FOOTNOTES
[1] B. 37, M. 23.
[2] Similarly, we do not say—if we mean what we say—of a man who is colour blind that an object which others call blue is pink to him or to his perception, but that it looks pink to him.
[3] B. 44, 52, 53-4, 62-3, 69-70; M. 27, 31-2, 37-8, 41-2; Prol., § 13, Remark iii.
[4] This is Kant's way of putting the question which should be expressed by asking, 'Are things spatial, or do they only look spatial?'
[5] B. 43, M. 26. Cf. Prol., § 9 fin. with § 10 init.
[6] It should be noticed that 'things-in-themselves' and 'things as they are in themselves' have a different meaning.
[7] Cf. p. 55 and ff.
[8] Cf. p. 93 and ff.
[9] 'Things' is substituted for 'the reality which we believe to exist independently of perception' in order to conform to Kant's language. The substitution, of course, has the implication—which Kant took for granted—that the reality consists of a plurality of individuals.
[10] 'Things in themselves' has here to be substituted for 'things as they are in themselves' in the statement of the negative side of the position, in order to express the proper antithesis, which is now that between two things, the one known and the other unknown, and not that between two points of view from which one and the same thing is known and not known respectively.
[11] Erscheinung.
[12] Schein.
[13] We might add time also; but, for a reason which will appear later (p. 139), it can be neglected.
[14] I. e. the consciousness for which the problems are those of science as opposed to philosophy.
[15] 'Looks' means 'appears to sight', and 'looks' is throughout used as synonymous with 'appear', where the instance under discussion relates to visual perception.
[16] Cf. Dr. Stout, on 'Things and Sensations' (Proceedings of the British Academy, vol. ii).
[17] Cf., however, p. 87 and pp. 89-91.
[18] This is, of course, not refuted by the reminder that we see with two eyes, and that these are in different places.
[19] It is important to notice that the proper formula to express what is loosely called 'an appearance' is 'A looks or appears B', and that this cannot be analysed into anything more simple and, in particular, into a statement about 'appearances'. Even in the case of looking at the candle, there is no need to speak of two 'appearances' or 'images'. Before we discover the truth, the proper assertion is 'The body which we perceive looks as if it were two candles', and, after we discover the truth, the proper assertion is 'The candle looks as if it were in two places'.
[20] Cf. pp. 72-3, and 91.
[21] Not 'appearances'.
[22] Cf. p. 91 note.
[23] Cf. p. 82.
[24] It is assumed that there is not even plausibility in the supposition of continuity or identity between colour proper and its physical conditions in the way of light vibrations.
[25] I. e. in the sense of something which exists independently of perception.
[28] This consideration disposes of the view that, if colour is relative to perception, the primary qualities, as being inseparable from colour, must also be relative to perception; for it implies that the primary qualities cannot from their very nature be relative to perception. Moreover, if the possibility of the separation of the primary qualities from colour is still doubted, it is only necessary to appeal to the blind man's ability to apprehend the primary qualities, though he may not even know what the word 'colour' means. Of course, it must be admitted that some sensuous elements are involved in the apprehension of the primary qualities, but the case of the blind man shows that these may relate to sight instead of to touch. Moreover, it, of course, does not follow from the fact that sensuous elements are inseparable from our perception of bodies that they belong to, and are therefore inseparable from, the bodies perceived.
[29] Prol., § 13, Remark iii. (Cf. p. 100 note.) Cf. the confused note B. 70, M. 42. (See Dr. Vaihinger's Commentary on the Critique, ii, 488 ff.)
[30] The case of time can be ignored, since, as will be seen later (pp. 112-14), the contention that space is 'ideal' really involves the admission that time is real.
[31] Dieses Empirische.
[32] B. 62-3, M. 37-8. Erscheinung is here translated 'appearance'.
[33] It should be noticed that the passage is, in the main, expressed in terms of the distinction between 'things' and 'appearances', and not, as it should be, in terms of the distinction between what things are and what things appear or look.
[34] Hence Kant's protest (B. 45, M. 27), against illustrating the ideality of space by the 'inadequate' examples of colour, taste, &c., must be unavailing. For his contention is that, while the assertion that space is not a property of things means that it is not a property of things in themselves, the assertion that colour, for example, is not a property of a rose only means that it is not a property of a thing in itself in an empirical sense, i. e. of an appearance of a special kind.
[35] Cf. pp. 72-3.
[36] Cf. pp. 72-3.
[37] In the Prol., § 13, Remark iii, Kant carefully distinguishes judgement from perception, but destroys the effect of the distinction by regarding judgement as referring to what is relative to perception, viz. appearances.
NOTE ON THE FIRST ANTINOMY
Kant holds that the antinomy or contradiction which arises when we consider the character of the world as spatial and temporal, viz. that we are equally bound to hold that the world is infinite in space and time, and that it is finite in space and time, is due to regarding the world as a thing in itself. He holds that the contradiction disappears, as soon as it is recognized that the world is only a phenomenon, for then we find that we need only say that the world is capable of being extended infinitely in respect of time and space.[1] Objects in space and time are only phenomena, and, as such, are actual only in perception. When we say that a past event, or that a body which we do not perceive, is real, we merely assert the possibility of a 'perception'. "All events from time immemorial prior to my existence mean nothing else than the possibility of prolonging the chain of experience from the present perception upwards to the conditions which determine this perception according to time."[2] "That there may be inhabitants of the moon, although no one has ever seen them, must certainly be admitted, but this assertion only means that we could come upon them in the possible progress of experience."[3] The contradictions, therefore, can be avoided by substituting for the actual infinity of space and time, as relating to things in themselves, the possible infinity of a series of 'perceptions'.
This contention, if successful, is clearly important. If it could be shown that the treatment of the world as a thing in itself is the source of a contradiction, we should have what at least would seem a strong, if not conclusive, ground for holding that the world is a phenomenon, and, consequently, that the distinction between phenomena and things in themselves is valid.
Professor Cook Wilson has, however, pointed out that Kant's own doctrine does not avoid the difficulty. For, though, according to Kant, the infinity of actual representations of spaces and times is only possible, yet the possibilities of these representations will be themselves infinite, and, as such, will give rise to contradictions similar to those involved in the infinity of space and time. Moreover, as Professor Cook Wilson has also pointed out, there is no contradiction involved in the thought of the world as spatial and temporal; for, as we see when we reflect, we always presuppose that space and time are infinite, and we are only tempted to think that they must be finite, because, when maintaining that the world must be a whole, we are apt to make the false assumption, without in any way questioning it, that any whole must be finite.