FOOTNOTES:
[3] Taken from my official report for the month of April, 1847. G. W. S.
[4] Colonel Joseph G. Totten. Chief Engineer, had left Vera Cruz and returned to his duties in Washington City. Major John L. Smith then became Senior Engineer with General Scott's forces.
CHAPTER IV.
FROM PUEBLA TO CHURUBUSCO.
On the 7th of August, 1847, the advance of General Scott's army, Twiggs' division, the engineer company leading, left Puebla and commenced the forward movement into the valley of Mexico. The company served with that division, until Worth's division was placed in the lead during the turning movement made by the army around Lake Chalco. In that movement the engineer company was at the head of Worth's division.
The road ran between the western border of the lake and a high range of hills which, in some places, rose from the water's edge. The road was narrow and rough; and had been obstructed by rolling immense masses of stone upon it from the almost overhanging cliffs. These obstructions were of considerable height; they completely blocked our way; and at several points ditches had been cut across the road.
General Worth directed the Light Battalion, under Colonel C. F. Smith, to advance and drive off the Mexicans who were firing upon us—ordered me to make the road passable for artillery and wagons as soon as possible—and notified me that the leading brigade would assist in that work when called upon. I immediately asked for a detail of 500 men; put them to work, at once, under the direction of the officers and men of the engineer company, and everything was progressing rapidly, when, to my surprise, Lieutenant J. C. Pemberton, aide to General Worth, came up to me and insisted that the whole character of the operations should be changed. Whilst he was elaborating his views I cut him short by asking if he had any orders for me from General Worth. In the meanwhile the latter had reached the front, without either Pemberton or I being aware of his presence. Before the aide had time to reply to my question, General Worth, in a very peremptory tone called out "Come away from there Mr. Pemberton, and let Mr. Smith alone. This is his business—not yours".
In a few hours, the road was put in such condition that, by the use of drag-ropes and men at the wheels, we were enabled to pass artillery and wagons over the obstructions; and the column moved on without further material delay.
After reaching San Augustine, and passing beyond, the forward movement, now on the main road, or causeway, leading from Acapulco to the city of Mexico, was checked by fortifications about six hundred yards in our front. These fortifications crossed the road at San Antonio, and were occupied by the enemy in large force. The afternoon of the 18th of August, was spent in reconnoitring that position.
About 3 A. M., on the 19th, I received an order to return to San Augustine with the engineer company and its train. In making our way from the head of Worth's division, along the main road, towards the rear, it was somewhat difficult to arouse the men of that division, who were sleeping on the road, and get them to clear the way for the passage of our wagons.
No explanation of the order for our return had been given. Just after the dawn of day, and before we were clear of the division, two soldiers on the side of the road, were lighting a fire for the purpose of preparing coffee. As we passed them, one said to the other: "We are not going to fight to-day: Twiggs's division is going to fight". The other of the two replied, sneeringly: "What do you know about it?" To which the first answered: "Don't you see those young engineer officers, with the engineer company and their wagons? They are going back, to be sent on another road with Twiggs's division, we are not going to fight to-day". As we passed out of hearing of the two soldiers I said to McClellan, who was riding by my side: "Did you hear that?" He answered "Yes and I consider it the handsomest compliment that could be paid to the engineer company. The private soldiers of this army understand that we are sent where the hardest work and hardest fighting are to be done—and always at the head of the leading division".
We reached San Augustine a little after sunrise, August 19. I will now quote direct from my official report of these operations.
"Orders were [at once] received, from the headquarters of the army, directing me to report to Captain R. E. Lee, of the Corps of Engineers, with the company under my command, and [I] was ordered by Captain Lee to take ten of my men, and select certain tools from the general engineer train, in addition to those carried along with the company. I turned over the command of the engineer company to Lieutenant McClellan, who, under the direction of Captain Lee, proceeded at once to commence the work on the road from San Augustine to Contreras." "In about one hour and a half, I rejoined the command with the necessary implements for certain section of the road, to bring forward my wagons as rapidly as possible, and to see that the road was practicable before I passed any portion of it. At this time my company was divided into five sections, each under an engineer officer directing operations on [different portions of] the road".
At Contreras. General Scott, in his official report, says, "By three o'clock, this afternoon, [August 19th.] the advanced divisions came to a point where the new road could only be continued under the direct fire of 22 pieces of the enemy's artillery [most of them of large calibre] placed in a strong entrenched camp to oppose our operations, and surrounded by every advantage of ground, besides immense bodies of cavalry and infantry".
In my official report it is stated that; "The head of the column having halted, I reached the front in time to receive instructions from Captain Lee to halt the company, collect the scattered parties, and to examine the road inclining to the left, while he went to the right. Lieutenants McClellan and Foster had been for some hours detached. Having gone about four hundred yards, I heard just ahead sharp firing of musketry; and immediately after met Captain McClellan, of the topographical engineers, and Lieutenant McClellan, of the engineer company, returning on horseback—they had come suddenly on a strong picket, and were fired upon. Lieutenant McClellan had his horse shot under him. Information of the enemy's picket being in our vicinity was reported to General Twiggs, who ordered a regiment of rifles forward. There being several engineer officers present when the rifles came to the front, I returned to my company, which had been for a short time left without an officer. Captain Lee about this time, sent back for Captain Magruder's battery, which was conducted by Lieutenant Foster, and placed in position by Lieutenant McClellan".
"The Third Infantry was ordered to support the battery. I moved forward with this regiment, taking my company and pack mules, loaded with tools, and placed my command under such shelter as could be found on the left, near the position occupied by the Third Infantry, and in rear of the battery. Meeting with Lieutenant McClellan, I directed him still to remain with the battery, but to order Lieutenant Foster to rejoin the company. In a few moments this officer reported to me, and brought information that the troops were preparing to storm the enemy's position."
"Riley's brigade had moved in advance by our right. Leaving the mules and tools, I moved the company forward, falling in with the brigade of General [Persifor] Smith. Captain Lee being present, with his consent, I requested the General to allow the engineer company to fight in his brigade. He told me to take the head of the column, and to direct myself towards a church in a village, on the left of the enemy's battery—between it and the city. Whilst passing down the hill and crossing the ravine, the enemy were rapidly appearing [reinforcements from the direction of the city] on an eminence beyond the church. General Smith directed me to take my company as an escort, reconnoitre the village, and find out whether Colonel Riley's brigade was in the vicinity. I continued some distance beyond the church; and returned without seeing the brigade under Colonel Riley, which had, as I understood afterwards, advanced very near [the rear of] the enemy's battery. The reinforcements of the enemy upon the hill in our front were rapidly increasing. They had at this time probably ten thousand men, on the height, formed in line of battle. Towards dark Colonel Riley's brigade returned and joined the troops under the command of General Smith: too late, however, to allow time for forming the troops to attack the enemy [on the hill] in our front. Lieutenant McClellan joined me about this time in our movement on the village. Lieutenant Foster, who was on horseback, became detached with a few of the men, and did not rejoin me until after the action on the morning of the 20th."
"General Smith, very soon after dark, informed me that the enemy's main battery would be stormed, [in rear], at daylight on the morning of the 20th. This would open the road for artillery, and our communications with [the main army under] General Scott would be re-established. I received orders to hold the engineer company ready to move at 3 A. M. and to take my place on the right of the rifles. On the morning of the 20th there was considerable delay in the movement of the brigade [raw troops] under General Cadwallader, by which General Smith's brigade, now under the command of Major Dimmick, First Artillery, was detained very nearly an hour. Part of the Eleventh Regiment [Cadwallader's brigade] lost its way, caused the Voltigeurs to halt, thus throwing the brigade under Major Dimmick still further from Riley's, which had moved very soon after 3 o'clock. At the request of General Cadwallader, Major Dimmick ordered me to turn over the command of my company to the officer next in rank, and to move forward and conduct the troops that had lost their way. The whole force was by sunrise, or little after, halted in a sheltered position in rear of the enemy's battery". (Ex. Doc. No. 1, Appendix p. 67).
I reported the cause of the delay to General Smith and requested instructions to rejoin my company; but he said he desired that I should remain with him for a while. By his order, the three brigades were soon put in motion. I again asked him to permit me to rejoin my proper command. He replied "Not yet" and added: "I will soon give you instructions".
Because of a dense fog the delay in reaching the position in rear of the Mexican works was no material disadvantage. The fog began to disappear about the time I reported to General Smith. He was then on a ridge at a point, about 600 yards in rear of the Mexican works. The three brigades were passing around the extremity of that ridge, several hundred yards in rear of the General. All was quiet in the lines of the enemy. There was another ridge south of the one on which General Smith was standing, and separated from it by a deep and very narrow valley. The sides of both ridges were precipitous; their tops sloped gently to the enemy's line.
General Smith informed me that Riley's brigade would pass partly beyond the extremity of the second ridge; then face to the left, and attack a strong Mexican detachment which was in position on that ridge, several hundred yards in rear of their works. Riley was ordered to drive that detachment and pursue it closely into the Mexican main lines. Cadwallader's brigade would go on when Riley faced to the left; and, as soon as he passed Riley, Cadwallader would also face to the left and come into action on Riley's right. Smith's own brigade would turn to the left before reaching the extremity of the second ridge. The Third Infantry and First Artillery would advance in the deep valley between the two ridges; whilst the Rifle Regiment, with the engineer company leading, would ascend the steep slope of the second ridge, and get into position on the flank, or rear, of the Mexican detachment which Riley was to attack in front. In the meantime the head of Smith's brigade had come within view, near the foot of the steep slope of the second ridge, and was moving towards the Mexican main line.
General Smith pointed out to me the route to be taken to reach the top of the second ridge; and ordered that the engineer company and rifles should bear to the right, and on getting near the Mexican detachment, remain concealed, and quiet, until Riley's brigade became well engaged; then join in the attack and pursuit of that detachment.
With these specific instructions, I was ordered to rejoin my company; and Lieutenant Beauregard was directed to take general charge of the movements of Smith's brigade. When Beauregard and I reached the top of the second ridge we found we were 50 yards, or less, in rear of the Mexican detachment, which was facing Riley. All was quiet. In a very few moments Riley's fire commenced.
The engineer company, followed by the rifle regiment was then forming in line, under cover, in rear of the Mexican detachment, whose attention was concentrated on Riley, in their front. We were between that detachment and the Mexican works. A small portion only of the Rifle Regiment was in line, when the firing with Riley became very severe, and the order was given for the engineer company and rifles to rise and fire into the backs of the enemy. That fire was very destructive. The Mexicans were astounded; faced squarely about, and in a moment precipitately retreated.
In my official report it is stated that: "Colonel Riley's advance became engaged with a very strong picket, some 300 yards or more from the rear of the [enemy's] battery, near the crest of the ridge; the engineers and rifles came up at once in position to take the picket in rear, delivered a deadly volley within 50 yards, cheered and rushed on. The enemy's force fled; the head of our column crossed the line of their retreat, which brought the right of the column [engineer company and rifles] conducted by Lieutenant Beauregard, in contact with the Seventh Infantry, which formed the left of Colonel Riley's brigade. I went into the enemy's battery with the colors of the Seventh Infantry, my company immediately behind me. The enemy, or at least a portion of them, stood to their guns well, and delivered a fire of grape into our troops when the head of the column was within 25 yards of their pieces. Our troops followed the retreating enemy without halting until they were beyond the reach of our musketry. Lieutenant Beauregard then strongly advised that the troops be halted and formed. A short time afterwards General Twiggs, came up. The pursuit was resumed. At San Angel we had an unimportant skirmish". (Ex. Doc. No. 1, Appendix, p. 68).
The following additional quotations from my official report are not deemed irrelevant:
"In the action of the morning of the 20th—the battle of Contreras—my men acted with great gallantry; their promptness in obeying every order, and the effect with which they used their muskets, entitle them all to the highest praise. In my report to the chief engineer in the field, I shall make special mention of all who, to my knowledge, particularly distinguished themselves. I will mention here, First Sergeant D. H. Hastings, of the engineer company, who, by his gallant conduct and soldiery bearing, in this action, richly deserves promotion to the rank of commissioned officer in the army. Sergeant Hastings was slightly wounded by my side in the battery. Sergeant [S. H.] Starr attracted my particular attention by his gallant and efficient conduct. Sergeant Starr was the ranking non-commissioned officer with the detachment of the engineer company which accompanied Colonel Harney's command at the battle of Cerro Gordo. I would recommend him for promotion [to the grade of commissioned officer in the army]."
"Artificer W. H. Bartlett attracted my particular attention by [his] cool and steady gallantry, Artificer A. S. Read shot the color bearer of the Twelfth Regiment of artillery, and secured the color."
"Lieutenant Foster was at this time, as I have before remarked, detached with a portion of the company; and, at the head of his men, led the Ninth and Twelfth Regiments of Infantry in their attack on the flank of the retreating column at Contreras."
"Lieutenant McClellan, frequently detached, and several times in command of the engineer company, is entitled to the highest praise for his cool and daring gallantry, on all occasions, in the actions of both the 19th and 20th." (Ex. Doc. No. 1, Appendix, p. 69.)
In the pursuit, we passed through the village of San Angel; and near that place, were again halted. During that halt, I noticed a large, high building, in an extensive open field, five or six hundred yards to the North. I was satisfied that from the top of that building, with a powerful field glass, which was a portion of the engineer company equipment, I would be able to get a good view of the level country for miles around, and obtain quite definite knowledge of the positions and movements of the main Mexican forces.
I communicated my wishes to Major Loring; and asked him if he felt authorized to support the engineer company, with the Rifle Regiment, in a close reconnaissance of the building I pointed out. He laughingly replied: "I have been directed by General Smith to follow you and your company—of course I will go with you".
We had not proceeded more than two hundred yards towards the building when we were overtaken by Lieutenant Van Dorn, Aide to General Smith, who brought an order requiring the Rifle Regiment and the engineer company to return to the head of the column on the road. I told Van Dorn the purpose I had in view, asked him to explain the matter to General Smith, and expressed my conviction that he would approve the movement, when he knew its object. Van Dorn replied: "General Smith was very peremptory. I am directed to see that you and Major Loring, with your respective commands, return at once". On our way back, Van Dorn said that General Pillow had reached the front and taken control; and his belief was that General Pillow had ordered General Smith to recall the engineer company and the Rifle Regiment. A short time thereafter we moved from San Angel to Coyoacan, where the head of the column again halted; and was soon joined by General Scott.
There is good reason to believe that observations, which could easily have been made from the roof of the high building above referred to, would have resulted in obtaining such information in regard to the Mexican position at the Convent of Churubusco and at the tête-de-pont, as would have enabled General Scott to complete the rout of the Mexican Army without incurring the additional loss of nearly one thousand men in killed and wounded.
At Churubusco. The following quotations are taken from my official report:
"Between 12 and 1 o'clock, P. M., [August 20, 1847] I received orders to move, from the village of [Coyoacan] immediately after the rifle regiment, on a road intersecting the road from San Antonio to Mexico, in order to cut off the enemy already retreating from San Antonio.
"I had not gone two hundred yards when I received orders to countermarch and move on another route intersecting the road from San Antonio to the city nearer to Mexico. [The latter road led nearly due east, parallel to the front of the earthworks at the Convent, distant from those works about 250 yards]. The regiment of riflemen continued on the road on which I first started. [This road led south-east from Coyoacan]. The company took its place [again] at the head of the column [Twiggs's division]. The column was halted by General Twiggs, and I was directed by him to send an officer in advance to see the position of a battery reported to be not far in front. Lieutenant McClellan was sent on one road; and Lieutenant Stevens of the engineers, was directed by General Twiggs, to take another. Both officers soon returned and reported a battery in front of a convent, the roof and steeples of which were in plain view of the head of the column and within 700 yards. The roof was crowded with troops; the battery was masked by intervening trees and corn-fields. General Twiggs then directed these officers to make a closer reconnaissance and ordered my company as an escort. Having proceeded 500 yards, we saw [Mexican] troops on our right, left, and in front. A lancer was taken prisoner. Lieutenant Stevens directed me to take the prisoner to the general and request an additional escort of two companies. We were at this time about 300 yards from the battery, but it was still almost masked from view. I delivered the prisoner and the message to General Twiggs, and returned at once to my company which I had left in charge of Lieutenant Foster. Lieutenant Stevens joined General Twiggs whilst I was with him. When I resumed command of the company, Lieutenant McClellan reported to me that our troops were already engaged in our front; having, apparently, turned the battery and convent by our right. One of General Twiggs's staff, [Lieutenant W. T. H. Brooks, A. A. Adjutant General, Twiggs's division,] was present and informed us that the rifles with Captain Lee of the engineers, were reconnoitring the same works, and had gone to our right considerably farther from the battery than we then were. We all concurred in opinion that the rifles were engaged with a vastly superior force. There was at this time no firing of artillery. I ordered Lieutenant McClellan to report the result of his observations to General Twiggs. He did so, and on the recommendation of Lieutenants Stevens and McClellan, in which I concurred, the First Regiment of Artillery was ordered to support the rifles. The firing on the right increased; it was evident that several thousands of the enemy were pouring a heavy musketry fire into our troops on the right. The tops of the convent and the surrounding walls were lined with troops; the roof was literally covered. Lieutenant Stevens was of opinion that a few rounds of grape would disperse these masses and relieve our troops already engaged [on the right] from a destructive plunging fire. He went back to the general, leaving myself the senior engineer then in front of the [convent] battery. The fire had now become very brisk upon my [reconnoitring] party; having placed the company under the best shelter at hand, with Lieutenant Foster I proceeded to examine the works to determine the number, character and position of the pieces of artillery. Nothing heavier than a 4 or 6-pounder had yet been fired." (Ex. Doc. No. 1, Appendix, p. 69.)
In my official report it is further stated that: "The troops had become engaged in our front within ten minutes after a reconnaissance had been ordered by General Twiggs, and before the officer whom I was escorting had been able to make a single observation".
In my official copy of that report, I find the following sentence, which is not in the printed report:
"Deeply do I regret that the attack, in advance of the reconnoitring party, precipitated the attack on our side, and involved us in action against we knew not what".
The force which became engaged, far to our right—before the reconnaissance, supported by the engineer company, fairly commenced, was the advance of Worth's division pursuing the Mexicans who had abandoned their strong works at San Antonio.
Captain James L. Mason, engineer of Worth's division, says, in his official report, that the works attacked by that division, and "so gallantly stormed, had not been reconnoitred".
The engineers in front of the convent, being informed that the rifles with Captain Lee had gone to our right considerably farther from the battery, advised that the rifles be supported by an additional regiment. The same engineers advised that one gun be sent to the front to drive the Mexicans from the roof of the convent, and thus relieve our troops on the right from a destructive plunging fire.
The additional escort of two companies, asked for by the reconnoitring engineers, had not come to the front. After Lieutenant Stevens had gone back to General Twiggs, to have one gun with a few rounds of proper ammunition sent forward for the purpose of clearing the roof of the convent, the firing in our front, on the San Antonio road, had materially increased; and the fire from the convent, upon the engineer company, was becoming troublesome. There had been, to me, unexpected delay in bringing the one gun forward; and I determined, as already stated, to place the men under the best shelter at hand, and endeavor to make, in person, a closer examination of the works.
Resuming quotations from my official report—it is therein stated:
"At this time the First Artillery came up to where I was. The lamented and gallant Burke, at the head of the leading company, asked which direction they were to take. I inquired what were his orders. He said that the regiment was ordered to support the Rifles. I pointed to the smoke, which was all we could see by which to determine the position of our troops engaged in a corn-field on our right; told him that they reached their present place by moving farther to the rear, out of range of the works; and remarked to him that the fire through which he would have to pass in the direction he was going was very severe. He replied that they were ordered to move by that road to support the Rifles. The First Artillery filed by and soon encountered, at a distance of 150 yards from the enemy, the heaviest fire of artillery and musketry, followed almost immediately after [by that] brought to bear upon Taylor's battery, which had been ordered to fire upon the convent; and, in selecting a place suitable for managing the guns, had most unfortunately been placed, entirely exposed, directly in front of a well constructed battery with heavy pieces firing in embrasure."
"As the First Artillery filed by me, I ordered my company to be formed, determined to go on with the reconnaissance; and if possible, send back to the general, [Twiggs,] accurate information in reference to the works of the enemy and the position of our own troops, which at that time I could not understand. In moving forward, I was opposite the centre of the [First] Artillery which inclined more to the left, toward the battery, whilst I kept nearer the [principal road leading almost due east from Coyoacan]. The ground was level, but some shelter was afforded to small bodies of men, by the ditches, maguey plant, etc. I ordered my men to separate, to shelter themselves as much as possible, [and] to keep within supporting distance of me. I proceeded about two hundred yards. I ordered every man to shelter himself in a small ditch which was fortunately near us; immediately after I heard the fire of Taylor's battery passing directly over my head. [When that fire commenced we were] in the corn-field, about half-way between Taylor's battery and the enemy. Requiring my command to lie close, with Lieutenant Foster, I made my way to an old ruined wall in the open space east of the corn-field, and from that position sent Lieutenant Foster to General Twiggs to report the extent of the line engaged on the right, that we were directly in front of the works [which were now in plain view], and that, in my opinion, the whole force under General Twiggs's command should turn the enemy's position by our left. Another battery [of the enemy] was seen distinctly to our right and far in rear of the Churubusco battery, apparently enfilading our line engaged on the right. General Twiggs had already sent Colonel Riley's brigade to turn the position by our left, and take the battery by the gorge. When Lieutenant Foster returned, I withdrew the company to a position of more safety, and joined General Smith and Lieutenant Stevens, who were near the place from which I started with the First Artillery. I remained there [under General Smith's order] until after the action." (Ex. Doc. No. 1, Appendix, pp. 70-71.)
That point was about 300 yards south-west of the convent. There were several adobe houses near, and from it a road along which there were some huts, led to the convent, and another road, almost due east, passed in front of the convent. In moving forward I had kept nearer the latter road, the First Artillery nearer the former. The point I reached in the open, east of the corn-field, was within less than 100 yards of the works at the convent, and there was every indication that these works did not extend along the western side of that building.
The place at which I joined General Smith and Lieutenant Stevens, after I returned from beyond the corn-field, was that at which it had been proposed to place one gun, under cover of the adobe hut; run it out by hand; fire, and run it under shelter again to reload. By this means, a few rounds of grape, canister, and shrapnel, could have cleared the roof of the convent.
In more senses than one, the firing of Taylor's battery through the ranks of the engineer company, in the corn-field, was a surprise to me. I learned from Lieutenant Stevens that, when he applied for one gun to be sent to the front, those in authority had deemed it best to send forward a whole battery, and place it in an open field, square in front of the fortifications.
The battle of Churubusco was commenced, and mostly fought, haphazard, against the front of the Mexican fortified lines, without giving time for proper reconnaissance.
General Scott, in his official report of the battle, says: "Lieutenant Stevens of the engineers, supported by Lieutenant G. W. Smith's company of sappers and miners, of the same corps, was sent to reconnoitre the strongly fortified church or convent of San Pablo in the hamlet of Churubusco—one mile off [from Coyoacan]. Twiggs with one of his brigades [Smith's, less the rifles] and Captain Taylor's field battery, were ordered to follow and to attack the convent. Major Smith, senior engineer, was despatched to concert with Twiggs the mode of attack, and Twiggs's other brigade [Riley's] I soon ordered to support him." (Ex. Doc. No. 1, p. 309.)
Major John L. Smith, senior engineer, says: "Lieutenant Stevens in the reconnaissance of the position of Churubusco, was assisted by Lieutenant McClellan and escorted by the company of sappers and miners. This company also participated in the operations of the right [of Twiggs's division]". (Ex. Doc. No. 1, p. 353.)
Major Dimmick, commanding the First Regiment of Artillery, says: "About 12 o'clock, M., the battalion was ordered to attack the position of the enemy at the church, reported by the engineers at the time to have but one piece of artillery. The point of attack selected by the senior engineer officer was masked by a corn-field, in front of which I deployed the battalion and ordered it to advance, when almost instantly a shower of musketry, grape and round shot poured upon us, under which the battalion advanced".
"The right had advanced to within one hundred yards of a regular bastion front, the curtain of which had four pieces in embrasure, besides nearly a thousand infantry, both of which kept up such a constant stream of fire that I could not advance further in line; I therefore ordered the men to cover themselves as well as possible. The left of the battalion advanced to within seventy yards of the work, being exposed to the fire of two pieces of artillery, en barbette, in addition to the fire of a considerable force of infantry and some of them still nearer, so that they had a destructive fire on the cannoniers and infantry; which position the battalion maintained until the enemy were driven from their guns and bastion, when they were followed into their work and surrendered." (Ex. Doc. No. 1, Appendix, p. 78.)
Captain Francis Taylor, commanding light battery, says: "On reaching Churubusco, we came in sight of a church, where the enemy was posted, having, as was supposed, an entrenched battery thrown across the road. Troops were soon thrown forward to attack this place; and, after a short time, I was ordered to place the battery in a position where it was thought I could drive the enemy from the roof and walls of the church, and sustain the other troops in their efforts to carry this place by storm. On taking the position assigned me, I found we were exposed to a most terrible fire of artillery and musketry, of a regular entrenchment, covering the front of the church to which we were opposite, and which the intervening Indian corn hid from our sight at the time. Here I opened my battery, and it was served with great precision for about an hour and a half, notwithstanding it was exposed, during that time, to a constant shower of grape, round shot, shell and musketry. At last, finding my loss was becoming very great, and having succeeded in driving the enemy from the roof and walls of the church, and given to our troops such support as was in my power, I determined to withdraw the pieces". (Ex. Doc. No. 1, Appendix, p. 73).
The connection between the reconnaissance of the engineers, and the operations of the First Artillery and Taylor's battery at Churubusco, has already been described in extracts taken from my official report.
In his official report, General Persifor F. Smith says: "Lieutenant G. W. Smith, in command of the engineer company, and Lieutenant McClellan, his subaltern, distinguished themselves throughout the whole of the three actions [19th and 20th at Contreras; and at Churubusco]. Nothing seemed to them too bold to be undertaken, or too difficult to be executed; and their services as engineers were as valuable as those they rendered in battle at the head of their gallant men. Lieutenant Foster, being detached from his company during the action at Contreras, did not fall under my notice; but in the action on the 19th and at Churubusco, he was equally conspicuous for his gallantry". (Ex. Doc. No. 1, p. 332).
General Twiggs, in his official report, says: "To Lieutenant G. W. Smith, of the engineers, who commanded the company of sappers and miners, I am under obligations for his services on this and on other occasions. Whenever his legitimate duties with the pick and spade were performed, he always solicited permission to join in the advance of the storming party with his muskets, in which position his gallantry, and that of his officers and men, was conspicuously displayed at Contreras as well as Cerro Gordo." (Ex. Doc. No. 1, p. 325.)
CHAPTER V.
CAPTURE OF THE CITY OF MEXICO.
During the armistice, which was entered into just after the battle of Churubusco, and terminated on the 6th of September, the engineer company was quartered in the village of San Angel. On the 7th of September I received orders to move the company, its train, and the general engineer train of the army to Tacubaya.
Molino Del Rey. That night I was ordered to detail an officer and ten men of the engineer company to report to General Worth. Lieutenant Foster was placed in charge of this detail. He and his men were on the right of the storming party of five hundred picked men, of Worth's division, which led the attack against Molino Del Rey on the morning of the 8th. In that attack Lieutenant Foster was very severely wounded and disabled.
Chapultepec. On the 11th of September, I received orders to furnish details of men from the company to assist engineer officers in supervising the construction of batteries against Chapultepec. I was placed in charge of Battery No. 1, on the Tacubaya road, against the southern face of the Castle; and Lieutenant McClellan in charge of Battery No. 2, against the southwestern angle. On the night of the 12th, the details were all called in, and I was directed to furnish implements to the different storming parties which were to assault the castle of Chapultepec on the morning of the 13th.
San Cosme Garita. At 3 P. M., that day, I received orders to join the siege train, and report to General Worth whose column was to attack the city by the San Cosme route.
At 4 P. M., I reported to General Worth, who was then with his forces, in the suburbs of the city, on the San Cosme causeway, at the point where it changes direction, at an angle of nearly ninety degrees, and is then nearly straight for about six hundred yards to the fortified Garita in our front. He informed me that Lieutenant Stevens had just been severely wounded and this made me the senior engineer with Worth's division. He directed me to go forward in person, closely examine the condition of affairs at the front, endeavor to determine the best method of operating against the fortified Garita, and report to him the result of my observations as soon as possible. He directed me, particularly, to have in view the question whether it would be advisable to bring the siege guns forward against the embrasured battery at the Garita. Just as I was leaving him, he said: "If you find there are two different methods by which the Garita can be carried, one in a shorter time at a sacrifice of men, the other in longer time, but a saving of men, choose the latter". And he added: "There have been too many valuable lives, of officers and men, lost recently in my division, for nothing".
Though he did not specify the action referred to, he meant the battle of Molino Del Rey. Under these instructions, I proceeded to the extreme front, made the requisite examination of our position and that of the enemy, and soon came back. I reported that the houses on the left of the causeway were built up continuously to the battery at the Garita, we could easily break through the walls from house to house; and, under perfect cover, reach the top of a three-story building, with flat roof and stone parapet, within 40 yards of the battery. A fire of musketry from that roof would make the works untenable; and we could thus in a short time drive the enemy from the fortified Garita, and secure a good lodgement within the city, without material loss and without using the siege guns.
General Worth directed me to bring forward the engineer company, which was with the siege train a short distance to the rear, and commence operations on the proposed plan; and at the same time ordered that Clarke's brigade should render any assistance I might call for.
An hour or more before sunset we reached the top of the house above referred to. From that position the inside of the enemy's works could be plainly seen almost to the foot of the interior slope of the parapet. Our first fire upon the Mexicans, who were unconscious of the impending peril, was very deadly. Those who were not killed or disabled by that fire seemed dazed for an instant; but in a few moments, they precipitately retreated, leaving the San Cosme Garita without a single defender in the works. One of their pieces of artillery was withdrawn a few hundred yards, but was then abandoned.
Immediately after that first fire, a portion of the force with me on the roof became engaged with the enemy who appeared on house tops in rear of their battery. We soon drove them from their position. The other portion of our men fell back to the stairs, made their way to the lower story, broke open the thick, heavily barred, strong door, passed into the street, entered the abandoned works, and pursued the enemy. In the meantime, some of our troops from the right of the causeway had come forward and, a very small number of them, were slightly in advance of us in reaching the abandoned battery.
Colonel Garland, commander of the first brigade of Worth's division, on the right of the causeway, says, in his official report: "The enemy then took position at the Garita San Cosme, where they were supported by two pieces of artillery which raked the streets with grape and canister. Finding a secure position to the right of the second defence, [about 350 yards in front of the Garita], I reorganized the command as it came up; mounted a howitzer on the top of a convent, which, under the direction of Lieutenant [U. S.] Grant, Quartermaster, 4th Infantry, and Lieutenant Lendrum, 3rd Artillery, annoyed the enemy considerably. About this time, report was made to me that considerable progress had been made by the troops on the other side of the street by means of crowbars and pickaxes, working through houses and yards. This caused me to watch closely for the first movement of the enemy indicative of retreat. The moment this was discovered, the 4th Infantry, followed by detachments of the 2nd and 3rd Artillery, under Colonel Belton, rushed up the road, when they entered the work simultaneously with the forces operating to the right and left, Captain McKenzie's storming party slightly in advance". (Ex. Doc. No. 1, Appendix, p. 170.)
Referring to this operation, General Worth, in his official report, says; "the moment had now arrived for the final and combined attack upon the last stronghold of the enemy in my quarter; it was made, by our men springing, as if by magic, to the tops of the houses into which they had patiently and quietly made their way with the bar and pick, and to the utter surprise and consternation of the enemy, opening upon him, within easy range, a destructive fire of musketry. A single discharge, in which many of his gunners were killed at their pieces, was sufficient to drive him in confusion from the breastworks; when a prolonged shout from our brave fellows announced that we were in possession of the Garita of San Cosme and already in the city of Mexico". (Ex. Doc. No. 1, p. 392.)
The American army having thus captured the fortifications of the capital of the enemy's country, a magnificent city of nearly 200,000 inhabitants, a secure lodgement was immediately effected in large houses, on the left of the street, a few hundred yards from the Garita. I then proceeded, with the engineer company and an infantry detachment, several hundred yards farther; and found a strong position, on the right of the street where the troops could rest protected from fire. Going farther to the front, I discovered that, 150 yards in advance there was a large convent, on the left of the street, occupied by a strong force. The next cross street, the Paseo, had batteries upon it. These facts were reported to General Worth, who ordered forward two brigades—one to occupy each of the positions selected—and, directed me to place those troops, station the picket-guards, and then, with Lieutenant McClellan, report at his headquarters which was several hundred yards within the Garita.
The aqueduct, in the middle of the street along which we advanced, was an open stone trough, supported at a height of ten feet, or more, by pillars and arches. There was a good deal of firing down the street from Mexican detachments; but, by taking shelter under the arches, between the pillars, our men, in small groups, were quite well protected. A little before dark, whilst I was under one of the arches at the extreme front, endeavoring to get a closer view of the enemy at the convent and on the Paseo, I was joined by Lieutenant Sydney Smith, of the Fourth Infantry, who had borne several messages from me to General Worth during the afternoon. In a few moments after he joined me we heard horses feet rapidly approaching us from the direction of the citadel. These horsemen were captured, and proved to be three Mexican officers, one of whom was Adjutant-General on the staff of Santa Anna.
Accompanied by Lieutenant McClellan, I reported to General Worth at 10 P. M., and was ordered by him to suspend operations for the night and resume them at daylight. He received us both very kindly, expressed satisfaction with the manner in which the works at the Garita had been carried, and approved of all the dispositions that had been subsequently made of the troops at the front. I called his attention again to the convent, told him that the large Mexican force in that position might give us a great deal of trouble next morning, and asked him to permit me, with the engineer company supported by a detachment of about five hundred men, to pass the convent that night, get into a strong position beyond it, and thus induce the enemy to abandon that position before morning; and said I thought it probable a detachment of five hundred men could reach the main plaza of the city, that night, without material difficulty; and that, in case this force encountered serious opposition, they could take possession of some one of the many large, strong buildings on the way, and hold their own against the whole Mexican army until relief could reach them.
General Worth not only refused to comply with my request; but, ordered both myself and Lieutenant McClellan to remain at his headquarters until 3 A. M., at which hour he said he would have us called, and we could then go to the front and resume our duties.
That arrangement left the engineer company, for the night, at the extreme front, without an officer. In spite of my earnest remonstrances General Worth insisted that we should remain. On the latter point he was inexorable. I finally asked him if I was under arrest. He said "No" and added: "You soon will be if you show further hesitation in obeying my order for you to remain here".
Being awakened by one of General Worth's aides, I asked if it was already 3 o'clock. It seemed to me that I had not been asleep five minutes. The aide said: "It is about 1 o'clock. A deputation from the civil authorities has just informed General Worth that Santa Anna's army evacuated the city before midnight, and they offered to surrender the city. They have been passed on to General Scott, at Tacubaya; and General Worth wishes to see you at once".
The latter told me more fully about the deputation and their proposal to surrender; expressed some doubt in reference to the evacuation of the city by the Mexican army; directed me to return to the front; take the engineer company and a detachment of infantry; proceed carefully forward, using every precaution; and report to him the slightest indication that the city had not been evacuated. I was directed to examine closely every large building and strong position along our route; and not pass them until thoroughly satisfied that they were not occupied by Mexican soldiers.
This forward movement commenced about 2 A. M. There was some delay in determining whether the strong convent, mentioned above, had been evacuated. Accounts on that subject were conflicting; but a thorough examination of the whole position showed that it was abandoned. I reported that fact to General Worth, and informed him that we would move on with great care, in strict compliance with his instructions.
All buildings of importance were broken open. None of them were occupied by the enemy. From time to time, I reported these facts to General Worth; and, at daylight, I informed him that, from a church steeple near the Alameda, I could see that the Citadel, which had stopped the advance of General Quitman's troops early in the afternoon of the 13th, was deserted. At that time, Lieutenant McClellan reported to me there were no signs of the enemy in any portion of the Alameda; and I suggested to General Worth that his whole division be moved forward.
In the meantime, with the engineer company and the infantry detachment, I passed beyond the Alameda, breaking open, as before, and examining all strong buildings on our route. We had gone more than two blocks in advance of the Alameda, and were closely approaching the Main Plaza and the National Palace, when I received a positive order to countermarch my command, and report to General Worth at the Alameda. I demurred, and told the aide, who bore the order, that I had obeyed all of General Worth's cautionary instructions; that there was no enemy in our front, and no reason for calling us back. The aide replied: "The order is positive. You must go back." I then gave the order to countermarch. On our way, the aide, who was a classmate and intimate friend of mine, said to me; "General Worth is very cross, he is angry. My opinion is that he has received orders from the headquarters of the army which have riled him up badly".
A few days later I learned from General Worth that he received a peremptory order from General Scott not to permit any one under his command to pass beyond the Alameda, until further instructions were received from the General-in-Chief.
For several hours after the engineer company took its place on the right of Worth's division, at the Alameda, all seemed to be quiet in the city. General Quitman's troops, from the Belen Gate, had passed the abandoned citadel, reached the Main Plaza, and took possession of the National Palace. Later, General Scott, with his staff officers and mounted escort, entered the city.
About that time a shot was fired, evidently aimed at General Worth, from a narrow street or lane, opposite the head of the division. The shot missed Worth, but very severely wounded Colonel Garland. General Worth, immediately ordered me to take the engineer company, go into the lane, find the man who fired the shot, and hang him.
Within fifty yards we found the man who I believed fired the shot, a rope was placed around his neck, but I did not order my men to hang him. I had no positive proof against him. I took the man to General Worth, reported the circumstances of the case, in full; stated the reasons for my belief that the prisoner fired the shot which severely wounded Colonel Garland; and added: "In the absence of specific proof against this man I have brought him to you, and await your further instructions".
To which General Worth replied, in a cold and haughty manner: "This is not the way in which my orders are obeyed by officers of my division".
Colonel Duncan, who was close beside General Worth, both mounted, whilst I was on foot, said, at once, before I could make any reply to the foregoing censure: "General Worth, you are wrong; Lieutenant Smith is right. Under the circumstances he ought not to have hanged this man. It is for you, the Major-General commanding these forces, to decide that matter. Give the order. You see he and his men are ready to obey you. Give the order".
In the meantime, the men of the engineer company, without instructions from me, had passed the rope over an adjacent large lantern iron; and stood ready to string the man up. General Worth did not give the order. The man was not hanged.
In less than an hour after Colonel Garland was wounded, lawless bands of armed Mexicans commenced firing from the parapet roofs of houses, from church steeples and windows, in various parts of the city, upon our troops in the open streets. An order was then given, by General Scott, for Worth's forces to move beyond the Alameda and join with the rest of the army, in putting down the rising of armed outlaws who made this murderous attack upon us eight or ten hours after the city surrendered. In these operations the engineer company was with Worth's division until the recall was sounded late that afternoon.
General Scott, in his official report, says: "I communicated, about daylight [on the 14th], orders to Worth and Quitman to advance slowly and cautiously [to guard against treachery] towards the heart of the city, and to occupy its stronger and more commanding points. Quitman proceeded to the great plaza or square, planted guards and hoisted the colors of the United States on the national palace, containing the halls of Congress and executive apartments of Federal Mexico. In this grateful service, Quitman might have been anticipated by Worth, but for my express orders halting the latter at the head of the Alameda, General Worth, in his official report, says: "At 5 A. M., on the 14th, my troops and heavy guns advanced into the city, and occupied the Alameda to the point where it fronts the palace, and there halted at 6 o'clock, the general-in-chief having instructed me to take a position and await his further orders. Shortly afterwards a straggling assassin-like fire commenced from the house-tops, which continued, in various parts of the city through the day, causing us some loss. The first shot, fired at a group of officers at the head of my column, struck down Colonel Garland, badly wounded. About the time of our entrance into the city, the convicts in the different prisons, to the number of some thirty thousand men, were liberated by order of the flying government, armed and distributed in the most advantageous houses, including the churches, convents, and even the hospitals, for the purpose of exciting, if possible, the city to revolt". In speaking of the general operations of his forces in the capture of the city, General Worth adds: "Officers and men of every corps carried themselves with wonted gallantry and conduct. Of the staff; Lieutenants Stevens, Smith, and McClellan, engineers, displayed the gallantry, skill and conduct, which so eminently distinguished their corps". (Ex. Doc. No. 1, pp. 393-4.) General Scott adds: "Captain Lee, engineer, so constantly distinguished, also bore important orders from me [September 13] until he fainted from a wound and the loss of two nights' sleep at the batteries. Lieutenants Beauregard, Stevens, and Tower, all wounded, were employed with the divisions, and Lieutenants G. W. Smith and G. B. McClellan with the company of sappers and miners. Those five lieutenants of engineers, like their captain, won the admiration of all about them". (Ex. Doc. No. 1, p. 385.) Major John L. Smith, senior engineer, says: "Lieutenant Smith reports all the sappers who were engaged on the 13th and 14th, to have conducted themselves with intelligence and intrepidity altogether satisfactory; but, he mentions the orderly sergeant, Hastings, who was wounded, as being eminently distinguished, and he mentions also artificer Gerber, as having been particularly distinguished". (Ex. Doc. No. 1, p. 430.) Without dwelling upon details of the fighting in the streets and houses on the 14th, it may be stated that, a short time before the recall was sounded, when Orderly Sergeant Hastings fell, Lieutenant McClellan seized the Sergeant's musket, fired at, and killed the man who shot Hastings. In a few moments thereafter the company passed the dead body of that "liberated", convict Mexican. The unoccupied private house in which we were quartered that night was near the place at which the man, who shot Colonel Garland, had been left tied to a lantern iron with a rope around his neck. When we returned the man was gone. Nothing further was said or done upon our side, in his case. An hour or more after we were comfortably "settled in our new home", I noticed that McClellan was very quiet for a considerable time, evidently thinking of matters which deeply interested him. An occasional marked change seemed to come over the spirit of his dream. Finally I awakened him from his reverie, saying: "A penny for your thoughts. I have been watching you for half an hour or more, and would like much to know, honor bright, what you have been thinking about". To which he replied: "I have been making a 'general review' of what we have gone through since we left West Point, one year ago this month, bound for the 'Halls of the Montezumas'; have been again on the Rio Grande, that grave-yard of our forces; have gone over the road from Matamoros to Victoria and Tampico, where we had so much hard work; went through the siege of Vera Cruz, where we were left out in the cold during the ceremonies of surrender, and later, had to make our way as best we could, with the engineer train through the horrid sand; glanced at Cerro Gordo, where it was my misfortune to be with General Pillow's 'whipped community'; stopped again with our friends, the Monks, in the convent at Puebla; crossed over the mountains; came by way of San Antonio, Contreras, Churubusco, Chapultepec and the San Cosme Garita, into this city. Here we are—the deed is done—I am glad no one can say 'poor Mac' over me". The capture of the city, and its occupation by General Scott's army, virtually ended the war made by the United States against Mexico. After the street fighting on the 14th, the city was quiet and remained so. The men of the company were fairly entitled to a good rest and a new outfit of clothing; but the quartermaster could not then furnish the latter. At their request, I authorized them to purchase a better quality of cloth than that furnished by the government, and to have finer material for trimmings than the coarse cotton braid allowed by the regulations. The clothing was made by good tailors and paid for by the men. In the course of a month or six weeks, the company was provided with handsome, well-fitting uniforms. In the meantime, drills were suspended for about a month. During that period the only duty required of the men, other than that of ordinary guard over their quarters and the engineer train of the army, was that of details to assist engineer officers in making surveys of the recent battlefields. In the latter part of October, the surveys of the battlefields being completed, and the men provided with new and well-fitting uniforms, infantry drills were resumed. An order was issued requiring the company to be formed without arms, the next day, in the Alameda, for squad drill. Immediately thereafter, one of my most trusted sergeants informed me that this order caused great dissatisfaction in the company. He said the men felt they would be degraded if now turned back to the beginning—at squad drill without arms—thus placing them in the position of raw recruits, whilst the rest of the army were being exercised at brigade and division drill, "evolutions of the line," with all attendant "pomp and circumstance". The sergeant warned me that the state of feeling in the company would, in his opinion, lead to serious trouble if the order was carried into effect. I thanked him for the information. When the men were formed on the drill ground next day, I told them I was aware of their opposition to the order; but, that I was under the impression I commanded that company, and if there was a man amongst them who felt disposed to dispute my legal authority he was requested to step to the front. No one moved. I then directed the artificers and privates to go to their quarters, and inform the sergeant of the guard they had my permission to be absent until evening parade. Turning to the non-commissioned officers, I stated that, in my judgment, there was no occasion for them to feel degraded if drilled by their own officers at squad drill without arms. I drilled the sergeants, McClellan the corporals. Whilst the non-commissioned officers were being thus drilled, the men were allowed daily liberty from quarters. Later, the non-commissioned officers drilled the men in squads under the supervision of the officers. Instruction and practice in the infantry "School of the Company" was then resumed; and, after a time, each non-commissioned officer was required, in turn, to take his place by my side and drill the company. On those occasions, the men were warned that no inattention or remissness on their part would be tolerated; no matter how lenient with them I might choose to be when commanding in person. It is safe to say that within six weeks from the time squad drills without arms were commenced in the engineer company, in the City of Mexico, that company as Infantry, was better drilled than any other in the army. In that respect, and in discipline, they were pattern soldiers. Regular instruction in the "School of the Engineer Soldier" was then resumed. From raw recruits, on the Rio Grande, disturbed by the epithet, "pick and shovel brigade" applied to them, at that time, by the soldiers of the line, the engineer company had become veterans of more than half a dozen important battles; had always been in the front of the fighting; and had often been called upon to direct large working parties of soldiers, detailed to use the "pick and shovel". About two months after we entered the city of Mexico, it was reported to me, by the sergeant of the guard, that Artificer Gerber was then absent, two hours beyond the time limit of his pass. I directed the sergeant to send Gerber to me, in my quarters, as soon as he returned. Frederick W. Gerber was one of the four men, enlisted by Captain Swift, who had served in the old regular army. He was enlisted as musician, and was the finest bugler in the service. He was soon made company clerk, and had thorough knowledge of routine "company papers". He was German by birth. As company clerk his duties brought him in close relations with the commander of the company; and I soon formed a very high estimate of his qualities as a soldier—and as a man in every respect; except that he would, on occasion, at intervals, when off duty, indulge too freely in strong drink. I had repeatedly threatened to deprive him of his warrant as artificer, if he did not quit drinking to excess; but I was reluctant to do so, especially because his promotion to that grade was in reward for distinguished gallantry in the attack on the "key-point" of the Mexican position at the battle of Cerro Gordo. When it was reported to me that he had not returned within the time of his "pass", I was quite sure he was again "on a spree". It was several hours later when he reported to me as ordered by the sergeant of the guard. I was alone when he entered my room. He had evidently been drinking to excess; but was to some extent recovering. I charged him with being drunk; told him he had behaved so well in that respect lately that I had made up my mind to recommend his being promoted to the grade of corporal; and even to that of sergeant, when opportunity was afforded me, and added: "You know I cannot make such recommendation whilst you continue this habit of getting drunk". He replied: "The lieutenant is mistaken; I am not drunk, and, if he will allow me, I will satisfy him on that point; and explain to him how I happened to overstay my pass". I told him to go on with his explanation. He said that soon after he left the company quarters, early that morning, with permission to be absent for four hours, he met with a sergeant he had known as a private in the old regular service long before the war. They were glad to see each other, took a few drinks, and then hired a carriage for a drive of several hours in the great city they had helped to capture. He added: "During the drive the sergeant got mad and threatened to have me arrested. I told him that 'no d——d infantry sergeant had rank enough to arrest an artificer of engineers'. He then offered to fight me. We stopped the carriage, got out, drew our swords, and I told him to come on, and we would soon settle the matter. He attacked me, and I disarmed him, kept his sword, made him get into the carriage, drove to General Twiggs's headquarters, reported to the sergeant of his guard, told him what had occurred; and asked him to hold, as a prisoner, the sergeant that had attacked me". "But he, being also an infantry sergeant, released the sergeant I had brought there, made me a prisoner, and demanded my sword. I gave it to him; but, when he ordered me to give up the sword I had captured, I told him I would see him d——d first; and I kept it. I then asked to be taken before General Twiggs. They told me he was out". "In three or four hours General Twiggs returned, and when he was passing through the sally-port, the guard all in line, at present-arms, saluting him, I rushed in front of his horse, and calling him by name, told him his guard had made me a prisoner, and I asked for justice at his hands. He ordered me to get out of his way. Still standing in front of his horse, I again asked for justice. To which he replied: 'Who in the h—ll are you?' When I told him who I was, he said: 'How is it that you are a prisoner in my guard-house?' I told General Twiggs the whole story: and showed him the infantry Sergeant's sword I had captured; and which his guard tried to make me give up. General Twiggs then asked me if I was willing to hand that sword to him. I gave it to him at once; and he ordered the sergeant of the guard to release me and give me back my own sword. I then came straight home." After hearing Gerber's story, on which I placed implicit reliance, I strongly advised him to let liquor alone in future: and, again told him I would gladly have him promoted, if he would quit drinking. Some time after we returned to the United States, and I had left the company, I learned that, during the time Gerber was closeted with me, opinion in the company was divided, and ran high in regard to the course I would take in his case. All the men knew that he was deservedly a great favorite of mine. Some of them said I would let him off; others that I would deprive him of his warrant as artificer, and otherwise punish him. These conflicting opinions as to what I would do in Gerber's case, were freely backed by heavy bets among the men. When he joined them, all were anxious to know what "the lieutenant" was going to do—"what did he say?" To which he replied: "It is none of your business". For some time they could get nothing more from him. But he finally said: "D——n it, if you must know; the lieutenant told me he would make me a corporal". The sergeant who gave me the facts just related, added: "Previous to that time, Gerber was believed, by the whole company, to be a perfectly truthful man. But many of the men thought he lied on that occasion. Although he has been truthful ever since, there is still, amongst us, very grave suspicion in regard to the correctness of his assertion that you then told him you would make him a corporal. I would like very much to know the truth in regard to that matter". I replied: "Gerber told the truth". It will be shown later, by extracts from official correspondence, that I was not permitted to recommend for promotion, in the company, any of the gallant men under my command who were so highly distinguished in the various battles that occurred in the Valley of Mexico. So I had no opportunity to have Gerber made a corporal—much less a sergeant.[5] The following extracts from correspondence, and from my monthly reports, give a brief official account of the affairs of the company after the capture of the City of Mexico. On the 4th of October, 1847, I addressed to Lieutenant I. I. Stevens, Adjutant of Engineers, for the information of the senior engineer in the field, and the General in Chief, a letter from which the following quotations are taken: "By the last advices that I have received I learn that only six engineer recruits have been made in the United States since September, 1846. During that time the effective strength of the company in the field has been reduced from seventy-one to thirty-six. Something must be done. I have endeavored to reenlist good men whose terms of enlistment in other corps had expired; I have tried to get transfers of good men, and succeeded in obtaining but one. The senior engineer, believing that more could be done, attempted it himself—he procured none". "At Vera Cruz my men were worked too hard; many of them are suffering yet from disease contracted there. Time, labor and life would have been saved if we had had the proportion of engineer soldiers usual in the armies of civilized nations. At Cerro Gordo, when I could furnish ten men [for details], fifty, at least, were necessary. In the operations in this valley, the same necessity has been felt for a larger number of soldiers of this character. There ought to be more companies of engineer soldiers in this army. Certainly, measures should be taken to complete the number of men allowed in the only company now authorized. I know of none so likely to succeed as sending an officer and non-commissioned officers [to the United States] on this duty". In my official report for the month of November, 1847, it is stated: "The system of instruction now being pursued is the following: From 9 A. M. until 10:45 A. M., recitations and instruction of the whole company, under direction of both officers, in Manuel du Sapeur, together with lectures and recitations on field fortifications. From 11 A. M. until 12:30 P. M., [infantry drill]. From 2 P. M. until 4 P. M., recitations in arithmetic and practice in writing. Each officer has a section in arithmetic, and gives a general superintendence to a section in writing. Instruction in writing is given by sergeants". "I have nothing new to offer either in reference to the property, the enlistment of men, or the settlement of the accounts of the late Captain Swift. All, in my opinion, matters of importance; but already referred to, [in previous reports and correspondence], perhaps, too often". "It is just one year since, by the casualties of service, the command of this company devolved upon myself as the senior officer for duty with the engineer troops. During this time the interests of the general engineer service, particularly of the non-commissioned officers and men, have materially suffered for want of an officer of rank at the head of the company. In the French service two captains are assigned to every company of this character, and the companies are all [well] instructed before they take the field. I earnestly recommend that four officers of engineers be assigned to duty with this company. The commander should be an officer of rank; his position permanent. In case the Chief Engineer should order an officer into the field to take command of Company A, engineers, I respectfully request that I may be ordered to the United States as soon as relieved from this duty". On the 1st of February, 1848, I reported that the course of instruction, adopted for the company, "had been continued, with satisfactory progress on the part of non-commissioned officers and men". On the 27th of February, 1848, in a letter to Colonel Totten, Chief Engineer, Washington, D. C., transmitting copies of certain papers, I stated: "I would respectfully refer you to my communication of October 4th, 1847, addressed to the then Adjutant of Engineers, in which I strongly urged that the interest of the engineer service required that an officer and non-commissioned officers should be ordered to the United States for the purpose of obtaining recruits for this company. Such is the course pursued in every other arm of service: and I hesitate not to say that, had my recommendation, as commander of the engineer company, been acted upon favorably, at that time, we would now have in this city, a full company. I have referred often to the wants of the company, without favorable action having been had on my recommendations. We are not furnished with men, not allowed to take the usual and, in my opinion, necessary means of procuring recruits. I respectfully request to be relieved from the command of the engineer company without further delay than is necessary for the arrival of the captain commander in this city". Owing to casualties of service, I had almost continually commanded the company, its train, and the general engineer train of the army for more than a year. My rank was that of Second Lieutenant—low on that list. I was conscious that my rank or lack of rank, rather, was, in some essential respects, a detriment to the company. It was believed that the war was over; but, in freely expressing willingness to give up the command I had long exercised, to which I had no claim based upon rank, I did not hesitate to say that: "If the war should be continued, and an additional company of engineer soldiers was authorized to be raised, thus creating an engineer battalion, I would be more than willing to command it in the field: provided, I was made Major, by brevet, and assigned to duty with that rank". In my official report for the month of March, 1848, it is stated: "During the month, daily instruction [of the company] in branches pertaining to engineering has been omitted, I have thought it best to pay more attention to their improvement in writing and arithmetic. The infantry exercises are continued". On the 1st of May, I reported: "During the month of April the course of instruction and drill pursued in March has been continued, with satisfactory results". "Three privates of this company have been appointed [by the government at Washington] commissioned officers. Three sergeants, all men of intelligence, education and character, have been recommended [by me], in compliance with law, for commissions; they having all been repeatedly distinguished for gallant and high soldierly conduct in battle. [As yet] none of these sergeants have received [appointments]". When it became generally known in the army that the Mexican Government had agreed to the proposed treaty of peace, and that the formal ratification would soon be consummated, I requested the senior engineer, Captain R. E. Lee, to direct me to sell the tools, etc., of the engineer train, in the city of Mexico: order me to proceed to the coast by the first opportunity, for the purpose of looking up, and accounting for, a large amount of engineer property for which the estate of the late Captain A. J. Swift was responsible; and authorize me to turn over the command of the engineer company to Lieutenant McClellan, when I started for the coast. In compliance with Captain Lee's instructions, the tools were sold. They brought more than they had originally cost in the United States. I left the city of Mexico the day the treaty of peace was signed on the part of the Mexicans; and accompanied General Persifor F. Smith to Vera Cruz, at which place he was charged with making all preparations for the transportation of the army to the United States. Before leaving the City of Mexico I turned over the command of the engineer company to Lieutenant McClellan. I was detained in Vera Cruz about two weeks, obtaining information in regard to, and making disposition of, the public property in that vicinity, for which Captain Swift's estate was then held responsible. The accounting officers of the government in Washington, had charged against him, on their books, the value of large amounts of property which had been shipped to, but never received by him. Several vessels, partly loaded with portions of that property, were shipwrecked by northers during the siege of Vera Cruz. In the time I spent at that place after the war ended, I obtained knowledge which enabled me to clear up all accounts against the estate of Captain Swift. The amount of that nominal indebtedness far exceeded the value of his property; which would have been unfairly sacrificed to the government, and have left his name unjustly tarnished as that of a defaulter, if conclusive evidence of the facts in the case had not been furnished to the accounting officers. The engineer company, under Lieutenant McClellan, accompanied by all the engineer officers from the City of Mexico, left that city on the 28th of May, 1848, and marched to Vera Cruz. From the latter place the company was transported by steamer to New York City; arrived at West Point, N. Y., on the 22nd of June; reported to the superintendent of the Military Academy, and was immediately ordered to report to Captain George W. Cullum, of the engineer corps, as its new commander. I remained about a week in Vera Cruz after the company sailed; arrived at West Point in July; and was ordered to report to Captain Cullum. A short time thereafter, I asked to be relieved from duty with the company; and applied for six months leave of absence. The leave was granted, and it was understood that, on its expiration, I would be ordered to other engineer service. Before the expiration of my leave, the war men of the company procured the passage of an act by Congress, authorizing their discharge from the service. Under that act nearly all the men of the company, who had served in Mexico, immediately obtained their discharge from the army. This virtually reduced the company to the detachment of recruits which had been collected and retained at West Point. At the expiration of my leave of absence I was formally relieved from further direct service with the engineer company; and at the request of the Chief Engineer, consented to undertake the enlistment of new recruits to fill the places in the company vacated by the war men, who had been discharged. That business was finished within a few months. I was then ordered on other engineer duty and, thus, my connection with the engineer company ended.CHAPTER VI.
IN THE CITY OF MEXICO—RETURN TO WEST POINT.