FOOTNOTES
[1] Cf. B. 46-9, §§ 4, 5 and 6 (a), M. 28-30, §§ 5, 6 and 7 (a) with B. 38-42, § 2 (1-4), and § (3) to (a) inclusive, M. 23-6, §§ 2, 3, and 4 (a). The only qualification needed is that, since the parts of time cannot, like those of space, be said to exist simultaneously, B. § 4 (5), M. § 5, 5 is compelled to appeal to a different consideration from that adduced in the parallel passage on space (B. § 2 (4), M. § 2, 4). Since, however, B. § 4 (5), M. § 5, 5 introduces no new matter, but only appeals to the consideration already urged (B. § 4, 4, M. § 5, 4), this difference can be neglected. B. § 5, M. § 6 adds a remark about change which does not affect the main argument.
[2] B. 49 (b), M. 30 (b). See pp. 109-12.
[3] Locke, Essay, ii, 1, §§ 2-4.
[4] Cf. B. 67 fin., M. 41 init.
[5] It is here assumed that this is Kant's normal view of the phenomenal character of our knowledge. Cf. p. 75.
[6] B. 68 init., M. 41 init.
[7] The precise nature of the activity makes no difference to the argument.
[8] In B. 152 fin., M. 93 fin. Kant expresses his conclusion in the form that we know ourselves only as we appear to ourselves, and not as we are in ourselves (cf. p. 75). The above account, and the criticism which immediately follows, can be adapted, mutatis mutandis, to this form of the view.
[9] B. 49 (b), M. 30 (b).
[10] Cf. B. 49 (b) line 2, M. 30 (b) line 2
[11] Cf. pp. 38-40.
[12] B. 53, M. 32.
[13] B. 55, M. 33.
[14] Cf. p. 123.
[15] B. 55, M. 33 med.
[16] Cf. pp. 71-3.