our troops to reach them or to rescue them by following them, and as soon as I arrived at Fort Kearney I asked authority of the Government to enlist and muster into service two companies of Pawnee Indians, to be under the command of their old interpreter, Major North, who I knew to be a brave, level-headed leader. This authority was immediately given me, and Major North was given confidential instructions to proceed to the Sioux country, apparently on scout duty, but to watch his opportunity and rescue these prisoners, while their braves were down fighting us. He started, but storms of snow came down so heavy that his ponies could get nothing to eat, and during the latter part of February and all of March these storms were continuous, the snow falling to the depth of two feet over the entire plains. Major North was compelled to seek shelter in the river bottoms, and browsed his stock on cottonwood limbs to save them. In the campaign of the summer and winter of 1865 and 1866 Major North, with his two enlisted companies, to which I added two more, made some wonderful marches, scouts, battles, and captures, and during that campaign we recaptured and had surrendered to us many of these women and children prisoners.

After the war Major North became manager of the Indians in Buffalo Bill's Wild West Show, and died in that service. He was a noted man on the plains. My acquaintance with him commenced in 1856, and together we had seen and endured many hardships. It was seldom one met his equal in any of the different phases of plains life. Although he had led an eventful career, still I never heard him refer to what he had done or accomplished, or the part he had taken in battles, and probably no man was ever more worshiped than he was by the two tribes of Pawnee Indians; and his death was virtually their destruction, for during his life among them he held them under good discipline and kept them away from vice, diseases, and war.

A great many amusing reports came to me from my scouts and the captured Indians. When on the plains in the 50's I was known among the Indians by the name, in their language, that signified "Long Eye," "Sharp Eye," and "Hawk Eye." This came from the fact that when I first went among them it was as an engineer making surveys through their country. With my engineering instruments I could set a head-flag two or three miles away, even further than an Indian could see, and it is their custom to give a practical name to everything. Of course I was not many days on the plains until it reached the Indians that "Long Eye" was there, and in every fight that occurred they had me present. They said I could shoot as far as I could see. The scouts said the Indian chiefs laid their defeats to that fact. Then again they were very superstitious about my power in other matters. When the overland telegraph was built they were taught to respect it and not destroy it. They were made to believe that it was a Great Medicine. This was done after the line was opened to Fort Laramie by stationing several of their most intelligent chiefs at Fort Laramie and others at Fort Kearney, the two posts being 300 miles apart, and then having them talk to each other over the wire and note the time sent and received. Then we had them mount their fleetest horses and ride as fast as they could until they met at Old Jule's ranch, at the mouth of the Lodge Pole, this being about half way between Kearney and Laramie. Of course this was astonishing and mysterious to the Indians. Thereafter you could often see Indians with their heads against the telegraph poles, listening to the peculiar sound the wind makes as it runs along the wires and through the insulators. It is a soughing, singing sound. They thought and said it was "Big Medicine" talking. I never could convince them that I could not go to the telegraph poles the same as they did and tell them what was said, or send a message for them to some chief far away, as they had often seen me use my traveling-instrument and cut into the line, sending and receiving messages. Then again, most of the noted scouts of the plains who had married into the different tribes had been guides for me, and many of these men were half-breeds, and were with these hostile Indians. Some of them took part with them, but more of them had tried to pacify and bring them to terms, and they gave me information about those who were not engaged in the depredations.

I was supposed to be, by the Indians of the plains, a person of great power and great moment. These half-breeds worked upon their superstitions, endeavoring to convince them it was useless to fight "Long Eye." No doubt my appearing on the plains the time I did, and the fact that from the time I appeared until the time I left, the troops had nothing but success, carried great weight with them, and seemed to confirm what the old voyageurs and guides told them, and had much influence in causing their abandonment of the Platte country and returning to their villages.

My own experience on the plains led me to be just as watchful and just as vigilant when I knew the Indians were not near me as I was when they were in sight. In all my travels I never allowed them to camp near or occupy my camps even in the time of peace, when they were friendly, and I never allowed myself to knowingly do them an injustice, making it a point never to lie to them in any of my councils and treaties, or never allow, if I knew it, the interpreter to deceive them. That brought me respect in all my dealings with them, and I treated them with respect, courtesy, and consideration, and demanded the same from them. This, no doubt, was one of the principal reasons that in fifteen years, more or less, of intercourse with them, traveling through their country both during the times they were hostile and at peace, that I escaped many of the misfortunes that befell others.

Although this short campaign was not remarkable for great battles or large loss by killed and wounded, still it required great fortitude from the troops, and often great personal courage, and its success was of great moment to the Government and to the people of the plains and the Pacific Coast, for over these three great overland routes were carried the mails, telegrams, and traffic during the entire war of the rebellion, which did much to hold these people loyal to our Government. A long stoppage was a destruction to business, and would bring starvation and untold misery; and when, with only thirteen days and nights of untiring energy on the part of the troops in a winter of unheard-of severity, California, Utah and Colorado were put in communication with the rest of the world, there was great rejoicing. In seventeen days the stages were started and overland travel was again safe, after being interrupted for two months, and by March 1st the commercial trains were all en route to their destinations and I had returned to my duties at the headquarters of the Department, in St. Louis.

It was with no little satisfaction that I answered a personal letter General Grant had written me, when he assigned me to this duty, and which I found awaiting me on my return to Fort Leavenworth. In his letter he outlined what it was necessary to do and why he had asked me to take the field. He judged rightly of the condition of affairs and the necessity of immediate action. I wrote him how promptly the troops responded to my call. They had opened the overland routes; they had made them secure and were then guarding them, and they would be kept open. But after grass came, unless these hostile Indians were thoroughly chastised, they would certainly and successfully attack them and prevent safe travel overland, and from my letter the order soon came for me to prepare for the extensive campaign of the next summer and winter that followed these Indians to the Yellowstone on the north and the Cimarron on the south, and conquered a peace with every hostile tribe.

---

JAMES BRIDGER

Chief Guide to Indian Campaign, 1865-6.

THE INDIAN CAMPAIGNS
1865 AND 1866

During the Indian campaigns of the winter and spring of 1864-65, against the Indians that were holding all the overland roads, stations, telegraph and emigrant routes over the plains, my command reopened them in a short campaign of sixty days in which many fights occurred in which the troops were uniformly successful. The telegraph-lines were rebuilt, the stages re-established, the mails transported regularly, and protection given. Although we were able to drive the Indians off of all of these routes and open them successfully and hold them open, my experience convinced me that as soon as grass started on the plains these Indians would again come down on the routes, and that the only possible way of settling the Indian question was to make a well-planned and continuous campaign against them on the Arkansas, the Smoky Hill, the Republican, and the North and South Platte Valley routes, and to keep them off the traveled roads. To do this we would be obliged to get our troops into their country as soon as possible and go for their villages.

In my report to the Government, in April, 1865, I set forth the necessity for this and outlined the plans. Upon the receipt of that report I received authority from General Grant and General Pope to go forward and carry out the plans that I had suggested. This plan contemplated placing upon the plains about 5,000 men to protect the stations and telegraph-lines, furnish escort to emigrants and Government trains of supplies that were necessary to supply the wants of that vast country with provisions and outfit five movable columns of soldiers, a total of 6,000 or 7,000 men. Contracts were immediately made for the supplies for this number of men; for horses for the cavalry, and for the supplying of the posts on the plains with a surplus at each, so that if the campaign extended into the winter it would not have to stop for want of provisions. The campaign in the spring had to be made on supplies moved there in the middle of winter, at great cost and suffering. The Quartermaster and Commissary at Fort Leavenworth made contracts for supplies to be delivered in June, and General Grant sent to Fort Leavenworth something like 10,000 troops, very few of whom got into the campaigns from the fact that the troops would no sooner reach Fort Leavenworth than they would protest, claiming that the Civil War was ended and saying they had not enlisted to fight Indians. The Governors of their States, Congressmen, and other influential men, would bring such pressure to bear that the War Department would order them mustered out. While the Government was at great expense in moving these troops to the plains, some even reaching as far as Julesburg, we never got any service from them; they were a great detriment, and caused much delay in our plans, so that the overland routes had to be protected by about one-half of the troops that it was at first thought necessary to accomplish the work. Three Regiments of infantry, eleven Regiments of cavalry, and three Batteries of artillery, that reported to me under the order of General Grant, were mustered out on the march between Fort Leavenworth and Julesburg.

There was enlisted for the Indian campaign, five Regiments of United States volunteers, recruited from the rebel prisoners, who, desiring to be at liberty, were willing to enlist under the United States flag to fight Indians, and these five Regiments had to be depended upon mostly for taking care of all the country west of the Lakes,—the overland routes on the plains, to man the posts on the upper Missouri and Mississippi Rivers, and for escorts for surveying parties, etc. So when I was ready to move all five columns I had less than 7,000 officers and men in my department. The Indians commenced their depredations on all the routes in April, especially on the Arkansas route, where we had to contend with the South Cheyennes, Comanches, Apaches, Kiowas, and Arapahoe tribes. This district was under the command of Brigadier-General Ford, a very efficient officer, and it was planned that he should make a campaign in May and June into the Indian country, crossing the Arkansas and moving south for their villages, which we knew were situated in the Wichita Mountains. General Ford had a compact veteran command, and fought one or two battles before crossing the Arkansas. Just about the time he was ready to cross the Arkansas the Government sent west a peace commission composed of Senator Doolittle, General Alex McD. McCook, and others. The Indian agent for these tribes was Colonel J. H. Leavenworth. They no sooner reached the Indian country than they protested against the movement of any troops into the territory south of the Arkansas River. In fact, General McCook issued an order, using General Pope's name as authority, stopping General Ford's movement. He had no authority to do this, but General Ford obeyed, as the information came to him that these chiefs were assembling at the mouth of the Little Arkansas to make peace. After parleying with the Indians, the commission accomplished nothing, and the Indians all the time were committing their depredations on the emigrant trains that were passing up the Arkansas Valley to New Mexico and Colorado. All the protests and appeals of General Pope, General Ford and myself to the Government in relation to this matter seemed to have no effect. These Indians had murdered the settlers, wiped out their ranches, and stolen their property and their stock, and our scouts who went among them saw their captures in plenty. As soon as we would start out to punish them, even those that had crossed north of the Arkansas River, protests were sent to Washington and came back to us, so that we virtually accomplished nothing. The condition of matters became so complicated that on June 6, 1865, I stated my views of the question to Major-General John Pope, commanding the Military Division of the Missouri, as follows:

Headquarters Department of the Missouri.
Fort Leavenworth, June 6, 1865.

Major-General John Pope, Commanding Military Division of the Missouri:

General: You have been notified of the action of Major-General McCook, under the orders of the Congressional Committee, in stopping the expedition of General Ford south of the Arkansas, that they might confer, and, if possible, make peace with the Arapahoes, Cheyennes, Comanches, Kiowas, etc. Colonel Leavenworth started south a week ago to bring the chiefs up to the mouth of Cow Creek, and while we are endeavoring to make terms with them, their warriors are strung along the route from Zarah to Lyon, dashing in on any train that they find off its guard. They are in parties of from fifteen to fifty, and hide in the valleys and ravines. These Indians now have their villages at Fort Cobb, and have driven out all friendly Indians and traders, declaring that they mean war and nothing else. They are composed of one band of Arapahoes, led by Little Rover; one small band of Cheyennes, three bands of Apaches, a large body of Comanches, also the Southern Comanches, and all the Kiowas, and they have no respect for our authority or power, and I have no faith in any peace made by them until they are made to feel our strength. I do not believe it will be a month before we hear of large trains being captured or attacked by them in force. They notified Jesus, the Mexican trader sent in by General Carleton, to leave, and it is said they murdered Major Morrison, a trader permitted to go in by General Carleton. It appeared to me bad policy to give permits to any of the traders to go among them to trade. Not one of them will act as guide to take a force toward them.

Colonel Leavenworth satisfied the committee, and I think General McCook also, that the Comanches and others had not committed any depredations. There is not an officer or trader who has been on the plains but knows they have been in all or nearly all the outrages committed. I desire very much to have peace with the Indians, but I do think we should punish them for what they have done, and that they should feel our power and have respect for us. My plan to reach them is to start in three columns for Fort Cobb; viz., First, by Major Merrill's route; second, by Captain Booner's route; third, from the mouth of Mulberry Creek, on the Arkansas. Make the parties about 400 or 500 strong, and march direct for their villages. This will draw every warrior after us and leave the Santa Fe route free. When we get down there if the Indians are so anxious for peace, they will have an opportunity to show it, and we can make an agreement with them that will stop hostilities until the properly authorized authorities conclude a lasting peace. I have attempted to get these expeditions off twice. The first time they were stopped by General Halleck, on Colonel Leavenworth's representations. He started to make peace; the Indians stole all his stock, and very nearly got his scalp. He came back for fight and wished to whip them, but has now changed again, and it is possible he may get the chiefs together, but I very much doubt it; and, even if he does, they will only represent a portion of each tribe. I have concluded, by representations of the Congressional Committee made to General Ford, to wait and see the effects of Colonel Leavenworth's mission. I will have my troops at the designated points. If he should fail I will go forward and make the campaign as originally ordered. I desire to add that there is not a leading officer on the plains who has had any experience with Indians who has faith in peace made with any of these Indians unless they are punished for the murders, robberies and outrages they have committed for over a year; and unless we have a settled policy, either fight and allow the commanding officer of the department to dictate terms of peace to them, or else it be decided that we are not to fight, but make some kind of peace at all hazards, we will squander the summer without result. Indians will rob and murder, and some Indian agents will defend them, and when fall comes I will be held responsible for not having protected the route or punished them for what they may have done. It must be evident to the Government that I cannot be making war on the Indians while other parties are at the same time making peace, as has been the case so far. Whatever may be the desire of the Government, I will lend all my energies to carry it out and make every officer and man under me do the same. I cannot approve the manner in which the Indians have been treated, and have no faith in them, nor will I allow such treatment as shown at the Big Sandy fight. If peace is concluded I trust that their reservations may be made at safe distances from overland routes so far as possible, and that they be made to keep away from them.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
G. M. Dodge,
Major-General.

The Government, after receiving General Pope's and my own views, sent out Inspector-General D. B. Sackett, of the Regular Army, to investigate the conditions in that country and to report to the Government the actual facts. In the meantime the peace commission that had been endeavoring to negotiate with these Indians had gone on to Denver, still protesting against any movement against the Indians, believing that peace could be brought about. General Sackett, upon reaching the Indian country, sent the following dispatch, on June 14, 1865, to the commanding officer at Fort Larned, Kas.:

For the last few days the Indians along the route have been very active and hostile; many men have been murdered, hundreds of animals have been stolen, Fort Dodge has lost every animal. The force can now do nothing with the Indians. A large and effective cavalry force under a good commander must be sent here without delay, or the large number of trains now on the plains will be destroyed or captured.

Upon the receipt of this dispatch I immediately gave orders to the commanding officer to go out and concentrate our forces north of the Arkansas, and to protect the trains, but not to go south of the river. This they accomplished very effectively, and drove all the Indians south of the Arkansas, killing and capturing a good many. On June 14th, General Pope wrote a long letter to General U. S. Grant, enclosing my letter to him, reiterating what I had said, and insisting for very strong reasons that the Indians should be left entirely to the military; that there should be no peace commission sent until the military had met these Indians and brought them to terms, either by fighting or negotiations; and afterwards for the commission to go there and make such arrangements as they saw proper. In the mustering out of troops General Ford was relieved of the command and Major-General John B. Sanborn, a very efficient officer, was sent to take his place. It was now agreed that after the failure of the peace commission to accomplish anything with these Indians that I should make the campaigns south of the Arkansas, and General Sanborn concentrated his troops and moved to the Arkansas. Before I reached there I received a communication from Colonel Leavenworth stating that all the chiefs of the Indians were then on Cow Creek, anxious to meet him. At the same time, a dispatch came from Washington to General Pope, stopping Sanborn's movement. General Pope immediately arranged to have an interview with these Indians, and General Sanborn went there with instructions to make an agreement with them that they should keep off of the overland trails, and to arrange a time for a commission to meet them, later in the year. On August 5th Sanborn agreed with the chiefs of the Kiowas, Apaches, Comanches, and Arapahoes, on the part of the Government, to suspend all actions of hostility towards any of the tribes above mentioned and to remain at peace until the fourth day of October, 1865, when they were to meet the Government commissioners at Bluffs Creek about forty miles south of the Little Arkansas. This agreement did not take in the South Cheyennes, who had been more mischievous than any of the tribes, but this tribe kept south of the Arkansas, retaining all the stock they captured, and none of them were punished for the murders they committed. It was a business matter on their part to remain at peace only until the troops moved out of that country and to prevent Sanborn with his organized forces from going south to their villages and punishing them. The effect of this agreement was that the Indians continued their depredations through the following years,—not so much by killing but by stealing,—until finally they became so hostile that in the campaign against them by General Sheridan, in 1868, an agreement was made with them forcing all the tribes to move into the Indian Territory. If General Ford or General Sanborn had been allowed to go forward and punish these Indians as they deserved, they would have been able to make not only a peace, but could have forced them to go on the reservation in the Indian territories, and thus have saved the murders and crimes that they committed for so many years afterwards; however, this agreement of Sanborn's allowed the emigration to go forward over the Arkansas, properly organized and guarded, and it was not molested during the rest of that year.

To show the conditions on the overland routes up the two forks of the Platte River at the time, I sent this dispatch:

Headquarters Department of the Missouri.
St. Louis, Mo., June 17, 1865.

Major-General John Pope, Commanding Military Division of the Missouri, St. Louis:

General: There is no doubt but that all, or nearly all, the tribes of Indians east of the Rocky Mountains from the British Possessions on the north to the Red River on the south are engaged in open hostilities against the Government. It is possible that in a few of the tribes there are some chiefs and warriors who desire to be friendly, but each day reduces the number of these, and they even are used by the hostile tribes to deceive us as to their intentions and keep us quiet. The Crows and Snakes appear to be friendly, but everything indicates that they too are ready to join in the hostilities, and the latter (the Snakes) are accused of being concerned in the depredations west of the mountains. In my opinion there is but one way to effectually terminate these Indian troubles; viz., to push our cavalry into the heart of their country from all directions, to punish them whenever and wherever we find them, and force them to respect our power and to sue for peace. Then let the military authorities make informal treaties with them for a cessation of hostilities. This we can accomplish successfully, for the Indians will treat with soldiers, as they fear them and have confidence in their word. Any treaty made now by civilians, Indian agents, or others, will, in my opinion, amount to nothing, as the Indians in all the tribes openly express dissatisfaction with them and contempt for them. The friendly Indians say that whenever the hostile bands are made aware of our ability and determination to whip them, they will readily and in good faith treat with our officers and comply with any demands we may make. If we can keep citizen agents and traders from among them we can, I am confident, settle the matter this season, and when settled I am clearly of the opinion that these Indians should be dealt with entirely by competent commissioned officers of the Army, whom they will respect and who will not only have the power to make them comply with the terms of the agreements made, but will also have the power and authority to compel troops, citizens and others to respect implicitly and to comply strictly with the obligations assumed on our part. The cavalry now moving into the Indian country will, I doubt not, if allowed to proceed and carry out the instructions given them, accomplish the object designed by bringing about an effectual peace and permanent settlement of our Indian difficulties.

I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
G. M. Dodge,
Major-General.

The campaign to the north was planned with a view of going after all the northern Indians then at war—the Arapahoes, North Cheyennes, and the different bands of the Sioux. Their depredations had extended east to the Missouri River, and General Pope sent General Sully with a force up that river to take care of the hostile Sioux that had gathered and had been fighting the troops at Forts Rice, Berthoud, and other points. Before reaching these posts his column was turned and sent to Devil's Lake after the Santee Sioux, who had been committing depredations in Minnesota, but after reaching the lake he failed to find any Indians, they having fled to the British Possessions. He returned to the Missouri River and endeavored to make terms with the tribes concentrated on it, but only partially succeeded. We knew that there were from two to three thousand of the Sioux, Cheyennes and Arapahoes concentrated at or near Bear Butte, near the north end of the Black Hills, and it was the intention of General Sully with his force to go after this band, but, being turned to the east, I organized a force about 1,000 strong under Colonel Nelson Cole, who went up the Missouri River in boats to Omaha and whose orders were to move from Omaha to Columbus up the Loup Fork to its head and thence across the Niobrara to the White Earth River and then to Bear Butte. Failing to find the Indians there, he was to push on to Powder and Tongue Rivers, where he was to join Brigadier-General P. E. Connor, who was in command of this district. Lieutenant-Colonel Samuel Walker's column of about 500 men of the Sixteenth Kansas Cavalry was to go north from Fort Laramie along the west base of the Black Hills and join Colonel Cole, and later join General Connor on the Tongue River; while General Connor, with a small command of about 500 men, was moving north along the Platte to the head of Salt Creek down the Salt to Powder River, where he was to establish a fort and supply station; from thence he was to move along the east base of the Big Horn Mountains until he struck the hostile Indians in that vicinity. These columns should have moved in May or June, but it was July and August before they got started, on account of the failure of the contractors to deliver the supplies to them on the plains at the different supply-depots; but when they started they moved with alacrity, and would, no doubt, have accomplished the purpose of the campaign had it not been for the fact that they were stopped by an order from Washington to return to Fort Laramie by October 15th.

During May, June, and July the Indians were very aggressive all along the South Platte and North Platte routes. Every Government train had to go guarded; every emigrant train had to be organized into trains of 50 or 100 wagons, with the teamsters armed and placed under an officer, and even then a great many of their people were killed and a great deal of stock run off. The commanding officer at Fort Laramie, during June, had concentrated at his post about 2,000 of what was considered friendly Indians. Most of these Indians had been captured during the spring campaign. They had brought in with them most of the prisoners that had been captured on their raids upon the stage-lines and the ranches. General Connor, desiring to get these Indians removed as far as possible from the hostile Indians, under my order moved them south toward the Republican River, in charge of two companies of the Seventh Iowa Cavalry, commanded by Captain Fouts. These Indians did not take kindly to this movement, and the escort sent with them was not as large as it ought to have been. When they were sixty miles south of Fort Laramie they were communicated with by a band of hostile Indians who followed down the opposite side of the Platte River, and early in the morning they attacked their escort, killing Captain Fouts and four soldiers, and wounding seven others. In the fight there were a great many Indians killed and wounded, but these Indians were allowed to go south with their arms, to convince them that we put confidence in them and did not treat them as prisoners. With the aid of the other Indians on the north side of the Platte, they forced the escort to intrench itself, by doing which the train and the women and others who had been rescued from the Sioux Indians were saved, as word was gotten to Fort Laramie and relief was sent. The Indians after this fight crossed the North Platte River and moved north toward the Black Hills.

Colonel Moonlight, in command of Fort Laramie, as soon as he heard of this revolt, went to relieve the intrenched party. The Indians, however, had crossed the Platte River. He followed them. When within ten or fifteen miles of the band, through carelessness in taking care of his horses, the Indians turned upon him, stampeded his stock, and, in fact, drove off 200 or 300 head of it, leaving his command on foot. The attack of the hostiles frightened the horses so that they could not be controlled, and they ran towards the Indians. Moonlight and his command had to march back to Laramie, a long distance, without food or transportation, as they had started out with only one or two days' rations. Colonel Moonlight was immediately relieved of his command, but the damage had been done, which gave the hostile Indians great encouragement. General Connor sent this dispatch:

Julesburg, June 15, 1865.
(Received 9:50 p. m.)

Major-General Dodge:

I ordered the Indians who surrendered at Laramie to be sent to Kearney. Colonel Moonlight sent them without first dismounting them, under charge of two companies of Seventh Iowa Cavalry. They revolted sixty miles this side of Laramie, killing Captain Fouts, who was in command, and four soldiers, and wounding seven; also killed four of their own chiefs who refused to join them; fifteen Indians were killed; the Indians fled north with their ponies, women, and children, leaving all their camp equipage. Troops are in pursuit. Mail-stages have stopped west of Camp Collins. Everything appears to work unfavorably owing to failure of corn contractors and incompetency of some of my subordinates. I will overcome all obstacles, however, in a short time. Have you sent me cavalry yet? J. D. Doty, Governor of Utah, was buried at Camp Douglas Cemetery this morning. Died of heart disease.

P. E. Connor,
Brigadier-General.

During July, a band of the Arapahoes raided the South Platte River stage-line between Fort Collins and Fort Halleck, drove off most of the stock from the stations, and committed other depredations. Colonel Porter, who was in command of that district, concentrated his force and went after the Indians, and in a very few days restored the stage stations and gave the Indians sound whippings, which kept that line clear nearly all summer. The Indians that had done this work had gone into Fort Collins claiming to be friendly and wishing to make a treaty, and after being fed there for some time, left one night and committed the depredations before troops could stop them. From here they moved immediately north to join the hostile Indians north of the North Platte. I had received notice from Washington that the Interior Department had information that these Indians were peaceable and would not join in the campaigns; but, being on the ground, I knew better, because we were capturing them in nearly all of the attacks that they made. With them was a portion of one of the bands of the Sioux.

On July 27, ten miles west of the North Platte Bridge station, a Mormon train coming east was attacked by the Indians and Lieutenant Casper W. Collins, of the Eleventh Ohio, and twenty-five men of the Eleventh Kansas, went out to relieve it, when about one thousand Indians attacked him. While he saved the train he lost his own life, and twenty-five of his men were scalped and their bodies horribly mutilated; but while the Indians had heavy losses in the fight, they were able to divide up and scatter before any of the troops sent to attack them could reach them. I named the post at Platte Bridge Fort Casper, and it is now known as the town of Casper, on the North-Western railroad.

On August 16th a large band of Sioux Indians attacked a military station on the South Platte route. They were overtaken by the Pawnee Indian Battalion of our forces, who gave them a good whipping. They killed a large number and took their stock and scattered them. This was a band of Sioux Indians that had been lying on the North Platte and made this dash to the South Platte stage-line, thinking we had withdrawn the troops from it to the northern expedition. Very few of them ever got back to their tribes.

The battalion of Pawnees with General Conner had made a great capture of a band of Cheyennes who had been down on the Fort Halleck route. The latter had there captured a part of a company of a Michigan Regiment who were escorting a few wagons, the captives having been tied to the wagons and burned. By some means, General Conner got word of this, and knew the trail they would take to get back to the main command, and on this trail he placed Major North and his battalion of Pawnees. Major North, in describing to me what followed, said that when the Indians came back and discovered that they were surrounded, one, an old man, moved up towards him and placed his hand up to his mouth, telling him to come on; that they were ready to die; that they were full of white men up to that,—meaning up to his mouth. The Pawnees killed every one of this band and scalped them. On one of them was found a diary of one of the Michigan soldiers who had been killed, and one of the Cheyennes had used the book to give an account of their travels, their camps and fights, and what they had done on this raid. From this diary our guides could tell just exactly where the party had been, where they had camped, where they had captured the Michigan soldiers, and their route on their return. A half-breed had written in the book a defiance of the troops, telling what the Indians demanded. Among other things they demanded that before they would make peace we should give up all their prisoners; that we should abandon the country north of the Platte River, etc.

As soon as General Connor reached Powder River he established his post and named it Fort Connor. (It was afterward named Fort Reno by me.) Connor immediately pushed on to the Crazy Woman Mountain fork of Powder River and then to the east base of the Big Horn Mountains, following that to the Tongue River and down the Tongue until James Bridger, the chief scout and guide of the expedition, claimed to have seen the smoke a long distance away, of an Indian camp. No one else could see it, but, as a precaution, Connor sent out the Pawnee scouts, and on August 27th they discovered about 2,000 Indians camped on the Tongue River, near the mouth of Wolf Creek. It is a singular fact that in this vicinity General Crook fought his great battle on the Rosebud, the Custer massacre occurred, and it was not very far away that the Phil Kearney disaster occurred, when Lieutenant Fetterman and his whole command was slaughtered. General Connor immediately corralled the trains and took his available forces, about 250 men, and marched all night and struck this band at daylight, giving them a complete surprise. They were Arapahoes under Black Bear and Old David, with several other noted chiefs. The band was just breaking up their camp, but the Indian soldiers rallied and fought desperately. Captain H. E. Palmer, A. A. G., with General Connor, gives this description of the attack:

The word was passed back for the men to close up and follow the General and not to fire a shot until he fired in advance. General Conner then took the lead, riding his horse up the steep bank of the ravine and dashing out across the mesa as if there were no Indians just to his left. Every man followed as close as possible. At the first sight of the General the Indian ponies grazing on the table-land in front of us sent up a tremendous whinnying, and galloped down toward the Indian village. More than 1,000 dogs began to bark, and more than 700 Indians made the air ring with their fearful yelling. It appeared that the Indians were in the act of breaking camp. The most of their tepees were down and packed for the march. The ponies, more than 3,000, had been gathered in and most of the squaws and children were mounted, some of them having taken the line of march up the stream to the new camp. The General watched the movements of his men until he saw the last man emerge from the ravine, when he wheeled on the left into line. The whole line then fired a volley into the village without stopping their horses, and the bugles sounded a charge. Not a man but realized that the charge into the village without a moment's hesitation was our only salvation. We already saw that we were greatly outnumbered, and that only desperate fighting would save our scalps. We were in the village in the midst of a hand-to-hand fight with the warriors and squaws, for many of the squaws did as brave fighting as their savage lords. Unfortunately for the squaws and children, our men had no time to direct their aim, and bullets from both sides and murderous arrows filled the air. Women and children fell among the killed and wounded. The scene was indescribable. Each man seemed an army by himself. Near the sweathouse I emptied my revolver into the carcasses of three warriors. One of our men, a member of the Eleventh Ohio Cavalry, a fine-looking soldier with as handsome a face as I ever saw on a man, grabbed me by the shoulder and turned me about that I might assist him in drawing an arrow from his mouth. Having no surgeon of a higher grade than a hospital steward, it was decided that in order to get the arrow out of his mouth the tongue would have to be cut out, which was done. The Indians made a brave stand trying to save their families, and succeeded in getting away with a large majority of their women and children, leaving behind nearly all of their plunder.

We now went up a stream called Wolf Creek, General Connor in close pursuit. Soon after we left the village General Connor advised me to instruct Captain North to take his battalion of Indians and get all the stock he could possibly gather. General Connor pursued the savages fully ten miles from camp, when he found himself accompanied by only fourteen men. Our horses were so worn out that it was impossible for the men to keep up. The Indians noticed his movements and turned upon him and his soldiers. They fell back as fast as possible. Captain North and myself had succeeded in coralling about a thousand ponies. Scores of buffalo-robes, blankets, and furs were heaped up on lodge-poles, and on these we placed our dead, and burned their bodies to keep the Indians from mutilating them. Our attack on the village began at 9 a. m. We remained until 2:30 and had destroyed a great deal of Indian property. At 2:30 we took up the line of march for the corralled train. Captain North with his eighty Indians undertook to drive the captured stock. They were soon a great ways ahead, while the rest of the force was engaged in beating back the Indians. The Indians pressed on every side. They seemed to have plenty of ammunition, but they did most of their fighting with arrows. Before dark we were reduced to forty men, and had only a little ammunition. The Indians showed no signs of stopping the fight, but kept on charging on us, dashing away at the stock, and keeping us constantly on the move until fifteen minutes of twelve, when the last shot was fired by our pursuers. The incidents of this fight would make very interesting reading. Every man was a general. Not a man in the company but realized that his life was in the balance. We must either whip the Indians and whip them badly or be whipped ourselves. We could see that the Indians greatly outnumbered us, but we were better armed than they. As for fighting qualities the savages proved themselves as brave as any of our men. We had accomplished a great deal; 250 Indian lodges and their contents had been burned, with the entire winter's supplies; the son of Black Bear was killed: sixty-three Indians were killed, 1,100 ponies were captured, and a lot of women and children were taken prisoners.

General Connor's report of this battle was burned in Utah, and consequently was never forwarded to me or to the Government, so we do not know what the loss on his part was; but it was severe.

General Connor now moved down the Tongue River to make a connection with Colonel Walker and Colonel Cole, at the appointed rendezvous. His scouts discovered that Colonel Cole in moving north had endeavored to reach the mouth of Powder River and had failed, and after six days' fighting had marched south, expecting to go to Port Laramie, not knowing that there were supplies at Fort Connor.

Colonel Cole, who with his column had started from Omaha, had made reasonable progress, following out the routes laid down, and did not discover any Indians until he reached the Little Missouri River, on a branch of the Piney that he was coming down. Lieutenant-Colonel Walker, of the center column, visited his camp and was two days behind him. He should have immediately joined him, to carry out his instructions. Cole was headed toward the Tongue River, near the Wolf Mountains. When he got into the brakes of the Powder River, he discovered many signs of Indians. This is a very rough country, and he had great difficulty in getting his long trains through it; however, he dropped into the valley about fifty miles above the mouth of Powder River and sent a detachment with his best guide fifty miles across to Tongue River and Panther Mountains and discovered nothing of Connor. In Cole's instructions he was told that there would be a supply-depot at Panther or Wolf Mountains, but General Connor had changed this and made the supply-depot at what was known as Camp Connor, on Powder River, and he did not notify either Cole or Walker of this change, which he should have done, as had he done so it would have avoided all the trouble that these two columns encountered. Cole's detachment of cavalry discovered no signs of Connor on Tongue River and so followed down the river, while they should have gone up; and failing to find any sign of any depot at Panther Mountains, reported back to Cole. Cole's rations were now exhausted, or nearly so, as he had not been as careful of them as he should have been, expecting as he did to find a depot where he could get plenty at the end of his sixty days' march. It shows that he was not up to the woodcraft of the country. In examining Powder River towards its mouth he found it destitute of grass and full of canyons. He, therefore, made up his mind to move south up the Powder River valley, with a view to either meeting Connor or making for Fort Laramie. The Indians, seeing this retreat, became very bold. There were at least 2,000 of them, Cheyennes and Sioux, and without making an attack they simply harassed him, sometimes forcing a fight; but very few were hurt. Colonel Cole should have parked his train, placed it in a defensive position under a good guard, and then mobilized the rest of his force, and, with what rations he had, gone after the Indians, giving them battle and forcing the fight with them. He had plenty of men.

Cole had not advanced very far towards Port Connor when, on September 6th, Colonel Walker and his command joined him. Then he had plenty of men to meet all the Indians in the country, if his force was properly handled. When this fighting commenced he was not over thirty miles from where Connor fought his battle, and Captain Palmer states that they heard a cannon, but could not tell which direction the noise came from. Connor, hearing nothing from Cole, sent out Major North with a couple of Indian scouts and with Bridger as guide. They got over into the Powder River country and discovered Cole's trail. During Cole's retreat up the Powder there came a fearful snow-storm. The animals having marched so far without grain, were already very much exhausted, and the storm lasting three days, they became so weak that they were not fit to use, and they were therefore shot, just as they stood at the picket-line, to prevent them from falling into the Indians' hands. This destruction of the animals and the burning of all their equipment was about the first thing that Major North struck, and of course he experienced a great anxiety, fearing that Cole had met with great disaster, and immediately reported to General Connor, who at once sent Sergeant C. L. Thomas with two Pawnees with dispatches to Colonel Cole to march on up Powder River to Fort Connor, where he would find supplies. Cole's troops seem to have started out not fully prepared for such a trip, especially in the line of shoes and leggings, although they were carefully instructed by me to be sure to take a surplus, as I knew the country. Cole's excuse is that while he made ample requisition, the Quartermaster never shipped them, and so when he reached Omaha he had to buy such as he could find. Colonel Cole's troops seem to have kept up their organization and their fighting qualities, for whenever they met the Indians they always whipped them; but they were on the retreat, which gave every advantage to the Indians. When Cole's troops reached Port Connor they were in a deplorable condition—ragged, barefooted, and almost without rations and ammunition.

The Indians surrounding Fort Connor at this time had become so numerous that the commanding officer thought it prudent to intrench the post, which shows good judgment; but Colonel Cole complains in his report that the troops were made to help do this intrenching. Speaking of this he says:

While camped here (Fort Connor) an occurrence took place, strange but most true, which as an integral part of the closing history of the command must have full relation. Some thirty-six hours after reaching this post, a fatigued detail of 400 men was ordered from the Second Missouri Light Artillery to work on the earthworks being thrown up around the place. If the spirit that prompted the detail expected to force its principles through insubordination or rebellion, it was disappointed. What a sight was here! Four hundred ragged, bare-footed men, emaciated with fatigue, who had met and worsted the enemy on three several occasions, marched up in the face of a garrison of 2,000 or more.

I don't know where he got the 2,000 troops, as all the troops when he reached Fort Connor were two companies of Michigan cavalry, General Connor then not having reached that post; and when he did, all told there were not 2,000 troops there. Cole's loss was very light,—nine killed,—while he claims to have killed from 200 to 500 of the Indians.

It was very evident to me that there was no very severe fighting here; it was simply a skirmish on a retreat.

Lieutenant-Colonel Walker's column, which started from Fort Laramie on August 2d, moved up the west base of the Black Hills, and struck Cole's column on August 20th on what was known as Piney Creek. After striking Cole's trail he followed it a short distance, and then left it and struck Powder River, much farther south than Cole had, and on reaching the river he fell right into the same band of Indians that were gathered along the Powder River to harass Cole. He, too, was short of provisions, although he was equipped to travel very rapidly, having all his supplies on pack-mules. As soon as he got in touch with Cole he joined him and followed him to Fort Connor. General Connor's idea was to make up a rapid-moving column of about 1,000 men, using the pack-mules of Walker, and then combine his and Cole's troops to move on a line farther to the west and follow these Indians to the British Possessions if necessary. He had the ammunition, equipment and everything at Fort Connor to fit out these columns with. As near as they could estimate there were about 6,000 Indians all told.

PUMPKIN BUTTES

Prominent land-mark near where Colonels Cole and Walker fought the Indians in September, 1865, on Powder River.

The wagon-road train that started from Sioux City under Colonel Sawyer's engineering party, with two companies of the Fifth United States Volunteer Infantry under the command of Captain George N. Williford, that were to open a wagon-road from Sioux City up the Niobrara River by a short route to the north end of the Black Hills, intended to cross to Powder River and then to the south end of the Big Horn Mountains, making a direct emigrant route into Montana. As soon as I heard of the instructions given this expedition I got word to Colonel Sawyer that it was impossible for him to travel on that route; that he must keep to the south end of the Black Hills and follow up the North Platte until he struck what was known as the Bozeman trail, that was laid out in 1864 by some emigrants going into Montana. This was the trail that Connor had taken on his route to Tongue River. It was feasible all the way from the Platte to Montana. Colonel Sawyer paid no attention to this information, but kept on his original route until he got into the brakes of the Powder River, not very far from where Cole struck them. When within twenty miles of the River, he ascertained by his own guide that it was impossible to advance any farther in that direction; consequently, he had to retrace his steps. On the second day they were attacked by a large band of Indians; evidently the Cheyennes and Sioux that afterwards attacked Colonels Cole and Walker. These Indians kept them corralled nearly four days and nights, fighting through the day and withdrawing at night, only to begin their hostilities at dawn; but finding that their efforts only resulted in many being killed, they abandoned the siege and left, going south, striking Cole's trail on August 22d, which they followed, and on the 23d Colonel Sawyer marched into Port Connor. While Captain Williford does not say that he took charge of this train, that is a fact. He took charge of it and kept it until he got to Fort Connor. He was a splendid officer and it was through his good judgment and his ability as a soldier that he saved the whole outfit. The Bent Boys, who were at the head of the Cheyennes, would communicate with Sawyer and get him to send out persons for the purpose of trading with them, and whoever was sent inside their lines was held prisoner, the idea being to wear Sawyer's force out by this means. But they struck the wrong man in Captain Williford, who, comprehending the situation, attacked the Indians. I knew Williford in the Civil War, and he was a very efficient officer. At Fort Connor I relieved Williford, his men being mostly barefooted, and put Colonel Kidd of the Michigan Cavalry, in command, with a suitable escort, and instructed him to follow the Connor trail until they struck Tongue River, and then to swing towards the Yellowstone and strike the trail up that river to Bozeman. This train, when they got nearly opposite to where General Connor fought, was again attacked by the Indians; but Colonel Kidd managed to get news to General Connor and he sent two or three companies of his command to the rescue. They were absent while he fought his battle on Tongue River. They drove off the Indians, and relieved the train, which reached Montana in safety.

Early in September I reached Fort Connor—before General Cole and Colonel Walker had concentrated there—and gave instructions under the direction of the authorities at Washington, forwarded to me by General Pope, to withdraw all the troops to Fort Laramie, and stop all their operations against the Indians, and endeavor to bring them in for a consultation, and, if possible, to make an agreement as to the cessation of all hostilities. This was a fatal mistake. When I received this dispatch from General Pope, on August 31st, I sent the following message to him:

Headquarters U. S. Forces.
Fort Laramie, Dakota Territory, August 31, 1865.

Major-General John Pope, St. Louis, Mo.:

I consider the Indian matters here of so much importance, and knowing no one can judge of them so well as when he is on the ground, that I desire to make a proposition to the Government. If the Government will allow me to keep General Connor in the field with not to exceed 2,000 men of his present force, leaving the forces you have designated to garrison posts on the plains. I will settle these Indian difficulties before spring satisfactorily to the Government, and bring about a peace that will be lasting. I may do it in a month or two; or it may be longer. The additional expense to the Government will be the pay of that number of troops for the time detained. All the stores, forage, etc., to support them are here and en route. As soon as we settle with them we can send these troops in and take 2,000 more from our posts in addition and muster them out. General Connor left Powder River with sixty days' supplies, and I am satisfied if we will allow him he will settle the matter before he returns. Should he come back by our orders without settling the matter, the entire Indian tribes will be down on our lines, and we will have our hands full, and more too. The forces for Utah I will soon have on the road, and when Connor gets back he can go right there.

G. M. Dodge,
Major-General.

General Connor, after getting news of the position of Cole's and Walker's forces, moved back with his forces to Fort Connor, with a view of taking command of Cole's and Walker's forces and organizing them into two columns—one a light column with pack-mules, and the other with the trains,—and then to follow and attack the Indians that had been fighting Cole and Walker. When he arrived at Fort Connor he found my dispatches, which, of course, changed his whole policy. He knew then where all the Indians were located. They had all been forced away from the traveled lines to protect their villages, and it was only a question of time—weeks or months—before we would have conquered a peace that the Indians would have recognized.

The dispatches which I sent from Fort Laramie brought an answer from General Grant to the effect that the authorities at Washington were determined to stop all campaigns against the Indians. They had been made to believe by the Interior Department that all they had to do was to withdraw the troops and the Indians would come in and make peace. On my return from Fort Connor, when I reached the North Platte I sent this dispatch:

Horseshoe, September 15, 1865.

Major-General John Pope, St. Louis:

Arrived here today on my return from Powder River. That post is well located, right in heart of Indian country, and is an important post. The Indians' trails all cross at or near it, and it will have good effect hereafter in holding in check Indians. Have not heard from General Connor since August 24. We cannot reach him now. They have done a good deal of work on Powder River; got up stockade and commenced Quartermaster buildings; well under way. Great lack of Quartermaster's stores up there, the Powder River stores not having reached Laramie yet. From Laramie to Powder River, then to Virginia City, is an excellent wagon-road; good grass, water, and wood all the way, and the most direct road that can be got. The travel over it in another season will be immense; it saves at least 450 miles in distance. After the Indians attacked Colonel Sawyer's wagon-road party and failed in their attempt, they held a parley. Colonel Bent's sons, George and Charles Bent, appeared on part of Indians, and Colonel Sawyer gave them a wagon-load of goods to let him go undisturbed, Captain Williford, commanding escort, not agreeing to it. The Indians accepted proposition and agreed to it, but after receiving the goods they attacked party; killed three men. Bent said that there was one condition on which the Cheyennes would treat; viz., the hanging by Government of Colonel Chivington. He also said that the Indians considered that they were strong enough to fight the Government; preferred to do it; that they knew the Government would withdraw troops in fall; then they would have it all their own way again. Expressed great fear about Connor, and said they were concentrating everything to meet him, which is true. Since he left no Indians have troubled the mail- or telegraph-lines, but are all moving north, stragglers and all. At Fort Connor they kill a few of them as they pass every few days. There is one band of Arapahoes in Medicine Bow Mountains, who are committing depredations around Denver, on Cache La Poudre and Big Thompson Creeks. They belong to the band that was at Cow Creek treaty. I shall be in Laramie tomorrow; see General Wheaton; thence to Denver. Bent also said that some of tribes had agreed to make peace on Missouri River, but they were doing this to keep us from sending a force that way. These Bent boys were educated in St. Louis. One has been with Price in the rebel Army; was captured. His father got him released and took him to his ranch on the Arkansas River, when he joined the Cheyennes, of which he is a half-breed. He was dressed in one of our staff officer's uniforms.

G. M. Dodge,
Major-General.

On General Connor's arrival at Fort Connor he wired me the results of the campaign and protested strenuously against the order stopping it, saying he was then in condition and position to close it, conquer the Indians, and force a lasting peace. On receipt of his report I sent this dispatch:

Central City, Colo., September 27, 1865.

Major-General John Pope, St. Louis, Mo.:

On August 28th, General Connor surprised Medicine Man's band of Indians on Tongue River; killed fifty; captured village, all winter provisions, and 600 horses—all the stock they had. On the 1st of September the right column, under Colonel Cole, had a fight with the Sioux, Cheyennes, and Arapahoes, on Powder River, and whipped them. On the evening of the 3d of September attacked them again, driving them down Powder River ten miles. Next morning at daylight attacked again, fight lasting until 10 a. m., when Indians were defeated with loss of 200 killed. They fled in every direction, losing large number of horses, camp equipage, provisions, etc. On 8th instant, Colonel Walker, commanding center column, who was in advance of Colonel Cole, met Indians in large force. Colonel Cole came up and after a short but spirited engagement they totally routed Indians, driving them in every direction with great loss, several of principal chiefs being killed in this fight. On the night of the 9th of September a severe snow-storm raged, in which 400 of Colonel Cole's horses perished. I was in that storm on Powder River. It was very severe, and I lost several animals. Our total loss in all the engagements not more than fifty killed and wounded, including one officer. Colonel Cole or Colonel Walker had not communicated with General Connor and were on Powder River, but by this time they have communicated, as they had ascertained where General Connor's column was.

G. M. Dodge,
Major-General.

General Connor, in compliance with his orders, moved south from Fort Connor to distribute at the different posts where they had been assigned, the forces not ordered to be mustered out. As soon as he started south to Fort Laramie the Indians followed him and swarmed immediately on the overland routes, both the North and South Platte, reaching even as far as the Arkansas, and committed great depredations. The troops along those lines had been mustered out, and the regular-army force that was to take their places had not arrived. It was a harvest for the Indians. In my absence General Pope had assigned to the different districts regular-army officers for permanent command. They were to take the places of the volunteers. Under my instructions I immediately sent word to the Indians to come to Fort Laramie for the purpose of a consultation. To accomplish this I sent out the best-posted guides (using chiefs, sub-chiefs, half-breeds of friendly Indians) that I knew on the plains, to each of the hostile tribes asking them to come into Fort Laramie. I instructed the messengers to tell them that if any of their people had gone to the Missouri River for peaceable purposes to let them go, but to bring in all that were left, providing they felt disposed to settle without delay. I sent them word that if they did not come in and settle they would find that our summer campaign was only a taste of what they would get this winter, for we would give them no rest. I posted the district commanders thoroughly, telling them what we wanted was to settle with the Indians before they discovered the smallness of our forces on the plains. I told them they might say, also, that all of the Indians south of the Arkansas had made peace, and gave instructions that they be told about the battle with the Arapahoes and Cheyennes on Powder and Tongue Rivers. I sent the district commanders word to show Big Ribs, one of my messengers, the forces at their posts, and to impress upon him our power. The effect of this appeal to the different tribes was that early in the spring of 1866 we got together at Fort Laramie the principal chiefs and the head men of the North Cheyennes, Arapahoes, and the different tribes of the Sioux, when a council was held.

I had instructed General Frank Wheaton, who commanded at Fort Laramie, that we would agree to almost anything to bring a permanent peace except to allow the Indians to come down to the North Platte and occupy the country through which the new military road was laid out to Bozeman, Mont. Our troops, in passing up the east base of the Black Hills, had discovered gold. There were Colorado and California Regiments in the commands, and I knew, and so did General Connor, that many were preparing, as soon as a treaty was made, to go back into that country and prospect it, and I gave that reason to the Indians for holding them north of the Belle Fourche Fork of the Cheyenne River; but that country was their best hunting-ground. They were perfectly willing to give up all the country south of the Platte River, and not to interfere with the building of the Union Pacific road or with any of the overland routes up the North or South Platte; but they would not consent to give up the Black Hills north of the North Platte. Finally we made an agreement with them that they should occupy the country north of the North Platte River until such time as the Government should see proper to send a commission out to negotiate a permanent peace with them. I gave instructions to tell them that if the white men went into their territory and we did not keep them out, they were at liberty to do so. I knew that would deter any white man going in there, and as long as they kept the peace, we would. Red Cloud, who had then come to the head of the Ogalalla band of the Sioux Indians, took a prominent part in this conference, and was backed by such chiefs as Spotted Tail, Man-Afraid-of-His-Horses, Big Ribs, and the Bent boys on behalf of the Cheyennes. He declared that they would never give up their country north of the Platte. "You may take my country," said Red Cloud, "but I will mark every mile of that Bozeman trail from the North Platte to Yellowstone with the bodies of your soldiers;" and this he pretty nearly accomplished. This agreement, made at Fort Laramie, accomplished nothing. During the years 1866, 1867 and 1868 the Indians swarmed across the lines agreed upon and occupied the country, especially along the Union Pacific, which was then being constructed through that country. The Government had to send in additional troops, and all the military posts over the country had to be re-occupied the same as they had been before. The Government endeavored to again reach these Indians through a peace commission in 1868. General W. T. Sherman was at the head of it, and it was composed of General Harney and others. They visited me at Fort Sanders, Wyo., before they went to make a treaty with the Indians, and wished to know my reasons for the position I took in the consultation of 1866. I then told General Sherman that my soldiers had found gold in all the streams heading in the Black Hills north of the North Platte, and that as soon as he allowed those Indians to come to the North Platte under a treaty of peace, he would not be across the Missouri River on his return before that country would be covered by prospectors from California and Colorado. General Sherman answered that their instructions were to make such a peace and they were sent there to do it, and, sure enough, they did; and as soon as the treaty was made the miners poured into the country. One of the first mines that was discovered was the Homestake or Homestead. Sitting Bull, who had taken part in this treaty and whose country was the Black Hills, sent in protest after protest, demanding that the Government live up to the terms of the treaty and drive the miners out, but no attention was paid to them. The miners and settlers poured into the Black Hills country and drove the Indians out, and Sitting Bull said in a conference he had with some of the Army officers in the 70's that if the Government did not protect their territory as provided in the treaty, they would themselves; and they started to do it. The massacres of that year came from his band, the troubles finally ending with the sacrifice of the Custer Regiment in 1876. While this was a horrible event, the Indians, under the treaty, were fully justified in it. During this same time Red Cloud occupied the Bozeman trail. He killed emigrants, besides murdering Captain Fetterman and his company at Fort Phil Kearney, and other troops located at the posts that we established along there in 1866, such as Forts Reno, McKinney, Phil Kearney, and C. F. Smith. It was not until after the Custer massacre that these Indians were brought to time and put on reservations; since then peace has prevailed.

The Government had the same difficulty on the Arkansas River route that we had on the Platte routes in the summer of 1866, 1867, and 1868. The Indians that had made the agreement with Colonel Leavenworth were all committing depredations until finally the Government sent General Sheridan there with instructions to punish them. They tried to play the same game with Sheridan that they had played with us, but he would have none of it. There was no one in Washington who would force him to listen to the appeals of the peace commission. His troops, under Colonels Custer, Evans, and others, fought three battles south of the Arkansas, noticeably wiping out some bands, and making them give up their prisoners, stop their murders, and go on reservations in the Indians' territory. From that time on they have been peaceable.

We were much better prepared, in the fall of 1865, both on the Arkansas and on the Yellowstone, to conquer these Indians. We had got up to their villages and had plenty of troops, plenty of provisions, and plenty of clothing, and could carry on the campaign through the winter, if necessary; and so, if we had allowed General Ford or General Sanborn to have gone forward with the columns and punish those southern Indians, they would have made a permanent peace. But the fact is the Indians did not give up until they were thoroughly thrashed and made to recognize the power and authority of the Government.

The policy of the United States in dealing with the Indian problem is beyond the comprehension of any sensible man. They were treated the same as foreign nations; and while they made treaties they never carried out their part of them, breaking them whenever the trend of civilization westward interfered with them in any way. The Government attempted to deal with and govern the Indians with civil agents and at the same time tried to enforce peace through the military authorities. This caused friction; and deception and cheating in the supplying of them through their contractors and civil agents brought untold complaints. If the Government had treated the Indians as a ward that they were bound to protect, as the English did, they would have had very little trouble in handling them. The military force would have held all conferences with them; fed them when they needed it; located them in an early day on unoccupied good hunting-grounds; and finally, as civilization moved into their territories and as their tribes wasted away, would have given them reservations where the Government from the money they received from the lands the Indians claimed, could have kept and fed them without any great burden or cost. In all the days of Indian warfare and treaties, there never was such a farce, or failure to comprehend the frontier situation, as in the years 1865 and 1866, and the failure of the Government to take advantage of the comprehensive plans instituted by the military authorities, as well as of the great expenditures made, and to punish the Indians as they deserved, brought, in after years, greater expenditures and more disturbances than ever.

Early in the campaign, after General Pope had made known his views to the Government, he requested me to write fully mine to the Secretary of the Interior, who had charge of Indian affairs, and who was from my state, and I sent him this letter:

Headquarters Department of the Missouri.
St. Louis, Mo., June 22, 1865.

Hon. James Harlan, Secretary of the Interior, Washington, D. C.:

My Dear Sir: Copies of Senator Doolittle's and Commissioner Dole's letters to you of dates May 31 and June 12 have been furnished me. My acquaintance with you leads me to believe that you are endeavoring to get at the real facts of our Indian difficulties and the best methods for putting an end to them. So far as Senator Doolittle's letter refers to "some general getting up of an Indian war on his own hook" and for his own purposes, I shall indulge no reply. You know me, and if it was intended in any way to apply to me I leave you to judge of how much credence should be attached to it. My sincere desire is to terminate these Indian troubles, and I have no hesitation in saying that if I am allowed to carry out the policy now being pursued toward them I will have peace with them before another emigration crosses the plains. When I assumed command of the former Department of Kansas I found all the important Indian tribes on the plains in open hostility against us. Whether it was the fault of the white man or the Indian, the fact was patent. They were holding the entire overland route from Julesburg to Junction Station, had destroyed the telegraph-lines, captured trains, burned ranches, and murdered men, women, and children indiscriminately. I soon stopped these proceedings, opened our broken lines of communication; repaired, so far as possible, the injury done; pushed troops out there, and then tried to effect a settlement with the Indians. On the southern route I found a similar state of affairs existing. The Indians were on the warpath, and I at once started expeditions against them, learning of which Colonel Leavenworth, Indian Agent, informed me that he could make peace with them; that we were at fault, etc. I stopped my expeditions on the southern route to give him an opportunity to accomplish this object. He started for their camps; they robbed him, stole his mules, and he hardly escaped with his scalp; and on his return stated that it was useless to attempt to make peace with them. I then, in accordance with the orders of the Secretary of War, started for the Indians again, and had just got my forces under way when the committee, of which Senator Doolittle is a member, reached Fort Larned, and after an interview with Colonel Leavenworth, gave orders for the expeditionary movements to stop. The grounds for this action the Senator gives in his letter. I was then aware that the Indians were moving north to attack that line, and was moving two columns in concert with General Ford to intercept and punish them; and I at that time telegraphed that the tribes spoken of by Senator Doolittle were on their way north to attack our trains. They had then driven out all traders, made a treaty with the southern Indians and Texans, and sent me word that they wanted no peace.

Within ten days from the time Senator Doolittle and his party left Fort Larned, and before I had time to countermand their orders and get my troops disposed, the Indians attacked the posts and trains all along the line, running off stock, capturing trains, etc., murdering men, and showing conclusively that they were determined on war at all hazards. Our overtures to them, as well as those of the agents sent out by General Carleton, were treated with disdain. From Fort Laramie I sent word to the Sioux, Cheyennes, etc., that if they wanted peace to come in and stop their hostilities. A few of each tribe responded by coming in; the rest refused, and indicated their purposes and feelings by attacking the posts west of Fort Laramie, and on Laramie Plains, murdering, stealing, etc. I undertook to remove the friendly Indians from Fort Laramie to Fort Kearney, in order to get them away from the troubles. When about sixty miles south of Fort Laramie they attacked their guard, killed a captain and four privates, turned upon five of their chiefs who were disposed to be friendly, killed them, and then escaped, leaving their camps, etc., in our hands; so that now we have every Indian tribe capable of mischief from the British Possessions on the north to the Red River on the south, at war with us, while the whites are backing them up. These facts, it appears to me, are a sufficient answer to the letters of Senator Doolittle and Commissioner Dole. That these Indians have been greatly wronged I have no doubt, and I am certain that the agents who have been connected with them are as much to blame as any one else. So far as the Chivington fight was concerned, it occurred before I assumed command. I condemned it, and I have issued orders that no such acts will be tolerated or allowed; that the Indians on the warpath must be fought wherever and whenever found, but no outrages or barbarities must be committed. I am convinced that the only way to effectually settle these troubles is for us to move our columns directly into their country, punish them when we find them, show them our power, and at the same time give them to know that: we are ready to make peace with them—not, however, by paying them for murdering our people and plundering our trains and posts, but by informing them that if they will refrain from further hostilities they shall not be molested; that neither agents nor citizens shall be allowed to go among them to swindle them; that we will protect them in their rights; that we will enforce compliance with our part of the treaty, and will require them to do the same on their part. Let them ask for peace. We should keep citizens out of their country. The class of men sent among them as agents go there for no good purpose. They take positions for the sole purpose of making money out of the Indians by swindling them, and so long as they can do this they shield them in their crimes.

Colonel Leavenworth, who stands up so boldly for the southern Indians, was dismissed from the United States service. He "blows hot and cold" with singular grace. To my officers he talks war to the knife; to Senator Doolittle and others he talks peace. Indeed, he is all things to all men. When officers of the army deal with these Indians, if they mistreat them, we have a certain remedy for their cases. They can be dismissed and disgraced, while Indian agents can only be displaced by others perhaps no better. Now I am confident we can settle these Indian difficulties in the manner I have indicated. The Indians say to me that they will treat with an officer of the army (a brave), in all of whom they seem to have confidence, while they despise and suspect civilian agents and citizens, by whom they say they have been deceived and swindled so much that they put no trust in their words. I have given orders to the commanders of each of my columns that when they have met and whipped these Indians, or even before, if they have an opportunity, to arrange, if possible, an informal treaty with them for a cessation of hostilities, and whatever they agree to do, to live to strictly, allowing no one, either citizen or soldier, to break it. I shall myself go out on the plains in a few weeks and try to get an interview with the chiefs and if possible effect an amicable settlement of affairs; but I am utterly opposed to making any treaty that pays them for the outrages they have committed, or that hires them to keep the peace. Such treaties last just as long as they think them for their benefit, and no longer. As soon as the sugar, coffee, powder, lead, etc., that we give them, is gone, they make war to get us to give them more. We must first punish them until we make them fear us and respect our power, and then we must ourselves live strictly up to the treaties made. No one desires more than I do to effect a permanent peace with these Indians, and such is the desire of every officer under me, all of whom agree in the method suggested for bringing it about.

Very many of these officers on the plains have been there for years, and are well acquainted with these Indians and their character, and my own opinions in this matter are founded not alone from my experience and observations since I have commanded here, but also with intercourse with them on the plains during a number of years prior to the war, in which time I met and had dealings with nearly every tribe east of the Rocky Mountains. Until hostilities cease I trust that you will keep all agents, citizens and traders away from them. When peace is made with them, if civilian agents and citizens are sent among them, send those who you know to be of undoubted integrity. I know you desire to do so, and from the appointments you have already made I believe you will be successful. My plan, however, would be to keep these Indians under the care of officers of the army, stationed in their country; that what is given them be given by these officers, and that all citizens, agents and traders should, while among them, be subject to their (the officers') supervision and police regulations. In this way I have no doubt these Indians can be kept in their own country, their outrages stopped, and our overland routes kept safe. Now, not a train or coach of any kind can cross the plains in safety without being guarded, and I have over 3,000 miles of route to protect and guard. The statement that the Sand Creek affair was the first Indian aggression is a mistake. For months prior to that affair the Indians had been attacking our trains, posts, and ranches; had robbed the emigrants and murdered any party they considered too weak to defend themselves.

The theory that we cannot punish these Indians effectually, and that we must make or accept any kind of a peace in order to hold our overland routes, is not sustained by the facts, is singularly erroneous, and I cannot agree to it by any means. I have now seven different columns of troops penetrating their country in all directions, while at the same time I am holding the overland routes. This display of force alone will alarm and terrify them; will show them that we are in earnest, have the power, and intend at all hazards to make them behave themselves. After we have taught them this they will sue for peace; then if the government sees fit to indemnify them for any wrongs inflicted upon them, they will not charge it to our fears or inability to cope with them. The cost of carrying on this war with them is, to be sure, considerable; but the question arises, Had we not better bear this cost now while the preparations are made and the force on hand ready to be thrown in such strength into their country as to make quick, effective, and final work of it, than to suffer a continuance of their outrages for a long time and finally have to do the work at greater expense of blood and treasure? I have written you this frankly and truly, knowing that you want to get at the facts and do that which is for the best, and I am convinced that when you fully understand these matters you will agree with me. I shall be glad at any and all times to furnish you any information in my possession that you may desire, and I assure you I shall bend all my energies to the accomplishment of the great object in view and so much desired—a lasting and just peace with these Indians.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant.

G. M. Dodge,
Major-General Commanding.

Since writing this report of the Indian campaign of 1865 and 1866, I have seen Secretary of the Navy Gideon Wells's diary of the reconstruction period, from which the following extracts are taken:

Tuesday, August 8, 1865.

Stanton submitted a number of not material questions, yet possessed of some little interest. Before the meeting closed the subject of army movements on the plains came up, and Stanton said there were three columns of twenty-two thousand troops moving into the Indian country, with a view to an Indian campaign. Inquiry as to the origin and authority of such a movement elicited nothing from the War Secretary. He said he knew nothing on the subject. He had been told there was such a movement, and Meigs had informed him it was true. Grant had been written to for information, but Grant was away and he knew not when he should have a reply. The expenses of this movement could not, he said, be less than $50,000,000. But he knew nothing about it.

Friday, August 11, 1865.

The question of the Indian war on the plains was again brought forward. No one, it appears, has any knowledge on the question. The Secretary of War is in absolute ignorance. Says he has telegraphed to General Grant, and General Grant says he has not ordered it. McCulloch wanted to know the probable expense—the numbers engaged, etc. Stanton thought McCulloch had better state how many should be engaged—said General Pope had command. Harlan said he considered Pope an improper man—was extravagant and wasteful. Thought twenty-two hundred instead of twenty-two thousand men was a better and sufficient number.

This whole thing is a discredit to the War Department.

Tuesday, August 15, 1865.

Stanton says there is to be a large reduction of the force which is moving against the Indians. That by the 1st of October the force will be about 6,000. That large supplies have gone on, but they can be divided or deflected to New Mexico and other points, so that they will not be lost.

Friday, August 18, 1865.

Senator Doolittle and Mr. Ford, who have been on a mission to the plains, visiting New Mexico, Colorado, etc., had an interview with the President and Cabinet of an hour and a half. Their statement in relation to the Indians and Indian affairs exhibits the folly and wickedness of the expedition which has been gotten up by somebody without authority or the knowledge of the Government.

Their strong protestations against an Indian war, and their statement of the means which they had taken to prevent it, came in very opportunely. Stanton said General Grant had already written to restrict operations; he had also sent to General Meigs. I have no doubt a check has been put on a very extraordinary and unaccountable proceeding, but I doubt if an active stop is yet put to war expenses.

It is no wonder that with such ignorance in the Cabinet as to the condition of the country, that the administration at Washington was so incompetent in the Civil War. No person can read Secretary Wells's diary of the daily doings at Washington of the Cabinet during President Lincoln's administration and see how little appreciation and support he got from his Cabinet. Dissensions among themselves and hardly ever agreeing on any important question, brings to view the great responsibility of the President and the fact that in all the important matters he was dependent upon his own judgment. The Cabinet knew nothing of the Indian depredations that for three months held all the lines of travel, mail, and telegraph crossing the plains to California, with every State and Territory west of the Missouri River appealing for protection, until President Lincoln wrote to General Grant to try and have something done to protect that country. General Grant instructed me to make the campaign in the winter of 1864-65, which was so successful that in forty days all the overland routes were opened, and the stage, telegraph, and mails replaced, as shown in my reports, though at the beginning of the campaign every tribe of Indians from the British Possessions to the Indian Territory was at war, with captures and murders of settlers along all the overland routes, in all the frontier States, every-day occurrences; with women and children captured and outrages committed that cannot be mentioned. And yet this Cabinet had no knowledge of the conditions, and concluded from the report of the Doolittle Peace Commission that the Indian expedition was a complete failure, notwithstanding that this commission failed to make ponce with a single tribe of Indians and failed to stop the depredations of any band of Indians; and, upon its report, declaring that the Indian expeditions were a folly and wickedness gotten up by some one without the authority or knowledge of the Government.

There never were 22,000 troops on the plains, nor one-half of that number. The War Department may have sent that number out, but, as I have shown, they were all mustered out before they reached their work; and the cost of the campaign with a year's supplies at the posts for all the troops on the plains or engaged in the campaign was not more than $10,000,000, a very small amount compared with the trouble and cost of fighting these Indians for ten years thereafter. Secretary Harlan says that 2,200 troops were sufficient. When I took command, in January, 1865, there were not to exceed 5,000 troops guarding trains, stages, and telegraph-lines, and protecting all the routes of travel across the plains, and they had utterly failed. All travel had been stopped and no expeditions against the Indians had been made. The Indians had held the overland routes for three months in spite of these troops. It shows how little knowledge Secretary Harlan had of the condition of Indian affairs in his department. From the statements of Secretary Wells it is evident where the order came from to stop all operations on the plains and withdraw all troops by October 15th. When Secretary Stanton states that by October 1st the troops on the plains would be reduced to 6,000, it shows how little knowledge he had of affairs in his department, for at that time there were not 6,000 troops on the plains or in my command.

It is well that no one knew the condition of affairs; that no one was aware of the ignorance of the group of statesmen at Washington who were supposed to be responsible for our nation and its preservation. They did not seem to know where to ascertain the facts. It would seem that Secretary Stanton purposely wished to place a reflection on General Grant, for he must have known that he was responsible for the Army and for all of its movements. It seems that General Grant was away at the time the dispatches of General Pope and myself were sent showing the necessity of continuing the campaign and punishing these savages. When he returned he tried to stop this Cabinet panic, but his dispatches in answer to those from Pope and myself show that he could not do it, and the fatal mistake was made of stopping the campaign just as it was accomplishing and successfully ending a year's work. It seems to have all come about through the misrepresentation of the Doolittle Peace Commission and the lack of proper information on the part of the Cabinet.

In the years 1863, 1864 and 1865 the Indians deliberately made war, believing that the Civil War had so crippled us that we could not effectively contend with them; but just as we had spent millions of dollars, sent thousands of troops into their country, and commenced fighting and capturing them, we were forced to lay down our arms almost in sight of the line of battle and beg for peace, and the Indians believed they had defeated us and that we could not conquer them, and for from three to ten years afterward we had to spend great sums, make winter campaigns, and suffer great losses of life and property, before we obtained the lasting peace which was in sight in 1865 and 1866 if we had been allowed to carry out our campaigns and plans to a legitimate end.

Upon the close of my campaigns on the plains the Legislature of the State of Iowa passed and sent me these commendations of my services:

Resolved, By the Senate and House of Representatives of the State of Iowa, That the thanks of the people of this State are due and are hereby extended to Major-General Grenville M. Dodge, for his able and efficient management of Indian affairs on the plains, in protecting the Great Overland Routes, and our western borders from the depredations and incursions of hostile Indians, as also for his distinguished services as a commander in the field, and his able administration of the Department of the Missouri.

During this campaigning on the plains I had as my escort Company A, Fourteenth Pennsylvania Cavalry. They belonged to one of the Regiments that was sent from the East to take part in the Indian campaigns, and did not ask to be mustered out until after the campaign. I was greatly indebted to this company for the close attention they gave to me and the intelligence they showed during the whole trip. They had served faithfully in the Civil War, and their veteran experience there was a great benefit in the work they had to do on the plains, often in taking messages and performing other duties where only two or three of them could be detailed at a time. It has always been a great pleasure to me to have had an invitation, ever since they organized their society, to attend their reunions, but, unfortunately, I have been so far away that I could not go; and to the surviving members I with great pleasure extend my thanks for their good services to me.

---

BRIGADIER-GENERAL G. M. DODGE AND STAFF AT CORINTH, MISS., IN THE SPRING OF 1862

Model of fortified town on the table. Left to right—Lieutenant J. W. Barnes, A. D. C.; Captain O. J. Dodds, D. Q. M.; Captain C. C. Carpenter, Com. of Sub.; Captain J. K. King, A. Q. M.; Lieutenant-Colonel R. S. Barnhill, D. P. M.; Major N. B. Howard, Judge Advocate; Lieutenant J. H. Hogan, Ordnance Officer; Major W. R. Marsh, Medical Director; Captain B. P. Chenoweth, A. A. I. G.; Captain Henry Horn, Chief of Grand Guards.