FOOTNOTES
[1] Cf. pp. 235-6.
[2] Cf. p. 119.
[3] Though not apart from relation to the mind of some other kind.
[4] Cf. p. 116.
[5] Cf. pp. 89-91.
[6] This assertion, being self-evident, admits of no direct proof. A 'proof' can only take the form of showing that any supposed 'derivation' or 'explanation' of knowledge presupposes knowledge in that from which it derives it. Professor Cook Wilson has pointed out that we must understand what knowing is in order to explain anything at all, so that any proposed explanation of knowing would necessarily presuppose that we understood what knowing is. For the general doctrine, cf. p. 245.
[7] It is, of course, possible to say significantly that two elements, A and B, are related as universal and individual, or as surface and volume, if we are trying to explain what we mean by 'universal and individual' or 'surface and volume'; but in that case we are elucidating the relationship through the already known relation of A and B, and are not giving information about the hitherto unknown relation of A and B.
[8] Professor Cook Wilson has pointed out that the distinction between these two kinds of relation is marked in language in that, for instance, while we speak of the 'relation of universal and individual', we speak of 'the relation between one man and another', or of 'the relation of one man to another', using, however, the phrase 'the relation of doctor and patient', when we consider two men only as in that relation.
I owe to him recognition of the fact that the use of the word 'relation' in connexion with such terms as 'universal and individual' is really justified.
[9] Cf. p. 51, note 1.
[10] Cf. p. 30 and ff.
[11] Cf. p. 39.
[12] It can be shown in the same way, mutatis mutandis (cp. p. 111), that the view that time, though the form of inner perception, is a characteristic of a reality gains plausibility from Kant's implicit treatment of our states as appearances due to ourselves.
[13] B. 49-50 (b) and (c), M. 30 (b) and (c).
[14] Kant here refers to bodies by the term 'phenomena', but their character as phenomena is not relevant to his argument.
[15] It may be noted that Kant's assertion (B. 50, M. 31) that time is the immediate condition of internal phenomena, and thereby also mediately the condition of external phenomena, does not help to reconcile the two positions.